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author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2014-12-05 18:26:30 -0600 |
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committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2014-12-09 17:08:32 -0600 |
commit | 80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d (patch) | |
tree | 40ff3ad2233bc6f08bcde250acc87a29af9ad0af /crypto | |
parent | be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d.zip op-kernel-dev-80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d.tar.gz |
userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping
setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and
fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map
their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid,
as no new credentials can be obtained.
I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting
uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use
of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions