diff options
author | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | 2017-08-07 20:45:20 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-08-08 18:11:17 -0700 |
commit | 752ba56fb130b27c32c2ae6c82c8ef246b22106c (patch) | |
tree | 5ee1b20c2245bc4a75281a2323807642793ed49b | |
parent | 58291a7465f6b88248c9f34807c16705bd5698f8 (diff) | |
download | op-kernel-dev-752ba56fb130b27c32c2ae6c82c8ef246b22106c.zip op-kernel-dev-752ba56fb130b27c32c2ae6c82c8ef246b22106c.tar.gz |
bpf: Extend check_uarg_tail_zero() checks
The function check_uarg_tail_zero() was created from bpf(2) for
BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD without taking the access_ok() nor the PAGE_SIZE
checks. Make this checks more generally available while unlikely to be
triggered, extend the memory range check and add an explanation
including why the ToCToU should not be a security concern.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAGXu5j+vRGFvJZmjtAcT8Hi8B+Wz0e1b6VKYZHfQP_=DXzC4CQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index c653ee0..fbe09a0 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -48,6 +48,15 @@ static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = { #undef BPF_MAP_TYPE }; +/* + * If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of, ensure all the unknown bits + * are 0 - i.e. new user-space does not rely on any kernel feature extensions + * we don't know about yet. + * + * There is a ToCToU between this function call and the following + * copy_from_user() call. However, this is not a concern since this function is + * meant to be a future-proofing of bits. + */ static int check_uarg_tail_zero(void __user *uaddr, size_t expected_size, size_t actual_size) @@ -57,6 +66,12 @@ static int check_uarg_tail_zero(void __user *uaddr, unsigned char val; int err; + if (unlikely(actual_size > PAGE_SIZE)) /* silly large */ + return -E2BIG; + + if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uaddr, actual_size))) + return -EFAULT; + if (actual_size <= expected_size) return 0; @@ -1393,17 +1408,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, siz if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled) return -EPERM; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uattr, 1)) - return -EFAULT; - - if (size > PAGE_SIZE) /* silly large */ - return -E2BIG; - - /* If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of, - * ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new - * user-space does not rely on any kernel feature - * extensions we dont know about yet. - */ err = check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size); if (err) return err; |