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| author | Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> | 2013-10-23 11:06:57 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-10-23 17:01:41 -0400 |
| commit | 7088ad74e6e710d0c80ea2cead9500f47a2a5d58 (patch) | |
| tree | 5e0931546c135c8802911ed2e5218c825b59ae2f | |
| parent | b1190570b451fb9fd77be8c115fcdb418c5108a5 (diff) | |
| download | op-kernel-dev-7088ad74e6e710d0c80ea2cead9500f47a2a5d58.zip op-kernel-dev-7088ad74e6e710d0c80ea2cead9500f47a2a5d58.tar.gz | |
inet: remove old fragmentation hash initializing
All fragmentation hash secrets now get initialized by their
corresponding hash function with net_get_random_once. Thus we can
eliminate the initial seeding.
Also provide a comment that hash secret seeding happens at the first
call to the corresponding hashing function.
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/inet_frag.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 3 |
2 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/inet_frag.h b/include/net/inet_frag.h index bfcbc00..6f59de9 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_frag.h +++ b/include/net/inet_frag.h @@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ struct inet_frags { rwlock_t lock ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; int secret_interval; struct timer_list secret_timer; + + /* The first call to hashfn is responsible to initialize + * rnd. This is best done with net_get_random_once. + */ u32 rnd; int qsize; diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c index c5313a9..bb075fc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c @@ -93,9 +93,6 @@ void inet_frags_init(struct inet_frags *f) } rwlock_init(&f->lock); - f->rnd = (u32) ((totalram_pages ^ (totalram_pages >> 7)) ^ - (jiffies ^ (jiffies >> 6))); - setup_timer(&f->secret_timer, inet_frag_secret_rebuild, (unsigned long)f); f->secret_timer.expires = jiffies + f->secret_interval; |
