From 328d35b53db61c86717c68cc564a790ccfa2956c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai Kang Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 17:02:42 +0800 Subject: qemu: backport patches to fix CVE issues Backport patches to fix CVE-2015-4103, CVE-2015-4104, CVE-2015-4105 and CVE-2015-4106. These patches are from debian, but they are originally from: http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=shortlog;h=c25bbf1 (From OE-Core master rev: 496b3ffba6755bb76709c88cf81399c9d23f830a) (From OE-Core rev: 29746e78ca000f4464c8e0a1da55c77e02c651e4) Signed-off-by: Kai Kang Signed-off-by: Ross Burton Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie Refresh the following patches to apply cleanly to our qemu-2.2.0: 07-xen-pt-split-out-calculation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch 10-xen-pt-add-a-few-PCI-config-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch Signed-off-by: Joshua Lock Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie --- ...f-modified-PCI-CFG-contents-CVE-2015-4103.patch | 140 +++++++++++ ...o-control-MSI-mask-register-CVE-2015-4104.patch | 194 +++++++++++++++ ...-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch | 90 +++++++ ...s-through-of-enable-bit-mod-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 76 ++++++ ...date-PM-capability-emu_mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 86 +++++++ ...rectly-handle-PM-status-bit-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 38 +++ ...ulation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 263 +++++++++++++++++++++ ...e-capability-bits-read-only-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 38 +++ ...-in-PCI-config-space-fields-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 93 ++++++++ ...ig-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 77 ++++++ ...e-fields-should-be-readonly-CVE-2015-4106.patch | 137 +++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_2.2.0.bb | 13 +- 12 files changed, 1244 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/01-xen-properly-gate-host-writes-of-modified-PCI-CFG-contents-CVE-2015-4103.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/02-xen-dont-allow-guest-to-control-MSI-mask-register-CVE-2015-4104.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/04-xen-MSI-dont-open-code-pass-through-of-enable-bit-mod-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/05-xen-pt-consolidate-PM-capability-emu_mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/06-xen-pt-correctly-handle-PM-status-bit-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/07-xen-pt-split-out-calculation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/08-xen-pt-mark-all-PCIe-capability-bits-read-only-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/09-xen-pt-mark-reserved-bits-in-PCI-config-space-fields-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/10-xen-pt-add-a-few-PCI-config-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/11-xen-pt-unknown-PCI-config-space-fields-should-be-readonly-CVE-2015-4106.patch (limited to 'meta/recipes-devtools') diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/01-xen-properly-gate-host-writes-of-modified-PCI-CFG-contents-CVE-2015-4103.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/01-xen-properly-gate-host-writes-of-modified-PCI-CFG-contents-CVE-2015-4103.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42a4960 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/01-xen-properly-gate-host-writes-of-modified-PCI-CFG-contents-CVE-2015-4103.patch @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From 5c83b2f5b4b956e91dd6e5711f14df7ab800aefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000 +Subject: xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple +fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message +Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field). +Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed +fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in +doing any host write. + +This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any +host write attempt when already the host read failed. + +This is XSA-128. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- + hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 -- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 4 ---- + 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c +index d095c08..8923582 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c +@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + int index = 0; + XenPTRegGroup *reg_grp_entry = NULL; + int rc = 0; +- uint32_t read_val = 0; ++ uint32_t read_val = 0, wb_mask; + int emul_len = 0; + XenPTReg *reg_entry = NULL; + uint32_t find_addr = addr; +@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + if (rc < 0) { + XEN_PT_ERR(d, "pci_read_block failed. return value: %d.\n", rc); + memset(&read_val, 0xff, len); ++ wb_mask = 0; ++ } else { ++ wb_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - len) << 3); + } + + /* pass directly to the real device for passthrough type register group */ +@@ -298,6 +301,11 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + + valid_mask <<= (find_addr - real_offset) << 3; + ptr_val = (uint8_t *)&val + (real_offset & 3); ++ if (reg->emu_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) { ++ wb_mask &= ~((reg->emu_mask ++ >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3)) ++ << ((len - emul_len) << 3)); ++ } + + /* do emulation based on register size */ + switch (reg->size) { +@@ -350,10 +358,19 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + memory_region_transaction_commit(); + + out: +- if (!(reg && reg->no_wb)) { ++ for (index = 0; wb_mask; index += len) { + /* unknown regs are passed through */ +- rc = xen_host_pci_set_block(&s->real_device, addr, +- (uint8_t *)&val, len); ++ while (!