Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit

Pull audit changes from Eric Paris:
 "Al used to send pull requests every couple of years but he told me to
  just start pushing them to you directly.

  Our touching outside of core audit code is pretty straight forward.  A
  couple of interface changes which hit net/.  A simple argument bug
  calling audit functions in namei.c and the removal of some assembly
  branch prediction code on ppc"

* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits)
  audit: fix message spacing printing auid
  Revert "audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit init"
  audit: vfs: fix audit_inode call in O_CREAT case of do_last
  audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
  audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK
  audit: use spin_lock in audit_receive_msg to process tty logging
  audit: do not needlessly take a lock in tty_audit_exit
  audit: do not needlessly take a spinlock in copy_signal
  audit: add an option to control logging of passwords with pam_tty_audit
  audit: use spin_lock_irqsave/restore in audit tty code
  helper for some session id stuff
  audit: use a consistent audit helper to log lsm information
  audit: push loginuid and sessionid processing down
  audit: stop pushing loginid, uid, sessionid as arguments
  audit: remove the old depricated kernel interface
  audit: make validity checking generic
  audit: allow checking the type of audit message in the user filter
  audit: fix build break when AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
  audit: remove duplicate export of audit_enabled
  Audit: do not print error when LSMs disabled
  ...

4 files changed, 656 insertions, 783 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0b084fa..21c7fa6 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 
@@ -265,7 +267,6 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
 }
 
 static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old,
-				   kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
 				   int allow_changes)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -274,29 +275,17 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old,
 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return rc;
-	audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%d old=%d auid=%u ses=%u", function_name, new,
-			 old, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid), sessionid);
-	if (sid) {
-		char *ctx = NULL;
-		u32 len;
-
-		rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
-		if (rc) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " sid=%u", sid);
-			allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
-		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-		}
-	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, "%s=%d old=%d", function_name, new, old);
+	audit_log_session_info(ab);
+	rc = audit_log_task_context(ab);
+	if (rc)
+		allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
 	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change,
-				  int new, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid,
-				  u32 sid)
+static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change, int new)
 {
 	int allow_changes, rc = 0, old = *to_change;
 
@@ -307,8 +296,7 @@ static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change,
 		allow_changes = 1;
 
 	if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF) {
-		rc = audit_log_config_change(function_name, new, old, loginuid,
-					     sessionid, sid, allow_changes);
+		rc = audit_log_config_change(function_name, new, old, allow_changes);
 		if (rc)
 			allow_changes = 0;
 	}
@@ -322,44 +310,37 @@ static int audit_do_config_change(char *function_name, int *to_change,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid,
-				u32 sid)
+static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit)
 {
-	return audit_do_config_change("audit_rate_limit", &audit_rate_limit,
-				      limit, loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+	return audit_do_config_change("audit_rate_limit", &audit_rate_limit, limit);
 }
 
-static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid,
-				   u32 sid)
+static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit)
 {
-	return audit_do_config_change("audit_backlog_limit", &audit_backlog_limit,
-				      limit, loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+	return audit_do_config_change("audit_backlog_limit", &audit_backlog_limit, limit);
 }
 
-static int audit_set_enabled(int state, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
+static int audit_set_enabled(int state)
 {
 	int rc;
 	if (state < AUDIT_OFF || state > AUDIT_LOCKED)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc =  audit_do_config_change("audit_enabled", &audit_enabled, state,
-				     loginuid, sessionid, sid);
-
+	rc =  audit_do_config_change("audit_enabled", &audit_enabled, state);
 	if (!rc)
 		audit_ever_enabled |= !!state;
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int audit_set_failure(int state, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
+static int audit_set_failure(int state)
 {
 	if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK
 	    && state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return audit_do_config_change("audit_failure", &audit_failure, state,
-				      loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+	return audit_do_config_change("audit_failure", &audit_failure, state);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -417,34 +398,53 @@ static void kauditd_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 		consume_skb(skb);
 }
 
-static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
+/*
+ * flush_hold_queue - empty the hold queue if auditd appears
+ *
+ * If auditd just started, drain the queue of messages already
+ * sent to syslog/printk.  Remember loss here is ok.  We already
+ * called audit_log_lost() if it didn't go out normally.  so the
+ * race between the skb_dequeue and the next check for audit_pid
+ * doesn't matter.
+ *
+ * If you ever find kauditd to be too slow we can get a perf win
+ * by doing our own locking and keeping better track if there
+ * are messages in this queue.  I don't see the need now, but
+ * in 5 years when I want to play with this again I'll see this
+ * note and still have no friggin idea what i'm thinking today.
+ */
+static void flush_hold_queue(void)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
+	if (!audit_default || !audit_pid)
+		return;
+
+	skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_hold_queue);
+	if (likely(!skb))
+		return;
+
+	while (skb && audit_pid) {
+		kauditd_send_skb(skb);
+		skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_hold_queue);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if auditd just disappeared but we
+	 * dequeued an skb we need to drop ref
+	 */
+	if (skb)
+		consume_skb(skb);
+}
+
+static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
+{
 	set_freezable();
 	while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
-		/*
-		 * if auditd just started drain the queue of messages already
-		 * sent to syslog/printk.  remember loss here is ok.  we already
-		 * called audit_log_lost() if it didn't go out normally.  so the
-		 * race between the skb_dequeue and the next check for audit_pid
-		 * doesn't matter.
-		 *
-		 * if you ever find kauditd to be too slow we can get a perf win
-		 * by doing our own locking and keeping better track if there
-		 * are messages in this queue.  I don't see the need now, but
-		 * in 5 years when I want to play with this again I'll see this
-		 * note and still have no friggin idea what i'm thinking today.
-		 */
-		if (audit_default && audit_pid) {
-			skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_hold_queue);
-			if (unlikely(skb)) {
-				while (skb && audit_pid) {
-					kauditd_send_skb(skb);
-					skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_hold_queue);
-				}
-			}
-		}
+		struct sk_buff *skb;
+		DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
+
+		flush_hold_queue();
 
 		skb = skb_dequeue(&audit_skb_queue);
 		wake_up(&audit_backlog_wait);
@@ -453,19 +453,18 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
 				kauditd_send_skb(skb);
 			else
 				audit_printk_skb(skb);
-		} else {
-			DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
-			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
-			add_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
-
-			if (!skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue)) {
-				try_to_freeze();
-				schedule();
-			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		add_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
 
-			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
-			remove_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
+		if (!skb_queue_len(&audit_skb_queue)) {
+			try_to_freeze();
+			schedule();
 		}
+
+		__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+		remove_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -579,13 +578,14 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	switch (msg_type) {
-	case AUDIT_GET:
 	case AUDIT_LIST:
-	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
-	case AUDIT_SET:
 	case AUDIT_ADD:
-	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_DEL:
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	case AUDIT_GET:
+	case AUDIT_SET:
+	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
+	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 	case AUDIT_TTY_GET:
@@ -608,12 +608,10 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type,
-				     kuid_t auid, u32 ses, u32 sid)
+static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	u32 len;
+	uid_t uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid());
 
 	if (!audit_enabled) {
 		*ab = NULL;
@@ -623,33 +621,21 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type,
 	*ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
 	if (unlikely(!*ab))
 		return rc;
-	audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
-			 task_tgid_vnr(current),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), ses);
-	if (sid) {
-		rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
-		if (rc)
-			audit_log_format(*ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
-		else {
-			audit_log_format(*ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-		}
-	}
+	audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_vnr(current), uid);
+	audit_log_session_info(*ab);
+	audit_log_task_context(*ab);
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
 static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 {
-	u32			seq, sid;
+	u32			seq;
 	void			*data;
 	struct audit_status	*status_get, status_set;
 	int			err;
 	struct audit_buffer	*ab;
 	u16			msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
-	kuid_t			loginuid; /* loginuid of sender */
-	u32			sessionid;
 	struct audit_sig_info   *sig_data;
 	char			*ctx = NULL;
 	u32			len;
@@ -668,9 +654,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			return err;
 		}
 	}
-	loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
-	sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
 	seq  = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
 	data = nlmsg_data(nlh);
 
@@ -691,14 +674,12 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		status_get   = (struct audit_status *)data;
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) {
-			err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled,
-						loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+			err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled);
 			if (err < 0)
 				return err;
 		}
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE) {
-			err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure,
-						loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+			err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure);
 			if (err < 0)
 				return err;
 		}
@@ -706,22 +687,17 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			int new_pid = status_get->pid;
 
 			if (audit_enabled != AUDIT_OFF)
-				audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid,
-							audit_pid, loginuid,
-							sessionid, sid, 1);
-
+				audit_log_config_change("audit_pid", new_pid, audit_pid, 1);
 			audit_pid = new_pid;
 			audit_nlk_portid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
 		}
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT) {
-			err = audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit,
-						   loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+			err = audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit);
 			if (err < 0)
 				return err;
 		}
 		if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT)
-			err = audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit,
-						      loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+			err = audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
@@ -729,25 +705,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC)
 			return 0;
 
-		err = audit_filter_user();
+		err = audit_filter_user(msg_type);
 		if (err == 1) {
 			err = 0;
 			if (msg_type == AUDIT_USER_TTY) {
-				err = tty_audit_push_task(current, loginuid,
-							     sessionid);
+				err = tty_audit_push_current();
 				if (err)
 					break;
 			}
-			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type,
-						  loginuid, sessionid, sid);
-
+			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, msg_type);
 			if (msg_type != AUDIT_USER_TTY)
 				audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.1024s'",
 						 (char *)data);
 			else {
 				int size;
 
