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author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2013-04-14 13:47:02 -0700 |
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committer | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 2013-04-14 18:11:14 -0700 |
commit | 6708075f104c3c9b04b23336bb0366ca30c3931b (patch) | |
tree | 4e99cf865cea3d809bfadda9eec45dcf29454bee /scripts/config | |
parent | 6c4c4d4bdaff7ec0b7b26da67d741f639727c934 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-6708075f104c3c9b04b23336bb0366ca30c3931b.zip op-kernel-dev-6708075f104c3c9b04b23336bb0366ca30c3931b.tar.gz |
userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting the id_map
When we require privilege for setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map or
/proc/<pid>/gid_map no longer allow an unprivileged user to
open the file and pass it to a privileged program to write
to the file.
Instead when privilege is required require both the opener and the
writer to have the necessary capabilities.
I have tested this code and verified that setting /proc/<pid>/uid_map
fails when an unprivileged user opens the file and a privielged user
attempts to set the mapping, that unprivileged users can still map
their own id, and that a privileged users can still setup an arbitrary
mapping.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/config')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions