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| author | Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-01-18 02:53:44 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-04-18 11:42:36 -0700 |
| commit | 5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac (patch) | |
| tree | b7ba2116923723e193dfe7c633ec10056c6b1b53 /mm/rmap.c | |
| parent | 4495c08e84729385774601b5146d51d9e5849f81 (diff) | |
| download | op-kernel-dev-5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac.zip op-kernel-dev-5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac.tar.gz | |
mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted
from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence
guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated
during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the
case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire
slab of blocks.
However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit
therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order
to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
[ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric
Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find
the new one. ]
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/rmap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/rmap.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static void anon_vma_ctor(void *data) void __init anon_vma_init(void) { anon_vma_cachep = kmem_cache_create("anon_vma", sizeof(struct anon_vma), - 0, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, + 0, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, anon_vma_ctor); anon_vma_chain_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(anon_vma_chain, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT); @@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ struct anon_vma *page_get_anon_vma(struct page *page) * If this page is still mapped, then its anon_vma cannot have been * freed. But if it has been unmapped, we have no security against the * anon_vma structure being freed and reused (for another anon_vma: - * SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU guarantees that - so the atomic_inc_not_zero() + * SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU guarantees that - so the atomic_inc_not_zero() * above cannot corrupt). */ if (!page_mapped(page)) { |
