Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next

Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov.

 2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J
    Benniston.

 3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn
    Mork.

 4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez.

 5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel
    Borkmann.

 6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee.

 7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software
    TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers.  From Ezequiel Garcia.

 8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy.

 9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli.

10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large
    numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu.

11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses,
    from Lorenzo Colitti.

12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal
    Cardwell.

13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman.

14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru.

15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich.

16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it
    performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits)
  rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0
  tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery
  net: fec: Add software TSO support
  net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support
  net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number
  net: fec: Factorize feature setting
  net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum
  net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function
  bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support
  bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference
  via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable
  bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs
  bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch
  bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link
  bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane
  sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
  net/core: Add VF link state control policy
  net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO
  net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful
  net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving
  ...

1 files changed, 81 insertions, 79 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index dfb4e11..3d1cc16 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -35,6 +35,33 @@
 
 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK   0x07
 
+#define SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID	1
+#define SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING	2
+#define SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH	3
+#define SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE	4
+#define SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR	5
+
+struct smp_chan {
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+	u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
+	u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
+	u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
+	u8		rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
+	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
+	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+	u8		enc_key_size;
+	u8		remote_key_dist;
+	bdaddr_t	id_addr;
+	u8		id_addr_type;
+	u8		irk[16];
+	struct smp_csrk	*csrk;
+	struct smp_csrk	*slave_csrk;
+	struct smp_ltk	*ltk;
+	struct smp_ltk	*slave_ltk;
+	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
+	unsigned long	flags;
+};
+
 static inline void swap128(const u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
 {
 	int i;
@@ -369,7 +396,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 
 	/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
 	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
-	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 
 	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
 
@@ -388,19 +415,18 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 		method = JUST_WORKS;
 
 	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
-	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
-					   &smp->smp_flags))
+	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
 		method = JUST_WORKS;
 
 	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
 	if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
 	if (method != JUST_CFM)
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->smp_flags);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
 
 	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
 	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
@@ -419,7 +445,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 		passkey %= 1000000;
 		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
 		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 	}
 
 	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
@@ -441,15 +467,13 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
+static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 	int ret;
-	u8 reason;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -463,35 +487,27 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
-	if (ret) {
-		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
 
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
-	return;
-
-error:
-	smp_failure(conn, reason);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
+static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, random);
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes;
-	u8 reason, confirm[16];
+	u8 confirm[16];
 	int ret;
 
-	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm)) {
-		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
@@ -504,15 +520,12 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
-	if (ret) {
-		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-		goto error;
-	}
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
-		reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
-		goto error;
+		return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
 	}
 
 	if (hcon->out) {
@@ -525,10 +538,8 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
 		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
 
-		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) {
-			reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-			goto error;
-		}
+		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
 		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
@@ -550,10 +561,7 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 			    ediv, rand);
 	}
 
-	return;
-
-error:
-	smp_failure(conn, reason);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
@@ -564,9 +572,6 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	if (!smp)
 		return NULL;
 
-	INIT_WORK(&smp->confirm, confirm_work);
-	INIT_WORK(&smp->random, random_work);
-
 	smp->conn = conn;
 	conn->smp_chan = smp;
 	conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
@@ -583,7 +588,7 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	BUG_ON(!smp);
 
-	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags);
+	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
 	mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
 
 	kfree(smp->csrk);
@@ -634,7 +639,7 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 		put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
 		/* Fall Through */
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 		break;
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
@@ -646,8 +651,11 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 	}
 
 	/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
-	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
-		queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+		u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
+		if (rsp)
+			smp_failure(conn, rsp);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -656,14 +664,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
-	u8 key_size;
-	u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	u8 key_size, auth;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
@@ -681,8 +688,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
-	if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
-		auth = req->auth_req;
+	auth = req->auth_req;
 
 	conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
 
@@ -704,7 +710,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->smp_flags);
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -713,14 +719,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
@@ -753,11 +758,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
 
 	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
-	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
-		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_confirm(smp);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -765,12 +770,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
@@ -778,10 +782,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (conn->hcon->out)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
-	else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
-		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+	else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_confirm(smp);
 	else
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -789,19 +793,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
 
-	queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->random);
-
-	return 0;
+	return smp_random(smp);
 }
 
 static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
@@ -836,7 +837,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
@@ -861,7 +862,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
-	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->smp_flags);
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -908,10 +909,11 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
-	/* hcon->auth_type is set by pair_device in mgmt.c. If the MITM
-	 * flag is set we should also set it for the SMP request.
+	/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
+	 * requires it.
 	 */
-	if ((hcon->auth_type & 0x01))
+	if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
+	    sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
 
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
@@ -928,7 +930,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
 
-	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->smp_flags);
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 
 done:
 	hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
@@ -944,7 +946,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
@@ -969,7 +971,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
@@ -1001,7 +1003,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	BT_DBG("");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
@@ -1025,7 +1027,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	BT_DBG("");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
@@ -1075,7 +1077,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
 	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN))
@@ -1358,7 +1360,7 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
-	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags);
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
 	smp_notify_keys(conn);
 
 	smp_chan_destroy(conn);