Merge tag 'master-2014-12-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linville/wireless-next

John W. Linville says:

====================
pull request: wireless-next 2014-12-08

Please pull this last batch of pending wireless updates for the 3.19 tree...

For the wireless bits, Johannes says:

"This time I have Felix's no-status rate control work, which will allow
drivers to work better with rate control even if they don't have perfect
status reporting. In addition to this, a small hwsim fix from Patrik,
one of the regulatory patches from Arik, and a number of cleanups and
fixes I did myself.

Of note is a patch where I disable CFG80211_WEXT so that compatibility
is no longer selectable - this is intended as a wake-up call for anyone
who's still using it, and is still easily worked around (it's a one-line
patch) before we fully remove the code as well in the future."

For the Bluetooth bits, Johan says:

"Here's one more bluetooth-next pull request for 3.19:

 - Minor cleanups for ieee802154 & mac802154
 - Fix for the kernel warning with !TASK_RUNNING reported by Kirill A.
   Shutemov
 - Support for another ath3k device
 - Fix for tracking link key based security level
 - Device tree bindings for btmrvl + a state update fix
 - Fix for wrong ACL flags on LE links"

And...

"In addition to the previous one this contains two more cleanups to
mac802154 as well as support for some new HCI features from the
Bluetooth 4.2 specification.

From the original request:

'Here's what should be the last bluetooth-next pull request for 3.19.
It's rather large but the majority of it is the Low Energy Secure
Connections feature that's part of the Bluetooth 4.2 specification. The
specification went public only this week so we couldn't publish the
corresponding code before that. The code itself can nevertheless be
considered fairly mature as it's been in development for over 6 months
and gone through several interoperability test events.

Besides LE SC the pull request contains an important fix for command
complete events for mgmt sockets which also fixes some leaks of hci_conn
objects when powering off or unplugging Bluetooth adapters.

A smaller feature that's part of the pull request is service discovery
support. This is like normal device discovery except that devices not
matching specific UUIDs or strong enough RSSI are filtered out.

Other changes that the pull request contains are firmware dump support
to the btmrvl driver, firmware download support for Broadcom BCM20702A0
variants, as well as some coding style cleanups in 6lowpan &
ieee802154/mac802154 code.'"

For the NFC bits, Samuel says:

"With this one we get:

- NFC digital improvements for DEP support: Chaining, NACK and ATN
  support added.

- NCI improvements: Support for p2p target, SE IO operand addition,
  SE operands extensions to support proprietary implementations, and
  a few fixes.

- NFC HCI improvements: OPEN_PIPE and NOTIFY_ALL_CLEARED support,
  and SE IO operand addition.

- A bunch of minor improvements and fixes for STMicro st21nfcb and
  st21nfca"

For the iwlwifi bits, Emmanuel says:

"Major works are CSA and TDLS. On top of that I have a new
firmware API for scan and a few rate control improvements.
Johannes find a few tricks to improve our CPU utilization
and adds support for a new spin of 7265 called 7265D.
Along with this a few random things that don't stand out."

And...

"I deprecate here -8.ucode since -9 has been published long ago.
Along with that I have a new activity, we have now better
a infrastructure for firmware debugging. This will allow to
have configurable probes insides the firmware.
Luca continues his work on NetDetect, this feature is now
complete. All the rest is minor fixes here and there."

For the Atheros bits, Kalle says:

"Only ath10k changes this time and no major changes. Most visible are:

o new debugfs interface for runtime firmware debugging (Yanbo)

o fix shared WEP (Sujith)

o don't rebuild whenever kernel version changes (Johannes)

o lots of refactoring to make it easier to add new hw support (Michal)

There's also smaller fixes and improvements with no point of listing
here."

In addition, there are a few last minute updates to ath5k,
ath9k, brcmfmac, brcmsmac, mwifiex, rt2x00, rtlwifi, and wil6210.
Also included is a pull of the wireless tree to pick-up the fixes
originally included in "pull request: wireless 2014-12-03"...

