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/*
* Copyright 1988 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
* For copying and distribution information, please see the file
* <Copyright.MIT>.
*
* Utility routines for Kerberos programs which directly access
* the database. This code was duplicated in too many places
* before I gathered it here.
*
* Jon Rochlis, MIT Telecom, March 1988
*
* from: krb_kdb_utils.c,v 4.1 89/07/26 11:01:12 jtkohl Exp $
* $FreeBSD$
*/
#if 0
#ifndef lint
static char rcsid[] =
"$FreeBSD$";
#endif lint
#endif
#include <des.h>
#include <krb.h>
#include <krb_db.h>
#include <kdc.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
long
kdb_get_master_key(prompt, master_key, master_key_sched)
int prompt;
C_Block master_key;
Key_schedule master_key_sched;
{
int kfile;
if (prompt) {
#ifdef NOENCRYPTION
placebo_read_password(master_key,
"\nEnter Kerberos master key: ", 0);
#else
des_read_password((des_cblock *)master_key,
"\nEnter Kerberos master key: ", 0);
#endif
printf ("\n");
}
else {
kfile = open(MKEYFILE, O_RDONLY, 0600);
if (kfile < 0) {
/* oh, for com_err_ */
return (-1);
}
if (read(kfile, (char *) master_key, 8) != 8) {
return (-1);
}
close(kfile);
}
#ifndef NOENCRYPTION
key_sched((des_cblock *)master_key,master_key_sched);
#endif
return (0);
}
/* The caller is reasponsible for cleaning up the master key and sched,
even if we can't verify the master key */
/* Returns master key version if successful, otherwise -1 */
long
kdb_verify_master_key (master_key, master_key_sched, out)
C_Block master_key;
Key_schedule master_key_sched;
FILE *out; /* setting this to non-null be do output */
{
C_Block key_from_db;
Principal principal_data[1];
int n, more = 0;
long master_key_version;
/* lookup the master key version */
n = kerb_get_principal(KERB_M_NAME, KERB_M_INST, principal_data,
1 /* only one please */, &more);
if ((n != 1) || more) {
if (out != (FILE *) NULL)
fprintf(out,
"verify_master_key: %s, %d found.\n",
"Kerberos error on master key version lookup",
n);
return (-1);
}
master_key_version = (long) principal_data[0].key_version;
/* set up the master key */
if (out != (FILE *) NULL) /* should we punt this? */
fprintf(out, "Current Kerberos master key version is %d.\n",
principal_data[0].kdc_key_ver);
/*
* now use the master key to decrypt the key in the db, had better
* be the same!
*/
bcopy(&principal_data[0].key_low, key_from_db, 4);
bcopy(&principal_data[0].key_high, ((long *) key_from_db) + 1, 4);
kdb_encrypt_key (key_from_db, key_from_db,
master_key, master_key_sched, DECRYPT);
/* the decrypted database key had better equal the master key */
n = bcmp((char *) master_key, (char *) key_from_db,
sizeof(master_key));
/* this used to zero the master key here! */
bzero(key_from_db, sizeof(key_from_db));
bzero(principal_data, sizeof (principal_data));
if (n && (out != (FILE *) NULL)) {
fprintf(out, "\n\07\07verify_master_key: Invalid master key; ");
fprintf(out, "does not match database.\n");
return (-1);
}
if (out != (FILE *) NULL) {
fprintf(out, "\nMaster key entered. BEWARE!\07\07\n");
fflush(out);
}
return (master_key_version);
}
/* The old algorithm used the key schedule as the initial vector which
was byte order depedent ... */
void
kdb_encrypt_key (in, out, master_key, master_key_sched, e_d_flag)
C_Block in, out, master_key;
Key_schedule master_key_sched;
int e_d_flag;
{
#ifdef NOENCRYPTION
bcopy(in, out, sizeof(C_Block));
#else
pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)in,(des_cblock*)out,(long)sizeof(C_Block),
master_key_sched,(des_cblock*)master_key,e_d_flag);
#endif
}
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