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authorMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>2007-10-16 01:27:53 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>2007-10-16 09:43:10 -0700
commitf4aad16adfb8f0a2d666fdf8af4bd0dff2ce75e4 (patch)
tree42e7f191d1a3a1e1375af24acc5c336b30c5c4d1 /fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
parentcce76f9b9696a59974be9ed43478c000c57e597a (diff)
downloadop-kernel-dev-f4aad16adfb8f0a2d666fdf8af4bd0dff2ce75e4.zip
op-kernel-dev-f4aad16adfb8f0a2d666fdf8af4bd0dff2ce75e4.tar.gz
eCryptfs: add key list structure; search keyring
Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c743
1 files changed, 465 insertions, 278 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index b550dea..a1764fe 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -402,20 +402,24 @@ out:
*
* Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise.
*/
-static int decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(
- struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
- struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
- struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+static int
+decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
{
u16 cipher_code = 0;
struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx;
struct ecryptfs_message *msg = NULL;
+ char *auth_tok_sig;
char *netlink_message;
size_t netlink_message_length;
int rc;
- rc = write_tag_64_packet(mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
- &(auth_tok->session_key),
+ if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&auth_tok_sig, auth_tok))) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Unrecognized auth tok type: [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->token_type);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = write_tag_64_packet(auth_tok_sig, &(auth_tok->session_key),
&netlink_message, &netlink_message_length);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Failed to write tag 64 packet");
@@ -921,126 +925,241 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+static int
+ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(
+ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok,
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, char *sig)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *walker;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ (*global_auth_tok) = NULL;
+ mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry(walker,
+ &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
+ mount_crypt_stat_list) {
+ if (memcmp(walker->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX) == 0) {
+ (*global_auth_tok) = walker;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
- * decrypt_session_key - Decrypt the session key with the given auth_tok.
+ * ecryptfs_verify_version
+ * @version: The version number to confirm
+ *
+ * Returns zero on good version; non-zero otherwise
+ */
+static int ecryptfs_verify_version(u16 version)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ unsigned char major;
+ unsigned char minor;
+
+ major = ((version >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ minor = (version & 0xFF);
+ if (major != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Major version number mismatch. "
+ "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n",
+ ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR, major);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (minor != ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Minor version number mismatch. "
+ "Expected [%d]; got [%d]\n",
+ ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR, minor);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key,
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok,
+ char *sig)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL);
+ if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n",
+ sig);
+ process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key));
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ (*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(*auth_tok_key);
+ if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Data structure version mismatch. "
+ "Userspace tools must match eCryptfs "
+ "kernel module with major version [%d] "
+ "and minor version [%d]\n",
+ ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR,
+ ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD
+ && (*auth_tok)->token_type != ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Invalid auth_tok structure "
+ "returned from key query\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig
+ * @auth_tok: Set to the matching auth_tok; NULL if not found
+ * @crypt_stat: inode crypt_stat crypto context
+ * @sig: Sig of auth_tok to find
+ *
+ * For now, this function simply looks at the registered auth_tok's
+ * linked off the mount_crypt_stat, so all the auth_toks that can be
+ * used must be registered at mount time. This function could
+ * potentially try a lot harder to find auth_tok's (e.g., by calling
+ * out to ecryptfsd to dynamically retrieve an auth_tok object) so
+ * that static registration of auth_tok's will no longer be necessary.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on no error; non-zero on error
+ */
+static int
+ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig(
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok **auth_tok,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
+ crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat;
+ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ (*auth_tok) = NULL;
+ if (ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok,
+ mount_crypt_stat, sig)) {
+ struct key *auth_tok_key;
+
+ rc = ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(&auth_tok_key, auth_tok,
+ sig);
+ } else
+ (*auth_tok) = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key - Decrypt the session key
+ * with the given auth_tok.
*
* Returns Zero on success; non-zero error otherwise.
