From 4ecbd6db44d79348bc815f31096e53104f50838b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: markm Date: Sun, 9 Jan 2000 20:58:00 +0000 Subject: Import KTH Heimdal, which will be the core of our Kerberos5. Userland to follow. --- crypto/heimdal/ChangeLog | 5455 ++++++++ crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am | 9 + crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am.common | 35 + crypto/heimdal/Makefile.in | 645 + crypto/heimdal/NEWS | 272 + crypto/heimdal/TODO | 103 + crypto/heimdal/acconfig.h | 96 + crypto/heimdal/acinclude.m4 | 9 + crypto/heimdal/aclocal.m4 | 1615 +++ crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.am | 29 + crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.in | 680 + crypto/heimdal/admin/add.c | 155 + crypto/heimdal/admin/change.c | 224 + crypto/heimdal/admin/copy.c | 119 + crypto/heimdal/admin/get.c | 162 + crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.8 | 119 + crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.c | 155 + crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil_locl.h | 81 + crypto/heimdal/admin/list.c | 83 + crypto/heimdal/admin/purge.c | 175 + crypto/heimdal/admin/remove.c | 107 + crypto/heimdal/admin/srvconvert.c | 181 + crypto/heimdal/admin/srvcreate.c | 124 + crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.am | 22 + crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.in | 602 + crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/ChangeLog | 23 + crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am | 21 + crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/Makefile.in | 654 + crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/afslog.c | 227 + crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c | 152 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ChangeLog | 414 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.am | 5 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.in | 598 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/Makefile.am | 12 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/Makefile.in | 611 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/buffer.c | 69 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/common.h | 60 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c | 56 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am | 46 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in | 702 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c | 2116 ++++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c | 202 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c | 138 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h | 173 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 | 1193 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c | 1746 +++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h | 139 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h | 127 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c | 76 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c | 379 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c | 198 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c | 334 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c | 549 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h | 44 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c | 313 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c | 785 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h | 131 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am | 56 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in | 768 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h | 160 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y | 1455 +++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 | 473 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c | 2249 ++++ crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h | 170 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 | 38 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c | 69 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c | 365 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c | 137 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c | 588 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h | 58 + crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c | 224 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ChangeLog | 39 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.am | 42 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.in | 739 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/encdata.c | 96 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.c | 385 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.h | 116 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauthd.c | 207 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ksrvtgt.in | 14 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/marshall.c | 126 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/rkinit.c | 226 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/zrefresh | 12 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.am | 14 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.in | 626 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf.c | 361 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf_locl.h | 80 + crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kfd.c | 326 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/ChangeLog | 162 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.am | 34 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.in | 645 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/conf.c | 55 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login.c | 730 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_access.c | 261 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_locl.h | 128 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_protos.h | 67 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/osfc2.c | 79 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/read_string.c | 127 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/shadow.c | 95 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/stty_default.c | 100 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/tty.c | 70 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmp_login.c | 120 + crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmpx_login.c | 89 + crypto/heimdal/appl/push/ChangeLog | 150 + crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.am | 27 + crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.in | 713 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/push/pfrom.in | 6 + crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.8 | 138 + crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.c | 790 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push_locl.h | 98 + crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/ChangeLog | 237 + crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.am | 19 + crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.in | 698 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/common.c | 124 + crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh.c | 948 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h | 139 + crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rshd.c | 850 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/su/ChangeLog | 39 + crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.am | 16 + crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.in | 620 + crypto/heimdal/appl/su/su.c | 418 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.am | 37 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.in | 708 ++ crypto/heimdal/appl/test/common.c | 159 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.c | 108 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.h | 45 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_client.c | 157 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_server.c | 175 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c | 163 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c | 131 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h | 45 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c | 242 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_client.c | 132 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_server.c | 168 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/test_locl.h | 85 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_client.c | 175 + crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_server.c | 203 + crypto/heimdal/cf/ChangeLog | 235 + crypto/heimdal/cf/Makefile.am.common | 255 + crypto/heimdal/cf/auth-modules.m4 | 27 + crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-glob.m4 | 22 + crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 | 58 + crypto/heimdal/cf/broken.m4 | 19 + crypto/heimdal/cf/c-attribute.m4 | 31 + crypto/heimdal/cf/c-function.m4 | 33 + crypto/heimdal/cf/capabilities.m4 | 14 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-declaration.m4 | 25 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 | 24 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-man.m4 | 59 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 | 38 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-type-extra.m4 | 23 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-var.m4 | 20 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-x.m4 | 52 + crypto/heimdal/cf/check-xau.m4 | 64 + crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 | 9 + crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 | 63 + crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func.m4 | 9 + crypto/heimdal/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 | 13 + crypto/heimdal/cf/grok-type.m4 | 38 + crypto/heimdal/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 | 37 + crypto/heimdal/cf/have-struct-field.m4 | 19 + crypto/heimdal/cf/have-type.m4 | 32 + crypto/heimdal/cf/have-types.m4 | 14 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 | 57 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-find-db.m4 | 98 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 | 42 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 | 22 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 | 122 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 | 28 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 | 8 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 | 8 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 | 22 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 | 27 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 | 15 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 | 21 + crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-version.m4 | 25 + crypto/heimdal/cf/make-proto.pl | 199 + crypto/heimdal/cf/mips-abi.m4 | 87 + crypto/heimdal/cf/misc.m4 | 3 + crypto/heimdal/cf/need-proto.m4 | 25 + crypto/heimdal/cf/osfc2.m4 | 14 + crypto/heimdal/cf/proto-compat.m4 | 22 + crypto/heimdal/cf/shared-libs.m4 | 187 + crypto/heimdal/cf/test-package.m4 | 88 + crypto/heimdal/cf/wflags.m4 | 21 + crypto/heimdal/config.guess | 973 ++ crypto/heimdal/config.sub | 957 ++ crypto/heimdal/configure | 12371 +++++++++++++++++++ crypto/heimdal/configure.in | 934 ++ crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.am | 8 + crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.in | 620 + crypto/heimdal/doc/ack.texi | 55 + crypto/heimdal/doc/heimdal.texi | 246 + crypto/heimdal/doc/init-creds | 374 + crypto/heimdal/doc/install.texi | 86 + crypto/heimdal/doc/intro.texi | 93 + crypto/heimdal/doc/kerberos4.texi | 183 + crypto/heimdal/doc/latin1.tex | 95 + crypto/heimdal/doc/layman.asc | 1855 +++ crypto/heimdal/doc/mdate-sh | 92 + crypto/heimdal/doc/misc.texi | 62 + crypto/heimdal/doc/setup.texi | 247 + .../draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt | 412 + crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo | 171 + crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms | 136 + crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 | 171 + crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms | 145 + crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 | 227 + crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms | 260 + .../draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt | 244 + .../standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-08.txt | 62 + .../draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-cbind-04.txt | 6188 ++++++++++ .../draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt | 311 + .../draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt | 127 + .../draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt | 250 + .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt | 252 + .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt | 282 + .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt | 589 + .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt | 8277 +++++++++++++ .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt | 6214 ++++++++++ .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt | 6766 ++++++++++ .../draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04.txt | 6780 ++++++++++ .../draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt | 250 + .../standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt | 3415 +++++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt | 2747 ++++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt | 2691 ++++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt | 6275 ++++++++++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt | 1683 +++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt | 1011 ++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt | 1123 ++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt | 4763 +++++++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt | 1291 ++ crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt | 1515 +++ crypto/heimdal/doc/whatis.texi | 149 + crypto/heimdal/doc/win2k.texi | 57 + crypto/heimdal/etc/services.append | 27 + crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.am | 50 + crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.in | 748 ++ crypto/heimdal/include/bits.c | 201 + crypto/heimdal/include/config.h.in | 1164 ++ crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.am | 5 + crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.in | 494 + crypto/heimdal/include/stamp-h.in | 0 crypto/heimdal/install-sh | 238 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ChangeLog | 212 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.am | 55 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.in | 702 ++ crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ank.c | 266 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/cpw.c | 177 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del.c | 53 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del_enctype.c | 132 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/dump.c | 80 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ext.c | 116 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/get.c | 250 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/init.c | 210 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin.c | 281 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h | 161 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmind.c | 151 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/load.c | 335 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/mod.c | 143 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/random_password.c | 156 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/rename.c | 66 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/server.c | 506 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/util.c | 520 + crypto/heimdal/kadmin/version4.c | 985 ++ crypto/heimdal/kdc/524.c | 183 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.am | 62 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.in | 799 ++ crypto/heimdal/kdc/config.c | 309 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/connect.c | 727 ++ crypto/heimdal/kdc/headers.h | 96 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop-common.c | 83 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.8 | 66 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.c | 676 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.h | 55 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.8 | 27 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.c | 419 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kadb.h | 78 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kaserver.c | 794 ++ crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc.8 | 92 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc_locl.h | 103 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.c | 557 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.h | 43 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c | 1639 +++ crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.8 | 27 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.c | 188 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/log.c | 86 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/main.c | 98 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/misc.c | 63 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/rx.h | 79 + crypto/heimdal/kdc/string2key.c | 179 + crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.am | 25 + crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.in | 758 ++ crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 | 20 + crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.c | 144 + crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h | 94 + crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 | 60 + crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c | 634 + crypto/heimdal/krb5.conf | 26 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.am | 37 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.in | 777 ++ crypto/heimdal/kuser/kauth_options.c | 40 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c | 160 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.1 | 34 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.c | 125 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.1 | 41 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.c | 121 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.1 | 175 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.c | 391 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit_options.c | 40 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.1 | 37 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.c | 445 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kuser_locl.h | 89 + crypto/heimdal/kuser/kverify.c | 82 + crypto/heimdal/lib/45/45_locl.h | 52 + crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.am | 11 + crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.in | 636 + crypto/heimdal/lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c | 116 + crypto/heimdal/lib/45/mk_req.c | 130 + crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.am | 13 + crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.in | 604 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/Makefile.am | 107 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/Makefile.in | 794 ++ crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et | 20 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c | 239 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/check-der.c | 289 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der.h | 132 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_copy.c | 57 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_free.c | 48 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_get.c | 356 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_length.c | 111 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_locl.h | 54 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_put.c | 310 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.c | 351 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.h | 38 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c | 146 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c | 375 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c | 250 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_free.c | 130 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c | 139 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_length.c | 153 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h | 72 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.c | 207 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.h | 87 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 | 385 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.h | 36 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.l | 102 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/libasn1.h | 50 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/main.c | 90 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/parse.y | 231 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.c | 90 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.h | 83 + crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/timegm.c | 71 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/ChangeLog | 74 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.am | 6 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.in | 599 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/afskauthlib/Makefile.am | 38 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/afskauthlib/Makefile.in | 538 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c | 288 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am | 3 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in | 491 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.c | 243 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add | 76 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am | 66 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in | 551 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf | 58 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf | 59 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf | 27 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf | 27 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c | 78 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/security.patch | 11 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia.c | 672 + crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h | 94 + crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4.h | 76 + crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_enc.c | 133 + crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_skey.c | 101 + crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4test.c | 201 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/8003.c | 152 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog | 60 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am | 46 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in | 654 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c | 242 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c | 87 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c | 54 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c | 46 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c | 49 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/context_time.c | 64 + crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c | 50 + 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crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.h create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/parse.y create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/roken_rename.h create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.c create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.h create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl_locl.h create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.c create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.h create mode 100755 crypto/heimdal/ltconfig create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/ltmain.sh create mode 100644 crypto/heimdal/missing create mode 100755 crypto/heimdal/mkinstalldirs diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4472260 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,5455 @@ +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2m + +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 7:1:0 + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use + krb5_expand_hostname + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): handle + ai_canonname being set in any of the addresses returnedby + getaddrinfo. glibc apparently returns the reverse lookup of every + address in ai_canonname. + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2l + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: set version to 7:0:0 + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): remove `hp' + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: set version to 4:1:1 + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): use `krb5_get_default_realms' + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (add_padata): change types to make + everything work out + (krb5_get_in_cred): remove const to make types match + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (ARCFOUR_string_to_key): correct signature + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): handle not + getting back a canonname + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2k + +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): advance colon so that + we actually parse the port number. based on a patch from Leif + Johansson + +2000-01-02 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/purge.c: remove all non-current and old entries from a + keytab + + * admin: break up ktutil.c into files + + * admin/ktutil.c (list): support --verbose (also listning time + stamps) + (kt_add, kt_get): set timestamp in newly created entries + (kt_change): add `change' command + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): set timestamp in newly created + entries + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (akf_next_entry): set timetsamp, + always go the a predicatble position on error + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents): copy timestamp + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c (fkt_add_entry): store timestamp + (fkt_next_entry_int): return timestamp + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_keytab_entry): add timestamp + +1999-12-30 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (krb4): use `-ldes' in tests + +1999-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/print.c (event2string): handle events without principal. + From Luke Howard + +1999-12-25 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2j + +Tue Dec 21 18:03:17 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (asn1_files): add $(EXEEXT) for cygwin and + related systems + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (asn1_files): add $(EXEEXT) for cygwin and + related systems + + * include/Makefile.am (krb5-types.h): add $(EXEEXT) for cygwin and + related systems + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2i + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 6:3:1 + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_via_proxy): free data + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_via_proxy): new function use + getaddrinfo instead of gethostbyname{,2} + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: use getaddrinfo instead of + getnodebyname{,2} + +1999-12-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2h + +1999-12-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2g + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:2:1 + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): handle + ai_canonname not being set + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): handle + ai_canonname not being set + + * appl/test/uu_server.c: print messages to stderr + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: print messages to stderr + * appl/test/nt_gss_server.c: print messages to stderr + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c: print messages to stderr + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c (proto): remove shadowing `context' + * appl/test/common.c (client_doit): add forgotten ntohs + +1999-12-13 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (VERISON): bump to 0.2g-pre + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): be more + robust and handle extra dot at the beginning of default_domain + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2f + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:1:1 + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (get_kdc_address): use + `krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst' + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst): add + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: add support for _kerberos.domain + (according to draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-01.txt) + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2e + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): use the correct + address + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 6:0:1 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:4:0 + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: move AC_KRB_IPv6 to make sure it's performed + before AC_BROKEN + (el_init): use new feature of AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS + + * appl/test/uu_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/test_locl.h (client_doit): add prototype + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/nt_gss_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c: use client_doit + * appl/test/common.c (client_doit): move identical code here and + start using getaddrinfo + + * appl/kf/kf.c (doit): rewrite to use getaddrinfo + * kdc/hprop.c: re-write to use getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c (krb5_expand_hostname): use + getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: re-write to use getaddrinfo + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_parse_address): use getaddrinfo + +1999-12-03 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (BROKEN): check for freeaddrinfo, getaddrinfo, + getnameinfo, gai_strerror + (socklen_t): check for + +1999-11-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (ARCFOUR_string_to_key): change order of bytes + within unicode characters. this should probably be done in some + arbitrarly complex way to do it properly and you would have to + know what character encoding was used for the password and salt + string. + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv4_uninteresting): ignore 0.0.0.0 + (INADDR_ANY) + (ipv6_uninteresting): remove unused macro + +1999-11-22 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: rc4->arcfour + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: rc4->arcfour + +1999-11-17 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: add + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_keytype): add KEYTYPE_RC4 + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: some code for doing RC4/MD5/HMAC which might + not be totally different from some small company up in the + north-west corner of the US + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): change code to + actually increment buf_size + +1999-11-14 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add `scan_interfaces' + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (krb5_get_all_client_addrs): make interaces + scanning optional + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): set + `scan_interfaces' + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add add_et_list.c + * lib/krb5/add_et_list.c (krb5_add_et_list): new function + +1999-11-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c (krb5_get_default_realm, + krb5_get_default_realms): set realms if they were unset + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): don't + initialize default realms here. it's done lazily instead. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_TC_*): make constants unsigned + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_2int, generate_units): make sure + bit constants are unsigned + * lib/asn1/gen.c (define_type): make length in sequences be + unsigned. + + * configure.in: remove duplicate test for setsockopt test for + struct tm.tm_isdst + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): generate + preauthentication information if we get back ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): remove + preauthentication generation code. it's now in krb5_get_in_cred + + * configure.in (AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF): add strptime check for struct + tm.tm_gmtoff and timezone + +1999-11-11 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/main.c: make this work with multi-db + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: make this work with multi-db + + * kdc/config.c: make this work with multi-db + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/misc.c: update for multi-database code + + * kdc/main.c: update for multi-database code + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: update + + * kdc/config.c: allow us to have more than one database + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2d + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 to be safe + (krb5_context_data has changed and some code do (might) access + fields directly) + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add `etypes_des' + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): use + krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default): new + function + + * lib/krb5/context.c (set_etypes): new function + (init_context_from_config_file): set both `etypes' and `etypes_des' + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (VERSION): bump to 0.2d-pre + +1999-10-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_parse_name): check memory allocations + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2c + + * lib/krb5/dump_config.c (print_tree): check for empty tree + + * lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c (tests): update the test cases + with empty principals so that they actually use an empty realm and + not the default. use the correct etype for 3DES + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 4:1:0 + + * kdc/config.c (configure): more careful with the port string + +1999-10-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2b + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:0 + (krb524_convert_creds_kdc and potentially some other functions + have changed prototypes) + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:1 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:3:0 + + * configure.in (LIB_roken): add dbopen. getcap in roken + references dbopen and with shared libraries we need to add this + dependency. + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c (main): support speicifying the + configuration file to test on the command line + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding): handle line with no + whitespace before = + (krb5_config_parse_file_debug): set lineno earlier so that we don't + use it unitialized + + * configure.in (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump to 0.2b-pre opt*: need + more include files for these tests + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c (krb5_set_default_realm): use + krb5_config_get_strings, which means that your configuration file + should look like: + + [libdefaults] + default_realm = realm1 realm2 realm3 + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c (config_binding_to_list): fix + copy-o. From Michal Vocu + + * kdc/config.c (configure): add a missing strdup. From Michal + Vocu + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.2a + + * configure.in: only test for db.h with using berkeley_db. remember + to link with LIB_tgetent when checking for el_init. add xnlock + + * appl/Makefile.am: add xnlock + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (find_etype): support null keys + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (get_des_key): support null keys + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_get_wrapped_length): more correct + calculation + +1999-10-16 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): pass ccache to krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-10-12 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_enctype_to_keytype): remove warning + +1999-10-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use krb5_free_host_realm + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_ccache_data): make `ops' const + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_string_to_salttype): new function + + * **/*.[ch]: const-ize + +1999-10-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): const-ify + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: clean-up and comment-up + + * lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c (krb5_copy_host_realm): copy all the + strings + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c (krb5_verify_user_lrealm): free the + correct realm part + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): things work much better when ret is + initialized + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): look at the + type of the session key + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys): spell + correctly + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): fix spelling of + krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): get new + credentials from the KDC if the existing one doesn't have a DES + session key. + + * lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c (get_ad_tkt): update to new + krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-10-03 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: make krb5_akf_ops const + + * lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c: make krb5_mkt_ops const + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: make krb5_fkt_ops const + +1999-10-01 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: rewritten to allow error messages + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (bin_PROGRAMS): add verify_krb5_conf + (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add config_file_netinfo.c + + * lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c: new program for verifying that + krb5.conf is corret + + * lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c: moved netinfo code here from + config_file.c + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): kludge default_realm + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: add test cases for Generalized time and + make sure we return the correct value + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: simplify by using der_put_length_and_tag + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c (krb5_verify_user_lrealm): ariant of + krb5_verify_user that tries in all the local realms + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c: add support for having several + default realms + + * lib/krb5/kuserok.c (krb5_kuserok): use `krb5_get_default_realms' + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c (krb5_get_default_realms): add + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): change `default_realm' to + `default_realms' + + * lib/krb5/context.c: change from `default_realm' to + `default_realms' + + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c (krb5_aname_to_localname): use + krb5_get_default_realms + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add copy_host_realm.c + + * lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c: new file + +1999-09-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (encode_generalized_time): encode length + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c: new function `krb5_recvauth_match_version' + that allows more intelligent matching of the application version + +1999-09-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: add err.h + + * kdc/config.c (configure): use parse_bytes + + * appl/test/nt_gss_common.c: use the correct header file + +1999-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: add a `--cache' flag + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): only get default value for `get_v4_tgt' if + it's explicitly set in krb5.conf + +1999-09-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c (tag_names); add another univeral tag + + * lib/asn1/der.h: update universal tags + +1999-09-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c (loop): print length of octet string + +1999-09-21 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_get): add `--help' + +1999-09-21 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/Makefile.am: add kdecode_ticket + + * kuser/kdecode_ticket.c: new debug program + + * appl/test/nt_gss_server.c: new program to test against `Sample * + SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + + * appl/test/Makefile.am: add nt_gss_client and nt_gss_server + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (decode_general_string): remember to advance + ret over the length-len + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: add asn1_print + + * lib/asn1/asn1_print.c: new program for printing DER-structures + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: make functions more consistent + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c: make functions more consistent + +1999-09-20 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: be more informative in pa-data error messages + +1999-09-16 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: test for strlcpy, strlcat + +1999-09-14 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): return + KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR when interrupted + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c (krb5_password_key_proc): check return + value from des_read_pw_string + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): don't print any error if reading the + password was interrupted + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): don't print any error if reading the + password was interrupted + + * kdc/string2key.c (main): check the return value from fgets + + * kdc/kstash.c (main): check return value from des_read_pw_string + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_add): check the return-value from fgets and + overwrite the password for paranoid reasons + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c (get_cell_and_realm): only remove the + newline if it's there + +1999-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (main): remove bogus error with `--print'. remove + sysloging of number of principals transferred + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_convert): set flags correctly for krbtgt/CELL + principals + (main): get rid of bogus opening of hdb database when propagating + ka-server database + +1999-09-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h (O_BINARY): add fallback definition + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add keytab types + + * configure.in: revert back awk test, not worked around in + roken.awk + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: remove O_BINARY + + * lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c: some support for AFS KeyFile's. From + Love + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: remove O_BINARY + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: move the list of keytab types to the context + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: remove O_BINARY + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): register all + standard cache and keytab types + (krb5_free_context): free `kt_types' + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_resolve): move the registration of the + standard types of credential caches to context + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add keytab_keyfile.c + +1999-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: add comments and clean-up + + * admin/ktutil.c: add `ktutil copy' + + * lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_kt_cursor): add a `data' field + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add keytab_krb4.c + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: add krb4 and correct some if's + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): move common code + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_fkt_ops, krb5_mkt_ops): new variables + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: move out file and memory functions + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add keytab_file.c, + keytab_memory.c + + * lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/keytab_file.c: new file + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: move out password quality functions + +1999-09-07 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am (libhdb_la_SOURCES): add keytab.c. From + Love + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): check + return value from `krb5_sendto_kdc' + +1999-09-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_and_recv): rename to recv_loop and + remove the sending of data. add a parameter `limit'. let callers + send the date themselves (and preferably with net_write on tcp + sockets) + (send_and_recv_tcp): read first the length field and then only that + many bytes + +1999-09-05 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): try to print warning `TCP data of + strange type' less often + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (send_and_recv): handle EINTR properly. + return on EOF. always free data. check return value from + realloc. + (send_and_recv_tcp, send_and_recv_http): check advertised length + against actual length + +1999-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for sgi capabilities + +1999-08-27 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: krb5_get_all_server_addrs shouldn't return + extra addresses + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use HDB keytabs; change some error messages; + add --realm flag + + * lib/krb5/address.c (krb5_append_addresses): remove duplicates + +1999-08-26 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/keytab.c: HDB keytab backend + +1999-08-25 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c + (krb5_kt_{start_seq_get,next_entry,end_seq_get}): check for NULL + pointer + +1999-08-24 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: add `--keytab' flag + +1999-08-23 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4): use `s6_addr' + instead of the non-standard `s6_addr32'. From Yoshinobu Inoue + by way of the KAME repository + +1999-08-18 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (--enable-new-des3-code): remove check for `struct + addrinfo' + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (etypes): remove NEW_DES3_CODE, enable + des3-cbc-sha1 and keep old-des3-cbc-sha1 for backwards + compatability + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_enctype): des3-cbc-sha1 (with key + derivation) just got assigned etype 16 by . keep the + old etype at 7. + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): only look at errno if + krb5_net_read actually returns -1 + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c (krb5_recvauth): only look at errno if + krb5_net_read actually returns -1 + + * appl/kf/kf.c (proto): don't trust errno if krb5_net_read hasn't + returned -1 + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c (proto): only trust errno if + krb5_net_read actually returns -1 + + * appl/kf/kfd.c (proto): be more careful with the return value + from krb5_net_read + +1999-08-13 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (get_addrs_int): try the different ways + sequentially instead of just one. this helps if your heimdal was + built with v6-support but your kernel doesn't have it, for + example. + +1999-08-12 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c: add inetd flag. default means try to figure out + if stdin is a socket or not. + + * Makefile.am (ACLOCAL): just use `cf', this variable is only used + when the current directory is $(top_srcdir) anyways and having + $(top_srcdir) there breaks if it's a relative path + +1999-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for setproctitle + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): remember to call + freehostent + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: call freehostent + + * appl/kf/kf.c (doit): call freehostent + + * appl/kf/kf.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: simplify by using krb5_err instead of + errx + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: simplify by using krb5_err instead of + errx + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: make v6 friendly and simplify + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1m + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): some more KRB4-conditionalizing + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: type correctness + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_fwd_tgs_creds): set forwarded in + flags. From Miroslav Ruda + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): add config file support for forwardable + and krb4 support. From Miroslav Ruda + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): add an empty X500-compress string as + transited. + (fix_transited_encoding): check length. + From Miroslav Ruda + + * kdc/hpropd.c (dump_krb4): check the realm so that we don't dump + principals in some other realm. From Miroslav Ruda + + (main): rename sa_len -> sin_len, sa_lan is a define on some + platforms. + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: add regpag support. From Miroslav Ruda + + + * appl/kf/kf.c: add `-G' and forwardable option in krb5.conf. + From Miroslav Ruda + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_list): don't run past end of line + + * appl/test/gss_common.h: new prototypes + + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c: use gss_err instead of abort + + * appl/test/gss_common.c (gss_verr, gss_err): add + +1999-08-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (n_fold_test_LDADD): need to set this + otherwise it doesn't build with shared libraries + + * kdc/hpropd.c: v6-ify + + * kdc/hprop.c: v6-ify + +1999-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use krb5_expand_hostname + +1999-07-31 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm_int): new + function that takes a FQDN + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am (libkrb5_la_SOURCES): add exapnd_hostname.c + + * lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c: new file + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1l + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:2:0 + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 3:1:0 + + * configure.in: more inet_pton to roken + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): use + getipnodebyname + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1k + +1999-07-26 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version number (changed function + signatures) + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version number (changes to some + function signatures) + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: bump version to 3:0:2 + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: bump version to 2:1:0 + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: bump version to 1:1:0 + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1j + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: rokenize inet_ntop + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + + * lib/krb5/store.c: lots of changes from size_t to ssize_t + (krb5_ret_stringz): check return value from realloc + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c: some type correctness + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c: some type correctness + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_storage): change return values of + functions from size_t to ssize_t + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1i + + * configure.in (AC_PROG_AWK): disable. mawk seems to mishandle \# + in lib/roken/roken.awk + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): try to use SA_LEN to + step over addresses if there's no `sa_lan' field + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c (krb5_sock_to_principal): simplify by + using `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): simplify by using + `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (krb5_change_password): simplify by using + `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd): + simplify by using `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (*): simplify by using `struct + sockaddr_storage' + + * kdc/connect.c (*): simplify by using `struct sockaddr_storage' + + * configure.in (sa_family_t): just test for existence + (sockaddr_storage): also specify include file + + * configure.in (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump version to 0.1i + (sa_family_t): test for + (struct sockaddr_storage): test for + + * kdc/hprop.c (propagate_database): typo, NULL should be + auth_context + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: conditionalize on HAVE_IPV6 instead of + AF_INET6 + + * appl/kf/kf.c (main): use warnx + + * appl/kf/kf.c (proto): remove shadowing context + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): try to handle the + case of getting back an `sockaddr_in6' address when sizeof(struct + sockaddr_in6) > sizeof(struct sockaddr) and we have no sa_len to + tell us how large the address is. This obviously doesn't work + with unknown protocol types. + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1h + +1999-07-23 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/kf/kfd.c: clean-up and more paranoia + + * etc/services.append: add kf + + * appl/kf/kf.c: rename tk_file to ccache for consistency. clean-up + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c (main): print the correct data + + * appl/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): add kf + + * appl/kf: new program. From Miroslav Ruda + + * kdc/hprop.c: declare some variables unconditionally to simplify + things + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: initialize kadm5 connection for every change + (otherwise the modifier in the database doesn't get set) + + * kdc/hpropd.c: clean-up and re-organize + + * kdc/hprop.c: clean-up and re-organize + + * configure.in (SunOS): define to xy for SunOS x.y + +1999-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (AC_BROKEN): test for copyhostent, freehostent, + getipnodebyaddr, getipnodebyname + +1999-07-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: more test cases for integers + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c (length_int): handle the case of the + largest negative integer by not calling abs + +1999-07-14 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c (generic_test): check malloc return value + properly + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add string_to_key_test + + * lib/krb5/prog_setup.c (krb5_program_setup): always initialize + the context + + * lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c (main): return a relevant return value + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: do SRV lookups for admin server as well. + some clean-up. + +1999-07-12 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: handle not building X programs + +1999-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv6_parse_addr): remove duplicate + variable + (ipv6_sockaddr2port): fix typo + + * etc/services.append: beginning of a file with services + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_resolve): fall-back to files if + there's no prefix. also clean-up a little bit. + + * kdc/hprop.c (--kaspecials): new flag for handling special KA + server entries. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + +1999-07-05 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): make sure we have data before + starting to look for HTTP + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): always do getpeername, we can't + trust recvfrom to return anything sensible + +1999-07-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (add_padat): encrypt pre-auth data with + all enctypes + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (change): fetch the salt-type from the entry + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): better error messages + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (unparse_name): error check malloc properly + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_init_etype): error check malloc + properly + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (*): do some malloc return-value checks + properly + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_process_master_key): simplify by using + krb5_data_alloc + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_process_master_key): check return value from + malloc + + * lib/asn1/gen_decode.c (decode_type): fix generation of decoding + information for TSequenceOf. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): check return value from + malloc + +1999-07-02 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/der_copy.c (copy_octet_string): don't fail if length == + 0 and malloc returns NULL + +1999-06-29 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv6_parse_addr): implement + +1999-06-24 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c (krb5_rd_cred): compare the sender's address + as an addrport one + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT, KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT): + add + (krb5_auth_context): add local and remote port + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): get the + local and remote address and add them to the krb-cred packet + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: save the local and remove ports in the + auth_context + + * lib/krb5/address.c (krb5_make_addrport): create an address of + type KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT from (addr, port) + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_sockaddr2port): new function for + grabbing the port number out of the sockaddr + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/srvcreate.c (srvcreate): always take the DES-CBC-MD5 key. + increase possible verbosity. