/* * Copyright (c) 1983, 1988, 1993 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by the University of * California, Berkeley and its contributors. * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #if !defined(lint) && !defined(sgi) && !defined(__NetBSD__) static char sccsid[] = "@(#)input.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/5/93"; #elif defined(__NetBSD__) static char rcsid[] = "$NetBSD$"; #endif #ident "$Revision: 1.1.3.3 $" #include "defs.h" static void input(struct sockaddr_in *, struct interface*, struct rip *, int); static void input_route(struct interface *, naddr, naddr, naddr, naddr, struct netinfo *); /* process RIP input */ void read_rip(int sock, struct interface *ifp) { struct sockaddr_in from; int fromlen, cc; union pkt_buf inbuf; for (;;) { fromlen = sizeof(from); cc = recvfrom(sock, &inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), 0, (struct sockaddr*)&from, &fromlen); if (cc <= 0) { if (cc < 0 && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) LOGERR("recvfrom(rip)"); break; } if (fromlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) logbad(1,"impossible recvfrom(rip) fromlen=%d", fromlen); input(&from, (ifp != 0) ? ifp : iflookup(from.sin_addr.s_addr), &inbuf.rip, cc); } } /* Process a RIP packet */ static void input(struct sockaddr_in *from, /* received from this IP address */ struct interface *ifp, struct rip *rip, int size) { # define FROM_NADDR from->sin_addr.s_addr static naddr use_auth, bad_len, bad_mask; static naddr unk_router, bad_router, bad_nhop; struct rt_entry *rt; struct netinfo *n, *lim; struct interface *ifp1; naddr gate, mask, v1_mask, dst, ddst_h; int i; if (ifp != 0) ifp->int_state |= IS_ACTIVE; trace_rip("Recv", "from", from, ifp, rip, size); if (rip->rip_vers == 0) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("RIP version 0, cmd %d, packet received" " from %s", rip->rip_cmd, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } if (size > MAXPACKETSIZE) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("packet at least %d bytes too long received" " from %s", size-MAXPACKETSIZE, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } n = rip->rip_nets; lim = (struct netinfo *)((char*)rip + size); /* Notice authentication. * As required by section 4.2 in RFC 1723, discard authenticated * RIPv2 messages, but only if configured for that silliness. * * RIPv2 authentication is lame, since snooping on the wire makes * its simple passwords evident. Also, why authenticate queries? * Why should a RIPv2 implementation with authentication disabled * not be able to listen to RIPv2 packets with authenication, while * RIPv1 systems will listen? Crazy! */ if (!auth_ok && rip->rip_vers >= RIPv2 && n < lim && n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != use_auth) msglog("RIPv2 message with authentication" " from %s discarded", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); use_auth = from->sin_addr.s_addr; trace_pkt("discard authenticated RIPv2 message\n"); return; } switch (rip->rip_cmd) { case RIPCMD_REQUEST: /* did the request come from a router? */ if (from->sin_port == htons(RIP_PORT)) { /* yes, ignore it if RIP is off so that it does not * depend on us. */ if (rip_sock < 0) { trace_pkt("ignore request while RIP off\n"); return; } /* Ignore the request if we talking to ourself * (and not a remote gateway). */ if (ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 0) != 0) { trace_pkt("discard our own RIP request\n"); return; } } /* According to RFC 1723, we should ignore unathenticated * queries. That is too silly to bother with. Sheesh! * Are forwarding tables supposed to be secret? When * a bad guy can infer them with test traffic? * Maybe on firewalls you'd care, but not enough to * give up the diagnostic facilities of remote probing. */ if (n >= lim || size%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_len) msglog("request of bad length (%d) from %s", size, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); bad_len = from->sin_addr.s_addr; } for (; n < lim; n++) { n->n_metric = ntohl(n->n_metric); /* A single entry with family RIP_AF_UNSPEC and * metric HOPCNT_INFINITY means "all routes". * We respond to routers only if we are acting * as a supplier, or to anyone other than a router * (i.e. a query). * * Answer a