crypto: fips - only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.

v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.

CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 81e727c..ae79ce6 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/pfn.h>
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2448,9 +2447,6 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
 	}
 
 	/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-	if (err < 0 && fips_enabled)
-		panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n",
-		      err);
 	if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
 		err = 0;