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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-01-17 10:19:41 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-01-17 10:19:41 -0800 |
| commit | 951880e634a79884236a575b896abf55c39ae0bf (patch) | |
| tree | b23ec5a95cd72083227ed5b7396e2f8799f4a58c /kernel/capability.c | |
| parent | c2bc3a316a7281f67e36b34dac2802cbe36a9128 (diff) | |
| download | op-kernel-dev-951880e634a79884236a575b896abf55c39ae0bf.zip op-kernel-dev-951880e634a79884236a575b896abf55c39ae0bf.tar.gz | |
Revert "capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call"
This reverts commit d2a7009f0bb03fa22ad08dd25472efa0568126b9.
J. R. Okajima explains:
"After this commit, I am afraid access(2) on NFS may not work
correctly. The scenario based upon my guess.
- access(2) overrides the credentials.
- calls inode_permission() -- ... -- generic_permission() --
ns_capable().
- while the old ns_capable() calls security_capable(current_cred()),
the new ns_capable() calls has_ns_capability(current) --
security_capable(__task_cred(t)).
current_cred() returns current->cred which is effective (overridden)
credentials, but __task_cred(current) returns current->real_cred (the
NFSD's credential). And the overridden credentials by access(2) lost."
Requested-by: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 0fcf1c1..3f1adb6 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) BUG(); } - if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) { + if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; } |
