path: root/doc/draft/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04.txt

Network Working Group                                       S. Josefsson
Internet-Draft                                           August 30, 2005
Expires: March 3, 2006


          Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)
                    draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-04

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   Cryptographic public keys are frequently published and their
   authenticity demonstrated by certificates.  A CERT resource record
   (RR) is defined so that such certificates and related certificate
   revocation lists can be stored in the Domain Name System (DNS).

   This document obsoletes RFC 2538.






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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  The CERT Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Certificate Type Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Text Representation of CERT RRs  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  X.509 OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names  . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.3.  Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.4.  Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.5.  Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   9.  Changes since RFC 2538 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  Copying conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15


























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1.  Introduction

   Public keys are frequently published in the form of a certificate and
   their authenticity is commonly demonstrated by certificates and
   related certificate revocation lists (CRLs).  A certificate is a
   binding, through a cryptographic digital signature, of a public key,
   a validity interval and/or conditions, and identity, authorization,
   or other information.  A certificate revocation list is a list of
   certificates that are revoked, and incidental information, all signed
   by the signer (issuer) of the revoked certificates.  Examples are
   X.509 certificates/CRLs in the X.500 directory system or OpenPGP
   certificates/revocations used by OpenPGP software.

   Section 2 below specifies a CERT resource record (RR) for the storage
   of certificates in the Domain Name System [1] [2].

   Section 3 discusses appropriate owner names for CERT RRs.

   Sections 4, 5, and 6 below cover performance, IANA, and security
   considerations, respectively.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [3].


2.  The CERT Resource Record

   The CERT resource record (RR) has the structure given below.  Its RR
   type code is 37.

                       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             type              |             key tag           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   algorithm   |                                               /
   +---------------+            certificate or CRL                 /
   /                                                               /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|

   The type field is the certificate type as defined in section 2.1
   below.

   The key tag field is the 16 bit value computed for the key embedded
   in the certificate, using the RRSIG Key Tag algorithm described in
   Appendix B of [10].  This field is used as an efficiency measure to
   pick which CERT RRs may be applicable to a particular key.  The key



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   tag can be calculated for the key in question and then only CERT RRs
   with the same key tag need be examined.  However, the key must always
   be transformed to the format it would have as the public key portion
   of a DNSKEY RR before the key tag is computed.  This is only possible
   if the key is applicable to an algorithm (and limits such as key size
   limits) defined for DNS security.  If it is not, the algorithm field
   MUST BE zero and the tag field is meaningless and SHOULD BE zero.

   The algorithm field has the same meaning as the algorithm field in
   DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs [10], except that a zero algorithm field
   indicates the algorithm is unknown to a secure DNS, which may simply
   be the result of the algorithm not having been standardized for
   DNSSEC.

2.1.  Certificate Type Values

   The following values are defined or reserved:

       Value  Mnemonic  Certificate Type
       -----  --------  ----------------
           0            reserved
           1  PKIX      X.509 as per PKIX
           2  SPKI      SPKI certificate
           3  PGP       OpenPGP packet
           4  IPKIX     The URL of an X.509 data object
           5  ISPKI     The URL of an SPKI certificate
           6  IPGP      The URL of an OpenPGP packet
       7-252            available for IANA assignment
         253  URI       URI private
         254  OID       OID private
   255-65534            available for IANA assignment
       65535            reserved

   The PKIX type is reserved to indicate an X.509 certificate conforming
   to the profile being defined by the IETF PKIX working group.  The
   certificate section will start with a one-byte unsigned OID length
   and then an X.500 OID indicating the nature of the remainder of the
   certificate section (see 2.3 below).  (NOTE: X.509 certificates do
   not include their X.500 directory type designating OID as a prefix.)

   The SPKI type is reserved to indicate the SPKI certificate format
   [13], for use when the SPKI documents are moved from experimental
   status.

