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author | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> | 2015-07-14 17:51:08 +0200 |
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committer | Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | 2015-07-15 18:18:06 +0200 |
commit | 7814b6ec6d0d63444abdb49554166c8cfcbd063e (patch) | |
tree | c60aedd08c8c49b9a43e00c6cce865a96cdd43b7 /net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | |
parent | e7c8899f3e6f2830136cf6e115c4a55ce7a3920a (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-7814b6ec6d0d63444abdb49554166c8cfcbd063e.zip op-kernel-dev-7814b6ec6d0d63444abdb49554166c8cfcbd063e.tar.gz |
netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset
In most cases there is no reentrancy into ip/ip6tables.
For skbs sent by REJECT or SYNPROXY targets, there is one level
of reentrancy, but its not relevant as those targets issue an absolute
verdict, i.e. the jumpstack can be clobbered since its not used
after the target issues absolute verdict (ACCEPT, DROP, STOLEN, etc).
So the only special case where it is relevant is the TEE target, which
returns XT_CONTINUE.
This patch changes ip(6)_do_table to always use the jump stack starting
from 0.
When we detect we're operating on an skb sent via TEE (percpu
nf_skb_duplicated is 1) we switch to an alternate stack to leave
the original one alone.
Since there is no TEE support for arptables, it doesn't need to
test if tee is active.
The jump stack overflow tests are no longer needed as well --
since ->stacksize is the largest call depth we cannot exceed it.
A much better alternative to the external jumpstack would be to just
declare a jumps[32] stack on the local stack frame, but that would mean
we'd have to reject iptables rulesets that used to work before.
Another alternative would be to start rejecting rulesets with a larger
call depth, e.g. 1000 -- in this case it would be feasible to allocate the
entire stack in the percpu area which would avoid one dereference.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions