crypto: fips - only panic on bad/missing crypto mod signatures

Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.

v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.

CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c
index 7a1ae87..e8d3a7d 100644
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -41,8 +41,20 @@ static inline int crypto_set_driver_name(struct crypto_alg *alg)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void crypto_check_module_sig(struct module *mod)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+	if (fips_enabled && mod && !mod->sig_ok)
+		panic("Module %s signature verification failed in FIPS mode\n",
+		      mod->name);
+#endif
+	return;
+}
+
 static int crypto_check_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
 {
+	crypto_check_module_sig(alg->cra_module);
+
 	if (alg->cra_alignmask & (alg->cra_alignmask + 1))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -430,6 +442,8 @@ int crypto_register_template(struct crypto_template *tmpl)
 
 	down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
 
+	crypto_check_module_sig(tmpl->module);
+
 	list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_template_list, list) {
 		if (q == tmpl)
 			goto out;