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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-05-25 16:14:12 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-05-25 16:14:12 -0700 |
commit | 786f02b719f2285e2c0350b6a04dab4a1a0871a1 (patch) | |
tree | 0836083fa3bef945a46449c2d6badd5c29d7baad | |
parent | fa2af6e4fe0c4d2f8875d42625b25675e8584010 (diff) | |
parent | 37c3459b67dd5a396a968e819cf4a86d24ac9ace (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-786f02b719f2285e2c0350b6a04dab4a1a0871a1.zip op-kernel-dev-786f02b719f2285e2c0350b6a04dab4a1a0871a1.tar.gz |
Merge tag 'x86-mce-merge' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ras/ras
Pull x86/mce merge window patches from Tony Luck:
"Including two that make error_context() checks less sucky"
* tag 'x86-mce-merge' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ras/ras:
x86/mce: Add instruction recovery signatures to mce-severity table
x86/mce: Fix check for processor context when machine check was taken.
MCE: Fix vm86 handling for 32bit mce handler
x86/mce Add validation check before GHES error is recorded
x86/mce: Avoid reading every machine check bank register twice.
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-apei.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 24 |
3 files changed, 41 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-apei.c index 507ea58..cd8b166 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-apei.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-apei.c @@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ void apei_mce_report_mem_error(int corrected, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err) struct mce m; /* Only corrected MC is reported */ - if (!corrected) + if (!corrected || !(mem_err->validation_bits & + CPER_MEM_VALID_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)) return; mce_setup(&m); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c index 0c82091..413c2ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-severity.c @@ -126,6 +126,16 @@ static struct severity { SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA), USER ), + MCESEV( + KEEP, "HT thread notices Action required: instruction fetch error", + SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR), + MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_EIPV, 0) + ), + MCESEV( + AR, "Action required: instruction fetch error", + SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR), + USER + ), #endif MCESEV( PANIC, "Action required: unknown MCACOD", @@ -165,15 +175,19 @@ static struct severity { }; /* - * If the EIPV bit is set, it means the saved IP is the - * instruction which caused the MCE. + * If mcgstatus indicated that ip/cs on the stack were + * no good, then "m->cs" will be zero and we will have + * to assume the worst case (IN_KERNEL) as we actually + * have no idea what we were executing when the machine + * check hit. + * If we do have a good "m->cs" (or a faked one in the + * case we were executing in VM86 mode) we can use it to + * distinguish an exception taken in user from from one + * taken in the kernel. */ static int error_context(struct mce *m) { - if (m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_EIPV) - return (m->ip && (m->cs & 3) == 3) ? IN_USER : IN_KERNEL; - /* Unknown, assume kernel */ - return IN_KERNEL; + return ((m->cs & 3) == 3) ? IN_USER : IN_KERNEL; } int mce_severity(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index 2afcbd2..b772dd6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -437,6 +437,14 @@ static inline void mce_gather_info(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs) if (m->mcgstatus & (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV)) { m->ip = regs->ip; m->cs = regs->cs; + + /* + * When in VM86 mode make the cs look like ring 3 + * always. This is a lie, but it's better than passing + * the additional vm86 bit around everywhere. + */ + if (v8086_mode(regs)) + m->cs |= 3; } /* Use accurate RIP reporting if available. */ if (rip_msr) @@ -641,16 +649,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(machine_check_poll); * Do a quick check if any of the events requires a panic. * This decides if we keep the events around or clear them. */ -static int mce_no_way_out(struct mce *m, char **msg) +static int mce_no_way_out(struct mce *m, char **msg, unsigned long *validp) { - int i; + int i, ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) { m->status = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i)); + if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL) + __set_bit(i, validp); if (mce_severity(m, tolerant, msg) >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY) - return 1; + ret = 1; } - return 0; + return ret; } /* @@ -1013,6 +1023,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) */ int kill_it = 0; DECLARE_BITMAP(toclear, MAX_NR_BANKS); + DECLARE_BITMAP(valid_banks, MAX_NR_BANKS); char *msg = "Unknown"; atomic_inc(&mce_entry); @@ -1027,7 +1038,8 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) final = &__get_cpu_var(mces_seen); *final = m; - no_way_out = mce_no_way_out(&m, &msg); + memset(valid_banks, 0, sizeof(valid_banks)); + no_way_out = mce_no_way_out(&m, &msg, valid_banks); barrier(); @@ -1047,6 +1059,8 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) order = mce_start(&no_way_out); for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) { __clear_bit(i, toclear); + if (!test_bit(i, valid_banks)) + continue; if (!mce_banks[i].ctl) continue; |