Please let me know if there are problems!
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 1412 insertions, 131 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 069b76e..96bf16d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -29,14 +29,34 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
 
+#include "ecc.h"
 #include "smp.h"
 
+/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
+ * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
+ * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+				 ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+				    ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
 
+/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
+#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
+
 #define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
 
-#define AUTH_REQ_MASK   0x07
-#define KEY_DIST_MASK	0x07
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \
+				 0x1f : 0x07)
+#define KEY_DIST_MASK		0x07
+
+/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
+#define CMAC_MSG_MAX	80
 
 enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
@@ -44,6 +64,12 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
 	SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
 	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+	SMP_FLAG_SC,
+	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
+	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
+	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
+	SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
+	SMP_FLAG_OOB,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -57,6 +83,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	u8		rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
 	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+	u8		rr[16];
 	u8		enc_key_size;
 	u8		remote_key_dist;
 	bdaddr_t	id_addr;
@@ -67,9 +94,43 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	struct smp_ltk	*ltk;
 	struct smp_ltk	*slave_ltk;
 	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
+	u8		*link_key;
 	unsigned long	flags;
+	u8		method;
+	u8		passkey_round;
+
+	/* Secure Connections variables */
+	u8			local_pk[64];
+	u8			local_sk[32];
+	u8			remote_pk[64];
+	u8			dhkey[32];
+	u8			mackey[16];
 
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
+	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
+};
+
+/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
+ * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
+ * private debug key.
+ */
+static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
+		0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+		0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+		0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+		0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
+
+		0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
+		0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
+		0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
+		0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
+};
+
+static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
+		0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
+		0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
+		0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
+		0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
 };
 
 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
@@ -80,14 +141,22 @@ static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
 		dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
 }
 
-static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
+ * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
+ */
+
+static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
+		    size_t len, u8 mac[16])
 {
-	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
+	struct hash_desc desc;
 	struct scatterlist sg;
-	uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
 	int err;
 
-	if (tfm == NULL) {
+	if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
+		return -EFBIG;
+
+	if (!tfm) {
 		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -95,105 +164,233 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	desc.tfm = tfm;
 	desc.flags = 0;
 
-	/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
+	crypto_hash_init(&desc);
+
+	/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
 	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+	swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
 
-	err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+	SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
+	SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
+
+	err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
-	swap_buf(r, data, 16);
+	sg_init_one(&sg, msg_msb, len);
 
-	sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
+	err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Hash update error %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
 
-	err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+	err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, mac_msb);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Hash final error %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
+
+	SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+		  const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 m[65];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
+
+	m[0] = z;
+	memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
+	memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
 	if (err)
-		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+		return err;
 
-	/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
-	swap_buf(data, r, 16);
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
+		  u8 a1[7], u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
 {
-	u8 _res[16];
+	/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
+	 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
+	 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
+	 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
+	 * endian format.
+	 */
+	const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
+	const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
+			      0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
+	const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+	u8 m[53], t[16];
 	int err;
 
-	/* r' = padding || r */
-	memcpy(_res, r, 3);
-	memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
+	SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
+	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
 
-	err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
-	if (err) {
-		BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
+	if (err)
 		return err;
-	}
 
-	/* The output of the random address function ah is:
-	 *	ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
-	 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
-	 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
-	 * result of ah.
-	 */
-	memcpy(res, _res, 3);
+	SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
+
+	memcpy(m, length, 2);
+	memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
+
+	m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
+
+	m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
+		  const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
+		  u8 res[16])
 {
-	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
-	u8 hash[3];
+	u8 m[65];
 	int err;
 
-	if (!chan || !chan->data)
-		return false;
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
+	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
 
-	tfm = chan->data;
+	memcpy(m, a2, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
+	memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
 
-	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+		  const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
+{
+	u8 m[80], tmp[16];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
+
+	memcpy(m, y, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
+	memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
 	if (err)
-		return false;
+		return err;
 
-	return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+	*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
+	*val %= 1000000;
+
+	SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
 {
-	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
 	int err;
 
-	if (!chan || !chan->data)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
 
-	tfm = chan->data;
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 
-	rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f;	/* Clear two most significant bits */
-	rpa->b[5] |= 0x40;	/* Set second most significant bit */
+	return err;
+}
 
-	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
-	if (err < 0)
+/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
+ * s1 and ah.
+ */
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
+	int err;
+
+	if (!tfm) {
+		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc.tfm = tfm;
+	desc.flags = 0;
+
+	/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
+	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+
+	err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
 		return err;
+	}
 
-	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
+	/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
+	swap_buf(r, data, 16);
 