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_list): handle blank lines at + another place + + * kdc/connect.c (add_port_string): don't return a value + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (get_cred_cache): you cannot reuse the cred + cache if the principals are different. close and NULL the old one + so that we create a new one. + + * configure.in: move around cgywin et al + (LIB_kdb): set at the end of krb4-block + (krb4): test for krb_enable_debug and krb_disable_debug + +1999-06-16 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (main): try to destroy v4 ticket even if the + destruction of the v5 one fails + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (DES3_postproc): new version that does the + right thing + (*): don't put and recover length in 3DES encoding + other small fixes + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: rewrite to use + get_default_username + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: add n-fold-test + + * kdc/connect.c: add fallbacks for all lookups by service name + (handle_tcp): break-up and clean-up + +1999-06-09 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (ipv6_uninteresting): don't consider + the loopback address as uninteresting + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: new magic flag to get loopback address if + there are no other addresses. + (krb5_get_all_client_addrs): use that flag + +1999-06-04 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (HMAC_SHA1_DES3_checksum): don't include the + length + (checksum_sha1, checksum_hmac_sha1_des3): blocksize should be 64 + (encrypt_internal_derived): don't include the length and don't + decrease by the checksum size twice + (_get_derived_key): the constant should be 5 bytes + +1999-06-02 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use KRB_CHECK_X + + * configure.in: check for netinet/ip.h + +1999-05-31 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (setup_passwd_quality_check): conditionalize + on RTLD_NOW + +1999-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/test/uu_server.c: removed unused stuff + + * appl/test/uu_client.c: removed unused stuff + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kgetcred.c (main): correct error message + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (verify_checksum): call (*ct->checksum) + directly, avoiding redundant lookups and memory leaks + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd): free + local and remote addresses + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c (get_logname): also try + $USERNAME + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (asn1_files): add $(EXEEXT) + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (USE_RESOLVER): try to define only if we + have a libresolv (currently by checking for res_search) + +1999-05-18 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_tcp): remove %-escapes in request + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1g + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_remove): -t should be -e + + * configure.in (CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP): use + + * kdc/hpropd.c: support for dumping to krb4. From Miroslav Ruda + + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_add): new option `--no-salt'. From Miroslav + Ruda + + * configure.in: add cygwin and DOS tests replace sendmsg, recvmsg, + and innetgr with roken versions + + * kuser/kgetcred.c: new program + +Tue May 11 14:09:33 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: fix paste-o + +1999-05-10 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: don't use uname + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h (KRB_PUT_INT): if we don't have KRB4 use four + arguments :-) + + * appl/test/uu_server.c (setsockopt): cast to get rid of a warning + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c (setsockopt): cast to get rid of a + warning + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c (proto): call krb5_sendauth with ccache + == NULL + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c (setsockopt): cast to get rid of a + warning + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): handle ccache == NULL by + setting the default ccache. + + * configure.in (getsockopt, setsockopt): test for + (AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE): bump version to 0.1g + + * appl/Makefile.am (SUBDIRS): add kx + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c (main): handle the case of no master key + +1999-05-09 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1f + + * kuser/kinit.c: add --noaddresses + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (init_as_req): interpret `addrs' being an + empty sit of list as to not ask for any addresses. + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h (_GNU_SOURCE): define this to enable (used) + extensions on glibc-based systems such as linux + +1999-05-03 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_from_kdc_flags): allocate and free + `*out_creds' properly + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): just verify that the + keytypes/enctypes are compatible, not that they are the same + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (cache): const-correctness + +1999-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_set_master_key): initialise master key + version + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: add support for upgrading database + versions + + * kdc/misc.c: add flags to fetch + + * kdc/kstash.c: unlink keyfile on failure, chmod to 400 + + * kdc/hpropd.c: add --print option + + * kdc/hprop.c: pass flags to hdb_foreach + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: add some flags + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: remove extra LDFLAGS, update version to 2; + build prototype headers + + * lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h: update prototypes + + * lib/hdb/print.c: move printable version of entry from kadmin + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: change hdb_{seal,unseal}_* to check if the key is + sealed or not; add flags to hdb_foreach + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: add flags to NDBM_seq, NDBM_firstkey, and + NDBM_nextkey + + * lib/hdb/db.c: add flags to DB_seq, DB_firstkey, and DB_nextkey + + * lib/hdb/common.c: add flags to _hdb_{fetch,store} + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: add master_key_version to struct hdb, update + prototypes + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: make mkvno optional, update version to 2 + + * configure.in: --enable-netinfo + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: HAVE_NETINFO_NI_H -> HAVE_NETINFO + + * config.sub: fix for crays + + * config.guess: new version from automake 1.4 + + * config.sub: new version from automake 1.4 + +Wed Apr 28 00:21:17 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1e + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_get_next): get the current cursor + correctly + + * acconfig.h: correct definition of KRB_PUT_INT for old krb4 code. + From Ake Sandgren + +1999-04-27 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: fix arguments to decrypt_ticket + +1999-04-25 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_internal): try to handle old + DCE secd's that are not able to handle MD5 checksums by defaulting + to MD4 if the keytype was DES-CBC-CRC + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use auth_context->keytype + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_auth_context_data): add `keytype' and + `cksumtype' + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (make_pa_tgs_req): remove old kludge for + secd + (init_tgs_req): add all supported enctypes for the keytype in + `in_creds->session.keytype' if it's set + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (F_PSEUDO): new flag for non-protocol + encryption types + (do_checksum): new function + (verify_checksum): take the checksum to use from the checksum message + and not from the crypto struct + (etypes): add F_PSEUDO flags + (krb5_keytype_to_enctypes): new function + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): initalize keytype + and cksumtype + (krb5_auth_setcksumtype, krb5_auth_getcksumtype): implement + (krb5_auth_setkeytype, krb5_auth_getkeytype): implement + (krb5_auth_setenctype): comment out, it's rather bogus anyway + +Sun Apr 25 16:55:50 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: fix for stupid aix warnings + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (erase_file): don't malloc + +Sat Apr 24 18:35:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/config.c: pass context to krb5_config_file_free + + * kuser/kinit.c: add `--fcache-version' to set cache version to + create + + * kuser/klist.c: print cache version if verbose + + * lib/krb5/transited.c (krb5_domain_x500_decode): don't abort + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/context.c (init_context_from_config_file): init + fcache_version; add krb5_{get,set}_fcache_version + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: add support for reading (and writing?) old + version keytabs + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: add krb5_cc_get_version + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: add support for reading and writing old + version cache files + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c (krb5_storage_from_mem): zero flags + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (krb5_storage_emem): zero flags + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (krb5_storage_from_fd): zero flags + + * lib/krb5/store.c: add flags to change how various fields are + stored, used for old cache version support + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add support for reading and writing old version + cache files, and keytabs + +Wed Apr 21 00:09:26 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: fix test for readline.h remember to link with + $LIB_tgetent when trying linking with readline + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (get_init_creds_common): if start_time + is given, request a postdated ticket. + + * lib/krb5/data.c (krb5_data_free): free data as long as it's not + NULL + +Tue Apr 20 20:18:14 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am (kpasswdd_LDADD): add LIB_dlopen + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID): add + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_decrypt_ticket): add `flags` and + KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID for ignoring that the ticket is + invalid + +Tue Apr 20 12:42:08 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: don't try to load library by default; get + library and function name from krb5.conf + + * kpasswd/sample_passwd_check.c: sample password checking + functions + +Mon Apr 19 22:22:19 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_storage_to_data, krb5_ret_data): use + krb5_data_alloc and be careful with checking allocation and sizes. + + * kuser/klist.c (--tokens): conditionalize on KRB4 + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): set all flags + (main): fix cut-n-paste error when setting start-time + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_tgs_flags): starttime of a validate + ticket should be > than current time + (*): send flags to krb5_verify_ap_req and krb5_decrypt_ticket + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): use the client realm instead of + the local realm when renewing tickets. + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_fwd_tgs_creds): compat function + (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): correct freeing of out_creds + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): hopefully fix up freeing of + memory + + * configure.in: do all the krb4 tests with "$krb4" != "no" + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c (krb5_free_keyblock_contents): don't zero + keyvalue if it's NULL. noticed by Ake Sandgren + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (add_padata): loop over all enctypes + instead of just taking the first one. fix all callers. From + "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h (enable_kaserver): declaration + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_convert): print the failing principal. AFS 3.4a + creates krbtgt.REALMOFCELL as NOTGS+NOSEAL, work around. From + "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + * kdc/hpropd.c (open_socket): stupid cast to get rid of a warning + + * kdc/connect.c (add_standard_ports, process_request): look at + enable_kaserver. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + + * kdc/config.c: new flag --kaserver and config file option + enable-kaserver. From "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + +Mon Apr 19 12:32:04 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for dlopen, and dlfcn.h + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: add support for dlopen:ing password quality + check library + + * configure.in: add appl/su + +Sun Apr 18 15:46:53 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: add krb5_cc_get_type that returns type of a + cache + +Fri Apr 16 17:58:51 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: LIB_kdb: -L should be before -lkdb + test for prototype of strsep + +Thu Apr 15 11:34:38 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: update version + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): use + ALLOC_SEQ + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: add some support for reading and writing old + cache formats; + (fcc_store_cred): use krb5_store_creds; (fcc_read_cred): use + krb5_ret_creds + + * lib/krb5/store_mem.c (krb5_storage_from_mem): check malloc, + initialize host_byteorder + + * lib/krb5/store_fd.c (krb5_storage_from_fd): initialize + host_byteorder + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c (krb5_storage_emem): initialize + host_byteorder + + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_storage_set_host_byteorder): add; + (krb5_store_int32,krb5_ret_int32,krb5_store_int16,krb5_ret_int16): + check host_byteorder flag; (krb5_store_creds): add; + (krb5_ret_creds): add + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_storage): add `host_byteorder' flag for + storage of numbers + + * lib/krb5/heim_err.et: add `host not found' error + + * kdc/connect.c: don't use data after clearing decriptor + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: abort -> krb5_abortx + + * lib/krb5/warn.c: add __attribute__; add *abort functions + + * configure.in: check for __attribute__ + + * kdc/connect.c: log bogus requests + +Tue Apr 13 18:38:05 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c (kadm5_s_create_principal): create v4 salts + for all DES keys + +1999-04-12 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): re-structure a little bit + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): some more error checking + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c (krb5_generate_subkey): check return + value from malloc + +Sun Apr 11 03:47:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5: update to reality + + * lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3: update to reality + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: handle more than one realm for a host + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): use krb5_program_setup and + print_version + + * kdc/string2key.c (main): use krb5_program_setup and + print_version + +Sun Apr 11 02:35:58 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_524_conv_principal): make it actually + work, and check built-in list of host-type first-components + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: lookup SRV-records to find a kdc for a realm + + * lib/krb5/context.c: add srv_* flags to context + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: add default v4_name_convert entries + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add srv_* flags to context + +Sat Apr 10 22:52:28 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: complain about un-recognised commands + + * admin/ktutil.c: complain about un-recognised commands + +Sat Apr 10 15:41:49 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/load.c (doit): fix error message + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (encrypt_internal): free checksum if lengths + fail to match. + (krb5_get_wrapped_length): new function + + * configure.in: security/pam_modules.h: check for + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): kludge + around `ret_as_reply' semantics by only freeing it when ret == 0 + +Fri Apr 9 20:24:04 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/klist.c (print_cred_verbose): handle the case of a bad + enctype + + * configure.in: test for more header files + (LIB_roken): set + +Thu Apr 8 15:01:59 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: fixes for building w/o krb4 + + * ltmain.sh: update to libtool 1.2d + + * ltconfig: update to libtool 1.2d + +Wed Apr 7 23:37:26 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c: fix some error messages to be more understandable. + + * kdc/hprop.c (ka_dump): remove unused variables + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: remove unused variables + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c: remove unused variables + + * appl/test/gssapi_client.c: remove unused variables + +Wed Apr 7 14:05:15 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_get_err_text): long -> krb5_error_code + + * kuser/klist.c: make it compile w/o krb4 + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: make it compile w/o krb4 + + * admin/ktutil.c: fix {srv,key}2{srv,key}tab confusion; add help + strings + +Mon Apr 5 16:13:46 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: test for MIPS ABI; new test_package + +Thu Apr 1 11:00:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * include/Makefile.am: clean krb5-private.h + + * Release 0.1d + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (doit): pass context to + krb5_get_all_client_addrs + + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): pass context to + krb5_get_all_server_addrs + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (init_as_req): pass context to + krb5_get_all_client_addrs + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_kdc_la): pass context to + krb5_get_all_client_addrs + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (get_addrs_int): add extra host addresses + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add support for adding an extra set of + addresses + + * lib/krb5/context.c: add support for adding an extra set of + addresses + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: add krb5_parse_address + + * lib/krb5/address.c: krb5_append_addresses + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding): don't zap everything + after first whitespace + + * kuser/kinit.c (renew_validate): don't allocate out + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): don't + allocate out_creds + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (get_cred_kdc, get_cred_kdc_la): make + out_creds pointer; + (krb5_get_kdc_cred): allocate out_creds; (get_cred_from_kdc_flags): + free more memory + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (encrypt_internal): free checksum + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c (krb524_convert_creds_kdc): free reply, + and ticket + + * kuser/Makefile.am: remove kfoo + + * lib/Makefile.am: add auth + + * lib/kadm5/iprop.h: getarg.h + + * lib/kadm5/replay_log.c: use getarg + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c: use getarg + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c: use getarg + + * lib/kadm5/dump_log.c: use getarg + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use getarg + + * Makefile.am.common: make a more working check-local target + + * lib/asn1/main.c: use getargs + +Mon Mar 29 20:19:57 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c (print_cred_verbose): use krb5_print_address + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): handle unknown + address types; (ipv6_print_addr): print in 16-bit groups (as it + should) + + * lib/krb5/crc.c: crc_{init_table,update} -> + _krb5_crc_{init_table,update} + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + crc_{init_table,update} -> _krb5_crc_{init_table,update} + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + + * lib/krb5/store.c: k_{put,get}_int -> _krb5_{put,get}_int + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: include krb5-private.h + + * kdc/connect.c (addr_to_string): use krb5_print_address + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_print_address): int -> size_t + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: add support for printing ipv6 + addresses, either with inet_ntop, or ugly for-loop + + * kdc/524.c: check that the ticket came from a valid address; use + the address of the connection as the address to put in the v4 + ticket (if this address is AF_INET) + + * kdc/connect.c: pass addr to do_524 + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: prototype for do_524 + +Sat Mar 27 17:48:31 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for OSF C2; bind/bitypes.h, getudbnam, + setlim; check for auth modules; siad.h, getpwnam_r; + lib/auth/Makefile, lib/auth/sia/Makefile + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: n_fold -> _krb5_n_fold + + * lib/krb5/n-fold.c: n_fold -> _krb5_n_fold + +Thu Mar 25 04:35:21 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): free salt when zapping + it + + * lib/kadm5/free.c (kadm5_free_principal_ent): free `key_data' + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_destroy): clear master key + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_destroy): clear master key + (DB_open): check malloc + + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): free addresses + + * kadmin/kadmin.c (main): make code more consistent. always free + configuration information. + + * kadmin/init.c (create_random_entry): free the entry + +Wed Mar 24 04:02:03 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): + re-organize the code to always free `kdc_reply' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): be more careful about + freeing memory + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_destroy): don't call fcc_close + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_crypto_destroy): free `crypto' + + * lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h: try db_185.h first in case db.h is a DB 2.0 + header + + * configure.in (db_185.h): check for + + * admin/srvcreate.c: new file. contributed by Daniel Kouril + + + * admin/ktutil.c: srvcreate: new command + + * kuser/klist.c: add support for printing AFS tokens + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: add support for destroying v4 tickets and AFS + tokens. based on code by Love + + * kuser/Makefile.am (kdestroy_LDADD, klist_LDADD): more libraries + + * configure.in: sys/ioccom.h: test for + + * kuser/klist.c (main): don't print `no ticket file' with --test. + From: Love + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (doit): more braces to make gcc happy + + * kdc/connect.c (init_socket): get rid of a stupid warning + + * include/bits.c (my_strupr): cast away some stupid warnings + +Tue Mar 23 14:34:44 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): no infinite + loops, please + +Tue Mar 23 00:00:45 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am (install_build_headers): recover from make + rewriting the names of the headers kludge to help solaris make + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: kludge to help solaris make + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: kludge to help solaris make + + * configure.in (LIB_kdb): make sure there's a -L option in here by + adding $(LIB_krb4) + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_2int, generate_int2): int -> + unsigned + + * configure.in (SunOS): set to a number KRB4, KRB5 conditionals: + remove the `dnl' to work around an automake flaw + +Sun Mar 21 15:08:49 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c: char* -> krb5_realm + +Sun Mar 21 14:08:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * include/bits.c: + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: create krb5-private.h + +Sat Mar 20 00:08:59 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in (gethostname): remove duplicate + +Fri Mar 19 14:48:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: add version-info + + * lib/gssapi/Makefile.am: add version-info + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: use $(x:y=z) make syntax; move check-der + to check_PROGRAMS + + * lib/Makefile.am: add 45 + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: split in client and server libraries + (breaks shared libraries otherwise) + +Thu Mar 18 11:33:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * include/kadm5/Makefile.am: clean a lot of header files (since + automake lacks a clean-hook) + + * include/Makefile.am: clean a lot of header files (since automake + lacks a clean-hook) + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: fix build-installation of headers + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * include/Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * doc/whatis.texi: define sub for html + + * configure.in: LIB_kdb, have_err_h, have_fnmatch_h, have_glob_h + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: der.h + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: admin.h -> kadm5/admin.h + + * kdc/Makefile.am: remove junk + + * kadmin/Makefile.am: sl.a -> sl.la + + * appl/afsutil/Makefile.am: remove EXTRA_bin_PROGRAMS + + * admin/Makefile.am: sl.a -> sl.la + + * configure.in: condition KRB5; AC_CHECK_XAU + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * include/kadm5/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common; don't + install headers from here + + * include/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common; don't install + headers from here + + * doc/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/hdb/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/gssapi/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * lib/45/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kuser/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kdc/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * kadmin/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * appl/test/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * appl/afsutil/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * appl/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * admin/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Wed Mar 17 03:04:38 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/store.c (krb5_store_stringz): braces fix + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): braces fix + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): braces fix + + * kdc/connect.c (loop): braces fix + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: cast to unsigned char to make is* happy + + * lib/krb5/log.c (krb5_addlog_dest): more braces to make gcc happy + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (krb5_verify_checksum): rename C -> cksum to + be consistent + + * kadmin/util.c (timeval2str): more braces to make gcc happy + + * kadmin/load.c: cast in is* to get rid of stupid warning + + * kadmin/dump.c (append_hex): cast in isalnum to get rid of stupid + warning + + * kdc/kaserver.c: malloc checks and fixes + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): include leading + dot (if any) when looking up realms. + +Fri Mar 12 13:57:56 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: add dns support + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c: use krb5_free_host_realm + + * lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c: check for NULL realmlist + + * lib/krb5/context.c: don't print warning if there is no krb5.conf + +Wed Mar 10 19:29:46 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use AC_WFLAGS + +Mon Mar 8 11:49:43 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.1c + + * kuser/klist.c: use print_version + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: use print_version + + * kdc/hpropd.c: use print_version + + * kdc/hprop.c: use print_version + + * kdc/config.c: use print_version + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: use print_version + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: use print_version + + * appl/test/common.c: use print_version + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c: use print_version + +Mon Mar 1 10:49:14 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: SOCKADDR_HAS_SA_LEN -> + HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + + * configure.in, acconfig.h, cf/*: update to automake 1.4/autoconf 2.13 + +Sun Feb 28 18:19:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: make `BIT STRING's unsigned + + * lib/asn1/{symbol.h,gen.c}: add TUInteger type + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c (krb5_verify_user): pass prompter to + krb5_get_init_creds_password + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c (fcc_gen_new): implement + +Sat Feb 27 22:41:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/install.texi: krb4 is now automatically detected + + * doc/misc.texi: update procedure to set supported encryption + types + + * doc/setup.texi: change some silly wordings + +Sat Feb 27 22:17:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (fkt_remove_entry): make this work + + * admin/ktutil.c: add minimally working `get' command + +Sat Feb 27 19:44:49 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: more typos + + * include/Makefile.am: remove EXTRA_DATA (as of autoconf + 2.13/automake 1.4) + + * appl/Makefile.am: OTP_dir + +Fri Feb 26 17:37:00 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * doc/setup.texi: add kadmin section + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: fix printf warnings + +Thu Feb 25 11:16:49 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: -O does not belong in WFLAGS + +Thu Feb 25 11:05:57 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: fix der_put_int + +Tue Feb 23 20:35:12 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: use AC_BROKEN_GLOB + +Mon Feb 22 15:12:44 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * configure.in: check for glob + +Mon Feb 22 11:32:42 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.1b + +Sat Feb 20 15:48:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: convert DES3 keys to des3-cbc-sha1, and + des3-cbc-md5 + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (DES3_string_to_key): make this actually do + what the draft said it should + + * lib/hdb/convert_db.c: little program for database conversion + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_open): try to open database w/o .db extension + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_open): add test for database format + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_open): add test for database format + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_2int): don't depend on flags being + unsigned + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: change `hdb_set_master_key' to take an + EncryptionKey, and add a new function `hdb_set_master_keyfile' to + do what `hdb_set_master_key' used to do + + * kdc/kstash.c: add `--convert-file' option to change keytype of + existing master key file + +Fri Feb 19 07:04:14 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.1a + +Sat Feb 13 17:12:53 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): sizeof(buf) -> buf_size, buf + is now a `u_char *' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_init_etype): etypes are now `int' + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): constize + orig_host + + (krb5_salttype_to_string): new function (RSA_MD5_DES_verify, + RSA_MD5_DES3_verify): initialize ret + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c (init_auth): remove unnecessary + gssapi_krb5_init. ask for KEYTYPE_DES credentials + + * kadmin/get.c (print_entry_long): print the keytypes and salts + available for the principal + + * configure.in (WFLAGS): add `-O' to catch unitialized variables + and such + (gethostname, mkstemp, getusershell, inet_aton): more tests + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: update prototypes + + * configure.in: homogenize broken detection with krb4 + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_context): remove unused + `error' + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am (check-der): add + + * lib/asn1/gen.c (define_type): map ASN1 Integer to `int' instead + of `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c (length_unsigned): new function + (length_int): handle signed integers + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (der_put_unsigned): new function + (der_put_int): handle signed integers + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_unsigned): new function + (der_get_int): handle signed integers + + * lib/asn1/der.h: all integer functions take `int' instead of + `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/lex.l (filename): unused. remove. + + * lib/asn1/check-der.c: new test program for der encoding and + decoding. + +Mon Feb 1 04:09:06 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): only call + gethostbyname2 with AF_INET6 if we actually have IPv6. From + "Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH" + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (get_kdc_address): dito + +Sun Jan 31 06:26:36 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (parse_prots): always bind to AF_INET, there are + v6-implementations without support for `mapped V4 addresses'. + From Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino + +Sat Jan 30 22:38:27 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0u + +Sat Jan 30 13:43:02 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: explicit rules for *.et files + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (get_kadm_ticket): only remove creds if + krb5_get_credentials was succesful. + (get_new_cache): return better error codes and return earlier. + (get_cred_cache): only delete default_client if it's different + from client + (kadm5_c_init_with_context): return a more descriptive error. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_flags): handle NULL client or server + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): return the error in + `ret_error' iff != NULL + + * lib/krb5/rd_error.c (krb5_free_error, krb5_free_error_contents): + new functions + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): more + type-correctness + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_error): typedef to KRB_ERROR + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: KRB5_TGS_NAME: use + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: KRB5_TGS_NAME: use + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): update to changes + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c (kadm5_s_rename_principal): call remove + instead of rename, but shouldn't this just call rename? + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): always return an + error if the principal wasn't found. + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_seq): unseal key + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_seq): unseal key + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: added explicit rules for asn1_err.[ch] + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): add krbtgt/THISREALM@OTHERREALM when + finding cross-realm tgts in the v4 database + + * kadmin/mod.c (mod_entry): check the number of arguments. check + that kadm5_get_principal worked. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (fkt_remove_entry): remove KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND if + we weren't able to remove it. + + * admin/ktutil.c: less drive-by-deleting. From Love + + + * kdc/connect.c (parse_ports): copy the string before mishandling + it with strtok_r + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): print the principal with mismatching + kvnos + + * kadmin/kadmind.c (main): convert `debug_port' to network byte + order + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: allow specification of port number. + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h (kadm5_client_context): add + `kadmind_port'. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): move up + initalize_kadm5_error_table_r. + allow specification of port number. + + From Love + + * kuser/klist.c: add option -t | --test + +Sat Dec 5 19:49:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c: remove ktype_is_etype + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c, lib/krb5/krb5.h, acconfig.h: NEW_DES3_CODE + + * configure.in: fix for AIX install; better tests for AIX dynamic + AFS libs; `--enable-new-des3-code' + +Tue Dec 1 14:44:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/afsutil/Makefile.am: link with extra libs for aix + + * kuser/Makefile.am: link with extra libs for aix + +Sun Nov 29 01:56:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (krb5_get_all_server_addrs): add. almost + the same as krb5_get_all_client_addrs except that it includes + loopback addresses + + * kdc/connect.c (init_socket): bind to a particular address + (init_sockets): get all local addresses and bind to them all + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (addr2sockaddr, print_addr): new + methods + (find_af, find_atype): new functions. use them. + + * configure.in: add hesiod + +Wed Nov 25 11:37:48 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_err.et: add some codes from kerberos-revisions-03 + +Mon Nov 23 12:53:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/log.c: rename delete -> remove + + * lib/kadm5/delete_s.c: rename delete -> remove + + * lib/hdb/common.c: rename delete -> remove + +Sun Nov 22 12:26:26 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: check for environ and `struct spwd' + +Sun Nov 22 11:42:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): set keytype to sess_ktype if + ktype_is_etype + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (krb5_keytype_to_etypes): zero terminate + etypes + (em): sort entries + +Sun Nov 22 06:54:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: more type correctness + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: re-structure code. remove limits on ASN1 + generated bits. + +Sun Nov 22 01:49:50 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): fix bogus indexing + +Sat Nov 21 21:39:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c (fail_verify_is_ok): new function + (krb5_verify_init_creds): if we cannot get a ticket for + host/`hostname` and fail_verify_is_ok just return. use + krb5_rd_req + +Sat Nov 21 23:12:27 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/free.c (krb5_xfree): new function + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_free_creds_contents): new function + + * lib/krb5/context.c: more type correctness + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: more type correctness + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): more type + correctness + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_length): fix test of len + (der_get_tag): more type correctness + + * kuser/klist.c (usage): void-ize + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_remove): some more type correctness. + +Sat Nov 21 16:49:20 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: try to list enctypes as keytypes + + * kuser/kinit.c: remove extra `--cache' option, add `--enctypes' + to set list of enctypes to use + + * kadmin/load.c: load strings as hex + + * kadmin/dump.c: dump hex as string is possible + + * admin/ktutil.c: use print_version() + + * configure.in, acconfig.h: test for hesiod + +Sun Nov 15 17:28:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: add some crypto debug code + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (_krb5_extract_ticket): don't use fixed + buffer when encoding ticket + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (re-)implement `krb5_auth_setenctype' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: allow mis-match of tgt session key, and service + session key + + * admin/ktutil.c: keytype -> enctype + +Fri Nov 13 05:35:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (KRB5_TGS_NAME, KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE): added + +Sat Nov 7 19:56:31 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (add_cred): add termination NULL pointer + +Mon Nov 2 01:15:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: ENOMEM -> ERANGE + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c: cleanup and adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c: get enctype from auth_context keyblock + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: cleanup and adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: adopt to new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c: use new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/context.c: rename etype functions to enctype ditto + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: use new crypto api + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: remove enctype and cksumtype from + auth_context + +Mon Nov 2 01:15:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c (handle_udp, handle_tcp): correct type of `n' + +Tue Sep 15 18:41:38 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: fix printing of unrecognized keytypes + +Tue Sep 15 17:02:33 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c: add KEYTYPE_USE_AFS3_SALT to keytype if + using AFS3 salt + +Tue Aug 25 23:30:52 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): care about + `use_admin_kdc' + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (get_kdc_address): use + krb5_get_krb_admin_hst + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krb_admin_hst): new function + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): add `use_admin_kdc' + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_get_use_admin_kdc, + krb5_set_use_admin_kdc): new functions + +Tue Aug 18 22:24:12 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: remove all calls to abort(); check return + value from _key_schedule; + (RSA_MD[45]_DES_verify): zero tmp and res; + (RSA_MD5_DES3_{verify,checksum}): implement + +Mon Aug 17 20:18:46 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos4.c (swap32): conditionalize + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_internal): new function + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): if the hostname + returned from gethostby*() isn't a FQDN, try with the original + hostname + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (make_pa_tgs_req): use krb5_mk_req_internal + and correct key usage + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (verify_checksum): make static + + * admin/ktutil.c (kt_list): use krb5_enctype_to_string + +Sun Aug 16 20:57:56 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/cpw.c (do_cpw_entry): use asprintf for the prompt + + * kadmin/ank.c (ank): print principal name in prompt + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (hmac): always allocate space for checksum. + never trust c.checksum.length + (_get_derived_key): try to return the derived key + +Sun Aug 16 19:48:42 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c (hmac): fix some peculiarities and bugs + (get_checksum_key): assume usage is `formatted' + (create_checksum,verify_checksum): moved the guts of the krb5_* + functions here, both take `formatted' key-usages + (encrypt_internal_derived): fix various bogosities + (derive_key): drop key_type parameter (already given by the + encryption_type) + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_flags): handle case where client is NULL + + * kdc/connect.c (process_request): return zero after processing + kerberos 4 request + +Sun Aug 16 18:38:15 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/crypto.c: merge x-*.[ch] into one file + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: remove residual from krb5_ccache_data + +Fri Aug 14 16:28:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/x-crypto.c (derive_key): move DES3 specific code to + separate function (will eventually end up someplace else) + + * lib/krb5/x-crypto.c (krb5_string_to_key_derived): allocate key + + * configure.in, acconfig.h: test for four valued krb_put_int + +Thu Aug 13 23:46:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0t + +Thu Aug 13 22:40:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding): remove trailing + whitespace + +Wed Aug 12 20:15:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/x-checksum.c (krb5_verify_checksum): pass checksum type + to krb5_create_checksum + + * lib/krb5/x-key.c: implement DES3_string_to_key_derived; fix a + few typos + +Wed Aug 5 12:39:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0s + +Thu Jul 30 23:12:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c (krb5_mk_error): realloc until you die + +Thu Jul 23 19:49:03 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc_locl.h: proto for `get_des_key' + + * configure.in: test for four valued el_init + + * kuser/klist.c: keytype -> enctype + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (change): use new `krb5_string_to_key*' + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop, ka_convert): convert to a set of keys + + * kdc/kaserver.c: use `get_des_key' + + * kdc/524.c: use new crypto api + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: use new crypto api + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: always treat keytypes as enctypes; use new + crypto api + + * kdc/kstash.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * kdc/string2key.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * admin/srvconvert.c: add keys for all possible enctypes + + * admin/ktutil.c: keytype -> enctype + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c: get enctype from auth_context + keyblock + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: remove hdb_*_keytype2key + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c: adapt to new crypto api + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: add keys for des-cbc-crc, des-cbc-md4, + des-cbc-md5, and des3-cbc-sha1 + + * lib/krb5/heim_err.et: error message for unsupported salt + + * lib/krb5/codec.c: short-circuit these functions, since they are + not needed any more + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: cleanup and adapt to new crypto api + +Mon Jul 13 23:00:59 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): don't advance + hostent->h_addr_list, use a copy instead + +Mon Jul 13 15:00:31 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_binding, parse_section): make sure + everything is ok before adding to linked list + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: skip ws before checking for comment + +Wed Jul 8 10:45:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: hmac-sha1-des3 = 12 + +Tue Jun 30 18:08:05 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): do not close the + unopened file + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c: realloc correctly + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (find_all_addresses): init j + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_init_context): print error if parsing + of config file produced an error. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (parse_list, krb5_config_parse_file): + ignore more spaces + + * lib/krb5/codec.c (krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart, + krb5_encode_ETYPE_INFO): initialize `ret' + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): realloc + correctly + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): initialize `ret' + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (get_cred_cache): try to do the right thing + with default_client + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): initialize `ticket_life' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): initialize `ret' + (tgs_rep2): initialize `krbtgt' + + * kdc/connect.c (do_request): check for errors from `sendto' + + * kdc/524.c (do_524): initialize `ret' + + * kadmin/util.c (foreach_principal): don't clobber `ret' + + * kadmin/del.c (del_entry): don't apply on zeroth argument + + * kadmin/cpw.c (do_cpw_entry): initialize `ret' + +Sat Jun 13 04:14:01 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0r + +Sun Jun 7 04:13:14 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: fall-back definition of + IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4 + + * configure.in: only set CFLAGS if it wasn't set look for + dn_expand and res_search + +Mon Jun 1 21:28:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: remove duplicate seteuid + +Sat May 30 00:19:51 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: import _krb_time_to_life, to avoid + runtime dependencies on libkrb with some shared library + implementations + +Fri May 29 00:09:02 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit_options.c: Default options for kinit. + + * kuser/kauth_options.c: Default options for kauth. + + * kuser/kinit.c: Implement lots a new options. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (check_tgs_flags): make sure kdc-req-body->rtime + is not NULL; set endtime to min of new starttime + old_life, and + requested endtime + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (get_init_creds_common): if the + forwardable or proxiable flags are set in options, set the + kdc-flags to the value specified, and not always to one + +Thu May 28 21:28:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Optionally compare client address to addresses + in ticket. + + * kdc/connect.c: Pass client address to as_rep() and tgs_rep(). + + * kdc/config.c: Add check_ticket_addresses, and + allow_null_ticket_addresses variables. + +Tue May 26 14:03:42 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: possibly make DES keys version 4 salted + + * lib/kadm5/set_keys.c: check config file for kadmin/use_v4_salt + before zapping version 4 salts + +Sun May 24 05:22:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0q + + * lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c: new file + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c (repl_mutual): no output token + + * lib/gssapi/display_name.c (gss_display_name): zero terminate + output. + +Sat May 23 19:11:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/display_status.c: new file + + * Makefile.am: send -I to aclocal + + * configure.in: remove duplicate setenv + +Sat May 23 04:55:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/util.c (foreach_principal): Check for expression before + wading through the whole database. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Pass NULL password to + kadm5_*_init_with_password. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c: Implement init_with_{skey,creds}*. Make use + of `password' parameter to init_with_password. + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c: implement init_with_{skey,creds}* + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Better arguments for + kadm5_init_with_password. + +Sat May 16 07:10:36 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hprop.c: conditionalize ka-server reading support on + KASERVER_DB + + * configure.in: new option `--enable-kaserver-db' + +Fri May 15 19:39:18 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Better error if local tgt couldn't be + found. + +Tue May 12 21:11:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0p + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): only set + encryption type in auth_context if it's compatible with the type + of the session key + +Mon May 11 21:11:14 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: add support for ka-server databases + + * appl/ftp/ftpd: link with -lcrypt, if needed + +Fri May 1 07:29:52 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: don't test for winsock.h + +Sat Apr 18 21:43:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0o + +Sat Apr 18 00:31:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: Save hostname. + +Sun Apr 5 11:29:45 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: Use same enctype as in ticket. + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): Check for null key. + +Fri Apr 3 03:54:54 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Fix DES3 string-to-key. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Get default keytab name from context. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Get `default_keytab_name' value. + + * kadmin/util.c (foreach_principal): Print error message if + `kadm5_get_principals' fails. + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: Use `kadmind_loop'. + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Replace several other functions with + `kadmind_loop'. + +Sat Mar 28 09:49:18 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (fkt_add_entry): use an explicit seek instead + of O_APPEND + + * configure.in: generate ftp Makefiles + + * kuser/klist.c (print_cred_verbose): print IPv4-address in a + portable way. + + * admin/srvconvert.c (srvconv): return 0 if successful + +Tue Mar 24 00:40:33 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: MIT compatible changes: add and use sizes to + keytab entries, and change default keytab to `/etc/krb5.keytab'. + +Mon Mar 23 23:43:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/gssapi/wrap.c: Use `gss_krb5_getsomekey'. + + * lib/gssapi/unwrap.c: Implement and use `gss_krb5_getsomekey'. + Fix bug in checking of pad. + + * lib/gssapi/{un,}wrap.c: Add support for just integrity + protecting data. + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c: Use + `gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum'. + + * lib/gssapi/8003.c: Implement `gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum'. + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c: Zero cred, and store session key + properly in auth-context. + +Sun Mar 22 00:47:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/delete_s.c: Check immutable bit. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Pass client name to kadm5_init. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c: Get creds for client name passed in. + + * kdc/hprop.c (v4_prop): Check for `changepw.kerberos'. + +Sat Mar 21 22:57:13 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c: Verify that error_code is in the range + [0,127]. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Move checking of principal flags to new + function `check_flags'. + +Sat Mar 21 14:38:51 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): handle an empty salt + + * configure.in: define SunOS if running solaris + +Sat Mar 21 00:26:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Unifdef test for same principal when + changing password. + + * kadmin/util.c: If kadm5_get_principals failes, we might still be + able to perform the requested opreration (for instance someone if + trying to change his own password). + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c: Try to get ticket via initial request, if + not possible via tgt. + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Check for principals changing their own + passwords. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): check for interesting flags on + involved principals. + + * kadmin/util.c: Fix order of flags. + +Thu Mar 19 16:54:10 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Return sane error code if krb_rd_req fails. + +Wed Mar 18 17:11:47 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * acconfig.h: rename HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 to HAVE_IPV6 + +Wed Mar 18 09:58:18 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c (krb5_keytab_key_proc): don't + free keyseed; use correct keytab + +Tue Mar 10 09:56:16 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * acinclude.m4 (AC_KRB_IPV6): rewrote to avoid false positives + +Mon Mar 16 23:58:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0n + +Fri Mar 6 00:41:30 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/gssapi/{accept_sec_context,release_cred}.c: Use + krb5_kt_close/krb5_kt_resolve. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_425_conv_principal_ext): Use resolver + to lookup hosts, so CNAMEs can be ignored. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc, send_and_recv_http): + Add support for using proxy. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Initialize `http_proxy' from + `libdefaults/http_proxy'. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add `http_proxy' to context. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Recognize `http/' and `udp/' as protocol + specifications. + +Wed Mar 4 01:47:29 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: Implement `add' and `remove' functions. Make + `--keytab' a global option. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Implement remove with files. Add memory + operations. + +Tue Mar 3 20:09:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Use function pointers. + + * admin: Remove kdb_edit. + +Sun Mar 1 03:28:42 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/dump_log.c: print operation names + +Sun Mar 1 03:04:12 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: add X-tests, and {bin,...}dir appl/{kx,kauth} + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c,mk_priv.c,rd_safe.c,mk_safe.c,mk_rep.c: + remove arbitrary limit + + * kdc/hprop-common.c: use krb5_{read,write}_message + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c (send_diffs): more careful use + krb5_{write,read}_message + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c (get_creds): get credentials for + `iprop/master' directly. + (main): use `krb5_read_message' + +Sun Mar 1 02:05:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Cleanup commands list, and add help strings. + + * kadmin/get.c: Add long, short, and terse (equivalent to `list') + output formats. Short is the default. + + * kadmin/util.c: Add `include_time' flag to timeval2str. + + * kadmin/init.c: Max-life and max-renew can, infact, be zero. + + * kadmin/{cpw,del,ext,get}.c: Use `foreach_principal'. + + * kadmin/util.c: Add function `foreach_principal', that loops over + all principals matching an expression. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add usage string to `privileges'. + + * lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c: Also try to match aganist the + expression appended with `@default-realm'. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Add `krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short', that + excludes the realm if it's the same as the default realm. + +Fri Feb 27 05:02:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: more WFLAGS and WFLAGS_NOUNUSED added missing + headers and functions error -> com_err + + (krb5_get_init_creds_keytab): use krb5_keytab_key_proc + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c: make `krb5_keytab_key_proc' + global + + * lib/kadm5/marshall.c (ret_principal_ent): set `n_tl_data' + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: use `struct ndbm_db' everywhere. + +Fri Feb 27 04:49:24 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): bump static limit to 10240. + This should be fixed the correct way. + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c (check_acl:) truncate buf correctly + (send_diffs): compare versions correctly + (main): reorder handling of events + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (kadm5_log_previous): avoid bad type conversion + +Thu Feb 26 02:22:35 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/ipropd_{slave,master}.c: new files + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (kadm5_log_get_version): take an `fd' as + argument + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_context_data): `et_list' should be `struct + et_list *' + + * aux/make-proto.pl: Should work with perl4 + +Mon Feb 16 17:20:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: Remove (it gets included via + {asn1,krb5}_err.h). + +Thu Feb 12 03:28:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (_krb5_extract_ticket): if time difference + is larger than max_skew, return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (get_version): globalize + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h: include + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: add PA_KEY_INFO and PA_KEY_INFO_ENTRY + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (get_pa_etype_info): remove gcc-ism of + initializing local struct in declaration. + +Sat Jan 31 17:28:58 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/524.c: Use krb5_decode_EncTicketPart. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check at runtime whether to use enctypes + instead of keytypes. If so use the same value to encrypt ticket, + and kdc-rep as well as `keytype' for session key. Fix some obvious + bugs with the handling of additional tickets. