fs: fix overflow in sys_mount() for in-kernel calls

sys_mount() reads/copies a whole page for its "type" parameter.  When
do_mount_root() passes a kernel address that points to an object which is
smaller than a whole page, copy_mount_options() will happily go past this
memory object, possibly dereferencing "wild" pointers that could be in any
state (hence the kmemcheck warning, which shows that parts of the next
page are not even allocated).

(The likelihood of something going wrong here is pretty low -- first of
all this only applies to kernel calls to sys_mount(), which are mostly
found in the boot code.  Secondly, I guess if the page was not mapped,
exact_copy_from_user() _would_ in fact handle it correctly because of its
access_ok(), etc.  checks.)

But it is much nicer to avoid the dubious reads altogether, by stopping as
soon as we find a NUL byte.  Is there a good reason why we can't do
something like this, using the already existing strndup_from_user()?

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make copy_mount_string() static]
[AV: fix compat mount breakage, which involves undoing akpm's change above]

Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: al <al@dizzy.pdmi.ras.ru>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index d55ef56..515175b 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ extern int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *);
  * namespace.c
  */
 extern int copy_mount_options(const void __user *, unsigned long *);
+extern int copy_mount_string(const void __user *, char **);
 
 extern void free_vfsmnt(struct vfsmount *);
 extern struct vfsmount *alloc_vfsmnt(const char *);