-	return 0;
+	sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16);
+
+	err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+
+	/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
+	swap_buf(data, r, 16);
+
+	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
-		  u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat,
-		  bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
+		  const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
 {
 	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
 	int err;
@@ -232,8 +429,8 @@ static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
-		  u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
 {
 	int err;
 
@@ -248,6 +445,80 @@ static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
+		  const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+{
+	u8 _res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	/* r' = padding || r */
+	memcpy(_res, r, 3);
+	memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
+
+	err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* The output of the random address function ah is:
+	 *	ah(h, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
+	 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
+	 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
+	 * result of ah.
+	 */
+	memcpy(res, _res, 3);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+		     const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	u8 hash[3];
+	int err;
+
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return false;
+
+	tfm = chan->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
+
+	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+	if (err)
+		return false;
+
+	return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+}
+
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	tfm = chan->data;
+
+	get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+
+	rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f;	/* Clear two most significant bits */
+	rpa->b[5] |= 0x40;	/* Set second most significant bit */
+
+	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -282,17 +553,22 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 	schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
 }
 
-static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
 {
-	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
-		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
-	else
+	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
+		if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+			return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+		else
+			return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	} else {
 		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	}
 }
 
 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
 {
 	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
 	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
 		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
@@ -310,7 +586,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
-	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 
 	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
 		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
@@ -326,24 +602,52 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
 		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	    (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
+		struct oob_data *oob_data;
+		u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+		if (test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+			local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+			remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+		}
+
+		if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+		else
+			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+
+		oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						    bdaddr_type);
+		if (oob_data) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
+			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
+			memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
+			memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+		}
+
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
+	}
+
 	if (rsp == NULL) {
 		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
-		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+		req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
 		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 		req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
 		req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
-		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
 
 		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
 		return;
 	}
 
 	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
-	rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+	rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
 	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
 	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
-	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
 
 	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
 }
@@ -366,6 +670,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	bool complete;
 
 	BUG_ON(!smp);
@@ -373,12 +678,24 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
 
 	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
-	mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
+	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
 
 	kfree(smp->csrk);
 	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+	kfree(smp->link_key);
 
 	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+	crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+
+	/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
+	 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
+	 */
+	if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+		kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+		smp->ltk = NULL;
+	}
 
 	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
 	if (!complete) {
@@ -400,7 +717,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	chan->data = NULL;
 	kfree(smp);
-	hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
+	hci_conn_drop(hcon);
 }
 
 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
@@ -424,6 +741,7 @@ static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
 #define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
 #define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
 #define REQ_OOB		0x04
+#define DSP_PASSKEY	0x05
 #define OVERLAP		0xFF
 
 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
@@ -434,6 +752,14 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
 	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
 };
 
+static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+	{ DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
+	{ DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+};
+
 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 {
 	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
@@ -443,6 +769,9 @@ static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
 		return JUST_CFM;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
 	return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
 }
 
@@ -452,7 +781,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
-	u8 method;
 	u32 passkey = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -469,26 +797,28 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	 * table.
 	 */
 	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
-		method = JUST_CFM;
+		smp->method = JUST_CFM;
 	else
-		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+		smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
 
 	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
-	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
-		method = JUST_WORKS;
+	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+						&smp->flags))
+		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
 
 	/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
-	if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
-		method = JUST_WORKS;
+	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
+	    hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
 
 	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
-	if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
-	if (method != JUST_CFM) {
+	if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
 		if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
 			hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
@@ -497,15 +827,15 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
 	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
 	 */
-	if (method == OVERLAP) {
+	if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
 		if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
-			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+			smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
 		else
-			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+			smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
 	}
 
 	/* Generate random passkey. */
-	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+	if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
 		memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
 		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
 		passkey %= 1000000;
@@ -514,10 +844,10 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 	}
 
-	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
 		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
-	else if (method == JUST_CFM)
+	else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
 		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 						passkey, 1);
@@ -638,11 +968,13 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
 		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
 		 * identity address track the connection based on it
-		 * from now on.
+		 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
 		 */
-		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
-		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
-		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
+			bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+			hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+			queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+		}
 
