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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-18 18:18:30 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-18 18:18:30 -0700
commit3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4 (patch)
treec9a58417d9492f39f7fe81d4721d674c34dd8be2
parent334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321 (diff)
parent7cea51be4e91edad05bd834f3235b45c57783f0d (diff)
downloadop-kernel-dev-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.zip
op-kernel-dev-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.tar.gz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable Security: Introduce security= boot parameter Audit: Final renamings and cleanup SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks SELinux: remove redundant exports Netlink: Use generic LSM hook Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
-rw-r--r--Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h29
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h114
-rw-r--r--include/linux/selinux.h134
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c24
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h25
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c99
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c74
-rw-r--r--net/netlink/af_netlink.c3
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c51
-rw-r--r--security/security.c73
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c42
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c34
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/audit.h65
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c45
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c7
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c11
18 files changed, 503 insertions, 335 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 256a216..4b0f1ae 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -366,6 +366,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
possible to determine what the correct size should be.
This option provides an override for these situations.
+ security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
+ If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
+ security module asking for security registration will be
+ loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated
+ as if no module has been chosen.
+
capability.disable=
[SECURITY] Disable capabilities. This would normally
be used only if an alternative security model is to be
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2af9ec0..4ccb048 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -353,6 +353,33 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms;
struct linux_binprm;
struct mq_attr;
struct mqstat;
+struct audit_watch;
+struct audit_tree;
+
+struct audit_krule {
+ int vers_ops;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 listnr;
+ u32 action;
+ u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+ u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+ u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+ struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
+ struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
+ struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
+ struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
+ struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
+};
+
+struct audit_field {
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ void *lsm_rule;
+};
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
@@ -536,6 +563,8 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct path *path);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
+
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f5eb9ff..fea1f4a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -36,7 +36,11 @@
extern unsigned securebits;
+/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
+#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
+
struct ctl_table;
+struct audit_krule;
/*
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -136,6 +140,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
/**
* struct security_operations - main security structure
*
+ * Security module identifier.
+ *
+ * @name:
+ * A string that acts as a unique identifeir for the LSM with max number
+ * of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX.
+ *
* Security hooks for program execution operations.
*
* @bprm_alloc_security:
@@ -468,6 +478,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @dentry is the dentry being changed.
* Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
* causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ * @inode_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the node.
+ * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for file operations
*
@@ -636,6 +651,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @task_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
* @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
* @task_setgroups:
* Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of the
* current process.
@@ -997,6 +1014,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1223,9 +1245,42 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @secdata contains the security context.
* @seclen contains the length of the security context.
*
+ * Security hooks for Audit
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_init:
+ * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
+ * @op contains the operator the rule uses.
+ * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
+ * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
+ * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
+ * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_known:
+ * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM.
+ * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
+ * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_match:
+ * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
+ * by @audit_rule_known.
+ * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
+ * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
+ * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
+ * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
+ * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_free:
+ * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ * audit_rule_init.
+ * @rule contains the allocated rule
+ *
* This is the main security structure.
*/
struct security_operations {
+ char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+
int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct * parent, struct task_struct * child);
int (*capget) (struct task_struct * target,
kernel_cap_t * effective,
@@ -1317,6 +1372,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int (*file_permission) (struct file * file, int mask);
int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file * file);
@@ -1369,6 +1425,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1480,10 +1537,18 @@ struct security_operations {
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
};
/* prototypes */
extern int security_init (void);
+extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops);
extern int mod_reg_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops);
extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
@@ -1578,6 +1643,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -1622,6 +1688,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -2022,6 +2089,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -2137,7 +2209,9 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static inline int security_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -2216,6 +2290,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -2672,5 +2751,38 @@ static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 8c2cc4c..20f965d 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -16,99 +16,11 @@
struct selinux_audit_rule;
struct audit_context;
-struct inode;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
- * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
- * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
- * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
- *
- * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
- * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
- */
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
- *
- * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
- * -errno on failure.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
- * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
- *
- * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
- * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
- * using selinux_audit_rule_init().
- */
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
-
-/**
- * selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
- * @sid: security context ID to be converted.
- * @ctx: address of context string to be returned
- * @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the context
- * string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call
- * kfree() on it after use.
- */
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
- * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
- * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
- * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
* @sid: ID value returned via this.
@@ -151,52 +63,6 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
#else
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
- char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index b782b04..a7b1608 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
*
* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
*
- * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux.
+ * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules.
* 2) Minimal run-time overhead:
* a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0).