*/
-static int decrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
- struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
+static int
+decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+ struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
{
- struct ecryptfs_password *password_s_ptr;
- struct scatterlist src_sg[2], dst_sg[2];
+ struct scatterlist dst_sg;
+ struct scatterlist src_sg;
struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL;
- char *encrypted_session_key;
- char *session_key;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
};
int rc = 0;
- password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password;
- if (password_s_ptr->flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET)
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key "
- "set; skipping key generation\n");
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])"
- ":\n",
- password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
- if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
- ecryptfs_dump_hex(password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key,
- password_s_ptr->
- session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
- if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher,
- crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name)
- && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) {
- desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm;
- tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex;
- } else {
- char *full_alg_name;
-
- rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name,
- crypt_stat->cipher,
- "ecb");
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0,
- CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- kfree(full_alg_name);
- if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
- rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm);
- printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating crypto context; "
- "rc = [%d]\n", rc);
- goto out;
- }
- crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(
+ KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d]):\n",
+ auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
+ ecryptfs_dump_hex(
+ auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key,
+ auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes);
+ }
+ rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex,
+ crypt_stat->cipher);
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get "
+ "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
+ crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
+ goto out;
}
- if (tfm_mutex)
- mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm,
- password_s_ptr->session_key_encryption_key,
- crypt_stat->key_size);
- if (rc < 0) {
+ if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size,
+ &src_sg, 1)) != 1) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert "
+ "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key to scatterlist; "
+ "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. "
+ "auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = [%d]\n", rc,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size,
+ &dst_sg, 1)) != 1) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to convert "
+ "auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key to scatterlist; "
+ "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(
+ desc.tfm, auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key,
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
+ if (unlikely(rc < 0)) {
+ mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
printk(KERN_ERR "Error setting key for crypto context\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out_free_tfm;
- }
- /* TODO: virt_to_scatterlist */
- encrypted_session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!encrypted_session_key) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_tfm;
+ goto out;
}
- session_key = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!session_key) {
- kfree(encrypted_session_key);
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n");
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_tfm;
- }
- memcpy(encrypted_session_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
- auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
- src_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(encrypted_session_key);
- src_sg[0].offset = 0;
- BUG_ON(auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
- src_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
- dst_sg[0].page = virt_to_page(session_key);
- dst_sg[0].offset = 0;
- auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
- auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
- dst_sg[0].length = auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, dst_sg, src_sg,
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg,
auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
- if (rc) {
+ mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error decrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
- goto out_free_memory;
+ goto out;
}
- auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size =
- auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
- memcpy(auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key, session_key,
- auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY;
memcpy(crypt_stat->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypted session key:\n");
- if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
+ if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "FEK of size [%d]:\n",
+ crypt_stat->key_size);
ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
crypt_stat->key_size);
-out_free_memory:
- memset(encrypted_session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
- free_page((unsigned long)encrypted_session_key);
- memset(session_key, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
- free_page((unsigned long)session_key);
-out_free_tfm:
- if (tfm_mutex)
- mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
- else
- crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
+ }
out:
return rc;
}
+int ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(char **sig, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ (*sig) = NULL;
+ switch (auth_tok->token_type) {
+ case ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD:
+ (*sig) = auth_tok->token.password.signature;
+ break;
+ case ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY:
+ (*sig) = auth_tok->token.private_key.signature;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot get sig for auth_tok of type [%d]\n",
+ auth_tok->token_type);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
/**
* ecryptfs_parse_packet_set
* @dest: The header page in memory
