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author | Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> | 2016-10-18 19:51:19 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-10-19 11:09:28 -0400 |
commit | 57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0 (patch) | |
tree | ad40f415e0cc209db360cac500abcfb120031f17 /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 3134e9bdbe9c81a943b2c027a78433d4b0cf50dc (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0.zip op-kernel-dev-57a09bf0a416700676e77102c28f9cfcb48267e0.tar.gz |
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
A BPF program is required to check the return register of a
map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps
track of this by converting the type of the result register from
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional
jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed
for the result register 0.
In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG
instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes
them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the
verifier objects when the register is accessed:
0: (b7) r1 = 10
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
2: (bf) r2 = r10
3: (07) r2 += -8
4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000
6: (85) call 1
7: (bf) r4 = r0
8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0
R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'
This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by
assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional
jump is observed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 61 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 99a7e5b..846d7ce 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -212,9 +212,10 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) - verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d)", + verbose("(ks=%d,vs=%d,id=%u)", reg->map_ptr->key_size, - reg->map_ptr->value_size); + reg->map_ptr->value_size, + reg->id); if (reg->min_value != BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE) verbose(",min_value=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->min_value); @@ -447,6 +448,7 @@ static void mark_reg_unknown_value(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno) { BUG_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG); regs[regno].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE; + regs[regno].id = 0; regs[regno].imm = 0; } @@ -1252,6 +1254,7 @@ static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) return -EINVAL; } regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; + regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; } else { verbose("unknown return type %d of func %d\n", fn->ret_type, func_id); @@ -1644,8 +1647,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->src_reg); return -EACCES; } - regs[insn->dst_reg].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE; - regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = NULL; + mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg); } } else { /* case: R = imm @@ -1907,6 +1909,38 @@ static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg, check_reg_overflow(true_reg); } +static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id, + enum bpf_reg_type type) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; + + if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) { + reg->type = type; + if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) + mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno); + } +} + +/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually + * be folded together at some point. + */ +static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno, + enum bpf_reg_type type) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) + mark_map_reg(regs, i, regs[regno].id, type); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) { + if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) + continue; + mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, + regs[regno].id, type); + } +} + static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx) { @@ -1994,18 +2028,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) { - if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) { - /* next fallthrough insn can access memory via - * this register - */ - regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; - /* branch targer cannot access it, since reg == 0 */ - mark_reg_unknown_value(other_branch->regs, - insn->dst_reg); - } else { - other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; - mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, insn->dst_reg); - } + /* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either + * safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional. + */ + mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, + opcode == BPF_JEQ ? PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : UNKNOWN_VALUE); + mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, + opcode == BPF_JEQ ? UNKNOWN_VALUE : PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE); } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) { |