(wb_mask & 0xff)) { ++ index++; ++ wb_mask >>= 8; ++ } ++ len = 0; ++ do { ++ len++; ++ wb_mask >>= 8; ++ } while (wb_mask & 0xff); ++ rc = xen_host_pci_set_block(&s->real_device, addr + index, ++ (uint8_t *)&val + index, len); + + if (rc < 0) { + XEN_PT_ERR(d, "pci_write_block failed. return value: %d.\n", rc); +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +index 942dc60..52ceb85 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +@@ -105,8 +105,6 @@ struct XenPTRegInfo { + uint32_t ro_mask; + /* reg emulate field mask (ON:emu, OFF:passthrough) */ + uint32_t emu_mask; +- /* no write back allowed */ +- uint32_t no_wb; + xen_pt_conf_reg_init init; + /* read/write function pointer + * for double_word/word/byte size */ +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index 95a51db..dae0519 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -1279,7 +1279,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .init_val = 0x00000000, + .ro_mask = 0x00000003, + .emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, +- .no_wb = 1, + .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, + .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, + .u.dw.write = xen_pt_msgaddr32_reg_write, +@@ -1291,7 +1290,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .init_val = 0x00000000, + .ro_mask = 0x00000000, + .emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, +- .no_wb = 1, + .init = xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_init, + .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, + .u.dw.write = xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_write, +@@ -1303,7 +1301,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .init_val = 0x0000, + .ro_mask = 0x0000, + .emu_mask = 0xFFFF, +- .no_wb = 1, + .init = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write, +@@ -1315,7 +1312,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .init_val = 0x0000, + .ro_mask = 0x0000, + .emu_mask = 0xFFFF, +- .no_wb = 1, + .init = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write, +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/02-xen-dont-allow-guest-to-control-MSI-mask-register-CVE-2015-4104.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/02-xen-dont-allow-guest-to-control-MSI-mask-register-CVE-2015-4104.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..252bf02 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/02-xen-dont-allow-guest-to-control-MSI-mask-register-CVE-2015-4104.patch @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From 7611dae8a69f0f1775ba1a9a942961c2aa10d88e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000 +Subject: xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not +capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue +nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects. + +This is XSA-129. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini +--- + hw/pci/msi.c | 4 -- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h | 2 + + 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/pci/msi.c b/hw/pci/msi.c +index c111dba..f9c0484 100644 +--- a/hw/pci/msi.c ++++ b/hw/pci/msi.c +@@ -21,10 +21,6 @@ + #include "hw/pci/msi.h" + #include "qemu/range.h" + +-/* Eventually those constants should go to Linux pci_regs.h */ +-#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_32 0x10 +-#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_64 0x14 +- + /* PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO */ + #define PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO_MASK (~0x3) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index dae0519..68b8f22 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -1016,13 +1016,9 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pm[] = { + */ + + /* Helper */ +-static bool xen_pt_msgdata_check_type(uint32_t offset, uint16_t flags) +-{ +- /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */ +- bool is_32 = (offset == PCI_MSI_DATA_32) && !(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT); +- bool is_64 = (offset == PCI_MSI_DATA_64) && (flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT); +- return is_32 || is_64; +-} ++#define xen_pt_msi_check_type(offset, flags, what) \ ++ ((offset) == ((flags) & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT ? \ ++ PCI_MSI_##what##_64 : PCI_MSI_##what##_32)) + + /* Message Control register */ + static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, +@@ -1134,7 +1130,45 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + uint32_t offset = reg->offset; + + /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */ +- if (xen_pt_msgdata_check_type(offset, flags)) { ++ if (xen_pt_msi_check_type(offset, flags, DATA)) { ++ *data = reg->init_val; ++ } else { ++ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* this function will be called twice (for 32 bit and 64 bit type) */ ++/* initialize Mask register */ ++static int xen_pt_mask_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, ++ XenPTRegInfo *reg, uint32_t real_offset, ++ uint32_t *data) ++{ ++ uint32_t flags = s->msi->flags; ++ ++ /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */ ++ if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) { ++ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG; ++ } else if (xen_pt_msi_check_type(reg->offset, flags, MASK)) { ++ *data = reg->init_val; ++ } else { ++ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/* this function will be called twice (for 32 bit and 64 bit type) */ ++/* initialize Pending register */ ++static int xen_pt_pending_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, ++ XenPTRegInfo *reg, uint32_t real_offset, ++ uint32_t *data) ++{ ++ uint32_t flags = s->msi->flags; ++ ++ /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */ ++ if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) { ++ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG; ++ } else if (xen_pt_msi_check_type(reg->offset, flags, PENDING)) { + *data = reg->init_val; + } else { + *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG; +@@ -1222,7 +1256,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + uint32_t offset = reg->offset; + + /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */ +- if (!xen_pt_msgdata_check_type(offset, msi->flags)) { ++ if (!xen_pt_msi_check_type(offset, msi->flags, DATA)) { + /* exit I/O emulator */ + XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "the offset does not match the 32/64 bit type!