Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Verify lengths of keys provided by the user is AF_KEY, from Kevin
    Easton.

 2) Add device ID for BCM89610 PHY. Thanks to Bhadram Varka.

 3) Add Spectre guards to some ATM code, courtesy of Gustavo A. R.
    Silva.

 4) Fix infinite loop in NSH protocol code. To Eric Dumazet we are most
    grateful for this fix.

 5) Line up /proc/net/netlink headers properly. This fix from YU Bo, we
    do appreciate.

 6) Use after free in TLS code. Once again we are blessed by the
    honorable Eric Dumazet with this fix.

 7) Fix regression in TLS code causing stalls on partial TLS records.
    This fix is bestowed upon us by Andrew Tomt.

 8) Deal with too small MTUs properly in LLC code, another great gift
    from Eric Dumazet.

 9) Handle cached route flushing properly wrt. MTU locking in ipv4, to
    Hangbin Liu we give thanks for this.

10) Fix regression in SO_BINDTODEVIC handling wrt. UDP socket demux.
    Paolo Abeni, he gave us this.

11) Range check coalescing parameters in mlx4 driver, thank you Moshe
    Shemesh.

12) Some ipv6 ICMP error handling fixes in rxrpc, from our good brother
    David Howells.

13) Fix kexec on mlx5 by freeing IRQs in shutdown path. Daniel Juergens,
    you're the best!

14) Don't send bonding RLB updates to invalid MAC addresses. Debabrata
    Benerjee saved us!

15) Uh oh, we were leaking in udp_sendmsg and ping_v4_sendmsg. The ship
    is now water tight, thanks to Andrey Ignatov.

16) IPSEC memory leak in ixgbe from Colin Ian King, man we've got holes
    everywhere!

17) Fix error path in tcf_proto_create, Jiri Pirko what would we do
    without you!

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (92 commits)
  net sched actions: fix refcnt leak in skbmod
  net: sched: fix error path in tcf_proto_create() when modules are not configured
  net sched actions: fix invalid pointer dereferencing if skbedit flags missing
  ixgbe: fix memory leak on ipsec allocation
  ixgbevf: fix ixgbevf_xmit_frame()'s return type
  ixgbe: return error on unsupported SFP module when resetting
  ice: Set rq_last_status when cleaning rq
  ipv4: fix memory leaks in udp_sendmsg, ping_v4_sendmsg
  mlxsw: core: Fix an error handling path in 'mlxsw_core_bus_device_register()'
  bonding: send learning packets for vlans on slave
  bonding: do not allow rlb updates to invalid mac
  net/mlx5e: Err if asked to offload TC match on frag being first
  net/mlx5: E-Switch, Include VF RDMA stats in vport statistics
  net/mlx5: Free IRQs in shutdown path
  rxrpc: Trace UDP transmission failure
  rxrpc: Add a tracepoint to log ICMP/ICMP6 and error messages
  rxrpc: Fix the min security level for kernel calls
  rxrpc: Fix error reception on AF_INET6 sockets
  rxrpc: Fix missing start of call timeout
  qed: fix spelling mistake: "taskelt" -> "tasklet"
  ...

4 files changed, 76 insertions, 43 deletions

diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index 837806d..a47179d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -1024,8 +1024,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
 	struct sctp_inq *inqueue;
-	int state;
+	int first_time = 1;	/* is this the first time through the loop */
 	int error = 0;
+	int state;
 
 	/* The association should be held so we should be safe. */
 	ep = asoc->ep;
@@ -1036,6 +1037,30 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
 		state = asoc->state;
 		subtype = SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type);
 
+		/* If the first chunk in the packet is AUTH, do special
+		 * processing specified in Section 6.3 of SCTP-AUTH spec
+		 */
+		if (first_time && subtype.chunk == SCTP_CID_AUTH) {
+			struct sctp_chunkhdr *next_hdr;
+
+			next_hdr = sctp_inq_peek(inqueue);
+			if (!next_hdr)
+				goto normal;
+
+			/* If the next chunk is COOKIE-ECHO, skip the AUTH
+			 * chunk while saving a pointer to it so we can do
+			 * Authentication later (during cookie-echo
+			 * processing).
+			 */
+			if (next_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
+				chunk->auth_chunk = skb_clone(chunk->skb,
+							      GFP_ATOMIC);
+				chunk->auth = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+normal:
 		/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
 		 *    The receiver has a list of chunk types which it expects
 		 *    to be received only after an AUTH-chunk.  This list has
@@ -1074,6 +1099,9 @@ static void sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(struct work_struct *work)
 		/* If there is an error on chunk, discard this packet. */
 		if (error && chunk)
 			chunk->pdiscard = 1;
+
+		if (first_time)
+			first_time = 0;
 	}
 	sctp_association_put(asoc);
 }
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 5a4fb1d..e62addb 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_max_retrans(
 					const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 					const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
 {
-	static const char error[] = "Association exceeded its max_retans count";
+	static const char error[] = "Association exceeded its max_retrans count";
 	size_t payload_len = sizeof(error) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr);
 	struct sctp_chunk *retval;
 