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Use krb5_decode_EncTicketPart, and + krb5_decode_Authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c: Use krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart. + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c: Use krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart. + + * lib/krb5/mk_rep.c: Make sure enc_part.etype is an encryption + type, and not a key type. Use krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Use krb5_decode_PA_KEY_INFO. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Use krb5_decode_Enc{AS,TGS}RepPart. + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c: Use krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Use krb5_decode_Enc{AS,TGS}RepPart. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: Use krb5_encode_Authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/codec.c: Enctype conversion stuff. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Ignore KRB5_CONFIG if *not* running + setuid. Get configuration for libdefaults ktype_is_etype, and + default_etypes. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add krb5_string_to_etype, rename + krb5_convert_etype to krb5_decode_keytype, and add + krb5_decode_keyblock. + +Fri Jan 23 00:32:09 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{get_in_tkt,rd_req}.c: Use krb5_convert_etype. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add krb5_convert_etype function - converts + from protocol keytypes (that really are enctypes) to internal + representation. + +Thu Jan 22 21:24:36 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Add PA-KEY-INFO structure to hold information + on keys in the database; and also a new `pa-key-info' padata-type. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: If pre-authentication fails, return a list of + keytypes, salttypes, and salts. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Add better support for + pre-authentication, by looking at hints from the KDC. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Add better support for specifying what + pre-authentication to use. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Merge entries for KEYTYPE_DES and + KEYTYPE_DES_AFS3. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add pre-authentication structures. + + * kdc/connect.c: Don't fail if realloc(X, 0) returns NULL. + +Wed Jan 21 06:20:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c (kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx): initialize + `log_context.socket_name' and `log_context.socket_fd' + + * lib/kadm5/log.c (kadm5_log_flush): send a unix domain datagram + to inform the possible running ipropd of an update. + +Wed Jan 21 01:34:09 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Return error-packet to caller. + + * lib/krb5/free.c (krb5_free_kdc_rep): Free krb5_kdc_rep->error. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Add some support for using enctypes instead of + keytypes. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Fixes to send authorization-data to the + KDC. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c: Only generate local subkey if there is + none. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add krb5_authdata type. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Add + krb5_auth_con_set{,localsub,remotesub}key. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Return some error if prompter + functions return failure. + +Wed Jan 21 01:16:13 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: detect bad password. use krb5_err. + + * kadmin/util.c (edit_entry): remove unused variables + +Tue Jan 20 22:58:31 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: rename `-s' to `-S' to be MIT-compatible. + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h: add kadm5_log_context and + kadm5_log*-functions + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c (kadm5_s_create_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c (kadm5_s_rename_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c (kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx): initialize + log_context + + * lib/kadm5/delete_s.c (kadm5_s_delete_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/modify_s.c (kadm5_s_modify_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c (kadm5_s_randkey_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c (kadm5_s_chpass_principal): add change to + log + + * lib/kadm5/Makefile.am: add log.c, dump_log and replay_log + + * lib/kadm5/replay_log.c: new file + + * lib/kadm5/dump_log.c: new file + + * lib/kadm5/log.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c (get_str): initialize pad space to zero + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c (krb5_config_vget_next): handle c == NULL + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: rewritten to use the kadm5 API + + * kpasswd/Makefile.am: link with kadm5srv + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep): initialize `i' + + * kadmin/kadmind.c (main): use kadm5_server_{send,recv}_sp + + * include/Makefile.am: added admin.h + +Sun Jan 18 01:41:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/gen_copy.c: Don't return ENOMEM if allocating 0 bytes. + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c (mcc_store_cred): restore linked list if + copy_creds fails. + +Tue Jan 6 04:17:56 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: add kadm5_server_{send,recv}{,_sp} + + * lib/kadm5/marshall.c: add kadm5_{store,ret}_principal_ent_mask. + + * lib/kadm5/init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx): use + krb5_getportbyname + + * kadmin/kadmind.c (main): htons correctly. + moved kadm5_server_{recv,send} + + * kadmin/kadmin.c (main): only set admin_server if explicitly + given + +Mon Jan 5 23:34:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: Implement locking of database. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Process AuthorizationData. + +Sat Jan 3 22:07:07 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/string2key.c: Use AFS string-to-key from libkrb5. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Handle pa-afs3-salt case. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add value for AFS salts. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Add support for AFS string-to-key. + + * lib/kadm5/rename_s.c: Use correct salt. + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c: Always enable client. Only set max-life + and max-renew if != 0. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Add context to all krb5_config_*get_*. + +Thu Dec 25 17:03:25 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/ank.c (ank): don't zero password if --random-key was + given. + +Tue Dec 23 01:56:45 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0m + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c (attr_to_flags): try to set `client' + + * kadmin/util.c (edit_time): only set mask if != 0 + (edit_attributes): only set mask if != 0 + + * kadmin/init.c (init): create `default' + +Sun Dec 21 09:44:05 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kadmin/util.c (str2deltat, str2attr, get_deltat): return value + as pointer and have return value indicate success. + + (get_response): check NULL from fgets + + (edit_time, edit_attributes): new functions for reading values and + offering list of answers on '?' + + (edit_entry): use edit_time and edit_attributes + + * kadmin/ank.c (add_new_key): test the return value of + `krb5_parse_name' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_check_authenticator): RFC1510 doesn't say + that the checksum has to be keyed, even though later drafts do. + Accept unkeyed checksums to be compatible with MIT. + + * kadmin/kadmin_locl.h: add some prototypes. + + * kadmin/util.c (edit_entry): return a value + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c (main): return a exit code. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (init_tgs_req): use krb5_keytype_to_enctypes + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (krb5_keytype_to_enctypes): new function. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): use + krb5_{free,copy}_keyblock instead of the _contents versions + +Fri Dec 12 14:20:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{mk,rd}_priv.c: fix check for local/remote subkey + +Mon Dec 8 08:48:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/context.c: don't look at KRB5_CONFIG if running setuid + +Sat Dec 6 10:09:40 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c (krb5_free_keyblock): check for NULL + keyblock + +Sat Dec 6 08:26:10 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0l + +Thu Dec 4 03:38:12 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Add TCP client support. + + * lib/krb5/store.c: Add k_{put,get}_int. + + * kadmin/ank.c: Set initial kvno to 1. + + * kdc/connect.c: Send version 5 TCP-reply as length+data. + +Sat Nov 29 07:10:11 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req): fixed obvious bug + + * kdc/kaserver.c (create_reply_ticket): use a random nonce in the + reply packet. + + * kdc/connect.c (init_sockets): less reallocing. + + * **/*.c: changed `struct fd_set' to `fd_set' + +Sat Nov 29 05:12:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: More guessing. + +Thu Nov 20 02:55:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Use principal from ticket if no server is + given. + +Tue Nov 18 02:58:02 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: Use krb5_err*(). + +Sun Nov 16 11:57:43 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add local `init', `load', `dump', and `merge' + commands. + +Sun Nov 16 02:52:20 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_ext): figure out the correct + `enctype' + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c (krb5_mk_req): use `(*auth_context)->enctype' + if set. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: handle the case of a specific keytype + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): enctype as a + parameter instead of guessing it. + + * lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c (krb5_build_ap_req): new parameter + `enctype' + + * appl/test/common.c (common_setup): don't use `optarg' + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents): new function + (krb5_kt_get_entry): retrieve the latest version if kvno == 0 + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: define KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_compare_creds): check for + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE + + * lib/gssapi/8003.c (gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum): remove + unused variable + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_copy_creds_contents): only free the + contents if we fail. + +Sun Nov 16 00:32:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: Get password expiration time from config + file. + + * lib/asn1/{der_get,gen_decode}.c: Allow passing NULL size. + +Wed Nov 12 02:35:57 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): + restructured and fixed. + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c (krb5_h_addr2addr): new function. + +Wed Nov 12 01:36:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fall back to hostname's addresses if other + methods fail. + +Tue Nov 11 22:22:12 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add `-l' flag to use local database. + + * lib/kadm5/acl.c: Use KADM5_PRIV_ALL. + + * lib/kadm5: Use function pointer trampoline for easier dual use + (without radiation-hardening capability). + +Tue Nov 11 05:15:22 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (krb5_etype_valid): new function + + * lib/krb5/creds.c (krb5_copy_creds_contents): zero target + + * lib/krb5/context.c (valid_etype): remove + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: remove dead code + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c (send_request): free memory on error. + + * lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c (krb5_build_ap_req): check return value + from malloc. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): free memory on + failure correctly. + (krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd): return error correctly. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_{keytab,skey}.c: new files + +Tue Nov 11 02:53:19 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Implement auth_con_setuserkey. + + * lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c: Use krb5_auth_con_getkey. + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c: Rename krb5_free_keyblock to + krb5_free_keyblock_contents, and reimplement krb5_free_keyblock. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Use auth_context->keyblock if + ap_options.use_session_key. + +Tue Nov 11 02:35:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/net_{read,write}.c: change `int fd' to `void *p_fd'. + fix callers. + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: include and + + * include/Makefile.am: add xdbm.h + +Tue Nov 11 01:58:22 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Implement krb5_get_cred_from_kdc. + +Mon Nov 10 22:41:53 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/ticket.c: Implement copy_ticket. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Make `options' parameter MIT-compatible. + + * lib/krb5/data.c: Implement free_data and copy_data. + +Sun Nov 9 02:17:27 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5: Implement kadm5_get_privs, and kadm5_get_principals. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Add get_privileges function. + + * lib/kadm5: Rename KADM5_ACL_* -> KADM5_PRIV_* to conform with + specification. + + * kdc/connect.c: Exit if no sockets could be bound. + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: Check return value from krb5_net_read(). + + * lib/kadm5,kadmin: Fix memory leaks. + +Fri Nov 7 02:45:26 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: Get some default values from `default' + principal. + + * lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c: Add optional default entry to get some + values from. + +Thu Nov 6 00:20:41 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Remove generated destroy_*_error_table + prototype + + * kadmin/kadmind.c: Crude admin server. + + * kadmin/kadmin.c: Update to use remote protocol. + + * kadmin/get.c: Fix principal formatting. + + * lib/kadm5: Add client support. + + * lib/kadm5/error.c: Error code mapping. + + * lib/kadm5/server.c: Kadmind support function. + + * lib/kadm5/marshall.c: Kadm5 marshalling. + + * lib/kadm5/acl.c: Simple acl system. + + * lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h: Add client stuff. + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c: Initialize acl. + + * lib/kadm5/*: Return values. + + * lib/kadm5/create_s.c: Correct kvno. + +Wed Nov 5 22:06:50 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: Fix parsing of log destinations. + +Mon Nov 3 20:33:55 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Reduce number of reallocs in unparse_name. + +Sat Nov 1 01:40:53 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmin: Simple kadmin utility. + + * admin/ktutil.c: Print keytype. + + * lib/kadm5/get_s.c: Set correct n_key_data. + + * lib/kadm5/init_s.c: Add kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx. Use + master key. + + * lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c: Check for allocated context. + + * lib/kadm5/{create,chpass}_s.c: Use _kadm5_set_keys(). + +Sat Nov 1 00:21:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: test for readv, writev + +Wed Oct 29 23:41:26 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): handle the case of an illegal error + code + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (encode_reply): return success + +Wed Oct 29 18:01:59 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (find_etype) Return correct index of selected + etype. + +Wed Oct 29 04:07:06 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0k + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_init_context): support `KRB5_CONFIG' + environment variable + + * *: use the roken_get*-macros from roken.h for the benefit of + Crays. + + * configure.in: add --{enable,disable}-otp. check for compatible + prototypes for gethostbyname, gethostbyaddr, getservbyname, and + openlog (they have strange prototypes on Crays) + + * acinclude.m4: new macro `AC_PROTO_COMPAT' + +Tue Oct 28 00:11:22 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Log bad requests. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Move stuff that's in common between as_rep and + tgs_rep to separate functions. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fix user-to-user authentication. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Some restructuring of krb5_get_credentials: + - add a kdc-options argument to krb5_get_credentials, and rename + it to krb5_get_credentials_with_flags + - honour the KRB5_GC_CACHED, and KRB5_GC_USER_USER options + - add some more user-to-user glue + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Move parts of krb5_verify_ap_req into a new + function, krb5_decrypt_ticket, so it is easier to decrypt and + check a ticket without having an ap-req. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add KRB5_GC_CACHED, and KRB5_GC_USER_USER + flags. + + * lib/krb5/crc.c (crc_init_table): Check if table is already + inited. + +Sun Oct 26 04:51:02 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_length, fix_dce): Special-case + indefinite encoding. + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c (generate_units): Check for empty + member-list. + +Sat Oct 25 07:24:57 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Allow specifying table-base. + +Tue Oct 21 20:21:40 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check version number of krbtgt. + +Mon Oct 20 01:14:53 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c (krb5_prompter_posix): implement the + case of unhidden prompts. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c (string_to_key_internal): return error + instead of aborting. always free memory + + * admin/ktutil.c: add `help' command + + * admin/kdb_edit.c: implement new commands: add_random_key(ark), + change_password(cpw), change_random_key(crk) + +Thu Oct 16 05:16:36 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: change all the keys in the database + + * kdc: removed all unsealing, now done by the hdb layer + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: new functions `hdb_create', `hdb_set_master_key' + and `hdb_clear_master_key' + + * admin/misc.c: removed + +Wed Oct 15 22:47:31 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/klist.c: print year as YYYY iff verbose + +Wed Oct 15 20:02:13 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: print etype from ticket + +Mon Oct 13 17:18:57 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0j + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Get the subkey from mk_req so it can be + used to decrypt the reply from DCE secds. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Add {get,set}enctype. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Fix for DCE secd. + + * lib/krb5/store.c: Store keytype twice, as MIT does. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Use etype from reply. + +Fri Oct 10 00:39:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: check for leading '/' in http request + +Tue Sep 30 21:50:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0i + +Mon Sep 29 15:58:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req): redone because we don't know + the kvno or keytype before receiving the AP-REQ + + * lib/krb5/mk_safe.c (krb5_mk_safe): figure out what cksumtype to + use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): figure out what + cksumtype to use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): figure out what etype to use + from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_get_entry): check the keytype + + * lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c (krb5_get_forwarded_creds): figure out + what etype to use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c (krb5_generate_seq_number): + handle other key types than DES + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c (key_type): add `best_cksumtype' + (krb5_keytype_to_cksumtype): new function + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): figure out + what etype to use from the keytype. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): set `cksumtype' + and `enctype' to 0 + + * admin/extkeytab.c (ext_keytab): extract all keys + + * appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c: INET6_ADDRSTRLEN kludge + + * configure.in: check for . check for -linet6 + +Tue Sep 23 03:00:53 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: fix checksumtype for des3-cbc-sha1 + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: fix check for keyed and collision-proof + checksum + + * lib/krb5/context.c (valid_etype): remove hard-coded constants + (default_etypes): include DES3 + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: fix check for keyed and collision-proof + checksum + + * admin/util.c (init_des_key, set_password): DES3 keys also + + * lib/krb/send_to_kdc.c (krb5_sendto_kdc): no data returned means + no contact? + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: fix typo in `ipv6_anyaddr' + +Mon Sep 22 11:44:27 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Somewhat fix the etype usage. The list sent by + the client is used to select wich key to encrypt the kdc rep with + (in case of as-req), and with the server info to select the + session key type. The server key the ticket is encrypted is based + purely on the keys in the database. + + * kdc/string2key.c: Add keytype support. Default to version 5 + keys. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Fix a lot of etype/keytype misuse. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add des3-cbc-md5, and des3-cbc-sha1. Add + many *_to_* functions. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Add des3 string-to-key. Add ktype argument + to krb5_string_to_key(). + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: Some cleanup, and added: + - rsa-md5-des3 + - hmac-sha1-des3 + - keyed and collision proof flags to each checksum method + - checksum<->string functions. + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c: Use krb5_generate_random_keyblock. + +Sun Sep 21 15:19:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/connect.c: use new addr_families functions + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use new addr_families functions. Now works + over IPv6 + + * kuser/klist.c: use correct symbols for address families + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: add KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6 + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: use new addr_families functions. Now works + over IPv6 + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: use new addr_families functions + + * lib/krb5/addr_families.c: new file + + * acconfig.h: AC_SOCKADDR_IN6 -> AC_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6. Updated + uses. + + * acinclude.m4: new macro `AC_KRB_IPV6'. Use it. + +Sat Sep 13 23:04:23 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: Don't encrypt twice. Complain on non-convertable + principals. + +Sat Sep 13 00:59:36 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0h + + * appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c: AF_INET6 support + + * admin/misc.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/context.c: new configuration variable `max_retries' + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: fixes and better #ifdef's + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: implement krb5_config_get_int + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c, send_to_kdc.c, sock_principal.c: + AF_INET6 support + + * kuser/klist.c: support for printing IPv6-addresses + + * kdc/connect.c: support AF_INET6 + + * configure.in: test for gethostbyname2 and struct sockaddr_in6 + +Thu Sep 11 07:25:28 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Use `METHOD-DATA' instead of `SEQUENCE OF + PA-DATA' + +Wed Sep 10 21:20:17 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fixes for cross-realm, including (but not + limited to): + - allow client to be non-existant (should probably check for + "local realm") + - if server isn't found and it is a request for a krbtgt, try to + find a realm on the way to the requested realm + - update the transited encoding iff + client-realm != server-realm != tgt-realm + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Several fixes for cross-realm. + +Tue Sep 9 15:59:20 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/string2key.c: Fix password handling. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: krb5_key_to_string + +Tue Sep 9 07:46:05 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: rewrote. Now should be able to handle + aliases and IPv6 addresses + + * kuser/klist.c: try printing IPv6 addresses + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: increase the arbitrary limit from 1024 to 8192 + + * configure.in: check for + +Mon Sep 8 02:57:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * doc: fixes + + * admin/util.c (init_des_key): increase kvno + (set_password): return -1 if `des_read_pw_string' failed + + * admin/mod.c (doit2): check the return value from `set_password' + + * admin/ank.c (doit): don't add a new entry if `set_password' + failed + +Mon Sep 8 02:20:16 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c: fix ap_req_nofail semantics + + * lib/krb5/transited.c: something that might resemble + domain-x500-compress + +Mon Sep 8 01:24:42 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/hpropd.c (main): check number of arguments + + * appl/popper/pop_init.c (pop_init): check number of arguments + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kdc/string2key.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kuser/kdestroy.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kuser/kinit.c (main): check number of arguments + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c (main): use sigaction without SA_RESTART to + break out of select when a signal arrives + + * kdc/main.c (main): use sigaction without SA_RESTART to break out + of select when a signal arrives + + * kdc/kstash.c: default to HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key" + + * kdc/config.c (configure): add `--version'. Check the number of + arguments. Handle the case of there being no specification of port + numbers. + + * admin/util.c: seal and unseal key at appropriate places + + * admin/kdb_edit.c (main): parse arguments, config file and read + master key iff there's one. + + * admin/extkeytab.c (ext_keytab): unseal key while extracting + +Sun Sep 7 20:41:01 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/roken.h: include + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (set_salt_padata): new function + + * appl/telnet/telnetd/telnetd.c: Rename some variables that + conflict with cpp symbols on HP-UX 10.20 + + * change all calls of `gethostbyaddr' to cast argument 1 to `const + char *' + + * acconfig.h: only use SGTTY on nextstep + +Sun Sep 7 14:33:50 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check invalid flag. + +Fri Sep 5 14:19:38 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: Use get_init_creds/verify_init_creds. + + * lib/kafs: Move functions common to krb/krb5 modules to new file, + and make things more modular. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: rename STRING -> krb5_config_string, and LIST + -> krb5_config_list + +Thu Sep 4 23:39:43 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fix loopback test. + +Thu Sep 4 04:45:49 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/roken.h: fallback definition of `O_ACCMODE' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): be more careful when + checking for a v4 reply + +Wed Sep 3 18:20:14 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop.c: Add `--decrypt' and `--encrypt' flags. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: new {seal,unseal}_keys functions + + * kdc/{hprop,hpropd}.c: Add support to dump database to stdout. + + * kdc/hprop.c: Don't use same master key as version 4. + + * admin/util.c: Don't dump core if no `default' is found. + +Wed Sep 3 16:01:07 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Allow run time port specification. + + * kdc/config.c: Add flags for http support, and port + specifications. + +Tue Sep 2 02:00:03 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * include/bits.c: Don't generate ifndef's in bits.h. Instead, use + them when building the program. This makes it possible to include + bits.h without having defined all HAVE_INT17_T symbols. + + * configure.in: test for sigaction + + * doc: updated documentation. + +Tue Sep 2 00:20:31 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0g + +Mon Sep 1 17:42:14 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/data.c: don't return ENOMEM if len == 0 + +Sun Aug 31 17:15:49 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: Include salt type in salt. + + * kdc/hprop.h: Change port to 754. + + * kdc/hpropd.c: Verify who tries to transmit a database. + + * appl/popper: Use getarg and krb5_log. + + * lib/krb5/get_port.c: Add context parameter. Now takes port in + host byte order. + +Sat Aug 30 18:48:19 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Add timeout to select, and log about expired tcp + connections. + + * kdc/config.c: Add `database' option. + + * kdc/hpropd.c: Log about duplicate entries. + + * lib/hdb/{db,ndbm}.c: Use common routines. + + * lib/hdb/common.c: Implement more generic fetch/store/delete + functions. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: Add `replace' parameter to store. + + * kdc/connect.c: Set filedecriptor to -1 on allocated decriptor + entries. + +Fri Aug 29 03:13:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: extract_ticket -> _krb5_extract_ticket + + * aux/make-proto.pl: fix __P for stone age mode + +Fri Aug 29 02:45:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/45/mk_req.c: implementation of krb_mk_req that uses 524 + protocol + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: make change_password and + get_init_creds_common static + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Merge stuff from removed headerfiles. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: fcc_ops -> krb5_fcc_ops + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: mcc_ops -> krb5_mcc_ops + +Fri Aug 29 01:45:25 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Remove all prototypes. + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: Use `struct credentials' instead of + `CREDENTIALS'. + +Fri Aug 29 00:08:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen_glue.c: new file. generates 2int and int2 functions + and units for bit strings. + + * admin/util.c: flags2int, int2flags, and flag_units are now + generated by asn1_compile + + * lib/roken/parse_units.c: generalised `parse_units' and + `unparse_units' and added new functions `parse_flags' and + `unparse_flags' that use these + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: moved krb5_data* functions to krb5.h + + * admin/util.c: Use {un,}parse_flags for printing and parsing + hdbflags. + +Thu Aug 28 03:26:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: restructured + + * lib/krb5/warn.c (_warnerr): leak less memory + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c (hdb_free_entry): zero keys + (hdb_check_db_format): leak less memory + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c (NDBM_seq): check for valid hdb_entries implement + NDBM__get, NDBM__put + + * lib/hdb/db.c (DB_seq): check for valid hdb_entries + +Thu Aug 28 02:06:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Don't use sendto on connected sockets. + +Thu Aug 28 01:13:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.1, klist.1, kdestroy.1: new man pages + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.1, kpasswdd.8: new man pages + + * kdc/kstash.8, hprop.8, hpropd.8: new man pages + + * admin/ktutil.8, admin/kdb_edit.8: new man pages + + * admin/mod.c: new file + + * admin/life.c: renamed gettime and puttime to getlife and putlife + and moved them to life.c + + * admin/util.c: add print_flags, parse_flags, init_entry, + set_created_by, set_modified_by, edit_entry, set_password. Use + them. + + * admin/get.c: use print_flags + + * admin: removed unused stuff. use krb5_{warn,err}* + + * admin/ank.c: re-organized and abstracted. + + * admin/gettime.c: removed + +Thu Aug 28 00:37:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{get_cred,get_in_tkt}.c: Check for v4 reply. + + * lib/roken/base64.c: Add base64 functions. + + * kdc/connect.c lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Add http support. + +Wed Aug 27 00:29:20 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * include/Makefile.am: Don't make links to built files. + + * admin/kdb_edit.c: Add command to set the database path. + + * lib/hdb: Include version number in database. + +Tue Aug 26 20:14:54 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil: Merged v4 srvtab conversion. + +Mon Aug 25 23:02:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/roken.h: add F_OK + + * lib/gssapi/acquire_creds.c: fix typo + + * configure.in: call AC_TYPE_MODE_T + + * acinclude.m4: Add AC_TYPE_MODE_T + +Sun Aug 24 16:46:53 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0f + +Sun Aug 24 08:06:54 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/popper/pop_pass.c: log poppers + + * kdc/kaserver.c: some more checks + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: removed `-p' + + * kuser/kinit.c: removed `-p' + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (krb5_get_init_creds_password): If + KDC_ERR_PREUATH_REQUIRED, add preauthentication and try again. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): don't print out + krb-error text + + * lib/gssapi/import_name.c (input_name): more names types. + + * admin/load.c (parse_keys): handle the case of an empty salt + + * kdc/kaserver.c: fix up memory deallocation + + * kdc/kaserver.c: quick hack at talking kaserver protocol + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Make `db-fetch4' global + + * configure.in: add --enable-kaserver + + * kdc/rx.h, kdc/kerberos4.h: new header files + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: fix krb5_build_principal_ext & c:o + +Sun Aug 24 03:52:44 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/{get_in_tkt,mk_safe,mk_priv}.c: Fix some Cray specific + type conflicts. + + * lib/krb5/{get_cred,get_in_tkt}.c: Mask nonce to 32 bits. + + * lib/des/{md4,md5,sha}.c: Now works on Crays. + +Sat Aug 23 18:15:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c: If no cells or files specified, get + tokens for all local cells. Better test for files. + +Thu Aug 21 23:33:38 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/v1.c: new file with v1 compatibility functions. + +Thu Aug 21 20:36:13 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c: Don't check ticket file for afs ticket. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Check database when converting v4 principals. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Include kvno in Ticket. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Add kvno parameter to encrypt_EncryptedData. + + * kuser/klist.c: Print version number of ticket, include more + flags. + +Wed Aug 20 21:26:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c (get_cred): Check cached afs tickets for + expiration. + +Wed Aug 20 17:40:31 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c (krb5_recvauth): Send a KRB-ERROR iff + there's an error. + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c (krb5_sendauth): correct the protocol + documentation and process KRB-ERROR's + +Tue Aug 19 20:41:30 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Fix memory leak in v4 protocol handler. + +Mon Aug 18 05:15:09 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c: Added + `gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity' + +Sun Aug 17 01:40:20 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): don't + always pass server == NULL to krb5_rd_req. + + * lib/gssapi: new files: canonicalize_name.c export_name.c + context_time.c compare_name.c release_cred.c acquire_cred.c + inquire_cred.c, from Luke Howard + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Add netinfo support from Luke Howard + + + * lib/editline/sysunix.c: sgtty-support from Luke Howard + + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: krb5_sname_to_principal fix from Luke + Howard + +Sat Aug 16 00:44:47 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0e + +Sat Aug 16 00:23:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/afsutil/afslog.c: Use new libkafs. + + * lib/kafs/afskrb5.c: Get AFS tokens via 524 protocol. + + * lib/krb5/warn.c: Fix format string for *x type. + +Fri Aug 15 22:15:01 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * admin/get.c (get_entry): print more information about the entry + + * lib/des/Makefile.am: build destest, mdtest, des, rpw, speed + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: new functions `krb5_config_get_time' and + `krb5_config_vget_time'. Use them. + +Fri Aug 15 00:09:37 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/ktutil.c: Keytab manipulation program. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: Return sane values from resolve and + start_seq_get. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fix for old clients passing 0 for `no endtime'. + + * lib/45/get_ad_tkt.c: Kerberos 4 get_ad_tkt using + krb524_convert_creds_kdc. + + * lib/krb5/convert_creds.c: Implementation of + krb524_convert_creds_kdc. + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Make kdc-req-body.till OPTIONAL + + * kdc/524.c: A somewhat working 524-protocol module. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Add version 4 ticket encoding and encryption + functions. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Fix kdc_timeout. + + * lib/hdb/{ndbm,db}.c: Free name in close. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_check_autenticator): Return error code + +Thu Aug 14 21:29:03 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_make_reply): Fix endtime in reply. + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: Fix reallocation bug. + +Tue Aug 12 01:29:46 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c, appl/popper/pop_init.c: Use + `krb5_sock_to_principal'. Send server parameter to + krb5_rd_req/krb5_recvauth. Set addresses in auth_context. + + * lib/krb5/recvauth.c: Set addresses in auth_context if there + aren't any + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: New function + `krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd' + + * lib/krb5/sock_principal.c: new function + `krb5_sock_to_principal' + + * lib/krb5/time.c: new file with `krb5_timeofday' and + `krb5_us_timeofday'. Use these functions. + + * kuser/klist.c: print KDC offset iff verbose + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: implement KDC time offset and use it if + [libdefaults]kdc_timesync is set. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: Implement version 4 of the ccache format. + +Mon Aug 11 05:34:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c (krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part): free all memory + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_unparse_name): allocate memory + properly + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: Use `krb5_change_password' + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c (init_cred): set realm of server + correctly. + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: support changing of password when it + has expired + + * lib/krb5/changepw.c: new file + + * kuser/klist.c: use getarg + + * admin/init.c (init): add `kadmin/changepw' + +Mon Aug 11 04:30:47 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Make get_credentials handle cross-realm. + +Mon Aug 11 00:03:24 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: implement support for #-comments + +Sat Aug 9 02:21:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/hprop*.c: Add database propagation programs. + + * kdc/connect.c: Max request size. + +Sat Aug 9 00:47:28 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/otp: resurrected from krb4 + + * appl/push: new program for fetching mail with POP. + + * appl/popper/popper.h: new include files. new fields in `POP' + + * appl/popper/pop_pass.c: Implement both v4 and v5. + + * appl/popper/pop_init.c: Implement both v4 and v5. + + * appl/popper/pop_debug.c: use getarg. Talk both v4 and v5 + + * appl/popper: Popper from krb4. + + * configure.in: check for inline and generate + files in appl/popper, appl/push, and lib/otp + +Fri Aug 8 05:51:02 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: clean-up and try to free memory even when + there're errors + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: adapt to new `extract_ticket' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: reorganize. check everything and try to + return memory even if there are errors. + + * kuser/kverify.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_sname_to_principal): implement + different nametypes. Also free memory. + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c: more functionality + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c (krb5_mk_req_extended): free the checksum + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (extract_ticket): don't copy over the + principals in creds. Should also compare them with that received + from the KDC + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_gen_new): copy the newly allocated + krb5_ccache + (krb5_cc_destroy): call krb5_cc_close + (krb5_cc_retrieve_cred): delete the unused creds + +Fri Aug 8 02:30:40 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: Allow better control of destinations of logging + (like passing explicit destinations, and log-functions). + +Fri Aug 8 01:20:39 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c: new file + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: use krb5_log* + +Fri Aug 8 00:37:47 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Implement krb5_get_init_creds_keytab. + +Fri Aug 8 00:37:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: Use `krb5_get_default_principal'. + Print password expire information. + + * kdc/config.c: new variable `kdc_warn_pwexpire' + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: converted to getarg and get_init_creds + +Thu Aug 7 22:17:09 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/mcache.c: new file + + * admin/gettime.c: new function puttime. Use it. + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c: Added krb5_free_keyblock and + krb5_copy_keyblock + + * lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c: more functionality + + * lib/krb5/creds.c: Added krb5_free_creds_contents and + krb5_copy_creds. Changed callers. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: new functions krb5_config_get and + krb5_config_vget + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: cleanup added mcache + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: include last-req's of type 6 and 7, if + applicable + +Wed Aug 6 20:38:23 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: New parameter `log-level'. Default to `SYSLOG'. + +Tue Aug 5 22:53:54 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/verify_init.c, init_creds_pw.c, init_creds.c, + prompter_posix.c: the beginning of an implementation of the cygnus + initial-ticket API. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c: make `krb5_password_key_proc' global + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_cred): new function that is + almost krb5_get_in_tkt but doesn't write the creds to the ccache. + Small fixes in krb5_get_in_tkt + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c (krb5_get_all_client_addrs): don't include + loopback. + +Mon Aug 4 20:20:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc: Make context global. + +Fri Aug 1 17:23:56 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0d + + * lib/roken/flock.c: new file + + * kuser/kinit.c: check for and print expiry information in the + `kdc_rep' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Set `ret_as_reply' if != NULL + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check the valid times on client and server. + Check the password expiration. + Check the require_preauth flag. + Send an lr_type == 6 with pw_end. + Set key.expiration to min(valid_end, pw_end) + + * lib/hdb/hdb.asn1: new flags `require_preauth' and `change_pw' + + * admin/util.c, admin/load.c: handle the new flags. + +Fri Aug 1 16:56:12 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb: Add some simple locking. + +Sun Jul 27 04:44:31 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/log.c: Add some general logging functions. + + * kdc/kerberos4.c: Add version 4 protocol handler. The requrement + for this to work is that all involved principals has a des key in + the database, and that the client has a version 4 (un-)salted + key. Furthermore krb5_425_conv_principal has to do it's job, as + present it's not very clever. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Quick patch to make 425_conv work + somewhat. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: Add keytype->key and next key functions. + +Fri Jul 25 17:32:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): don't free + `cksum'. It's allocated and freed by the caller + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_kdc_cred): Don't free `addresses'. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): make sure we also have an defined + `client' to return as part of the KRB-ERROR + +Thu Jul 24 08:13:59 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Unseal keys from database before use. + + * kdc/misc.c: New functions set_master_key, unseal_key and + free_key. + + * lib/roken/getarg.c: Handle `-f arg' correctly. + +Thu Jul 24 01:54:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: implement `-l' aka `--lifetime' + + * lib/roken/parse_units.c, parse_time.c: new files + + * admin/gettime.c (gettime): use `parse_time' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): Use `METHOD-DATA' when sending + KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, not PA-DATA. + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: fix freeing bug use sequence numbers set + addresses in auth_context bind one socket per interface. + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: use sequence numbers + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_verify_ap_req): do abs when verifying + the timestamps + + * lib/krb5/rd_priv.c (krb5_rd_priv): Fetch the correct session key + from auth_context + + * lib/krb5/mk_priv.c (krb5_mk_priv): Fetch the correct session key + from auth_context + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c (krb5_mk_error): return an error number and + not a comerr'd number. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (krb5_get_in_tkt): interpret the error + number in KRB-ERROR correctly. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_kdc_cred): interpret the error + number in KRB-ERROR correctly. + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Add `METHOD-DATA' + + * removed some memory leaks. + +Wed Jul 23 07:53:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * Release 0.0c + + * lib/krb5/rd_cred.c, get_for_creds.c: new files + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: try default realm as last chance + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: updated to hdb changes + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c: Implement forwarding + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet: removed totally unused files + + * admin/ank.c: fix prompts and generation of random keys + +Wed Jul 23 04:02:32 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/dump.c: Include salt in dump. + + * admin: Mostly updated for new db-format. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Update to use new db format. Better checking of + flags and such. More logging. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: Use generated encode and decode functions. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: Get hdb_entry from ASN.1 generated code. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Get addresses from krbtgt if there are none + in the reply. + +Sun Jul 20 16:22:30 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kuser/kinit.c: break if des_read_pw_string() != 0 + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd.c: send a reply + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: restructured code. better report on + krb-error break if des_read_pw_string() != 0 + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check `require_enc_timestamp' malloc space for + starttime and renew_till + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_is): Send a + keyblock to krb5_verify_chekcsum + +Sun Jul 20 06:35:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0b + + * kpasswd/kpasswd.c: Avoid using non-standard struct names. + +Sat Jul 19 19:26:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_get_entry): check return from + `krb5_kt_start_seq_get'. From + +Sat Jul 19 04:07:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Update with more pa-data types from + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt + + * admin/load.c: Update to match current db-format. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (as_rep): Try all valid pa-datas before giving + up. Send back an empty pa-data if the client has the v4 flag set. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Pass both version5 and version4 salted + pa-data. DTRT if there is any pa-data in the reply. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: XOR with some sane value. + + * lib/hdb/hdb.h: Add `version 4 salted key' flag. + + * kuser/kinit.c: Ask for password before calling get_in_tkt. This + makes it possible to call key_proc more than once. + + * kdc/string2key.c: Add flags to output version 5 (DES only), + version 4, and AFS string-to-key of a password. + + * lib/asn1/gen_copy.c: copy_* functions now returns an int (0 or + ENOMEM). + +Fri Jul 18 02:54:58 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c (krb5_get_host_realm): do the + name2name thing + + * kdc/misc.c: check result of hdb_open + + * admin/kdb_edit: updated to new sl + + * lib/sl: sl_func now returns an int. != 0 means to exit. + + * kpasswd/kpasswdd: A crude (but somewhat working) implementation + of `draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-00.txt' + +Fri Jul 18 00:55:39 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/krenew.c: Crude ticket renewing program. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Rewritten flags parsing, it now might work to + get forwarded and renewed tickets. + + * kuser/kinit.c: Add `-r' flag. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Move most of contents of get_creds to new + function get_kdc_cred, that always contacts the kdc and doesn't + save in the cache. This is a hack. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Pass starttime and renew_till in request + (a bit kludgy). + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: Make an auth_context if none passed in. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Get timeout from context. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Add kdc_timeout to context struct. + +Thu Jul 17 20:35:45 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/klist.c: Print start time of ticket if available. + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: Return error if no realm was found. + +Thu Jul 17 20:28:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kpasswd: non-working kpasswd added + +Thu Jul 17 00:21:22 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * Release 0.0a + + * kdc/main.c: Add -p flag to disable pa-enc-timestamp requirement. + +Wed Jul 16 03:37:41 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep2): Free ticket and ap_req. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_free): Free remote + subkey. + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_free_principal): Check for NULL. + + * lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c: Check for NULL return from + gethostbyname. + + * lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c: Try to get realm of local host if + no default realm is available. + + * Remove non ASN.1 principal code. + +Wed Jul 16 03:17:30 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Split tgs_rep in smaller functions. Add better + error handing. Do some logging. + + * kdc/log.c: Some simple logging facilities. + + * kdc/misc.c (db_fetch): Take a krb5_principal. + + * kdc/connect.c: Pass address of request to as_rep and + tgs_rep. Send KRB-ERROR. + + * lib/krb5/mk_error.c: Add more fields. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Print normal error code if no e_text is + available. + +Wed Jul 16 03:07:50 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: implement `krb5_init_etype'. + Change encryption type of pa_enc_timestamp to DES-CBC-MD5 + + * lib/krb5/context.c: recognize all encryption types actually + implemented + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_init): Change default + encryption type to `DES_CBC_MD5' + + * lib/krb5/read_message.c, write_message.c: new files + +Tue Jul 15 17:14:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1: replaced asn1_locl.h by `der_locl.h' and `gen_locl.h'. + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: generate a prototype for the + `destroy_foo_error_table' function. + +Mon Jul 14 12:24:40 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c (krb5_get_krbhst): Get all kdc's and try also + with `kerberos.REALM' + + * kdc/kerberos5.c, lib/krb5/rd_priv.c, lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: use + `max_skew' + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_verify_ap_req): record authenticator + subkey + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): always + generate a subkey. + + * lib/krb5/address.c: implement `krb5_address_order' + + * lib/gssapi/import_name.c: Implement `gss_import_name' + + * lib/gssapi/external.c: Use new OID + + * lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c: New functions + `gssapi_krb5_encap_length' and `gssapi_krb5_make_header'. Changed + callers. + + * lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c: New function + `gssaspi_krb5_verify_header'. Changed callers. + + * lib/asn1/gen*.c: Give tags to generated structs. + Use `err' and `asprintf' + + * appl/test/gss_common.c: new file + + * appl/test/gssapi_server.c: removed all krb5 calls + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c: Add support for genering and + verifying checksums. Also start using session subkeys. + +Mon Jul 14 12:08:25 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c (krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock): Split up. + +Sun Jul 13 03:07:44 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c, mk_safe.c: made bug-compatible with MIT + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: new functions `DES_encrypt_null_ivec' and + `DES_encrypt_key_ivec' + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: implement rsa-md4-des and rsa-md5-des + + * kdc/kerberos5.c (tgs_rep): support keyed checksums + + * lib/krb5/creds.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: better freeing + + * lib/krb5/context.c (krb5_free_context): more freeing + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: New function `krb5_config_file_free' + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Generate a `destroy_' function. + + * kuser/kinit.c, klist.c: Don't leak memory. + +Sun Jul 13 02:46:27 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/connect.c: Check filedescriptor in select. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Remove most of the most common memory leaks. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Free allocated data. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_auth_con_free): Free a lot of + fields. + +Sun Jul 13 00:32:16 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet: Conditionalize the krb4-support. + + * configure.in: Test for krb4 + +Sat Jul 12 17:14:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: check if the pre-auth was decrypted properly. + set the `pre_authent' flag + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c, lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: generate a random nonce. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Made `generate_random_block' global. + + * appl/test: Added gssapi_client and gssapi_server. + + * lib/krb5/data.c: Add `krb5_data_zero' + + * appl/test/tcp_client.c: try `mk_safe' and `mk_priv' + + * appl/test/tcp_server.c: try `rd_safe' and `rd_priv' + +Sat Jul 12 16:45:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fix for systems that has sa_len, but + returns zero length from SIOCGIFCONF. + +Sat Jul 12 16:38:34 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/test: new programs + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: add address compare + + * lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c: allow no checksum + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_ret_string): 0-terminate string + + * lib/krb5/address.c: fix `krb5_address_compare' + +Sat Jul 12 15:03:16 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: Fix ip4 address extraction. + + * kuser/klist.c: Add verbose flag, and split main into smaller + pieces. + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: Save ticket flags. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (extract_ticket): Extract addresses and + flags. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add ticket_flags to krb5_creds. + +Sat Jul 12 13:12:48 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: Call `AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S' + + * acinclude.m4: Add `AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S' from krb4 + +Sat Jul 12 00:57:01 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Use union of krb5_flags and KDCOptions to + pass options. + +Fri Jul 11 15:04:22 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet: telnet & telnetd seems to be working. + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Added krb5_config_v?get_list Fixed + krb5_config_vget_next + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c: update to current API + +Thu Jul 10 14:54:39 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos5.c (kerberos5_status): call + `krb5_kuserok' + + * appl/telnet: Added. + +Thu Jul 10 05:09:25 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Remove usage of sub, gsub, and + functions for compatibility with awk. + + * include/bits.c: Must use signed char. