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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-05-19 09:21:36 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-05-19 09:21:36 -0700 |
commit | f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3 (patch) | |
tree | 09f25601316d22b64165c19042da51c101bde3c4 /fs/exec.c | |
parent | 2600a46ee0ed57c0e0a382c2a37ebac64d374d20 (diff) | |
parent | b937190c40de0f6f07f592042e3097b16c6b0130 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3.zip op-kernel-dev-f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing
of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this
is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified
cryptographically via dm-verity).
This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by
default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing).
- Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key.
Lots of general fixes and updates.
- SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via
finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability
checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits)
LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG
Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting
seccomp: Fix comment typo
ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall
ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr
vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory
fs: fix over-zealous use of "const"
selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks
selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration
Yama: consolidate error reporting
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable
selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label
selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible
selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it
selinux: Change bool variable name to index.
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 8 deletions
@@ -850,15 +850,25 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size, if (ret) return ret; + ret = deny_write_access(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); - if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) - return -EFBIG; - if (i_size <= 0) - return -EINVAL; + if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) { + ret = -EFBIG; + goto out; + } + if (i_size <= 0) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } *buf = vmalloc(i_size); - if (!*buf) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!*buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } pos = 0; while (pos < i_size) { @@ -876,18 +886,21 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size, if (pos != i_size) { ret = -EIO; - goto out; + goto out_free; } ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id); if (!ret) *size = pos; -out: +out_free: if (ret < 0) { vfree(*buf); *buf = NULL; } + +out: + allow_write_access(file); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file); |