Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
 "This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
  yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
  linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"

* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
  ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
  selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
  selinux:  Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
  Warning in scanf string typing
  Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
  Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
  security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
  Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
  Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
  SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
  bugfix patch for SMACK
  Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
  Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
  Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
  Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
  smack: fix key permission verification
  KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
index 5ea996f..b6ef7e9 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
@@ -204,6 +204,16 @@ onlycap
 	these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
 	label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
 	file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+ptrace
+	This is used to define the current ptrace policy
+	0 - default: this is the policy that relies on smack access rules.
+	    For the PTRACE_READ a subject needs to have a read access on
+	    object. For the PTRACE_ATTACH a read-write access is required.
+	1 - exact: this is the policy that limits PTRACE_ATTACH. Attach is
+	    only allowed when subject's and object's labels are equal.
+	    PTRACE_READ is not affected. Can be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
+	2 - draconian: this policy behaves like the 'exact' above with an
+	    exception that it can't be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
 revoke-subject
 	Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access
 	rules with that subject label.