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 28c070e..c9ae340 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -153,10 +153,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation_chunk(
 					struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands);
 
 static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
-					struct net *net,
-					const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 					const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-					const union sctp_subtype type,
 					struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
 
 static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(
@@ -626,6 +623,38 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net,
 	return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
 }
 
+static bool sctp_auth_chunk_verify(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+				   const struct sctp_association *asoc)
+{
+	struct sctp_chunk auth;
+
+	if (!chunk->auth_chunk)
+		return true;
+
+	/* SCTP-AUTH:  auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
+	 * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
+	 * authentication.  We've just recreated the association using
+	 * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
+	 * do the authentication.
+	 */
+
+	/* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
+	if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !asoc->peer.auth_capable)
+		return false;
+
+	/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
+	auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
+	auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
+	auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
+	auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
+				skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
+					 sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+	skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+	auth.transport = chunk->transport;
+
+	return sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, &auth) == SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+}
+
 /*
  * Respond to a normal COOKIE ECHO chunk.
  * We are the side that is being asked for an association.
@@ -763,37 +792,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
 	if (error)
 		goto nomem_init;
 
-	/* SCTP-AUTH:  auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
-	 * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
-	 * authentication.  We've just recreated the association using
-	 * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
-	 * do the authentication.
-	 */
-	if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
-		struct sctp_chunk auth;
-		enum sctp_ierror ret;
-
-		/* Make sure that we and the peer are AUTH capable */
-		if (!net->sctp.auth_enable || !new_asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
-			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
-			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-		}
-
-		/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
-		auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
-		auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
-		auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
-		auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)
-					skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
-						 sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
-		skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
-		auth.transport = chunk->transport;
-
-		ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
-		if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
-			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
-			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-		}
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc)) {
+		sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 	}
 
 	repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
@@ -1797,13 +1798,15 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(
 	if (sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC))
 		goto nomem;
 
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
+		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
 	/* Make sure no new addresses are being added during the
 	 * restart.  Though this is a pretty complicated attack
 	 * since you'd have to get inside the cookie.
 	 */
-	if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands)) {
+	if (!sctp_sf_check_restart_addrs(new_asoc, asoc, chunk, commands))
 		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
-	}
 
 	/* If the endpoint is in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state and recognizes
 	 * the peer has restarted (Action A), it MUST NOT setup a new
@@ -1912,6 +1915,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(
 	if (sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC))
 		goto nomem;
 
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, new_asoc))
+		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
 	/* Update the content of current association.  */
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
 	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
@@ -2009,6 +2015,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_d(
 	 * a COOKIE ACK.
 	 */
 
+	if (!sctp_auth_chunk_verify(net, chunk, asoc))
+		return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
+
 	/* Don't accidentally move back into established state. */
 	if (asoc->state < SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
@@ -4171,10 +4180,7 @@ gen_shutdown:
  * The return value is the disposition of the chunk.
  */
 static enum sctp_ierror sctp_sf_authenticate(
-					struct net *net,
-					const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 					const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-					const union sctp_subtype type,
 					struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
 {
 	struct sctp_shared_key *sh_key = NULL;
@@ -4275,7 +4281,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_eat_auth(struct net *net,
 						  commands);
 
 	auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
-	error = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, asoc, type, chunk);
+	error = sctp_sf_authenticate(asoc, chunk);
 	switch (error) {
 	case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC:
 		/* Generate the ERROR chunk and discard the rest
diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
index 84207ad..8cb7d98 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c
@@ -715,7 +715,6 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	return event;
 
 fail_mark:
-	sctp_chunk_put(chunk);
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 fail:
 	return NULL;