\n"); + return -1; +@@ -1267,7 +1301,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0000, + .ro_mask = 0xFF8E, +- .emu_mask = 0x007F, ++ .emu_mask = 0x017F, + .init = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write, +@@ -1316,6 +1350,50 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write, + }, ++ /* Mask reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 32-bit devices) */ ++ { ++ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_32, ++ .size = 4, ++ .init_val = 0x00000000, ++ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, ++ .emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, ++ .init = xen_pt_mask_reg_init, ++ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, ++ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write, ++ }, ++ /* Mask reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 64-bit devices) */ ++ { ++ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_64, ++ .size = 4, ++ .init_val = 0x00000000, ++ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, ++ .emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, ++ .init = xen_pt_mask_reg_init, ++ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, ++ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write, ++ }, ++ /* Pending reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 32-bit devices) */ ++ { ++ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_32 + 4, ++ .size = 4, ++ .init_val = 0x00000000, ++ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, ++ .emu_mask = 0x00000000, ++ .init = xen_pt_pending_reg_init, ++ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, ++ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write, ++ }, ++ /* Pending reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 64-bit devices) */ ++ { ++ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_64 + 4, ++ .size = 4, ++ .init_val = 0x00000000, ++ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, ++ .emu_mask = 0x00000000, ++ .init = xen_pt_pending_reg_init, ++ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, ++ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write, ++ }, + { + .size = 0, + }, +diff --git a/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h b/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h +index 56a404b..57e8c80 100644 +--- a/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h ++++ b/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h +@@ -298,8 +298,10 @@ + #define PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_HI 8 /* Upper 32 bits (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT set) */ + #define PCI_MSI_DATA_32 8 /* 16 bits of data for 32-bit devices */ + #define PCI_MSI_MASK_32 12 /* Mask bits register for 32-bit devices */ ++#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_32 16 /* Pending bits register for 32-bit devices */ + #define PCI_MSI_DATA_64 12 /* 16 bits of data for 64-bit devices */ + #define PCI_MSI_MASK_64 16 /* Mask bits register for 64-bit devices */ ++#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_64 20 /* Pending bits register for 32-bit devices */ + + /* MSI-X registers */ + #define PCI_MSIX_FLAGS 2 +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8bb2230 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From b38ec5ee7a581776bbce0bdaecb397632c3c4791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000 +Subject: xen/MSI-X: limit error messages +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +Limit error messages resulting from bad guest behavior to avoid allowing +the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill. + +The first message in pci_msix_write() can simply be deleted, as this +is indeed bad guest behavior, but such out of bounds writes don't +really need to be logged. + +The second one is more problematic, as there guest behavior may only +appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't take the mask-all bit +into account. And then this shouldn't depend on host device state (i.e. +the host may have masked the entry without the guest having done so). +Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when an entry is unmasked. +Instead, if they can't be made take effect right away, they should take +effect on the next unmasking or enabling operation - the specification +explicitly describes such caching behavior. Until we can validly drop +the message (implementing such caching/latching behavior), issue the +message just once per MSI-X table entry. + +Note that the log message in pci_msix_read() similar to the one being +removed here is not an issue: "addr" being of unsigned type, and the +maximum size of the MSI-X table being 32k, entry_nr simply can't be +negative and hence the conditonal guarding issuing of the message will +never be true. + +This is XSA-130. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 1 + + hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c | 12 +++++++----- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +index 52ceb85..8c9b6c2 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ typedef struct XenPTMSIXEntry { + uint32_t data; + uint32_t vector_ctrl; + bool updated; /* indicate whether MSI ADDR or DATA is updated */ ++ bool warned; /* avoid issuing (bogus) warning more than once */ + } XenPTMSIXEntry; + typedef struct XenPTMSIX { + uint32_t ctrl_offset; +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c +index 9ed9321..68db623 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c +@@ -434,11 +434,10 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, + XenPCIPassthroughState *s = opaque; + XenPTMSIX *msix = s->msix; + XenPTMSIXEntry *entry; +- int entry_nr, offset; ++ unsigned int entry_nr, offset; + + entry_nr = addr / PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE; +- if (entry_nr < 0 || entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) { +- XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "asked MSI-X entry '%i' invalid!