-				audit_log_format(ab, " msg=");
+				audit_log_format(ab, " data=");
 				size = nlmsg_len(nlh);
 				if (size > 0 &&
 				    ((unsigned char *)data)[size - 1] == '\0')
@@ -758,50 +731,24 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 		}
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_ADD:
-	case AUDIT_DEL:
-		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule))
-			return -EINVAL;
-		if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) {
-			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-						  loginuid, sessionid, sid);
-
-			audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0",
-					 audit_enabled);
-			audit_log_end(ab);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-		/* fallthrough */
-	case AUDIT_LIST:
-		err = audit_receive_filter(msg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
-					   seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
-					   loginuid, sessionid, sid);
-		break;
 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
 		if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct audit_rule_data))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_LOCKED) {
-			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-						  loginuid, sessionid, sid);
-
-			audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0",
-					 audit_enabled);
+			audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
+			audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0", audit_enabled);
 			audit_log_end(ab);
 			return -EPERM;
 		}
 		/* fallthrough */
 	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
 		err = audit_receive_filter(msg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
-					   seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
-					   loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+					   seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh));
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_TRIM:
 		audit_trim_trees();
-
-		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-					  loginuid, sessionid, sid);
-
+		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " op=trim res=1");
 		audit_log_end(ab);
 		break;
@@ -831,8 +778,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		/* OK, here comes... */
 		err = audit_tag_tree(old, new);
 
-		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-					  loginuid, sessionid, sid);
+		audit_log_common_recv_msg(&ab, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 
 		audit_log_format(ab, " op=make_equiv old=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, old);
@@ -871,27 +817,30 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 		struct audit_tty_status s;
 		struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
-		spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+		spin_lock(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 		s.enabled = tsk->signal->audit_tty != 0;
-		spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+		s.log_passwd = tsk->signal->audit_tty_log_passwd;
+		spin_unlock(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 
 		audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq,
 				 AUDIT_TTY_GET, 0, 0, &s, sizeof(s));
 		break;
 	}
 	case AUDIT_TTY_SET: {
-		struct audit_tty_status *s;
+		struct audit_tty_status s;
 		struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
-		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(struct audit_tty_status))
-			return -EINVAL;
-		s = data;
-		if (s->enabled != 0 && s->enabled != 1)
+		memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
+		/* guard against past and future API changes */
+		memcpy(&s, data, min(sizeof(s), (size_t)nlh->nlmsg_len));
+		if ((s.enabled != 0 && s.enabled != 1) ||
+		    (s.log_passwd != 0 && s.log_passwd != 1))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-		tsk->signal->audit_tty = s->enabled != 0;
-		spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+		spin_lock(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+		tsk->signal->audit_tty = s.enabled;
+		tsk->signal->audit_tty_log_passwd = s.log_passwd;
+		spin_unlock(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 		break;
 	}
 	default:
@@ -1434,6 +1383,14 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,
 	kfree(pathname);
 }
 
+void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+	u32 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+	uid_t auid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u\n", auid, sessionid);
+}
+
 void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 {
 	audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
@@ -1443,6 +1400,224 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
 }
 
+void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
+				 cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
+	}
+}
+
+void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+{
+	kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
+	kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
+	int log = 0;
+
+	if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
+		log = 1;
+	}
+	if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
+		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
+		log = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (log)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x",
+				 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
+}
+
+static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+				   const struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
+	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
+	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
+	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
+				VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
+void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
+		      const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
+	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
+	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
+	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
+	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
+ * @context: audit_context for the task
+ * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
+ * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
+ * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
+ * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
+ */
+void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
+		    struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
+
+	if (path)
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
+	else if (n->name) {
+		switch (n->name_len) {
+		case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
+			/* log the full path */
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			/* name was specified as a relative path and the
+			 * directory component is the cwd */
+			audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* log the name's directory component */
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
+						    n->name_len);
+		}
+	} else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
+
+	if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
+				 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
+				 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+				 n->ino,
+				 MAJOR(n->dev),
+				 MINOR(n->dev),
+				 n->mode,
+				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
+				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
+				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
+				 MINOR(n->rdev));
+	}
+	if (n->osid != 0) {
+		char *ctx = NULL;
+		u32 len;
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
+			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+			if (call_panic)
+				*call_panic = 2;
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+		}
+	}
+
+	audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+	char *ctx = NULL;
+	unsigned len;
+	int error;
+	u32 sid;
+
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+	if (!sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	if (error) {
+		if (error != -EINVAL)
+			goto error_path;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+	return 0;
+
+error_path:
+	audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+	return error;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
+
+void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+	struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
+	char *tty;
+
+	if (!ab)
+		return;
+
+	/* tsk == current */
+	cred = current_cred();
+
+	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+	if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+		tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
+	else
+		tty = "(none)";
+	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+
+	audit_log_format(ab,
+			 " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
+			 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
+			 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
+			 sys_getppid(),
+			 tsk->pid,
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk)),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
+			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
+			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
+			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
+			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
+			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
+			 audit_get_sessionid(tsk), tty);
+
+	get_task_comm(name, tsk);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
+
+	if (mm) {
+		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		if (mm->exe_file)
+			audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
+		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
+
 /**
  * audit_log_link_denied - report a link restriction denial
  * @operation: specific link opreation
@@ -1451,19 +1626,28 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation, struct path *link)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	struct audit_names *name;
+
+	name = kzalloc(sizeof(*name), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!name)
+		return;
 
