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author | Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> | 2009-10-04 21:49:48 +0900 |
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committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-10-12 10:56:02 +1100 |
commit | 8b8efb44033c7e86b3dc76f825c693ec92ae30e9 (patch) | |
tree | 8cf43afc59f88f36a86f3a8165770bccec28b3c3 | |
parent | 89eda06837094ce9f34fae269b8773fcfd70f046 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-8b8efb44033c7e86b3dc76f825c693ec92ae30e9.zip op-kernel-dev-8b8efb44033c7e86b3dc76f825c693ec92ae30e9.tar.gz |
LSM: Add security_path_chroot().
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.
This hook is used by TOMOYO.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-rw-r--r-- | fs/open.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 5 |
4 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -587,6 +587,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename) error = -EPERM; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) goto dput_and_out; + error = security_path_chroot(&path); + if (error) + goto dput_and_out; set_fs_root(current->fs, &path); error = 0; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c8a584c..ed0faea 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @uid contains new owner's ID. * @gid contains new group's ID. * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @path_chroot: + * Check for permission to change root directory. + * @path contains the path structure. + * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_readlink: * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link. @@ -1503,6 +1507,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*path_chmod) (struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); + int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path); #endif int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode); @@ -2970,6 +2975,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid); +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { @@ -3031,6 +3037,11 @@ static inline int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { return 0; } + +static inline int security_path_chroot(struct path *path) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 09279a8..4f3ab47 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { return 0; } + +static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root) +{ + return 0; +} #endif static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -990,6 +995,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot); #endif set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5259270..2797573 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) return 0; return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid); } + +int security_path_chroot(struct path *path) +{ + return security_ops->path_chroot(path); +} #endif int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) |