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| author | Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> | 2014-08-26 23:16:35 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2014-10-17 11:37:29 -0400 |
| commit | d4c5efdb97773f59a2b711754ca0953f24516739 (patch) | |
| tree | 83ededeb92d6d529e8081b97b2f9cdf491094b78 /drivers/char/random.c | |
| parent | 7d1311b93e58ed55f3a31cc8f94c4b8fe988a2b9 (diff) | |
| download | op-kernel-dev-d4c5efdb97773f59a2b711754ca0953f24516739.zip op-kernel-dev-d4c5efdb97773f59a2b711754ca0953f24516739.tar.gz | |
random: add and use memzero_explicit() for clearing data
zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7)
memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy,
entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc.
Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants)
that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is
being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto
code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in
and doesn't need any dependencies then. ]
Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041
Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index c18d41d..8c86a95 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w)); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); - memset(workspace, 0, sizeof(workspace)); + memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace)); /* * In case the hash function has some recognizable output @@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out) hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16); memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE); - memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); + memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash)); } /* @@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf, } /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); return ret; } @@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, } /* Wipe data just returned from memory */ - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); return ret; } |
