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author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2016-09-20 00:26:12 +0200 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-09-20 23:32:11 -0400 |
commit | b399cf64e318ac8c5f10d36bb911e61c746b8788 (patch) | |
tree | 266cbe6c69461f5a7b534b23f36e9f1d32a2c257 /kernel | |
parent | cf714ac147e08bc13cd6bc79f2b090da905398ef (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-b399cf64e318ac8c5f10d36bb911e61c746b8788.zip op-kernel-dev-b399cf64e318ac8c5f10d36bb911e61c746b8788.tar.gz |
bpf, verifier: enforce larger zero range for pkt on overloading stack buffs
Current contract for the following two helper argument types is:
* ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE: passed argument pair must be (ptr, >0).
* ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO: passed argument pair can be either
(NULL, 0) or (ptr, >0).
With 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), we can
pass also raw packet data to helpers, so depending on the argument type
being PTR_TO_PACKET, we now either assert memory via check_packet_access()
or check_stack_boundary(). As a result, the tests in check_packet_access()
currently allow more than intended with regards to reg->imm.
Back in 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access"), check_packet_access()
was fine to ignore size argument since in check_mem_access() size was
bpf_size_to_bytes() derived and prior to the call to check_packet_access()
guaranteed to be larger than zero.
However, for the above two argument types, it currently means, we can have
a <= 0 size and thus breaking current guarantees for helpers. Enforce a
check for size <= 0 and bail out if so.
check_stack_boundary() doesn't have such an issue since it already tests
for access_size <= 0 and bails out, resp. access_size == 0 in case of NULL
pointer passed when allowed.
Fixes: 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 90493a6..bc138f3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static int check_packet_access(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, struct reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; off += reg->off; - if (off < 0 || off + size > reg->range) { + if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > reg->range) { verbose("invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n", off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range); return -EACCES; |