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Move krb5_get_err_text, and krb5_init_ets + here. + + * lib/error/error.c: Replace krb5_get_err_text with new function + com_right. + + * lib/error/compile_et.awk: Avoid using static variables. + + * lib/error/error.c: Don't use krb5_locl.h + + * lib/error/error.h: Move definitions of error_table and + error_list from krb5.h. + + * lib/error: Moved from lib/krb5. + +Wed Jul 9 07:42:04 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Temporary hack to avoid des_rand_data. + +Wed Jul 9 06:58:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/{rd,mk}_{*}.c: more checking for addresses and stuff + according to pseudocode from 1510 + +Wed Jul 9 06:06:06 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/hdb.c: Add hdb_etype2key. + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Check authenticator. Use more general etype + functions. + +Wed Jul 9 03:51:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Made all `s_address' OPTIONAL according to + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-00.txt + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_parse_name): default to local realm + if none given + + * kuser/kinit.c: New option `-p' and prompt + +Wed Jul 9 02:30:06 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/keyblock.c: Keyblock generation functions. + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Use functions from checksum.c. + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: Move checksum functions here. Add + krb5_cksumsize function. + +Wed Jul 9 01:15:38 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c: implemented + + * lib/krb5/config_file.c: Redid part. New functions: + krb5_config_v?get_next + + * kuser/kdestroy.c: new program + + * kuser/kinit.c: new flag `-f' + + * lib/asn1/k5.asn1: Made HostAddresses = SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + + * acinclude.m4: Added AC_KRB_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: krb5_addresses == HostAddresses. Changed all + users. + + * lib/krb5/get_addrs.c: figure out all local addresses, possibly + even IPv6! + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: table-driven checksum + +Mon Jul 7 21:13:28 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Make krb5_decrypt use the same struct as + krb5_encrypt. + +Mon Jul 7 11:15:51 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/roken/vsyslog.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: add des-cbc-md4. + adjust krb5_encrypt and krb5_decrypt to reality + +Mon Jul 7 02:46:31 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: Implement as a vector of function pointers. + + * lib/krb5/{decrypt,encrypt}.c: Implement des-cbc-crc, and + des-cbc-md5 in separate functions. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add more checksum and encryption types. + + * lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h: Add etype to krb5_decrypt. + +Sun Jul 6 23:02:59 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/[gs]et_default_realm.c, kuserok.c: new files + + * lib/krb5/config_file.[ch]: new c-based configuration reading + stuff + +Wed Jul 2 23:12:56 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: Set WFLAGS if using gcc + +Wed Jul 2 17:47:03 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c (der_put_int): Return size correctly. + + * admin/ank.c: Be compatible with the asn1 principal format. + +Wed Jul 1 23:52:20 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1: Now all decode_* and encode_* functions now take a + final size_t* argument, that they return the size in. Return + values are zero for success, and anything else (such as some + ASN1_* constant) for error. + +Mon Jun 30 06:08:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c (krb5_kt_add_entry): change open mode to + O_WRONLY | O_APPEND + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: removed stale prototype for + `extract_ticket' and corrected call. + + * lib/asn1/gen_length.c (length_type): Make the length functions + for SequenceOf non-destructive + + * admin/ank.c (doit): Fix reading of `y/n'. + +Mon Jun 16 05:41:43 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi/wrap.c, unwrap.c: do encrypt and add sequence number + + * lib/gssapi/get_mic.c, verify_mic.c: Add sequence number. + + * lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): Set + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE. Verify 8003 checksum. + + * lib/gssapi/8003.c: New file. + + * lib/krb/krb5.h: Define a `krb_authenticator' as an ASN.1 + Authenticator. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: New functions + `krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber' and `krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber' + +Tue Jun 10 00:35:54 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5: Preapre for use of some asn1-types. + + * lib/asn1/*.c (copy_*): Constness. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Include asn1.h; krb5_data is now an + octet_string. + + * lib/asn1/der*,gen.c: krb5_data -> octet_string, char * -> + general_string + + * lib/asn1/libasn1.h: Moved stuff from asn1_locl.h that doesn't + have anything to do with asn1_compile. + + * lib/asn1/asn1_locl.h: Remove der.h. Add some prototypes. + +Sun Jun 8 03:51:55 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kerberos5.c: Fix PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + * kdc/connect.c(process_request): Set `new' + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Do PA-ENC-TS-ENC the correct way. + + * lib: Added editline,sl,roken. + +Mon Jun 2 00:37:48 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/fcache.c: Move file cache from cache.c. + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: Allow more than one cache type. + +Sun Jun 1 23:45:33 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * admin/extkeytab.c: Merged with kdb_edit. + +Sun Jun 1 23:23:08 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * kdc/kdc.c: more support for ENC-TS-ENC + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: redone to enable pre-authentication + +Sun Jun 1 22:45:11 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/db.c: Merge fetch and store. + + * admin: Merge to one program. + + * lib/krb5/str2key.c: Fill in keytype and length. + +Sun Jun 1 16:31:23 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c, lib/krb5/rd_priv.c, lib/krb5/mk_rep.c, + lib/krb5/mk_priv.c, lib/krb5/build_auth.c: Some support for + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (get_in_tkt): be prepared to parse an + KRB_ERROR. Some support for PA_ENC_TS_ENC. + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: implemented seq_number functions + + * lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c, generate_seq_number.c: new files + + * lib/gssapi/gssapi.h: avoid including + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: SUFFIXES as a variable to make automake + happy + + * kdc/kdc.c: preliminary PREAUTH_ENC_TIMESTAMP + + * configure.in: adapted to automake 1.1p + +Mon May 26 22:26:21 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/principal.c: Add contexts to many functions. + +Thu May 15 20:25:37 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/verify_user.c: First stab at a verify user. + + * lib/auth/sia/sia5.c: SIA module for Kerberos 5. + +Mon Apr 14 00:09:03 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/gssapi: Enough of a gssapi-over-krb5 implementation to be + able to (mostly) run gss-client and gss-server. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: implemented krb5_kt_add_entry, + krb5_kt_store_principal, krb5_kt_store_keyblock + + * lib/des/md5.[ch], sha.[ch]: new files + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (generalizedtime2time): use `timegm' + + * lib/asn1/timegm.c: new file + + * admin/extkeytab.c: new program + + * admin/admin_locl.h: new file + + * admin/Makefile.am: Added extkeytab + + * configure.in: moved config to include + removed timezone garbage + added lib/gssapi and admin + + * Makefile.am: Added admin + +Mon Mar 17 11:34:05 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc.c: Use new copying functions, and free some data. + + * lib/asn1/Makefile.am: Try to not always rebuild generated files. + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: Add fix_dce(). + + * lib/asn1/der_{get,length,put}.c: Fix include files. + + * lib/asn1/der_free.c: Remove unused functions. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Split into gen_encode, gen_decode, gen_free, + gen_length, and gen_copy. + +Sun Mar 16 18:13:52 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/sendauth.c: implemented functionality + + * lib/krb5/rd_rep.c: Use `krb5_decrypt' + + * lib/krb5/cache.c (krb5_cc_get_name): return default if `id' == + NULL + + * lib/krb5/principal.c (krb5_free_principal): added `context' + argument. Changed all callers. + + (krb5_sname_to_principal): new function + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c (krb5_free_authenticator): add `context' + argument. Changed all callers + + * lib/krb5/{net_write.c,net_read.c,recvauth.c}: new files + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Fix encoding and decoding of BitStrings + +Fri Mar 14 11:29:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * configure.in: look for *dbm? + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Fix filename in generated files. Check fopens. + Put trailing newline in asn1_files. + +Fri Mar 14 05:06:44 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Fix some memory leaks. + + * lib/krb5/krbhst.c: Properly free hostlist. + + * lib/krb5/decrypt.c: CRCs are 32 bits. + +Fri Mar 14 04:39:15 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Generate one file for each type. + +Fri Mar 14 04:13:47 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Generate `length_FOO' functions + + * lib/asn1/der_length.c: new file + + * kuser/klist.c: renamed stime -> printable_time to avoid conflict + on HP/UX + +Fri Mar 14 03:37:23 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/hdb/ndbm.c: Return NOENTRY if fetch fails. Don't free + datums. Don't add .db to filename. + +Fri Mar 14 02:49:51 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/dump.c: Database dump program. + + * kdc/ank.c: Trivial database editing program. + + * kdc/{kdc.c, load.c}: Use libhdb. + + * lib/hdb: New database routine library. + + * lib/krb5/error/Makefile.am: Add hdb_err. + +Wed Mar 12 17:41:14 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * kdc/kdc.c: Rewritten AS, and somewhat more working TGS support. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: Generate free functions. + + * Some specific free functions. + +Wed Mar 12 12:30:13 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/krb5_mk_req_ext.c: new file + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: optimize the case with a simple type + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_credentials): Use + `mk_req_extended' and remove old code. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c (decrypt_tkt): First try with an + EncASRepPart, then with an EncTGSRepPart. + +Wed Mar 12 08:26:04 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/store_emem.c: New resizable memory storage. + + * lib/krb5/{store.c, store_fd.c, store_mem.c}: Split of store.c + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add free entry to krb5_storage. + + * lib/krb5/decrypt.c: Make keyblock const. + +Tue Mar 11 20:22:17 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Add EncTicketPart to krb5_ticket. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Return whole asn.1 ticket in + krb5_ticket->tkt. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: TGS -> AS + + * kuser/kfoo.c: Print error string rather than number. + + * kdc/kdc.c: Some kind of non-working TGS support. + +Mon Mar 10 01:43:22 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: reduced generated code by 1/5 + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: (der_put_length_and_tag): new function + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_match_tag_and_length): new function + + * lib/asn1/der.h: added prototypes + +Mon Mar 10 01:15:43 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Include . Add prototype for + krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock. + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: Add function krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock that + takes a precomputed keyblock. + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: Use krb5_mk_req rather than inlined code. + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c: Calculate checksum of in_data. + +Sun Mar 9 21:17:58 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/error/compile_et.awk: Add a declaration of struct + error_list, and multiple inclusion block to header files. + +Sun Mar 9 21:01:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_req.c: do some checks on times + + * lib/krb/{mk_priv.c, rd_priv.c, sendauth.c, decrypt.c, + address.c}: new files + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: more code + + * configure.in: try to figure out timezone + +Sat Mar 8 11:41:07 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/error/error.c: Try strerror if error code wasn't found. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Remove realm parameter from + krb5_get_salt. + + * lib/krb5/context.c: Initialize error table. + + * kdc: The beginnings of a kdc. + +Sat Mar 8 08:16:28 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/rd_safe.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c (krb5_verify_checksum): New function + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c: use krb5_create_checksum + + * lib/krb5/checksum.c: new file + + * lib/krb5/store.c: no more arithmetic with void* + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: now seems to work again + +Sat Mar 8 06:58:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: Add asn1_glue.c and error/*.c to libkrb5. + + * lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c: Moved some functions to asn1_glue.c. + + * lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c: Moved some asn1-stuff here. + + * lib/krb5/{cache,keytab}.c: Use new storage functions. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Protypes for new storage functions. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Make krb5_{ret,store}_* functions able to write + data to more than file descriptors. + +Sat Mar 8 01:01:17 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/encrypt.c: New file. + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: More -I + + * configure.in: Test for big endian, random, rand, setitimer + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: perhaps even decodes bitstrings + +Thu Mar 6 19:05:29 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/config_file.y: Better return values on error. + +Sat Feb 8 15:59:56 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/asn1/parse.y: ifdef HAVE_STRDUP + + * lib/asn1/lex.l: ifdef strdup + brange-dead version of list of special characters to make stupid + lex accept it. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: A DER integer should really be a `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/der_put.c: A DER integer should really be a `unsigned' + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c: A DER integer should really be a `unsigned' + + * lib/krb5/error/Makefile.am: It seems "$(SHELL) ./compile_et" is + needed. + + * lib/krb/mk_rep.c, lib/krb/rd_req.c, lib/krb/store.c, + lib/krb/store.h: new files. + + * lib/krb5/keytab.c: now even with some functionality. + + * lib/asn1/gen.c: changed paramater from void * to Foo * + + * lib/asn1/der_get.c (der_get_octet_string): Fixed bug with empty + string. + +Sun Jan 19 06:17:39 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/get_cred.c (krb5_get_credentials): Check for creds in + cc before getting new ones. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h (krb5_free_keyblock): Fix prototype. + + * lib/krb5/build_auth.c (krb5_build_authenticator): It seems the + CRC should be stored LSW first. (?) + + * lib/krb5/auth_context.c: Implement `krb5_auth_con_getkey' and + `krb5_free_keyblock' + + * lib/**/Makefile.am: Rename foo libfoo.a + + * include/Makefile.in: Use test instead of [ + -e does not work with /bin/sh on psoriasis + + * configure.in: Search for awk + create lib/krb/error/compile_et + +Tue Jan 14 03:46:26 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * lib/krb5/Makefile.am: replaced mit-crc.c by crc.c + +Wed Dec 18 00:53:55 1996 Johan Danielsson + + * kuser/kinit.c: Guess principal. + + * lib/krb5/error/compile_et.awk: Don't include krb5.h. Fix some + warnings. + + * lib/krb5/error/asn1_err.et: Add ASN.1 error messages. + + * lib/krb5/mk_req.c: Get client from cache. + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: Add better error checking some useful return + values. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Fix krb5_auth_context. + + * lib/asn1/der.h: Make krb5_data compatible with krb5.h + +Tue Dec 17 01:32:36 1996 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/error: Add primitive error library. + +Mon Dec 16 16:30:20 1996 Johan Danielsson + + * lib/krb5/cache.c: Get correct address type from cache. + + * lib/krb5/krb5.h: Change int16 to int to be compatible with asn1. + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..919d69c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.14 1999/08/12 02:21:43 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = include lib kuser kdc admin kadmin kpasswd appl doc + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ -I cf + +EXTRA_DIST = Makefile.am.common krb5.conf diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am.common b/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am.common new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8452bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.am.common @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + +SUFFIXES += .x + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28684cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,645 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.14 1999/08/12 02:21:43 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ 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\ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/NEWS b/crypto/heimdal/NEWS new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4a9a7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/NEWS @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +Changes in release 0.2m: + + * handle glibc's getaddrinfo() that returns several ai_canonname + + * new endian test + + * man pages fixes + +Changes in release 0.2l: + + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2k: + + * better IPv6 test + + * make struct sockaddr_storage in roken work better on alphas + + * some missing [hn]to[hn]s fixed. + + * allow users to change their own passwords with kadmin (with initial + tickets) + + * fix stupid bug in parsing KDC specification + + * add `ktutil change' and `ktutil purge' + +Changes in release 0.2j: + + * builds on Irix + + * ftpd works in passive mode + + * should build on cygwin + + * work around broken IPv6-code on OpenBSD 2.6, also add configure + option --disable-ipv6 + +Changes in release 0.2i: + + * use getaddrinfo in the missing places. + + * fix SRV lookup for admin server + + * use get{addr,name}info everywhere. and implement it in terms of + getipnodeby{name,addr} (which uses gethostbyname{,2} and + gethostbyaddr) + +Changes in release 0.2h: + + * fix typo in kx (now compiles) + +Changes in release 0.2g: + + * lots of bug fixes: + * push works + * repair appl/test programs + * sockaddr_storage works on solaris (alignment issues) + * works better with non-roken getaddrinfo + * rsh works + * some non standard C constructs removed + +Changes in release 0.2f: + + * support SRV records for kpasswd + * look for both _kerberos and krb5-realm when doing host -> realm mapping + +Changes in release 0.2e: + + * changed copyright notices to remove `advertising'-clause. + * get{addr,name}info added to roken and used in the other code + (this makes things work much better with hosts with both v4 and v6 + addresses, among other things) + * do pre-auth for both password and key-based get_in_tkt + * support for having several databases + * new command `del_enctype' in kadmin + * strptime (and new strftime) add to roken + * more paranoia about finding libdb + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2d: + + * new configuration option [libdefaults]default_etypes_des + * internal ls in ftpd builds without KRB4 + * kx/rsh/push/pop_debug tries v5 and v4 consistenly + * build bug fixes + * other bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.2c: + + * bug fixes (see ChangeLog's for details) + +Changes in release 0.2b: + + * bug fixes + * actually bump shared library versions + +Changes in release 0.2a: + + * a new program verify_krb5_conf for checking your /etc/krb5.conf + * add 3DES keys when changing password + * support null keys in database + * support multiple local realms + * implement a keytab backend for AFS KeyFile's + * implement a keytab backend for v4 srvtabs + * implement `ktutil copy' + * support password quality control in v4 kadmind + * improvements in v4 compat kadmind + * handle the case of having the correct cred in the ccache but with + the wrong encryption type better + * v6-ify the remaining programs. + * internal ls in ftpd + * rename strcpy_truncate/strcat_truncate to strlcpy/strlcat + * add `ank --random-password' and `cpw --random-password' in kadmin + * some programs and documentation for trying to talk to a W2K KDC + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1m: + + * support for getting default from krb5.conf for kinit/kf/rsh/telnet. + From Miroslav Ruda + * v6-ify hprop and hpropd + * support numeric addresses in krb5_mk_req + * shadow support in login and su. From Miroslav Ruda + * make rsh/rshd IPv6-aware + * make the gssapi sample applications better at reporting errors + * lots of bug fixes + * handle systems with v6-aware libc and non-v6 kernels (like Linux + with glibc 2.1) better + * hide failure of ERPT in ftp + * lots of bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1l: + + * make ftp and ftpd IPv6-aware + * add inet_pton to roken + * more IPv6-awareness + * make mini_inetd v6 aware + +Changes in release 0.1k: + + * bump shared libraries versions + * add roken version of inet_ntop + * merge more changes to rshd + +Changes in release 0.1j: + + * restore back to the `old' 3DES code. This was supposed to be done + in 0.1h and 0.1i but I did a CVS screw-up. + * make telnetd handle v6 connections + +Changes in release 0.1i: + + * start using `struct sockaddr_storage' which simplifies the code + (with a fallback definition if it's not defined) + * bug fixes (including in hprop and kf) + * don't use mawk which seems to mishandle roken.awk + * get_addrs should be able to handle v6 addresses on Linux (with the + required patch to the Linux kernel -- ask within) + * rshd builds with shadow passwords + +Changes in release 0.1h: + + * kf: new program for forwarding credentials + * portability fixes + * make forwarding credentials work with MIT code + * better conversion of ka database + * add etc/services.append + * correct `modified by' from kpasswdd + * lots of bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1g: + + * kgetcred: new program for explicitly obtaining tickets + * configure fixes + * krb5-aware kx + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1f; + + * experimental support for v4 kadmin protokoll in kadmind + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1e: + + * try to handle old DCE and MIT kdcs + * support for older versions of credential cache files and keytabs + * postdated tickets work + * support for password quality checks in kpasswdd + * new flag --enable-kaserver for kdc + * renew fixes + * prototype su program + * updated (some) manpages + * support for KDC resource records + * should build with --without-krb4 + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1d: + + * Support building with DB2 (uses 1.85-compat API) + * Support krb5-realm.DOMAIN in DNS + * new `ktutil srvcreate' + * v4/kafs support in klist/kdestroy + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1c: + + * fix ASN.1 encoding of signed integers + * somewhat working `ktutil get' + * some documentation updates + * update to Autoconf 2.13 and Automake 1.4 + * the usual bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1b: + + * some old -> new crypto conversion utils + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.1a: + + * new crypto code + * more bug fixes + * make sure we ask for DES keys in gssapi + * support signed ints in ASN1 + * IPv6-bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0u: + + * lots of bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0t: + + * more robust parsing of krb5.conf + * include net{read,write} in lib/roken + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0s: + + * kludges for parsing options to rsh + * more robust parsing of krb5.conf + * removed some arbitrary limits + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0r: + + * default options for some programs + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0q: + + * support for building shared libraries with libtool + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0p: + + * keytab moved to /etc/krb5.keytab + * avoid false detection of IPv6 on Linux + * Lots of more functionality in the gssapi-library + * hprop can now read ka-server databases + * bug fixes + +Changes in release 0.0o: + + * FTP with GSSAPI support. + * Bug fixes. + +Changes in release 0.0n: + + * Incremental database propagation. + * Somewhat improved kadmin ui; the stuff in admin is now removed. + * Some support for using enctypes instead of keytypes. + * Lots of other improvement and bug fixes, see ChangeLog for details. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/TODO b/crypto/heimdal/TODO new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95d5caa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +-*- indented-text -*- + +$Id: TODO,v 1.39 1999/12/05 01:08:19 assar Exp $ + +* configure + +use more careful checking before starting to use berkeley db. it only +makes sense to do so if we have the appropriate library and the header +file. + +* appl + +more programs here + +** appl/login + +/etc/environment etc. + +** appl/popper + +Implement RFC1731 and 1734, pop over GSS-API + +** appl/test + +should test more stuff + +** appl/rsh + +add rcp program + +** appl/ftp + +* doc + +there's some room for improvement here. + +* kdc + +* kadmin + +is in need of a major cleanup + +* lib + +** lib/asn1 + +prepend a prefix on all generated symbols + +make asn1_compile use enum types where applicable + +** lib/auth + +PAM + +** lib/des + +** lib/gssapi + +process_context_token, display_status, add_cred, inquire_cred_by_mech, +export_sec_context, import_sec_context, inquire_names_for_mech, and +inquire_mechs_for_name not implemented. + +only DES MAC MD5 and DES implemented. + +set minor_status in all functions + +init_sec_context: `initiator_cred_handle' and `time_req' ignored. + +input channel bindings are not supported + +delegation not implemented + +anonymous credentials not implemented + +** lib/hdb + +** lib/kadm5 + +add policies? + +fix to use rpc? + +** lib/krb5 + +the replay cache is, in its current state, not very useful + +the following encryption types have been implemented: DES-CBC-CRC, +DES-CBC-MD4, DES-CBC-MD5, DES3-CBC-MD5, DES3-CBC-SHA1 + +supports the following checksums: CRC32, RSA-MD4, RSA-MD5, +RSA-MD4-DES, RSA-MD5-DES, RSA-MD5-DES3, SHA1, HMAC-SHA1-DES3 + +always generates a new subkey in an authenticator + +should the sequence numbers be XORed? + +fix pre-authentication with pa-afs3-salt + +OTP? + +** lib/roken + +** lib/sl diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/acconfig.h b/crypto/heimdal/acconfig.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c94b363 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/acconfig.h @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +@BOTTOM@ + +#undef BINDIR +#undef LIBDIR +#undef LIBEXECDIR +#undef SBINDIR + +#undef HAVE_INT8_T +#undef HAVE_INT16_T +#undef HAVE_INT32_T +#undef HAVE_INT64_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT8_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT16_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT32_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T + +#if defined(HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT) || !defined(KRB4) +#define KRB_PUT_INT(F, T, L, S) krb_put_int((F), (T), (L), (S)) +#else +#define KRB_PUT_INT(F, T, L, S) krb_put_int((F), (T), (S)) +#endif + +#ifdef BROKEN_REALLOC +#define realloc(X, Y) isoc_realloc((X), (Y)) +#define isoc_realloc(X, Y) ((X) ? realloc((X), (Y)) : malloc(Y)) +#endif + +#ifdef VOID_RETSIGTYPE +#define SIGRETURN(x) return +#else +#define SIGRETURN(x) return (RETSIGTYPE)(x) +#endif + +#define RCSID(msg) \ +static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg } + +#undef PROTOTYPES + +/* Maximum values on all known systems */ +#define MaxHostNameLen (64+4) +#define MaxPathLen (1024+4) + +#if defined(HAVE_SGTTY_H) && defined(__NeXT__) +#define SGTTY +#endif + +/* + * Define NDBM if you are using the 4.3 ndbm library (which is part of + * libc). If not defined, 4.2 dbm will be assumed. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_DBM_FIRSTKEY) +#define NDBM +#endif + +/* telnet stuff ----------------------------------------------- */ + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) && !defined(AUTHENTICATION) +#define AUTHENTICATION 1 +#endif + +/* Set this to the default system lead string for telnetd + * can contain %-escapes: %s=sysname, %m=machine, %r=os-release + * %v=os-version, %t=tty, %h=hostname, %d=date and time + */ +#undef USE_IM + +/* Used with login -p */ +#undef LOGIN_ARGS + +/* set this to a sensible login */ +#ifndef LOGIN_PATH +#define LOGIN_PATH BINDIR "/login" +#endif + +/* random defines */ + +/* + * Defining this enables lots of useful (and used) extensions on + * glibc-based systems such as Linux + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +/* + * this assumes that KRB_C_BIGENDIAN is used. + * if we can find out endianess at compile-time, do so, + * otherwise WORDS_BIGENDIAN should already have been defined + */ + +#if ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H +# include +# include +# if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN +# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 +# endif +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/acinclude.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/acinclude.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff87042 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/acinclude.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl $Id: acinclude.m4,v 1.15 1998/05/23 14:54:53 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Only put things that for some reason can't live in the `cf' +dnl directory in this file. +dnl + +dnl $xId: misc.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:04 joda Exp $ +dnl +define(upcase,`echo $1 | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`)dnl diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/aclocal.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/aclocal.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d1c0a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/aclocal.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,1615 @@ +dnl aclocal.m4 generated automatically by aclocal 1.4 + +dnl Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +dnl This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation +dnl gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +dnl with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +dnl This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +dnl but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +dnl even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +dnl PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +dnl $Id: acinclude.m4,v 1.15 1998/05/23 14:54:53 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Only put things that for some reason can't live in the `cf' +dnl directory in this file. +dnl + +dnl $xId: misc.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:04 joda Exp $ +dnl +define(upcase,`echo $1 | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`)dnl + +# Like AC_CONFIG_HEADER, but automatically create stamp file. + +AC_DEFUN(AM_CONFIG_HEADER, +[AC_PREREQ([2.12]) +AC_CONFIG_HEADER([$1]) +dnl When config.status generates a header, we must update the stamp-h file. +dnl This file resides in the same directory as the config header +dnl that is generated. We must strip everything past the first ":", +dnl and everything past the last "/". +AC_OUTPUT_COMMANDS(changequote(<<,>>)dnl +ifelse(patsubst(<<$1>>, <<[^ ]>>, <<>>), <<>>, +<>CONFIG_HEADERS" || echo timestamp > patsubst(<<$1>>, <<^\([^:]*/\)?.*>>, <<\1>>)stamp-h<<>>dnl>>, +<>; do + case " <<$>>CONFIG_HEADERS " in + *" <<$>>am_file "*<<)>> + echo timestamp > `echo <<$>>am_file | sed -e 's%:.*%%' -e 's%[^/]*$%%'`stamp-h$am_indx + ;; + esac + am_indx=`expr "<<$>>am_indx" + 1` +done<<>>dnl>>) +changequote([,]))]) + +# Do all the work for Automake. This macro actually does too much -- +# some checks are only needed if your package does certain things. +# But this isn't really a big deal. + +# serial 1 + +dnl Usage: +dnl AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(package,version, [no-define]) + +AC_DEFUN(AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE, +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_INSTALL]) +PACKAGE=[$1] +AC_SUBST(PACKAGE) +VERSION=[$2] +AC_SUBST(VERSION) +dnl test to see if srcdir already configured +if test "`cd $srcdir && pwd`" != "`pwd`" && test -f $srcdir/config.status; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([source directory already configured; run "make distclean" there first]) +fi +ifelse([$3],, +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PACKAGE, "$PACKAGE", [Name of package]) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(VERSION, "$VERSION", [Version number of package])) +AC_REQUIRE([AM_SANITY_CHECK]) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_ARG_PROGRAM]) +dnl FIXME This is truly gross. +missing_dir=`cd $ac_aux_dir && pwd` +AM_MISSING_PROG(ACLOCAL, aclocal, $missing_dir) +AM_MISSING_PROG(AUTOCONF, autoconf, $missing_dir) +AM_MISSING_PROG(AUTOMAKE, automake, $missing_dir) +AM_MISSING_PROG(AUTOHEADER, autoheader, $missing_dir) +AM_MISSING_PROG(MAKEINFO, makeinfo, $missing_dir) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_MAKE_SET])]) + +# +# Check to make sure that the build environment is sane. +# + +AC_DEFUN(AM_SANITY_CHECK, +[AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether build environment is sane]) +# Just in case +sleep 1 +echo timestamp > conftestfile +# Do `set' in a subshell so we don't clobber the current shell's +# arguments. Must try -L first in case configure is actually a +# symlink; some systems play weird games with the mod time of symlinks +# (eg FreeBSD returns the mod time of the symlink's containing +# directory). +if ( + set X `ls -Lt $srcdir/configure conftestfile 2> /dev/null` + if test "[$]*" = "X"; then + # -L didn't work. + set X `ls -t $srcdir/configure conftestfile` + fi + if test "[$]*" != "X $srcdir/configure conftestfile" \ + && test "[$]*" != "X conftestfile $srcdir/configure"; then + + # If neither matched, then we have a broken ls. This can happen + # if, for instance, CONFIG_SHELL is bash and it inherits a + # broken ls alias from the environment. This has actually + # happened. Such a system could not be considered "sane". + AC_MSG_ERROR([ls -t appears to fail. Make sure there is not a broken +alias in your environment]) + fi + + test "[$]2" = conftestfile + ) +then + # Ok. + : +else + AC_MSG_ERROR([newly created file is older than distributed files! +Check your system clock]) +fi +rm -f conftest* +AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)]) + +dnl AM_MISSING_PROG(NAME, PROGRAM, DIRECTORY) +dnl The program must properly implement --version. +AC_DEFUN(AM_MISSING_PROG, +[AC_MSG_CHECKING(for working $2) +# Run test in a subshell; some versions of sh will print an error if +# an executable is not found, even if stderr is redirected. +# Redirect stdin to placate older versions of autoconf. Sigh. +if ($2 --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + $1=$2 + AC_MSG_RESULT(found) +else + $1="$3/missing $2" + AC_MSG_RESULT(missing) +fi +AC_SUBST($1)]) + + +dnl AM_PROG_LEX +dnl Look for flex, lex or missing, then run AC_PROG_LEX and AC_DECL_YYTEXT +AC_DEFUN(AM_PROG_LEX, +[missing_dir=ifelse([$1],,`cd $ac_aux_dir && pwd`,$1) +AC_CHECK_PROGS(LEX, flex lex, "$missing_dir/missing flex") +AC_PROG_LEX +AC_DECL_YYTEXT]) + +dnl $Id: krb-prog-ln-s.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:01 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Better test for ln -s, ln or cp +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S, +[AC_MSG_CHECKING(for ln -s or something else) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_prog_LN_S, +[rm -f conftestdata +if ln -s X conftestdata 2>/dev/null +then + rm -f conftestdata + ac_cv_prog_LN_S="ln -s" +else + touch conftestdata1 + if ln conftestdata1 conftestdata2; then + rm -f conftestdata* + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=ln + else + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=cp + fi +fi])dnl +LN_S="$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_prog_LN_S) +AC_SUBST(LN_S)dnl +]) + + +dnl $Id: mips-abi.m4,v 1.4 1998/05/16 20:44:15 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check for MIPS/IRIX ABI flags. Sets $abi and $abilibdirext to some +dnl value. + +AC_DEFUN(AC_MIPS_ABI, [ +AC_ARG_WITH(mips_abi, +[ --with-mips-abi=abi ABI to use for IRIX (32, n32, or 64)]) + +case "$host_os" in +irix*) +with_mips_abi="${with_mips_abi:-yes}" +if test -n "$GCC"; then + +# GCC < 2.8 only supports the O32 ABI. GCC >= 2.8 has a flag to select +# which ABI to use, but only supports (as of 2.8.1) the N32 and 64 ABIs. +# +# Default to N32, but if GCC doesn't grok -mabi=n32, we assume an old +# GCC and revert back to O32. The same goes if O32 is asked for - old +# GCCs doesn't like the -mabi option, and new GCCs can't output O32. +# +# Don't you just love *all* the different SGI ABIs? + +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-mabi=32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-mabi=n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-mabi=64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) AC_ERROR("Invalid ABI specified") ;; +esac +if test -n "$abi" ; then +ac_foo=krb_cv_gcc_`echo $abi | tr =- __` +dnl +dnl can't use AC_CACHE_CHECK here, since it doesn't quote CACHE-ID to +dnl AC_MSG_RESULT +dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports the $abi option]) +AC_CACHE_VAL($ac_foo, [ +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $abi" +AC_TRY_COMPILE(,int x;, eval $ac_foo=yes, eval $ac_foo=no) +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +]) +ac_res=`eval echo \\\$$ac_foo` +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) +if test $ac_res = no; then +# Try to figure out why that failed... +case $abi in + -mabi=32) + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -mabi=n32" + AC_TRY_COMPILE(,int x;, ac_res=yes, ac_res=no) + CLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + if test $ac_res = yes; then + # New GCC + AC_ERROR([$CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI]) + fi + # Old GCC + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + ;; + -mabi=n32|-mabi=64) + if test $with_mips_abi = yes; then + # Old GCC, default to O32 + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + else + # Some broken GCC + AC_ERROR([$CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI]) + fi + ;; +esac +fi #if test $ac_res = no; then +fi #if test -n "$abi" ; then +else +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) AC_ERROR("Invalid ABI specified") ;; +esac +fi #if test -n "$GCC"; then +;; +esac +]) + +dnl +dnl $Id: c-attribute.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test for __attribute__ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_C___ATTRIBUTE__, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for __attribute__) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv___attribute__, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +], +[ +static void foo(void) __attribute__ ((noreturn)); + +static void +foo(void) +{ + exit(1); +} +], +ac_cv___attribute__=yes, +ac_cv___attribute__=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv___attribute__" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__, 1, [define if your compiler has __attribute__]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv___attribute__) +]) + + + +# serial 25 AM_PROG_LIBTOOL +AC_DEFUN(AM_PROG_LIBTOOL, +[AC_REQUIRE([AM_ENABLE_SHARED])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AM_ENABLE_STATIC])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_CANONICAL_HOST])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_RANLIB])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AM_PROG_LD])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AM_PROG_NM])dnl +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_LN_S])dnl +dnl +# Always use our own libtool. +LIBTOOL='$(top_builddir)/libtool' +AC_SUBST(LIBTOOL)dnl + +# Check for any special flags to pass to ltconfig. +libtool_flags= +test "$enable_shared" = no && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --disable-shared" +test "$enable_static" = no && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --disable-static" +test "$silent" = yes && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --silent" +test "$ac_cv_prog_gcc" = yes && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --with-gcc" +test "$ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld" = yes && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --with-gnu-ld" + +# Some flags need to be propagated to the compiler or linker for good +# libtool support. +case "$host" in +*-*-irix6*) + # Find out which ABI we are using. + echo '[#]line __oline__ "configure"' > conftest.$ac_ext + if AC_TRY_EVAL(ac_compile); then + case "`/usr/bin/file conftest.o`" in + *32-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -32" + ;; + *N32*) + LD="${LD-ld} -n32" + ;; + *64-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -64" + ;; + esac + fi + rm -rf conftest* + ;; + +*-*-sco3.2v5*) + # On SCO OpenServer 5, we need -belf to get full-featured binaries. + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" + ;; +esac + +# Actually configure libtool. ac_aux_dir is where install-sh is found. +CC="$CC" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" \ +LD="$LD" NM="$NM" RANLIB="$RANLIB" LN_S="$LN_S" \ +${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $ac_aux_dir/ltconfig --no-reexec \ +$libtool_flags --no-verify $ac_aux_dir/ltmain.sh $host \ +|| AC_MSG_ERROR([libtool configure failed]) + +# Redirect the config.log output again, so that the ltconfig log is not +# clobbered by the next message. +exec 5>>./config.log +]) + +# AM_ENABLE_SHARED - implement the --enable-shared flag +# Usage: AM_ENABLE_SHARED[(DEFAULT)] +# Where DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to +# `yes'. +AC_DEFUN(AM_ENABLE_SHARED, +[define([AM_ENABLE_SHARED_DEFAULT], ifelse($1, no, no, yes))dnl +AC_ARG_ENABLE(shared, +changequote(<<, >>)dnl +<< --enable-shared[=PKGS] build shared libraries [default=>>AM_ENABLE_SHARED_DEFAULT], +changequote([, ])dnl +[p=${PACKAGE-default} +case "$enableval" in +yes) enable_shared=yes ;; +no) enable_shared=no ;; +*) + enable_shared=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:," + for pkg in $enableval; do + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_shared=yes + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + ;; +esac], +enable_shared=AM_ENABLE_SHARED_DEFAULT)dnl +]) + +# AM_DISABLE_SHARED - set the default shared flag to --disable-shared +AC_DEFUN(AM_DISABLE_SHARED, +[AM_ENABLE_SHARED(no)]) + +# AM_DISABLE_STATIC - set the default static flag to --disable-static +AC_DEFUN(AM_DISABLE_STATIC, +[AM_ENABLE_STATIC(no)]) + +# AM_ENABLE_STATIC - implement the --enable-static flag +# Usage: AM_ENABLE_STATIC[(DEFAULT)] +# Where DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to +# `yes'. +AC_DEFUN(AM_ENABLE_STATIC, +[define([AM_ENABLE_STATIC_DEFAULT], ifelse($1, no, no, yes))dnl +AC_ARG_ENABLE(static, +changequote(<<, >>)dnl +<< --enable-static[=PKGS] build static libraries [default=>>AM_ENABLE_STATIC_DEFAULT], +changequote([, ])dnl +[p=${PACKAGE-default} +case "$enableval" in +yes) enable_static=yes ;; +no) enable_static=no ;; +*) + enable_static=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:," + for pkg in $enableval; do + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_static=yes + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + ;; +esac], +enable_static=AM_ENABLE_STATIC_DEFAULT)dnl +]) + + +# AM_PROG_LD - find the path to the GNU or non-GNU linker +AC_DEFUN(AM_PROG_LD, +[AC_ARG_WITH(gnu-ld, +[ --with-gnu-ld assume the C compiler uses GNU ld [default=no]], +test "$withval" = no || with_gnu_ld=yes, with_gnu_ld=no) +AC_REQUIRE([AC_PROG_CC]) +ac_prog=ld +if test "$ac_cv_prog_gcc" = yes; then + # Check if gcc -print-prog-name=ld gives a path. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ld used by GCC]) + ac_prog=`($CC -print-prog-name=ld) 2>&5` + case "$ac_prog" in + # Accept absolute paths. +changequote(,)dnl + /* | [A-Za-z]:\\*) +changequote([,])dnl + test -z "$LD" && LD="$ac_prog" + ;; + "") + # If it fails, then pretend we aren't using GCC. + ac_prog=ld + ;; + *) + # If it is relative, then search for the first ld in PATH. + with_gnu_ld=unknown + ;; + esac +elif test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GNU ld]) +else + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for non-GNU ld]) +fi +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_path_LD, +[if test -z "$LD"; then + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for ac_dir in $PATH; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f "$ac_dir/$ac_prog"; then + ac_cv_path_LD="$ac_dir/$ac_prog" + # Check to see if the program is GNU ld. I'd rather use --version, + # but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. + # Break only if it was the GNU/non-GNU ld that we prefer. + if "$ac_cv_path_LD" -v 2>&1 < /dev/null | egrep '(GNU|with BFD)' > /dev/null; then + test "$with_gnu_ld" != no && break + else + test "$with_gnu_ld" != yes && break + fi + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +else + ac_cv_path_LD="$LD" # Let the user override the test with a path. +fi]) +LD="$ac_cv_path_LD" +if test -n "$LD"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($LD) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) +fi +test -z "$LD" && AC_MSG_ERROR([no acceptable ld found in \$PATH]) +AC_SUBST(LD) +AM_PROG_LD_GNU +]) + +AC_DEFUN(AM_PROG_LD_GNU, +[AC_CACHE_CHECK([if the linker ($LD) is GNU ld], ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld, +[# I'd rather use --version here, but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. +if $LD -v 2>&1 &5; then + ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld=yes +else + ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld=no +fi]) +]) + +# AM_PROG_NM - find the path to a BSD-compatible name lister +AC_DEFUN(AM_PROG_NM, +[AC_MSG_CHECKING([for BSD-compatible nm]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_path_NM, +[if test -n "$NM"; then + # Let the user override the test. + ac_cv_path_NM="$NM" +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for ac_dir in /usr/ucb /usr/ccs/bin $PATH /bin; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/nm; then + # Check to see if the nm accepts a BSD-compat flag. + # Adding the `sed 1q' prevents false positives on HP-UX, which says: + # nm: unknown option "B" ignored + if ($ac_dir/nm -B /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'; exit 0) | egrep /dev/null >/dev/null; then + ac_cv_path_NM="$ac_dir/nm -B" + elif ($ac_dir/nm -p /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'; exit 0) | egrep /dev/null >/dev/null; then + ac_cv_path_NM="$ac_dir/nm -p" + else + ac_cv_path_NM="$ac_dir/nm" + fi + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_cv_path_NM" && ac_cv_path_NM=nm +fi]) +NM="$ac_cv_path_NM" +AC_MSG_RESULT([$NM]) +AC_SUBST(NM) +]) + +dnl $Id: wflags.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/11 12:11:41 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl set WFLAGS + +AC_DEFUN(AC_WFLAGS,[ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="" +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="" +if test -z "$WFLAGS" -a "$GCC" = "yes"; then + # -Wno-implicit-int for broken X11 headers + # leave these out for now: + # -Wcast-align doesn't work well on alpha osf/1 + # -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast + # -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs + WFLAGS="ifelse($#, 0,-Wall, $1)" + WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="-Wno-unused" + WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="-Wno-implicit-int" +fi +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS)dnl +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS_NOUNUSED)dnl +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT)dnl +]) + +dnl $Id: test-package.m4,v 1.7 1999/04/19 13:33:05 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW(package,headers,libraries,extra libs,default locations) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_TEST_PACKAGE,[AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW($1,[#include <$2>],$4,,$5)]) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW,[ +AC_ARG_WITH($1, +[ --with-$1=dir use $1 in dir]) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-lib, +[ --with-$1-lib=dir use $1 libraries in dir], +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-lib]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-include, +[ --with-$1-include=dir use $1 headers in dir], +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-include]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) + +case "$with_$1" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +"") ;; +*) if test "$with_$1_include" = ""; then + with_$1_include="$with_$1/include" + fi + if test "$with_$1_lib" = ""; then + with_$1_lib="$with_$1/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + ;; +esac +header_dirs= +lib_dirs= +d='$5' +for i in $d; do + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include" + lib_dirs="$lib_dirs $i/lib$abilibdirext" +done + +case "$with_$1_include" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) header_dirs="$with_$1_include $header_dirs";; +esac +case "$with_$1_lib" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) lib_dirs="$with_$1_lib $lib_dirs";; +esac + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +ires= lres= +for i in $header_dirs; do + CFLAGS="-I$i $save_CFLAGS" + AC_TRY_COMPILE([$2],,ires=$i;break) +done +for i in $lib_dirs; do + LIBS="-L$i $3 $4 $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$2],,lres=$i;break) +done +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +LIBS="$save_LIBS" + +if test "$ires" -a "$lres" -a "$with_$1" != "no"; then + $1_includedir="$ires" + $1_libdir="$lres" + INCLUDE_$1="-I$$1_includedir" + LIB_$1="-L$$1_libdir $3" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(upcase($1),1,[Define if you have the $1 package.]) + with_$1=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([headers $ires, libraries $lres]) +else + INCLUDE_$1= + LIB_$1= + with_$1=no + AC_MSG_RESULT($with_$1) +fi +AC_SUBST(INCLUDE_$1) +AC_SUBST(LIB_$1) +]) + +dnl $Id: find-func.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:58:58 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC(func, libraries, includes, arguments) +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_FUNC, [ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS([$1], [$2], [$3], [$4]) +if test -n "$LIB_$1"; then + LIBS="$LIB_$1 $LIBS" +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: find-func-no-libs.m4,v 1.5 1999/10/30 21:08:18 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Look for function in any of the specified libraries +dnl + +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(func, libraries, includes, arguments, extra libs, extra args) +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS, [ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2([$1], ["" $2], [$3], [$4], [$5], [$6])]) + +dnl $Id: find-func-no-libs2.m4,v 1.3 1999/10/30 21:09:53 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Look for function in any of the specified libraries +dnl + +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2(func, libraries, includes, arguments, extra libs, extra args) +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2, [ + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_funclib_$1, +[ +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_$1\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in $2; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS="$6 $ac_lib $5 $ac_save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$3],[$1($4)],eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_$1=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_$1=yes; fi";break) + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_$1=\${ac_cv_funclib_$1-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi +]) + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_$1" + +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs $1"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs $2"@@@ +END + +# $1 +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_[]upcase($1)" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB[]upcase($ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//')" +eval "LIB_$1=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=yes" + eval "LIB_$1=" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=no" + eval "LIB_$1=" + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_lib) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, in $ac_res]) + ;; +esac +AC_SUBST(LIB_$1) +]) + +# Define a conditional. + +AC_DEFUN(AM_CONDITIONAL, +[AC_SUBST($1_TRUE) +AC_SUBST($1_FALSE) +if $2; then + $1_TRUE= + $1_FALSE='#' +else + $1_TRUE='#' + $1_FALSE= +fi]) + +dnl $Id: osfc2.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/27 17:28:16 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl enable OSF C2 stuff + +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_OSFC2,[ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(osfc2, +[ --enable-osfc2 enable some OSF C2 support]) +LIB_security= +if test "$enable_osfc2" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OSFC2, 1, [Define to enable basic OSF C2 support.]) + LIB_security=-lsecurity +fi +AC_SUBST(LIB_security) +]) + +dnl $Id: check-man.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/21 14:30:50 joda Exp $ +dnl check how to format manual pages +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_MAN, +[AC_PATH_PROG(NROFF, nroff) +AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(how to format man pages,ac_cv_sys_man_format, +[cat > conftest.1 << END +.Dd January 1, 1970 +.Dt CONFTEST 1 +.Sh NAME +.Nm conftest +.Nd +foobar +END + +if test "$NROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$NROFF" $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$NROFF $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format" = "" -a "$GROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$GROFF" -Tascii $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$GROFF -Tascii $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$ac_cv_sys_man_format \[$]< > \[$]@" +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + CATMAN="$ac_cv_sys_man_format" + AC_SUBST(CATMAN) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(CATMAN, test "$CATMAN") +AC_CACHE_CHECK(extension of pre-formatted manual pages,ac_cv_sys_catman_ext, +[if grep _suffix /etc/man.conf > /dev/null 2>&1; then + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=0 +else + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=number +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_sys_catman_ext" = number; then + CATMANEXT='$$ext' +else + CATMANEXT=0 +fi +AC_SUBST(CATMANEXT) + +]) +dnl +dnl $Id: krb-bigendian.m4,v 1.5 2000/01/08 10:34:44 assar Exp $ +dnl + +dnl check if this computer is little or big-endian +dnl if we can figure it out at compile-time then don't define the cpp symbol +dnl otherwise test for it and define it. also allow options for overriding +dnl it when cross-compiling + +AC_DEFUN(KRB_C_BIGENDIAN, [ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(bigendian, +[ --enable-bigendian the target is big endian], +krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(littleendian, +[ --enable-littleendian the target is little endian], +krb_cv_c_bigendian=no) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether byte order is known at compile time, +krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile, +[AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include ],[ +#if !BYTE_ORDER || !BIG_ENDIAN || !LITTLE_ENDIAN + bogus endian macros +#endif], krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=yes, krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=no)]) +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "no"; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether byte ordering is bigendian, krb_cv_c_bigendian,[ + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = ""; then + krb_cv_c_bigendian=unknown + fi + AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include ],[ +#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN + not big endian +#endif], krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes, krb_cv_c_bigendian=no) + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "unknown"; then + AC_TRY_RUN([main () { + /* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */ + union + { + long l; + char c[sizeof (long)]; + } u; + u.l = 1; + exit (u.c[sizeof (long) - 1] == 1); + }], krb_cv_c_bigendian=no, krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes, + AC_MSG_ERROR([specify either --enable-bigendian or --enable-littleendian])) + fi + ]) + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(WORDS_BIGENDIAN, 1, [define if target is big endian])dnl + fi +fi +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H, 1, [define if sys/param.h defines the endiness])dnl +fi +]) + +dnl +dnl See if there is any X11 present +dnl +dnl $Id: check-x.m4,v 1.2 1999/11/05 04:25:23 assar Exp $ + +AC_DEFUN(KRB_CHECK_X,[ +AC_PATH_XTRA + +# try to figure out if we need any additional ld flags, like -R +# and yes, the autoconf X test is utterly broken +if test "$no_x" != yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for special X linker flags,krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath,[ + ac_save_libs="$LIBS" + ac_save_cflags="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $X_CFLAGS" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs="" + for rflag in "" "-R" "-R " "-rpath "; do + if test "$rflag" = ""; then + foo="$X_LIBS" + else + foo="" + for flag in $X_LIBS; do + case $flag in + -L*) + foo="$foo $flag `echo $flag | sed \"s/-L/$rflag/\"`" + ;; + *) + foo="$foo $flag" + ;; + esac + done + fi + LIBS="$ac_save_libs $foo $X_PRE_LIBS -lX11 $X_EXTRA_LIBS" + AC_TRY_RUN([ + #include + foo() + { + XOpenDisplay(NULL); + } + main() + { + return 0; + } + ], krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="$rflag"; krb_cv_sys_x_libs="$foo"; break,:) + done + LIBS="$ac_save_libs" + CFLAGS="$ac_save_cflags" + ]) + X_LIBS="$krb_cv_sys_x_libs" +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: check-xau.m4,v 1.3 1999/05/14 01:17:06 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for Xau{Read,Write}Auth and XauFileName +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_XAU,[ +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$X_CFLAGS $CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +dnl LIBS="$X_LIBS $X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +LIBS="$X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $X_LIBS" + + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauWriteAuth, X11 Xau) +ac_xxx="$LIBS" +LIBS="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIBS" +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauReadAuth, X11 Xau) +LIBS="$LIB_XauReadAauth $LIBS" +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauFileName, X11 Xau) +LIBS="$ac_xxx" + +case "$ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth" = yes; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + else + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +if test "$AUTOMAKE" != ""; then + AM_CONDITIONAL(NEED_WRITEAUTH, test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes") +else + AC_SUBST(NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE) + AC_SUBST(NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE) + if test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes"; then + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE= + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE='#' + else + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE='#' + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE= + fi +fi +CFLAGS=$save_CFLAGS +LIBS=$save_LIBS +LDFLAGS=$save_LDFLAGS +]) + +dnl $Id: check-type-extra.