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author | Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> | 2008-07-31 13:41:58 +0200 |
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committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2008-10-23 05:13:25 -0400 |
commit | f696a3659fc4b3a3bf4bc83d9dbec5e5a2ffd929 (patch) | |
tree | 738adf557608f26e881a710839de12b7527549b6 /fs/proc | |
parent | 5cec56deb6d41b5b570306b17cd0b1590ebd0897 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-f696a3659fc4b3a3bf4bc83d9dbec5e5a2ffd929.zip op-kernel-dev-f696a3659fc4b3a3bf4bc83d9dbec5e5a2ffd929.tar.gz |
[PATCH] move executable checking into ->permission()
For execute permission on a regular files we need to check if file has
any execute bits at all, regardless of capabilites.
This check is normally performed by generic_permission() but was also
added to the case when the filesystem defines its own ->permission()
method. In the latter case the filesystem should be responsible for
performing this check.
Move the check from inode_permission() inside filesystems which are
not calling generic_permission().
Create a helper function execute_ok() that returns true if the inode
is a directory or if any execute bits are present in i_mode.
Also fix up the following code:
- coda control file is never executable
- sysctl files are never executable
- hfs_permission seems broken on MAY_EXEC, remove
- hfsplus_permission is eqivalent to generic_permission(), remove
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index 5fe210c..7b99775 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -298,13 +298,19 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) * sysctl entries that are not writeable, * are _NOT_ writeable, capabilities or not. */ - struct ctl_table_header *head = grab_header(inode); - struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry; + struct ctl_table_header *head; + struct ctl_table *table; int error; + /* Executable files are not allowed under /proc/sys/ */ + if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return -EACCES; + + head = grab_header(inode); if (IS_ERR(head)) return PTR_ERR(head); + table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry; if (!table) /* global root - r-xr-xr-x */ error = mask & MAY_WRITE ? -EACCES : 0; else /* Use the permissions on the sysctl table entry */ |