query from a stray program with all * we know. Filter the answer to a query from a * router in the about same way broadcasts are * filtered. * * Only answer a router if we are a supplier * to keep an unwary host that is just starting * from picking us an a router. */ if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_UNSPEC && n->n_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY && n == rip->rip_nets && n+1 == lim) { if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) { /* query from `rtquery` or similar */ supply(from, ifp, OUT_QUERY, 0, rip->rip_vers); } else if (supplier) { /* a router trying to prime its * tables. */ supply(from, ifp, OUT_UNICAST, 0, rip->rip_vers); } return; } if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("request from %s" " for unsupported (af %d) %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), ntohs(n->n_family), naddr_ntoa(n->n_dst)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } dst = n->n_dst; if (!check_dst(dst)) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("bad queried destination" " %s from %s", naddr_ntoa(dst), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1 || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask)) || 0 != (ntohl(dst) & ~mask)) mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst,ifp); rt = rtget(dst, mask); if (!rt && dst != RIP_DEFAULT) rt = rtfind(n->n_dst); n->n_tag = 0; n->n_nhop = 0; if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) { n->n_mask = 0; } else { n->n_mask = mask; } if (rt == 0) { n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY; } else { n->n_metric = rt->rt_metric+1; n->n_metric += (ifp!=0) ? ifp->int_metric : 1; if (n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY; if (rip->rip_vers != RIPv1) { n->n_tag = rt->rt_tag; if (ifp != 0 && on_net(rt->rt_gate, ifp->int_net, ifp->int_mask) && rt->rt_gate != ifp->int_addr) n->n_nhop = rt->rt_gate; } } HTONL(n->n_metric); } /* Answer about specific routes. * Only answer a router if we are a supplier * to keep an unwary host that is just starting * from picking us an a router. */ rip->rip_cmd = RIPCMD_RESPONSE; rip->rip_res1 = 0; if (rip->rip_vers != RIPv1) rip->rip_vers = RIPv2; if (from->sin_port != htons(RIP_PORT)) { /* query */ (void)output(OUT_QUERY, from, ifp, rip, size); } else if (supplier) { (void)output(OUT_UNICAST, from, ifp, rip, size); } return; case RIPCMD_TRACEON: case RIPCMD_TRACEOFF: /* verify message came from a privileged port */ if (ntohs(from->sin_port) > IPPORT_RESERVED) { msglog("trace command from untrusted port on %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); return; } if (ifp == 0) { msglog("trace command from unknown router %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); return; } if (rip->rip_cmd == RIPCMD_TRACEON) { rip->rip_tracefile[size-4] = '\0'; trace_on((char*)rip->rip_tracefile, 0); } else { trace_off("tracing turned off by %s\n", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); } return; case RIPCMD_RESPONSE: if (size%sizeof(*n) != sizeof(struct rip)%sizeof(*n)) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_len) msglog("response of bad length (%d) from %s", size, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); bad_len = from->sin_addr.s_addr; } /* verify message came from a router */ if (from->sin_port != ntohs(RIP_PORT)) { trace_pkt("discard RIP response from unknown port\n"); return; } if (rip_sock < 0) { trace_pkt("discard response while RIP off\n"); return; } /* Are we talking to ourself or a remote gateway? */ ifp1 = ifwithaddr(FROM_NADDR, 0, 1); if (ifp1) { if (ifp1->int_state & IS_REMOTE) { if (ifp1->int_state & IS_PASSIVE) { msglog("bogus input from %s on" " supposedly passive %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), ifp1->int_name); } else { ifp1->int_act_time = now.tv_sec; if (if_ok(ifp1, "remote ")) addrouteforif(ifp1); } } else { trace_pkt("discard our own RIP response\n"); } return; } /* Check the router from which message originated. We accept * routing packets from routers directly connected via * broadcast or point-to-point networks, and from * those listed in /etc/gateways. */ if (!ifp) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != unk_router) msglog("packet from unknown router %s" " or via unidentified interface", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); unk_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } if (ifp->int_state & IS_PASSIVE) { trace_act("packet from %s via passive interface %s\n", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), ifp->int_name); return; } /* Check required version */ if (((ifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV1_IN) && rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) || ((ifp->int_state & IS_NO_RIPV2_IN) && rip->rip_vers != RIPv1)) { trace_pkt("discard RIPv%d response\n", rip->rip_vers); return; } /* Ignore routes via dead interface. */ if (ifp->int_state & IS_BROKE) { trace_pkt("discard response via broken interface %s\n", ifp->int_name); return; } /* Authenticate the packet if we have a secret. */ if (ifp->int_passwd[0] != '\0') { if (n >= lim || n->n_family != RIP_AF_AUTH || ((struct netauth*)n)->a_type != RIP_AUTH_PW) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != use_auth) msglog("missing password from %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); use_auth = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } else if (0 != bcmp(((struct netauth*)n)->au.au_pw, ifp->int_passwd, sizeof(ifp->int_passwd))) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != use_auth) msglog("bad password from %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); use_auth = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } } for (; n < lim; n++) { if (n->n_family == RIP_AF_AUTH) continue; NTOHL(n->n_metric); dst = n->n_dst; if (n->n_family != RIP_AF_INET && (n->n_family != RIP_AF_UNSPEC || dst != RIP_DEFAULT)) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("route from %s to unsupported" " address family %d," " destination %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), n->n_family, naddr_ntoa(dst)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; continue; } if (!check_dst(dst)) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("bad destination %s from %s", naddr_ntoa(dst), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } if (n->n_metric == 0 || n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) { if (from->sin_addr.s_addr != bad_router) msglog("bad metric %d from %s" " for destination %s", n->n_metric, naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), naddr_ntoa(dst)); bad_router = from->sin_addr.s_addr; return; } /* Notice the next-hop. */ gate = from->sin_addr.s_addr; if (n->n_nhop != 0 && rip->rip_vers == RIPv2) { /* Ignore the route if it points to us */ if (0 != ifwithaddr(n->n_nhop, 1, 0)) continue; /* Use it only if it is valid. */ if (on_net(n->n_nhop, ifp->int_net, ifp->int_mask) && check_dst(n->n_nhop)) { gate = n->n_nhop; } else { if (bad_nhop != from->sin_addr.s_addr) msglog("router %s to %s has" " bad next hop %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), naddr_ntoa(dst), naddr_ntoa(n->n_nhop)); bad_nhop = from->sin_addr.s_addr; } } if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1 || 0 == (mask = ntohl(n->n_mask))) { mask = ripv1_mask_host(dst,ifp); } else if ((ntohl(dst) & ~mask) != 0) { if (bad_mask != from->sin_addr.s_addr) { msglog("router %s sent bad netmask" " %#x with %s", naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), mask, naddr_ntoa(dst)); bad_mask = from->sin_addr.s_addr; } continue; } if (rip->rip_vers == RIPv1) n->n_tag = 0; /* Adjust metric according to incoming interface.. */ n->n_metric += ifp->int_metric; if (n->n_metric > HOPCNT_INFINITY) n->n_metric = HOPCNT_INFINITY; /* Recognize and ignore a default route we faked * which is being sent back to us by a machine with * broken split-horizon. * Be a little more paranoid than that, and reject * default routes with the same metric we advertised. */ if (ifp->int_d_metric != 0 && dst == RIP_DEFAULT && n->n_metric >= ifp->int_d_metric) continue; /* We can receive aggregated RIPv2 routes that must * be broken down before they are transmitted by * RIPv1 via an interface on a subnet. * We might also receive the same routes aggregated * via other RIPv2 interfaces. * This could cause duplicate routes to be sent on * the RIPv1 interfaces. "Longest matching variable * length netmasks" lets RIPv2 listeners understand, * but breaking down the aggregated routes for RIPv1 * listeners can produce duplicate routes. * * Breaking down aggregated routes here bloats * the daemon table, but does not hurt the kernel * table, since routes are always aggregated for * the kernel. * * Notice that this does not break down network * routes corresponding to subnets. This is part * of the defense against RS_NET_SYN. */ if (have_ripv1_out && (v1_mask = ripv1_mask_net(dst,0)) > mask && (((rt = rtget(dst,mask)) == 0 || !(rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN)))) { ddst_h = v1_mask & -v1_mask; i = (v1_mask & ~mask)/ddst_h; if (i >= 511) { /* Punt if we would have to generate * an unreasonable number of routes. */ #ifdef DEBUG msglog("accept %s from %s as 1" " instead of %d routes", addrname(dst,mask,0), naddr_ntoa(FROM_NADDR), i+1); #endif i = 0; } else { mask = v1_mask; } } else { i = 0; } for (;;) { input_route(ifp, FROM_NADDR, dst, mask, gate, n); if (i-- == 0) break; dst = htonl(ntohl(dst) + ddst_h); } } break; } } /* Process a single input route. */ static void input_route(struct interface *ifp, naddr from, naddr dst, naddr mask, naddr gate, struct netinfo *n) { int i; struct rt_entry *rt; struct rt_spare *rts, *rts0; struct interface *ifp1; time_t new_time; /* See if the other guy is telling us to send our packets to him. * Sometimes network routes arrive over a point-to-point link for * the network containing the address(es) of the link. * * If our interface is broken, switch to using the other guy. */ ifp1 = ifwithaddr(dst, 1, 1); if (ifp1 != 0 && !(ifp1->int_state & IS_BROKE)) return; /* Look for the route in our table. */ rt = rtget(dst, mask); /* Consider adding the route if we do not already have it. */ if (rt == 0) { /* Ignore unknown routes being poisoned. */ if (n->n_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) return; if (total_routes < MAX_ROUTES) rtadd(dst, mask, gate, from, n->n_metric, n->n_tag, 0, ifp); return; } /* We already know about the route. Consider this update. * * If (rt->rt_state & RS_NET_SYN), then this route * is the same as a network route we have inferred * for subnets we know, in order to tell RIPv1 routers * about the subnets. * * It is impossible to tell if the route is coming * from a distant RIPv2 router with the standard * netmask because that router knows about the entire * network, or if it is a round-about echo of a * synthetic, RIPv1 network route of our own. * The worst is that both kinds of routes might be * received, and the bad one might have the smaller * metric. Partly solve this problem by faking the * RIPv1 route with a metric that reflects the most * distant part of the subnet. Also never * aggregate into such a route. Also keep it * around as long as the interface exists. */ rts0 = rt->rt_spares; for (rts = rts0, i = NUM_SPARES; i != 0; i--, rts++) { if (rts->rts_router == from) break; /* Note the worst slot to reuse, * other than the current slot. */ if (rts0 == rt->rt_spares || BETTER_LINK(rt, rts0, rts)) rts0 = rts; } if (i != 0) { /* Found the router */ int old_metric = rts->rts_metric; /* Keep poisoned routes around only long enough to pass * the poison on. Get a new timestamp for good routes. */ new_time =((old_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY) ? rts->rts_time : now.tv_sec); /* If this is an update for the router we currently prefer, * then note it. */ if (i == NUM_SPARES) { rtchange(rt,rt->rt_state, gate,rt->rt_router, n->n_metric, n->n_tag, ifp, new_time, 0); /* If the route got worse, check for something better. */ if (n->n_metric > old_metric) rtswitch(rt, 0); return; } /* This is an update for a spare route. * Finished if the route is unchanged. */ if (rts->rts_gate == gate && old_metric == n->n_metric && rts->rts_tag == n->n_tag) { rts->rts_time = new_time; return; } } else { /* The update is for a route we know about, * but not from a familiar router. */ rts = rts0; /* Save the route as a spare only if it has * a better metric than our worst spare. * This also ignores poisoned routes (those * received with metric HOPCNT_INFINITY). */ if (n->n_metric >= rts->rts_metric) return; new_time = now.tv_sec; } trace_upslot(rt, rts, gate, from, ifp, n->n_metric,n->n_tag, new_time); rts->rts_gate = gate; rts->rts_router = from; rts->rts_metric = n->n_metric; rts->rts_tag = n->n_tag; rts->rts_time = new_time; rts->rts_ifp = ifp; /* try to switch to a better route */ rtswitch(rt, rts); }