\n", entry_nr); ++ if (entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) { + return; + } + entry = &msix->msix_entry[entry_nr]; +@@ -460,8 +459,11 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, + + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL; + + if (msix->enabled && !(*vec_ctrl & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT)) { +- XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is" +- " already enabled.\n", entry_nr); ++ if (!entry->warned) { ++ entry->warned = true; ++ XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is" ++ " already enabled.\n", entry_nr); ++ } + return; + } + +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/04-xen-MSI-dont-open-code-pass-through-of-enable-bit-mod-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/04-xen-MSI-dont-open-code-pass-through-of-enable-bit-mod-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87fb7f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/04-xen-MSI-dont-open-code-pass-through-of-enable-bit-mod-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From d1d35cf4ffb6a60a356193397919e83306d0bb74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not +get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based +on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask). + +Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by +qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will +require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the +security issue got addressed. + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 10 ++-------- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index 68b8f22..436d0fd 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -1053,7 +1053,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + XenPTMSI *msi = s->msi; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; + uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t raw_val; + + /* Currently no support for multi-vector */ + if (*val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_QSIZE) { +@@ -1066,12 +1065,11 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + msi->flags |= cfg_entry->data & ~PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE; + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- raw_val = *val; + throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + /* update MSI */ +- if (raw_val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE) { ++ if (*val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE) { + /* setup MSI pirq for the first time */ + if (!msi->initialized) { + /* Init physical one */ +@@ -1099,10 +1097,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + xen_pt_msi_disable(s); + } + +- /* pass through MSI_ENABLE bit */ +- *val &= ~PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE; +- *val |= raw_val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE; +- + return 0; + } + +@@ -1301,7 +1295,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = { + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0000, + .ro_mask = 0xFF8E, +- .emu_mask = 0x017F, ++ .emu_mask = 0x017E, + .init = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write, +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/05-xen-pt-consolidate-PM-capability-emu_mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/05-xen-pt-consolidate-PM-capability-emu_mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9e4fcc --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/05-xen-pt-consolidate-PM-capability-emu_mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From d61bb2482dc0c7426f451f23ba7e2748ae2cc06d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing +PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local +emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field +descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that +xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later +patches to be less intrusive. + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini +Acked-by: Ian Campbell +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 25 ++++--------------------- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index 436d0fd..516236a 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -933,38 +933,21 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = { + * Power Management Capability + */ + +-/* read Power Management Control/Status register */ +-static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_read(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry, +- uint16_t *value, uint16_t valid_mask) +-{ +- XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; +- uint16_t valid_emu_mask = reg->emu_mask; +- +- valid_emu_mask |= PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK | PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET; +- +- valid_emu_mask = valid_emu_mask & valid_mask; +- *value = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*value, cfg_entry->data, ~valid_emu_mask); +- +- return 0; +-} + /* write Power Management Control/Status register */ + static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + XenPTReg *cfg_entry, uint16_t *val, + uint16_t dev_value, uint16_t valid_mask) + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; +- uint16_t emu_mask = reg->emu_mask; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; + uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; + +- emu_mask |= PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK | PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET; +- + /* modify emulate register */ +- writable_mask = emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask; ++ writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask; + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~emu_mask & valid_mask; ++ throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + return 0; +@@ -1000,9 +983,9 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pm[] = { + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0008, + .ro_mask = 0xE1FC, +- .emu_mask = 0x8100, ++ .emu_mask = 0x810B, + .