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl ac_check_type + extra headers + +dnl AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA(TYPE, DEFAULT, HEADERS) +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA, +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC])dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_type_$1, +[AC_EGREP_CPP(dnl +changequote(<<,>>)dnl +<<$1[^a-zA-Z_0-9]>>dnl +changequote([,]), [#include +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +$3], ac_cv_type_$1=yes, ac_cv_type_$1=no)])dnl +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_type_$1) +if test $ac_cv_type_$1 = no; then + AC_DEFINE($1, $2, [Define this to what the type $1 should be.]) +fi +]) + +dnl +dnl $Id: check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4,v 1.2 1999/05/14 13:15:40 assar Exp $ +dnl + +dnl extra magic check for netinet/{ip.h,tcp.h} because on irix 6.5.3 +dnl you have to include standards.h before including these files + +AC_DEFUN(CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP, +[ +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(standards.h) +for i in netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h; do + +cv=`echo "$i" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $i]) +AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_header_$cv], +[AC_TRY_CPP([\ +#ifdef HAVE_STANDARDS_H +#include +#endif +#include <$i> +], +eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=yes", +eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=no")]) +AC_MSG_RESULT(`eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv`) +changequote(, )dnl +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $i | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` +changequote([, ])dnl + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_hdr, 1) +fi +done +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +: << END +@@@headers="$headers netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h"@@@ +END + +]) + +dnl $Id: krb-ipv6.m4,v 1.8 2000/01/01 11:44:45 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for IPv6 +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_IPV6, [ +AC_ARG_WITH(ipv6, +[ --without-ipv6 do not enable IPv6 support],[ +if test "$withval" = "no"; then + ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no +fi]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_lib_ipv6, +[dnl check for different v6 implementations (by itojun) +v6type=unknown +v6lib=none + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([ipv6 stack type]) +for i in v6d toshiba kame inria zeta linux; do + case $i in + v6d) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef __V6D__ +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=v6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-I/usr/local/v6/include $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + toshiba) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef _TOSHIBA_INET6 +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + kame) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef __KAME__ +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + inria) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef IPV6_INRIA_VERSION +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + zeta) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef _ZETA_MINAMI_INET6 +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + linux) + if test -d /usr/inet6; then + v6type=$i + v6lib=inet6 + v6libdir=/usr/inet6 + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" + fi + ;; + esac + if test "$v6type" != "unknown"; then + break + fi +done +AC_MSG_RESULT($v6type) + +if test "$v6lib" != "none"; then + for dir in $v6libdir /usr/local/v6/lib /usr/local/lib; do + if test -d $dir -a -f $dir/lib$v6lib.a; then + LIBS="-L$dir -l$v6lib $LIBS" + break + fi + done +fi +AC_TRY_LINK([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +], +[ + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + int s; + + s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_port = htons(17); + sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); +], +ac_cv_lib_ipv6=yes, +ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no)]) +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for IPv6) +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_lib_ipv6) +if test "$ac_cv_lib_ipv6" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_IPV6, 1, [Define if you have IPv6.]) +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: broken-snprintf.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 09:52:22 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF, [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working snprintf,ac_cv_func_snprintf_working, +ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=yes +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +int main() +{ +changequote(`,')dnl + char foo[3]; +changequote([,])dnl + snprintf(foo, 2, "12"); + return strcmp(foo, "1"); +}],:,ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_SNPRINTF, 1, [define if you have a working snprintf]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ],snprintf) +fi +]) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN_VSNPRINTF,[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working vsnprintf,ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working, +ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=yes +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#include + +int foo(int num, ...) +{ +changequote(`,')dnl + char bar[3]; +changequote([,])dnl + va_list arg; + va_start(arg, num); + vsnprintf(bar, 2, "%s", arg); + va_end(arg); + return strcmp(bar, "1"); +} + + +int main() +{ + return foo(0, "12"); +}],:,ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_VSNPRINTF, 1, [define if you have a working vsnprintf]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ],vsnprintf) +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: need-proto.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:24 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if we need the prototype for a function +dnl + +dnl AC_NEED_PROTO(includes, function) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_NEED_PROTO, [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_$2" = yes; then +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $2 needs a prototype], ac_cv_func_$2_noproto, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1], +[struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int $2 (struct foo*); +$2(&xx); +], +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_noproto=yes", +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_noproto=no")) +define([foo], [NEED_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_PROTO]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2_noproto" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if the system is missing a prototype for $2()]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: broken-glob.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:15 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for glob(3) +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN_GLOB,[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working glob, ac_cv_func_glob_working, +ac_cv_func_glob_working=yes +AC_TRY_LINK([ +#include +#include ],[ +glob(NULL, GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE, NULL, NULL); +],:,ac_cv_func_glob_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GLOB, 1, [define if you have a glob() that groks + GLOB_BRACE, GLOB_NOCHECK, GLOB_QUOTE, and GLOB_TILDE]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include +#include ],glob) +fi +]) + +dnl +dnl $Id: krb-func-getlogin.m4,v 1.1 1999/07/13 17:45:30 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for POSIX (broken) getlogin +dnl + + +AC_DEFUN(AC_FUNC_GETLOGIN, [ +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getlogin setlogin) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes; then +AC_CACHE_CHECK(if getlogin is posix, ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix, [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes -a "$ac_cv_func_setlogin" = yes; then + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=no +else + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=yes +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(POSIX_GETLOGIN, 1, [Define if getlogin has POSIX flavour (and not BSD).]) +fi +fi +]) + +dnl +dnl $Id: capabilities.m4,v 1.2 1999/09/01 11:02:26 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test SGI capabilities +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(KRB_CAPABILITIES,[ + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(capability.h sys/capability.h) + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(sgi_getcapabilitybyname cap_set_proc) +]) + +dnl $Id: check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/23 16:47:31 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for getpwnam_r, and if it's posix or not + +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_GETPWNAM_R_POSIX,[ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(getpwnam_r,c_r) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r" = yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(if getpwnam_r is posix,ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix, + ac_libs="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $LIB_getpwnam_r" + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +int main() +{ + struct passwd pw, *pwd; + return getpwnam_r("", &pw, NULL, 0, &pwd) < 0; +} +],ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=yes,ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=no,:) +LIBS="$ac_libs") +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(POSIX_GETPWNAM_R, 1, [Define if getpwnam_r has POSIX flavour.]) +fi +fi +]) +dnl $Id: find-if-not-broken.m4,v 1.2 1998/03/16 22:16:27 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Mix between AC_FIND_FUNC and AC_BROKEN +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN, +[AC_FIND_FUNC([$1], [$2], [$3], [$4]) +if eval "test \"$ac_cv_func_$1\" != yes"; then +LIBOBJS[]="$LIBOBJS $1.o" +fi +AC_SUBST(LIBOBJS)dnl +]) + +dnl $Id: broken.m4,v 1.3 1998/03/16 22:16:19 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Same as AC _REPLACE_FUNCS, just define HAVE_func if found in normal +dnl libraries + +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN, +[for ac_func in $1 +do +AC_CHECK_FUNC($ac_func, [ +ac_tr_func=HAVE_[]upcase($ac_func) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func)],[LIBOBJS[]="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o"]) +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs $1"@@@ +END +done +AC_SUBST(LIBOBJS)dnl +]) + +dnl $Id: proto-compat.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 13:03:48 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if the prototype of a function is compatible with another one +dnl + +dnl AC_PROTO_COMPAT(includes, function, prototype) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_PROTO_COMPAT, [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $2 is compatible with system prototype], +ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1], +[$3;], +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat=yes", +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat=no")) +define([foo], translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_PROTO_COMPATIBLE]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if prototype of $2 is compatible with + $3]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) +dnl $Id: check-var.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_CHECK_VAR(includes, variable) +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_VAR, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $2) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_var_$2, [ +AC_TRY_LINK([extern int $2; +int foo() { return $2; }], + [foo()], + ac_cv_var_$2=yes, ac_cv_var_$2=no) +]) +define([foo], [HAVE_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])) + +AC_MSG_RESULT(`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_$2`) +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_$2` = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(foo, 1, [define if you have $2]) + AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([$1],[$2]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) + +dnl $Id: check-declaration.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 13:03:08 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if we need the declaration of a variable +dnl + +dnl AC_HAVE_DECLARATION(includes, variable) +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_DECLARATION, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $2 is properly declared]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_var_$2_declaration, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1 +extern struct { int foo; } $2;], +[$2.foo = 1;], +eval "ac_cv_var_$2_declaration=no", +eval "ac_cv_var_$2_declaration=yes") +]) + +define(foo, [HAVE_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_DECLARATION]) + +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_var_$2_declaration) +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_$2_declaration\" = yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if your system declares $2]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) + +dnl $Id: have-struct-field.m4,v 1.6 1999/07/29 01:44:32 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for fields in a structure +dnl +dnl AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct, field, headers) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD, [ +define(cache_val, translit(ac_cv_type_$1_$2, [A-Z ], [a-z_])) +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for $2 in $1], cache_val,[ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$3],[$1 x; x.$2;], +cache_val=yes, +cache_val=no)]) +if test "$cache_val" = yes; then + define(foo, translit(HAVE_$1_$2, [a-z ], [A-Z_])) + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [Define if $1 has field $2.]) + undefine([foo]) +fi +undefine([cache_val]) +]) + +dnl $Id: have-type.m4,v 1.5 1999/12/31 03:10:22 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for existance of a type + +dnl AC_HAVE_TYPE(TYPE,INCLUDES) +AC_DEFUN(AC_HAVE_TYPE, [ +AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC]) +cv=`echo "$1" | sed 'y%./+- %__p__%'` +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_type_$cv], +AC_TRY_COMPILE( +[#include +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +$2], +[$1 foo;], +eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes", +eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no"))dnl +AC_MSG_RESULT(`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`) +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $1 | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +define(foo,translit($1, [ ], [_])) +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs foo"@@@ +END +undefine([foo]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_hdr, 1) +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: krb-struct-winsize.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Search for struct winsize +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_STRUCT_WINSIZE, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for struct winsize) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_struct_winsize, [ +ac_cv_struct_winsize=no +for i in sys/termios.h sys/ioctl.h; do +AC_EGREP_HEADER( +changequote(, )dnl +struct[ ]*winsize,dnl +changequote([,])dnl +$i, ac_cv_struct_winsize=yes; break)dnl +done +]) +if test "$ac_cv_struct_winsize" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE, 1, [define if struct winsize is declared in sys/termios.h]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_struct_winsize) +AC_EGREP_HEADER(ws_xpixel, termios.h, + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WS_XPIXEL, 1, [define if struct winsize has ws_xpixel])) +AC_EGREP_HEADER(ws_ypixel, termios.h, + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WS_YPIXEL, 1, [define if struct winsize has ws_ypixel])) +]) + +dnl $Id: krb-struct-spwd.m4,v 1.3 1999/07/13 21:04:11 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl Test for `struct spwd' + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_STRUCT_SPWD, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for struct spwd) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_struct_spwd, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE( +[#include +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif], +[struct spwd foo;], +ac_cv_struct_spwd=yes, +ac_cv_struct_spwd=no) +]) +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_struct_spwd) + +if test "$ac_cv_struct_spwd" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD, 1, [define if you have struct spwd]) +fi +]) + +dnl $Id: grok-type.m4,v 1.4 1999/11/29 11:16:48 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_GROK_TYPE, [ +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_type_$1, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H +#include +#endif +], +$i x; +, +eval ac_cv_type_$1=yes, +eval ac_cv_type_$1=no))]) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_GROK_TYPES, [ +for i in $1; do + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $i) + AC_GROK_TYPE($i) + eval ac_res=\$ac_cv_type_$i + if test "$ac_res" = yes; then + type=HAVE_[]upcase($i) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($type) + fi + AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) +done +]) + +dnl $Id: auth-modules.m4,v 1.1 1999/03/21 13:48:00 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Figure what authentication modules should be built + +AC_DEFUN(AC_AUTH_MODULES,[ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(which authentication modules should be built) + +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS= + +if test "$ac_cv_header_siad_h" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS sia" +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_header_security_pam_modules_h" = yes -a "$enable_shared" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS pam" +fi + +case "${host}" in +changequote(,)dnl +*-*-irix[56]*) LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS afskauthlib" ;; +changequote([,])dnl +esac + +AC_MSG_RESULT($LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS) + +AC_SUBST(LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS)dnl +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b9d5b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.30 2000/01/06 08:02:37 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_readline) + +man_MANS = ktutil.8 + +sbin_PROGRAMS = ktutil + +ktutil_SOURCES = add.c \ + change.c \ + copy.c \ + get.c \ + ktutil.c \ + list.c \ + purge.c \ + remove.c \ + srvconvert.c \ + srvcreate.c + +LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la \ + $(LIB_readline) \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52665a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,680 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.30 2000/01/06 08:02:37 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_readline) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +man_MANS = ktutil.8 + +sbin_PROGRAMS = ktutil + +ktutil_SOURCES = add.c change.c copy.c get.c ktutil.c list.c purge.c remove.c srvconvert.c srvcreate.c + + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la $(LIB_readline) $(LIB_roken) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +sbin_PROGRAMS = ktutil$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(sbin_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +ktutil_OBJECTS = add.$(OBJEXT) change.$(OBJEXT) copy.$(OBJEXT) \ +get.$(OBJEXT) ktutil.$(OBJEXT) list.$(OBJEXT) purge.$(OBJEXT) \ +remove.$(OBJEXT) srvconvert.$(OBJEXT) srvcreate.$(OBJEXT) +ktutil_LDADD = $(LDADD) +ktutil_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la 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$(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/add.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/add.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..954b5f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/add.c @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add.c,v 1.1 2000/01/02 04:41:00 assar Exp $"); + +int +kt_add(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + char buf[128]; + char *principal_string = NULL; + int kvno = -1; + char *enctype_string = NULL; + krb5_enctype enctype; + char *password_string = NULL; + int salt_flag = 1; + int random_flag = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "principal of key", "principal"}, + { "kvno", 'V', arg_integer, NULL, "key version of key" }, + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, NULL, "encryption type of key" }, + { "password", 'w', arg_string, NULL, "password for key"}, + { "salt", 's', arg_negative_flag, NULL, "no salt" }, + { "random", 'r', arg_flag, NULL, "generate random key" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + args[i++].value = &principal_string; + args[i++].value = &kvno; + args[i++].value = &enctype_string; + args[i++].value = &password_string; + args[i++].value = &salt_flag; + args[i++].value = &random_flag; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil add", ""); + return 0; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil add", ""); + return 0; + } + if(principal_string == NULL) { + printf("Principal: "); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return 0; + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + principal_string = buf; + } + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string, &entry.principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", principal_string); + return 0; + } + if(enctype_string == NULL) { + printf("Encryption type: "); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry.principal); + return 0; + } + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + enctype_string = buf; + } + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, enctype_string, &enctype); + if(ret) { + int t; + if(sscanf(enctype_string, "%d", &t) == 1) + enctype = t; + else { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", enctype_string); + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + return 0; + } + } + if(kvno == -1) { + printf("Key version: "); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry.principal); + return 0; + } + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + kvno = atoi(buf); + } + if(password_string == NULL && random_flag == 0) { + if(des_read_pw_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "Password: ", 1)) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry.principal); + return 0; + } + password_string = buf; + } + if(password_string) { + if (!salt_flag) { + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_data pw; + + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + pw.data = (void*)password_string; + pw.length = strlen(password_string); + krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context, enctype, pw, salt, + &entry.keyblock); + } else { + krb5_string_to_key(context, enctype, password_string, + entry.principal, &entry.keyblock); + } + memset (password_string, 0, strlen(password_string)); + } else { + krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, enctype, &entry.keyblock); + } + entry.vno = kvno; + entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "add"); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/change.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/change.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3de4f86 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/change.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: change.c,v 1.1 2000/01/02 04:41:00 assar Exp $"); + +static void +change_entry (krb5_context context, krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + const char *realm, const char *admin_server, int server_port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + kadm5_config_params conf; + void *kadm_handle; + char *client_name; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int num_keys; + int i; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, entry->principal, &client_name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx"); + return; + } + + memset (&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + + if(realm) + conf.realm = (char *)realm; + else + conf.realm = *krb5_princ_realm (context, entry->principal); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + + if (admin_server) { + conf.admin_server = (char *)admin_server; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER; + } + + if (server_port) { + conf.kadmind_port = htons(server_port); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT; + } + + ret = kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx (context, + client_name, + keytab_string, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + free (client_name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx"); + return; + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal (kadm_handle, entry->principal, + &keys, &num_keys); + kadm5_destroy (kadm_handle); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_randkey_principal"); + return; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_keys; ++i) { + krb5_keytab_entry new_entry; + + new_entry = *entry; + new_entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + ++new_entry.vno; + new_entry.keyblock = keys[i]; + + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry (context, keytab, &new_entry); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &keys[i]); + } +} + +/* + * loop over all the entries in the keytab (or those given) and change + * their keys, writing the new keys + */ + +int +kt_change (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + char *realm = NULL; + char *admin_server = NULL; + int server_port = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + int optind = 0; + int j, max; + krb5_principal *princs; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, NULL, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { "admin-server", 'a', arg_string, NULL, + "server to contact", "host" + }, + { "server-port", 's', arg_integer, NULL, + "port to contact", "port number" + }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + + args[0].value = &realm; + args[1].value = &admin_server; + args[2].value = &server_port; + args[3].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind) + || help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + "ktutil change", "principal..."); + return 0; + } + + j = 0; + max = 10; + princs = malloc (max * sizeof(*princs)); + if (princs == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + return 1; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + int i; + int done = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < j; ++i) + if (krb5_principal_compare (context, princs[i], + entry.principal)) + break; + if (i < j) + continue; + + if (optind == argc) { + change_entry (context, &entry, realm, admin_server, server_port); + done = 1; + } else { + for (i = optind; i < argc; ++i) { + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, argv[i], &princ); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", argv[i]); + continue; + } + if (krb5_principal_compare (context, princ, entry.principal)) { + change_entry (context, &entry, + realm, admin_server, server_port); + done = 1; + } + krb5_free_principal (context, princ); + } + } + if (done) { + if (j >= max) { + void *tmp; + + max *= 2; + tmp = realloc (princs, max * sizeof(*princs)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + krb5_warnx (context, "realloc: out of memory"); + break; + } + princs = tmp; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, entry.principal, &princs[j]); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_copy_principal"); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + break; + } + ++j; + } + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + } + while (j-- > 0) + krb5_free_principal (context, princs[j]); + free (princs); + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/copy.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d846610 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: copy.c,v 1.1 2000/01/02 04:41:01 assar Exp $"); + +int +kt_copy (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int help_flag = 0; + int optind = 0; + krb5_keytab src_keytab, dst_keytab; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL} + }; + + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int i = 0; + + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil copy", + "keytab-src keytab-dest"); + return 0; + } + if (help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil copy", + "keytab-src keytab-dest"); + return 0; + } + + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + + if (argc != 2) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil copy", + "keytab-src keytab-dest"); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, argv[0], &src_keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "resolving src keytab `%s'", argv[0]); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, argv[1], &dst_keytab); + if (ret) { + krb5_kt_close (context, src_keytab); + krb5_warn (context, ret, "resolving dst keytab `%s'", argv[1]); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get (context, src_keytab, &cursor); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + goto fail; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, src_keytab, + &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry (context, dst_keytab, &entry); + if (verbose_flag) { + char *name_str; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, entry.principal, &name_str); + printf ("copying %s\n", name_str); + free (name_str); + } + + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + break; + } + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get (context, src_keytab, &cursor); + +fail: + krb5_kt_close (context, src_keytab); + krb5_kt_close (context, dst_keytab); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/get.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/get.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..143ffa2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/get.c @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get.c,v 1.15 2000/01/02 04:41:01 assar Exp $"); + +int +kt_get(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + kadm5_config_params conf; + void *kadm_handle; + char *principal = NULL; + char *realm = NULL; + char *admin_server = NULL; + int server_port = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + int optind = 0; + int i, j; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, NULL, + "admin principal", "principal" + }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, NULL, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { "admin-server", 'a', arg_string, NULL, + "server to contact", "host" + }, + { "server-port", 's', arg_integer, NULL, + "port to contact", "port number" + }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + + args[0].value = &principal; + args[1].value = &realm; + args[2].value = &admin_server; + args[3].value = &server_port; + args[4].value = &help_flag; + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind) + || help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + "ktutil get", "principal..."); + return 0; + } + + if(realm) { + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm); /* XXX should be fixed + some other way */ + conf.realm = realm; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + } + + if (admin_server) { + conf.admin_server = admin_server; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER; + } + + if (server_port) { + conf.kadmind_port = htons(server_port); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT; + } + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + principal, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password"); + return 0; + } + + + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + krb5_principal princ_ent; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + int mask = 0; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int n_keys; + int created = 0; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[i], &princ_ent); + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + princ.principal = princ_ent; + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + princ.attributes |= KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + princ.princ_expire_time = 0; + mask |= KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME; + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask, "x"); + if(ret == 0) + created++; + else if(ret != KADM5_DUP) { + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + continue; + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &keys, &n_keys); + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + princ.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + mask = KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + if(created) { + princ.kvno = 1; + mask |= KADM5_KVNO; + } + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask); + for(j = 0; j < n_keys; j++) { + entry.principal = princ_ent; + entry.vno = princ.kvno; + entry.keyblock = keys[j]; + entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[j]); + } + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + } + kadm5_destroy(kadm_handle); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.8 b/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b70fc93 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.\" $Id: ktutil.8,v 1.6 2000/01/02 05:07:50 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Aug 27, 1997 +.Dt KTUTIL 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm ktutil +.Ar command +.Nd +handle a keytab +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl k Ar keytab +.Op Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytab +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl h +.Op Fl -help +.Ar command +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a program for managing keytabs. +.Ar command +can be one of the following: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It add Xo +.Op Fl p Ar principal +.Op Fl -principal= Ns Ar principal +.Op Fl V Ar kvno +.Op Fl -kvno= Ns Ar kvno +.Op Fl e Ar encype +.Op Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Op Fl w Ar password +.Op Fl -password= Ns Ar password +.Op Fl r +.Op Fl -random +.Op Fl s +.Op Fl -no-salt +.Xc +Adds a key to the keytab. Options that are not specified will be +prompted for. +.It change Xo +.Op Fl r Ar realm +.Op Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Op Fl -a Ar host +.Op Fl -admin-server= Ns Ar hots +.Op Fl -s Ar port +.Op Fl -server-port= Ns Ar port +.Xc +Update one or several keys to new versions. By default, use the admin +server for the realm of an keytab entry. Otherwise it will use the +values specified by the options. +.Pp +If no principals are given, all the ones in the keytab are updated. +.It copy Xo +.Ar keytab-src +.Ar keytab-dest +.Xc +Copies all the entries from +.Ar keytab-src +to +.Ar keytab-dest . +.It get Xo +.Op Fl p Ar admin principal +.Op Fl -principal= Ns Ar admin principal +.Op Fl r Ar realm +.Op Fl -realm= Ns Ar realm +.Op Fl a Ar admin server +.Op Fl -admin-server= Ns Ar admin server +.Op Fl s Ar server port +.Op Fl -server-port= Ns Ar server port +.Ar principal +.Xc +Get a key for +.Nm principal +and store it in a keytab. +.It list +List the keys stored in the keytab. +.It remove Xo +.Op Fl p Ar principal +.Op Fl -principal= Ns Ar principal +.Op Fl V kvno +.Op Fl -kvno= Ns Ar kvno +.Op Fl e enctype +.Op Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Xc +Removes the specified key or keys. Not specifying a +.Ar kvno +removes keys with any version number. Not specifying a +.Ar enctype +removes keys of any type. +.It purge Xo +.Op Fl -age= Ns Ar age +.Xc +Removes all old entries (for which there is a newer version) that are +older than +.Ar age +seconds. +.It srvconvert +.It srv2keytab Xo +.Op Fl s Ar srvtab +.Op Fl -srvtab= Ns Ar srvtab +.Xc +Converts the version 4 srvtab in +.Ar srvtab +to a version 5 keytab and stores it in +.Ar keytab . +.It srvcreate +.It key2srvtab Xo +.Op Fl s Ar srvtab +.Op Fl -srvtab= Ns Ar srvtab +.Xc +Converts the version 5 keytab in +.Ar keytab +to a version 4 srvtab and stores it in +.Ar srvtab . +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kadmin 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4893f2d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil.c @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ktutil.c,v 1.25 2000/01/02 05:07:34 assar Exp $"); + +int help_flag; +int version_flag; +int verbose_flag; +char *keytab_string; + +static int help(int argc, char **argv); + +static SL_cmd cmds[] = { + { "add", kt_add, "add", + "adds key to keytab" }, + { "change", kt_change, "change [principal...]", + "get new key for principals (all)" }, + { "copy", kt_copy, "copy src dst", + "copy one keytab to another" }, + { "get", kt_get, "get [principal...]", + "create key in database and add to keytab" }, + { "list", kt_list, "list", + "shows contents of a keytab" }, + { "purge", kt_purge, "purge", + "remove old and superceeded entries" }, + { "remove", kt_remove, "remove", + "remove key from keytab" }, + { "srvconvert", srvconv, "srvconvert [flags]", + "convert v4 srvtab to keytab" }, + { "srv2keytab" }, + { "srvcreate", srvcreate, "srvcreate [flags]", + "convert keytab to v4 srvtab" }, + { "key2srvtab" }, + { "help", help, "help", "" }, + { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL } +}; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { + "version", + 0, + arg_flag, + &version_flag, + NULL, + NULL + }, + { + "help", + 'h', + arg_flag, + &help_flag, + NULL, + NULL + }, + { + "keytab", + 'k', + arg_string, + &keytab_string, + "keytab", + "keytab to operate on" + }, + { + "verbose", + 'v', + arg_flag, + &verbose_flag, + "verbose", + "run verbosely" + } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +krb5_context context; +krb5_keytab keytab; + +static int +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sl_help(cmds, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +static void +usage(int status) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "command"); + exit(status); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + set_progname(argv[0]); + krb5_init_context(&context); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + if(argc == 0) + usage(1); + if(keytab_string) { + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_string, &keytab); + } else { + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &keytab); + } + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "resolving keytab"); + ret = sl_command(cmds, argc, argv); + if(ret == -1) + krb5_warnx (context, "unrecognized command: %s", argv[0]); + krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a45f51 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/ktutil_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: ktutil_locl.h,v 1.9 2000/01/06 08:03:06 assar Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __KTUTIL_LOCL_H__ +#define __KTUTIL_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +extern krb5_context context; +extern krb5_keytab keytab; + +extern int help_flag; +extern int version_flag; +extern int verbose_flag; +extern char *keytab_string; + +int kt_add (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_change (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_copy (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_get (int argc, char **argv); +int kt_list(int argc, char **argv); +int kt_purge(int argc, char **argv); +int kt_remove(int argc, char **argv); +int srvconv(int argc, char **argv); +int srvcreate(int argc, char **argv); + +#endif /* __KTUTIL_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/list.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/list.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1924a21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/list.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: list.c,v 1.1 2000/01/02 04:41:02 assar Exp $"); + +int +kt_list(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + return 1; + } + printf("%s", "Version"); + printf(" "); + printf("%-15s", "Type"); + printf(" "); + printf("%s", "Principal"); + printf("\n"); + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0){ + char *p; + printf(" %3d ", entry.vno); + printf(" "); + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, entry.keyblock.keytype, &p); + if (ret != 0) + asprintf(&p, "unknown (%d)", entry.keyblock.keytype); + printf("%-15s", p); + free(p); + printf(" "); + krb5_unparse_name(context, entry.principal, &p); + printf("%s ", p); + free(p); + printf("\n"); + if (verbose_flag) { + char tstamp[256]; + struct tm *tm; + time_t ts = entry.timestamp; + + tm = gmtime (&ts); + strftime (tstamp, sizeof(tstamp), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC", tm); + printf(" Timestamp: %s\n", tstamp); + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/purge.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/purge.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e262c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/purge.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: purge.c,v 1.1 2000/01/02 05:06:50 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * keep track of the highest version for every principal. + */ + +struct e { + krb5_principal principal; + int max_vno; + struct e *next; +}; + +static struct e * +get_entry (krb5_principal princ, struct e *head) +{ + struct e *e; + + for (e = head; e != NULL; e = e->next) + if (krb5_principal_compare (context, princ, e->principal)) + return e; + return NULL; +} + +static void +add_entry (krb5_principal princ, int vno, struct e **head) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct e *e; + + e = get_entry (princ, *head); + if (e != NULL) { + e->max_vno = max (e->max_vno, vno); + return; + } + e = malloc (sizeof (*e)); + if (e == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: out of memory"); + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, princ, &e->principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_copy_principal"); + e->max_vno = vno; + e->next = *head; + *head = e; +} + +static void +delete_list (struct e *head) +{ + while (head != NULL) { + struct e *next = head->next; + krb5_free_principal (context, head->principal); + free (head); + head = next; + } +} + +/* + * Remove all entries that have newer versions and that are older + * than `age' + */ + +int +kt_purge(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + int help_flag = 0; + int age = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "age", 0, arg_integer, NULL, "age to retire" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + struct e *head = NULL; + time_t judgement_day; + + args[i++].value = &age; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil remove", ""); + return 0; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil remove", ""); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + return 1; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + add_entry (entry.principal, entry.vno, &head); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + + judgement_day = time (NULL); + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + return 1; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0) { + struct e *e = get_entry (entry.principal, head); + + if (e == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "ignoring extra entry"); + continue; + } + + if (entry.vno < e->max_vno + && judgement_day - entry.timestamp > age) { + if (verbose_flag) { + char *name_str; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, entry.principal, &name_str); + printf ("removing %s vno %d\n", name_str, entry.vno); + free (name_str); + } + ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry (context, keytab, &entry); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "remove"); + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + + delete_list (head); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/remove.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/remove.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e19de0a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/remove.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: remove.c,v 1.1 2000/01/02 04:41:02 assar Exp $"); + +int +kt_remove(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + char *principal_string = NULL; + krb5_principal principal = NULL; + int kvno = 0; + char *keytype_string = NULL; + krb5_enctype enctype = 0; + int help_flag = 0; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "principal to remove" }, + { "kvno", 'V', arg_integer, NULL, "key version to remove" }, + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, NULL, "enctype to remove" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, NULL } + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int i = 0; + args[i++].value = &principal_string; + args[i++].value = &kvno; + args[i++].value = &keytype_string; + args[i++].value = &help_flag; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil remove", ""); + return 0; + } + if(help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil remove", ""); + return 0; + } + if(principal_string) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal_string, &principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", principal_string); + return 0; + } + } + if(keytype_string) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, keytype_string, &enctype); + if(ret) { + int t; + if(sscanf(keytype_string, "%d", &t) == 1) + enctype = t; + else { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", keytype_string); + if(principal) + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + return 0; + } + } + } + if (!principal && !enctype && !kvno) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "You must give at least one of " + "principal, enctype or kvno."); + return 0; + } + entry.principal = principal; + entry.keyblock.keytype = enctype; + entry.vno = kvno; + ret = krb5_kt_remove_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "remove"); + if(principal) + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/srvconvert.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/srvconvert.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4a2b11 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/srvconvert.c @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: srvconvert.c,v 1.11 2000/01/02 03:56:21 assar Exp $"); + +/* convert a version 4 srvtab to a version 5 keytab */ + +#ifndef KEYFILE +#define KEYFILE "/etc/srvtab" +#endif + +static char *srvtab = KEYFILE; +static int help_flag; +static int verbose; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "srvtab", 's', arg_string, &srvtab, "srvtab to convert", "file" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "verbose", 'v', arg_flag, &verbose }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +srvconv(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int optind = 0; + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil srvconvert", ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil srvconvert", ""); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil srvconvert", ""); + return 1; + } + + fd = open(srvtab, O_RDONLY); + if(fd < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "%s", srvtab); + return 1; + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + if(sp == NULL){ + close(fd); + return 1; + } + while(1){ + char *service, *instance, *realm; + int8_t kvno; + des_cblock key; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &service); + if(ret == KRB5_CC_END) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "reading service"); + break; + } + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &instance); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "reading instance"); + free(service); + break; + } + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &realm); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "reading realm"); + free(service); + free(instance); + break; + } + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, service, instance, realm, + &entry.principal); + free(service); + free(instance); + free(realm); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_425_conv_principal (%s.%s@%s)", + service, instance, realm); + break; + } + + ret = krb5_ret_int8(sp, &kvno); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "reading kvno"); + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + break; + } + ret = sp->fetch(sp, key, 8); + if(ret < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "reading key"); + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + break; + } + if(ret < 8) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "end of file while reading key"); + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + break; + } + + entry.vno = kvno; + entry.timestamp = time (NULL); + entry.keyblock.keyvalue.data = key; + entry.keyblock.keyvalue.length = 8; + + if(verbose){ + char *p; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, entry.principal, &p); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + break; + } else{ + fprintf(stderr, "Storing keytab for %s\n", p); + free(p); + } + + } + entry.keyblock.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + entry.keyblock.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + entry.keyblock.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, keytab, &entry); + krb5_free_principal(context, entry.principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + break; + } + } + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/admin/srvcreate.c b/crypto/heimdal/admin/srvcreate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc86bc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/admin/srvcreate.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ktutil_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: srvcreate.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:53 joda Exp $"); + +/* convert a version 5 keytab to a version 4 srvtab */ + +#ifndef KEYFILE +#define KEYFILE "/etc/srvtab" +#endif + +static char *srvtab = KEYFILE; +static int help_flag; +static int verbose; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "srvtab", 's', arg_string, &srvtab, "srvtab to create", "file" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "verbose", 'v', arg_flag, &verbose }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +srvcreate(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int optind = 0; + int fd; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + char service[100], instance[100], realm[100]; + int8_t kvno; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil srvcreate", ""); + return 1; + } + if(help_flag){ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil srvcreate", ""); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ktutil srvcreate", ""); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_start_seq_get"); + return 1; + } + + fd = open(srvtab, O_WRONLY |O_APPEND |O_CREAT, 0600); + if(fd < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "%s", srvtab); + return 1; + } + + while((ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(context, keytab, &entry, &cursor)) == 0){ + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, entry.principal, + service, instance, realm); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_524_conv_principal"); + close(fd); + return 1; + } + if ( (entry.keyblock.keyvalue.length == 8) && + (entry.keyblock.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) ) { + if (verbose) { + printf ("%s.%s@%s vno %d\n", service, instance, realm, + entry.vno); + } + + write(fd, service, strlen(service)+1); + write(fd, instance, strlen(instance)+1); + write(fd, realm, strlen(realm)+1); + kvno = entry.vno; + write(fd, &kvno, sizeof(kvno)); + write(fd, entry.keyblock. keyvalue.data, 8); + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + + close(fd); + ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..307f450 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.19 1999/10/17 10:51:26 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +if OTP +dir_otp = otp +endif +SUBDIRS = \ + afsutil \ + ftp \ + login \ + $(dir_otp) \ + popper \ + push \ + rsh \ + su \ + xnlock \ + telnet \ + test \ + kx \ + kf \ + # kauth diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f78cfa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,602 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.19 1999/10/17 10:51:26 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = 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$@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cdc960 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * pagsh.c (main): use mkstemp to generate temporary file names. + From Miroslav Ruda + +1999-07-04 Assar Westerlund + + * afslog.c (expand_cell_name): terminate on #. From Miroslav Ruda + + +1999-06-27 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (bin_PROGRAMS): only include pagsh if KRB4 + +1999-06-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add pagsh + + * pagsh.c: new file. contributed by Miroslav Ruda + +Sat Mar 27 12:49:43 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * afslog.c: cleanup option parsing diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d94758 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.11 1999/06/27 00:45:26 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +if KRB4 +AFSPROGS = afslog pagsh +endif +bin_PROGRAMS = $(AFSPROGS) + +afslog_SOURCES = afslog.c + +pagsh_SOURCES = pagsh.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git 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following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: afslog.c,v 1.11 1999/07/04 23:50:39 assar Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +#if 0 +static int create_user; +#endif +static getarg_strings cells; +static char *realm; +static getarg_strings files; +static int unlog_flag; +static int verbose; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "cell", 'c', arg_strings, &cells, "cell to get tokens for", "cell" }, + { "file", 'p', arg_strings, &files, "file to get tokens for", "path" }, + { "realm", 'k', arg_string, &realm, "realm for afs cell", "realm" }, + { "unlog", 'u', arg_flag, &unlog_flag, "remove tokens" }, +#if 0 + { "create-user", 0, arg_flag, &create_user, "create user if not found" }, +#endif + { "verbose",'v', arg_flag, &verbose }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static const char * +expand_cell_name(const char *cell) +{ + FILE *f; + static char buf[128]; + char *p; + + f = fopen(_PATH_CELLSERVDB, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return cell; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + if(buf[0] == '>'){ + for(p=buf; *p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p) && *p != '#'; p++) + ; + *p = '\0'; + if(strstr(buf, cell)){ + fclose(f); + return buf + 1; + } + } + buf[0] = 0; + } + fclose(f); + return cell; +} + +#if 0 +static int +createuser (char *cell) +{ + char cellbuf[64]; + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char cmd[1024]; + + if (cell == NULL) { + FILE *f; + int len; + + f = fopen (_PATH_THISCELL, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + err (1, "open(%s)", _PATH_THISCELL); + if (fgets (cellbuf, sizeof(cellbuf), f) == NULL) + err (1, "read cellname from %s", _PATH_THISCELL); + len = strlen(cellbuf); + if (cellbuf[len-1] == '\n') + cellbuf[len-1] = '\0'; + cell = cellbuf; + } + + if(krb_get_default_principal(name, instance, realm)) + errx (1, "Could not even figure out who you are"); + + snprintf (cmd, sizeof(cmd), + "pts createuser %s%s%s@%s -cell %s", + name, *instance ? "." : "", instance, strlwr(realm), + cell); + DEBUG("Executing %s", cmd); + return system(cmd); +} +#endif + +static void +usage(int ecode) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "[cell]... [path]..."); + exit(ecode); +} + +static int +afslog_cell(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, int expand) +{ + const char *c = cell; + if(expand){ + c = expand_cell_name(cell); + if(c == NULL){ + krb5_warnx(context, "No cell matching \"%s\" found.", cell); + return -1; + } + if(verbose) + krb5_warnx(context, "Cell \"%s\" expanded to \"%s\"", cell, c); + } + return krb5_afslog(context, id, c, realm); +} + +static int +afslog_file(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, + const char *path) +{ + char cell[64]; + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(path, cell, sizeof(cell))){ + krb5_warnx(context, "No cell found for file \"%s\".", path); + return -1; + } + if(verbose) + krb5_warnx(context, "File \"%s\" lives in cell \"%s\"", path, cell); + return afslog_cell(context, id, cell, 0); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache id; + int i; + int num; + int ret = 0; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + krb5_init_context(&context); + if(!k_hasafs()) + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "AFS doesn't seem to be present on this machine"); + + if(unlog_flag){ + k_unlog(); + exit(0); + } + krb5_cc_default(context, &id); + num = 0; + for(i = 0; i < files.num_strings; i++){ + afslog_file(context, id, files.strings[i]); + num++; + } + for(i = 0; i < cells.num_strings; i++){ + afslog_cell(context, id, cells.strings[i], 1); + num++; + } + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + num++; + if(strcmp(argv[i], ".") == 0 || + strcmp(argv[i], "..") == 0 || + strchr(argv[i], '/') || + access(argv[i], F_OK) == 0) + afslog_file(context, id, argv[i]); + else + afslog_cell(context, id, argv[i], 1); + } + if(num == 0) { + krb5_afslog(context, id, NULL, NULL); + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bddb40 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/afsutil/pagsh.c @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: pagsh.