@@ -1058,25 +1177,22 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry)
{
size_t i = 0;
- size_t found_auth_tok = 0;
+ size_t found_auth_tok;
size_t next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet;
- char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX];
struct list_head auth_tok_list;
- struct list_head *walker;
- struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *chosen_auth_tok = NULL;
- struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
- &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
- ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *matching_auth_tok = NULL;
struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *candidate_auth_tok = NULL;
+ char *candidate_auth_tok_sig;
size_t packet_size;
struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;
unsigned char sig_tmp_space[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE];
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
size_t tag_11_contents_size;
size_t tag_11_packet_size;
int rc = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&auth_tok_list);
- /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can, these will be
+ /* Parse the header to find as many packets as we can; these will be
* added the our &auth_tok_list */
next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet = 1;
while (next_packet_is_auth_tok_packet) {
@@ -1155,73 +1271,86 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
}
}
if (list_empty(&auth_tok_list)) {
- rc = -EINVAL; /* Do not support non-encrypted files in
- * the 0.1 release */
+ printk(KERN_ERR "The lower file appears to be a non-encrypted "
+ "eCryptfs file; this is not supported in this version "
+ "of the eCryptfs kernel module\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- /* If we have a global auth tok, then we should try to use
- * it */
- if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
- memcpy(sig, mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
- ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
- chosen_auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok;
- } else
- BUG(); /* We should always have a global auth tok in
- * the 0.1 release */
- /* Scan list to see if our chosen_auth_tok works */
- list_for_each(walker, &auth_tok_list) {
- struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item;
- auth_tok_list_item =
- list_entry(walker, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item,
- list);
+ /* auth_tok_list contains the set of authentication tokens
+ * parsed from the metadata. We need to find a matching
+ * authentication token that has the secret component(s)
+ * necessary to decrypt the EFEK in the auth_tok parsed from
+ * the metadata. There may be several potential matches, but
+ * just one will be sufficient to decrypt to get the FEK. */
+find_next_matching_auth_tok:
+ found_auth_tok = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(auth_tok_list_item, &auth_tok_list, list) {
candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok;
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
"Considering cadidate auth tok:\n");
ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok);
}
- /* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */
- if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD
- && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature,
- sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
- found_auth_tok = 1;
- goto leave_list;
- /* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the
- * crypt_stat salt */
- } else if ((candidate_auth_tok->token_type
- == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY)
- && !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key.signature,
- sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
+ if ((rc = ecryptfs_get_auth_tok_sig(&candidate_auth_tok_sig,
+ candidate_auth_tok))) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Unrecognized candidate auth tok type: [%d]\n",
+ candidate_auth_tok->token_type);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_wipe_list;
+ }
+ if ((rc = ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig(
+ &matching_auth_tok, crypt_stat,
+ candidate_auth_tok_sig)))
+ rc = 0;
+ if (matching_auth_tok) {
found_auth_tok = 1;
- goto leave_list;
+ goto found_matching_auth_tok;
}
}
if (!found_auth_tok) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find authentication "
- "token on temporary list for sig [%.*s]\n",
- ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, sig);
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not find a usable "
+ "authentication token\n");
rc = -EIO;
goto out_wipe_list;
}
-leave_list:
- rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+found_matching_auth_tok:
if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key),
- &(chosen_auth_tok->token.private_key),
+ &(matching_auth_tok->token.private_key),
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key));
- rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(mount_crypt_stat,
- candidate_auth_tok,
+ rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(candidate_auth_tok,
crypt_stat);
} else if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) {
memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password),
- &(chosen_auth_tok->token.password),
+ &(matching_auth_tok->token.password),
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password));
- rc = decrypt_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat);
+ rc = decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key(
+ candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat);
}
if (rc) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error decrypting the "
- "session key; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
- goto out_wipe_list;
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp;
+
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error decrypting the "
+ "session key for authentication token with sig "
+ "[%.*s]; rc = [%d]. Removing auth tok "
+ "candidate from the list and searching for "
+ "the next match.\n", candidate_auth_tok_sig,
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX, rc);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(auth_tok_list_item,
+ auth_tok_list_item_tmp,
+ &auth_tok_list, list) {
+ if (candidate_auth_tok
+ == &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok) {
+ list_del(&auth_tok_list_item->list);
+ kmem_cache_free(
+ ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item_cache,
+ auth_tok_list_item);
+ goto find_next_matching_auth_tok;
+ }
+ }
+ BUG();
}
rc = ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat);
if (rc) {
@@ -1240,6 +1369,7 @@ out_wipe_list:
out:
return rc;
}
+
static int
pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
@@ -1291,15 +1421,15 @@ out:
* Returns zero on success; non-zero on error.