 		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
 		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
@@ -661,10 +993,20 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
-	 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
-	 */
-	persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+			persistent = false;
+		else
+			persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
+					       &hcon->flags);
+	} else {
+		/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
+		 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
+		 */
+		persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
+				SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+	}
+
 
 	if (smp->csrk) {
 		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
@@ -689,6 +1031,81 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
 		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
 	}
+
+	if (smp->link_key) {
+		struct link_key *key;
+		u8 type;
+
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+			type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
+		else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+			type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+		else
+			type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+
+		key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
+				       smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
+		if (key) {
+			mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
+
+			/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
+			 * flag is not set.
+			 */
+			if (!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+			    key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
+				list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+				kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	u8 key_type, auth;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+	else
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+
+	if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+		auth = 1;
+	else
+		auth = 0;
+
+	memset(smp->tk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+	       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			       key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			       0, 0);
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
+	 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
+	 */
+	const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+	const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+
+	smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!smp->link_key)
+		return;
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
+		kfree(smp->link_key);
+		smp->link_key = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
+		kfree(smp->link_key);
+		smp->link_key = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
 }
 
 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
@@ -705,6 +1122,35 @@ static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
 }
 
+static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
+	 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
+	 */
+	const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+	const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct link_key *key;
+
+	key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
+	if (!key) {
+		BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
+		return;
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
+		return;
+
+	sc_add_ltk(smp);
+}
+
 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
@@ -733,6 +1179,16 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
 	}
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
+			sc_generate_link_key(smp);
+		if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
+			sc_generate_ltk(smp);
+
+		/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+	}
+
 	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
 
 	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
@@ -844,6 +1300,14 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
+	smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+		kfree(smp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	smp->conn = conn;
 	chan->data = smp;
 
@@ -856,6 +1320,213 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	return smp;
 }
 
+static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
+}
+
+static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
+	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local_addr = a;
+		remote_addr = b;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+	} else {
+		local_addr = b;
+		remote_addr = a;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+	}
+
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+		memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
+
+	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
+	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+	u8 r;
+
+	r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+	r |= 0x80;
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+	if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
+		   cfm.confirm_val))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	u8 cfm[16], r;
+
+	/* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
+	if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (smp_op) {
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+		r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+		r |= 0x80;
+
+		if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+			   smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+		smp->passkey_round++;
+
+		if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
+			/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+			if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		}
+
+		/* The round is only complete when the initiator
+		 * receives pairing random.
+		 */
+		if (!hcon->out) {
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+			if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
+				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+			else
+				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Start the next round */
+		if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
+			return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
+
+		/* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+		if (hcon->out) {
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	default:
+		/* Initiating device starts the round */
+		if (!hcon->out)
+			return 0;
+
+		BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
+		       smp->passkey_round + 1);
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 smp_op;
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		smp->passkey_round = 0;
+
+		if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
+			smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
+		else
+			smp_op = 0;
+
+		if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
+			return -EIO;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		sc_add_ltk(smp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
@@ -881,6 +1552,11 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 
 	smp = chan->data;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
 	switch (mgmt_op) {
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
 		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
@@ -916,6 +1592,46 @@ unlock:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
+				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (!rsp) {
+		memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+		req->init_key_dist   = local_dist;
+		req->resp_key_dist   = remote_dist;
+		req->max_key_size    = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	rsp->max_key_size    = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+	rsp->init_key_dist   = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+	rsp->resp_key_dist   = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+
+	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -942,16 +1658,49 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
-	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
 	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
 		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
 	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
+	/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
+	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
+		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags))
+			return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
+
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+		build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
+
+		key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+		if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+			return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+
+		smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+		memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
 	if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
 		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
 	else
@@ -970,8 +1719,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
 	}
 
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
-
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
@@ -982,7 +1729,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
-	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+	}
 
 	/* Request setup of TK */
 	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
@@ -992,11 +1750,46 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+		memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+	} else {
+		while (true) {
+			/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+			if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+			 */
+			if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	u8 key_size, auth;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1016,7 +1809,31 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+	 */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+	/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
+	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+	else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
 
 	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
@@ -1030,14 +1847,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
 
-	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
-	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
-
 	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
 	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
 	 */
 	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		return sc_send_public_key(smp);
+	}
+
 	auth |= req->auth_req;
 
 	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
@@ -1053,6 +1874,28 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1066,6 +1909,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
@@ -1085,6 +1931,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
+	u32 passkey;
+	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -1094,7 +1944,75 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
 
