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author | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2017-01-06 19:32:01 +0100 |
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committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2017-01-27 14:25:06 -0500 |
commit | f5b98461cb8167ba362ad9f74c41d126b7becea7 (patch) | |
tree | a03acbf2b6426dc27d642bacedd567611896d709 /drivers | |
parent | 5d0e5ea343a0f70351428476bcf8715e0731f26a (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-f5b98461cb8167ba362ad9f74c41d126b7becea7.zip op-kernel-dev-f5b98461cb8167ba362ad9f74c41d126b7becea7.tar.gz |
random: use chacha20 for get_random_int/long
Now that our crng uses chacha20, we can rely on its speedy
characteristics for replacing MD5, while simultaneously achieving a
higher security guarantee. Before the idea was to use these functions if
you wanted random integers that aren't stupidly insecure but aren't
necessarily secure either, a vague gray zone, that hopefully was "good
enough" for its users. With chacha20, we can strengthen this claim,
since either we're using an rdrand-like instruction, or we're using the
same crng as /dev/urandom. And it's faster than what was before.
We could have chosen to replace this with a SipHash-derived function,
which might be slightly faster, but at the cost of having yet another
RNG construction in the kernel. By moving to chacha20, we have a single
RNG to analyze and verify, and we also already get good performance
improvements on all platforms.
Implementation-wise, rather than use a generic buffer for both
get_random_int/long and memcpy based on the size needs, we use a
specific buffer for 32-bit reads and for 64-bit reads. This way, we're
guaranteed to always have aligned accesses on all platforms. While
slightly more verbose in C, the assembly this generates is a lot
simpler than otherwise.
Finally, on 32-bit platforms where longs and ints are the same size,
we simply alias get_random_int to get_random_long.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 84 |
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 9d147d4..b800e54 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2016,63 +2016,65 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ -static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned; - -int random_int_secret_init(void) -{ - get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret)); - return 0; -} - -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash) - __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); +struct batched_entropy { + union { + unsigned long entropy_long[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; + unsigned int entropy_int[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned int)]; + }; + unsigned int position; +}; /* - * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but - * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random - * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of - * depleting entropy is too high + * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random + * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the + * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. */ -unsigned int get_random_int(void) +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_long); +unsigned long get_random_long(void) { - __u32 *hash; - unsigned int ret; + unsigned long ret; + struct batched_entropy *batch; - if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) + if (arch_get_random_long(&ret)) return ret; - hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - - hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy(); - md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); - ret = hash[0]; - put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - + batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_long) == 0) { + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_long); + batch->position = 0; + } + ret = batch->entropy_long[batch->position++]; + put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); -/* - * Same as get_random_int(), but returns unsigned long. - */ -unsigned long get_random_long(void) +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 +unsigned int get_random_int(void) { - __u32 *hash; - unsigned long ret; + return get_random_long(); +} +#else +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_int); +unsigned int get_random_int(void) +{ + unsigned int ret; + struct batched_entropy *batch; - if (arch_get_random_long(&ret)) + if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) return ret; - hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - - hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy(); - md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); - ret = *(unsigned long *)hash; - put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - + batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_int) == 0) { + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_int); + batch->position = 0; + } + ret = batch->entropy_int[batch->position++]; + put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); +#endif +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int); /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address |