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author | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | 2015-12-29 21:35:47 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> | 2016-01-10 21:49:49 +0100 |
commit | c50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0 (patch) | |
tree | 700ad5bdbc1726819971e0f258d49dd778606c5f /arch/um | |
parent | d8f8b8445648c267a24f30a72533e77cb6543f21 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-c50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0.zip op-kernel-dev-c50b4659e444b020657e01bdf769c965e5597cb0.tar.gz |
um: Add seccomp support
This brings SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT and SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER support through
prctl(2) and seccomp(2) to User-mode Linux for i386 and x86_64
subarchitectures.
secure_computing() is called first in handle_syscall() so that the
syscall emulation will be aborted quickly if matching a seccomp rule.
This is inspired from Meredydd Luff's patch
(https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21425).
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/um')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/um/Kconfig.common | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/um/Kconfig.um | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c | 5 |
4 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.common b/arch/um/Kconfig.common index d195a87..cc00134 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig.common +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.common @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ config UML bool default y select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_UID16 select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig.um b/arch/um/Kconfig.um index 28a9885..4b2ed58 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig.um +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig.um @@ -104,3 +104,19 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS int default 3 if 3_LEVEL_PGTABLES default 2 + +config SECCOMP + def_bool y + prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" + ---help--- + This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications + that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their + execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to + the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write + syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in + their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is + enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled + and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls + defined by each seccomp mode. + + If unsure, say Y. diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h index 53968aa..053baff 100644 --- a/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/um/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -62,11 +62,13 @@ static inline struct thread_info *current_thread_info(void) #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 6 #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK 7 #define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 8 +#define TIF_SECCOMP 9 /* secure computing */ #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) #define _TIF_MEMDIE (1 << TIF_MEMDIE) #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) +#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP) #endif diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c index 6cadce7..48b0dcb 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> #include <kern_util.h> #include <sysdep/ptrace.h> #include <sysdep/ptrace_user.h> @@ -19,6 +20,10 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r) UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r) = PT_SYSCALL_NR(r->gp); PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, -ENOSYS); + /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */ + if (secure_computing() == -1) + return; + if (syscall_trace_enter(regs)) goto out; |