*/
static int
-write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
- struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size)
{
size_t i;
size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
- size_t key_rec_size;
size_t packet_size_length;
+ size_t max_packet_size;
int rc = 0;
(*packet_size) = 0;
@@ -1329,37 +1459,23 @@ write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key, key_rec->enc_key_size);
}
encrypted_session_key_set:
- /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the
- * key_rec set. */
- key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record)
- - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES
- + (key_rec->enc_key_size));
- /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this
- * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions
- * later than 0.1 */
- if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- /* ***** TAG 1 Packet Format *****
- * | version number | 1 byte |
- * | key ID | 8 bytes |
- * | public key algorithm | 1 byte |
- * | encrypted session key | arbitrary |
- */
- if ((0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR,
- "Authentication token is too large\n");
+ /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
+ * packet tag 1 */
+ max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 1 identifier */
+ + 3 /* Max Tag 1 packet size */
+ + 1 /* Version */
+ + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE /* Key identifier */
+ + 1 /* Cipher identifier */
+ + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */
+ if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Packet length larger than maximum allowable; "
+ "need up to [%d] bytes, but there are only [%d] "
+ "available\n", max_packet_size, (*remaining_bytes));
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE;
- /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
- * packet tag 1 */
- rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)],
- (0x02 + ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE +
- key_rec->enc_key_size),
+ rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4),
&packet_size_length);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 1 packet "
@@ -1377,6 +1493,8 @@ encrypted_session_key_set:
out:
if (rc)
(*packet_size) = 0;
+ else
+ (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size);
return rc;
}
@@ -1448,19 +1566,22 @@ write_tag_11_packet(char *dest, int max, char *contents, size_t contents_length,
* Returns zero on success; non-zero on error.
*/
static int
-write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
+write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes,
+ struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size)
{
size_t i;
size_t encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
char session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
- struct scatterlist dest_sg[2];
- struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
+ struct scatterlist dst_sg;
+ struct scatterlist src_sg;
struct mutex *tfm_mutex = NULL;
- size_t key_rec_size;
- size_t packet_size_length;
size_t cipher_code;
+ size_t packet_size_length;
+ size_t max_packet_size;
+ struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
+ crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
.tfm = NULL,
.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
@@ -1470,16 +1591,25 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
(*packet_size) = 0;
ecryptfs_from_hex(key_rec->sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature,
ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE);
- encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < crypt_stat->key_size; i++)
- encrypted_session_key_valid |=
- auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i];
- if (encrypted_session_key_valid) {
- memcpy(key_rec->enc_key,
- auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
- auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size);
- goto encrypted_session_key_set;
+ rc = ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name(&desc.tfm, &tfm_mutex,
+ crypt_stat->cipher);
+ if (unlikely(rc)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Internal error whilst attempting to get "
+ "tfm and mutex for cipher name [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
+ crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size == 0) {
+ struct blkcipher_alg *alg = crypto_blkcipher_alg(desc.tfm);
+
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "No key size specified at mount; "
+ "defaulting to [%d]\n", alg->max_keysize);
+ mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size =
+ alg->max_keysize;
}
+ if (crypt_stat->key_size == 0)
+ crypt_stat->key_size =
+ mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_key_size;
if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0)
auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size =
crypt_stat->key_size;
@@ -1487,9 +1617,24 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
&& strcmp("aes", crypt_stat->cipher) == 0) {
memset((crypt_stat->key + 24), 0, 8);
auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = 32;
- }
+ } else
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = crypt_stat->key_size;
key_rec->enc_key_size =
auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size;
+ encrypted_session_key_valid = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size; i++)
+ encrypted_session_key_valid |=
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key[i];
+ if (encrypted_session_key_valid) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "encrypted_session_key_valid != 0; "
+ "using auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, "