   The PGP type indicates an OpenPGP packet as described in [6] and its
   extensions and successors.  Two uses are to transfer public key
   material and revocation signatures.  The data is binary, and MUST NOT
   be encoded into an ASCII armor.  An implementation SHOULD process



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   transferable public keys as described in section 10.1 of [6], but it
   MAY handle additional OpenPGP packets.

   The IPKIX, ISPKI and IPGP types indicate a URL which will serve the
   content that would have been in the "certificate, CRL or URL" field
   of the corresponding (PKIX, SPKI or PGP) packet types.  These types
   are known as "indirect".  These packet types MUST be used when the
   content is too large to fit in the CERT RR, and MAY be used at the
   implementer's discretion.  They SHOULD NOT be used where the entire
   UDP packet would have fit in 512 bytes.

   The URI private type indicates a certificate format defined by an
   absolute URI.  The certificate portion of the CERT RR MUST begin with
   a null terminated URI [5] and the data after the null is the private
   format certificate itself.  The URI SHOULD be such that a retrieval
   from it will lead to documentation on the format of the certificate.
   Recognition of private certificate types need not be based on URI
   equality but can use various forms of pattern matching so that, for
   example, subtype or version information can also be encoded into the
   URI.

   The OID private type indicates a private format certificate specified
   by an ISO OID prefix.  The certificate section will start with a one-
   byte unsigned OID length and then a BER encoded OID indicating the
   nature of the remainder of the certificate section.  This can be an
   X.509 certificate format or some other format.  X.509 certificates
   that conform to the IETF PKIX profile SHOULD be indicated by the PKIX
   type, not the OID private type.  Recognition of private certificate
   types need not be based on OID equality but can use various forms of
   pattern matching such as OID prefix.

2.2.  Text Representation of CERT RRs

   The RDATA portion of a CERT RR has the type field as an unsigned
   decimal integer or as a mnemonic symbol as listed in section 2.1
   above.

   The key tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.

   The algorithm field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer or
   a mnemonic symbol as listed in [10].

   The certificate / CRL portion is represented in base 64 [14] and may
   be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings,
   down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the
   full signature.  These substrings can span lines using the standard
   parenthesis.




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   Note that the certificate / CRL portion may have internal sub-fields,
   but these do not appear in the master file representation.  For
   example, with type 254, there will be an OID size, an OID, and then
   the certificate / CRL proper.  But only a single logical base 64
   string will appear in the text representation.

2.3.  X.509 OIDs

   OIDs have been defined in connection with the X.500 directory for
   user certificates, certification authority certificates, revocations
   of certification authority, and revocations of user certificates.
   The following table lists the OIDs, their BER encoding, and their
   length-prefixed hex format for use in CERT RRs:

       id-at-userCertificate
           = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 36 }
              == 0x 03 55 04 24
       id-at-cACertificate
           = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 37 }
              == 0x 03 55 04 25
       id-at-authorityRevocationList
           = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 38 }
              == 0x 03 55 04 26
       id-at-certificateRevocationList
           = { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) at(4) 39 }
              == 0x 03 55 04 27


3.  Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs

   It is recommended that certificate CERT RRs be stored under a domain
   name related to their subject, i.e., the name of the entity intended
   to control the private key corresponding to the public key being
   certified.  It is recommended that certificate revocation list CERT
   RRs be stored under a domain name related to their issuer.

   Following some of the guidelines below may result in the use in DNS
   names of characters that require DNS quoting which is to use a
   backslash followed by the octal representation of the ASCII code for
   the character (e.g., \000 for NULL).

   The choice of name under which CERT RRs are stored is important to
   clients that perform CERT queries.  In some situations, the clients
   may not know all information about the CERT RR object it wishes to
   retrieve.  For example, a client may not know the subject name of an
   X.509 certificate, or the e-mail address of the owner of an OpenPGP
   key.  Further, the client might only know the hostname of a service
   that uses X.509 certificates or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key.



