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author | Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> | 2013-02-23 01:13:47 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-02-23 13:51:54 -0500 |
commit | 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 (patch) | |
tree | fb4a77a604c2cd35d53ec2600b9bf612a47407ef /net/core | |
parent | c9b20a5effcb29acf0f8a2a31c875073b2a0c74e (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0.zip op-kernel-dev-6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0.tar.gz |
sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c index 602cd63..750f44f 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_diag.c +++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req)) return -EINVAL; + if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family); if (hndl == NULL) err = -ENOENT; |