* b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -265,13 +264,13 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (rc) {
audit_log_format(ab, " sid=%u", sid);
allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
@@ -550,12 +549,13 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type,
audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, auid);
if (sid) {
- rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (rc)
audit_log_format(*ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(*ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
return rc;
@@ -758,18 +758,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = audit_sig_uid;
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,
0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
kfree(sig_data);
@@ -881,10 +881,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_enabled = audit_default;
audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
- /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
- * when a new policy is loaded. */
- selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
-
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 2554bd5..3cfc54e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -65,34 +65,9 @@ struct audit_watch {
struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
};
-struct audit_field {
- u32 type;
- u32 val;
- u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
-};
-
struct audit_tree;
struct audit_chunk;
-struct audit_krule {
- int vers_ops;
- u32 flags;
- u32 listnr;
- u32 action;
- u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
- u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
- u32 field_count;
- char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
- struct audit_field *fields;
- struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
- struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
- struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
- struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
- struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
-};
-
struct audit_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 2f2914b..28fef6b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
- * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
+ * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
if (e->rule.fields)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
- kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ kfree(f->lsm_str);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
f->type = data->fields[i];
f->val = data->values[i];
- f->se_str = NULL;
- f->se_rule = NULL;
+ f->lsm_str = NULL;
+ f->lsm_rule = NULL;
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
case AUDIT_UID:
@@ -597,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
kfree(str);
goto exit_free;
} else
- f->se_str = str;
+ f->lsm_str = str;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
- audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+ if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
return 1;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
@@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
- char *se_str;
+ char *lsm_str;
- /* our own copy of se_str */
- se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!se_str))
+ /* our own copy of lsm_str */
+ lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
return -ENOMEM;
- df->se_str = se_str;
+ df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
+ (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
- "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
+ "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
- * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
@@ -1515,11 +1515,12 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
if (rule->filterkey)
@@ -1761,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
- * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
@@ -1804,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
@@ -1815,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
* return value */
if (!err)
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
- audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+ audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
if (watch)
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 782262e..56e56ed 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -528,14 +527,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
- f->se_rule,
+ f->lsm_rule,
ctx);
}
break;
@@ -546,18 +545,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx);
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -885,11 +884,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
int error;
u32 sid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return;
- error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -897,7 +896,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return;
error_path:
@@ -941,7 +940,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
u32 sid, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- char *s = NULL;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -951,15 +950,16 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
uid, sessionid);
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
- kfree(s);
return rc;
}
@@ -1271,14 +1271,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
axi->osid);
call_panic = 1;
- } else
+ } else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
break; }
@@ -1392,13 +1393,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
call_panic = 2;
- } else
+ } else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1775,7 +1777,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
}
/**
@@ -2190,8 +2192,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
@@ -2343,7 +2344,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = t->uid;
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2371,7 +2372,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
else
audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2384,7 +2385,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2405,7 +2406,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
@@ -2435,16 +2436,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 36f75d8..46f3e44 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -1249,7 +1248,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 480366f..98d5f96 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -542,7 +547,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -616,6 +623,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -983,7 +995,33 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = {
+ .name = "dummy",
+};
#define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
do { \
@@ -1060,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
@@ -1096,6 +1135,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
@@ -1170,6 +1210,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
+#endif
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 54affd0..2e250c70 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
+static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
/* things that live in dummy.c */
extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
@@ -67,13 +69,47 @@ int __init security_init(void)
return 0;
}
+/* Save user chosen LSM */
+static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
+{
+ strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+
+/**
+ * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
+ * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked.
+ *
+ * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
+ * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
+ * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
+ *
+ * Return true if:
+ * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
+ * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
+ * for registeration permissoin,
+ * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
+ * Otherwise, return false.
+ */
+int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (!*chosen_lsm)
+ strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
+ else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/**
* register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
* @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
*
* This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the
* kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
- * value passed to this function.
+ * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
+ * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
*
* If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
* an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success.
@@ -523,6 +559,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
}
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+}
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
@@ -712,6 +753,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
}
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+}
+
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
@@ -1111,3 +1157,28 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+}
+
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 87d2bb3..64af2d3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -25,48 +25,6 @@
/* SECMARK reference count */
extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled)
- return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen);
- else {
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
- *sid = tsec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 34f2d46..f9927f02 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#include "netport.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
@@ -2792,6 +2793,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
}
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -3183,7 +3190,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ *secid = tsec->sid;
}
static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
@@ -4149,7 +4157,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
goto out;
if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
- selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
@@ -5026,6 +5034,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -5281,6 +5295,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
#endif
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+ .name = "selinux",
+
.ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
@@ -5342,6 +5358,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
+ .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
@@ -5382,6 +5399,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+ .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
@@ -5463,12 +5481,24 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.key_free = selinux_key_free,
.key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
+ .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
+ .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
+ .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
+ selinux_enabled = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!selinux_enabled) {
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c8b9ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
+ * is released under below copyrights:
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ * @rule: rule to be checked
+ * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 33425b1..b341b8f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
@@ -2296,21 +2297,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
struct context au_ctxt;
};
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
int rc = 0;
*rule = NULL;
@@ -2397,12 +2400,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return rc;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
if (!rule) {
@@ -2509,7 +2537,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
@@ -2534,11 +2562,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 62c1e98..4a4477f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
/*
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
/*
* Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e2d6f7c..93f5b0c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2424,7 +2424,9 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
-static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+ .name = "smack",
+
.ptrace = smack_ptrace,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset_check = cap_capset_check,
@@ -2557,6 +2559,9 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
*/
static __init int smack_init(void)
{
+ if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ return 0;
+
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index cfae8af..6ba2837 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -965,12 +965,21 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
*
* register the smackfs
*
- * Returns 0 unless the registration fails.
+ * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled
+ * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the
+ * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get
+ * initialized before the vfs caches.
+ *
+ * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if
+ * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded.
*/
static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
{
int err;
+ if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ return 0;
+
err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
if (!err) {
smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
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