From 90eb685fcad1aa13ec79f7d8d0383559f77dccee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: pjd Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2006 16:18:47 +0000 Subject: Implement support for HMAC/SHA1 and HMAC/SHA256 acceleration found in new VIA CPUs. For older CPUs HMAC/SHA1 and HMAC/SHA256 (and others) will still be done in software. Move symmetric cryptography (currently only AES-CBC 128/192/256) to padlock_cipher.c file. Move HMAC cryptography to padlock_hash.c file. Hardware from: Centaur Technologies --- sys/crypto/via/padlock.c | 399 +++++++--------------------------------- sys/crypto/via/padlock.h | 87 +++++++++ sys/crypto/via/padlock_cipher.c | 226 +++++++++++++++++++++++ sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c | 389 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 766 insertions(+), 335 deletions(-) create mode 100644 sys/crypto/via/padlock.h create mode 100644 sys/crypto/via/padlock_cipher.c create mode 100644 sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c (limited to 'sys/crypto') diff --git a/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c b/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c index 9a221d7..4304c49 100644 --- a/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c +++ b/sys/crypto/via/padlock.c @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ /*- - * Copyright (c) 2005 Pawel Jakub Dawidek - * Copyright (c) 2004 Mark R V Murray + * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -25,25 +24,6 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: via.c,v 1.3 2004/06/15 23:36:55 deraadt Exp $ */ -/*- - * Copyright (c) 2003 Jason Wright - * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Theo de Raadt - * All rights reserved. - * - * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any - * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above - * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES - * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR - * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES - * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN - * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF - * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. - */ - #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); @@ -63,66 +43,14 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #endif #include -#include /* for hmac_ipad_buffer and hmac_opad_buffer */ -#include -#include - - -#define PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES128 10 -#define PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES192 12 -#define PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES256 14 - -#define PADLOCK_ALGORITHM_TYPE_AES 0 - -#define PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_HW 0 -#define PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW 1 - -#define PADLOCK_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT 0 -#define PADLOCK_DIRECTION_DECRYPT 1 - -#define PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_128 0 -#define PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_192 1 -#define PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_256 2 - -union padlock_cw { - uint64_t raw; - struct { - u_int round_count : 4; - u_int algorithm_type : 3; - u_int key_generation : 1; - u_int intermediate : 1; - u_int direction : 1; - u_int key_size : 2; - u_int filler0 : 20; - u_int filler1 : 32; - u_int filler2 : 32; - u_int filler3 : 32; - } __field; -}; -#define cw_round_count __field.round_count -#define cw_algorithm_type __field.algorithm_type -#define cw_key_generation __field.key_generation -#define cw_intermediate __field.intermediate -#define cw_direction __field.direction -#define cw_key_size __field.key_size -#define cw_filler0 __field.filler0 -#define cw_filler1 __field.filler1 -#define cw_filler2 __field.filler2 -#define cw_filler3 __field.filler3 - -struct padlock_session { - union padlock_cw ses_cw __aligned(16); - uint32_t ses_ekey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */ - uint32_t ses_dkey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */ - uint8_t ses_iv[16] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */ - struct auth_hash *ses_axf; - uint8_t *ses_ictx; - uint8_t *ses_octx; - int ses_mlen; - int ses_used; - uint32_t ses_id; - TAILQ_ENTRY(padlock_session) ses_next; -}; + +#include + +/* + * Technical documentation about the PadLock engine can be found here: + * + * http://www.via.com.tw/en/downloads/whitepapers/initiatives/padlock/programming_guide.pdf + */ struct padlock_softc { int32_t sc_cid; @@ -139,47 +67,50 @@ static int padlock_freesession(void *arg __unused, uint64_t tid); static int padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused); -static __inline void -padlock_cbc(void *in, void *out, size_t count, void *key, union padlock_cw *cw, - void *iv) -{ -#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM - /* The .byte line is really VIA C3 "xcrypt-cbc" instruction */ - __asm __volatile( - "pushf \n\t" - "popf \n\t" - "rep \n\t" - ".byte 0x0f, 0xa7, 0xd0" - : "+a" (iv), "+c" (count), "+D" (out), "+S" (in) - : "b" (key), "d" (cw) - : "cc", "memory" - ); -#endif -} +MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PADLOCK, "padlock_data", "PadLock Data"); static int padlock_init(void) { struct padlock_softc *sc; + char capp[256]; + #if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98) + /* If there is no AES support, we has nothing to do here. */ if (!