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   Therefore, two owner name guidelines are defined: content-based owner
   names and purpose-based owner names.  A content-based owner name is
   derived from the content of the CERT RR data; for example, the
   Subject field in an X.509 certificate or the User ID field in OpenPGP
   keys.  A purpose-based owner name is a name that a client retrieving
   CERT RRs MUST already know; for example, the host name of an X.509
   protected service or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key.  The content-based
   and purpose-based owner name MAY be the same; for example, when a
   client looks up a key based on the From: address of an incoming
   e-mail.

   Implementations SHOULD use the purpose-based owner name guidelines
   described in this document, and MAY use CNAMEs of content-based owner
   names (or other names), pointing to the purpose-based owner name.

3.1.  Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names

   Some X.509 versions permit multiple names to be associated with
   subjects and issuers under "Subject Alternate Name" and "Issuer
   Alternate Name".  For example, X.509v3 has such Alternate Names with
   an ASN.1 specification as follows:

        GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
           otherName                  [0] INSTANCE OF OTHER-NAME,
           rfc822Name                 [1] IA5String,
           dNSName                    [2] IA5String,
           x400Address                [3] EXPLICIT OR-ADDRESS.&Type,
           directoryName              [4] EXPLICIT Name,
           ediPartyName               [5] EDIPartyName,
           uniformResourceIdentifier  [6] IA5String,
           iPAddress                  [7] OCTET STRING,
           registeredID               [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
        }

   The recommended locations of CERT storage are as follows, in priority
   order:
   1.  If a domain name is included in the identification in the
       certificate or CRL, that should be used.
   2.  If a domain name is not included but an IP address is included,
       then the translation of that IP address into the appropriate
       inverse domain name should be used.
   3.  If neither of the above is used, but a URI containing a domain
       name is present, that domain name should be used.
   4.  If none of the above is included but a character string name is
       included, then it should be treated as described for OpenPGP
       names below.





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   5.  If none of the above apply, then the distinguished name (DN)
       should be mapped into a domain name as specified in [4].

   Example 1: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=John Doe /DC=Doe/
   DC=com/DC=xy/O=Doe Inc/C=XY/ with Subject Alternative Names of (a)
   string "John (the Man) Doe", (b) domain name john-doe.com, and (c)
   uri <https://www.secure.john-doe.com:8080/>.  The storage locations
   recommended, in priority order, would be
   1.  john-doe.com,
   2.  www.secure.john-doe.com, and
   3.  Doe.com.xy.

   Example 2: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=James Hacker/
   L=Basingstoke/O=Widget Inc/C=GB/ with Subject Alternate names of (a)
   domain name widget.foo.example, (b) IPv4 address 10.251.13.201, and
   (c) string "James Hacker <hacker@mail.widget.foo.example>".  The
   storage locations recommended, in priority order, would be
   1.  widget.foo.example,
   2.  201.13.251.10.in-addr.arpa, and
   3.  hacker.mail.widget.foo.example.

3.2.  Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names

   Due to the difficulty for clients that do not already possess a
   certificate to reconstruct the content-based owner name, purpose-
   based owner names are recommended in this section.  Recommendations
   for purpose-based owner names vary per scenario.  The following table
   summarizes the purpose-based X.509 CERT RR owner name guidelines for
   use with S/MIME [16], SSL/TLS [11], and IPSEC [12]:

    Scenario             Owner name
    ------------------   ----------------------------------------------
    S/MIME Certificate   Standard translation of an RFC 2822 email
                         address.  Example: An S/MIME certificate for
                         "postmaster@example.org" will use a standard
                         hostname translation of the owner name,
                         "postmaster.example.org".

    TLS Certificate      Hostname of the TLS server.

    IPSEC Certificate    Hostname of the IPSEC machine and/or, for IPv4
                         or IPv6 addresses, the fully qualified domain
                         name in the appropriate reverse domain.

   An alternate approach for IPSEC is to store raw public keys [15].






