From fb3c70eda88d3175627edc6a3316b4508b3d29c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: simon Date: Sat, 29 Jul 2006 19:10:21 +0000 Subject: Vendor import of OpenSSL 0.9.8b --- crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt | 11 +- crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt | 6 +- crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt | 322 +++++++++++++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod | 44 +- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod | 78 +++- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/config.pod | 7 + crypto/openssl/doc/apps/dgst.pod | 6 + crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod | 190 +++++++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ecparam.pod | 179 ++++++++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/enc.pod | 16 +- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/errstr.pod | 39 ++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/req.pod | 10 + crypto/openssl/doc/apps/s_client.pod | 16 + crypto/openssl/doc/apps/s_server.pod | 23 ++ crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509.pod | 20 +- crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod | 456 +++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod | 6 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod | 253 ++++++++++++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/BIO_f_base64.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod | 109 +++++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_add_word.pod | 10 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_new.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_error_string.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod | 38 ++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_BytesToKey.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod | 8 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_SealInit.pod | 5 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/EVP_SignInit.pod | 9 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod | 21 + crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod | 35 ++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod | 18 + crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod | 24 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/RSA_sign.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod | 14 +- .../doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod | 6 +- .../doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod | 6 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/blowfish.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/bn.pod | 25 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/bn_internal.pod | 14 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod | 6 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/des_modes.pod | 2 + crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod | 210 ++++++++++ crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/engine.pod | 206 +++++----- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/hmac.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/threads.pod | 25 +- crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/x509.pod | 64 +++ crypto/openssl/doc/fingerprints.txt | 57 +++ crypto/openssl/doc/openssl.txt | 27 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod | 6 +- .../openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode.pod | 12 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_cert_store.pod | 2 +- .../openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_info_callback.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod | 4 +- .../openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_use_certificate.pod | 16 +- .../doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_SESSION_get_time.pod | 8 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_SSL_CTX.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ciphers.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_client_CA_list.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_current_cipher.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_default_timeout.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_error.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_ex_new_index.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_fd.pod | 6 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_cert_chain.pod | 2 +- .../openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_peer_certificate.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_session.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_verify_result.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_get_version.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_pending.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_set_shutdown.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_state_string.pod | 4 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/SSL_want.pod | 10 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/d2i_SSL_SESSION.pod | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/ssl/ssl.pod | 110 ++--- crypto/openssl/doc/ssleay.txt | 2 +- crypto/openssl/doc/standards.txt | 4 + 87 files changed, 2560 insertions(+), 327 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ec.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ecparam.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/apps/errstr.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/apps/x509v3_config.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ASN1_generate_nconf.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/BN_BLINDING_new.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ERR_set_mark.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_Applink.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/OPENSSL_ia32cap.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/x509.pod create mode 100644 crypto/openssl/doc/fingerprints.txt (limited to 'crypto/openssl/doc') diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt index d3a6254..a8a34c7 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/certificates.txt @@ -66,14 +66,13 @@ Section 5 will tell you more on how to handle the certificate you received. -4. Creating a self-signed certificate +4. Creating a self-signed test certificate If you don't want to deal with another certificate authority, or just -want to create a test certificate for yourself, or are setting up a -certificate authority of your own, you may want to make the requested -certificate a self-signed one. This is similar to creating a -certificate request, but creates a certificate instead of a -certificate request (1095 is 3 years): +want to create a test certificate for yourself. This is similar to +creating a certificate request, but creates a certificate instead of +a certificate request. This is NOT the recommended way to create a +CA certificate, see ca.txt. openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095 diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt index 45f42ea..7ae2a3a 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt @@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon. 3. To generate a DSA key -A DSA key can be used both for signing only. This is important to -keep in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with -a DSA key can really be used for. +A DSA key can be used for signing only. This is important to keep +in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with a +DSA key can really be used for. Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process. First, you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key: diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d36b02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ + + HOWTO proxy certificates + +0. WARNING + +NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAVE BEEN CHECKED! They are just an +example to show you how things can be done. There may be typos or +type conflicts, and you will have to resolve them. + +1. Introduction + +Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual +certificates with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo. + +Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), +either directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by +extension through an already issued proxy certificate.. They are used +to extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, +or sometimes to the user itself), so it can perform operations in the +name of the owner of the EE certificate. + +See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information. + + +2. A warning about proxy certificates + +Noone seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind. +Basically, to this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only +been used in a world that's highly aware of them. What would happen +if an unsuspecting application is to validate a chain of certificates +that contains proxy certificates? It would usually consider the leaf +to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, and since proxy +certificates are controlled by the EE certificate owner alone, it's +would be normal to consider what the EE certificate owner could do +with them. + +subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, +and this is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the +issuer, with one commonName added on. + +Possible threats are, as far as has been imagined so far: + + - impersonation through commonName (think server certificates). + - use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in + certain environments, that would grant extra or different + authorisation rights. + +For this reason, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates +be explicitely allowed. Currently, this can be done using the +following methods: + + - if the application calls X509_verify_cert() itself, it can do the + following prior to that call (ctx is the pointer passed in the call + to X509_verify_cert()): + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); + + - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled + before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable + OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY with some non-empty value. + +There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the +default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future. + + +3. How to create proxy cerificates + +It's quite easy to create proxy certificates, by taking advantage of +the lack of checks of the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). But +first, you need to create a configuration section that contains a +definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this: + + [ v3_proxy ] + # A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate. + basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + + # Usual authority key ID + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always + + # Now, for the extension that marks this certificate as a proxy one + proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB + +It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section: + + proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext + + [ proxy_ext ] + language=id-ppl-anyLanguage + pathlen=0 + policy=text:BC + +The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the +syntag determines what will be done with the string. The recognised +syntags are as follows: + + text indicates that the string is simply the bytes, not + encoded in any kind of way: + + policy=text:räksmörgås + + Previous versions of this design had a specific tag + for UTF-8 text. However, since the bytes are copied + as-is anyway, there's no need for it. Instead, use + the text: tag, like this: + + policy=text:räksmörgÃ¥s + + hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons + between each byte (every second hex digit): + + policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73 + + Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a + complete DER blob. However, the only legal use for + this would be to surround the bytes that would go with + the hex: tag with what's needed to construct a correct + OCTET STRING. Since hex: does that, the DER tag felt + superfluous, and was therefore removed. + + file indicates that the text of the policy should really be + taken from a file. The string is then really a file + name. This is useful for policies that are large + (more than a few of lines) XML documents, for example. + +The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this: + + 0.policy=This is + 1.polisy= a multi- + 2.policy=line policy. + +NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part that determines the rights +granted to the process using the proxy certificate. The value is +completely dependent on the application reading and interpretting it! + +Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy +certificate, you can now easily create a proxy certificate like this: + + openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \ + -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key + openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 \ + -out proxy.crt -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key \ + -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy + +It's just as easy to create a proxy certificate using another proxy +certificate as issuer (note that I'm using a different configuration +section for it): + + openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \ + -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key + openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 \ + -out proxy2.crt -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key \ + -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2 + + +4. How to have your application interpret the policy? + +The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to prepare some default +rights, then do a check of the proxy certificate against the a chain +of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates, and see +what rights came out by the end. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is. + +The slightly complicated part is how to pass data between your +application and the certificate validation procedure. + +You need the following ingredients: + + - a callback routing that will be called for every certificate that's + validated. It will be called several times for each certificates, + so you must be attentive to when it's a good time to do the proxy + policy interpretation and check, as well as to fill in the defaults + when the EE certificate is checked. + + - a structure of data that's shared between your application code and + the callback. + + - a wrapper function that sets it all up. + + - an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic + ex_data store that's attached to an X509 validation context. + +This is some cookbook code for you to fill in: + + /* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit + array, one bit for each possible right. */ + typedef struct your_rights { + unsigned char rights[total_rights / 8]; + } YOUR_RIGHTS; + + /* The following procedure will create an index for the ex_data + store in the X509 validation context the first time it's called. + Subsequent calls will return the same index. */ + static int get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(void) + { + static volatile int idx = -1; + if (idx < 0) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + if (idx < 0) + { + idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, + "for verify callback", + NULL,NULL,NULL); + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); + } + return idx; + } + + /* Callback to be given to the X509 validation procedure. */ + static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + { + if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy + check within this secion. It's important to know + that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked + from top to bottom. You get the CA root first, + followed by the possible chain of intermediate + CAs, followed by the EE certificate, followed by + the possible proxy certificates. */ + { + X509 *xs = ctx->current_cert; + + if (xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) + { + YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = + (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx()); + PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci = + X509_get_ext_d2i(xs, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL); + + switch (OBJ_obj2nid(pci->proxyPolicy->policyLanguage)) + { + case NID_Independent: + /* Do whatever you need to grant explicit rights to + this particular proxy certificate, usually by + pulling them from some database. If there are none + to be found, clear all rights (making this and any + subsequent proxy certificate void of any rights). + */ + memset(rights->rights, 0, sizeof(rights->rights)); + break; + case NID_id_ppl_inheritAll: + /* This is basically a NOP, we simply let the current + rights stand as they are. */ + break; + default: + /* This is usually the most complex section of code. + You really do whatever you want as long as you + follow RFC 3820. In the example we use here, the + simplest thing to do is to build another, temporary + bit array and fill it with the rights granted by + the current proxy certificate, then use it as a + mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and + voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit + array. */ + { + int i; + YOUR_RIGHTS tmp_rights; + memset(tmp_rights.rights, 0, sizeof(tmp_rights.rights)); + + /* process_rights() is supposed to be a procedure + that takes a string and it's length, interprets + it and sets the bits in the YOUR_RIGHTS pointed + at by the third argument. */ + process_rights((char *) pci->proxyPolicy->policy->data, + pci->proxyPolicy->policy->length, + &tmp_rights); + + for(i = 0; i < total_rights / 8; i++) + rights->rights[i] &= tmp_rights.rights[i]; + } + break; + } + PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); + } + else if (!(xs->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) + { + /* We have a EE certificate, let's use it to set default! + */ + YOUR_RIGHTS *rights = + (YOUR_RIGHTS *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, + get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx()); + + /* The following procedure finds out what rights the owner + of the current certificate has, and sets them in the + YOUR_RIGHTS structure pointed at by the second + argument. */ + set_default_rights(xs, rights); + } + } + return ok; + } + + static int my_X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, + YOUR_RIGHTS *needed_rights) + { + int i; + int (*save_verify_cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) = ctx->verify_cb; + YOUR_RIGHTS rights; + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, verify_callback); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx, get_proxy_auth_ex_data_idx(), &rights); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); + ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + + if (ok == 1) + { + ok = check_needed_rights(rights, needed_rights); + } + + X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, save_verify_cb); + + return ok; + } + +If you use SSL or TLS, you can easily set up a callback to have the +certificates checked properly, using the code above: + + SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(s_ctx, my_X509_verify_cert, &needed_rights); + + +-- +Richard Levitte diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod index 58e0f52..ed69952 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/CA.pl.pod @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ written to the file "newreq.pem". creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are written to the file "newreq.pem". -=item B<-newreq-nowdes> +=item B<-newreq-nodes> is like B<-newreq> except that the private key will not be encrypted. diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod index e76e981..542d969 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/asn1parse.pod @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ B B [B<-i>] [B<-oid filename>] [B<-strparse offset>] +[B<-genstr string>] +[B<-genconf file>] =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -67,6 +69,14 @@ file is described in the NOTES section below. parse the contents octets of the ASN.1 object starting at B. This option can be used multiple times to "drill down" into a nested structure. +=item B<-genstr string>, B<-genconf file> + +generate encoded data based on B, B or both using +ASN1_generate_nconf() format. If B only is present then the string +is obtained from the default section using the name B. The encoded +data is passed through the ASN1 parser and printed out as though it came +from a file, the contents can thus be examined and written to a file +using the B option. =back @@ -121,9 +131,41 @@ by white space. The final column is the rest of the line and is the C<1.2.3.4 shortName A long name> +=head1 EXAMPLES + +Parse a file: + + openssl asn1parse -in file.pem + +Parse a DER file: + + openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in file.der + +Generate a simple UTF8String: + + openssl asn1parse -genstr 'UTF8:Hello World' + +Generate and write out a UTF8String, don't print parsed output: + + openssl asn1parse -genstr 'UTF8:Hello World' -noout -out utf8.der + +Generate using a config file: + + openssl asn1parse -genconf asn1.cnf -noout -out asn1.der + +Example config file: + + asn1=SEQUENCE:seq_sect + + [seq_sect] + + field1=BOOL:TRUE + field2=EXP:0, UTF8:some random string + + =head1 BUGS -There should be options to change the format of input lines. The output of some +There should be options to change the format of output lines. The output of some ASN.1 types is not well handled (if at all). =cut diff --git a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod index 74f45ca..5618c2d 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod +++ b/crypto/openssl/doc/apps/ca.pod @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ B B [B<-crl_hold instruction>] [B<-crl_compromise time>] [B<-crl_CA_compromise time>] -[B<-subj arg>] [B<-crldays days>] [B<-crlhours hours>] [B<-crlexts section>] @@ -30,6 +29,7 @@ B B [B<-key arg>] [B<-passin arg>] [B<-cert file>] +[B<-selfsign>] [B<-in file>] [B<-out file>] [B<-notext>] @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ B B [B<-extensions section>] [B<-extfile section>] [B<-engine id>] +[B<-subj arg>] +[B<-utf8>] +[B<-multivalue-rdn>] =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -113,6 +116,20 @@ the password used to encrypt the private key. Since on some systems the command line arguments are visible (e.g. Unix with the 'ps' utility) this option should be used with caution. +=item B<-selfsign> + +indicates the issued certificates are to be signed with the key +the certificate requests were signed with (given with B<-keyfile>). +Cerificate requests signed with a different key are ignored. If +B<-spkac>, B<-ss_cert> or B<-gencrl> are given, B<-selfsign> is +ignored. + +A consequence of using B<-selfsign> is that the self-signed +certificate appears among the entries in the certificate database +(see the configuration option B), and uses the same +serial number counter as all other certificates sign with the +self-signed certificate. + =item B<-passin arg> the key password source. For more information about the format of B @@ -203,6 +220,28 @@ to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms. +=item B<-subj arg> + +supersedes subject name given in the request. +The arg must be formatted as I, +characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped. + +=item B<-utf8> + +this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by +default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field +values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a +configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings. + +=item B<-multivalue-rdn> + +this option causes the -subj argument to be interpretedt with full +support for multivalued RDNs. Example: + +I + +If -multi-rdn is not used then the UID value is I<123456+CN=John Doe>. + =back =head1 CRL OPTIONS @@ -253,12 +292,6 @@ B