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author | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2007-10-09 13:30:57 -0700 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net> | 2007-10-10 16:55:02 -0700 |
commit | 68325d3b12ad5bce650c2883bb878257f197efff (patch) | |
tree | c6d15e03e017599b07742d0a8453e4ee8ee253e3 /net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | |
parent | 658b219e9379d75fbdc578b9630b598098471258 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-68325d3b12ad5bce650c2883bb878257f197efff.zip op-kernel-dev-68325d3b12ad5bce650c2883bb878257f197efff.tar.gz |
[XFRM] user: Move attribute copying code into copy_to_user_state_extra
Here's a good example of code duplication leading to code rot. The
notification patch did its own netlink message creation for xfrm states.
It duplicated code that was already in dump_one_state. Guess what, the
next time (and the time after) when someone updated dump_one_state the
notification path got zilch.
This patch moves that code from dump_one_state to copy_to_user_state_extra
and uses it in xfrm_notify_sa too. Unfortunately whoever updates this
still needs to update xfrm_sa_len since the notification path wants to
know the exact size for allocation.
At least I've added a comment saying so and if someone still forgest, we'll
have a WARN_ON telling us so.
I also changed the security size calculation to use xfrm_user_sec_ctx since
that's what we actually put into the skb. However it makes no practical
difference since it has the same size as xfrm_sec_ctx.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 76 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 52c7fce..2cbbe5e 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -483,9 +483,9 @@ struct xfrm_dump_info { static int copy_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *s, struct sk_buff *skb) { - int ctx_size = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) + s->ctx_len; struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx; struct nlattr *attr; + int ctx_size = sizeof(*uctx) + s->ctx_len; attr = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_SEC_CTX, ctx_size); if (attr == NULL) @@ -502,23 +502,11 @@ static int copy_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *s, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -static int dump_one_state(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr) +/* Don't change this without updating xfrm_sa_len! */ +static int copy_to_user_state_extra(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, + struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct xfrm_dump_info *sp = ptr; - struct sk_buff *in_skb = sp->in_skb; - struct sk_buff *skb = sp->out_skb; - struct xfrm_usersa_info *p; - struct nlmsghdr *nlh; - - if (sp->this_idx < sp->start_idx) - goto out; - - nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, sp->nlmsg_seq, - XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, sizeof(*p), sp->nlmsg_flags); - if (nlh == NULL) - return -EMSGSIZE; - - p = nlmsg_data(nlh); copy_to_user_state(x, p); if (x->aalg) @@ -540,6 +528,35 @@ static int dump_one_state(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr) if (x->lastused) NLA_PUT_U64(skb, XFRMA_LASTUSED, x->lastused); + return 0; + +nla_put_failure: + return -EMSGSIZE; +} + +static int dump_one_state(struct xfrm_state *x, int count, void *ptr) +{ + struct xfrm_dump_info *sp = ptr; + struct sk_buff *in_skb = sp->in_skb; + struct sk_buff *skb = sp->out_skb; + struct xfrm_usersa_info *p; + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + int err; + + if (sp->this_idx < sp->start_idx) + goto out; + + nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, sp->nlmsg_seq, + XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, sizeof(*p), sp->nlmsg_flags); + if (nlh == NULL) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + p = nlmsg_data(nlh); + + err = copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb); + if (err) + goto nla_put_failure; + nlmsg_end(skb, nlh); out: sp->this_idx++; @@ -547,7 +564,7 @@ out: nla_put_failure: nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh); - return -EMSGSIZE; + return err; } static int xfrm_dump_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) @@ -1973,6 +1990,14 @@ static inline size_t xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x) l += nla_total_size(sizeof(*x->calg)); if (x->encap) l += nla_total_size(sizeof(*x->encap)); + if (x->security) + l += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + + x->security->ctx_len); + if (x->coaddr) + l += nla_total_size(sizeof(*x->coaddr)); + + /* Must count this as this may become non-zero behind our back. */ + l += nla_total_size(sizeof(x->lastused)); return l; } @@ -2018,23 +2043,16 @@ static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, struct km_event *c) p = nla_data(attr); } - copy_to_user_state(x, p); - - if (x->aalg) - NLA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH, alg_len(x->aalg), x->aalg); - if (x->ealg) - NLA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT, alg_len(x->ealg), x->ealg); - if (x->calg) - NLA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ALG_COMP, sizeof(*(x->calg)), x->calg); - - if (x->encap) - NLA_PUT(skb, XFRMA_ENCAP, sizeof(*x->encap), x->encap); + if (copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb)) + goto nla_put_failure; nlmsg_end(skb, nlh); return nlmsg_multicast(xfrm_nl, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA, GFP_ATOMIC); nla_put_failure: + /* Somebody screwed up with xfrm_sa_len! */ + WARN_ON(1); kfree_skb(skb); return -1; } |