Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach

Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.

Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.

In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit).  At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).

This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).

Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0).  I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 11 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 50737c7..62bd80c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ struct audit_krule;
  */
 extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
 extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
-extern int cap_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child);
+extern int cap_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		      unsigned int mode);
 extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern int cap_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 extern void cap_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
@@ -1170,6 +1171,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	attributes would be changed by the execve.
  *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for parent process.
  *	@child contains the task_struct structure for child process.
+ *	@mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @capget:
  *	Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
@@ -1295,7 +1297,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 struct security_operations {
 	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
-	int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child);
+	int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		       unsigned int mode);
 	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
 		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
@@ -1573,7 +1576,8 @@ extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *par
 extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 /* Security operations */
-int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child);
+int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child,
+		    unsigned int mode);
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
@@ -1755,9 +1759,11 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+static inline int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
+				  struct task_struct *child,
+				  unsigned int mode)
 {
-	return cap_ptrace(parent, child);
+	return cap_ptrace(parent, child, mode);
 }
 
 static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,