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, +- .u.w.read = xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_read, ++ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write, + }, + { +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/06-xen-pt-correctly-handle-PM-status-bit-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/06-xen-pt-correctly-handle-PM-status-bit-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37758cd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/06-xen-pt-correctly-handle-PM-status-bit-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From c4ff1e68c621928abc680266cad0a451686c403b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C +nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS). + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index 516236a..027ac32 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -948,7 +948,8 @@ static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ + throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; +- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); ++ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value & ~PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS, ++ throughable_mask); + + return 0; + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/07-xen-pt-split-out-calculation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/07-xen-pt-split-out-calculation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8308d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/07-xen-pt-split-out-calculation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From 0e7ef22136955169a0fd03c4e41af95662352733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in + PCI config space handling +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in +multiple places. + +Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation +is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it +doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag +is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is +r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway). + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini +Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) + +Index: qemu-2.2.0/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +=================================================================== +--- qemu-2.2.0.orig/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ qemu-2.2.0/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ XenPTReg *xen_pt_find_reg(XenPTRegGroup + return NULL; + } + ++static uint32_t get_throughable_mask(const XenPCIPassthroughState *s, ++ const XenPTRegInfo *reg, ++ uint32_t valid_mask) ++{ ++ uint32_t throughable_mask = ~(reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask); ++ ++ return throughable_mask & valid_mask; ++} + + /**************** + * general register functions +@@ -157,14 +165,13 @@ static int xen_pt_byte_reg_write(XenPCIP + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint8_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint8_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint8_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + + /* modify emulate register */ + writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask; + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + return 0; +@@ -175,14 +182,13 @@ static int xen_pt_word_reg_write(XenPCIP + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + + /* modify emulate register */ + writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask; + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + return 0; +@@ -193,14 +199,13 @@ static int xen_pt_long_reg_write(XenPCIP + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint32_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint32_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + + /* modify emulate register */ + writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask; + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + return 0; +@@ -309,7 +314,7 @@ static int xen_pt_cmd_reg_write(XenPCIPa + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + uint16_t emu_mask = reg->emu_mask; + + if (s->is_virtfn) { +@@ -321,8 +326,6 @@ static int xen_pt_cmd_reg_write(XenPCIPa + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~emu_mask & valid_mask; +- + if (*val & PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE) { + throughable_mask |= PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE; + } else { +@@ -478,7 +481,6 @@ static int xen_pt_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPa + PCIDevice *d = &s->dev; + const PCIIORegion *r; + uint32_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0; + uint32_t bar_emu_mask = 0; + uint32_t bar_ro_mask = 0; + uint32_t r_size = 0; +@@ -535,8 +537,7 @@ static int xen_pt_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPa + } + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~bar_emu_mask & valid_mask; +- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); ++ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0); + + return 0; + } +@@ -550,9 +551,8 @@ static int xen_pt_exp_rom_bar_reg_write( + XenPTRegion *base = NULL; + PCIDevice *d = (PCIDevice *)&s->dev; + uint32_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint32_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + pcibus_t r_size = 0; +- uint32_t bar_emu_mask = 0; + uint32_t bar_ro_mask = 0; + + r_size = d->io_regions[PCI_ROM_SLOT].size; +@@ -561,7 +561,6 @@ static int xen_pt_exp_rom_bar_reg_write( + r_size = xen_pt_get_emul_size(base->bar_flag, r_size); + + /* set emulate mask and read-only mask */ +- bar_emu_mask = reg->emu_mask; + bar_ro_mask = (reg->ro_mask | (r_size - 1)) & ~PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE; + + /* modify emulate register */ +@@ -569,7 +568,6 @@ static int xen_pt_exp_rom_bar_reg_write( + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~bar_emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + return 0; +@@ -964,14 +962,13 @@ static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write(XenPCI + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + + /* modify emulate register */ + writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask; + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value & ~PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS, + throughable_mask); + +@@ -1060,7 +1057,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenP + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + XenPTMSI *msi = s->msi; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + + /* Currently no support for multi-vector */ + if (*val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_QSIZE) { +@@ -1073,7 +1070,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenP + msi->flags |= cfg_entry->data & ~PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE; + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + /* update MSI */ +@@ -1185,7 +1181,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr32_reg_write(Xe + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint32_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0; + uint32_t old_addr = cfg_entry->data; + + /* modify emulate register */ +@@ -1194,8 +1189,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr32_reg_write(Xe + s->msi->addr_lo = cfg_entry->data; + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; +- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); ++ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0); + + /* update MSI */ + if (cfg_entry->data != old_addr) { +@@ -1213,7 +1207,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_write(Xe + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint32_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0; + uint32_t old_addr = cfg_entry->data; + + /* check whether the type is 64 bit or not */ +@@ -1230,8 +1223,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_write(Xe + s->msi->addr_hi = cfg_entry->data; + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; +- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); ++ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0); + + /* update MSI */ + if (cfg_entry->data != old_addr) { +@@ -1253,7 +1245,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write(XenP + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + XenPTMSI *msi = s->msi; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; + uint16_t old_data = cfg_entry->data; + uint32_t offset = reg->offset; + +@@ -1271,8 +1262,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write(XenP + msi->data = cfg_entry->data; + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; +- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); ++ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0); + + /* update MSI */ + if (cfg_entry->data != old_data) { +@@ -1434,7 +1424,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msixctrl_reg_write(Xen + { + XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg; + uint16_t writable_mask = 0; +- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0; ++ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask); + int debug_msix_enabled_old; + + /* modify emulate register */ +@@ -1442,7 +1432,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msixctrl_reg_write(Xen + cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask); + + /* create value for writing to I/O device register */ +- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask; + *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask); + + /* update MSI-X */ diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/08-xen-pt-mark-all-PCIe-capability-bits-read-only-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/08-xen-pt-mark-all-PCIe-capability-bits-read-only-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4236a12 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/08-xen-pt-mark-all-PCIe-capability-bits-read-only-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From 45ebe3916ab16f859ed930e92fbd52d84d5dcdaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read- +only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought +to be read-only in hardware). + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index 3833b9e..9f6c00e 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = { + .offset = PCI_EXP_DEVCAP, + .size = 4, + .init_val = 0x00000000, +- .ro_mask = 0x1FFCFFFF, ++ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF, + .emu_mask = 0x10000000, + .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, + .