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3.3.  Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names

   OpenPGP signed keys (certificates) use a general character string
   User ID [6].  However, it is recommended by OpenPGP that such names
   include the RFC 2822 [8] email address of the party, as in "Leslie
   Example <Leslie@host.example>".  If such a format is used, the CERT
   should be under the standard translation of the email address into a
   domain name, which would be leslie.host.example in this case.  If no
   RFC 2822 name can be extracted from the string name, no specific
   domain name is recommended.

   If a user has more than one email address, the CNAME type can be used
   to reduce the amount of data stored in the DNS.  Example:

      $ORIGIN example.org.
      smith        IN CERT PGP 0 0 <OpenPGP binary>
      john.smith   IN CNAME smith
      js           IN CNAME smith

3.4.  Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names

   Applications that receive an OpenPGP packet containing encrypted or
   signed data but do not know the email address of the sender will have
   difficulties constructing the correct owner name and cannot use the
   content-based owner name guidelines.  However, these clients commonly
   know the key fingerprint or the Key ID.  The key ID is found in
   OpenPGP packets, and the key fingerprint is commonly found in
   auxilliary data that may be available.  In this case, use of an owner
   name identical to the key fingerprint and the key ID expressed in
   hexadecimal [14] is recommended.  Example:

      $ORIGIN example.org.
      0424D4EE81A0E3D119C6F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ...
      F835EDA21E94B565716F                     IN CERT PGP ...
      B565716F                                 IN CERT PGP ...

   If the same key material is stored for several owner names, the use
   of CNAME may be used to avoid data duplication.  Note that CNAME is
   not always applicable, because it maps one owner name to the other
   for all purposes, which may be sub-optimal when two keys with the
   same Key ID are stored.

3.5.  Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP

   These types are stored under the same owner names, both purpose- and
   content-based, as the PKIX, SPKI and PGP types.





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4.  Performance Considerations

   Current Domain Name System (DNS) implementations are optimized for
   small transfers, typically not more than 512 bytes including
   overhead.  While larger transfers will perform correctly and work is
   underway to make larger transfers more efficient, it is still
   advisable at this time to make every reasonable effort to minimize
   the size of certificates stored within the DNS.  Steps that can be
   taken may include using the fewest possible optional or extension
   fields and using short field values for necessary variable length
   fields.

   The RDATA field in the DNS protocol may only hold data of size 65535
   octets (64kb) or less.  This means that each CERT RR MUST NOT contain
   more than 64kb of payload, even if the corresponding certificate or
   certificate revocation list is larger.  This document addresses this
   by defining "indirect" data types for each normal type.


5.  Contributors

   The majority of this document is copied verbatim from RFC 2538, by
   Donald Eastlake 3rd and Olafur Gudmundsson.


6.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to David Shaw and Michael Graff for their contributions to
   earlier works that motivated, and served as inspiration for, this
   document.

   This document was improved by suggestions and comments from Olivier
   Dubuisson, Olaf M. Kolkman, Ben Laurie, Edward Lewis, Jason
   Sloderbeck, Samuel Weiler, and Florian Weimer.  No doubt the list is
   incomplete.  We apologize to anyone we left out.


7.  Security Considerations

   By definition, certificates contain their own authenticating
   signature.  Thus, it is reasonable to store certificates in non-
   secure DNS zones or to retrieve certificates from DNS with DNS
   security checking not implemented or deferred for efficiency.  The
   results MAY be trusted if the certificate chain is verified back to a
   known trusted key and this conforms with the user's security policy.

   Alternatively, if certificates are retrieved from a secure DNS zone
   with DNS security checking enabled and are verified by DNS security,



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   the key within the retrieved certificate MAY be trusted without
   verifying the certificate chain if this conforms with the user's
   security policy.

