From f63d2e920584a3d403a07e765a61eeac57210332 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: jonathan <jonathan@FreeBSD.org>
Date: Sat, 13 Aug 2011 09:21:16 +0000
Subject: Allow Capsicum capabilities to delegate constrained access to file
 system subtrees to sandboxed processes.

- Use of absolute paths and '..' are limited in capability mode.
- Use of absolute paths and '..' are limited when looking up relative
  to a capability.
- When a name lookup is performed, identify what operation is to be
  performed (such as CAP_MKDIR) as well as check for CAP_LOOKUP.

With these constraints, openat() and friends are now safe in capability
mode, and can then be used by code such as the capability-mode runtime
linker.

Approved by: re (bz), mentor (rwatson)
Sponsored by: Google Inc
---
 sys/kern/vfs_lookup.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'sys/kern/vfs_lookup.c')

diff --git a/sys/kern/vfs_lookup.c b/sys/kern/vfs_lookup.c
index ae8982f..a145017 100644
--- a/sys/kern/vfs_lookup.c
+++ b/sys/kern/vfs_lookup.c
@@ -180,6 +180,18 @@ namei(struct nameidata *ndp)
 	if (!error && *cnp->cn_pnbuf == '\0')
 		error = ENOENT;
 
+#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
+	/*
+	 * In capability mode, lookups must be "strictly relative" (i.e.
+	 * not an absolute path, and not containing '..' components) to
+	 * a real file descriptor, not the pseudo-descriptor AT_FDCWD.
+	 */
+	if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) {
+		ndp->ni_strictrelative = 1;
+		if (ndp->ni_dirfd == AT_FDCWD)
+			error = ECAPMODE;
+	}
+#endif
 	if (error) {
 		uma_zfree(namei_zone, cnp->cn_pnbuf);
 #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
@@ -214,12 +226,20 @@ namei(struct nameidata *ndp)
 				AUDIT_ARG_ATFD1(ndp->ni_dirfd);
 			if (cnp->cn_flags & AUDITVNODE2)
 				AUDIT_ARG_ATFD2(ndp->ni_dirfd);
-#ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE
-			KASSERT(!IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td),
-			    ("%s: reached %s:%d in capability mode",
-			     __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__));
+			error = fgetvp_rights(td, ndp->ni_dirfd,
+			    ndp->ni_rightsneeded | CAP_LOOKUP,
+			    &(ndp->ni_baserights), &dp);
+#ifdef CAPABILITIES
+			/*
+			 * Lookups relative to a capability must also be
+			 * strictly relative.
+			 *
+			 * Note that a capability with rights CAP_MASK_VALID
+			 * is treated exactly like a regular file descriptor.
+			 */
+			if (ndp->ni_baserights != CAP_MASK_VALID)
+				ndp->ni_strictrelative = 1;
 #endif
-			error = fgetvp(td, ndp->ni_dirfd, 0, &dp);
 		}
 		if (error != 0 || dp != NULL) {
 			FILEDESC_SUNLOCK(fdp);
@@ -261,6 +281,8 @@ namei(struct nameidata *ndp)
 		if (*(cnp->cn_nameptr) == '/') {
 			vrele(dp);
 			VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
+			if (ndp->ni_strictrelative != 0)
+				return (ENOTCAPABLE);
 			while (*(cnp->cn_nameptr) == '/') {
 				cnp->cn_nameptr++;
 				ndp->ni_pathlen--;
@@ -604,7 +626,10 @@ dirloop:
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Handle "..": four special cases.
+	 * Handle "..": five special cases.
+	 * 0. If doing a capability lookup, return ENOTCAPABLE (this is a
+	 *    fairly conservative design choice, but it's the only one that we
+	 *    are satisfied guarantees the property we're looking for).
 	 * 1. Return an error if this is the last component of
 	 *    the name and the operation is DELETE or RENAME.
 	 * 2. If at root directory (e.g. after chroot)
@@ -618,6 +643,10 @@ dirloop:
 	 *    the jail or chroot, don't let them out.
 	 */
 	if (cnp->cn_flags & ISDOTDOT) {
+		if (ndp->ni_strictrelative != 0) {
+			error = ENOTCAPABLE;
+			goto bad;
+		}
 		if ((cnp->cn_flags & ISLASTCN) != 0 &&
 		    (cnp->cn_nameiop == DELETE || cnp->cn_nameiop == RENAME)) {
 			error = EINVAL;
-- 
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