+	/* Generate AUDIT_ANOM_LINK with subject, operation, outcome. */
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
 			     AUDIT_ANOM_LINK);
 	if (!ab)
-		return;
-	audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s action=denied", operation);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
-	audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", link);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, link->dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_id);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", link->dentry->d_inode->i_ino);
+		goto out;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s", operation);
+	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
 	audit_log_end(ab);
+
+	/* Generate AUDIT_PATH record with object. */
+	name->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
+	audit_copy_inode(name, link->dentry, link->dentry->d_inode);
+	audit_log_name(current->audit_context, name, link, 0, NULL);
+out:
+	kfree(name);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 11468d9..1c95131 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
 
 /* 0 = no checking
    1 = put_count checking
@@ -29,6 +30,11 @@
 */
 #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
 
+/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
+ * for saving names from getname().  If we get more names we will allocate
+ * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
+#define AUDIT_NAMES	5
+
 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
    a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
    the syscall filter. */
@@ -59,8 +65,158 @@ struct audit_entry {
 	struct audit_krule	rule;
 };
 
+struct audit_cap_data {
+	kernel_cap_t		permitted;
+	kernel_cap_t		inheritable;
+	union {
+		unsigned int	fE;		/* effective bit of file cap */
+		kernel_cap_t	effective;	/* effective set of process */
+	};
+};
+
+/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
+ * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
+ * pointers at syscall exit time).
+ *
+ * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device.
+ */
+struct audit_names {
+	struct list_head	list;		/* audit_context->names_list */
+
+	struct filename		*name;
+	int			name_len;	/* number of chars to log */
+	bool			name_put;	/* call __putname()? */
+
+	unsigned long		ino;
+	dev_t			dev;
+	umode_t			mode;
+	kuid_t			uid;
+	kgid_t			gid;
+	dev_t			rdev;
+	u32			osid;
+	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
+	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
+	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
+	/*
+	 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
+	 * names allocated in the task audit context.  Thus this name
+	 * should be freed on syscall exit.
+	 */
+	bool			should_free;
+};
+
+/* The per-task audit context. */
+struct audit_context {
+	int		    dummy;	/* must be the first element */
+	int		    in_syscall;	/* 1 if task is in a syscall */
+	enum audit_state    state, current_state;
+	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
+	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
+	struct timespec	    ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
+	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
+	long		    return_code;/* syscall return code */
+	u64		    prio;
+	int		    return_valid; /* return code is valid */
+	/*
+	 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
+	 * syscall.  The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
+	 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
+	 * reasons.  Except during allocation they should never be referenced
+	 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
+	 * by running the names_list.
+	 */
+	struct audit_names  preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+	int		    name_count; /* total records in names_list */
+	struct list_head    names_list;	/* struct audit_names->list anchor */
+	char		    *filterkey;	/* key for rule that triggered record */
+	struct path	    pwd;
+	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+	struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
+	struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
+	size_t sockaddr_len;
+				/* Save things to print about task_struct */
+	pid_t		    pid, ppid;
+	kuid_t		    uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
+	kgid_t		    gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
+	unsigned long	    personality;
+	int		    arch;
+
+	pid_t		    target_pid;
+	kuid_t		    target_auid;
+	kuid_t		    target_uid;
+	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
+	u32		    target_sid;
+	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
+	struct list_head killed_trees;
+	int tree_count;
+
+	int type;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			int nargs;
+			long args[6];
+		} socketcall;
+		struct {
+			kuid_t			uid;
+			kgid_t			gid;
+			umode_t			mode;
+			u32			osid;
+			int			has_perm;
+			uid_t			perm_uid;
+			gid_t			perm_gid;
+			umode_t			perm_mode;
+			unsigned long		qbytes;
+		} ipc;
+		struct {
+			mqd_t			mqdes;
+			struct mq_attr		mqstat;
+		} mq_getsetattr;
+		struct {
+			mqd_t			mqdes;
+			int			sigev_signo;
+		} mq_notify;
+		struct {
+			mqd_t			mqdes;
+			size_t			msg_len;
+			unsigned int		msg_prio;
+			struct timespec		abs_timeout;
+		} mq_sendrecv;
+		struct {
+			int			oflag;
+			umode_t			mode;
+			struct mq_attr		attr;
+		} mq_open;
+		struct {
+			pid_t			pid;
+			struct audit_cap_data	cap;
+		} capset;
+		struct {
+			int			fd;
+			int			flags;
+		} mmap;
+	};
+	int fds[2];
+
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	int		    put_count;
+	int		    ino_count;
+#endif
+};
+
 extern int audit_ever_enabled;
 
+extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
+			     const struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const struct inode *inode);
+extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
+			  kernel_cap_t *cap);
+extern void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name);
+extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
+			   struct audit_names *n, struct path *path,
+			   int record_num, int *call_panic);
+
 extern int audit_pid;
 
 #define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS	32
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 2674368..83a2970 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -310,121 +310,83 @@ static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
 	return n;
 }
 
-
-/* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
- * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
-static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
+/* check if an audit field is valid */
+static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
 {
-	struct audit_entry *entry;
-	int err = 0;
-	int i;
-
-	entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule);
-	if (IS_ERR(entry))
-		goto exit_nofree;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-		struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
-		u32 n;
-
-		n = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
-
-		/* Support for legacy operators where
-		 * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
-		if (n & AUDIT_NEGATE)
-			f->op = Audit_not_equal;
-		else if (!n)
-			f->op = Audit_equal;
-		else
-			f->op = audit_to_op(n);
-
-		entry->rule.vers_ops = (n & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
-
-		f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
-		f->val = rule->values[i];
-		f->uid = INVALID_UID;
-		f->gid = INVALID_GID;
-
-		err = -EINVAL;
-		if (f->op == Audit_bad)
-			goto exit_free;
-
-		switch(f->type) {
-		default:
-			goto exit_free;
-		case AUDIT_UID:
-		case AUDIT_EUID:
-		case AUDIT_SUID:
-		case AUDIT_FSUID:
-		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
-			/* bit ops not implemented for uid comparisons */
-			if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
-				goto exit_free;
-
-			f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
-			if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_GID:
-		case AUDIT_EGID:
-		case AUDIT_SGID:
-		case AUDIT_FSGID:
-			/* bit ops not implemented for gid comparisons */
-			if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
-				goto exit_free;
-
-			f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
-			if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_PID:
-		case AUDIT_PERS:
-		case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
-		case AUDIT_PPID:
-		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
-		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
-		case AUDIT_EXIT:
-		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
-			/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
-			if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_ARG0:
-		case AUDIT_ARG1:
-		case AUDIT_ARG2:
-		case AUDIT_ARG3:
-			break;
-		/* arch is only allowed to be = or != */
-		case AUDIT_ARCH:
-			if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
-				goto exit_free;
-			entry->rule.arch_f = f;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_PERM:
-			if (f->val & ~15)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
-			if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_INODE:
-			err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
-			if (err)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
-		entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
-
-exit_nofree:
-	return entry;
+	switch(f->type) {
+	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
+		if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE &&
+		    entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	};
 
-exit_free:
-	audit_free_rule(entry);
-	return ERR_PTR(err);
+	switch(f->type) {
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case AUDIT_UID:
+	case AUDIT_EUID:
+	case AUDIT_SUID:
+	case AUDIT_FSUID:
+	case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
+	case AUDIT_GID:
+	case AUDIT_EGID:
+	case AUDIT_SGID:
+	case AUDIT_FSGID:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
+	case AUDIT_PID:
+	case AUDIT_PERS:
+	case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
+	case AUDIT_PPID:
+	case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
+	case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
+	case AUDIT_EXIT:
+	case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
+		/* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
+		if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_ARG0:
+	case AUDIT_ARG1:
+	case AUDIT_ARG2:
+	case AUDIT_ARG3:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+	case AUDIT_WATCH:
+	case AUDIT_DIR:
+	case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+		if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	/* FALL THROUGH */
+	case AUDIT_ARCH:
+		if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_PERM:
+		if (f->val & ~15)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+		if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
+		if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	};
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
@@ -459,17 +421,25 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		f->gid = INVALID_GID;
 		f->lsm_str = NULL;
 		f->lsm_rule = NULL;
-		switch(f->type) {
+
+		/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
+		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) {
+			f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
+			f->val = 0;
+		}
+
+		err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
+		if (err)
+			goto exit_free;
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		switch (f->type) {
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 		case AUDIT_UID:
 		case AUDIT_EUID:
 		case AUDIT_SUID:
 		case AUDIT_FSUID:
-		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
-			/* bit ops not implemented for uid comparisons */
-			if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
-				goto exit_free;
-
 			f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
 			if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
 				goto exit_free;
@@ -479,27 +449,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 		case AUDIT_SGID:
 		case AUDIT_FSGID:
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
-			/* bit ops not implemented for gid comparisons */
-			if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
-				goto exit_free;
-
 			f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
 			if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
 				goto exit_free;
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_PID:
-		case AUDIT_PERS:
-		case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
-		case AUDIT_PPID:
-		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
-		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
-		case AUDIT_EXIT:
-		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
-		case AUDIT_ARG0:
-		case AUDIT_ARG1:
-		case AUDIT_ARG2:
-		case AUDIT_ARG3:
-			break;
 		case AUDIT_ARCH:
 			entry->rule.arch_f = f;
 			break;
@@ -570,20 +523,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 			entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
 			entry->rule.filterkey = str;
 			break;
-		case AUDIT_PERM:
-			if (f->val & ~15)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
-			if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
-			if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
-				goto exit_free;
-			break;
-		default:
-			goto exit_free;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -613,36 +552,6 @@ static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
 	return len;
 }
 
