Btrfs: fix file corruption after cloning inline extents

Using the clone ioctl (or extent_same ioctl, which calls the same extent
cloning function as well) we end up allowing copy an inline extent from
the source file into a non-zero offset of the destination file. This is
something not expected and that the btrfs code is not prepared to deal
with - all inline extents must be at a file offset equals to 0.

For example, the following excerpt of a test case for fstests triggers
a crash/BUG_ON() on a write operation after an inline extent is cloned
into a non-zero offset:

  _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
  _scratch_mount

  # Create our test files. File foo has the same 2K of data at offset 4K
  # as file bar has at its offset 0.
  $XFS_IO_PROG -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 4K" \
      -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 4k 2K" \
      -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 8K 4K" \
      $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io

  # File bar consists of a single inline extent (2K size).
  $XFS_IO_PROG -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 2K" \
     $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io

  # Now call the clone ioctl to clone the extent of file bar into file
  # foo at its offset 4K. This made file foo have an inline extent at
  # offset 4K, something which the btrfs code can not deal with in future
  # IO operations because all inline extents are supposed to start at an
  # offset of 0, resulting in all sorts of chaos.
  # So here we validate that clone ioctl returns an EOPNOTSUPP, which is
  # what it returns for other cases dealing with inlined extents.
  $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d $((4 * 1024)) -l $((2 * 1024)) \
      $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo

  # Because of the inline extent at offset 4K, the following write made
  # the kernel crash with a BUG_ON().
  $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 6K 2K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io

  status=0
  exit

The stack trace of the BUG_ON() triggered by the last write is:

  [152154.035903] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [152154.036424] kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2286!
  [152154.036424] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
  [152154.036424] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_flakey dm_mod crc32c_generic xor raid6_pq nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc loop fuse parport_pc acpi_cpu$
  [152154.036424] CPU: 2 PID: 17873 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G        W       4.1.0-rc6-btrfs-next-11+ #2
  [152154.036424] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20150316_085822-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
  [152154.036424] task: ffff880429f70990 ti: ffff880429efc000 task.ti: ffff880429efc000
  [152154.036424] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8111a9d5>]  [<ffffffff8111a9d5>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x90
  [152154.036424] RSP: 0018:ffff880429effc68  EFLAGS: 00010246
  [152154.036424] RAX: 0200000000000806 RBX: ffffea0006a6d8f0 RCX: 0000000000000001
  [152154.036424] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81155d1b RDI: ffffea0006a6d8f0
  [152154.036424] RBP: ffff880429effc78 R08: ffff8801ce389fe0 R09: 0000000000000001
  [152154.036424] R10: 0000000000002000 R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: ffff8800200dce68
  [152154.036424] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800200dcc88 R15: ffff8803d5736d80
  [152154.036424] FS:  00007fbf119f6700(0000) GS:ffff88043d280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [152154.036424] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [152154.036424] CR2: 0000000001bdc000 CR3: 00000003aa555000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  [152154.036424] Stack:
  [152154.036424]  ffff8803d5736d80 0000000000000001 ffff880429effcd8 ffffffffa04e97c1
  [152154.036424]  ffff880429effd68 ffff880429effd60 0000000000000001 ffff8800200dc9c8
  [152154.036424]  0000000000000001 ffff8800200dcc88 0000000000000000 0000000000001000
  [152154.036424] Call Trace:
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04e97c1>] lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need+0x147/0x18d [btrfs]
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ea82c>] __btrfs_buffered_write+0x245/0x4c8 [btrfs]
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ed14b>] ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x150/0x3e0 [btrfs]
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ed15a>] ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x15f/0x3e0 [btrfs]
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffffa04ed2c7>] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x2cc/0x3e0 [btrfs]
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81165a4a>] __vfs_write+0x7c/0xa5
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81165f89>] vfs_write+0xa0/0xe4
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81166855>] SyS_pwrite64+0x64/0x82
  [152154.036424]  [<ffffffff81465197>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
  [152154.036424] Code: 48 89 c7 e8 0f ff ff ff 5b 41 5c 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 48 89 fb e8 ae ef 00 00 49 89 c4 48 8b 03 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 4d 85 e4 74 59 49 8b 3c 2$
  [152154.036424] RIP  [<ffffffff8111a9d5>] clear_page_dirty_for_io+0x1e/0x90
  [152154.036424]  RSP <ffff880429effc68>
  [152154.242621] ---[ end trace e3d3376b23a57041 ]---

Fix this by returning the error EOPNOTSUPP if an attempt to copy an
inline extent into a non-zero offset happens, just like what is done for
other scenarios that would require copying/splitting inline extents,
which were introduced by the following commits:

   00fdf13a2e9f ("Btrfs: fix a crash of clone with inline extents's split")
   3f9e3df8da3c ("btrfs: replace error code from btrfs_drop_extents")

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>

1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
index d389815..0770c91 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
@@ -3588,6 +3588,20 @@ process_slot:
 				u64 trim = 0;
 				u64 aligned_end = 0;
 
+				/*
+				 * Don't copy an inline extent into an offset
+				 * greater than zero. Having an inline extent
+				 * at such an offset results in chaos as btrfs
+				 * isn't prepared for such cases. Just skip
+				 * this case for the same reasons as commented
+				 * at btrfs_ioctl_clone().
+				 */
+				if (last_dest_end > 0) {
+					ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
+					goto out;
+				}
+
 				if (off > key.offset) {
 					skip = off - key.offset;
 					new_key.offset += skip;