From 982baf1130c41455fc3687fb5647a568742342bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fan Xin Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 11:41:32 +0900 Subject: wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146 wpa-supplicant: backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146 Backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4141, CVE-2015-4143, CVE-2015-4144, CVE-2015-4145, CVE-2015-4146. This patch is originally from: For CVE-2015-4141: http://w1.fi/security/2015-2/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch For CVE-2015-4143: http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch For CVE-2015-4144 and CVE-2015-4145: http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch For CVE-2015-4146: http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch (From OE-Core master rev: ce16e95de05db24e4e4132660d793cc7b1d890b9) (From OE-Core rev: b236c0882d62d8aa722117a54c1ff9edec7f5a6d) Signed-off-by: Fan Xin Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie Signed-off-by: Joshua Lock Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc | 6 ++ ...r-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++ ...Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++ ...ver-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++ ...r-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch | 56 ++++++++++++++++ ...ver-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch | 54 +++++++++++++++ ...eer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch | 36 ++++++++++ 7 files changed, 352 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch (limited to 'meta') diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc index b3e1465..1d171ef 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc @@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ file://fix-libnl3-host-contamination.patch \ file://0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch \ + file://0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch \ + file://0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch \ + file://0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch \ + file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch \ + file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \ + file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f2ed8fef72cf63d8d446a2d0a6da630a" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "eaaa5bf3055270e521b2dff64f2d203ec8040f71958b8588269a82c00c9d7b6a" diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2bafc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin + +From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index f2b0926..a629437 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + u16 offset; + u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; ++ ++ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } + + if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) || +@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) { ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* + * first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function | + * prf +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2568ea1 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin + +From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser + +strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and +resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could +result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length +argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault. + +This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that +has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This +would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with +upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER +(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used). + +Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to +rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be +larger than the maximum configured body length. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c +index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644 +--- a/src/wps/httpread.c ++++ b/src/wps/httpread.c +@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + if (!isxdigit(*cbp)) + goto bad; + h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16); ++ if (h->chunk_size < 0 || ++ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d", ++ h->chunk_size); ++ goto bad; ++ } + /* throw away chunk header + * so we have only real data + */ +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c477c2f --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin + +From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; + int res = 0; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); + ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || +@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ + grp = htons(data->group_num); + ptr = (u8 *) &cs; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e46ce43 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin + +From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment + reassembly + +The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the +Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked +prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could +have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted +as a huge positive integer. + +In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress +before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a +potential memory leak when processing invalid message. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index a629437..1d2079b 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + * if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose " + "total length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return NULL; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ ret->ignore = TRUE; ++ return NULL; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer " +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4c02b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin + +From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment + reassembly + +The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the +Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked +prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could +have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted +as a huge positive integer. + +In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress +before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a +potential memory leak when processing invalid message. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + * the first fragment has a total length + */ + if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) { ++ if (len < 2) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field"); ++ return; ++ } + tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total " + "length = %d", tot_len); + if (tot_len > 15000) + return; ++ if (data->inbuf) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use"); ++ return; ++ } + data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len); + if (data->inbuf == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to " +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4073600 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin + +From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior + +The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding +whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This +fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid +for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in +triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process +due to invalid buffer allocation. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c +@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, + /* + * we have output! Do we need to fragment it? + */ ++ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch); + len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf); + if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) { + resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu, +-- +1.9.1 + -- cgit v1.1