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:55 joda Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include + +/* + * Run command with a new ticket file / credentials cache / token + */ + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int f; + char tf[1024]; + char *p; + + char *path; + char **args; + int i; + +#ifdef KRB5 + snprintf (tf, sizeof(tf), "%sXXXXXX", KRB5_DEFAULT_CCROOT); + f = mkstemp (tf + 5); + close (f); + unlink (tf + 5); + setenv("KRB5CCNAME", tf, 1); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 + snprintf (tf, sizeof(tf), "%s_XXXXXX", TKT_ROOT); + f = mkstemp (tf); + close (f); + unlink (tf); + setenv("KRBTKFILE", tf, 1); +#endif + + i = 0; + + args = (char **) malloc((argc + 10)*sizeof(char *)); + if (args == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory allocating %lu bytes", + (unsigned long)((argc + 10)*sizeof(char *))); + + argv++; + + if(*argv == NULL) { + path = getenv("SHELL"); + if(path == NULL){ + struct passwd *pw = k_getpwuid(geteuid()); + path = strdup(pw->pw_shell); + } + } else { + if(strcmp(*argv, "-c") == 0) argv++; + path = strdup(*argv++); + } + if (path == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory copying path"); + + p=strrchr(path, '/'); + if(p) + args[i] = strdup(p+1); + else + args[i] = strdup(path); + + if (args[i++] == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory copying arguments"); + + while(*argv) + args[i++] = *argv++; + + args[i++] = NULL; + + if(k_hasafs()) + k_setpag(); + + unsetenv("PAGPID"); + execvp(path, args); + if (errno == ENOENT) { + char **sh_args = malloc ((i + 2) * sizeof(char *)); + int j; + + if (sh_args == NULL) + errx (1, "Out of memory copying sh arguments"); + for (j = 1; j < i; ++j) + sh_args[j + 2] = args[j]; + sh_args[0] = "sh"; + sh_args[1] = "-c"; + sh_args[2] = path; + execv ("/bin/sh", sh_args); + } + err (1, "execvp"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a55c38 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (hookup): handle ai_canonname being set in any of the + addresses returnedby getaddrinfo. glibc apparently returns the + reverse lookup of every address in ai_canonname. + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): dito + +1999-12-21 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: don't use sa_len as a parameter, it's defined on + Irix + +1999-12-21 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dataconn): make sure from points to actual data + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): handle ai_canonname not being + set + * ftp/ftp.c (hookup): handle ai_canonname not being set + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_auth): the nat-IP address might not be realm + bounded. + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dolog): update prototype + * ftpd/ftpd.c (dolog): use getnameinfo_verified + * ftpd/ftpd.c: replace inaddr2str by getnameinfo + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): re-write to use getaddrinfo + * ftp/ftp.c (hookup): re-write to use getaddrinfo + +1999-11-30 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (getdatasock): make sure to keep the port-number of + the outgoing connections. It has to be `ftp-data' or some people + might get upset. + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): set correct variable when `-l' so that + logging actually works + +1999-11-29 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c (sec_login): check return value from realloc + (sec_end): set app_data to NULL + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_auth): obtain the `local' address when doing + NAT. also turn on passive mode. From + +1999-11-20 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (make_fileinfo): cast to allow for non-const + prototypes of readlink + +1999-11-12 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): use arg_counter for `l' + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (S_ISSOCK, S_ISLNK): fallback definitions for systems + that don't have them (such as ultrix) + +1999-10-29 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (make_fileinfo): cast uid's and gid's to unsigned in + printf, we don't know what types they might be. + (lstat_file): conditionalize the kafs part on KRB4 + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: is needed for kafs.h + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c (lstat_file): don't set st_mode, it should already be + correct + + * ftpd/ls.c: don't use warnx to print errors + + * ftpd/ls.c (builtin_ls): fix typo, 'd' shouldn't imply 'f' + + * ftpd/ls.c (lstat_file): new function for avoiding stating AFS + mount points. From Love + (list_files): use `lstat_file' + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: some const-poisoning + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (args): add `-B' as an alias for `--builtin-ls' to + allow for stupid inetds that only support two arguments. From + Love + +1999-10-26 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y (help): it's unnecessary to interpret help strings + as printf commands + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (show_issue): don't interpret contents of + /etc/issue* as printf commands. From Brian A May + + +1999-10-21 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/kauth.c (kauth): complain if protection level isn't + `private' + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_decode): syslog failure reason + + * ftp/kauth.c (kauth): set private level earlier + + * ftp/security.c: get_command_prot; (sec_prot): partially match + `command' and `data' + +1999-10-18 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: change `-l' flag to use arg_collect (this makes + `-ll' work again) + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (list_file): pass filename to ls + +1999-10-04 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: FEAT + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ls.c: fall-back definitions for constans and casts for + printfs + +1999-10-03 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (main): make this use getarg; add `list_file' + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y (LIST): call list_file + + * ftpd/ls.c: add simple built-in ls + + * ftp/security.c: add `sec_vfprintf2' and `sec_fprintf2' that + prints to the data stream + + * ftp/kauth.c (kauth): make sure we're using private protection + level + + * ftp/security.c (set_command_prot): set command protection level + + * ftp/security.c: make it possible to set the command protection + level with `prot' + +1999-09-30 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: add prototype for fclose to make sunos happy + +1999-08-19 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (do_login): show issue-file + (send_data): change handling of zero-byte files + +1999-08-18 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/cmds.c (getit): be more suspicious when parsing the result + of MDTM. Do the comparison of timestamps correctly. + +1999-08-13 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (send_data): avoid calling mmap with `len == 0'. + Some mmap:s rather dislike that (Solaris) and some munmap (Linux) + get grumpy later. + + * ftp/ftp.c (copy_stream): avoid calling mmap with `len == 0'. + Some mmap:s rather dislike that (Solaris) and some munmap (Linux) + get grumpy later. + +1999-08-03 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (active_mode): hide failure of EPRT by setting verbose + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): initialize application_data in bindings + +1999-08-02 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: save file names when doing commands that might + get aborted (and longjmp:ed out of) to avoid overwriting them also + remove extra closing brace + +1999-08-01 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: change `site find' to `site locate' (to match + what it does, and other implementations) keep find as an alias + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * common/socket.c: moved to roken + + * common/socket.c: new file with generic socket functions + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: make it more AF-neutral and v6-capable + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: add EPRT and EPSV + + * ftpd/extern.h: update prototypes and variables + + * ftp/krb4.c: update to new types of addresses + + * ftp/gssapi.c: add support for both AF_INET and AF_INET6 + addresses + + * ftp/ftp.c: make it more AF-neutral and v6-capable + + * ftp/extern.h (hookup): change prototype + + * common/common.h: add prototypes for functions in socket.c + + * common/Makefile.am (libcommon_a_SOURCES): add socket.c + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): check return value from + `gss_import_name' and print error messages if it fails + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/krb4.c (krb4_auth): type correctness + +1999-06-02 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/ftp.c (sendrequest): lmode != rmode + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/extern.h (sendrequest): update prototype + + * ftp/cmds.c: update calls to sendrequest and recvrequest to send + "b" when appropriate + + * ftp/ftp.c (sendrequest): add argument for mode to open file in. + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: rename getline -> ftpd_getline + + * ftp/main.c (makeargv): fill in unused slots with NULL + +Thu Apr 8 15:06:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER (moved to + config.h) + +Wed Apr 7 16:15:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): call gss_display_status to get a sane + error message; return AUTH_{CONTINUE,ERROR}, where appropriate + + * ftp/krb4.c: return AUTH_{CONTINUE,ERROR}, where appropriate + + * ftp/security.c (sec_login): if mechanism returns AUTH_CONTINUE, + just continue with the next mechanism, this fixes the case of + having GSSAPI fail because of non-existant of expired tickets + + * ftp/security.h: add AUTH_{OK,CONTINUE,ERROR} + +Thu Apr 1 16:59:04 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: don't run check-local + + * ftp/Makefile.am: don't run check-local + +Mon Mar 22 22:15:18 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (pass): fall-back for KRB_VERIFY_SECURE + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (pass): 1 -> KRB_VERIFY_SECURE + +Thu Mar 18 12:07:09 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: clean ftpcmd.c + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: remove krb5.h (breaks in ftpcmd.y) + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: move include of krb5.h here + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * ftp/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + + * common/Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Tue Mar 16 22:28:37 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: add krb5.h to get heimdal_version + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: krb_verify_user_multiple -> krb_verify_user + +Thu Mar 11 14:54:59 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/Makefile.in: WFLAGS + + * ftp/ruserpass.c: add some if-braces + +Wed Mar 10 20:02:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd_locl.h: remove ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH + +Mon Mar 8 21:29:24 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/ftpd.c: re-add version in greeting message + +Mon Mar 1 10:49:38 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/logwtmp.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + +Mon Feb 22 19:20:51 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * common/Makefile.in: remove glob + +Sat Feb 13 17:19:35 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (match): remove #ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH. We have a + fnmatch implementation in roken and therefore always have it. + + * ftp/ftp.c (copy_stream): initialize `werr' + +Wed Jan 13 23:52:57 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpcmd.y: moved all check_login and check_login_no_guest to + the end of the rules to ensure we don't generate several + (independent) error messages. once again, having a yacc-grammar + for FTP with embedded actions doesn't strike me as the most + optimal way of doing it. + +Tue Dec 1 14:44:29 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: link with extra libs for aix + +Sun Nov 22 10:28:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/ftpd.c (retrying): support on-the-fly decompression + + * ftpd/Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + + * ftp/ruserpass.c (guess_domain): new function + (ruserpass): use it + + * common/Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sat Nov 21 23:13:03 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c: some more type correctness. + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_adat): more braces to shut up warnings + +Wed Nov 18 21:47:55 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/main.c (main): new option `-p' for enable passive mode. + +Mon Nov 2 01:57:49 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c (getreply): remove extra `break' + + * ftp/gssapi.c (gss_auth): fixo typo(copyo?) + + * ftp/security.c (sec_login): fix loop and return value + +Tue Sep 1 16:56:42 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/cmds.c (quote1): fix % quoting bug + +Fri Aug 14 17:10:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/krb4.c: krb_put_int -> KRB_PUT_INT + +Tue Jun 30 18:07:15 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/security.c (auth): free `app_data' + (sec_end): only destroy if it was initialized + +Tue Jun 9 21:01:59 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/krb4.c: pass client address to krb_rd_req + +Sat May 16 00:02:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftpd/Makefile.am: link with DBLIB + +Tue May 12 14:15:32 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/gssapi.c: Save client name for userok(). + + * ftpd/gss_userok.c: Userok for gssapi. + +Fri May 1 07:15:01 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * ftp/ftp.c: unifdef -DHAVE_H_ERRNO + +Fri Mar 27 00:46:07 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Make compile w/o krb4. + +Thu Mar 26 03:49:12 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * ftp/*, ftpd/*: Changes for new framework. + + * ftp/gssapi.c: GSS-API backend for the new security framework. + + * ftp/krb4.c: Updated for new framework. + + * ftp/security.{c,h}: New unified security framework. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8831a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:14 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = common ftp ftpd diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9c0d09d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,598 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:14 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX 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"$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/buffer.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0385d49 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include +#include +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: buffer.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Allocate a buffer enough to handle st->st_blksize, if + * there is such a field, otherwise BUFSIZ. + */ + +void * +alloc_buffer (void *oldbuf, size_t *sz, struct stat *st) +{ + size_t new_sz; + + new_sz = BUFSIZ; +#ifdef HAVE_ST_BLKSIZE + if (st) + new_sz = max(BUFSIZ, st->st_blksize); +#endif + if(new_sz > *sz) { + if (oldbuf) + free (oldbuf); + oldbuf = malloc (new_sz); + if (oldbuf == NULL) { + warn ("malloc"); + *sz = 0; + return NULL; + } + *sz = new_sz; + } + return oldbuf; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/common.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5949b25 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: common.h,v 1.12 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef __COMMON_H__ +#define __COMMON_H__ + +#include "base64.h" + +void set_buffer_size(int, int); + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +void *alloc_buffer (void *oldbuf, size_t *sz, struct stat *st); + +#endif /* __COMMON_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..460cc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/common/sockbuf.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "common.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: sockbuf.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $"); + +void +set_buffer_size(int fd, int read) +{ +#if defined(SO_RCVBUF) && defined(SO_SNDBUF) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + size_t size = 4194304; + while(size >= 131072 && + setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, read ? SO_RCVBUF : SO_SNDBUF, + (void *)&size, sizeof(size)) < 0) + size /= 2; +#endif +} + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e24025c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 2000/01/06 15:11:43 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/../common $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = ftp + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +if KRB4 +krb4_sources = krb4.c kauth.c +endif +if KRB5 +krb5_sources = gssapi.c +endif + +ftp_SOURCES = \ + cmds.c \ + cmdtab.c \ + extern.h \ + ftp.c \ + ftp_locl.h \ + ftp_var.h \ + main.c \ + pathnames.h \ + ruserpass.c \ + domacro.c \ + globals.c \ + security.c \ + security.h \ + $(krb4_sources) \ + $(krb5_sources) + +EXTRA_ftp_SOURCES = krb4.c kauth.c gssapi.c + +man_MANS = ftp.1 + +LDADD = \ + ../common/libcommon.a \ + $(LIB_gssapi) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_readline) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f8603d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,702 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 2000/01/06 15:11:43 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include -I$(srcdir)/../common $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +bin_PROGRAMS = ftp + +@KRB4_TRUE@krb4_sources = krb4.c kauth.c +@KRB5_TRUE@krb5_sources = gssapi.c + +ftp_SOURCES = cmds.c cmdtab.c extern.h ftp.c ftp_locl.h ftp_var.h main.c pathnames.h ruserpass.c domacro.c globals.c security.c security.h $(krb4_sources) $(krb5_sources) + + +EXTRA_ftp_SOURCES = krb4.c kauth.c gssapi.c + +man_MANS = ftp.1 + +LDADD = ../common/libcommon.a $(LIB_gssapi) $(LIB_krb5) $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(LIB_roken) $(LIB_readline) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +bin_PROGRAMS = ftp$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@ftp_OBJECTS = cmds.$(OBJEXT) cmdtab.$(OBJEXT) \ +@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@ftp.$(OBJEXT) main.$(OBJEXT) ruserpass.$(OBJEXT) \ +@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@domacro.$(OBJEXT) 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\ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat1-mans: + @ext=1;\ + foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat3-mans: + @ext=3;\ + foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7698313 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmds.c @@ -0,0 +1,2116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * FTP User Program -- Command Routines. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: cmds.c,v 1.36 1999/09/16 20:37:28 assar Exp $"); + +typedef void (*sighand)(int); + +jmp_buf jabort; +char *mname; +char *home = "/"; + +/* + * `Another' gets another argument, and stores the new argc and argv. + * It reverts to the top level (via main.c's intr()) on EOF/error. + * + * Returns false if no new arguments have been added. + */ +int +another(int *pargc, char ***pargv, char *prompt) +{ + int len = strlen(line), ret; + + if (len >= sizeof(line) - 3) { + printf("sorry, arguments too long\n"); + intr(0); + } + printf("(%s) ", prompt); + line[len++] = ' '; + if (fgets(&line[len], sizeof(line) - len, stdin) == NULL) + intr(0); + len += strlen(&line[len]); + if (len > 0 && line[len - 1] == '\n') + line[len - 1] = '\0'; + makeargv(); + ret = margc > *pargc; + *pargc = margc; + *pargv = margv; + return (ret); +} + +/* + * Connect to peer server and + * auto-login, if possible. + */ +void +setpeer(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *host; + short port; + struct servent *sp; + + if (connected) { + printf("Already connected to %s, use close first.\n", + hostname); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (argc < 2) + another(&argc, &argv, "to"); + if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) { + printf("usage: %s host-name [port]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + sp = getservbyname("ftp", "tcp"); + if (sp == NULL) + errx(1, "You bastard. You removed ftp/tcp from services"); + port = sp->s_port; + if (argc > 2) { + port = atoi(argv[2]); + if (port <= 0) { + printf("%s: bad port number-- %s\n", argv[1], argv[2]); + printf ("usage: %s host-name [port]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + port = htons(port); + } + host = hookup(argv[1], port); + if (host) { + int overbose; + + connected = 1; + /* + * Set up defaults for FTP. + */ + strlcpy(typename, "ascii", sizeof(typename)); + type = TYPE_A; + curtype = TYPE_A; + strlcpy(formname, "non-print", sizeof(formname)); + form = FORM_N; + strlcpy(modename, "stream", sizeof(modename)); + mode = MODE_S; + strlcpy(structname, "file", sizeof(structname)); + stru = STRU_F; + strlcpy(bytename, "8", sizeof(bytename)); + bytesize = 8; + if (autologin) + login(argv[1]); + +#if (defined(unix) || defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || defined(_AIX) || defined(_CRAY)) && NBBY == 8 +/* + * this ifdef is to keep someone form "porting" this to an incompatible + * system and not checking this out. This way they have to think about it. + */ + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + if (command("SYST") == COMPLETE && overbose) { + char *cp, c; + cp = strchr(reply_string+4, ' '); + if (cp == NULL) + cp = strchr(reply_string+4, '\r'); + if (cp) { + if (cp[-1] == '.') + cp--; + c = *cp; + *cp = '\0'; + } + + printf("Remote system type is %s.\n", + reply_string+4); + if (cp) + *cp = c; + } + if (!strncmp(reply_string, "215 UNIX Type: L8", 17)) { + if (proxy) + unix_proxy = 1; + else + unix_server = 1; + /* + * Set type to 0 (not specified by user), + * meaning binary by default, but don't bother + * telling server. We can use binary + * for text files unless changed by the user. + */ + type = 0; + strlcpy(typename, "binary", sizeof(typename)); + if (overbose) + printf("Using %s mode to transfer files.\n", + typename); + } else { + if (proxy) + unix_proxy = 0; + else + unix_server = 0; + if (overbose && + !strncmp(reply_string, "215 TOPS20", 10)) + printf( +"Remember to set tenex mode when transfering binary files from this machine.\n"); + } + verbose = overbose; +#endif /* unix */ + } +} + +struct types { + char *t_name; + char *t_mode; + int t_type; + char *t_arg; +} types[] = { + { "ascii", "A", TYPE_A, 0 }, + { "binary", "I", TYPE_I, 0 }, + { "image", "I", TYPE_I, 0 }, + { "ebcdic", "E", TYPE_E, 0 }, + { "tenex", "L", TYPE_L, bytename }, + { NULL } +}; + +/* + * Set transfer type. + */ +void +settype(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct types *p; + int comret; + + if (argc > 2) { + char *sep; + + printf("usage: %s [", argv[0]); + sep = " "; + for (p = types; p->t_name; p++) { + printf("%s%s", sep, p->t_name); + sep = " | "; + } + printf(" ]\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (argc < 2) { + printf("Using %s mode to transfer files.\n", typename); + code = 0; + return; + } + for (p = types; p->t_name; p++) + if (strcmp(argv[1], p->t_name) == 0) + break; + if (p->t_name == 0) { + printf("%s: unknown mode\n", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if ((p->t_arg != NULL) && (*(p->t_arg) != '\0')) + comret = command ("TYPE %s %s", p->t_mode, p->t_arg); + else + comret = command("TYPE %s", p->t_mode); + if (comret == COMPLETE) { + strlcpy(typename, p->t_name, sizeof(typename)); + curtype = type = p->t_type; + } +} + +/* + * Internal form of settype; changes current type in use with server + * without changing our notion of the type for data transfers. + * Used to change to and from ascii for listings. + */ +void +changetype(int newtype, int show) +{ + struct types *p; + int comret, oldverbose = verbose; + + if (newtype == 0) + newtype = TYPE_I; + if (newtype == curtype) + return; + if (debug == 0 && show == 0) + verbose = 0; + for (p = types; p->t_name; p++) + if (newtype == p->t_type) + break; + if (p->t_name == 0) { + printf("ftp: internal error: unknown type %d\n", newtype); + return; + } + if (newtype == TYPE_L && bytename[0] != '\0') + comret = command("TYPE %s %s", p->t_mode, bytename); + else + comret = command("TYPE %s", p->t_mode); + if (comret == COMPLETE) + curtype = newtype; + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +char *stype[] = { + "type", + "", + 0 +}; + +/* + * Set binary transfer type. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +setbinary(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + stype[1] = "binary"; + settype(2, stype); +} + +/* + * Set ascii transfer type. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +setascii(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + stype[1] = "ascii"; + settype(2, stype); +} + +/* + * Set tenex transfer type. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +settenex(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + stype[1] = "tenex"; + settype(2, stype); +} + +/* + * Set file transfer mode. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +setftmode(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + printf("We only support %s mode, sorry.\n", modename); + code = -1; +} + +/* + * Set file transfer format. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +setform(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + printf("We only support %s format, sorry.\n", formname); + code = -1; +} + +/* + * Set file transfer structure. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +setstruct(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + printf("We only support %s structure, sorry.\n", structname); + code = -1; +} + +/* + * Send a single file. + */ +void +put(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cmd; + int loc = 0; + char *oldargv1, *oldargv2; + + if (argc == 2) { + argc++; + argv[2] = argv[1]; + loc++; + } + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-file")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-file")) { +usage: + printf("usage: %s local-file remote-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + oldargv1 = argv[1]; + oldargv2 = argv[2]; + if (!globulize(&argv[1])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + /* + * If "globulize" modifies argv[1], and argv[2] is a copy of + * the old argv[1], make it a copy of the new argv[1]. + */ + if (argv[1] != oldargv1 && argv[2] == oldargv1) { + argv[2] = argv[1]; + } + cmd = (argv[0][0] == 'a') ? "APPE" : ((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR"); + if (loc && ntflag) { + argv[2] = dotrans(argv[2]); + } + if (loc && mapflag) { + argv[2] = domap(argv[2]); + } + sendrequest(cmd, argv[1], argv[2], + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + argv[1] != oldargv1 || argv[2] != oldargv2); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static RETSIGTYPE +mabort(int signo) +{ + int ointer; + + printf("\n"); + fflush(stdout); + if (mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with", mname)) { + interactive = ointer; + longjmp(jabort,0); + } + interactive = ointer; + } + mflag = 0; + longjmp(jabort,0); +} + +/* + * Send multiple files. + */ +void +mput(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + RETSIGTYPE (*oldintr)(); + int ointer; + char *tp; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-files")) { + printf("usage: %s local-files\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + if (proxy) { + char *cp, *tp2, tmpbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + while ((cp = remglob(argv,0)) != NULL) { + if (*cp == 0) { + mflag = 0; + continue; + } + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], cp)) { + tp = cp; + if (mcase) { + while (*tp && !islower(*tp)) { + tp++; + } + if (!*tp) { + tp = cp; + tp2 = tmpbuf; + while ((*tp2 = *tp) != '\0') { + if (isupper(*tp2)) { + *tp2 = 'a' + *tp2 - 'A'; + } + tp++; + tp2++; + } + } + tp = tmpbuf; + } + if (ntflag) { + tp = dotrans(tp); + } + if (mapflag) { + tp = domap(tp); + } + sendrequest((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR", + cp, tp, + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + cp != tp || !interactive); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mput")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; + return; + } + for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + char **cpp; + glob_t gl; + int flags; + + if (!doglob) { + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], argv[i])) { + tp = (ntflag) ? dotrans(argv[i]) : argv[i]; + tp = (mapflag) ? domap(tp) : tp; + sendrequest((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR", + argv[i], + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + tp, tp != argv[i] || !interactive); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mput")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + continue; + } + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + if (glob(argv[i], flags, NULL, &gl) || gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + warnx("%s: not found", argv[i]); + globfree(&gl); + continue; + } + for (cpp = gl.gl_pathv; cpp && *cpp != NULL; cpp++) { + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], *cpp)) { + tp = (ntflag) ? dotrans(*cpp) : *cpp; + tp = (mapflag) ? domap(tp) : tp; + sendrequest((sunique) ? "STOU" : "STOR", + *cpp, tp, + curtype == TYPE_I ? "rb" : "r", + *cpp != tp || !interactive); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mput")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + globfree(&gl); + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +void +reget(int argc, char **argv) +{ + getit(argc, argv, 1, curtype == TYPE_I ? "r+wb" : "r+w"); +} + +void +get(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *mode; + + if (restart_point) + if (curtype == TYPE_I) + mode = "r+wb"; + else + mode = "r+w"; + else + if (curtype == TYPE_I) + mode = "wb"; + else + mode = "w"; + + getit(argc, argv, 0, mode); +} + +/* + * Receive one file. + */ +int +getit(int argc, char **argv, int restartit, char *mode) +{ + int loc = 0; + int local_given = 1; + char *oldargv1, *oldargv2; + + if (argc == 2) { + argc++; + local_given = 0; + argv[2] = argv[1]; + loc++; + } + if ((argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-file")) || + (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-file"))) { + printf("usage: %s remote-file [ local-file ]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return (0); + } + oldargv1 = argv[1]; + oldargv2 = argv[2]; + if (!globulize(&argv[2])) { + code = -1; + return (0); + } + if (loc && mcase) { + char *tp = argv[1], *tp2, tmpbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + while (*tp && !islower(*tp)) { + tp++; + } + if (!*tp) { + tp = argv[2]; + tp2 = tmpbuf; + while ((*tp2 = *tp) != '\0') { + if (isupper(*tp2)) { + *tp2 = 'a' + *tp2 - 'A'; + } + tp++; + tp2++; + } + argv[2] = tmpbuf; + } + } + if (loc && ntflag) + argv[2] = dotrans(argv[2]); + if (loc && mapflag) + argv[2] = domap(argv[2]); + if (restartit) { + struct stat stbuf; + int ret; + + ret = stat(argv[2], &stbuf); + if (restartit == 1) { + if (ret < 0) { + warn("local: %s", argv[2]); + return (0); + } + restart_point = stbuf.st_size; + } else if (ret == 0) { + int overbose; + int cmdret; + int yy, mo, day, hour, min, sec; + struct tm *tm; + + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + cmdret = command("MDTM %s", argv[1]); + verbose = overbose; + if (cmdret != COMPLETE) { + printf("%s\n", reply_string); + return (0); + } + if (sscanf(reply_string, + "%*s %04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", + &yy, &mo, &day, &hour, &min, &sec) + != 6) { + printf ("bad MDTM result\n"); + return (0); + } + + tm = gmtime(&stbuf.st_mtime); + tm->tm_mon++; + tm->tm_year += 1900; + + if ((tm->tm_year > yy) || + (tm->tm_year == yy && + tm->tm_mon > mo) || + (tm->tm_mon == mo && + tm->tm_mday > day) || + (tm->tm_mday == day && + tm->tm_hour > hour) || + (tm->tm_hour == hour && + tm->tm_min > min) || + (tm->tm_min == min && + tm->tm_sec > sec)) + return (1); + } + } + + recvrequest("RETR", argv[2], argv[1], mode, + argv[1] != oldargv1 || argv[2] != oldargv2, local_given); + restart_point = 0; + return (0); +} + +static int +suspicious_filename(const char *fn) +{ + return strstr(fn, "../") != NULL || *fn == '/'; +} + +/* + * Get multiple files. + */ +void +mget(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int ch, ointer; + char *cp, *tp, *tp2, tmpbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-files")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-files\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + while ((cp = remglob(argv,proxy)) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '\0') { + mflag = 0; + continue; + } + if (mflag && suspicious_filename(cp)) + printf("*** Suspicious filename: %s\n", cp); + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], cp)) { + tp = cp; + if (mcase) { + for (tp2 = tmpbuf; (ch = *tp++);) + *tp2++ = isupper(ch) ? tolower(ch) : ch; + *tp2 = '\0'; + tp = tmpbuf; + } + if (ntflag) { + tp = dotrans(tp); + } + if (mapflag) { + tp = domap(tp); + } + recvrequest("RETR", tp, cp, + curtype == TYPE_I ? "wb" : "w", + tp != cp || !interactive, 0); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with","mget")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + signal(SIGINT,oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +char * +remglob(char **argv, int doswitch) +{ + char temp[16]; + static char buf[MaxPathLen]; + static FILE *ftemp = NULL; + static char **args; + int oldverbose, oldhash; + char *cp, *mode; + + if (!mflag) { + if (!doglob) { + args = NULL; + } + else { + if (ftemp) { + fclose(ftemp); + ftemp = NULL; + } + } + return (NULL); + } + if (!doglob) { + if (args == NULL) + args = argv; + if ((cp = *++args) == NULL) + args = NULL; + return (cp); + } + if (ftemp == NULL) { + int fd; + strlcpy(temp, _PATH_TMP_XXX, sizeof(temp)); + fd = mkstemp(temp); + if(fd < 0){ + warn("unable to create temporary file %s", temp); + return NULL; + } + close(fd); + oldverbose = verbose, verbose = 0; + oldhash = hash, hash = 0; + if (doswitch) { + pswitch(!proxy); + } + for (mode = "w"; *++argv != NULL; mode = "a") + recvrequest ("NLST", temp, *argv, mode, 0, 0); + if (doswitch) { + pswitch(!proxy); + } + verbose = oldverbose; hash = oldhash; + ftemp = fopen(temp, "r"); + unlink(temp); + if (ftemp == NULL) { + printf("can't find list of remote files, oops\n"); + return (NULL); + } + } + while(fgets(buf, sizeof (buf), ftemp)) { + if ((cp = strchr(buf, '\n')) != NULL) + *cp = '\0'; + if(!interactive && suspicious_filename(buf)){ + printf("Ignoring remote globbed file `%s'\n", buf); + continue; + } + return buf; + } + fclose(ftemp); + ftemp = NULL; + return (NULL); +} + +char * +onoff(int bool) +{ + + return (bool ? "on" : "off"); +} + +/* + * Show status. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +status(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + + if (connected) + printf("Connected to %s.\n", hostname); + else + printf("Not connected.\n"); + if (!proxy) { + pswitch(1); + if (connected) { + printf("Connected for proxy commands to %s.\n", hostname); + } + else { + printf("No proxy connection.\n"); + } + pswitch(0); + } + sec_status(); + printf("Mode: %s; Type: %s; Form: %s; Structure: %s\n", + modename, typename, formname, structname); + printf("Verbose: %s; Bell: %s; Prompting: %s; Globbing: %s\n", + onoff(verbose), onoff(bell), onoff(interactive), + onoff(doglob)); + printf("Store unique: %s; Receive unique: %s\n", onoff(sunique), + onoff(runique)); + printf("Case: %s; CR stripping: %s\n",onoff(mcase),onoff(crflag)); + if (ntflag) { + printf("Ntrans: (in) %s (out) %s\n", ntin,ntout); + } + else { + printf("Ntrans: off\n"); + } + if (mapflag) { + printf("Nmap: (in) %s (out) %s\n", mapin, mapout); + } + else { + printf("Nmap: off\n"); + } + printf("Hash mark printing: %s; Use of PORT cmds: %s\n", + onoff(hash), onoff(sendport)); + if (macnum > 0) { + printf("Macros:\n"); + for (i=0; i 1) { + val = atoi(argv[1]); + if (val < 0) { + printf("%s: bad debugging value.\n", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + } else + val = !debug; + debug = val; + if (debug) + options |= SO_DEBUG; + else + options &= ~SO_DEBUG; + printf("Debugging %s (debug=%d).\n", onoff(debug), debug); + code = debug > 0; +} + +/* + * Set current working directory + * on remote machine. + */ +void +cd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-directory")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-directory\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("CWD %s", argv[1]) == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("CWD command not recognized, trying XCWD\n"); + command("XCWD %s", argv[1]); + } +} + +/* + * Set current working directory + * on local machine. + */ +void +lcd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (argc < 2) + argc++, argv[1] = home; + if (argc != 2) { + printf("usage: %s local-directory\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (!globulize(&argv[1])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + if (chdir(argv[1]) < 0) { + warn("local: %s", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (getcwd(buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL) + printf("Local directory now %s\n", buf); + else + warnx("getwd: %s", buf); + code = 0; +} + +/* + * Delete a single file. + */ +void +delete(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-file")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + command("DELE %s", argv[1]); +} + +/* + * Delete multiple files. + */ +void +mdelete(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int ointer; + char *cp; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-files")) { + printf("usage: %s remote-files\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + while ((cp = remglob(argv,0)) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '\0') { + mflag = 0; + continue; + } + if (mflag && confirm(argv[0], cp)) { + command("DELE %s", cp); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with", "mdelete")) { + mflag++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +/* + * Rename a remote file. + */ +void +renamefile(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "from-name")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "to-name")) { +usage: + printf("%s from-name to-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("RNFR %s", argv[1]) == CONTINUE) + command("RNTO %s", argv[2]); +} + +/* + * Get a directory listing + * of remote files. + */ +void +ls(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cmd; + + if (argc < 2) + argc++, argv[1] = NULL; + if (argc < 3) + argc++, argv[2] = "-"; + if (argc > 3) { + printf("usage: %s remote-directory local-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + cmd = argv[0][0] == 'n' ? "NLST" : "LIST"; + if (strcmp(argv[2], "-") && !globulize(&argv[2])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + if (strcmp(argv[2], "-") && *argv[2] != '|') + if (!globulize(&argv[2]) || !confirm("output to local-file:", + argv[2])) { + code = -1; + return; + } + recvrequest(cmd, argv[2], argv[1], "w", 0, 1); +} + +/* + * Get a directory listing + * of multiple remote files. + */ +void +mls(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int ointer, i; + char *cmd, mode[1], *dest; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "remote-files")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "local-file")) { +usage: + printf("usage: %s remote-files local-file\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + dest = argv[argc - 1]; + argv[argc - 1] = NULL; + if (strcmp(dest, "-") && *dest != '|') + if (!globulize(&dest) || + !confirm("output to local-file:", dest)) { + code = -1; + return; + } + cmd = argv[0][1] == 'l' ? "NLST" : "LIST"; + mname = argv[0]; + mflag = 1; + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, mabort); + setjmp(jabort); + for (i = 1; mflag && i < argc-1; ++i) { + *mode = (i == 1) ? 'w' : 'a'; + recvrequest(cmd, dest, argv[i], mode, 0, 1); + if (!mflag && fromatty) { + ointer = interactive; + interactive = 1; + if (confirm("Continue with", argv[0])) { + mflag ++; + } + interactive = ointer; + } + } + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + mflag = 0; +} + +/* + * Do a shell escape + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +void +shell(int argc, char **argv) +{ + pid_t pid; + RETSIGTYPE (*old1)(), (*old2)(); + char shellnam[40], *shell, *namep; + int status; + + old1 = signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + old2 = signal (SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + for (pid = 3; pid < 20; pid++) + close(pid); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); + shell = getenv("SHELL"); + if (shell == NULL) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + namep = strrchr(shell,'/'); + if (namep == NULL) + namep = shell; + snprintf (shellnam, sizeof(shellnam), + "-%s", ++namep); + if (strcmp(namep, "sh") != 0) + shellnam[0] = '+'; + if (debug) { + printf ("%s\n", shell); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (argc > 1) { + execl(shell,shellnam,"-c",altarg,(char *)0); + } + else { + execl(shell,shellnam,(char *)0); + } + warn("%s", shell); + code = -1; + exit(1); + } + if (pid > 0) + while (waitpid(-1, &status, 0) != pid) + ; + signal(SIGINT, old1); + signal(SIGQUIT, old2); + if (pid == -1) { + warn("%s", "Try again later"); + code = -1; + } + else { + code = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Send new user information (re-login) + */ +void +user(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char acct[80]; + int n, aflag = 0; + char tmp[256]; + + if (argc < 2) + another(&argc, &argv, "username"); + if (argc < 2 || argc > 4) { + printf("usage: %s username [password] [account]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + n = command("USER %s", argv[1]); + if (n == CONTINUE) { + if (argc < 3 ) { + des_read_pw_string (tmp, + sizeof(tmp), + "Password: ", 0); + argv[2] = tmp; + argc++; + } + n = command("PASS %s", argv[2]); + } + if (n == CONTINUE) { + if (argc < 4) { + printf("Account: "); fflush(stdout); + fgets(acct, sizeof(acct) - 1, stdin); + acct[strlen(acct) - 1] = '\0'; + argv[3] = acct; argc++; + } + n = command("ACCT %s", argv[3]); + aflag++; + } + if (n != COMPLETE) { + fprintf(stdout, "Login failed.\n"); + return; + } + if (!aflag && argc == 4) { + command("ACCT %s", argv[3]); + } +} + +/* + * Print working directory. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +pwd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + /* + * If we aren't verbose, this doesn't do anything! + */ + verbose = 1; + if (command("PWD") == ERROR && code == 500) { + printf("PWD command not recognized, trying XPWD\n"); + command("XPWD"); + } + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +/* + * Make a directory. + */ +void +makedir(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "directory-name")) { + printf("usage: %s directory-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("MKD %s", argv[1]) == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("MKD command not recognized, trying XMKD\n"); + command("XMKD %s", argv[1]); + } +} + +/* + * Remove a directory. + */ +void +removedir(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "directory-name")) { + printf("usage: %s directory-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (command("RMD %s", argv[1]) == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("RMD command not recognized, trying XRMD\n"); + command("XRMD %s", argv[1]); + } +} + +/* + * Send a line, verbatim, to the remote machine. + */ +void +quote(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "command line to send")) { + printf("usage: %s line-to-send\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + quote1("", argc, argv); +} + +/* + * Send a SITE command to the remote machine. The line + * is sent verbatim to the remote machine, except that the + * word "SITE" is added at the front. + */ +void +site(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "arguments to SITE command")) { + printf("usage: %s line-to-send\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + quote1("SITE ", argc, argv); +} + +/* + * Turn argv[1..argc) into a space-separated string, then prepend initial text. + * Send the result as a one-line command and get response. + */ +void +quote1(char *initial, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; /* must be >= sizeof(line) */ + + strlcpy(buf, initial, sizeof(buf)); + for(i = 1; i < argc; i++) { + if(i > 1) + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, argv[i], sizeof(buf)); + } + if (command("%s", buf) == PRELIM) { + while (getreply(0) == PRELIM) + continue; + } +} + +void +do_chmod(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "mode")) + goto usage; + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "file-name")) { +usage: + printf("usage: %s mode file-name\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + command("SITE CHMOD %s %s", argv[1], argv[2]); +} + +void +do_umask(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + verbose = 1; + command(argc == 1 ? "SITE UMASK" : "SITE UMASK %s", argv[1]); + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +void +ftp_idle(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + verbose = 1; + command(argc == 1 ? "SITE IDLE" : "SITE IDLE %s", argv[1]); + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +/* + * Ask the other side for help. + */ +void +rmthelp(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int oldverbose = verbose; + + verbose = 1; + command(argc == 1 ? "HELP" : "HELP %s", argv[1]); + verbose = oldverbose; +} + +/* + * Terminate session and exit. + */ +/*VARARGS*/ +void +quit(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (connected) + disconnect(0, 0); + pswitch(1); + if (connected) { + disconnect(0, 0); + } + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Terminate session, but don't exit. + */ +void +disconnect(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (!connected) + return; + command("QUIT"); + if (cout) { + fclose(cout); + } + cout = NULL; + connected = 0; + sec_end(); + data = -1; + if (!proxy) { + macnum = 0; + } +} + +int +confirm(char *cmd, char *file) +{ + char line[BUFSIZ]; + + if (!interactive) + return (1); + printf("%s %s? ", cmd, file); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(line, sizeof line, stdin) == NULL) + return (0); + return (*line == 'y' || *line == 'Y'); +} + +void +fatal(char *msg) +{ + + errx(1, "%s", msg); +} + +/* + * Glob a local file name specification with + * the expectation of a single return value. + * Can't control multiple values being expanded + * from the expression, we return only the first. + */ +int +globulize(char **cpp) +{ + glob_t gl; + int flags; + + if (!doglob) + return (1); + + flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + if (glob(*cpp, flags, NULL, &gl) || + gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + warnx("%s: not found", *cpp); + globfree(&gl); + return (0); + } + *cpp = strdup(gl.gl_pathv[0]); /* XXX - wasted memory */ + globfree(&gl); + return (1); +} + +void +account(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char acct[50]; + + if (argc > 1) { + ++argv; + --argc; + strlcpy (acct, *argv, sizeof(acct)); + while (argc > 1) { + --argc; + ++argv; + strlcat(acct, *argv, sizeof(acct)); + } + } + else { + des_read_pw_string(acct, sizeof(acct), "Account:", 0); + } + command("ACCT %s", acct); +} + +jmp_buf abortprox; + +static RETSIGTYPE +proxabort(int sig) +{ + + if (!proxy) { + pswitch(1); + } + if (connected) { + proxflag = 1; + } + else { + proxflag = 0; + } + pswitch(0); + longjmp(abortprox,1); +} + +void +doproxy(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct cmd *c; + RETSIGTYPE (*oldintr)(); + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "command")) { + printf("usage: %s command\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + c = getcmd(argv[1]); + if (c == (struct cmd *) -1) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\n"); + fflush(stdout); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\n"); + fflush(stdout); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (!c->c_proxy) { + printf("?Invalid proxy command\n"); + fflush(stdout); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (setjmp(abortprox)) { + code = -1; + return; + } + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, proxabort); + pswitch(1); + if (c->c_conn && !connected) { + printf("Not connected\n"); + fflush(stdout); + pswitch(0); + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + (*c->c_handler)(argc-1, argv+1); + if (connected) { + proxflag = 1; + } + else { + proxflag = 0; + } + pswitch(0); + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); +} + +void +setcase(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + mcase = !mcase; + printf("Case mapping %s.\n", onoff(mcase)); + code = mcase; +} + +void +setcr(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + crflag = !crflag; + printf("Carriage Return stripping %s.\n", onoff(crflag)); + code = crflag; +} + +void +setntrans(int argc, char **argv) +{ + if (argc == 1) { + ntflag = 0; + printf("Ntrans off.\n"); + code = ntflag; + return; + } + ntflag++; + code = ntflag; + strlcpy (ntin, argv[1], 17); + if (argc == 2) { + ntout[0] = '\0'; + return; + } + strlcpy (ntout, argv[2], 17); +} + +char * +dotrans(char *name) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + char *cp1, *cp2 = new; + int i, ostop, found; + + for (ostop = 0; *(ntout + ostop) && ostop < 16; ostop++) + continue; + for (cp1 = name; *cp1; cp1++) { + found = 0; + for (i = 0; *(ntin + i) && i < 16; i++) { + if (*cp1 == *(ntin + i)) { + found++; + if (i < ostop) { + *cp2++ = *(ntout + i); + } + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + *cp2++ = *cp1; + } + } + *cp2 = '\0'; + return (new); +} + +void +setnmap(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cp; + + if (argc == 1) { + mapflag = 0; + printf("Nmap off.\n"); + code = mapflag; + return; + } + if (argc < 3 && !another(&argc, &argv, "mapout")) { + printf("Usage: %s [mapin mapout]\n",argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + mapflag = 1; + code = 1; + cp = strchr(altarg, ' '); + if (proxy) { + while(*++cp == ' ') + continue; + altarg = cp; + cp = strchr(altarg, ' '); + } + *cp = '\0'; + strlcpy(mapin, altarg, MaxPathLen); + while (*++cp == ' ') + continue; + strlcpy(mapout, cp, MaxPathLen); +} + +char * +domap(char *name) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + char *cp1 = name, *cp2 = mapin; + char *tp[9], *te[9]; + int i, toks[9], toknum = 0, match = 1; + + for (i=0; i < 9; ++i) { + toks[i] = 0; + } + while (match && *cp1 && *cp2) { + switch (*cp2) { + case '\\': + if (*++cp2 != *cp1) { + match = 0; + } + break; + case '$': + if (*(cp2+1) >= '1' && (*cp2+1) <= '9') { + if (*cp1 != *(++cp2+1)) { + toks[toknum = *cp2 - '1']++; + tp[toknum] = cp1; + while (*++cp1 && *(cp2+1) + != *cp1); + te[toknum] = cp1; + } + cp2++; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + if (*cp2 != *cp1) { + match = 0; + } + break; + } + if (match && *cp1) { + cp1++; + } + if (match && *cp2) { + cp2++; + } + } + if (!match && *cp1) /* last token mismatch */ + { + toks[toknum] = 0; + } + cp1 = new; + *cp1 = '\0'; + cp2 = mapout; + while (*cp2) { + match = 0; + switch (*cp2) { + case '\\': + if (*(cp2 + 1)) { + *cp1++ = *++cp2; + } + break; + case '[': +LOOP: + if (*++cp2 == '$' && isdigit(*(cp2+1))) { + if (*++cp2 == '0') { + char *cp3 = name; + + while (*cp3) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + match = 1; + } + else if (toks[toknum = *cp2 - '1']) { + char *cp3 = tp[toknum]; + + while (cp3 != te[toknum]) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + match = 1; + } + } + else { + while (*cp2 && *cp2 != ',' && + *cp2 != ']') { + if (*cp2 == '\\') { + cp2++; + } + else if (*cp2 == '$' && + isdigit(*(cp2+1))) { + if (*++cp2 == '0') { + char *cp3 = name; + + while (*cp3) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + else if (toks[toknum = + *cp2 - '1']) { + char *cp3=tp[toknum]; + + while (cp3 != + te[toknum]) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + } + else if (*cp2) { + *cp1++ = *cp2++; + } + } + if (!*cp2) { + printf("nmap: unbalanced brackets\n"); + return (name); + } + match = 1; + cp2--; + } + if (match) { + while (*++cp2 && *cp2 != ']') { + if (*cp2 == '\\' && *(cp2 + 1)) { + cp2++; + } + } + if (!*cp2) { + printf("nmap: unbalanced brackets\n"); + return (name); + } + break; + } + switch (*++cp2) { + case ',': + goto LOOP; + case ']': + break; + default: + cp2--; + goto LOOP; + } + break; + case '$': + if (isdigit(*(cp2 + 1))) { + if (*++cp2 == '0') { + char *cp3 = name; + + while (*cp3) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + else if (toks[toknum = *cp2 - '1']) { + char *cp3 = tp[toknum]; + + while (cp3 != te[toknum]) { + *cp1++ = *cp3++; + } + } + break; + } + /* intentional drop through */ + default: + *cp1++ = *cp2; + break; + } + cp2++; + } + *cp1 = '\0'; + if (!*new) { + return (name); + } + return (new); +} + +void +setpassive(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + passivemode = !passivemode; + printf("Passive mode %s.\n", onoff(passivemode)); + code = passivemode; +} + +void +setsunique(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + sunique = !sunique; + printf("Store unique %s.\n", onoff(sunique)); + code = sunique; +} + +void +setrunique(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + runique = !runique; + printf("Receive unique %s.\n", onoff(runique)); + code = runique; +} + +/* change directory to perent directory */ +void +cdup(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (command("CDUP") == ERROR && code == 500) { + if (verbose) + printf("CDUP command not recognized, trying XCUP\n"); + command("XCUP"); + } +} + +/* restart transfer at specific point */ +void +restart(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc != 2) + printf("restart: offset not specified\n"); + else { + restart_point = atol(argv[1]); + printf("restarting at %ld. %s\n", (long)restart_point, + "execute get, put or append to initiate transfer"); + } +} + +/* show remote system type */ +void +syst(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + command("SYST"); +} + +void +macdef(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *tmp; + int c; + + if (macnum == 16) { + printf("Limit of 16 macros have already been defined\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "macro name")) { + printf("Usage: %s macro_name\n",argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (interactive) { + printf("Enter macro line by line, terminating it with a null line\n"); + } + strlcpy(macros[macnum].mac_name, + argv[1], + sizeof(macros[macnum].mac_name)); + if (macnum == 0) { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macbuf; + } + else { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macros[macnum - 1].mac_end + 1; + } + tmp = macros[macnum].mac_start; + while (tmp != macbuf+4096) { + if ((c = getchar()) == EOF) { + printf("macdef:end of file encountered\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + if ((*tmp = c) == '\n') { + if (tmp == macros[macnum].mac_start) { + macros[macnum++].mac_end = tmp; + code = 0; + return; + } + if (*(tmp-1) == '\0') { + macros[macnum++].mac_end = tmp - 1; + code = 0; + return; + } + *tmp = '\0'; + } + tmp++; + } + while (1) { + while ((c = getchar()) != '\n' && c != EOF) + /* LOOP */; + if (c == EOF || getchar() == '\n') { + printf("Macro not defined - 4k buffer exceeded\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + } +} + +/* + * get size of file on remote machine + */ +void +sizecmd(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "filename")) { + printf("usage: %s filename\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + command("SIZE %s", argv[1]); +} + +/* + * get last modification time of file on remote machine + */ +void +modtime(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int overbose; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "filename")) { + printf("usage: %s filename\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + if (command("MDTM %s", argv[1]) == COMPLETE) { + int yy, mo, day, hour, min, sec; + sscanf(reply_string, "%*s %04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", &yy, &mo, + &day, &hour, &min, &sec); + /* might want to print this in local time */ + printf("%s\t%02d/%02d/%04d %02d:%02d:%02d GMT\n", argv[1], + mo, day, yy, hour, min, sec); + } else + printf("%s\n", reply_string); + verbose = overbose; +} + +/* + * show status on reomte machine + */ +void +rmtstatus(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + command(argc > 1 ? "STAT %s" : "STAT" , argv[1]); +} + +/* + * get file if modtime is more recent than current file + */ +void +newer(int argc, char **argv) +{ + + if (getit(argc, argv, -1, curtype == TYPE_I ? "wb" : "w")) + printf("Local file \"%s\" is newer than remote file \"%s\"\n", + argv[2], argv[1]); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5dc96ef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/cmdtab.c @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" + +/* + * User FTP -- Command Tables. + */ + +char accounthelp[] = "send account command to remote server"; +char appendhelp[] = "append to a file"; +char asciihelp[] = "set ascii transfer type"; +char beephelp[] = "beep when command completed"; +char binaryhelp[] = "set binary transfer type"; +char casehelp[] = "toggle mget upper/lower case id mapping"; +char cdhelp[] = "change remote working directory"; +char cduphelp[] = "change remote working directory to parent directory"; +char chmodhelp[] = "change file permissions of remote file"; +char connecthelp[] = "connect to remote tftp"; +char crhelp[] = "toggle carriage return stripping on ascii gets"; +char deletehelp[] = "delete remote file"; +char debughelp[] = "toggle/set debugging mode"; +char dirhelp[] = "list contents of remote directory"; +char disconhelp[] = "terminate ftp session"; +char domachelp[] = "execute macro"; +char formhelp[] = "set file transfer format"; +char globhelp[] = "toggle metacharacter expansion of local file names"; +char hashhelp[] = "toggle printing `#' for each buffer transferred"; +char helphelp[] = "print local help information"; +char idlehelp[] = "get (set) idle timer on remote side"; +char lcdhelp[] = "change local working directory"; +char lshelp[] = "list contents of remote directory"; +char macdefhelp[] = "define a macro"; +char mdeletehelp[] = "delete multiple files"; +char mdirhelp[] = "list contents of multiple remote directories"; +char mgethelp[] = "get multiple files"; +char mkdirhelp[] = "make directory on the remote machine"; +char mlshelp[] = "list contents of multiple remote directories"; +char modtimehelp[] = "show last modification time of remote file"; +char modehelp[] = "set file transfer mode"; +char mputhelp[] = "send multiple files"; +char newerhelp[] = "get file if remote file is newer than local file "; +char nlisthelp[] = "nlist contents of remote directory"; +char nmaphelp[] = "set templates for default file name mapping"; +char ntranshelp[] = "set translation table for default file name mapping"; +char porthelp[] = "toggle use of PORT cmd for each data connection"; +char prompthelp[] = "force interactive prompting on multiple commands"; +char proxyhelp[] = "issue command on alternate connection"; +char pwdhelp[] = "print working directory on remote machine"; +char quithelp[] = "terminate ftp session and exit"; +char quotehelp[] = "send arbitrary ftp command"; +char receivehelp[] = "receive file"; +char regethelp[] = "get file restarting at end of local file"; +char remotehelp[] = "get help from remote server"; +char renamehelp[] = "rename file"; +char restarthelp[]= "restart file transfer at bytecount"; +char rmdirhelp[] = "remove directory on the remote machine"; +char rmtstatushelp[]="show status of remote machine"; +char runiquehelp[] = "toggle store unique for local files"; +char resethelp[] = "clear queued command replies"; +char sendhelp[] = "send one file"; +char passivehelp[] = "enter passive transfer mode"; +char sitehelp[] = "send site specific command to remote server\n\t\tTry \"rhelp site\" or \"site help\" for more information"; +char shellhelp[] = "escape to the shell"; +char sizecmdhelp[] = "show size of remote file"; +char statushelp[] = "show current status"; +char structhelp[] = "set file transfer structure"; +char suniquehelp[] = "toggle store unique on remote machine"; +char systemhelp[] = "show remote system type"; +char tenexhelp[] = "set tenex file transfer type"; +char tracehelp[] = "toggle packet tracing"; +char typehelp[] = "set file transfer type"; +char umaskhelp[] = "get (set) umask on remote side"; +char userhelp[] = "send new user information"; +char verbosehelp[] = "toggle verbose mode"; + +char prothelp[] = "set protection level"; +#ifdef KRB4 +char kauthhelp[] = "get remote tokens"; +char klisthelp[] = "show remote tickets"; +char kdestroyhelp[] = "destroy remote tickets"; +char krbtkfilehelp[] = "set filename of remote tickets"; +char afsloghelp[] = "obtain remote AFS tokens"; +#endif + +struct cmd cmdtab[] = { + { "!", shellhelp, 0, 0, 0, shell }, + { "$", domachelp, 1, 0, 0, domacro }, + { "account", accounthelp, 0, 1, 1, account}, + { "append", appendhelp, 1, 1, 1, put }, + { "ascii", asciihelp, 0, 1, 1, setascii }, + { "bell", beephelp, 0, 0, 0, setbell }, + { "binary", binaryhelp, 0, 1, 1, setbinary }, + { "bye", quithelp, 0, 0, 0, quit }, + { "case", casehelp, 0, 0, 1, setcase }, + { "cd", cdhelp, 0, 1, 1, cd }, + { "cdup", cduphelp, 0, 1, 1, cdup }, + { "chmod", chmodhelp, 0, 1, 1, do_chmod }, + { "close", disconhelp, 0, 1, 1, disconnect }, + { "cr", crhelp, 0, 0, 0, setcr }, + { "delete", deletehelp, 0, 1, 1, delete }, + { "debug", debughelp, 0, 0, 0, setdebug }, + { "dir", dirhelp, 1, 1, 1, ls }, + { "disconnect", disconhelp, 0, 1, 1, disconnect }, + { "form", formhelp, 0, 1, 1, setform }, + { "get", receivehelp, 1, 1, 1, get }, + { "glob", globhelp, 0, 0, 0, setglob }, + { "hash", hashhelp, 0, 0, 0, sethash }, + { "help", helphelp, 0, 0, 1, help }, + { "idle", idlehelp, 0, 1, 1, ftp_idle }, + { "image", binaryhelp, 0, 1, 1, setbinary }, + { "lcd", lcdhelp, 0, 0, 0, lcd }, + { "ls", lshelp, 1, 1, 1, ls }, + { "macdef", macdefhelp, 0, 0, 0, macdef }, + { "mdelete", mdeletehelp, 1, 1, 1, mdelete }, + { "mdir", mdirhelp, 1, 1, 1, mls }, + { "mget", mgethelp, 1, 1, 1, mget }, + { "mkdir", mkdirhelp, 0, 1, 1, makedir }, + { "mls", mlshelp, 1, 1, 1, mls }, + { "mode", modehelp, 0, 1, 1, setftmode }, + { "modtime", modtimehelp, 0, 1, 1, modtime }, + { "mput", mputhelp, 1, 1, 1, mput }, + { "newer", newerhelp, 1, 1, 1, newer }, + { "nmap", nmaphelp, 0, 0, 1, setnmap }, + { "nlist", nlisthelp, 1, 1, 1, ls }, + { "ntrans", ntranshelp, 0, 0, 1, setntrans }, + { "open", connecthelp, 0, 0, 1, setpeer }, + { "passive", passivehelp, 0, 0, 0, setpassive }, + { "prompt", prompthelp, 0, 0, 0, setprompt }, + { "proxy", proxyhelp, 0, 0, 1, doproxy }, + { "sendport", porthelp, 0, 0, 0, setport }, + { "put", sendhelp, 1, 1, 1, put }, + { "pwd", pwdhelp, 0, 1, 1, pwd }, + { "quit", quithelp, 0, 0, 0, quit }, + { "quote", quotehelp, 1, 1, 1, quote }, + { "recv", receivehelp, 1, 1, 1, get }, + { "reget", regethelp, 1, 1, 1, reget }, + { "rstatus", rmtstatushelp, 0, 1, 1, rmtstatus }, + { "rhelp", remotehelp, 0, 1, 1, rmthelp }, + { "rename", renamehelp, 0, 1, 1, renamefile }, + { "reset", resethelp, 0, 1, 1, reset }, + { "restart", restarthelp, 1, 1, 1, restart }, + { "rmdir", rmdirhelp, 0, 1, 1, removedir }, + { "runique", runiquehelp, 0, 0, 1, setrunique }, + { "send", sendhelp, 1, 1, 1, put }, + { "site", sitehelp, 0, 1, 1, site }, + { "size", sizecmdhelp, 1, 1, 1, sizecmd }, + { "status", statushelp, 0, 0, 1, status }, + { "struct", structhelp, 0, 1, 1, setstruct }, + { "system", systemhelp, 0, 1, 1, syst }, + { "sunique", suniquehelp, 0, 0, 1, setsunique }, + { "tenex", tenexhelp, 0, 1, 1, settenex }, + { "trace", tracehelp, 0, 0, 0, settrace }, + { "type", typehelp, 0, 1, 1, settype }, + { "user", userhelp, 0, 1, 1, user }, + { "umask", umaskhelp, 0, 1, 1, do_umask }, + { "verbose", verbosehelp, 0, 0, 0, setverbose }, + { "?", helphelp, 0, 0, 1, help }, + + { "prot", prothelp, 0, 1, 0, sec_prot }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "kauth", kauthhelp, 0, 1, 0, kauth }, + { "klist", klisthelp, 0, 1, 0, klist }, + { "kdestroy", kdestroyhelp, 0, 1, 0, kdestroy }, + { "krbtkfile", krbtkfilehelp, 0, 1, 0, krbtkfile }, + { "afslog", afsloghelp, 0, 1, 0, afslog }, +#endif + + { 0 }, +}; + +int NCMDS = (sizeof (cmdtab) / sizeof (cmdtab[0])) - 1; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d91660d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/domacro.