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read, +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/09-xen-pt-mark-reserved-bits-in-PCI-config-space-fields-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/09-xen-pt-mark-reserved-bits-in-PCI-config-space-fields-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7d4a88 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/09-xen-pt-mark-reserved-bits-in-PCI-config-space-fields-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From 0ad3393ad032f76e88b4dbd04d36ad84dff75dd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right +(and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode +(introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers +and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in +default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in +permissive mode). + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 ++ + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 14 +++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +Index: qemu-2.2.0/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +=================================================================== +--- qemu-2.2.0.orig/hw/xen/xen_pt.h ++++ qemu-2.2.0/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ struct XenPTRegInfo { + uint32_t offset; + uint32_t size; + uint32_t init_val; ++ /* reg reserved field mask (ON:reserved, OFF:defined) */ ++ uint32_t res_mask; + /* reg read only field mask (ON:RO/ROS, OFF:other) */ + uint32_t ro_mask; + /* reg emulate field mask (ON:emu, OFF:passthrough) */ +Index: qemu-2.2.0/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +=================================================================== +--- qemu-2.2.0.orig/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ qemu-2.2.0/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -580,8 +580,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_heade + .offset = PCI_VENDOR_ID, + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0000, +- .ro_mask = 0xFFFF, +- .emu_mask = 0xFFFF, ++ .res_mask = 0xF880, ++ .emu_mask = 0x0743, + .init = xen_pt_vendor_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write, +@@ -627,7 +627,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_heade + .offset = PCI_STATUS, + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0000, +- .ro_mask = 0x06FF, ++ .res_mask = 0x0007, ++ .ro_mask = 0x06F8, + .emu_mask = 0x0010, + .init = xen_pt_status_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, +@@ -1004,7 +1005,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pm[] + .offset = PCI_PM_CTRL, + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0008, +- .ro_mask = 0xE1FC, ++ .res_mask = 0x00F0, ++ .ro_mask = 0xE10C, + .emu_mask = 0x810B, + .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, +@@ -1292,7 +1294,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] + .offset = PCI_MSI_FLAGS, + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0000, +- .ro_mask = 0xFF8E, ++ .res_mask = 0xFE00, ++ .ro_mask = 0x018E, + .emu_mask = 0x017E, + .init = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, +@@ -1470,7 +1473,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msix[ + .offset = PCI_MSI_FLAGS, + .size = 2, + .init_val = 0x0000, +- .ro_mask = 0x3FFF, ++ .res_mask = 0x3800, ++ .ro_mask = 0x07FF, + .emu_mask = 0x0000, + .init = xen_pt_msixctrl_reg_init, + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/10-xen-pt-add-a-few-PCI-config-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/10-xen-pt-add-a-few-PCI-config-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f30b40a --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/10-xen-pt-add-a-few-PCI-config-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From a88a3f887181605f4487a22bdfb7d87ffafde5d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields +read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need +to be given explicit descriptors. + +This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index efd8bac..19f926b 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -754,6 +754,15 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_vpd[] = { + .u.b.write = xen_pt_byte_reg_write, + }, + { ++ .offset = PCI_VPD_ADDR, ++ .size = 2, ++ .ro_mask = 0x0003, ++ .emu_mask = 0x0003, ++ .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, ++ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, ++ .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write, ++ }, ++ { + .size = 0, + }, + }; +@@ -889,6 +898,16 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = { + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write, + }, ++ /* Device Status reg */ ++ { ++ .offset = PCI_EXP_DEVSTA, ++ .size = 2, ++ .res_mask = 0xFFC0, ++ .ro_mask = 0x0030, ++ .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, ++ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, ++ .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write, ++ }, + /* Link Control reg */ + { + .offset = PCI_EXP_LNKCTL, +@@ -900,6 +919,15 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = { + .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, + .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write, + }, ++ /* Link Status reg */ ++ { ++ .offset = PCI_EXP_LNKSTA, ++ .size = 2, ++ .ro_mask = 0x3FFF, ++ .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init, ++ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read, ++ .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write, ++ }, + /* Device Control 2 reg */ + { + .offset = 0x28, +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/11-xen-pt-unknown-PCI-config-space-fields-should-be-readonly-CVE-2015-4106.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/11-xen-pt-unknown-PCI-config-space-fields-should-be-readonly-CVE-2015-4106.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bfcf5e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/11-xen-pt-unknown-PCI-config-space-fields-should-be-readonly-CVE-2015-4106.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang + +From c25bbf1545a53ac051f9e51d4140e397660c10ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Beulich +Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000 +Subject: xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only +Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/787547 + +... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's +to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again, +i.e. should be used only for trusted guests). + +This is part of XSA-131. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich +Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini +Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD ) +--- + hw/xen/xen_pt.