sunrpc: trim off trailing checksum before returning decrypted or integrity authenticated buffer

When GSSAPI integrity signatures are in use, or when we're using GSSAPI
privacy with the v2 token format, there is a trailing checksum on the
xdr_buf that is returned.

It's checked during the authentication stage, and afterward nothing
cares about it. Ordinarily, it's not a problem since the XDR code
generally ignores it, but it will be when we try to compute a checksum
over the buffer to help prevent XID collisions in the duplicate reply
cache.

Fix the code to trim off the checksums after verifying them. Note that
in unwrap_integ_data, we must avoid trying to reverify the checksum if
the request was deferred since it will no longer be present when it's
revisited.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

2 files changed, 10 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
index 107c452..88edec9 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -574,6 +574,8 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
 	buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
 	buf->len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
 
+	/* Trim off the checksum blob */
+	xdr_buf_trim(buf, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip);
 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index 73e9573..a5b41e2 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -817,13 +817,17 @@ read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj)
  *	The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the
  *	client uses separate pointer. */
 static int
-unwrap_integ_data(struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
+unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	int stat = -EINVAL;
 	u32 integ_len, maj_stat;
 	struct xdr_netobj mic;
 	struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
 
+	/* Did we already verify the signature on the original pass through? */
+	if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
+		return 0;
+
 	integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
 	if (integ_len & 3)
 		return stat;
@@ -846,6 +850,8 @@ unwrap_integ_data(struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
 		goto out;
 	if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
 		goto out;
+	/* trim off the mic at the end before returning */
+	xdr_buf_trim(buf, mic.len + 4);
 	stat = 0;
 out:
 	kfree(mic.data);
@@ -1190,7 +1196,7 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
 			/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
 			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
 			svc_putnl(resv, 0);
-			if (unwrap_integ_data(&rqstp->rq_arg,
+			if (unwrap_integ_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
 					gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
 				goto garbage_args;
 			break;