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: domacro.c,v 1.7 1999/09/16 20:37:29 assar Exp $"); + +void +domacro(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j, count = 2, loopflg = 0; + char *cp1, *cp2, line2[200]; + struct cmd *c; + + if (argc < 2 && !another(&argc, &argv, "macro name")) { + printf("Usage: %s macro_name.\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + for (i = 0; i < macnum; ++i) { + if (!strncmp(argv[1], macros[i].mac_name, 9)) { + break; + } + } + if (i == macnum) { + printf("'%s' macro not found.\n", argv[1]); + code = -1; + return; + } + strlcpy(line2, line, sizeof(line2)); +TOP: + cp1 = macros[i].mac_start; + while (cp1 != macros[i].mac_end) { + while (isspace(*cp1)) { + cp1++; + } + cp2 = line; + while (*cp1 != '\0') { + switch(*cp1) { + case '\\': + *cp2++ = *++cp1; + break; + case '$': + if (isdigit(*(cp1+1))) { + j = 0; + while (isdigit(*++cp1)) { + j = 10*j + *cp1 - '0'; + } + cp1--; + if (argc - 2 >= j) { + strcpy(cp2, argv[j+1]); + cp2 += strlen(argv[j+1]); + } + break; + } + if (*(cp1+1) == 'i') { + loopflg = 1; + cp1++; + if (count < argc) { + strcpy(cp2, argv[count]); + cp2 += strlen(argv[count]); + } + break; + } + /* intentional drop through */ + default: + *cp2++ = *cp1; + break; + } + if (*cp1 != '\0') { + cp1++; + } + } + *cp2 = '\0'; + makeargv(); + c = getcmd(margv[0]); + if (c == (struct cmd *)-1) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\n"); + code = -1; + } + else if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\n"); + code = -1; + } + else if (c->c_conn && !connected) { + printf("Not connected.\n"); + code = -1; + } + else { + if (verbose) { + printf("%s\n",line); + } + (*c->c_handler)(margc, margv); + if (bell && c->c_bell) { + putchar('\007'); + } + strcpy(line, line2); + makeargv(); + argc = margc; + argv = margv; + } + if (cp1 != macros[i].mac_end) { + cp1++; + } + } + if (loopflg && ++count < argc) { + goto TOP; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d488ecd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/extern.h @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1994 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)extern.h 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/9/94 + */ + +/* $Id: extern.h,v 1.18 1999/10/28 20:49:10 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif + +void abort_remote (FILE *); +void abortpt (int); +void abortrecv (int); +void account (int, char **); +int another (int *, char ***, char *); +void blkfree (char **); +void cd (int, char **); +void cdup (int, char **); +void changetype (int, int); +void cmdabort (int); +void cmdscanner (int); +int command (char *fmt, ...); +int confirm (char *, char *); +FILE *dataconn (const char *); +void delete (int, char **); +void disconnect (int, char **); +void do_chmod (int, char **); +void do_umask (int, char **); +void domacro (int, char **); +char *domap (char *); +void doproxy (int, char **); +char *dotrans (char *); +int empty (fd_set *, int); +void fatal (char *); +void get (int, char **); +struct cmd *getcmd (char *); +int getit (int, char **, int, char *); +int getreply (int); +int globulize (char **); +char *gunique (char *); +void help (int, char **); +char *hookup (const char *, int); +void ftp_idle (int, char **); +int initconn (void); +void intr (int); +void lcd (int, char **); +int login (char *); +RETSIGTYPE lostpeer (int); +void ls (int, char **); +void macdef (int, char **); +void makeargv (void); +void makedir (int, char **); +void mdelete (int, char **); +void mget (int, char **); +void mls (int, char **); +void modtime (int, char **); +void mput (int, char **); +char *onoff (int); +void newer (int, char **); +void proxtrans (char *, char *, char *); +void psabort (int); +void pswitch (int); +void ptransfer (char *, long, struct timeval *, struct timeval *); +void put (int, char **); +void pwd (int, char **); +void quit (int, char **); +void quote (int, char **); +void quote1 (char *, int, char **); +void recvrequest (char *, char *, char *, char *, int, int); +void reget (int, char **); +char *remglob (char **, int); +void removedir (int, char **); +void renamefile (int, char **); +void reset (int, char **); +void restart (int, char **); +void rmthelp (int, char **); +void rmtstatus (int, char **); +int ruserpass (char *, char **, char **, char **); +void sendrequest (char *, char *, char *, char *, int); +void setascii (int, char **); +void setbell (int, char **); +void setbinary (int, char **); +void setcase (int, char **); +void setcr (int, char **); +void setdebug (int, char **); +void setform (int, char **); +void setftmode (int, char **); +void setglob (int, char **); +void sethash (int, char **); +void setnmap (int, char **); +void setntrans (int, char **); +void setpassive (int, char **); +void setpeer (int, char **); +void setport (int, char **); +void setprompt (int, char **); +void setrunique (int, char **); +void setstruct (int, char **); +void setsunique (int, char **); +void settenex (int, char **); +void settrace (int, char **); +void settype (int, char **); +void setverbose (int, char **); +void shell (int, char **); +void site (int, char **); +void sizecmd (int, char **); +char *slurpstring (void); +void status (int, char **); +void syst (int, char **); +void tvsub (struct timeval *, struct timeval *, struct timeval *); +void user (int, char **); + +extern jmp_buf abortprox; +extern int abrtflag; +extern struct cmd cmdtab[]; +extern FILE *cout; +extern int data; +extern char *home; +extern jmp_buf jabort; +extern int proxy; +extern char reply_string[]; +extern off_t restart_point; +extern int NCMDS; + +extern char username[32]; +extern char myhostname[]; +extern char *mydomain; + +void afslog (int, char **); +void kauth (int, char **); +void kdestroy (int, char **); +void klist (int, char **); +void krbtkfile (int, char **); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5c21f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,1193 @@ +.\" $NetBSD: ftp.1,v 1.11 1995/09/08 01:06:24 tls Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1990, 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)ftp.1 8.3 (Berkeley) 10/9/94 +.\" +.Dd April 27, 1996 +.Dt FTP 1 +.Os BSD 4.2 +.Sh NAME +.Nm ftp +.Nd +.Tn ARPANET +file transfer program +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ftp +.Op Fl t +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl i +.Op Fl n +.Op Fl g +.Op Fl p +.Op Ar host +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm Ftp +is the user interface to the +.Tn ARPANET +standard File Transfer Protocol. +The program allows a user to transfer files to and from a +remote network site. +.Pp +Modifications has been made so that it almost follows the ftpsec +Internet draft. +.Pp +Options may be specified at the command line, or to the +command interpreter. +.Bl -tag -width flag +.It Fl t +Enables packet tracing. +.It Fl v +Verbose option forces +.Nm ftp +to show all responses from the remote server, as well +as report on data transfer statistics. +.It Fl n +Restrains +.Nm ftp +from attempting \*(Lqauto-login\*(Rq upon initial connection. +If auto-login is enabled, +.Nm ftp +will check the +.Pa .netrc +(see below) file in the user's home directory for an entry describing +an account on the remote machine. +If no entry exists, +.Nm ftp +will prompt for the remote machine login name (default is the user +identity on the local machine), and, if necessary, prompt for a password +and an account with which to login. +.It Fl i +Turns off interactive prompting during +multiple file transfers. +.It Fl p +Turn on passive mode. +.It Fl d +Enables debugging. +.It Fl g +Disables file name globbing. +.El +.Pp +The client host with which +.Nm ftp +is to communicate may be specified on the command line. +If this is done, +.Nm ftp +will immediately attempt to establish a connection to an +.Tn FTP +server on that host; otherwise, +.Nm ftp +will enter its command interpreter and await instructions +from the user. +When +.Nm ftp +is awaiting commands from the user the prompt +.Ql ftp> +is provided to the user. +The following commands are recognized +by +.Nm ftp : +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ic \&! Op Ar command Op Ar args +Invoke an interactive shell on the local machine. +If there are arguments, the first is taken to be a command to execute +directly, with the rest of the arguments as its arguments. +.It Ic \&$ Ar macro-name Op Ar args +Execute the macro +.Ar macro-name +that was defined with the +.Ic macdef +command. +Arguments are passed to the macro unglobbed. +.It Ic account Op Ar passwd +Supply a supplemental password required by a remote system for access +to resources once a login has been successfully completed. +If no argument is included, the user will be prompted for an account +password in a non-echoing input mode. +.It Ic append Ar local-file Op Ar remote-file +Append a local file to a file on the remote machine. +If +.Ar remote-file +is left unspecified, the local file name is used in naming the +remote file after being altered by any +.Ic ntrans +or +.Ic nmap +setting. +File transfer uses the current settings for +.Ic type , +.Ic format , +.Ic mode , +and +.Ic structure . +.It Ic ascii +Set the file transfer +.Ic type +to network +.Tn ASCII . +This is the default type. +.It Ic bell +Arrange that a bell be sounded after each file transfer +command is completed. +.It Ic binary +Set the file transfer +.Ic type +to support binary image transfer. +.It Ic bye +Terminate the +.Tn FTP +session with the remote server +and exit +.Nm ftp . +An end of file will also terminate the session and exit. +.It Ic case +Toggle remote computer file name case mapping during +.Ic mget +commands. +When +.Ic case +is on (default is off), remote computer file names with all letters in +upper case are written in the local directory with the letters mapped +to lower case. +.It Ic \&cd Ar remote-directory +Change the working directory on the remote machine +to +.Ar remote-directory . +.It Ic cdup +Change the remote machine working directory to the parent of the +current remote machine working directory. +.It Ic chmod Ar mode file-name +Change the permission modes of the file +.Ar file-name +on the remote +sytem to +.Ar mode . +.It Ic close +Terminate the +.Tn FTP +session with the remote server, and +return to the command interpreter. +Any defined macros are erased. +.It Ic \&cr +Toggle carriage return stripping during +ascii type file retrieval. +Records are denoted by a carriage return/linefeed sequence +during ascii type file transfer. +When +.Ic \&cr +is on (the default), carriage returns are stripped from this +sequence to conform with the +.Ux +single linefeed record +delimiter. +Records on +.Pf non\- Ns Ux +remote systems may contain single linefeeds; +when an ascii type transfer is made, these linefeeds may be +distinguished from a record delimiter only when +.Ic \&cr +is off. +.It Ic delete Ar remote-file +Delete the file +.Ar remote-file +on the remote machine. +.It Ic debug Op Ar debug-value +Toggle debugging mode. +If an optional +.Ar debug-value +is specified it is used to set the debugging level. +When debugging is on, +.Nm ftp +prints each command sent to the remote machine, preceded +by the string +.Ql \-\-> +.It Xo +.Ic dir +.Op Ar remote-directory +.Op Ar local-file +.Xc +Print a listing of the directory contents in the +directory, +.Ar remote-directory , +and, optionally, placing the output in +.Ar local-file . +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic dir +output. +If no directory is specified, the current working +directory on the remote machine is used. +If no local +file is specified, or +.Ar local-file +is +.Fl , +output comes to the terminal. +.It Ic disconnect +A synonym for +.Ar close . +.It Ic form Ar format +Set the file transfer +.Ic form +to +.Ar format . +The default format is \*(Lqfile\*(Rq. +.It Ic get Ar remote-file Op Ar local-file +Retrieve the +.Ar remote-file +and store it on the local machine. +If the local +file name is not specified, it is given the same +name it has on the remote machine, subject to +alteration by the current +.Ic case , +.Ic ntrans , +and +.Ic nmap +settings. +The current settings for +.Ic type , +.Ic form , +.Ic mode , +and +.Ic structure +are used while transferring the file. +.It Ic glob +Toggle filename expansion for +.Ic mdelete , +.Ic mget +and +.Ic mput . +If globbing is turned off with +.Ic glob , +the file name arguments +are taken literally and not expanded. +Globbing for +.Ic mput +is done as in +.Xr csh 1 . +For +.Ic mdelete +and +.Ic mget , +each remote file name is expanded +separately on the remote machine and the lists are not merged. +Expansion of a directory name is likely to be +different from expansion of the name of an ordinary file: +the exact result depends on the foreign operating system and ftp server, +and can be previewed by doing +.Ql mls remote-files \- . +As a security measure, remotely globbed files that starts with +.Sq / +or contains +.Sq ../ , +will not be automatically received. If you have interactive prompting +turned off, these filenames will be ignored. Note: +.Ic mget +and +.Ic mput +are not meant to transfer +entire directory subtrees of files. +That can be done by +transferring a +.Xr tar 1 +archive of the subtree (in binary mode). +.It Ic hash +Toggle hash-sign (``#'') printing for each data block +transferred. +The size of a data block is 1024 bytes. +.It Ic help Op Ar command +Print an informative message about the meaning of +.Ar command . +If no argument is given, +.Nm ftp +prints a list of the known commands. +.It Ic idle Op Ar seconds +Set the inactivity timer on the remote server to +.Ar seconds +seconds. +If +.Ar seconds +is omitted, the current inactivity timer is printed. +.It Ic lcd Op Ar directory +Change the working directory on the local machine. +If +no +.Ar directory +is specified, the user's home directory is used. +.It Xo +.Ic \&ls +.Op Ar remote-directory +.Op Ar local-file +.Xc +Print a listing of the contents of a +directory on the remote machine. +The listing includes any system-dependent information that the server +chooses to include; for example, most +.Ux +systems will produce +output from the command +.Ql ls \-l . +(See also +.Ic nlist . ) +If +.Ar remote-directory +is left unspecified, the current working directory is used. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic \&ls +output. +If no local file is specified, or if +.Ar local-file +is +.Sq Fl , +the output is sent to the terminal. +.It Ic macdef Ar macro-name +Define a macro. +Subsequent lines are stored as the macro +.Ar macro-name ; +a null line (consecutive newline characters +in a file or +carriage returns from the terminal) terminates macro input mode. +There is a limit of 16 macros and 4096 total characters in all +defined macros. +Macros remain defined until a +.Ic close +command is executed. +The macro processor interprets `$' and `\e' as special characters. +A `$' followed by a number (or numbers) is replaced by the +corresponding argument on the macro invocation command line. +A `$' followed by an `i' signals that macro processor that the +executing macro is to be looped. +On the first pass `$i' is +replaced by the first argument on the macro invocation command line, +on the second pass it is replaced by the second argument, and so on. +A `\e' followed by any character is replaced by that character. +Use the `\e' to prevent special treatment of the `$'. +.It Ic mdelete Op Ar remote-files +Delete the +.Ar remote-files +on the remote machine. +.It Ic mdir Ar remote-files local-file +Like +.Ic dir , +except multiple remote files may be specified. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic mdir +output. +.It Ic mget Ar remote-files +Expand the +.Ar remote-files +on the remote machine +and do a +.Ic get +for each file name thus produced. +See +.Ic glob +for details on the filename expansion. +Resulting file names will then be processed according to +.Ic case , +.Ic ntrans , +and +.Ic nmap +settings. +Files are transferred into the local working directory, +which can be changed with +.Ql lcd directory ; +new local directories can be created with +.Ql "\&! mkdir directory" . +.It Ic mkdir Ar directory-name +Make a directory on the remote machine. +.It Ic mls Ar remote-files local-file +Like +.Ic nlist , +except multiple remote files may be specified, +and the +.Ar local-file +must be specified. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic mls +output. +.It Ic mode Op Ar mode-name +Set the file transfer +.Ic mode +to +.Ar mode-name . +The default mode is \*(Lqstream\*(Rq mode. +.It Ic modtime Ar file-name +Show the last modification time of the file on the remote machine. +.It Ic mput Ar local-files +Expand wild cards in the list of local files given as arguments +and do a +.Ic put +for each file in the resulting list. +See +.Ic glob +for details of filename expansion. +Resulting file names will then be processed according to +.Ic ntrans +and +.Ic nmap +settings. +.It Ic newer Ar file-name +Get the file only if the modification time of the remote file is more +recent that the file on the current system. +If the file does not +exist on the current system, the remote file is considered +.Ic newer . +Otherwise, this command is identical to +.Ar get . +.It Xo +.Ic nlist +.Op Ar remote-directory +.Op Ar local-file +.Xc +Print a list of the files in a +directory on the remote machine. +If +.Ar remote-directory +is left unspecified, the current working directory is used. +If interactive prompting is on, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user to verify that the last argument is indeed the +target local file for receiving +.Ic nlist +output. +If no local file is specified, or if +.Ar local-file +is +.Fl , +the output is sent to the terminal. +.It Ic nmap Op Ar inpattern outpattern +Set or unset the filename mapping mechanism. +If no arguments are specified, the filename mapping mechanism is unset. +If arguments are specified, remote filenames are mapped during +.Ic mput +commands and +.Ic put +commands issued without a specified remote target filename. +If arguments are specified, local filenames are mapped during +.Ic mget +commands and +.Ic get +commands issued without a specified local target filename. +This command is useful when connecting to a +.No non\- Ns Ux +remote computer +with different file naming conventions or practices. +The mapping follows the pattern set by +.Ar inpattern +and +.Ar outpattern . +.Op Ar Inpattern +is a template for incoming filenames (which may have already been +processed according to the +.Ic ntrans +and +.Ic case +settings). +Variable templating is accomplished by including the +sequences `$1', `$2', ..., `$9' in +.Ar inpattern . +Use `\\' to prevent this special treatment of the `$' character. +All other characters are treated literally, and are used to determine the +.Ic nmap +.Op Ar inpattern +variable values. +For example, given +.Ar inpattern +$1.$2 and the remote file name "mydata.data", $1 would have the value +"mydata", and $2 would have the value "data". +The +.Ar outpattern +determines the resulting mapped filename. +The sequences `$1', `$2', ...., `$9' are replaced by any value resulting +from the +.Ar inpattern +template. +The sequence `$0' is replace by the original filename. +Additionally, the sequence +.Ql Op Ar seq1 , Ar seq2 +is replaced by +.Op Ar seq1 +if +.Ar seq1 +is not a null string; otherwise it is replaced by +.Ar seq2 . +For example, the command +.Pp +.Bd -literal -offset indent -compact +nmap $1.$2.$3 [$1,$2].[$2,file] +.Ed +.Pp +would yield +the output filename "myfile.data" for input filenames "myfile.data" and +"myfile.data.old", "myfile.file" for the input filename "myfile", and +"myfile.myfile" for the input filename ".myfile". +Spaces may be included in +.Ar outpattern , +as in the example: `nmap $1 sed "s/ *$//" > $1' . +Use the `\e' character to prevent special treatment +of the `$','[','[', and `,' characters. +.It Ic ntrans Op Ar inchars Op Ar outchars +Set or unset the filename character translation mechanism. +If no arguments are specified, the filename character +translation mechanism is unset. +If arguments are specified, characters in +remote filenames are translated during +.Ic mput +commands and +.Ic put +commands issued without a specified remote target filename. +If arguments are specified, characters in +local filenames are translated during +.Ic mget +commands and +.Ic get +commands issued without a specified local target filename. +This command is useful when connecting to a +.No non\- Ns Ux +remote computer +with different file naming conventions or practices. +Characters in a filename matching a character in +.Ar inchars +are replaced with the corresponding character in +.Ar outchars . +If the character's position in +.Ar inchars +is longer than the length of +.Ar outchars , +the character is deleted from the file name. +.It Ic open Ar host Op Ar port +Establish a connection to the specified +.Ar host +.Tn FTP +server. +An optional port number may be supplied, +in which case, +.Nm ftp +will attempt to contact an +.Tn FTP +server at that port. +If the +.Ic auto-login +option is on (default), +.Nm ftp +will also attempt to automatically log the user in to +the +.Tn FTP +server (see below). +.It Ic passive +Toggle passive mode. If passive mode is turned on +(default is off), the ftp client will +send a +.Dv PASV +command for all data connections instead of the usual +.Dv PORT +command. The +.Dv PASV +command requests that the remote server open a port for the data connection +and return the address of that port. The remote server listens on that +port and the client connects to it. When using the more traditional +.Dv PORT +command, the client listens on a port and sends that address to the remote +server, who connects back to it. Passive mode is useful when using +.Nm ftp +through a gateway router or host that controls the directionality of +traffic. +(Note that though ftp servers are required to support the +.Dv PASV +command by RFC 1123, some do not.) +.It Ic prompt +Toggle interactive prompting. +Interactive prompting +occurs during multiple file transfers to allow the +user to selectively retrieve or store files. +If prompting is turned off (default is on), any +.Ic mget +or +.Ic mput +will transfer all files, and any +.Ic mdelete +will delete all files. +.It Ic proxy Ar ftp-command +Execute an ftp command on a secondary control connection. +This command allows simultaneous connection to two remote ftp +servers for transferring files between the two servers. +The first +.Ic proxy +command should be an +.Ic open , +to establish the secondary control connection. +Enter the command "proxy ?" to see other ftp commands executable on the +secondary connection. +The following commands behave differently when prefaced by +.Ic proxy : +.Ic open +will not define new macros during the auto-login process, +.Ic close +will not erase existing macro definitions, +.Ic get +and +.Ic mget +transfer files from the host on the primary control connection +to the host on the secondary control connection, and +.Ic put , +.Ic mput , +and +.Ic append +transfer files from the host on the secondary control connection +to the host on the primary control connection. +Third party file transfers depend upon support of the ftp protocol +.Dv PASV +command by the server on the secondary control connection. +.It Ic put Ar local-file Op Ar remote-file +Store a local file on the remote machine. +If +.Ar remote-file +is left unspecified, the local file name is used +after processing according to any +.Ic ntrans +or +.Ic nmap +settings +in naming the remote file. +File transfer uses the +current settings for +.Ic type , +.Ic format , +.Ic mode , +and +.Ic structure . +.It Ic pwd +Print the name of the current working directory on the remote +machine. +.It Ic quit +A synonym for +.Ic bye . +.It Ic quote Ar arg1 arg2 ... +The arguments specified are sent, verbatim, to the remote +.Tn FTP +server. +.It Ic recv Ar remote-file Op Ar local-file +A synonym for get. +.It Ic reget Ar remote-file Op Ar local-file +Reget acts like get, except that if +.Ar local-file +exists and is +smaller than +.Ar remote-file , +.Ar local-file +is presumed to be +a partially transferred copy of +.Ar remote-file +and the transfer +is continued from the apparent point of failure. +This command +is useful when transferring very large files over networks that +are prone to dropping connections. +.It Ic remotehelp Op Ar command-name +Request help from the remote +.Tn FTP +server. +If a +.Ar command-name +is specified it is supplied to the server as well. +.It Ic remotestatus Op Ar file-name +With no arguments, show status of remote machine. +If +.Ar file-name +is specified, show status of +.Ar file-name +on remote machine. +.It Xo +.Ic rename +.Op Ar from +.Op Ar to +.Xc +Rename the file +.Ar from +on the remote machine, to the file +.Ar to . +.It Ic reset +Clear reply queue. +This command re-synchronizes command/reply sequencing with the remote +ftp server. +Resynchronization may be necessary following a violation of the ftp protocol +by the remote server. +.It Ic restart Ar marker +Restart the immediately following +.Ic get +or +.Ic put +at the +indicated +.Ar marker . +On +.Ux +systems, marker is usually a byte +offset into the file. +.It Ic rmdir Ar directory-name +Delete a directory on the remote machine. +.It Ic runique +Toggle storing of files on the local system with unique filenames. +If a file already exists with a name equal to the target +local filename for a +.Ic get +or +.Ic mget +command, a ".1" is appended to the name. +If the resulting name matches another existing file, +a ".2" is appended to the original name. +If this process continues up to ".99", an error +message is printed, and the transfer does not take place. +The generated unique filename will be reported. +Note that +.Ic runique +will not affect local files generated from a shell command +(see below). +The default value is off. +.It Ic send Ar local-file Op Ar remote-file +A synonym for put. +.It Ic sendport +Toggle the use of +.Dv PORT +commands. +By default, +.Nm ftp +will attempt to use a +.Dv PORT +command when establishing +a connection for each data transfer. +The use of +.Dv PORT +commands can prevent delays +when performing multiple file transfers. +If the +.Dv PORT +command fails, +.Nm ftp +will use the default data port. +When the use of +.Dv PORT +commands is disabled, no attempt will be made to use +.Dv PORT +commands for each data transfer. +This is useful +for certain +.Tn FTP +implementations which do ignore +.Dv PORT +commands but, incorrectly, indicate they've been accepted. +.It Ic site Ar arg1 arg2 ... +The arguments specified are sent, verbatim, to the remote +.Tn FTP +server as a +.Dv SITE +command. +.It Ic size Ar file-name +Return size of +.Ar file-name +on remote machine. +.It Ic status +Show the current status of +.Nm ftp . +.It Ic struct Op Ar struct-name +Set the file transfer +.Ar structure +to +.Ar struct-name . +By default \*(Lqstream\*(Rq structure is used. +.It Ic sunique +Toggle storing of files on remote machine under unique file names. +Remote ftp server must support ftp protocol +.Dv STOU +command for +successful completion. +The remote server will report unique name. +Default value is off. +.It Ic system +Show the type of operating system running on the remote machine. +.It Ic tenex +Set the file transfer type to that needed to +talk to +.Tn TENEX +machines. +.It Ic trace +Toggle packet tracing. +.It Ic type Op Ar type-name +Set the file transfer +.Ic type +to +.Ar type-name . +If no type is specified, the current type +is printed. +The default type is network +.Tn ASCII . +.It Ic umask Op Ar newmask +Set the default umask on the remote server to +.Ar newmask . +If +.Ar newmask +is omitted, the current umask is printed. +.It Xo +.Ic user Ar user-name +.Op Ar password +.Op Ar account +.Xc +Identify yourself to the remote +.Tn FTP +server. +If the +.Ar password +is not specified and the server requires it, +.Nm ftp +will prompt the user for it (after disabling local echo). +If an +.Ar account +field is not specified, and the +.Tn FTP +server +requires it, the user will be prompted for it. +If an +.Ar account +field is specified, an account command will +be relayed to the remote server after the login sequence +is completed if the remote server did not require it +for logging in. +Unless +.Nm ftp +is invoked with \*(Lqauto-login\*(Rq disabled, this +process is done automatically on initial connection to +the +.Tn FTP +server. +.It Ic verbose +Toggle verbose mode. +In verbose mode, all responses from +the +.Tn FTP +server are displayed to the user. +In addition, +if verbose is on, when a file transfer completes, statistics +regarding the efficiency of the transfer are reported. +By default, +verbose is on. +.It Ic ? Op Ar command +A synonym for help. +.El +.Pp +The following command can be used with ftpsec-aware servers. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Xo +.Ic prot +.Ar clear | +.Ar safe | +.Ar confidential | +.Ar private +.Xc +Set the data protection level to the requested level. +.El +.Pp +The following command can be used with ftp servers that has +implemented the KAUTH site command. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ic kauth Op Ar principal +Obtain remote tickets. +.El +.Pp +Command arguments which have embedded spaces may be quoted with +quote `"' marks. +.Sh ABORTING A FILE TRANSFER +To abort a file transfer, use the terminal interrupt key +(usually Ctrl-C). +Sending transfers will be immediately halted. +Receiving transfers will be halted by sending a ftp protocol +.Dv ABOR +command to the remote server, and discarding any further data received. +The speed at which this is accomplished depends upon the remote +server's support for +.Dv ABOR +processing. +If the remote server does not support the +.Dv ABOR +command, an +.Ql ftp> +prompt will not appear until the remote server has completed +sending the requested file. +.Pp +The terminal interrupt key sequence will be ignored when +.Nm ftp +has completed any local processing and is awaiting a reply +from the remote server. +A long delay in this mode may result from the ABOR processing described +above, or from unexpected behavior by the remote server, including +violations of the ftp protocol. +If the delay results from unexpected remote server behavior, the local +.Nm ftp +program must be killed by hand. +.Sh FILE NAMING CONVENTIONS +Files specified as arguments to +.Nm ftp +commands are processed according to the following rules. +.Bl -enum +.It +If the file name +.Sq Fl +is specified, the +.Ar stdin +(for reading) or +.Ar stdout +(for writing) is used. +.It +If the first character of the file name is +.Sq \&| , +the +remainder of the argument is interpreted as a shell command. +.Nm Ftp +then forks a shell, using +.Xr popen 3 +with the argument supplied, and reads (writes) from the stdout +(stdin). +If the shell command includes spaces, the argument +must be quoted; e.g. +\*(Lq" ls -lt"\*(Rq. +A particularly +useful example of this mechanism is: \*(Lqdir more\*(Rq. +.It +Failing the above checks, if ``globbing'' is enabled, +local file names are expanded +according to the rules used in the +.Xr csh 1 ; +c.f. the +.Ic glob +command. +If the +.Nm ftp +command expects a single local file (.e.g. +.Ic put ) , +only the first filename generated by the "globbing" operation is used. +.It +For +.Ic mget +commands and +.Ic get +commands with unspecified local file names, the local filename is +the remote filename, which may be altered by a +.Ic case , +.Ic ntrans , +or +.Ic nmap +setting. +The resulting filename may then be altered if +.Ic runique +is on. +.It +For +.Ic mput +commands and +.Ic put +commands with unspecified remote file names, the remote filename is +the local filename, which may be altered by a +.Ic ntrans +or +.Ic nmap +setting. +The resulting filename may then be altered by the remote server if +.Ic sunique +is on. +.El +.Sh FILE TRANSFER PARAMETERS +The FTP specification specifies many parameters which may +affect a file transfer. +The +.Ic type +may be one of \*(Lqascii\*(Rq, \*(Lqimage\*(Rq (binary), +\*(Lqebcdic\*(Rq, and \*(Lqlocal byte size\*(Rq (for +.Tn PDP Ns -10's +and +.Tn PDP Ns -20's +mostly). +.Nm Ftp +supports the ascii and image types of file transfer, +plus local byte size 8 for +.Ic tenex +mode transfers. +.Pp +.Nm Ftp +supports only the default values for the remaining +file transfer parameters: +.Ic mode , +.Ic form , +and +.Ic struct . +.Sh THE .netrc FILE +The +.Pa .netrc +file contains login and initialization information +used by the auto-login process. +It resides in the user's home directory. +The following tokens are recognized; they may be separated by spaces, +tabs, or new-lines: +.Bl -tag -width password +.It Ic machine Ar name +Identify a remote machine +.Ar name . +The auto-login process searches the +.Pa .netrc +file for a +.Ic machine +token that matches the remote machine specified on the +.Nm ftp +command line or as an +.Ic open +command argument. +Once a match is made, the subsequent +.Pa .netrc +tokens are processed, +stopping when the end of file is reached or another +.Ic machine +or a +.Ic default +token is encountered. +.It Ic default +This is the same as +.Ic machine +.Ar name +except that +.Ic default +matches any name. +There can be only one +.Ic default +token, and it must be after all +.Ic machine +tokens. +This is normally used as: +.Pp +.Dl default login anonymous password user@site +.Pp +thereby giving the user +.Ar automatic +anonymous ftp login to +machines not specified in +.Pa .netrc . +This can be overridden +by using the +.Fl n +flag to disable auto-login. +.It Ic login Ar name +Identify a user on the remote machine. +If this token is present, the auto-login process will initiate +a login using the specified +.Ar name . +.It Ic password Ar string +Supply a password. +If this token is present, the auto-login process will supply the +specified string if the remote server requires a password as part +of the login process. +Note that if this token is present in the +.Pa .netrc +file for any user other +than +.Ar anonymous , +.Nm ftp +will abort the auto-login process if the +.Pa .netrc +is readable by +anyone besides the user. +.It Ic account Ar string +Supply an additional account password. +If this token is present, the auto-login process will supply the +specified string if the remote server requires an additional +account password, or the auto-login process will initiate an +.Dv ACCT +command if it does not. +.It Ic macdef Ar name +Define a macro. +This token functions like the +.Nm ftp +.Ic macdef +command functions. +A macro is defined with the specified name; its contents begin with the +next +.Pa .netrc +line and continue until a null line (consecutive new-line +characters) is encountered. +If a macro named +.Ic init +is defined, it is automatically executed as the last step in the +auto-login process. +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Nm Ftp +utilizes the following environment variables. +.Bl -tag -width Fl +.It Ev HOME +For default location of a +.Pa .netrc +file, if one exists. +.It Ev SHELL +For default shell. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftpd 8 , +.%T RFC2228 +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm ftp +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . +.Sh BUGS +Correct execution of many commands depends upon proper behavior +by the remote server. +.Pp +An error in the treatment of carriage returns +in the +.Bx 4.2 +ascii-mode transfer code +has been corrected. +This correction may result in incorrect transfers of binary files +to and from +.Bx 4.2 +servers using the ascii type. +Avoid this problem by using the binary image type. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e7a9dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp.c @@ -0,0 +1,1746 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID ("$Id: ftp.c,v 1.63 2000/01/08 07:43:47 assar Exp $"); + +struct sockaddr_storage hisctladdr_ss; +struct sockaddr *hisctladdr = (struct sockaddr *)&hisctladdr_ss; +struct sockaddr_storage data_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *data_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&data_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr_storage myctladdr_ss; +struct sockaddr *myctladdr = (struct sockaddr *)&myctladdr_ss; +int data = -1; +int abrtflag = 0; +jmp_buf ptabort; +int ptabflg; +int ptflag = 0; +off_t restart_point = 0; + + +FILE *cin, *cout; + +typedef void (*sighand) (int); + +char * +hookup (const char *host, int port) +{ + static char hostnamebuf[MaxHostNameLen]; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + int len; + int s; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (host, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + warnx ("%s: %s", host, gai_strerror(error)); + code = -1; + return NULL; + } + strlcpy (hostnamebuf, host, sizeof(hostnamebuf)); + hostname = hostnamebuf; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) + strlcpy (hostnamebuf, a->ai_canonname, sizeof(hostnamebuf)); + + memcpy (hisctladdr, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen); + + error = connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen); + if (error < 0) { + char addrstr[256]; + + if (getnameinfo (a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen, + addrstr, sizeof(addrstr), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + strlcpy (addrstr, "unknown address", sizeof(addrstr)); + + warn ("connect %s", addrstr); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (error < 0) { + warnx ("failed to contact %s", host); + code = -1; + return NULL; + } + + len = sizeof(myctladdr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, myctladdr, &len) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname"); + code = -1; + close (s); + return NULL; + } +#ifdef IPTOS_LOWDELAY + socket_set_tos (s, IPTOS_LOWDELAY); +#endif + cin = fdopen (s, "r"); + cout = fdopen (s, "w"); + if (cin == NULL || cout == NULL) { + warnx ("fdopen failed."); + if (cin) + fclose (cin); + if (cout) + fclose (cout); + code = -1; + goto bad; + } + if (verbose) + printf ("Connected to %s.\n", hostname); + if (getreply (0) > 2) { /* read startup message from server */ + if (cin) + fclose (cin); + if (cout) + fclose (cout); + code = -1; + goto bad; + } +#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int on = 1; + + if (setsockopt (s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, (char *) &on, sizeof (on)) + < 0 && debug) { + warn ("setsockopt"); + } + } +#endif /* SO_OOBINLINE */ + + return (hostname); +bad: + close (s); + return NULL; +} + +int +login (char *host) +{ + char tmp[80]; + char defaultpass[128]; + char *user, *pass, *acct; + int n, aflag = 0; + + char *myname = NULL; + struct passwd *pw = k_getpwuid(getuid()); + + if (pw != NULL) + myname = pw->pw_name; + + user = pass = acct = 0; + + if(sec_login(host)) + printf("\n*** Using plaintext user and password ***\n\n"); + else{ + printf("Authentication successful.\n\n"); + } + + if (ruserpass (host, &user, &pass, &acct) < 0) { + code = -1; + return (0); + } + while (user == NULL) { + if (myname) + printf ("Name (%s:%s): ", host, myname); + else + printf ("Name (%s): ", host); + fgets (tmp, sizeof (tmp) - 1, stdin); + tmp[strlen (tmp) - 1] = '\0'; + if (*tmp == '\0') + user = myname; + else + user = tmp; + } + strlcpy(username, user, sizeof(username)); + n = command("USER %s", user); + if (n == CONTINUE) { + if(sec_complete) + pass = myname; + else if (pass == NULL) { + char prompt[128]; + if(myname && + (!strcmp(user, "ftp") || !strcmp(user, "anonymous"))){ + snprintf(defaultpass, sizeof(defaultpass), + "%s@%s", myname, mydomain); + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Password (%s): ", defaultpass); + }else{ + *defaultpass = '\0'; + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Password: "); + } + pass = defaultpass; + des_read_pw_string (tmp, sizeof (tmp), prompt, 0); + if (tmp[0]) + pass = tmp; + } + n = command ("PASS %s", pass); + } + if (n == CONTINUE) { + aflag++; + acct = tmp; + des_read_pw_string (acct, 128, "Account:", 0); + n = command ("ACCT %s", acct); + } + if (n != COMPLETE) { + warnx ("Login failed."); + return (0); + } + if (!aflag && acct != NULL) + command ("ACCT %s", acct); + if (proxy) + return (1); + for (n = 0; n < macnum; ++n) { + if (!strcmp("init", macros[n].mac_name)) { + strlcpy (line, "$init", sizeof (line)); + makeargv(); + domacro(margc, margv); + break; + } + } + sec_set_protection_level (); + return (1); +} + +void +cmdabort (int sig) +{ + + printf ("\n"); + fflush (stdout); + abrtflag++; + if (ptflag) + longjmp (ptabort, 1); +} + +int +command (char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list ap; + int r; + sighand oldintr; + + abrtflag = 0; + if (cout == NULL) { + warn ("No control connection for command"); + code = -1; + return (0); + } + oldintr = signal(SIGINT, cmdabort); + va_start(ap, fmt); + if(debug){ + printf("---> "); + if (strncmp("PASS ", fmt, 5) == 0) + printf("PASS XXXX"); + else + vfprintf(stdout, fmt, ap); + va_start(ap, fmt); + } + sec_vfprintf(cout, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(debug){ + printf("\n"); + fflush(stdout); + } + fprintf (cout, "\r\n"); + fflush (cout); + cpend = 1; + r = getreply (!strcmp (fmt, "QUIT")); + if (abrtflag && oldintr != SIG_IGN) + (*oldintr) (SIGINT); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return (r); +} + +char reply_string[BUFSIZ]; /* last line of previous reply */ + +int +getreply (int expecteof) +{ + char *p; + char *lead_string; + int c; + struct sigaction sa, osa; + char buf[1024]; + + sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = cmdabort; + sigaction (SIGINT, &sa, &osa); + + p = buf; + + while (1) { + c = getc (cin); + switch (c) { + case EOF: + if (expecteof) { + sigaction (SIGINT, &osa, NULL); + code = 221; + return 0; + } + lostpeer (0); + if (verbose) { + printf ("421 Service not available, " + "remote server has closed connection\n"); + fflush (stdout); + } + code = 421; + return (4); + case IAC: + c = getc (cin); + if (c == WILL || c == WONT) + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, DONT, getc (cin)); + if (c == DO || c == DONT) + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, WONT, getc (cin)); + continue; + case '\n': + *p++ = '\0'; + if(isdigit(buf[0])){ + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + if(code == 631){ + sec_read_msg(buf, prot_safe); + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + lead_string = "S:"; + } else if(code == 632){ + sec_read_msg(buf, prot_private); + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + lead_string = "P:"; + }else if(code == 633){ + sec_read_msg(buf, prot_confidential); + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + lead_string = "C:"; + }else if(sec_complete) + lead_string = "!!"; + else + lead_string = ""; + if (verbose > 0 || (verbose > -1 && code > 499)) + fprintf (stdout, "%s%s\n", lead_string, buf); + if (buf[3] == ' ') { + strcpy (reply_string, buf); + if (code >= 200) + cpend = 0; + sigaction (SIGINT, &osa, NULL); + if (code == 421) + lostpeer (0); +#if 1 + if (abrtflag && + osa.sa_handler != cmdabort && + osa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN) + osa.sa_handler (SIGINT); +#endif + if (code == 227 || code == 229) { + char *p, *q; + + pasv[0] = 0; + p = strchr (reply_string, '('); + if (p) { + p++; + q = strchr(p, ')'); + if(q){ + memcpy (pasv, p, q - p); + pasv[q - p] = 0; + } + } + } + return code / 100; + } + }else{ + if(verbose > 0 || (verbose > -1 && code > 499)){ + if(sec_complete) + fprintf(stdout, "!!"); + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", buf); + } + } + p = buf; + continue; + default: + *p++ = c; + } + } + +} + + +#if 0 +int +getreply (int expecteof) +{ + int c, n; + int dig; + int originalcode = 0, continuation = 0; + sighand oldintr; + int pflag = 0; + char *cp, *pt = pasv; + + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, cmdabort); + for (;;) { + dig = n = code = 0; + cp = reply_string; + while ((c = getc (cin)) != '\n') { + if (c == IAC) { /* handle telnet commands */ + switch (c = getc (cin)) { + case WILL: + case WONT: + c = getc (cin); + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, DONT, c); + fflush (cout); + break; + case DO: + case DONT: + c = getc (cin); + fprintf (cout, "%c%c%c", IAC, WONT, c); + fflush (cout); + break; + default: + break; + } + continue; + } + dig++; + if (c == EOF) { + if (expecteof) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = 221; + return (0); + } + lostpeer (0); + if (verbose) { + printf ("421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection\n"); + fflush (stdout); + } + code = 421; + return (4); + } + if (c != '\r' && (verbose > 0 || + (verbose > -1 && n == '5' && dig > 4))) { + if (proxflag && + (dig == 1 || dig == 5 && verbose == 0)) + printf ("%s:", hostname); + putchar (c); + } + if (dig < 4 && isdigit (c)) + code = code * 10 + (c - '0'); + if (!pflag && code == 227) + pflag = 1; + if (dig > 4 && pflag == 1 && isdigit (c)) + pflag = 2; + if (pflag == 2) { + if (c != '\r' && c != ')') + *pt++ = c; + else { + *pt = '\0'; + pflag = 3; + } + } + if (dig == 4 && c == '-') { + if (continuation) + code = 0; + continuation++; + } + if (n == 0) + n = c; + if (cp < &reply_string[sizeof (reply_string) - 1]) + *cp++ = c; + } + if (verbose > 0 || verbose > -1 && n == '5') { + putchar (c); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (continuation && code != originalcode) { + if (originalcode == 0) + originalcode = code; + continue; + } + *cp = '\0'; + if(sec_complete){ + if(code == 631) + sec_read_msg(reply_string, prot_safe); + else if(code == 632) + sec_read_msg(reply_string, prot_private); + else if(code == 633) + sec_read_msg(reply_string, prot_confidential); + n = code / 100 + '0'; + } + if (n != '1') + cpend = 0; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (code == 421 || originalcode == 421) + lostpeer (0); + if (abrtflag && oldintr != cmdabort && oldintr != SIG_IGN) + (*oldintr) (SIGINT); + return (n - '0'); + } +} + +#endif + +int +empty (fd_set * mask, int sec) +{ + struct timeval t; + + t.tv_sec = (long) sec; + t.tv_usec = 0; + return (select (32, mask, NULL, NULL, &t)); +} + +jmp_buf sendabort; + +static RETSIGTYPE +abortsend (int sig) +{ + + mflag = 0; + abrtflag = 0; + printf ("\nsend aborted\nwaiting for remote to finish abort\n"); + fflush (stdout); + longjmp (sendabort, 1); +} + +#define HASHBYTES 1024 + +static int +copy_stream (FILE * from, FILE * to) +{ + static size_t bufsize; + static char *buf; + int n; + int bytes = 0; + int werr = 0; + int hashbytes = HASHBYTES; + struct stat st; + +#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && !defined(NO_MMAP) + void *chunk; + +#ifndef MAP_FAILED +#define MAP_FAILED (-1) +#endif + + if (fstat (fileno (from), &st) == 0 && S_ISREG (st.st_mode)) { + /* + * mmap zero bytes has potential of loosing, don't do it. + */ + if (st.st_size == 0) + return 0; + chunk = mmap (0, st.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fileno (from), 0); + if (chunk != (void *) MAP_FAILED) { + int res; + + res = sec_write (fileno (to), chunk, st.st_size); + if (munmap (chunk, st.st_size) < 0) + warn ("munmap"); + sec_fflush (to); + return res; + } + } +#endif + + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat (fileno (from), &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) + return -1; + + while ((n = read (fileno (from), buf, bufsize)) > 0) { + werr = sec_write (fileno (to), buf, n); + if (werr < 0) + break; + bytes += werr; + while (hash && bytes > hashbytes) { + putchar ('#'); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + } + sec_fflush (to); + if (n < 0) + warn ("local"); + + if (werr < 0) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netout"); + bytes = -1; + } + return bytes; +} + +void +sendrequest (char *cmd, char *local, char *remote, char *lmode, int printnames) +{ + struct stat st; + struct timeval start, stop; + int c, d; + FILE *fin, *dout = 0; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + RETSIGTYPE (*oldintr)(), (*oldintp)(); + long bytes = 0, hashbytes = HASHBYTES; + char *rmode = "w"; + + if (verbose && printnames) { + if (local && strcmp (local, "-") != 0) + printf ("local: %s ", local); + if (remote) + printf ("remote: %s\n", remote); + } + if (proxy) { + proxtrans (cmd, local, remote); + return; + } + if (curtype != type) + changetype (type, 0); + closefunc = NULL; + oldintr = NULL; + oldintp = NULL; + + if (setjmp (sendabort)) { + while (cpend) { + getreply (0); + } + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (oldintr) + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + code = -1; + return; + } + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, abortsend); + if (strcmp (local, "-") == 0) + fin = stdin; + else if (*local == '|') { + oldintp = signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + fin = popen (local + 1, lmode); + if (fin == NULL) { + warn ("%s", local + 1); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + code = -1; + return; + } + closefunc = pclose; + } else { + fin = fopen (local, lmode); + if (fin == NULL) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + closefunc = fclose; + if (fstat (fileno (fin), &st) < 0 || + (st.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) { + fprintf (stdout, "%s: not a plain file.\n", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + fclose (fin); + code = -1; + return; + } + } + if (initconn ()) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + code = -1; + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + if (setjmp (sendabort)) + goto abort; + + if (restart_point && + (strcmp (cmd, "STOR") == 0 || strcmp (cmd, "APPE") == 0)) { + int rc; + + switch (curtype) { + case TYPE_A: + rc = fseek (fin, (long) restart_point, SEEK_SET); + break; + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + rc = lseek (fileno (fin), restart_point, SEEK_SET); + break; + } + if (rc < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + restart_point = 0; + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + if (command ("REST %ld", (long) restart_point) + != CONTINUE) { + restart_point = 0; + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + restart_point = 0; + rmode = "r+w"; + } + if (remote) { + if (command ("%s %s", cmd, remote) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + return; + } + } else if (command ("%s", cmd) != PRELIM) { + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal(SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc)(fin); + return; + } + dout = dataconn(rmode); + if (dout == NULL) + goto abort; + set_buffer_size (fileno (dout), 0); + gettimeofday (&start, (struct timezone *) 0); + oldintp = signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + switch (curtype) { + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + errno = d = c = 0; + bytes = copy_stream (fin, dout); + break; + + case TYPE_A: + while ((c = getc (fin)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') { + while (hash && (bytes >= hashbytes)) { + putchar ('#'); + fflush (stdout); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + if (ferror (dout)) + break; + sec_putc ('\r', dout); + bytes++; + } + sec_putc (c, dout); + bytes++; + } + sec_fflush (dout); + if (hash) { + if (bytes < hashbytes) + putchar ('#'); + putchar ('\n'); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (ferror (fin)) + warn ("local: %s", local); + if (ferror (dout)) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netout"); + bytes = -1; + } + break; + } + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + fclose (dout); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + getreply (0); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (bytes > 0) + ptransfer ("sent", bytes, &start, &stop); + return; +abort: + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + if (!cpend) { + code = -1; + return; + } + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (dout) + fclose (dout); + getreply (0); + code = -1; + if (closefunc != NULL && fin != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fin); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + if (bytes > 0) + ptransfer ("sent", bytes, &start, &stop); +} + +jmp_buf recvabort; + +void +abortrecv (int sig) +{ + + mflag = 0; + abrtflag = 0; + printf ("\nreceive aborted\nwaiting for remote to finish abort\n"); + fflush (stdout); + longjmp (recvabort, 1); +} + +void +recvrequest (char *cmd, char *local, char *remote, + char *lmode, int printnames, int local_given) +{ + FILE *fout, *din = 0; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + sighand oldintr, oldintp; + int c, d, is_retr, tcrflag, bare_lfs = 0; + static size_t bufsize; + static char *buf; + long bytes = 0, hashbytes = HASHBYTES; + struct timeval start, stop; + struct stat st; + + is_retr = strcmp (cmd, "RETR") == 0; + if (is_retr && verbose && printnames) { + if (local && strcmp (local, "-") != 0) + printf ("local: %s ", local); + if (remote) + printf ("remote: %s\n", remote); + } + if (proxy && is_retr) { + proxtrans (cmd, local, remote); + return; + } + closefunc = NULL; + oldintr = NULL; + oldintp = NULL; + tcrflag = !crflag && is_retr; + if (setjmp (recvabort)) { + while (cpend) { + getreply (0); + } + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (oldintr) + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, abortrecv); + if (!local_given || (strcmp (local, "-") && *local != '|')) { + if (access (local, 2) < 0) { + char *dir = strrchr (local, '/'); + + if (errno != ENOENT && errno != EACCES) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (dir != NULL) + *dir = 0; + d = access (dir ? local : ".", 2); + if (dir != NULL) + *dir = '/'; + if (d < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (!runique && errno == EACCES && + chmod (local, 0600) < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (runique && errno == EACCES && + (local = gunique (local)) == NULL) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + } else if (runique && (local = gunique (local)) == NULL) { + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + } + if (!is_retr) { + if (curtype != TYPE_A) + changetype (TYPE_A, 0); + } else if (curtype != type) + changetype (type, 0); + if (initconn ()) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (setjmp (recvabort)) + goto abort; + if (is_retr && restart_point && + command ("REST %ld", (long) restart_point) != CONTINUE) + return; + if (remote) { + if (command ("%s %s", cmd, remote) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + } else { + if (command ("%s", cmd) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + } + din = dataconn ("r"); + if (din == NULL) + goto abort; + set_buffer_size (fileno (din), 1); + if (local_given && strcmp (local, "-") == 0) + fout = stdout; + else if (local_given && *local == '|') { + oldintp = signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + fout = popen (local + 1, "w"); + if (fout == NULL) { + warn ("%s", local + 1); + goto abort; + } + closefunc = pclose; + } else { + fout = fopen (local, lmode); + if (fout == NULL) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + goto abort; + } + closefunc = fclose; + } + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat (fileno (fout), &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) + goto abort; + + gettimeofday (&start, (struct timezone *) 0); + switch (curtype) { + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + if (restart_point && + lseek (fileno (fout), restart_point, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + return; + } + errno = d = 0; + while ((c = sec_read (fileno (din), buf, bufsize)) > 0) { + if ((d = write (fileno (fout), buf, c)) != c) + break; + bytes += c; + if (hash) { + while (bytes >= hashbytes) { + putchar ('#'); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + fflush (stdout); + } + } + if (hash && bytes > 0) { + if (bytes < HASHBYTES) + putchar ('#'); + putchar ('\n'); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (c < 0) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netin"); + bytes = -1; + } + if (d < c) { + if (d < 0) + warn ("local: %s", local); + else + warnx ("%s: short write", local); + } + break; + + case TYPE_A: + if (restart_point) { + int i, n, ch; + + if (fseek (fout, 0L, SEEK_SET) < 0) + goto done; + n = restart_point; + for (i = 0; i++ < n;) { + if ((ch = sec_getc (fout)) == EOF) + goto done; + if (ch == '\n') + i++; + } + if (fseek (fout, 0L, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + done: + warn ("local: %s", local); + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + return; + } + } + while ((c = sec_getc(din)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') + bare_lfs++; + while (c == '\r') { + while (hash && (bytes >= hashbytes)) { + putchar ('#'); + fflush (stdout); + hashbytes += HASHBYTES; + } + bytes++; + if ((c = sec_getc (din)) != '\n' || tcrflag) { + if (ferror (fout)) + goto break2; + putc ('\r', fout); + if (c == '\0') { + bytes++; + goto contin2; + } + if (c == EOF) + goto contin2; + } + } + putc (c, fout); + bytes++; + contin2:; + } +break2: + if (bare_lfs) { + printf ("WARNING! %d bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode\n", + bare_lfs); + printf ("File may not have transferred correctly.