   If an organization chooses to issue certificates for it's employees,
   placing CERT RR's in the DNS by owner name, and if DNSSEC (with NSEC)
   is in use, it is possible for someone to enumerate all employees of
   the organization.  This is usually not considered desirable, for the
   same reason enterprise phone listings are not often publicly
   published and are even mark confidential.

   When the URI type is used, it should be understood that it introduces
   an additional indirection that may allow for a new attack vector.
   One method to secure that indirection is to include a hash of the
   certificate in the URI itself.

   CERT RRs are not used by DNSSEC [9], so there are no security
   considerations related to CERT RRs and securing the DNS itself.

   If DNSSEC is used, then the non-existence of a CERT RR and,
   consequently, certificates or revocation lists can be securely
   asserted.  Without DNSSEC, this is not possible.


8.  IANA Considerations

   Certificate types 0x0000 through 0x00FF and 0xFF00 through 0xFFFF can
   only be assigned by an IETF standards action [7].  This document
   assigns 0x0001 through 0x0006 and 0x00FD and 0x00FE.  Certificate
   types 0x0100 through 0xFEFF are assigned through IETF Consensus [7]
   based on RFC documentation of the certificate type.  The availability
   of private types under 0x00FD and 0x00FE should satisfy most
   requirements for proprietary or private types.

   The CERT RR reuses the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry.  In
   particular, the CERT RR requires that algorithm number 0 remain
   reserved, as described in Section 2.  The IANA is directed to
   reference the CERT RR as a user of this registry and value 0, in
   particular.


9.  Changes since RFC 2538

   1.   Editorial changes to conform with new document requirements,
        including splitting reference section into two parts and
        updating the references to point at latest versions, and to add
        some additional references.




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   2.   Improve terminology.  For example replace "PGP" with "OpenPGP",
        to align with RFC 2440.
   3.   In section 2.1, clarify that OpenPGP public key data are binary,
        not the ASCII armored format, and reference 10.1 in RFC 2440 on
        how to deal with OpenPGP keys, and acknowledge that
        implementations may handle additional packet types.
   4.   Clarify that integers in the representation format are decimal.
   5.   Replace KEY/SIG with DNSKEY/RRSIG etc, to align with DNSSECbis
        terminology.  Improve reference for Key Tag Algorithm
        calculations.
   6.   Add examples that suggest use of CNAME to reduce bandwidth.
   7.   In section 3, appended the last paragraphs that discuss
        "content-based" vs "purpose-based" owner names.  Add section 3.2
        for purpose-based X.509 CERT owner names, and section 3.4 for
        purpose-based OpenPGP CERT owner names.
   8.   Added size considerations.
   9.   The SPKI types has been reserved, until RFC 2692/2693 is moved
        from the experimental status.
   10.  Added indirect types IPKIX, ISPKI, and IPGP.


Appendix A.  Copying conditions

   Regarding the portion of this document that was written by Simon
   Josefsson ("the author", for the remainder of this section), the
   author makes no guarantees and is not responsible for any damage
   resulting from its use.  The author grants irrevocable permission to
   anyone to use, modify, and distribute it in any way that does not
   diminish the rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it,
   provided that redistributed derivative works do not contain
   misleading author or version information.  Derivative works need not
   be licensed under similar terms.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
         STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [2]   Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
         specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [3]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [4]   Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R., and S. Sataluri,



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         "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", RFC 2247,
         January 1998.

   [5]   Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
         Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396,
         August 1998.

   [6]   Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., and R. Thayer,
         "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.

   [7]   Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
         Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
         October 1998.

   [8]   Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001.

   [9]   Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
         "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
         March 2005.

   [10]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
         "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
         March 2005.

10.2.  Informative References

   [11]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
         RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [12]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
         Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [13]  Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, B.,
         and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
         September 1999.

   [14]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",
         RFC 3548, July 2003.

   [15]  Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in
         DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005.

   [16]  Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
         (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851,
         July 2004.






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Author's Address

   Simon Josefsson

   Email: simon@josefsson.org














































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