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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-06-05 00:23:17 -0700
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-07-18 12:13:40 -0700
commitc2e1f2e30daa551db3c670c0ccfeab20a540b9e1 (patch)
treee18b30519856013f4ed0d6349a7a31325e896918 /fs/exec.c
parent3ba2530cc06eb4aee4f1f754f43d781e8a12ee09 (diff)
downloadop-kernel-dev-c2e1f2e30daa551db3c670c0ccfeab20a540b9e1.zip
op-kernel-dev-c2e1f2e30daa551db3c670c0ccfeab20a540b9e1.tar.gz
seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
Applying restrictive seccomp filter programs to large or diverse codebases often requires handling threads which may be started early in the process lifetime (e.g., by code that is linked in). While it is possible to apply permissive programs prior to process start up, it is difficult to further restrict the kernel ABI to those threads after that point. This change adds a new seccomp syscall flag to SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER for synchronizing thread group seccomp filters at filter installation time. When calling seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC, filter) an attempt will be made to synchronize all threads in current's threadgroup to its new seccomp filter program. This is possible iff all threads are using a filter that is an ancestor to the filter current is attempting to synchronize to. NULL filters (where the task is running as SECCOMP_MODE_NONE) are also treated as ancestors allowing threads to be transitioned into SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER. If prctrl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) has been set on the calling thread, no_new_privs will be set for all synchronized threads too. On success, 0 is returned. On failure, the pid of one of the failing threads will be returned and no filters will have been applied. The race conditions against another thread are: - requesting TSYNC (already handled by sighand lock) - performing a clone (already handled by sighand lock) - changing its filter (already handled by sighand lock) - calling exec (handled by cred_guard_mutex) The clone case is assisted by the fact that new threads will have their seccomp state duplicated from their parent before appearing on the tasklist. Holding cred_guard_mutex means that seccomp filters cannot be assigned while in the middle of another thread's exec (potentially bypassing no_new_privs or similar). The call to de_thread() may kill threads waiting for the mutex. Changes across threads to the filter pointer includes a barrier. Based on patches by Will Drewry. Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 0f5c272..ab1f120 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
* - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
- * PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync
*/
static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
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