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authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2018-05-12 20:10:00 +0200
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2018-05-17 17:09:20 +0200
commitbe6fcb5478e95bb1c91f489121238deb3abca46a (patch)
treec27fa962513013e6df71c61e12ce85ba11d67830 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
parent4b59bdb569453a60b752b274ca61f009e37f4dae (diff)
downloadop-kernel-dev-be6fcb5478e95bb1c91f489121238deb3abca46a.zip
op-kernel-dev-be6fcb5478e95bb1c91f489121238deb3abca46a.tar.gz
x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic
x86_spec_ctrL_mask is intended to mask out bits from a MSR_SPEC_CTRL value which are not to be modified. However the implementation is not really used and the bitmask was inverted to make a check easier, which was removed in "x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()" Aside of that it is missing the STIBP bit if it is supported by the platform, so if the mask would be used in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() then it would prevent a guest from setting STIBP. Add the STIBP bit if supported and use the mask in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() to sanitize the value which is supplied by the guest. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c26
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e0b2e3b..8e327bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
* x86_spec_ctrl_base.
*/
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
/*
* AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
@@ -68,6 +68,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
@@ -136,18 +140,26 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
+ u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
- u64 msr, host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ /*
+ * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
+ * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
+ * modifiable bits from the guest value.
+ */
+ guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+ guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+
/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
- host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+ hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
- if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) {
- msr = setguest ? guest_spec_ctrl : host;
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+ if (hostval != guestval) {
+ msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
}
}
}
@@ -493,7 +505,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
break;
case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
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