(via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_AES)) { - printf("PADLOCK: No ACE support.\n"); + printf("PadLock: No ACE support.\n"); return (EINVAL); - } else - printf("PADLOCK: HW support loaded.\n"); + } + strlcpy(capp, "AES-CBC", sizeof(capp)); +#if 0 + strlcat(capp, ",AES-EBC", sizeof(capp)); + strlcat(capp, ",AES-CFB", sizeof(capp)); + strlcat(capp, ",AES-OFB", sizeof(capp)); +#endif + if (via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) { + strlcat(capp, ",SHA1", sizeof(capp)); + strlcat(capp, ",SHA256", sizeof(capp)); + } +#if 0 + if (via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_AESCTR) + strlcat(capp, ",AES-CTR", sizeof(capp)); + if (via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_MM) + strlcat(capp, ",RSA", sizeof(capp)); +#endif + printf("PadLock: HW support loaded for %s.\n", capp); #else return (EINVAL); #endif - padlock_sc = sc = malloc(sizeof(*padlock_sc), M_DEVBUF, + padlock_sc = sc = malloc(sizeof(*padlock_sc), M_PADLOCK, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); TAILQ_INIT(&sc->sc_sessions); sc->sc_sid = 1; sc->sc_cid = crypto_get_driverid(0); if (sc->sc_cid < 0) { - printf("PADLOCK: Could not get crypto driver id.\n"); - free(padlock_sc, M_DEVBUF); + printf("PadLock: Could not get crypto driver id.\n"); + free(padlock_sc, M_PADLOCK); padlock_sc = NULL; return (ENOMEM); } @@ -218,7 +149,7 @@ padlock_destroy(void) } if (active > 0) { mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx); - printf("PADLOCK: Cannot destroy, %u sessions active.\n", + printf("PadLock: Cannot destroy, %u sessions active.\n", active); return (EBUSY); } @@ -226,102 +157,21 @@ padlock_destroy(void) for (ses = TAILQ_FIRST(&sc->sc_sessions); ses != NULL; ses = TAILQ_FIRST(&sc->sc_sessions)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next); - free(ses, M_DEVBUF); + free(ses, M_PADLOCK); } mtx_destroy(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx); crypto_unregister_all(sc->sc_cid); - free(sc, M_DEVBUF); + free(sc, M_PADLOCK); return (0); } -static void -padlock_setup_enckey(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen) -{ - union padlock_cw *cw; - int i; - - cw = &ses->ses_cw; - if (cw->cw_key_generation == PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW) { - /* Build expanded keys for both directions */ - rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ses->ses_ekey, key, klen); - rijndaelKeySetupDec(ses->ses_dkey, key, klen); - for (i = 0; i < 4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1); i++) { - ses->ses_ekey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_ekey[i]); - ses->ses_dkey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_dkey[i]); - } - } else { - bcopy(key, ses->ses_ekey, klen); - bcopy(key, ses->ses_dkey, klen); - } -} - -static void -padlock_setup_mackey(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen) -{ - struct auth_hash *axf; - int i; - - klen /= 8; - axf = ses->ses_axf; - - for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) - key[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL; - - axf->Init(ses->ses_ictx); - axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, key, klen); - axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, hmac_ipad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen); - - for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) - key[i] ^= (HMAC_IPAD_VAL ^ HMAC_OPAD_VAL); - - axf->Init(ses->ses_octx); - axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, key, klen); - axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, hmac_opad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen); - - for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) - key[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL; -} - -/* - * Compute keyed-hash authenticator. - */ -static int -padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *crd, - caddr_t buf, int flags) -{ - u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN]; - struct auth_hash *axf; - union authctx ctx; - int error; - - axf = ses->ses_axf; - - bcopy(ses->ses_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); - - error = crypto_apply(flags, buf, crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len, - (int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx); - if (error != 0) - return (error); - - axf->Final(hash, &ctx); - bcopy(ses->ses_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize); - axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize); - axf->Final(hash, &ctx); - - /* Inject the authentication data */ - crypto_copyback(flags, buf, crd->crd_inject, - ses->ses_mlen == 0 ? axf->hashsize : ses->ses_mlen, hash); - return (0); -} - - static int padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri) { struct padlock_softc *sc = padlock_sc; struct padlock_session *ses = NULL; struct cryptoini *encini, *macini; - union padlock_cw *cw; + int error; if (sc == NULL || sidp == NULL || cri == NULL) return (EINVAL); @@ -357,10 +207,6 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri) */ if (encini == NULL) return (EINVAL); - if (encini->cri_klen != 128 && encini->cri_klen != 192 && - encini->cri_klen != 256) { - return (EINVAL); - } /* * Let's look for a free session structure. @@ -380,7 +226,7 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri) } mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx); if (ses == NULL) { - ses = malloc(sizeof(*ses), M_DEVBUF, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); + ses = malloc(sizeof(*ses), M_PADLOCK, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); if (ses == NULL) return (ENOMEM); ses->ses_used = 1; @@ -390,76 +236,17 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri) mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx); } - cw = &ses->ses_cw; - bzero(cw, sizeof(*cw)); - cw->cw_algorithm_type = PADLOCK_ALGORITHM_TYPE_AES; - cw->cw_key_generation = PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW; - cw->cw_intermediate = 0; - switch (encini->cri_klen) { - case 128: - cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES128; - cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_128; -#ifdef HW_KEY_GENERATION - /* This doesn't buy us much, that's why it is commented out. */ - cw->cw_key_generation = PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_HW; -#endif - break; - case 192: - cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES192; - cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_192; - break; - case 256: - cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES256; - cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_256; - break; + error = padlock_cipher_setup(ses, encini); + if (error != 0) { + padlock_freesession(NULL, ses->ses_id); + return (error); } - if (encini->cri_key != NULL) - padlock_setup_enckey(ses, encini->cri_key, encini->cri_klen); - - arc4rand(ses->ses_iv, sizeof(ses->ses_iv), 0); if (macini != NULL) { - ses->ses_mlen = macini->cri_mlen; - - /* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */ - switch (macini->cri_alg) { - case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_null; - break; - case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5; - break; - case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1; - break; - case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160; - break; - case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; - break; - case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; - break; - case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: - ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; - break; - } - - /* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */ - ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, - M_NOWAIT); - ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA, - M_NOWAIT); - if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL) { + error = padlock_hash_setup(ses, macini); + if (error != 0) { padlock_freesession(NULL, ses->ses_id); - return (ENOMEM); - } - - /* Setup key if given. */ - if (macini->cri_key != NULL) { - padlock_setup_mackey(ses, macini->cri_key, - macini->cri_klen); + return (error); } } @@ -486,16 +273,7 @@ padlock_freesession(void *arg __unused, uint64_t tid) return (EINVAL); } TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next); - if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) { - bzero(ses->ses_ictx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize); - free(ses->ses_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - ses->ses_ictx = NULL; - } - if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) { - bzero(ses->ses_ictx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize); - free(ses->ses_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA); - ses->ses_octx = NULL; - } + padlock_hash_free(ses); bzero(ses, sizeof(*ses)); ses->ses_used = 0; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next); @@ -507,15 +285,11 @@ static int padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused) { struct padlock_softc *sc = padlock_sc; - struct padlock_session *ses; - union padlock_cw *cw; + struct padlock_session *ses = NULL; struct cryptodesc *crd, *enccrd, *maccrd; - uint32_t *key; - u_char *buf, *abuf; int error = 0; enccrd = maccrd = NULL; - buf = NULL; if (crp == NULL || crp->crp_callback == NULL || crp->crp_desc == NULL) { error = EINVAL; @@ -564,81 +338,36 @@ padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused) goto out; } - buf = malloc(enccrd->crd_len + 16, M_DEVBUF, M_NOWAIT); - if (buf == NULL) { - error = ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - /* Buffer has to be 16 bytes aligned. */ - abuf = buf + 16 - ((uintptr_t)buf % 16); - - if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) - padlock_setup_enckey(ses, enccrd->crd_key, enccrd->crd_klen); - if (maccrd != NULL && (maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) - padlock_setup_mackey(ses, maccrd->crd_key, maccrd->crd_klen); - - cw = &ses->ses_cw; - cw->cw_filler0 = 0; - cw->cw_filler1 = 0; - cw->cw_filler2 = 0; - cw->cw_filler3 = 0; - if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) { - cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT; - key = ses->ses_ekey; - if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0) - bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16); - - if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) { - crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, - enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv); - } - } else { - cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_DECRYPT; - key = ses->ses_dkey; - if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0) - bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN); - else { - crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, - enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv); - } - } - /* Perform data authentication if requested before encryption. */ if (maccrd != NULL && maccrd->crd_next == enccrd) { - error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf, - crp->crp_flags); + error = padlock_hash_process(ses, maccrd, crp); if (error != 0) goto out; } - crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip, - enccrd->crd_len, abuf); - - padlock_cbc(abuf, abuf, enccrd->crd_len / 16, key, cw, ses->ses_iv); - - crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip, - enccrd->crd_len, abuf); + error = padlock_cipher_process(ses, enccrd, crp); + if (error != 0) + goto out; /* Perform data authentication if requested after encryption. */ if (maccrd != NULL && enccrd->crd_next == maccrd) { - error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf, - crp->crp_flags); + error = padlock_hash_process(ses, maccrd, crp); if (error != 0) goto out; } - /* copy out last block for use as next session IV */ - if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) { - crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, - enccrd->crd_skip + enccrd->crd_len - AES_BLOCK_LEN, - AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv); - } - out: - if (buf != NULL) { - bzero(buf, enccrd->crd_len + 16); - free(buf, M_DEVBUF); +#if 0 + /* + * This code is not necessary, because contexts will be freed on next + * padlock_setup_mackey() call or at padlock_freesession() call. + */ + if (ses != NULL && maccrd != NULL && + (maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) { + padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_ictx); + padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_octx); } +#endif crp->crp_etype = error; crypto_done(crp); return (error); diff --git a/sys/crypto/via/padlock.h b/sys/crypto/via/padlock.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29eed52 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/crypto/via/padlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $FreeBSD$ + */ + +#ifndef _PADLOCK_H_ +#define _PADLOCK_H_ + +#include +#include + +union padlock_cw { + uint64_t raw; + struct { + u_int round_count : 4; + u_int algorithm_type : 3; + u_int key_generation : 1; + u_int intermediate : 1; + u_int direction : 1; + u_int key_size : 2; + u_int filler0 : 20; + u_int filler1 : 32; + u_int filler2 : 32; + u_int filler3 : 32; + } __field; +}; +#define cw_round_count __field.round_count +#define cw_algorithm_type __field.algorithm_type +#define cw_key_generation __field.key_generation +#define cw_intermediate __field.intermediate +#define cw_direction __field.direction +#define cw_key_size __field.key_size +#define cw_filler0 __field.filler0 +#define cw_filler1 __field.filler1 +#define cw_filler2 __field.filler2 +#define cw_filler3 __field.filler3 + +struct padlock_session { + union padlock_cw ses_cw __aligned(16); + uint32_t ses_ekey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */ + uint32_t ses_dkey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */ + uint8_t ses_iv[16] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */ + struct auth_hash *ses_axf; + uint8_t *ses_ictx; + uint8_t *ses_octx; + int ses_mlen; + int ses_used; + uint32_t ses_id; + TAILQ_ENTRY(padlock_session) ses_next; +}; + +#define PADLOCK_ALIGN(p) (void *)((char *)(p) - ((uintptr_t)(p) % 16) + 16) + +int padlock_cipher_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, + struct cryptoini *encini); +int padlock_cipher_process(struct padlock_session *ses, + struct cryptodesc *enccrd, struct cryptop *crp); +int padlock_hash_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, + struct cryptoini *macini); +int padlock_hash_process(struct padlock_session *ses, + struct cryptodesc *maccrd, struct cryptop *crp); +void padlock_hash_free(struct padlock_session *ses); + +#endif /* !_PADLOCK_H_ */ diff --git a/sys/crypto/via/padlock_cipher.c b/sys/crypto/via/padlock_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d881a8b --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/crypto/via/padlock_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek + * Copyright (c) 2004 Mark R V Murray + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: via.c,v 1.3 2004/06/15 23:36:55 deraadt Exp $ */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2003 Jason Wright + * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Theo de Raadt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +#define PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES128 10 +#define PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES192 12 +#define PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES256 14 + +#define PADLOCK_ALGORITHM_TYPE_AES 0 + +#define PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_HW 0 +#define PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW 1 + +#define PADLOCK_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT 0 +#define PADLOCK_DIRECTION_DECRYPT 1 + +#define PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_128 0 +#define PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_192 1 +#define PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_256 2 + +MALLOC_DECLARE(M_PADLOCK); + +static __inline void +padlock_cbc(void *in, void *out, size_t count, void *key, union padlock_cw *cw, + void *iv) +{ +#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM + /* The .byte line is really VIA C3 "xcrypt-cbc" instruction */ + __asm __volatile( + "pushf \n\t" + "popf \n\t" + "rep \n\t" + ".byte 0x0f, 0xa7, 0xd0" + : "+a" (iv), "+c" (count), "+D" (out), "+S" (in) + : "b" (key), "d" (cw) + : "cc", "memory" + ); +#endif +} + +static void +padlock_cipher_key_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen) +{ + union padlock_cw *cw; + int i; + + cw = &ses->ses_cw; + if (cw->cw_key_generation == PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW) { + /* Build expanded keys for both directions */ + rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ses->ses_ekey, key, klen); + rijndaelKeySetupDec(ses->ses_dkey, key, klen); + for (i = 0; i < 4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1); i++) { + ses->ses_ekey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_ekey[i]); + ses->ses_dkey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_dkey[i]); + } + } else { + bcopy(key, ses->ses_ekey, klen); + bcopy(key, ses->ses_dkey, klen); + } +} + +int +padlock_cipher_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptoini *encini) +{ + union padlock_cw *cw; + + if (encini->cri_klen != 128 && encini->cri_klen != 192 && + encini->cri_klen != 256) { + return (EINVAL); + } + + cw = &ses->ses_cw; + bzero(cw, sizeof(*cw)); + cw->cw_algorithm_type = PADLOCK_ALGORITHM_TYPE_AES; + cw->cw_key_generation = PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW; + cw->cw_intermediate = 0; + switch (encini->cri_klen) { + case 128: + cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES128; + cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_128; +#ifdef HW_KEY_GENERATION + /* This doesn't buy us much, that's why it is commented out. */ + cw->cw_key_generation = PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_HW; +#endif + break; + case 192: + cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES192; + cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_192; + break; + case 256: + cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES256; + cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_256; + break; + } + if (encini->cri_key != NULL) { + padlock_cipher_key_setup(ses, encini->cri_key, + encini->cri_klen); + } + + arc4rand(ses->ses_iv, sizeof(ses->ses_iv), 0); + return (0); +} + +int +padlock_cipher_process(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *enccrd, + struct cryptop *crp) +{ + union padlock_cw *cw; + u_char *buf, *abuf; + uint32_t *key; + + buf = malloc(enccrd->crd_len + 16, M_PADLOCK, M_NOWAIT); + if (buf == NULL) + return (ENOMEM); + /* Buffer has to be 16 bytes aligned. */ + abuf = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf); + + if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) { + padlock_cipher_key_setup(ses, enccrd->crd_key, + enccrd->crd_klen); + } + + cw = &ses->ses_cw; + cw->cw_filler0 = 0; + cw->cw_filler1 = 0; + cw->cw_filler2 = 0; + cw->cw_filler3 = 0; + if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) { + cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT; + key = ses->ses_ekey; + if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0) + bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16); + + if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) { + crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, + enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv); + } + } else { + cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_DECRYPT; + key = ses->ses_dkey; + if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0) + bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN); + else { + crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, + enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv); + } + } + + crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip, + enccrd->crd_len, abuf); + + padlock_cbc(abuf, abuf, enccrd->crd_len / 16, key, cw, ses->ses_iv); + + crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip, + enccrd->crd_len, abuf); + + /* copy out last block for use as next session IV */ + if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) { + crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, + enccrd->crd_skip + enccrd->crd_len - AES_BLOCK_LEN, + AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv); + } + + if (buf != NULL) { + bzero(buf, enccrd->crd_len + 16); + free(buf, M_PADLOCK); + } + return (0); +} diff --git a/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c b/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f666c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/crypto/via/padlock_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2006 Pawel Jakub Dawidek + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98) +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#include +#include /* for hmac_ipad_buffer and hmac_opad_buffer */ +#include + +#include + +/* + * Implementation notes. + * + * Some VIA CPUs provides SHA1 and SHA256 acceleration. + * We implement all HMAC algorithms provided by crypto(9) framework, but we do + * the crypto work in software unless this is HMAC/SHA1 or HMAC/SHA256 and + * our CPU can accelerate it. + * + * Additional CPU instructions, which preform SHA1 and SHA256 are one-shot + * functions - we have only one chance to give the data, CPU itself will add + * the padding and calculate hash automatically. + * This means, it is not possible to implement common init(), update(), final() + * methods. + * The way I've choosen is to keep adding data to the buffer on update() + * (reallocating the buffer if necessary) and call XSHA{1,256} instruction on + * final(). + */ + +struct padlock_sha_ctx { + uint8_t *psc_buf; + int psc_offset; + int psc_size; +}; +CTASSERT(sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx) <= sizeof(union authctx)); + +static void padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx); +static int padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *buf, + uint16_t bufsize); +static void padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx); +static void padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx); + +static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha1 = { + CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, "HMAC-SHA1", + 20, SHA1_HASH_LEN, SHA1_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx), + (void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init, + (int (*)(void *, uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update, + (void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha1_final +}; + +static struct auth_hash padlock_hmac_sha256 = { + CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, "HMAC-SHA2-256", + 32, SHA2_256_HASH_LEN, SHA2_256_HMAC_BLOCK_LEN, sizeof(struct padlock_sha_ctx), + (void (*)(void *))padlock_sha_init, + (int (*)(void *, uint8_t *, uint16_t))padlock_sha_update, + (void (*)(uint8_t *, void *))padlock_sha256_final +}; + +MALLOC_DECLARE(M_PADLOCK); + +static __inline void +padlock_output_block(uint32_t *src, uint32_t *dst, size_t count) +{ + + while (count-- > 0) + *dst++ = bswap32(*src++); +} + +static void +padlock_do_sha1(const u_char *in, u_char *out, int count) +{ + u_char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */ + u_char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf); + + ((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x67452301; + ((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0x10325476; + ((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + +#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM + __asm __volatile( + ".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xc8" /* rep xsha1 */ + : "+S"(in), "+D"(result) + : "c"(count), "a"(0) + ); +#endif + + padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out, + SHA1_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t)); +} + +static void +padlock_do_sha256(const char *in, char *out, int count) +{ + char buf[128+16]; /* PadLock needs at least 128 bytes buffer. */ + char *result = PADLOCK_ALIGN(buf); + + ((uint32_t *)result)[0] = 0x6A09E667; + ((uint32_t *)result)[1] = 0xBB67AE85; + ((uint32_t *)result)[2] = 0x3C6EF372; + ((uint32_t *)result)[3] = 0xA54FF53A; + ((uint32_t *)result)[4] = 0x510E527F; + ((uint32_t *)result)[5] = 0x9B05688C; + ((uint32_t *)result)[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; + ((uint32_t *)result)[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; + +#ifdef __GNUCLIKE_ASM + __asm __volatile( + ".byte 0xf3, 0x0f, 0xa6, 0xd0" /* rep xsha256 */ + : "+S"(in), "+D"(result) + : "c"(count), "a"(0) + ); +#endif + + padlock_output_block((uint32_t *)result, (uint32_t *)out, + SHA2_256_HASH_LEN / sizeof(uint32_t)); +} + +static void +padlock_sha_init(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + ctx->psc_buf = NULL; + ctx->psc_offset = 0; + ctx->psc_size = 0; +} + +static int +padlock_sha_update(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *buf, uint16_t bufsize) +{ + + if (ctx->psc_size - ctx->psc_offset < bufsize) { + ctx->psc_size = MAX(ctx->psc_size * 2, ctx->psc_size + bufsize); + ctx->psc_buf = realloc(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK, + M_WAITOK); + } + bcopy(buf, ctx->psc_buf + ctx->psc_offset, bufsize); + ctx->psc_offset += bufsize; + return (0); +} + +static void +padlock_sha_free(struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + if (ctx->psc_buf != NULL) { + //bzero(ctx->psc_buf, ctx->psc_size); + free(ctx->psc_buf, M_PADLOCK); + ctx->psc_buf = NULL; + ctx->psc_offset = 0; + ctx->psc_size = 0; + } +} + +static void +padlock_sha1_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + padlock_do_sha1(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset); + padlock_sha_free(ctx); +} + +static void +padlock_sha256_final(uint8_t *hash, struct padlock_sha_ctx *ctx) +{ + + padlock_do_sha256(ctx->psc_buf, hash, ctx->psc_offset); + padlock_sha_free(ctx); +} + +static void +padlock_copy_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *sctx, void *dctx) +{ + + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 && + (axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC || + axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) { + struct padlock_sha_ctx *spctx = sctx, *dpctx = dctx; + + dpctx->psc_offset = spctx->psc_offset; + dpctx->psc_size = spctx->psc_size; + dpctx->psc_buf = malloc(dpctx->psc_size, M_PADLOCK, M_WAITOK); + bcopy(spctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_buf, dpctx->psc_size); + } else { + bcopy(sctx, dctx, axf->ctxsize); + } +} + +static void +padlock_free_ctx(struct auth_hash *axf, void *ctx) +{ + + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0 && + (axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC || + axf->type == CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC)) { + padlock_sha_free(ctx); + } +} + +static void +padlock_hash_key_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen) +{ + struct auth_hash *axf; + int i; + + klen /= 8; + axf = ses->ses_axf; + + /* + * Try to free contexts before using them, because + * padlock_hash_key_setup() can be called twice - once from + * padlock_newsession() and again from padlock_process(). + */ + padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx); + padlock_free_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx); + + for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) + key[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL; + + axf->Init(ses->ses_ictx); + axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, key, klen); + axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, hmac_ipad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen); + + for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) + key[i] ^= (HMAC_IPAD_VAL ^ HMAC_OPAD_VAL); + + axf->Init(ses->ses_octx); + axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, key, klen); + axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, hmac_opad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen); + + for (i = 0; i < klen; i++) + key[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL; +} + +/* + * Compute keyed-hash authenticator. + */ +static int +padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *crd, + caddr_t buf, int flags) +{ + u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN]; + struct auth_hash *axf; + union authctx ctx; + int error; + + axf = ses->ses_axf; + + padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_ictx, &ctx); + error = crypto_apply(flags, buf, crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len, + (int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx); + if (error != 0) { + padlock_free_ctx(axf, &ctx); + return (error); + } + axf->Final(hash, &ctx); + + padlock_copy_ctx(axf, ses->ses_octx, &ctx); + axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize); + axf->Final(hash, &ctx); + + /* Inject the authentication data */ + crypto_copyback(flags, buf, crd->crd_inject, + ses->ses_mlen == 0 ? axf->hashsize : ses->ses_mlen, hash); + return (0); +} + +int +padlock_hash_setup(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptoini *macini) +{ + + ses->ses_mlen = macini->cri_mlen; + + /* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */ + switch (macini->cri_alg) { + case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_null; + break; + case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC: + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0) + ses->ses_axf = &padlock_hmac_sha1; + else + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1; + break; + case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: + if ((via_feature_xcrypt & VIA_HAS_SHA) != 0) + ses->ses_axf = &padlock_hmac_sha256; + else + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; + break; + case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: + ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; + break; + } + + /* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */ + ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK, + M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT); + ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_PADLOCK, + M_ZERO | M_NOWAIT); + if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL) + return (ENOMEM); + + /* Setup key if given. */ + if (macini->cri_key != NULL) { + padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, macini->cri_key, + macini->cri_klen); + } + return (0); +} + +int +padlock_hash_process(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *maccrd, + struct cryptop *crp) +{ + int error; + + if ((maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) + padlock_hash_key_setup(ses, maccrd->crd_key, maccrd->crd_klen); + + error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf, crp->crp_flags); + return (error); +} + +void +padlock_hash_free(struct padlock_session *ses) +{ + + if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) { + padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_ictx); + bzero(ses->ses_ictx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize); + free(ses->ses_ictx, M_PADLOCK); + ses->ses_ictx = NULL; + } + if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) { + padlock_free_ctx(ses->ses_axf, ses->ses_octx); + bzero(ses->ses_octx, ses->ses_axf->ctxsize); + free(ses->ses_octx, M_PADLOCK); + ses->ses_octx = NULL; + } +} -- cgit v1.1