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author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-03 12:25:15 -0500 |
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committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-05 18:53:00 -0500 |
commit | 69f594a38967f4540ce7a29b3fd214e68a8330bd (patch) | |
tree | dff25b5f5ef0736fb63b08729bec4ff57062c13f /fs | |
parent | f1c84dae0ecc51aa35c81f19a0ebcd6c0921ddcb (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-69f594a38967f4540ce7a29b3fd214e68a8330bd.zip op-kernel-dev-69f594a38967f4540ce7a29b3fd214e68a8330bd.tar.gz |
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions
on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the
process which might have security and attack implications. If the current
task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields
are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial
is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials.
This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without
flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 3a1dafd..ddffd7a 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; - permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); + permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT); mm = get_task_mm(task); if (mm) { vsize = task_vsize(mm); |