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author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2018-01-03 11:16:30 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2018-01-12 23:03:39 +1100 |
commit | dc26c17f743aa8e4720a5fda577dde855f2e36f8 (patch) | |
tree | fcd23cb048b79d5d3a83a0901aae8289da8e46cc /crypto | |
parent | f8d33fac84806eebd2ba31a3136066eeca19255f (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-dc26c17f743aa8e4720a5fda577dde855f2e36f8.zip op-kernel-dev-dc26c17f743aa8e4720a5fda577dde855f2e36f8.tar.gz |
crypto: aead - prevent using AEADs without setting key
Similar to what was done for the hash API, update the AEAD API to track
whether each transform has been keyed, and reject encryption/decryption
if a key is needed but one hasn't been set.
This isn't quite as important as the equivalent fix for the hash API
because AEADs always require a key, so are unlikely to be used without
one. Still, tracking the key will prevent accidental unkeyed use.
algif_aead also had to track the key anyway, so the new flag replaces
that and slightly simplifies the algif_aead implementation.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/aead.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/algif_aead.c | 11 |
2 files changed, 14 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c index fe00cbd..60b3bbe 100644 --- a/crypto/aead.c +++ b/crypto/aead.c @@ -54,11 +54,18 @@ int crypto_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm); + int err; if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask) - return setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen); + err = setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen); + else + err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen); + + if (err) + return err; - return crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setkey(tfm, key, keylen); + crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setkey); @@ -93,6 +100,8 @@ static int crypto_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) struct crypto_aead *aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm); struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead); + crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY); + aead->authsize = alg->maxauthsize; if (alg->exit) diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index d963c8c..4b07edd 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ struct aead_tfm { struct crypto_aead *aead; - bool has_key; struct crypto_skcipher *null_tfm; }; @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int aead_check_key(struct socket *sock) err = -ENOKEY; lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); - if (!tfm->has_key) + if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm->aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY) goto unlock; if (!pask->refcnt++) @@ -523,12 +522,8 @@ static int aead_setauthsize(void *private, unsigned int authsize) static int aead_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { struct aead_tfm *tfm = private; - int err; - - err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm->aead, key, keylen); - tfm->has_key = !err; - return err; + return crypto_aead_setkey(tfm->aead, key, keylen); } static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) @@ -589,7 +584,7 @@ static int aead_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk) { struct aead_tfm *tfm = private; - if (!tfm->has_key) + if (crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm->aead) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY) return -ENOKEY; return aead_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk); |