+ "where key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n",
+ key_rec->enc_key_size);
+ memcpy(key_rec->enc_key,
+ auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key,
+ key_rec->enc_key_size);
+ goto encrypted_session_key_set;
+ }
if (auth_tok->token.password.flags &
ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Using previously generated "
@@ -1508,54 +1653,32 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key:\n");
ecryptfs_dump_hex(session_key_encryption_key, 16);
}
- rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key,
- key_rec->enc_key_size, src_sg, 2);
- if (!rc) {
+ if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(crypt_stat->key,
+ key_rec->enc_key_size, &src_sg, 1))
+ != 1) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
- "for crypt_stat session key\n");
+ "for crypt_stat session key; expected rc = 1; "
+ "got rc = [%d]. key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n",
+ rc, key_rec->enc_key_size);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key,
- key_rec->enc_key_size, dest_sg, 2);
- if (!rc) {
+ if ((rc = virt_to_scatterlist(key_rec->enc_key,
+ key_rec->enc_key_size, &dst_sg, 1))
+ != 1) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating scatterlist "
- "for crypt_stat encrypted session key\n");
+ "for crypt_stat encrypted session key; "
+ "expected rc = 1; got rc = [%d]. "
+ "key_rec->enc_key_size = [%d]\n", rc,
+ key_rec->enc_key_size);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- if (!strcmp(crypt_stat->cipher,
- crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_default_cipher_name)
- && crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm) {
- desc.tfm = crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm;
- tfm_mutex = &crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat->global_key_tfm_mutex;
- } else {
- char *full_alg_name;
-
- rc = ecryptfs_crypto_api_algify_cipher_name(&full_alg_name,
- crypt_stat->cipher,
- "ecb");
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(full_alg_name, 0,
- CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- kfree(full_alg_name);
- if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
- rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm);
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Could not initialize crypto "
- "context for cipher [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
- crypt_stat->cipher, rc);
- goto out;
- }
- crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(desc.tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
- }
- if (tfm_mutex)
- mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(tfm_mutex);
rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, session_key_encryption_key,
crypt_stat->key_size);
if (rc < 0) {
- if (tfm_mutex)
- mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error setting key for crypto "
"context; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
@@ -1563,56 +1686,53 @@ write_tag_3_packet(char *dest, size_t max, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok,
rc = 0;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Encrypting [%d] bytes of the key\n",
crypt_stat->key_size);
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, dest_sg, src_sg,
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &dst_sg, &src_sg,
(*key_rec).enc_key_size);
+ mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error encrypting; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
- if (tfm_mutex)
- mutex_unlock(tfm_mutex);
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This should be the encrypted key:\n");
- if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
+ if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0) {
+ ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "EFEK of size [%d]:\n",
+ key_rec->enc_key_size);
ecryptfs_dump_hex(key_rec->enc_key,
key_rec->enc_key_size);
-encrypted_session_key_set:
- /* Now we have a valid key_rec. Append it to the
- * key_rec set. */
- key_rec_size = (sizeof(struct ecryptfs_key_record)
- - ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES
- + (key_rec->enc_key_size));
- /* TODO: Include a packet size limit as a parameter to this
- * function once we have multi-packet headers (for versions
- * later than 0.1 */
- if (key_rec_size >= ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Keyset too large\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
}
- /* TODO: Packet size limit */
- /* We have 5 bytes of surrounding packet data */
- if ((0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE
- + key_rec->enc_key_size) >= max) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Authentication token is too "
- "large\n");
+encrypted_session_key_set:
+ /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
+ * packet tag 3 */
+ max_packet_size = (1 /* Tag 3 identifier */
+ + 3 /* Max Tag 3 packet size */
+ + 1 /* Version */
+ + 1 /* Cipher code */
+ + 1 /* S2K specifier */
+ + 1 /* Hash identifier */
+ + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE /* Salt */
+ + 1 /* Hash iterations */
+ + key_rec->enc_key_size); /* Encrypted key size */
+ if (max_packet_size > (*remaining_bytes)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Packet too large; need up to [%d] bytes, but "
+ "there are only [%d] available\n", max_packet_size,
+ (*remaining_bytes));
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- /* This format is inspired by OpenPGP; see RFC 2440
- * packet tag 3 */
dest[(*packet_size)++] = ECRYPTFS_TAG_3_PACKET_TYPE;
- /* ver+cipher+s2k+hash+salt+iter+enc_key */
- rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)],
- (0x05 + ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE
- + key_rec->enc_key_size),
+ /* Chop off the Tag 3 identifier(1) and Tag 3 packet size(3)
+ * to get the number of octets in the actual Tag 3 packet */
+ rc = write_packet_length(&dest[(*packet_size)], (max_packet_size - 4),
&packet_size_length);
if (rc) {
- ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 3 packet "
- "header; cannot generate packet length\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Error generating tag 3 packet header; cannot "
+ "generate packet length. rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
(*packet_size) += packet_size_length;
dest[(*packet_size)++] = 0x04; /* version 4 */
+ /* TODO: Break from RFC2440 so that arbitrary ciphers can be
+ * specified with strings */
cipher_code = ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string(crypt_stat);
if (cipher_code == 0) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unable to generate code for "
@@ -1631,10 +1751,10 @@ encrypted_session_key_set:
key_rec->enc_key_size);
(*packet_size) += key_rec->enc_key_size;
out:
- if (desc.tfm && !tfm_mutex)
- crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
if (rc)
(*packet_size) = 0;
+ else
+ (*remaining_bytes) -= (*packet_size);
return rc;
}
@@ -1662,24 +1782,43 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
size_t max)
{
struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
+ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *global_auth_tok;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat =
&ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
size_t written;
struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec;
+ struct ecryptfs_key_sig *key_sig;
int rc = 0;
(*len) = 0;
+ mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
key_rec = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key_rec) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
- auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok;
+ list_for_each_entry(key_sig, &crypt_stat->keysig_list,
+ crypt_stat_list) {
+ memset(key_rec, 0, sizeof(*key_rec));
+ rc = ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig(&global_auth_tok,
+ mount_crypt_stat,
+ key_sig->keysig);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to get the global "
+ "auth_tok; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "Skipping invalid auth tok with sig = [%s]\n",
+ global_auth_tok->sig);
+ continue;
+ }
+ auth_tok = global_auth_tok->global_auth_tok;
if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) {
rc = write_tag_3_packet((dest_base + (*len)),
- max, auth_tok,
+ &max, auth_tok,
crypt_stat, key_rec,
&written);
if (rc) {
@@ -1689,10 +1828,9 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
}
(*len) += written;
/* Write auth tok signature packet */
- rc = write_tag_11_packet(
- (dest_base + (*len)),
- (max - (*len)),
- key_rec->sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written);
+ rc = write_tag_11_packet((dest_base + (*len)), &max,
+ key_rec->sig,
+ ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE, &written);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing "
"auth tok signature packet\n");
@@ -1701,9 +1839,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
(*len) += written;
} else if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len),
- max, auth_tok,
- crypt_stat,mount_crypt_stat,
- key_rec, &written);
+ &max, auth_tok,
+ crypt_stat, key_rec, &written);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error "
"writing tag 1 packet\n");
@@ -1716,19 +1853,69 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base,
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
- } else
- BUG();
- if (likely((max - (*len)) > 0)) {
+ }
+ if (likely(max > 0)) {
dest_base[(*len)] = 0x00;
} else {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error writing boundary byte\n");
rc = -EIO;
}
-
out_free:
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_record_cache, key_rec);
out:
if (rc)
(*len) = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_key_sig_cache;
+
+int ecryptfs_add_keysig(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, char *sig)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_key_sig *new_key_sig;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ new_key_sig = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_sig_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_key_sig) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Error allocating from ecryptfs_key_sig_cache\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(new_key_sig->keysig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
+ mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
+ list_add(&new_key_sig->crypt_stat_list, &crypt_stat->keysig_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
+out:
return rc;
}
+
+struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache;
+
+int
+ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,
+ char *sig)
+{
+ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ new_auth_tok = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_auth_tok) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating from "
+ "ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(new_auth_tok->sig, sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
+ new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
+ mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
+ list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list,
+ &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list);
+ mount_crypt_stat->num_global_auth_toks++;
+ mutex_unlock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
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