-	return smp_random(smp);
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_random(smp);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		pkax = smp->local_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		pkax = smp->remote_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->local_pk;
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		if (!hcon->out)
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+		goto mackey_and_ltk;
+	}
+
+	/* Passkey entry has special treatment */
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		u8 cfm[16];
+
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+			     smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+	} else {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+	}
+
+mackey_and_ltk:
+	/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+	err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		if (hcon->out) {
+			sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
@@ -1102,8 +2020,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
 	struct smp_ltk *key;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
-	key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				   hcon->role);
+	key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
 	if (!key)
 		return false;
 
@@ -1136,8 +2053,7 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
 	 */
 	if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
 	    test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
-	    hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				 hcon->role))
+	    hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
 		return false;
 
 	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
@@ -1151,6 +2067,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 sec_level, auth;
 
@@ -1162,7 +2079,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
 
 	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
 		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
@@ -1245,6 +2165,9 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
+
 	/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
 	 * requires it.
 	 */
@@ -1432,6 +2355,234 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
+	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags))
+		return REQ_OOB;
+
+	/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
+	 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
+	 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
+	 * first byte which contains the opcode.
+	 */
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+		remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+	} else {
+		local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+		remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	}
+
+	local_io = local->io_capability;
+	remote_io = remote->io_capability;
+
+	local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+	remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+	/* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
+	 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
+	 */
+	if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+	else
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	return method;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
+
+	/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
+	 * the key from the initiating device.
+	 */
+	if (!hcon->out) {
+		err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
+
+	if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
+
+	smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
+
+	BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
+
+	/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+
+	if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
+		get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
+				 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
+		hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
+		hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
+		smp->passkey_round = 0;
+		if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					     hcon->dst_type,
+					     hcon->passkey_notify,
+					     hcon->passkey_entered))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+			     smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+		if (hcon->out)
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (hcon->out)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
+		if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					      hcon->dst_type))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
+	 * send the confirm value.
+	 */
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
+		     0, cfm.confirm_val);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local_addr = a;
+		remote_addr = b;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+	} else {
+		local_addr = b;
+		remote_addr = a;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+	}
+
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
+	err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
+		     io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
+		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+
+	if (!hcon->out) {
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+	}
+
+	sc_add_ltk(smp);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk);
+		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+				   struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1440,11 +2591,6 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	__u8 code, reason;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) {
-		kfree_skb(skb);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (skb->len < 1)
 		return -EILSEQ;
 
@@ -1516,6 +2662,18 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+		reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
+		reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
+		reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
 		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
@@ -1551,6 +2709,74 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
 
+static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+	/* Only new pairings are interesting */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
+	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		return;
+
+	/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
+	if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
+		return;
+
+	/* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
+	if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
+	if (chan->data)
+		return;
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp) {
+		BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR",
+		       hdev->name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+	BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
+
+	/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
+	build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+}
+
 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
@@ -1559,6 +2785,11 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		bredr_pairing(chan);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!smp)
 		return;
 
@@ -1573,11 +2804,15 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
 	conn->smp = chan;
 	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
+
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		bredr_pairing(chan);
 }
 
 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1682,34 +2917,40 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
 	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
 };
 
-int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 
-	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
+		tfm_aes = NULL;
+		goto create_chan;
+	}
 
 	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
-		int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
-		return err;
+		return ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(tfm_aes));
 	}
 
+create_chan:
 	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
 	if (!chan) {
 		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
 	chan->data = tfm_aes;
 
-	l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+	l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
 
 	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
 
 	bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
-	chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP)
+		chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+	else
+		chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
 	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
 	chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
 	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
@@ -1718,20 +2959,14 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
 	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
 
-	hdev->smp_data = chan;
-
-	return 0;
+	return chan;
 }
 
-void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
-	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
-
-	if (!chan)
-		return;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 
-	BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
 	tfm_aes = chan->data;
 	if (tfm_aes) {
@@ -1739,6 +2974,52 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
 	}
 
-	hdev->smp_data = NULL;
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
+
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
+	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+	if (IS_ERR(chan))
+		return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+	hdev->smp_data = chan;
+
+	if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev) &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+	if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	if (hdev->smp_data) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+}