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 ++ + hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 4 ++++ + 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c +index 8923582..9afcda8 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c +@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + XenPTReg *reg_entry = NULL; + uint32_t find_addr = addr; + XenPTRegInfo *reg = NULL; ++ bool wp_flag = false; + + if (xen_pt_pci_config_access_check(d, addr, len)) { + return; +@@ -278,6 +279,10 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + + /* pass directly to the real device for passthrough type register group */ + if (reg_grp_entry == NULL) { ++ if (!s->permissive) { ++ wb_mask = 0; ++ wp_flag = true; ++ } + goto out; + } + +@@ -298,12 +303,15 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + uint32_t real_offset = reg_grp_entry->base_offset + reg->offset; + uint32_t valid_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - emul_len) << 3); + uint8_t *ptr_val = NULL; ++ uint32_t wp_mask = reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask; + + valid_mask <<= (find_addr - real_offset) << 3; + ptr_val = (uint8_t *)&val + (real_offset & 3); +- if (reg->emu_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) { +- wb_mask &= ~((reg->emu_mask +- >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3)) ++ if (!s->permissive) { ++ wp_mask |= reg->res_mask; ++ } ++ if (wp_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) { ++ wb_mask &= ~((wp_mask >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3)) + << ((len - emul_len) << 3)); + } + +@@ -347,6 +355,16 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + } else { + /* nothing to do with passthrough type register, + * continue to find next byte */ ++ if (!s->permissive) { ++ wb_mask &= ~(0xff << ((len - emul_len) << 3)); ++ /* Unused BARs will make it here, but we don't want to issue ++ * warnings for writes to them (bogus writes get dealt with ++ * above). ++ */ ++ if (index < 0) { ++ wp_flag = true; ++ } ++ } + emul_len--; + find_addr++; + } +@@ -358,6 +376,13 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr, + memory_region_transaction_commit(); + + out: ++ if (wp_flag && !s->permissive_warned) { ++ s->permissive_warned = true; ++ xen_pt_log(d, "Write-back to unknown field 0x%02x (partially) inhibited (0x%0*x)\n", ++ addr, len * 2, wb_mask); ++ xen_pt_log(d, "If the device doesn't work, try enabling permissive mode\n"); ++ xen_pt_log(d, "(unsafe) and if it helps report the problem to xen-devel\n"); ++ } + for (index = 0; wb_mask; index += len) { + /* unknown regs are passed through */ + while (!(wb_mask & 0xff)) { +@@ -824,6 +849,7 @@ static void xen_pt_unregister_device(PCIDevice *d) + + static Property xen_pci_passthrough_properties[] = { + DEFINE_PROP_PCI_HOST_DEVADDR("hostaddr", XenPCIPassthroughState, hostaddr), ++ DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("permissive", XenPCIPassthroughState, permissive, false), + DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(), + }; + +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +index f9795eb..4bba559 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h +@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ struct XenPCIPassthroughState { + + PCIHostDeviceAddress hostaddr; + bool is_virtfn; ++ bool permissive; ++ bool permissive_warned; + XenHostPCIDevice real_device; + XenPTRegion bases[PCI_NUM_REGIONS]; /* Access regions */ + QLIST_HEAD(, XenPTRegGroup) reg_grps; +diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +index 19f926b..f3cf069 100644 +--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c ++++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c +@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static uint32_t get_throughable_mask(const XenPCIPassthroughState *s, + { + uint32_t throughable_mask = ~(reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask); + ++ if (!s->permissive) { ++ throughable_mask &= ~reg->res_mask; ++ } ++ + return throughable_mask & valid_mask; + } + +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_2.2.0.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_2.2.0.bb index 99995b6..54dd7cb 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_2.2.0.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu_2.2.0.bb @@ -8,7 +8,18 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-fix-Darwin-target-detection.patch \ file://Qemu-Arm-versatilepb-Add-memory-size-checking.patch \ file://37ed3bf1ee07bb1a26adca0df8718f601f231c0b.patch \ file://qemu-CVE-2015-3456.patch \ - " + file://01-xen-properly-gate-host-writes-of-modified-PCI-CFG-contents-CVE-2015-4103.patch \ + file://02-xen-dont-allow-guest-to-control-MSI-mask-register-CVE-2015-4104.patch \ + file://03-xen-MSI-X-limit-error-messages-CVE-2015-4105.patch \ + file://04-xen-MSI-dont-open-code-pass-through-of-enable-bit-mod-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://05-xen-pt-consolidate-PM-capability-emu_mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://06-xen-pt-correctly-handle-PM-status-bit-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://07-xen-pt-split-out-calculation-of-throughable-mask-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://08-xen-pt-mark-all-PCIe-capability-bits-read-only-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://09-xen-pt-mark-reserved-bits-in-PCI-config-space-fields-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://10-xen-pt-add-a-few-PCI-config-space-field-descriptions-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + file://11-xen-pt-unknown-PCI-config-space-fields-should-be-readonly-CVE-2015-4106.patch \ + " SRC_URI_prepend = "http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/${BP}.tar.bz2" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f7a5e2da22d057eb838a91da7aff43c8" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b68c9b6c7c694f5489b5a6bffe993cd976ffbb78e7d178eb3bc016caf460039c" -- cgit v1.1