Merge branch 'x86-kaslr-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 kernel address space randomization support from Peter Anvin:
 "This enables kernel address space randomization for x86"

* 'x86-kaslr-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86, kaslr: Clarify RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
  x86, kaslr: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
  x86, kaslr: Use char array to gain sizeof sanity
  x86, kaslr: Add a circular multiply for better bit diffusion
  x86, kaslr: Mix entropy sources together as needed
  x86/relocs: Add percpu fixup for GNU ld 2.23
  x86, boot: Rename get_flags() and check_flags() to *_cpuflags()
  x86, kaslr: Raise the maximum virtual address to -1 GiB on x86_64
  x86, kaslr: Report kernel offset on panic
  x86, kaslr: Select random position from e820 maps
  x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions
  x86, kaslr: Return location from decompress_kernel
  x86, boot: Move CPU flags out of cpucheck
  x86, relocs: Add more per-cpu gold special cases

1 files changed, 55 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 5216e28..cd18b83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1693,16 +1693,67 @@ config RELOCATABLE
 
 	  Note: If CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y, then the kernel runs from the address
 	  it has been loaded at and the compile time physical address
-	  (CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START) is ignored.
+	  (CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START) is used as the minimum location.
 
-# Relocation on x86-32 needs some additional build support
+config RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
+	depends on RELOCATABLE
+	depends on !HIBERNATION
+	default n
+	---help---
+	   Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the
+	   kernel image is decompressed, as a security feature that
+	   deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
+	   of kernel internals.
+
+	   Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is
+	   supported. If RDTSC is supported, it is used as well. If
+	   neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are supported, then randomness is
+	   read from the i8254 timer.
+
+	   The kernel will be offset by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET,
+	   and aligned according to PHYSICAL_ALIGN. Since the kernel is
+	   built using 2GiB addressing, and PHYSICAL_ALGIN must be at a
+	   minimum of 2MiB, only 10 bits of entropy is theoretically
+	   possible. At best, due to page table layouts, 64-bit can use
+	   9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits.
+
+	   If unsure, say N.
+
+config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
+	hex "Maximum kASLR offset allowed" if EXPERT
+	depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	range 0x0 0x20000000 if X86_32
+	default "0x20000000" if X86_32
+	range 0x0 0x40000000 if X86_64
+	default "0x40000000" if X86_64
+	---help---
+	  The lesser of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET and available physical
+	  memory is used to determine the maximal offset in bytes that will
+	  be applied to the kernel when kernel Address Space Layout
+	  Randomization (kASLR) is active. This must be a multiple of
+	  PHYSICAL_ALIGN.
+
+	  On 32-bit this is limited to 512MiB by page table layouts. The
+	  default is 512MiB.
+
+	  On 64-bit this is limited by how the kernel fixmap page table is
+	  positioned, so this cannot be larger than 1GiB currently. Without
+	  RANDOMIZE_BASE, there is a 512MiB to 1.5GiB split between kernel
+	  and modules. When RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET is above 512MiB, the
+	  modules area will shrink to compensate, up to the current maximum
+	  1GiB to 1GiB split. The default is 1GiB.
+
+	  If unsure, leave at the default value.
+
+# Relocation on x86 needs some additional build support
 config X86_NEED_RELOCS
 	def_bool y
-	depends on X86_32 && RELOCATABLE
+	depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE || (X86_32 && RELOCATABLE)
 
 config PHYSICAL_ALIGN
 	hex "Alignment value to which kernel should be aligned"
-	default "0x1000000"
+	default "0x200000"
 	range 0x2000 0x1000000 if X86_32
 	range 0x200000 0x1000000 if X86_64
 	---help---