-/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule.
- * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
-static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
-{
-	struct audit_rule *rule;
-	int i;
-
-	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (unlikely(!rule))
-		return NULL;
-
-	rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
-	rule->action = krule->action;
-	rule->field_count = krule->field_count;
-	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
-		rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val;
-		rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
-
-		if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
-			if (krule->fields[i].op == Audit_not_equal)
-				rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
-		} else {
-			rule->fields[i] |= audit_ops[krule->fields[i].op];
-		}
-	}
-	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
-
-	return rule;
-}
-
 /* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
 static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
 {
@@ -1055,35 +964,6 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/* List rules using struct audit_rule.  Exists for backward
- * compatibility with userspace. */
-static void audit_list(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
-{
-	struct sk_buff *skb;
-	struct audit_krule *r;
-	int i;
-
-	/* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
-	 * iterator to sync with list writers. */
-	for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
-		list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
-			struct audit_rule *rule;
-
-			rule = audit_krule_to_rule(r);
-			if (unlikely(!rule))
-				break;
-			skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
-					 rule, sizeof(*rule));
-			if (skb)
-				skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
-			kfree(rule);
-		}
-	}
-	skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-	if (skb)
-		skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
-}
-
 /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
 static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
 {
@@ -1113,11 +993,11 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
 }
 
 /* Log rule additions and removals */
-static void audit_log_rule_change(kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
-				  char *action, struct audit_krule *rule,
-				  int res)
+static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
+	u32 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
@@ -1125,18 +1005,8 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
 	if (!ab)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u",
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid), sessionid);
-	if (sid) {
-		char *ctx = NULL;
-		u32 len;
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
-			audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
-		else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-		}
-	}
+	audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid);
+	audit_log_task_context(ab);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
 	audit_log_string(ab, action);
 	audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
@@ -1155,8 +1025,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
  * @sessionid: sessionid for netlink audit message
  * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
  */
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
-			 size_t datasz, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
@@ -1164,7 +1033,6 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
 
 	switch (type) {
-	case AUDIT_LIST:
 	case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
 		/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
 		 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
@@ -1179,10 +1047,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
 		skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
 
 		mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
-		if (type == AUDIT_LIST)
-			audit_list(pid, seq, &dest->q);
-		else
-			audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q);
+		audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q);
 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
 		tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
@@ -1192,35 +1057,23 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
 			err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
 		}
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_ADD:
 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
-		if (type == AUDIT_ADD)
-			entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
-		else
-			entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+		entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry))
 			return PTR_ERR(entry);
 
 		err = audit_add_rule(entry);
-		audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "add rule",
-				      &entry->rule, !err);
-
+		audit_log_rule_change("add rule", &entry->rule, !err);
 		if (err)
 			audit_free_rule(entry);
 		break;
-	case AUDIT_DEL:
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
-		if (type == AUDIT_DEL)
-			entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
-		else
-			entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+		entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
 		if (IS_ERR(entry))
 			return PTR_ERR(entry);
 
 		err = audit_del_rule(entry);
-		audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "remove rule",
-				      &entry->rule, !err);
-
+		audit_log_rule_change("remove rule", &entry->rule, !err);
 		audit_free_rule(entry);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -1358,7 +1211,7 @@ int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
 	return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
 }
 
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule, int type,
 				   enum audit_state *state)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -1382,6 +1235,13 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
 			result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
 						  f->op, f->uid);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+			result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
+						  f->op, f->val);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
+			result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
+			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
@@ -1408,7 +1268,7 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int audit_filter_user(void)
+int audit_filter_user(int type)
 {
 	enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
 	struct audit_entry *e;
@@ -1416,7 +1276,7 @@ int audit_filter_user(void)
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
-		if (audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, &state)) {
+		if (audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, type, &state)) {
 			if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
 				ret = 0;
 			break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index c682294..3c8a601 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -76,11 +76,6 @@
 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
 
-/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
- * for saving names from getname().  If we get more names we will allocate
- * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
-#define AUDIT_NAMES	5
-
 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
 
@@ -90,44 +85,6 @@ int audit_n_rules;
 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
 int audit_signals;
 
-struct audit_cap_data {
-	kernel_cap_t		permitted;
-	kernel_cap_t		inheritable;
-	union {
-		unsigned int	fE;		/* effective bit of a file capability */
-		kernel_cap_t	effective;	/* effective set of a process */
-	};
-};
-
-/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
- * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
- * pointers at syscall exit time).
- *
- * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device.
- */
-struct audit_names {
-	struct list_head	list;		/* audit_context->names_list */
-	struct filename	*name;
-	unsigned long		ino;
-	dev_t			dev;
-	umode_t			mode;
-	kuid_t			uid;
-	kgid_t			gid;
-	dev_t			rdev;
-	u32			osid;
-	struct audit_cap_data	 fcap;
-	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
-	int			name_len;	/* number of name's characters to log */
-	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
-	bool			name_put;	/* call __putname() for this name */
-	/*
-	 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
-	 * names allocated in the task audit context.  Thus this name
-	 * should be freed on syscall exit
-	 */
-	bool			should_free;
-};
-
 struct audit_aux_data {
 	struct audit_aux_data	*next;
 	int			type;
@@ -175,106 +132,6 @@ struct audit_tree_refs {
 	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
 };
 
-/* The per-task audit context. */
-struct audit_context {
-	int		    dummy;	/* must be the first element */
-	int		    in_syscall;	/* 1 if task is in a syscall */
-	enum audit_state    state, current_state;
-	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
-	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
-	struct timespec	    ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
-	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
-	long		    return_code;/* syscall return code */
-	u64		    prio;
-	int		    return_valid; /* return code is valid */
-	/*
-	 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
-	 * syscall.  The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
-	 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
-	 * reasons.  Except during allocation they should never be referenced
-	 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
-	 * by running the names_list.
-	 */
-	struct audit_names  preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
-	int		    name_count; /* total records in names_list */
-	struct list_head    names_list;	/* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
-	char *		    filterkey;	/* key for rule that triggered record */
-	struct path	    pwd;
-	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
-	struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
-	struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
-	size_t sockaddr_len;
-				/* Save things to print about task_struct */
-	pid_t		    pid, ppid;
-	kuid_t		    uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
-	kgid_t		    gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
-	unsigned long	    personality;
-	int		    arch;
-
-	pid_t		    target_pid;
-	kuid_t		    target_auid;
-	kuid_t		    target_uid;
-	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
-	u32		    target_sid;
-	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
-
-	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
-	struct list_head killed_trees;
-	int tree_count;
-
-	int type;
-	union {
-		struct {
-			int nargs;
-			long args[6];
-		} socketcall;
-		struct {
-			kuid_t			uid;
-			kgid_t			gid;
-			umode_t			mode;
-			u32			osid;
-			int			has_perm;
-			uid_t			perm_uid;
-			gid_t			perm_gid;
-			umode_t			perm_mode;
-			unsigned long		qbytes;
-		} ipc;
-		struct {
-			mqd_t			mqdes;
-			struct mq_attr 		mqstat;
-		} mq_getsetattr;
-		struct {
-			mqd_t			mqdes;
-			int			sigev_signo;
-		} mq_notify;
-		struct {
-			mqd_t			mqdes;
-			size_t			msg_len;
-			unsigned int		msg_prio;
-			struct timespec		abs_timeout;
-		} mq_sendrecv;
-		struct {
-			int			oflag;
-			umode_t			mode;
-			struct mq_attr		attr;
-		} mq_open;
-		struct {
-			pid_t			pid;
-			struct audit_cap_data	cap;
-		} capset;
-		struct {
-			int			fd;
-			int			flags;
-		} mmap;
-	};
-	int fds[2];
-
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
-	int		    put_count;
-	int		    ino_count;
-#endif
-};
-
 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
 {
 	int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
@@ -633,9 +490,23 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_GID:
 			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
+			if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
+				if (!result)
+					result = in_group_p(f->gid);
+			} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
+				if (result)
+					result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
+			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_EGID:
 			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
+			if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
+				if (!result)
+					result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
+			} else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
+				if (result)
+					result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
+			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_SGID:
 			result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
@@ -742,6 +613,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (ctx)
 				result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
 			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+			result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
+			break;
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
@@ -987,6 +861,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
 	if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
+		int i = 0;
+
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
 		       " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
 		       " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
@@ -995,7 +871,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 		       context->name_count, context->put_count,
 		       context->ino_count);
 		list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
+			printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
 			       n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
 		}
 		dump_stack();
@@ -1010,7 +886,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
 		list_del(&n->list);
 		if (n->name && n->name_put)
-			__putname(n->name);
+			final_putname(n->name);
 		if (n->should_free)
 			kfree(n);
 	}
@@ -1093,88 +969,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 	kfree(context);
 }
 
