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authorDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>2011-03-09 14:28:20 -0500
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2011-07-18 12:29:41 -0400
commit6be5cc5246f807fd8ede9f5f1bb2826f2c598658 (patch)
tree00fc342eb91fb50df4e8eddfe2a7294b27df8117 /security/integrity/evm
parent66dbc325afcef909043c30e90930a36823fc734c (diff)
downloadop-kernel-dev-6be5cc5246f807fd8ede9f5f1bb2826f2c598658.zip
op-kernel-dev-6be5cc5246f807fd8ede9f5f1bb2826f2c598658.tar.gz
evm: add support for different security.evm data types
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes. This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for the type of method. Changelog v6: - move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h - defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - removed unnecessary memset Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c10
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index d49bb00..c631b99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -141,14 +141,17 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
- u8 hmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
int rc = 0;
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, hmac);
- if (rc == 0)
+ xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
- hmac, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+ &xattr_data,
+ sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
+ }
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index a8fa45f..c0580dd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -51,20 +51,20 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
- char hmac_val[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
int rc;
if (iint->hmac_status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)
return iint->hmac_status;
- memset(hmac_val, 0, sizeof hmac_val);
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, hmac_val);
+ xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
if (rc < 0)
return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
- rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, hmac_val, sizeof hmac_val,
- GFP_NOFS);
+ xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+ rc = vfs_xattr_cmp(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (u8 *)&xattr_data,
+ sizeof xattr_data, GFP_NOFS);
if (rc < 0)
goto err_out;
iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
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