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diff --git a/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt b/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09b55e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/keys-request-key.txt @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ + =================== + KEY REQUEST SERVICE + =================== + +The key request service is part of the key retention service (refer to +Documentation/keys.txt). This document explains more fully how the requesting +algorithm works. + +The process starts by either the kernel requesting a service by calling +request_key*(): + + struct key *request_key(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info); + +or: + + struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + +or: + + struct key *request_key_async(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len); + +or: + + struct key *request_key_async_with_auxdata(const struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + size_t callout_len, + void *aux); + +Or by userspace invoking the request_key system call: + + key_serial_t request_key(const char *type, + const char *description, + const char *callout_info, + key_serial_t dest_keyring); + +The main difference between the access points is that the in-kernel interface +does not need to link the key to a keyring to prevent it from being immediately +destroyed. The kernel interface returns a pointer directly to the key, and +it's up to the caller to destroy the key. + +The request_key*_with_auxdata() calls are like the in-kernel request_key*() +calls, except that they permit auxiliary data to be passed to the upcaller (the +default is NULL). This is only useful for those key types that define their +own upcall mechanism rather than using /sbin/request-key. + +The two async in-kernel calls may return keys that are still in the process of +being constructed. The two non-async ones will wait for construction to +complete first. + +The userspace interface links the key to a keyring associated with the process +to prevent the key from going away, and returns the serial number of the key to +the caller. + + +The following example assumes that the key types involved don't define their +own upcall mechanisms. If they do, then those should be substituted for the +forking and execution of /sbin/request-key. + + +=========== +THE PROCESS +=========== + +A request proceeds in the following manner: + + (1) Process A calls request_key() [the userspace syscall calls the kernel + interface]. + + (2) request_key() searches the process's subscribed keyrings to see if there's + a suitable key there. If there is, it returns the key. If there isn't, + and callout_info is not set, an error is returned. Otherwise the process + proceeds to the next step. + + (3) request_key() sees that A doesn't have the desired key yet, so it creates + two things: + + (a) An uninstantiated key U of requested type and description. + + (b) An authorisation key V that refers to key U and notes that process A + is the context in which key U should be instantiated and secured, and + from which associated key requests may be satisfied. + + (4) request_key() then forks and executes /sbin/request-key with a new session + keyring that contains a link to auth key V. + + (5) /sbin/request-key assumes the authority associated with key U. + + (6) /sbin/request-key execs an appropriate program to perform the actual + instantiation. + + (7) The program may want to access another key from A's context (say a + Kerberos TGT key). It just requests the appropriate key, and the keyring + search notes that the session keyring has auth key V in its bottom level. + + This will permit it to then search the keyrings of process A with the + UID, GID, groups and security info of process A as if it was process A, + and come up with key W. + + (8) The program then does what it must to get the data with which to + instantiate key U, using key W as a reference (perhaps it contacts a + Kerberos server using the TGT) and then instantiates key U. + + (9) Upon instantiating key U, auth key V is automatically revoked so that it + may not be used again. + +(10) The program then exits 0 and request_key() deletes key V and returns key + U to the caller. + +This also extends further. If key W (step 7 above) didn't exist, key W would +be created uninstantiated, another auth key (X) would be created (as per step +3) and another copy of /sbin/request-key spawned (as per step 4); but the +context specified by auth key X will still be process A, as it was in auth key +V. + +This is because process A's keyrings can't simply be attached to +/sbin/request-key at the appropriate places because (a) execve will discard two +of them, and (b) it requires the same UID/GID/Groups all the way through. + + +====================== +NEGATIVE INSTANTIATION +====================== + +Rather than instantiating a key, it is possible for the possessor of an +authorisation key to negatively instantiate a key that's under construction. +This is a short duration placeholder that causes any attempt at re-requesting +the key whilst it exists to fail with error ENOKEY. + +This is provided to prevent excessive repeated spawning of /sbin/request-key +processes for a key that will never be obtainable. + +Should the /sbin/request-key process exit anything other than 0 or die on a +signal, the key under construction will be automatically negatively +instantiated for a short amount of time. + + +==================== +THE SEARCH ALGORITHM +==================== + +A search of any particular keyring proceeds in the following fashion: + + (1) When the key management code searches for a key (keyring_search_aux) it + firstly calls key_permission(SEARCH) on the keyring it's starting with, + if this denies permission, it doesn't search further. + + (2) It considers all the non-keyring keys within that keyring and, if any key + matches the criteria specified, calls key_permission(SEARCH) on it to see + if the key is allowed to be found. If it is, that key is returned; if + not, the search continues, and the error code is retained if of higher + priority than the one currently set. + + (3) It then considers all the keyring-type keys in the keyring it's currently + searching. It calls key_permission(SEARCH) on each keyring, and if this + grants permission, it recurses, executing steps (2) and (3) on that + keyring. + +The process stops immediately a valid key is found with permission granted to +use it. Any error from a previous match attempt is discarded and the key is +returned. + +When search_process_keyrings() is invoked, it performs the following searches +until one succeeds: + + (1) If extant, the process's thread keyring is searched. + + (2) If extant, the process's process keyring is searched. + + (3) The process's session keyring is searched. + + (4) If the process has assumed the authority associated with a request_key() + authorisation key then: + + (a) If extant, the calling process's thread keyring is searched. + + (b) If extant, the calling process's process keyring is searched. + + (c) The calling process's session keyring is searched. + +The moment one succeeds, all pending errors are discarded and the found key is +returned. + +Only if all these fail does the whole thing fail with the highest priority +error. Note that several errors may have come from LSM. + +The error priority is: + + EKEYREVOKED > EKEYEXPIRED > ENOKEY + +EACCES/EPERM are only returned on a direct search of a specific keyring where +the basal keyring does not grant Search permission. |