-void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
-{
-	char *ctx = NULL;
-	unsigned len;
-	int error;
-	u32 sid;
-
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-	if (!sid)
-		return;
-
-	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
-	if (error) {
-		if (error != -EINVAL)
-			goto error_path;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
-	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-	return;
-
-error_path:
-	audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
-	return;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
-
-void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	const struct cred *cred;
-	char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
-	struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
-	char *tty;
-
-	if (!ab)
-		return;
-
-	/* tsk == current */
-	cred = current_cred();
-
-	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-	if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty)
-		tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
-	else
-		tty = "(none)";
-	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
-
-
-	audit_log_format(ab,
-			 " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
-			 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
-			 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
-			 sys_getppid(),
-			 tsk->pid,
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tsk->loginuid),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
-			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
-			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
-			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
-			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
-			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
-			 tsk->sessionid, tty);
-
-	get_task_comm(name, tsk);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
-
-	if (mm) {
-		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-		if (mm->exe_file)
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
-		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	}
-	audit_log_task_context(ab);
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
-
 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
 				 u32 sid, char *comm)
@@ -1191,12 +985,14 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
-	if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
-		rc = 1;
-	} else {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-		security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+	if (sid) {
+		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
+			rc = 1;
+		} else {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+		}
 	}
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
@@ -1390,35 +1186,6 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
 	kfree(buf);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
-	}
-}
-
-static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
-{
-	kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
-	kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
-	int log = 0;
-
-	if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
-		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
-		log = 1;
-	}
-	if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
-		audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
-		log = 1;
-	}
-
-	if (log)
-		audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
-}
-
 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1516,68 +1283,6 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 }
 
-static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
-			   int record_num, int *call_panic)
-{
-	struct audit_buffer *ab;
-	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
-	if (!ab)
-		return; /* audit_panic has been called */
-
-	audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
-
-	if (n->name) {
-		switch (n->name_len) {
-		case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
-			/* log the full path */
-			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
-			break;
-		case 0:
-			/* name was specified as a relative path and the
-			 * directory component is the cwd */
-			audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
-			break;
-		default:
-			/* log the name's directory component */
-			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-			audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
-						    n->name_len);
-		}
-	} else
-		audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
-
-	if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
-				 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
-				 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
-				 n->ino,
-				 MAJOR(n->dev),
-				 MINOR(n->dev),
-				 n->mode,
-				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
-				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
-				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
-				 MINOR(n->rdev));
-	}
-	if (n->osid != 0) {
-		char *ctx = NULL;
-		u32 len;
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
-			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
-			*call_panic = 2;
-		} else {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
-			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
-		}
-	}
-
-	audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
-
-	audit_log_end(ab);
-}
-
 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	int i, call_panic = 0;
@@ -1695,7 +1400,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 
 	i = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
-		audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic);
+		audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
 
 	/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
 	ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
@@ -2030,18 +1735,18 @@ void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
 	BUG_ON(!context);
 	if (!context->in_syscall) {
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
-		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
 		       __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
 		if (context->name_count) {
 			struct audit_names *n;
-			int i;
+			int i = 0;
 
 			list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
-				printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
+				printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
 				       n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
 			}
 #endif
-		__putname(name);
+		final_putname(name);
 	}
 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
 	else {
@@ -2060,41 +1765,6 @@ void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
 #endif
 }
 
-static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!dentry)
-		return 0;
-
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
-	name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
-	name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
-	name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
-	name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-
-/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
-static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     const struct inode *inode)
-{
-	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
-	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
-	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
-	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
-	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
-	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
-	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
-}
-
 /**
  * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
  * @name: name being audited
@@ -2303,7 +1973,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
-	if (uid_valid(task->loginuid))
+	if (audit_loginuid_set(task))
 		return -EPERM;
 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
 	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
@@ -2471,17 +2141,20 @@ int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 /**
  * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
- * @nargs: number of args
+ * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
  * @args: args array
  *
  */
-void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
+int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
 
+	if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
+		return -EINVAL;
 	context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
 	context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
 	memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**