\n"); + } + if (hash) { + if (bytes < hashbytes) + putchar ('#'); + putchar ('\n'); + fflush (stdout); + } + if (ferror (din)) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + warn ("netin"); + bytes = -1; + } + if (ferror (fout)) + warn ("local: %s", local); + break; + } + if (closefunc != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintp); + fclose (din); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + getreply (0); + if (bytes > 0 && is_retr) + ptransfer ("received", bytes, &start, &stop); + return; +abort: + + /* abort using RFC959 recommended IP,SYNC sequence */ + + if (oldintp) + signal (SIGPIPE, oldintr); + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + if (!cpend) { + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + abort_remote(din); + code = -1; + if (data >= 0) { + close (data); + data = -1; + } + if (closefunc != NULL && fout != NULL) + (*closefunc) (fout); + if (din) + fclose (din); + gettimeofday (&stop, (struct timezone *) 0); + if (bytes > 0) + ptransfer ("received", bytes, &start, &stop); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); +} + +static int +parse_epsv (const char *str) +{ + char sep; + char *end; + int port; + + if (*str == '\0') + return -1; + sep = *str++; + if (sep != *str++) + return -1; + if (sep != *str++) + return -1; + port = strtol (str, &end, 0); + if (str == end) + return -1; + if (end[0] != sep || end[1] != '\0') + return -1; + return htons(port); +} + +static int +parse_pasv (struct sockaddr_in *sin, const char *str) +{ + int a0, a1, a2, a3, p0, p1; + + /* + * What we've got at this point is a string of comma separated + * one-byte unsigned integer values. The first four are the an IP + * address. The fifth is the MSB of the port number, the sixth is the + * LSB. From that we'll prepare a sockaddr_in. + */ + + if (sscanf (str, "%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d", + &a0, &a1, &a2, &a3, &p0, &p1) != 6) { + printf ("Passive mode address scan failure. " + "Shouldn't happen!\n"); + return -1; + } + if (a0 < 0 || a0 > 255 || + a1 < 0 || a1 > 255 || + a2 < 0 || a2 > 255 || + a3 < 0 || a3 > 255 || + p0 < 0 || p0 > 255 || + p1 < 0 || p1 > 255) { + printf ("Can't parse passive mode string.\n"); + return -1; + } + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl ((a0 << 24) | (a1 << 16) | + (a2 << 8) | a3); + sin->sin_port = htons ((p0 << 8) | p1); + return 0; +} + +static int +passive_mode (void) +{ + int port; + + data = socket (myctladdr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (data < 0) { + warn ("socket"); + return (1); + } + if (options & SO_DEBUG) + socket_set_debug (data); + if (command ("EPSV") != COMPLETE) { + if (command ("PASV") != COMPLETE) { + printf ("Passive mode refused.\n"); + goto bad; + } + } + + /* + * Parse the reply to EPSV or PASV + */ + + port = parse_epsv (pasv); + if (port > 0) { + data_addr->sa_family = myctladdr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (data_addr, + socket_get_address (hisctladdr), + port); + } else { + if (parse_pasv ((struct sockaddr_in *)data_addr, pasv) < 0) + goto bad; + } + + if (connect (data, data_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (data_addr)) < 0) { + warn ("connect"); + goto bad; + } +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (data, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (0); +bad: + close (data); + data = -1; + sendport = 1; + return (1); +} + + +static int +active_mode (void) +{ + int tmpno = 0; + int len; + int result; + +noport: + data_addr->sa_family = myctladdr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (data_addr, socket_get_address (myctladdr), + sendport ? 0 : socket_get_port (myctladdr)); + + if (data != -1) + close (data); + data = socket (data_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (data < 0) { + warn ("socket"); + if (tmpno) + sendport = 1; + return (1); + } + if (!sendport) + socket_set_reuseaddr (data, 1); + if (bind (data, data_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (data_addr)) < 0) { + warn ("bind"); + goto bad; + } + if (options & SO_DEBUG) + socket_set_debug (data); + len = sizeof (data_addr_ss); + if (getsockname (data, data_addr, &len) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname"); + goto bad; + } + if (listen (data, 1) < 0) + warn ("listen"); + if (sendport) { + char *cmd; + char addr_str[256]; + int inet_af; + int overbose; + + if (inet_ntop (data_addr->sa_family, socket_get_address (data_addr), + addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)) == NULL) + errx (1, "inet_ntop failed"); + switch (data_addr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : + inet_af = 1; + break; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + inet_af = 2; + break; +#endif + default : + errx (1, "bad address family %d", data_addr->sa_family); + } + + asprintf (&cmd, "EPRT |%d|%s|%d|", + inet_af, addr_str, ntohs(socket_get_port (data_addr))); + + overbose = verbose; + if (debug == 0) + verbose = -1; + + result = command (cmd); + + verbose = overbose; + + if (result == ERROR) { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)data_addr; + + unsigned int a = ntohl(sin->sin_addr.s_addr); + unsigned int p = ntohs(sin->sin_port); + + if (data_addr->sa_family != AF_INET) { + warnx ("remote server doesn't support EPRT"); + goto bad; + } + + result = command("PORT %d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d", + (a >> 24) & 0xff, + (a >> 16) & 0xff, + (a >> 8) & 0xff, + a & 0xff, + (p >> 8) & 0xff, + p & 0xff); + if (result == ERROR && sendport == -1) { + sendport = 0; + tmpno = 1; + goto noport; + } + return (result != COMPLETE); + } + return result != COMPLETE; + } + if (tmpno) + sendport = 1; + + +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (data, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (0); +bad: + close (data); + data = -1; + if (tmpno) + sendport = 1; + return (1); +} + +/* + * Need to start a listen on the data channel before we send the command, + * otherwise the server's connect may fail. + */ +int +initconn (void) +{ + if (passivemode) + return passive_mode (); + else + return active_mode (); +} + +FILE * +dataconn (const char *lmode) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from_ss; + struct sockaddr *from = (struct sockaddr *)&from_ss; + int s, fromlen = sizeof (from_ss); + + if (passivemode) + return (fdopen (data, lmode)); + + s = accept (data, from, &fromlen); + if (s < 0) { + warn ("accept"); + close (data), data = -1; + return (NULL); + } + close (data); + data = s; +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (s, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (fdopen (data, lmode)); +} + +void +ptransfer (char *direction, long int bytes, + struct timeval * t0, struct timeval * t1) +{ + struct timeval td; + float s; + float bs; + int prec; + char *unit; + + if (verbose) { + td.tv_sec = t1->tv_sec - t0->tv_sec; + td.tv_usec = t1->tv_usec - t0->tv_usec; + if (td.tv_usec < 0) { + td.tv_sec--; + td.tv_usec += 1000000; + } + s = td.tv_sec + (td.tv_usec / 1000000.); + bs = bytes / (s ? s : 1); + if (bs >= 1048576) { + bs /= 1048576; + unit = "M"; + prec = 2; + } else if (bs >= 1024) { + bs /= 1024; + unit = "k"; + prec = 1; + } else { + unit = ""; + prec = 0; + } + + printf ("%ld bytes %s in %.3g seconds (%.*f %sbyte/s)\n", + bytes, direction, s, prec, bs, unit); + } +} + +void +psabort (int sig) +{ + + abrtflag++; +} + +void +pswitch (int flag) +{ + sighand oldintr; + static struct comvars { + int connect; + char name[MaxHostNameLen]; + struct sockaddr_storage mctl; + struct sockaddr_storage hctl; + FILE *in; + FILE *out; + int tpe; + int curtpe; + int cpnd; + int sunqe; + int runqe; + int mcse; + int ntflg; + char nti[17]; + char nto[17]; + int mapflg; + char mi[MaxPathLen]; + char mo[MaxPathLen]; + } proxstruct, tmpstruct; + struct comvars *ip, *op; + + abrtflag = 0; + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, psabort); + if (flag) { + if (proxy) + return; + ip = &tmpstruct; + op = &proxstruct; + proxy++; + } else { + if (!proxy) + return; + ip = &proxstruct; + op = &tmpstruct; + proxy = 0; + } + ip->connect = connected; + connected = op->connect; + if (hostname) { + strlcpy (ip->name, hostname, sizeof (ip->name)); + } else + ip->name[0] = 0; + hostname = op->name; + ip->hctl = hisctladdr_ss; + hisctladdr_ss = op->hctl; + ip->mctl = myctladdr_ss; + myctladdr_ss = op->mctl; + ip->in = cin; + cin = op->in; + ip->out = cout; + cout = op->out; + ip->tpe = type; + type = op->tpe; + ip->curtpe = curtype; + curtype = op->curtpe; + ip->cpnd = cpend; + cpend = op->cpnd; + ip->sunqe = sunique; + sunique = op->sunqe; + ip->runqe = runique; + runique = op->runqe; + ip->mcse = mcase; + mcase = op->mcse; + ip->ntflg = ntflag; + ntflag = op->ntflg; + strlcpy (ip->nti, ntin, sizeof (ip->nti)); + strlcpy (ntin, op->nti, 17); + strlcpy (ip->nto, ntout, sizeof (ip->nto)); + strlcpy (ntout, op->nto, 17); + ip->mapflg = mapflag; + mapflag = op->mapflg; + strlcpy (ip->mi, mapin, MaxPathLen); + strlcpy (mapin, op->mi, MaxPathLen); + strlcpy (ip->mo, mapout, MaxPathLen); + strlcpy (mapout, op->mo, MaxPathLen); + signal(SIGINT, oldintr); + if (abrtflag) { + abrtflag = 0; + (*oldintr) (SIGINT); + } +} + +void +abortpt (int sig) +{ + + printf ("\n"); + fflush (stdout); + ptabflg++; + mflag = 0; + abrtflag = 0; + longjmp (ptabort, 1); +} + +void +proxtrans (char *cmd, char *local, char *remote) +{ + sighand oldintr; + int secndflag = 0, prox_type, nfnd; + char *cmd2; + fd_set mask; + + if (strcmp (cmd, "RETR")) + cmd2 = "RETR"; + else + cmd2 = runique ? "STOU" : "STOR"; + if ((prox_type = type) == 0) { + if (unix_server && unix_proxy) + prox_type = TYPE_I; + else + prox_type = TYPE_A; + } + if (curtype != prox_type) + changetype (prox_type, 1); + if (command ("PASV") != COMPLETE) { + printf ("proxy server does not support third party transfers.\n"); + return; + } + pswitch (0); + if (!connected) { + printf ("No primary connection\n"); + pswitch (1); + code = -1; + return; + } + if (curtype != prox_type) + changetype (prox_type, 1); + if (command ("PORT %s", pasv) != COMPLETE) { + pswitch (1); + return; + } + if (setjmp (ptabort)) + goto abort; + oldintr = signal (SIGINT, abortpt); + if (command ("%s %s", cmd, remote) != PRELIM) { + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + pswitch (1); + return; + } + sleep (2); + pswitch (1); + secndflag++; + if (command ("%s %s", cmd2, local) != PRELIM) + goto abort; + ptflag++; + getreply (0); + pswitch (0); + getreply (0); + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + pswitch (1); + ptflag = 0; + printf ("local: %s remote: %s\n", local, remote); + return; +abort: + signal (SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + ptflag = 0; + if (strcmp (cmd, "RETR") && !proxy) + pswitch (1); + else if (!strcmp (cmd, "RETR") && proxy) + pswitch (0); + if (!cpend && !secndflag) { /* only here if cmd = "STOR" (proxy=1) */ + if (command ("%s %s", cmd2, local) != PRELIM) { + pswitch (0); + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + } + pswitch (1); + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + pswitch (!proxy); + if (!cpend && !secndflag) { /* only if cmd = "RETR" (proxy=1) */ + if (command ("%s %s", cmd2, local) != PRELIM) { + pswitch (0); + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + pswitch (1); + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); + return; + } + } + if (cpend) + abort_remote ((FILE *) NULL); + pswitch (!proxy); + if (cpend) { + FD_ZERO (&mask); + FD_SET (fileno (cin), &mask); + if ((nfnd = empty (&mask, 10)) <= 0) { + if (nfnd < 0) { + warn ("abort"); + } + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + lostpeer (0); + } + getreply (0); + getreply (0); + } + if (proxy) + pswitch (0); + pswitch (1); + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + signal (SIGINT, oldintr); +} + +void +reset (int argc, char **argv) +{ + fd_set mask; + int nfnd = 1; + + FD_ZERO (&mask); + while (nfnd > 0) { + FD_SET (fileno (cin), &mask); + if ((nfnd = empty (&mask, 0)) < 0) { + warn ("reset"); + code = -1; + lostpeer(0); + } else if (nfnd) { + getreply(0); + } + } +} + +char * +gunique (char *local) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + char *cp = strrchr (local, '/'); + int d, count = 0; + char ext = '1'; + + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + d = access (cp ? local : ".", 2); + if (cp) + *cp = '/'; + if (d < 0) { + warn ("local: %s", local); + return NULL; + } + strlcpy (new, local, sizeof(new)); + cp = new + strlen(new); + *cp++ = '.'; + while (!d) { + if (++count == 100) { + printf ("runique: can't find unique file name.\n"); + return NULL; + } + *cp++ = ext; + *cp = '\0'; + if (ext == '9') + ext = '0'; + else + ext++; + if ((d = access (new, 0)) < 0) + break; + if (ext != '0') + cp--; + else if (*(cp - 2) == '.') + *(cp - 1) = '1'; + else { + *(cp - 2) = *(cp - 2) + 1; + cp--; + } + } + return (new); +} + +void +abort_remote (FILE * din) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int nfnd; + fd_set mask; + + /* + * send IAC in urgent mode instead of DM because 4.3BSD places oob mark + * after urgent byte rather than before as is protocol now + */ + snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%c%c%c", IAC, IP, IAC); + if (send (fileno (cout), buf, 3, MSG_OOB) != 3) + warn ("abort"); + fprintf (cout, "%cABOR\r\n", DM); + fflush (cout); + FD_ZERO (&mask); + FD_SET (fileno (cin), &mask); + if (din) { + FD_SET (fileno (din), &mask); + } + if ((nfnd = empty (&mask, 10)) <= 0) { + if (nfnd < 0) { + warn ("abort"); + } + if (ptabflg) + code = -1; + lostpeer (0); + } + if (din && FD_ISSET (fileno (din), &mask)) { + while (read (fileno (din), buf, BUFSIZ) > 0) + /* LOOP */ ; + } + if (getreply (0) == ERROR && code == 552) { + /* 552 needed for nic style abort */ + getreply (0); + } + getreply (0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49c2b2f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: ftp_locl.h,v 1.34 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __FTP_LOCL_H__ +#define __FTP_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_FTP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +extern int LIBPREFIX(fclose) (FILE *); + +/* This doesn't belong here. */ +struct tm *localtime(const time_t *); +struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *); + +#endif + +#include "ftp_var.h" +#include "extern.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "pathnames.h" + +#include "roken.h" +#include "security.h" +#include /* for des_read_pw_string */ + +#if defined(__sun__) && !defined(__svr4) +int fclose(FILE*); +int pclose(FILE*); +#endif + +#endif /* __FTP_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ffac59a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ftp_var.h @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)ftp_var.h 8.4 (Berkeley) 10/9/94 + */ + +/* + * FTP global variables. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include + +/* + * Options and other state info. + */ +extern int trace; /* trace packets exchanged */ +extern int hash; /* print # for each buffer transferred */ +extern int sendport; /* use PORT cmd for each data connection */ +extern int verbose; /* print messages coming back from server */ +extern int connected; /* connected to server */ +extern int fromatty; /* input is from a terminal */ +extern int interactive; /* interactively prompt on m* cmds */ +extern int debug; /* debugging level */ +extern int bell; /* ring bell on cmd completion */ +extern int doglob; /* glob local file names */ +extern int autologin; /* establish user account on connection */ +extern int proxy; /* proxy server connection active */ +extern int proxflag; /* proxy connection exists */ +extern int sunique; /* store files on server with unique name */ +extern int runique; /* store local files with unique name */ +extern int mcase; /* map upper to lower case for mget names */ +extern int ntflag; /* use ntin ntout tables for name translation */ +extern int mapflag; /* use mapin mapout templates on file names */ +extern int code; /* return/reply code for ftp command */ +extern int crflag; /* if 1, strip car. rets. on ascii gets */ +extern char pasv[64]; /* passive port for proxy data connection */ +extern int passivemode; /* passive mode enabled */ +extern char *altarg; /* argv[1] with no shell-like preprocessing */ +extern char ntin[17]; /* input translation table */ +extern char ntout[17]; /* output translation table */ +extern char mapin[MaxPathLen]; /* input map template */ +extern char mapout[MaxPathLen]; /* output map template */ +extern char typename[32]; /* name of file transfer type */ +extern int type; /* requested file transfer type */ +extern int curtype; /* current file transfer type */ +extern char structname[32]; /* name of file transfer structure */ +extern int stru; /* file transfer structure */ +extern char formname[32]; /* name of file transfer format */ +extern int form; /* file transfer format */ +extern char modename[32]; /* name of file transfer mode */ +extern int mode; /* file transfer mode */ +extern char bytename[32]; /* local byte size in ascii */ +extern int bytesize; /* local byte size in binary */ + +extern char *hostname; /* name of host connected to */ +extern int unix_server; /* server is unix, can use binary for ascii */ +extern int unix_proxy; /* proxy is unix, can use binary for ascii */ + +extern jmp_buf toplevel; /* non-local goto stuff for cmd scanner */ + +extern char line[200]; /* input line buffer */ +extern char *stringbase; /* current scan point in line buffer */ +extern char argbuf[200]; /* argument storage buffer */ +extern char *argbase; /* current storage point in arg buffer */ +extern int margc; /* count of arguments on input line */ +extern char **margv; /* args parsed from input line */ +extern int margvlen; /* how large margv is currently */ +extern int cpend; /* flag: if != 0, then pending server reply */ +extern int mflag; /* flag: if != 0, then active multi command */ + +extern int options; /* used during socket creation */ + +/* + * Format of command table. + */ +struct cmd { + char *c_name; /* name of command */ + char *c_help; /* help string */ + char c_bell; /* give bell when command completes */ + char c_conn; /* must be connected to use command */ + char c_proxy; /* proxy server may execute */ + void (*c_handler) (int, char **); /* function to call */ +}; + +struct macel { + char mac_name[9]; /* macro name */ + char *mac_start; /* start of macro in macbuf */ + char *mac_end; /* end of macro in macbuf */ +}; + +extern int macnum; /* number of defined macros */ +extern struct macel macros[16]; +extern char macbuf[4096]; + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7199e65 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/globals.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: globals.c,v 1.6 1996/08/26 22:46:26 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Options and other state info. + */ +int trace; /* trace packets exchanged */ +int hash; /* print # for each buffer transferred */ +int sendport; /* use PORT cmd for each data connection */ +int verbose; /* print messages coming back from server */ +int connected; /* connected to server */ +int fromatty; /* input is from a terminal */ +int interactive; /* interactively prompt on m* cmds */ +int debug; /* debugging level */ +int bell; /* ring bell on cmd completion */ +int doglob; /* glob local file names */ +int autologin; /* establish user account on connection */ +int proxy; /* proxy server connection active */ +int proxflag; /* proxy connection exists */ +int sunique; /* store files on server with unique name */ +int runique; /* store local files with unique name */ +int mcase; /* map upper to lower case for mget names */ +int ntflag; /* use ntin ntout tables for name translation */ +int mapflag; /* use mapin mapout templates on file names */ +int code; /* return/reply code for ftp command */ +int crflag; /* if 1, strip car. rets. on ascii gets */ +char pasv[64]; /* passive port for proxy data connection */ +int passivemode; /* passive mode enabled */ +char *altarg; /* argv[1] with no shell-like preprocessing */ +char ntin[17]; /* input translation table */ +char ntout[17]; /* output translation table */ +char mapin[MaxPathLen]; /* input map template */ +char mapout[MaxPathLen]; /* output map template */ +char typename[32]; /* name of file transfer type */ +int type; /* requested file transfer type */ +int curtype; /* current file transfer type */ +char structname[32]; /* name of file transfer structure */ +int stru; /* file transfer structure */ +char formname[32]; /* name of file transfer format */ +int form; /* file transfer format */ +char modename[32]; /* name of file transfer mode */ +int mode; /* file transfer mode */ +char bytename[32]; /* local byte size in ascii */ +int bytesize; /* local byte size in binary */ + +char *hostname; /* name of host connected to */ +int unix_server; /* server is unix, can use binary for ascii */ +int unix_proxy; /* proxy is unix, can use binary for ascii */ + +jmp_buf toplevel; /* non-local goto stuff for cmd scanner */ + +char line[200]; /* input line buffer */ +char *stringbase; /* current scan point in line buffer */ +char argbuf[200]; /* argument storage buffer */ +char *argbase; /* current storage point in arg buffer */ +int margc; /* count of arguments on input line */ +char **margv; /* args parsed from input line */ +int margvlen; /* how large margv is currently */ +int cpend; /* flag: if != 0, then pending server reply */ +int mflag; /* flag: if != 0, then active multi command */ + +int options; /* used during socket creation */ + +/* + * Format of command table. + */ + +int macnum; /* number of defined macros */ +struct macel macros[16]; +char macbuf[4096]; + +char username[32]; + +/* these are set in ruserpass */ +char myhostname[MaxHostNameLen]; +char *mydomain; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d06b5d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/gssapi.c @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#else +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#endif +#include + +RCSID("$Id: gssapi.c,v 1.13 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $"); + +struct gss_data { + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl; + char *client_name; +}; + +static int +gss_init(void *app_data) +{ + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + d->context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + return 0; +} + +static int +gss_check_prot(void *app_data, int level) +{ + if(level == prot_confidential) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +static int +gss_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len, int level) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc input, output; + gss_qop_t qop_state; + int conf_state; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + + input.length = len; + input.value = buf; + maj_stat = gss_unwrap (&min_stat, + d->context_hdl, + &input, + &output, + &conf_state, + &qop_state); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + return -1; + memmove(buf, output.value, output.length); + return output.length; +} + +static int +gss_overhead(void *app_data, int level, int len) +{ + return 100; /* dunno? */ +} + + +static int +gss_encode(void *app_data, void *from, int length, int level, void **to) +{ + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc input, output; + int conf_state; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + + input.length = length; + input.value = from; + maj_stat = gss_wrap (&min_stat, + d->context_hdl, + level == prot_private, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + &input, + &conf_state, + &output); + *to = output.value; + return output.length; +} + +static void +sockaddr_to_gss_address (const struct sockaddr *sa, + OM_uint32 *addr_type, + gss_buffer_desc *gss_addr) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + gss_addr->length = 16; + gss_addr->value = &sin6->sin6_addr; + *addr_type = GSS_C_AF_INET6; + break; + } +#endif + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + gss_addr->length = 4; + gss_addr->value = &sin->sin_addr; + *addr_type = GSS_C_AF_INET; + break; + } + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + + } +} + +/* end common stuff */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +static int +gss_adat(void *app_data, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + char *p = NULL; + gss_buffer_desc input_token, output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t client_name; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + + gss_channel_bindings_t bindings = malloc(sizeof(*bindings)); + sockaddr_to_gss_address (his_addr, + &bindings->initiator_addrtype, + &bindings->initiator_address); + sockaddr_to_gss_address (ctrl_addr, + &bindings->acceptor_addrtype, + &bindings->acceptor_address); + + bindings->application_data.length = 0; + bindings->application_data.value = NULL; + + input_token.value = buf; + input_token.length = len; + + maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context (&min_stat, + &d->context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &input_token, + bindings, + &client_name, + NULL, + &output_token, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + + if(output_token.length) { + if(base64_encode(output_token.value, output_token.length, &p) < 0) { + reply(535, "Out of memory base64-encoding."); + return -1; + } + } + if(maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE){ + char *name; + gss_buffer_desc export_name; + maj_stat = gss_export_name(&min_stat, client_name, &export_name); + if(maj_stat != 0) { + reply(500, "Error exporting name"); + goto out; + } + name = realloc(export_name.value, export_name.length + 1); + if(name == NULL) { + reply(500, "Out of memory"); + free(export_name.value); + goto out; + } + name[export_name.length] = '\0'; + d->client_name = name; + if(p) + reply(235, "ADAT=%s", p); + else + reply(235, "ADAT Complete"); + sec_complete = 1; + + } else if(maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + if(p) + reply(335, "ADAT=%s", p); + else + reply(335, "OK, need more data"); + } else + reply(535, "foo?"); +out: + free(p); + return 0; +} + +int gss_userok(void*, char*); + +struct sec_server_mech gss_server_mech = { + "GSSAPI", + sizeof(struct gss_data), + gss_init, /* init */ + NULL, /* end */ + gss_check_prot, + gss_overhead, + gss_encode, + gss_decode, + /* */ + NULL, + gss_adat, + NULL, /* pbsz */ + NULL, /* ccc */ + gss_userok +}; + +#else /* FTP_SERVER */ + +extern struct sockaddr *hisctladdr, *myctladdr; + +static int +gss_auth(void *app_data, char *host) +{ + + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_buffer_desc name; + gss_name_t target_name; + gss_buffer_desc input, output_token; + int context_established = 0; + char *p; + int n; + gss_channel_bindings_t bindings; + struct gss_data *d = app_data; + + name.length = asprintf((char**)&name.value, "ftp@%s", host); + maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, + &name, + GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &target_name); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + + gss_display_status(&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + printf("Error importing name %s: %s\n", + (char *)name.value, + (char *)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status_string); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + free(name.value); + + + input.length = 0; + input.value = NULL; + + bindings = malloc(sizeof(*bindings)); + + sockaddr_to_gss_address (myctladdr, + &bindings->initiator_addrtype, + &bindings->initiator_address); + sockaddr_to_gss_address (hisctladdr, + &bindings->acceptor_addrtype, + &bindings->acceptor_address); + + bindings->application_data.length = 0; + bindings->application_data.value = NULL; + + while(!context_established) { + maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &d->context_hdl, + target_name, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, + 0, + bindings, + &input, + NULL, + &output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + + gss_display_status(&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + printf("Error initializing security context: %s\n", + (char*)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer(&new_stat, &status_string); + return AUTH_CONTINUE; + } + + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &input); + if (output_token.length != 0) { + base64_encode(output_token.value, output_token.length, &p); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token); + n = command("ADAT %s", p); + free(p); + } + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (d->context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &d->context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + p = strstr(reply_string, "ADAT="); + if(p == NULL){ + printf("Error: expected ADAT in reply.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } else { + p+=5; + input.value = malloc(strlen(p)); + input.length = base64_decode(p, input.value); + } + } else { + if(code != 235) { + printf("Unrecognized response code: %d\n", code); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + context_established = 1; + } + } + return AUTH_OK; +} + +struct sec_client_mech gss_client_mech = { + "GSSAPI", + sizeof(struct gss_data), + gss_init, + gss_auth, + NULL, /* end */ + gss_check_prot, + gss_overhead, + gss_encode, + gss_decode, +}; + +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..613593a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/kauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#include +RCSID("$Id: kauth.c,v 1.20 1999/12/02 16:58:29 joda Exp $"); + +void +kauth(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + char buf[1024]; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + KTEXT_ST tkt, tktcopy; + char *name; + char *p; + int overbose; + char passwd[100]; + int tmp; + + int save; + + if(argc > 2){ + printf("usage: %s [principal]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if(argc == 2) + name = argv[1]; + else + name = username; + + overbose = verbose; + verbose = 0; + + save = set_command_prot(prot_private); + ret = command("SITE KAUTH %s", name); + if(ret != CONTINUE){ + verbose = overbose; + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + verbose = overbose; + p = strstr(reply_string, "T="); + if(!p){ + printf("Bad reply from server.\n"); + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + p += 2; + tmp = base64_decode(p, &tkt.dat); + if(tmp < 0){ + printf("Failed to decode base64 in reply.\n"); + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + tkt.length = tmp; + tktcopy.length = tkt.length; + + p = strstr(reply_string, "P="); + if(!p){ + printf("Bad reply from server.\n"); + verbose = overbose; + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + name = p + 2; + for(; *p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\r' && *p != '\n'; p++); + *p = 0; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Password for %s:", name); + if (des_read_pw_string (passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, buf, 0)) + *passwd = '\0'; + des_string_to_key (passwd, &key); + + des_key_sched(&key, schedule); + + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)tkt.dat, (des_cblock*)tktcopy.dat, + tkt.length, + schedule, &key, DES_DECRYPT); + if (strcmp ((char*)tktcopy.dat + 8, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET) != 0) { + afs_string_to_key (passwd, krb_realmofhost(hostname), &key); + des_key_sched (&key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)tkt.dat, (des_cblock*)tktcopy.dat, + tkt.length, + schedule, &key, DES_DECRYPT); + } + memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset(schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + if(base64_encode(tktcopy.dat, tktcopy.length, &p) < 0) { + printf("Out of memory base64-encoding.\n"); + set_command_prot(save); + code = -1; + return; + } + memset (tktcopy.dat, 0, tktcopy.length); + ret = command("SITE KAUTH %s %s", name, p); + free(p); + set_command_prot(save); + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + code = -1; + return; + } + code = 0; +} + +void +klist(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if(argc != 1){ + printf("usage: %s\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + + ret = command("SITE KLIST"); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} + +void +kdestroy(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if (argc != 1) { + printf("usage: %s\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + ret = command("SITE KDESTROY"); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} + +void +krbtkfile(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if(argc != 2) { + printf("usage: %s tktfile\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + ret = command("SITE KRBTKFILE %s", argv[1]); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} + +void +afslog(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + if(argc > 2) { + printf("usage: %s [cell]\n", argv[0]); + code = -1; + return; + } + if(argc == 2) + ret = command("SITE AFSLOG %s", argv[1]); + else + ret = command("SITE AFSLOG"); + code = (ret == COMPLETE); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c89ba95 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/krb4.c @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#else +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#endif +#include + +RCSID("$Id: krb4.c,v 1.37 1999/12/06 17:10:13 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#define LOCAL_ADDR ctrl_addr +#define REMOTE_ADDR his_addr +#else +#define LOCAL_ADDR myctladdr +#define REMOTE_ADDR hisctladdr +#endif + +extern struct sockaddr *LOCAL_ADDR, *REMOTE_ADDR; + +struct krb4_data { + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; +}; + +static int +krb4_check_prot(void *app_data, int level) +{ + if(level == prot_confidential) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +static int +krb4_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len, int level) +{ + MSG_DAT m; + int e; + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + + if(level == prot_safe) + e = krb_rd_safe(buf, len, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, &m); + else + e = krb_rd_priv(buf, len, d->schedule, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, &m); + if(e){ + syslog(LOG_ERR, "krb4_decode: %s", krb_get_err_text(e)); + return -1; + } + memmove(buf, m.app_data, m.app_length); + return m.app_length; +} + +static int +krb4_overhead(void *app_data, int level, int len) +{ + return 31; +} + +static int +krb4_encode(void *app_data, void *from, int length, int level, void **to) +{ + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + *to = malloc(length + 31); + if(level == prot_safe) + return krb_mk_safe(from, *to, length, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR); + else if(level == prot_private) + return krb_mk_priv(from, *to, length, d->schedule, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR); + else + return -1; +} + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +static int +krb4_adat(void *app_data, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + KTEXT_ST tkt; + AUTH_DAT auth_dat; + char *p; + int kerror; + u_int32_t cs; + char msg[35]; /* size of encrypted block */ + int tmp_len; + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + char inst[INST_SZ]; + struct sockaddr_in *his_addr_sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)his_addr; + + memcpy(tkt.dat, buf, len); + tkt.length = len; + + k_getsockinst(0, inst, sizeof(inst)); + kerror = krb_rd_req(&tkt, "ftp", inst, + his_addr_sin->sin_addr.s_addr, &auth_dat, ""); + if(kerror == RD_AP_UNDEC){ + k_getsockinst(0, inst, sizeof(inst)); + kerror = krb_rd_req(&tkt, "rcmd", inst, + his_addr_sin->sin_addr.s_addr, &auth_dat, ""); + } + + if(kerror){ + reply(535, "Error reading request: %s.", krb_get_err_text(kerror)); + return -1; + } + + memcpy(d->key, auth_dat.session, sizeof(d->key)); + des_set_key(&d->key, d->schedule); + + strlcpy(d->name, auth_dat.pname, sizeof(d->name)); + strlcpy(d->instance, auth_dat.pinst, sizeof(d->instance)); + strlcpy(d->realm, auth_dat.prealm, sizeof(d->instance)); + + cs = auth_dat.checksum + 1; + { + unsigned char tmp[4]; + KRB_PUT_INT(cs, tmp, 4, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp_len = krb_mk_safe(tmp, msg, 4, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR, + (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR); + } + if(tmp_len < 0){ + reply(535, "Error creating reply: %s.", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + len = tmp_len; + if(base64_encode(msg, len, &p) < 0) { + reply(535, "Out of memory base64-encoding."); + return -1; + } + reply(235, "ADAT=%s", p); + sec_complete = 1; + free(p); + return 0; +} + +static int +krb4_userok(void *app_data, char *user) +{ + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + return krb_kuserok(d->name, d->instance, d->realm, user); +} + +struct sec_server_mech krb4_server_mech = { + "KERBEROS_V4", + sizeof(struct krb4_data), + NULL, /* init */ + NULL, /* end */ + krb4_check_prot, + krb4_overhead, + krb4_encode, + krb4_decode, + /* */ + NULL, + krb4_adat, + NULL, /* pbsz */ + NULL, /* ccc */ + krb4_userok +}; + +#else /* FTP_SERVER */ + +static int +mk_auth(struct krb4_data *d, KTEXT adat, + char *service, char *host, int checksum) +{ + int ret; + CREDENTIALS cred; + char sname[SNAME_SZ], inst[INST_SZ], realm[REALM_SZ]; + + strlcpy(sname, service, sizeof(sname)); + strlcpy(inst, krb_get_phost(host), sizeof(inst)); + strlcpy(realm, krb_realmofhost(host), sizeof(realm)); + ret = krb_mk_req(adat, sname, inst, realm, checksum); + if(ret) + return ret; + strlcpy(sname, service, sizeof(sname)); + strlcpy(inst, krb_get_phost(host), sizeof(inst)); + strlcpy(realm, krb_realmofhost(host), sizeof(realm)); + ret = krb_get_cred(sname, inst, realm, &cred); + memmove(&d->key, &cred.session, sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_key_sched(&d->key, d->schedule); + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + return ret; +} + +static int +krb4_auth(void *app_data, char *host) +{ + int ret; + char *p; + int len; + KTEXT_ST adat; + MSG_DAT msg_data; + int checksum; + u_int32_t cs; + struct krb4_data *d = app_data; + struct sockaddr_in *localaddr = (struct sockaddr_in *)LOCAL_ADDR; + struct sockaddr_in *remoteaddr = (struct sockaddr_in *)REMOTE_ADDR; + + checksum = getpid(); + ret = mk_auth(d, &adat, "ftp", host, checksum); + if(ret == KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) + ret = mk_auth(d, &adat, "rcmd", host, checksum); + if(ret){ + printf("%s\n", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return AUTH_CONTINUE; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_KRB_GET_OUR_IP_FOR_REALM + if (krb_get_config_bool("nat_in_use")) { + struct in_addr natAddr; + + if (krb_get_our_ip_for_realm(krb_realmofhost(host), + &natAddr) != KSUCCESS + && krb_get_our_ip_for_realm(NULL, &natAddr) != KSUCCESS) + printf("Can't get address for realm %s\n", + krb_realmofhost(host)); + else { + if (natAddr.s_addr != localaddr->sin_addr.s_addr) { + printf("Using NAT IP address (%s) for kerberos 4\n", + inet_ntoa(natAddr)); + localaddr->sin_addr = natAddr; + + /* + * This not the best place to do this, but it + * is here we know that (probably) NAT is in + * use! + */ + + passivemode = 1; + printf("Setting: Passive mode on.\n"); + } + } + } +#endif + + printf("Local address is %s\n", inet_ntoa(localaddr->sin_addr)); + printf("Remote address is %s\n", inet_ntoa(remoteaddr->sin_addr)); + + if(base64_encode(adat.dat, adat.length, &p) < 0) { + printf("Out of memory base64-encoding.\n"); + return AUTH_CONTINUE; + } + ret = command("ADAT %s", p); + free(p); + + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + printf("Server didn't accept auth data.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + + p = strstr(reply_string, "ADAT="); + if(!p){ + printf("Remote host didn't send adat reply.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + p += 5; + len = base64_decode(p, adat.dat); + if(len < 0){ + printf("Failed to decode base64 from server.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + adat.length = len; + ret = krb_rd_safe(adat.dat, adat.length, &d->key, + (struct sockaddr_in *)hisctladdr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)myctladdr, &msg_data); + if(ret){ + printf("Error reading reply from server: %s.\n", + krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + krb_get_int(msg_data.app_data, &cs, 4, 0); + if(cs - checksum != 1){ + printf("Bad checksum returned from server.\n"); + return AUTH_ERROR; + } + return AUTH_OK; +} + +struct sec_client_mech krb4_client_mech = { + "KERBEROS_V4", + sizeof(struct krb4_data), + NULL, /* init */ + krb4_auth, + NULL, /* end */ + krb4_check_prot, + krb4_overhead, + krb4_encode, + krb4_decode +}; + +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfe9e88 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,549 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * FTP User Program -- Command Interface. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.27 1999/11/13 06:18:02 assar Exp $"); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch, top; + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + char homedir[MaxPathLen]; + struct servent *sp; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + sp = getservbyname("ftp", "tcp"); + if (sp == 0) + errx(1, "ftp/tcp: unknown service"); + doglob = 1; + interactive = 1; + autologin = 1; + passivemode = 0; /* passive mode not active */ + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dginptv")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'd': + options |= SO_DEBUG; + debug++; + break; + + case 'g': + doglob = 0; + break; + + case 'i': + interactive = 0; + break; + + case 'n': + autologin = 0; + break; + + case 'p': + passivemode = 1; + break; + case 't': + trace++; + break; + + case 'v': + verbose++; + break; + + default: + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: ftp [-dginptv] [host [port]]\n"); + exit(1); + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + fromatty = isatty(fileno(stdin)); + if (fromatty) + verbose++; + cpend = 0; /* no pending replies */ + proxy = 0; /* proxy not active */ + crflag = 1; /* strip c.r. on ascii gets */ + sendport = -1; /* not using ports */ + /* + * Set up the home directory in case we're globbing. + */ + pw = k_getpwuid(getuid()); + if (pw != NULL) { + strlcpy(homedir, pw->pw_dir, sizeof(homedir)); + home = homedir; + } + if (argc > 0) { + char *xargv[5]; + + if (setjmp(toplevel)) + exit(0); + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGPIPE, lostpeer); + xargv[0] = (char*)__progname; + xargv[1] = argv[0]; + xargv[2] = argv[1]; + xargv[3] = argv[2]; + xargv[4] = NULL; + setpeer(argc+1, xargv); + } + if(setjmp(toplevel) == 0) + top = 1; + else + top = 0; + if (top) { + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGPIPE, lostpeer); + } + for (;;) { + cmdscanner(top); + top = 1; + } +} + +void +intr(int sig) +{ + + longjmp(toplevel, 1); +} + +#ifndef SHUT_RDWR +#define SHUT_RDWR 2 +#endif + +RETSIGTYPE +lostpeer(int sig) +{ + + if (connected) { + if (cout != NULL) { + shutdown(fileno(cout), SHUT_RDWR); + fclose(cout); + cout = NULL; + } + if (data >= 0) { + shutdown(data, SHUT_RDWR); + close(data); + data = -1; + } + connected = 0; + } + pswitch(1); + if (connected) { + if (cout != NULL) { + shutdown(fileno(cout), SHUT_RDWR); + fclose(cout); + cout = NULL; + } + connected = 0; + } + proxflag = 0; + pswitch(0); + sec_end(); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +/* +char * +tail(filename) + char *filename; +{ + char *s; + + while (*filename) { + s = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if (s == NULL) + break; + if (s[1]) + return (s + 1); + *s = '\0'; + } + return (filename); +} +*/ + +#ifndef HAVE_READLINE + +static char * +readline(char *prompt) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + printf ("%s", prompt); + fflush (stdout); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + return strdup(buf); +} + +static void +add_history(char *p) +{ +} + +#else + +/* These should not really be here */ + +char *readline(char *); +void add_history(char *); + +#endif + +/* + * Command parser. + */ +void +cmdscanner(int top) +{ + struct cmd *c; + int l; + + if (!top) + putchar('\n'); + for (;;) { + if (fromatty) { + char *p; + p = readline("ftp> "); + if(p == NULL) + quit(0, 0); + strlcpy(line, p, sizeof(line)); + add_history(p); + free(p); + } else{ + if (fgets(line, sizeof line, stdin) == NULL) + quit(0, 0); + } + /* XXX will break on long lines */ + l = strlen(line); + if (l == 0) + break; + if (line[--l] == '\n') { + if (l == 0) + break; + line[l] = '\0'; + } else if (l == sizeof(line) - 2) { + printf("sorry, input line too long\n"); + while ((l = getchar()) != '\n' && l != EOF) + /* void */; + break; + } /* else it was a line without a newline */ + makeargv(); + if (margc == 0) { + continue; + } + c = getcmd(margv[0]); + if (c == (struct cmd *)-1) { + printf("?Ambiguous command\n"); + continue; + } + if (c == 0) { + printf("?Invalid command\n"); + continue; + } + if (c->c_conn && !connected) { + printf("Not connected.\n"); + continue; + } + (*c->c_handler)(margc, margv); + if (bell && c->c_bell) + putchar('\007'); + if (c->c_handler != help) + break; + } + signal(SIGINT, intr); + signal(SIGPIPE, lostpeer); +} + +struct cmd * +getcmd(char *name) +{ + char *p, *q; + struct cmd *c, *found; + int nmatches, longest; + + longest = 0; + nmatches = 0; + found = 0; + for (c = cmdtab; (p = c->c_name); c++) { + for (q = name; *q == *p++; q++) + if (*q == 0) /* exact match? */ + return (c); + if (!*q) { /* the name was a prefix */ + if (q - name > longest) { + longest = q - name; + nmatches = 1; + found = c; + } else if (q - name == longest) + nmatches++; + } + } + if (nmatches > 1) + return ((struct cmd *)-1); + return (found); +} + +/* + * Slice a string up into argc/argv. + */ + +int slrflag; + +void +makeargv(void) +{ + char **argp; + + argp = margv; + stringbase = line; /* scan from first of buffer */ + argbase = argbuf; /* store from first of buffer */ + slrflag = 0; + for (margc = 0; ; margc++) { + /* Expand array if necessary */ + if (margc == margvlen) { + int i; + + margv = (margvlen == 0) + ? (char **)malloc(20 * sizeof(char *)) + : (char **)realloc(margv, + (margvlen + 20)*sizeof(char *)); + if (margv == NULL) + errx(1, "cannot realloc argv array"); + for(i = margvlen; i < margvlen + 20; ++i) + margv[i] = NULL; + margvlen += 20; + argp = margv + margc; + } + + if ((*argp++ = slurpstring()) == NULL) + break; + } + +} + +/* + * Parse string into argbuf; + * implemented with FSM to + * handle quoting and strings + */ +char * +slurpstring(void) +{ + int got_one = 0; + char *sb = stringbase; + char *ap = argbase; + char *tmp = argbase; /* will return this if token found */ + + if (*sb == '!' || *sb == '$') { /* recognize ! as a token for shell */ + switch (slrflag) { /* and $ as token for macro invoke */ + case 0: + slrflag++; + stringbase++; + return ((*sb == '!') ? "!" : "$"); + /* NOTREACHED */ + case 1: + slrflag++; + altarg = stringbase; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + +S0: + switch (*sb) { + + case '\0': + goto OUT; + + case ' ': + case '\t': + sb++; goto S0; + + default: + switch (slrflag) { + case 0: + slrflag++; + break; + case 1: + slrflag++; + altarg = sb; + break; + default: + break; + } + goto S1; + } + +S1: + switch (*sb) { + + case ' ': + case '\t': + case '\0': + goto OUT; /* end of token */ + + case '\\': + sb++; goto S2; /* slurp next character */ + + case '"': + sb++; goto S3; /* slurp quoted string */ + + default: + *ap++ = *sb++; /* add character to token */ + got_one = 1; + goto S1; + } + +S2: + switch (*sb) { + + case '\0': + goto OUT; + + default: + *ap++ = *sb++; + got_one = 1; + goto S1; + } + +S3: + switch (*sb) { + + case '\0': + goto OUT; + + case '"': + sb++; goto S1; + + default: + *ap++ = *sb++; + got_one = 1; + goto S3; + } + +OUT: + if (got_one) + *ap++ = '\0'; + argbase = ap; /* update storage pointer */ + stringbase = sb; /* update scan pointer */ + if (got_one) { + return (tmp); + } + switch (slrflag) { + case 0: + slrflag++; + break; + case 1: + slrflag++; + altarg = (char *) 0; + break; + default: + break; + } + return NULL; +} + +#define HELPINDENT ((int) sizeof ("directory")) + +/* + * Help command. + * Call each command handler with argc == 0 and argv[0] == name. + */ +void +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct cmd *c; + + if (argc == 1) { + int i, j, w, k; + int columns, width = 0, lines; + + printf("Commands may be abbreviated. Commands are:\n\n"); + for (c = cmdtab; c < &cmdtab[NCMDS]; c++) { + int len = strlen(c->c_name); + + if (len > width) + width = len; + } + width = (width + 8) &~ 7; + columns = 80 / width; + if (columns == 0) + columns = 1; + lines = (NCMDS + columns - 1) / columns; + for (i = 0; i < lines; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < columns; j++) { + c = cmdtab + j * lines + i; + if (c->c_name && (!proxy || c->c_proxy)) { + printf("%s", c->c_name); + } + else if (c->c_name) { + for (k=0; k < strlen(c->c_name); k++) { + putchar(' '); + } + } + if (c + lines >= &cmdtab[NCMDS]) { + printf("\n"); + break; + } + w = strlen(c->c_name); + while (w < width) { + w = (w + 8) &~ 7; + putchar('\t'); + } + } + } + return; + } + while (--argc > 0) { + char *arg; + arg = *++argv; + c = getcmd(arg); + if (c == (struct cmd *)-1) + printf("?Ambiguous help command %s\n", arg); + else if (c == (struct cmd *)0) + printf("?Invalid help command %s\n", arg); + else + printf("%-*s\t%s\n", HELPINDENT, + c->c_name, c->c_help); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7c1fb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/pathnames.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)pathnames.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93 + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#define _PATH_TMP_XXX "/tmp/ftpXXXXXX" + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b22f699 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/ruserpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftp_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: ruserpass.c,v 1.19 2000/01/08 07:45:11 assar Exp $"); + +static int token (void); +static FILE *cfile; + +#define DEFAULT 1 +#define LOGIN 2 +#define PASSWD 3 +#define ACCOUNT 4 +#define MACDEF 5 +#define PROT 6 +#define ID 10 +#define MACH 11 + +static char tokval[100]; + +static struct toktab { + char *tokstr; + int tval; +} toktab[]= { + { "default", DEFAULT }, + { "login", LOGIN }, + { "password", PASSWD }, + { "passwd", PASSWD }, + { "account", ACCOUNT }, + { "machine", MACH }, + { "macdef", MACDEF }, + { "prot", PROT }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +/* + * Write a copy of the hostname into `hostname, sz' and return a guess + * as to the `domain' of that hostname. + */ + +static char * +guess_domain (char *hostname, size_t sz) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char *dot; + + if (gethostname (hostname, sz) < 0) { + strlcpy (hostname, "", sz); + return ""; + } + dot = strchr (hostname, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) + return dot + 1; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return hostname; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + strlcpy (hostname, ai->ai_canonname, sz); + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + dot = strchr (hostname, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) + return dot + 1; + else + return hostname; +} + +int +ruserpass(char *host, char **aname, char **apass, char **aacct) +{ + char *hdir, buf[BUFSIZ], *tmp; + int t, i, c, usedefault = 0; + struct stat stb; + + mydomain = guess_domain (myhostname, MaxHostNameLen); + + hdir = getenv("HOME"); + if (hdir == NULL) + hdir = "."; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.netrc", hdir); + cfile = fopen(buf, "r"); + if (cfile == NULL) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + warn("%s", buf); + return (0); + } + +next: + while ((t = token())) switch(t) { + + case DEFAULT: + usedefault = 1; + /* FALL THROUGH */ + + case MACH: + if (!usedefault) { + if (token() != ID) + continue; + /* + * Allow match either for user's input host name + * or official hostname. Also allow match of + * incompletely-specified host in local domain. + */ + if (strcasecmp(host, tokval) == 0) + goto match; + if (strcasecmp(hostname, tokval) == 0) + goto match; + if ((tmp = strchr(hostname, '.')) != NULL && + tmp++ && + strcasecmp(tmp, mydomain) == 0 && + strncasecmp(hostname, tokval, tmp-hostname) == 0 && + tokval[tmp - hostname] == '\0') + goto match; + if ((tmp = strchr(host, '.')) != NULL && + tmp++ && + strcasecmp(tmp, mydomain) == 0 && + strncasecmp(host, tokval, tmp - host) == 0 && + tokval[tmp - host] == '\0') + goto match; + continue; + } + match: + while ((t = token()) && t != MACH && t != DEFAULT) switch(t) { + + case LOGIN: + if (token()) { + if (*aname == 0) { + *aname = strdup(tokval); + } else { + if (strcmp(*aname, tokval)) + goto next; + } + } + break; + case PASSWD: + if ((*aname == NULL || strcmp(*aname, "anonymous")) && + fstat(fileno(cfile), &stb) >= 0 && + (stb.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + warnx("Error: .netrc file is readable by others."); + warnx("Remove password or make file unreadable by others."); + goto bad; + } + if (token() && *apass == 0) { + *apass = strdup(tokval); + } + break; + case ACCOUNT: + if (fstat(fileno(cfile), &stb) >= 0 + && (stb.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + warnx("Error: .netrc file is readable by others."); + warnx("Remove account or make file unreadable by others."); + goto bad; + } + if (token() && *aacct == 0) { + *aacct = strdup(tokval); + } + break; + case MACDEF: + if (proxy) { + fclose(cfile); + return (0); + } + while ((c=getc(cfile)) != EOF && + (c == ' ' || c == '\t')); + if (c == EOF || c == '\n') { + printf("Missing macdef name argument.\n"); + goto bad; + } + if (macnum == 16) { + printf("Limit of 16 macros have already been defined\n"); + goto bad; + } + tmp = macros[macnum].mac_name; + *tmp++ = c; + for (i=0; i < 8 && (c=getc(cfile)) != EOF && + !isspace(c); ++i) { + *tmp++ = c; + } + if (c == EOF) { + printf("Macro definition missing null line terminator.\n"); + goto bad; + } + *tmp = '\0'; + if (c != '\n') { + while ((c=getc(cfile)) != EOF && c != '\n'); + } + if (c == EOF) { + printf("Macro definition missing null line terminator.\n"); + goto bad; + } + if (macnum == 0) { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macbuf; + } + else { + macros[macnum].mac_start = macros[macnum-1].mac_end + 1; + } + tmp = macros[macnum].mac_start; + while (tmp != macbuf + 4096) { + if ((c=getc(cfile)) == EOF) { + printf("Macro definition missing null line terminator.\n"); + goto bad; + } + *tmp = c; + if (*tmp == '\n') { + if (*(tmp-1) == '\0') { + macros[macnum++].mac_end = tmp - 1; + break; + } + *tmp = '\0'; + } + tmp++; + } + if (tmp == macbuf + 4096) { + printf("4K macro buffer exceeded\n"); + goto bad; + } + break; + case PROT: + token(); + if(sec_request_prot(tokval) < 0) + warnx("Unknown protection level \"%s\"", tokval); + break; + default: + warnx("Unknown .netrc keyword %s", tokval); + break; + } + goto done; + } +done: + fclose(cfile); + return (0); +bad: + fclose(cfile); + return (-1); +} + +static int +token(void) +{ + char *cp; + int c; + struct toktab *t; + + if (feof(cfile) || ferror(cfile)) + return (0); + while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF && + (c == '\n' || c == '\t' || c == ' ' || c == ',')) + continue; + if (c == EOF) + return (0); + cp = tokval; + if (c == '"') { + while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF && c != '"') { + if (c == '\\') + c = getc(cfile); + *cp++ = c; + } + } else { + *cp++ = c; + while ((c = getc(cfile)) != EOF + && c != '\n' && c != '\t' && c != ' ' && c != ',') { + if (c == '\\') + c = getc(cfile); + *cp++ = c; + } + } + *cp = 0; + if (tokval[0] == 0) + return (0); + for (t = toktab; t->tokstr; t++) + if (!strcmp(t->tokstr, tokval)) + return (t->tval); + return (ID); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca7eb00 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.c @@ -0,0 +1,785 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#else +#include "ftp_locl.h" +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: security.c,v 1.15 1999/12/02 16:58:30 joda Exp $"); + +static enum protection_level command_prot; +static enum protection_level data_prot; +static size_t buffer_size; + +struct buffer { + void *data; + size_t size; + size_t index; + int eof_flag; +}; + +static struct buffer in_buffer, out_buffer; +int sec_complete; + +static struct { + enum protection_level level; + const char *name; +} level_names[] = { + { prot_clear, "clear" }, + { prot_safe, "safe" }, + { prot_confidential, "confidential" }, + { prot_private, "private" } +}; + +static const char * +level_to_name(enum protection_level level) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(level_names) / sizeof(level_names[0]); i++) + if(level_names[i].level == level) + return level_names[i].name; + return "unknown"; +} + +#ifndef FTP_SERVER /* not used in server */ +static enum protection_level +name_to_level(const char *name) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(level_names) / sizeof(level_names[0]); i++) + if(!strncasecmp(level_names[i].name, name, strlen(name))) + return level_names[i].level; + return (enum protection_level)-1; +} +#endif + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +static struct sec_server_mech *mechs[] = { +#ifdef KRB5 + &gss_server_mech, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + &krb4_server_mech, +#endif + NULL +}; + +static struct sec_server_mech *mech; + +#else + +static struct sec_client_mech *mechs[] = { +#ifdef KRB5 + &gss_client_mech, +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + &krb4_client_mech, +#endif + NULL +}; + +static struct sec_client_mech *mech; + +#endif + +static void *app_data; + +int +sec_getc(FILE *F) +{ + if(sec_complete && data_prot) { + char c; + if(sec_read(fileno(F), &c, 1) <= 0) + return EOF; + return c; + } else + return getc(F); +} + +static int +block_read(int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int b; + while(len) { + b = read(fd, p, len); + if (b == 0) + return 0; + else if (b < 0) + return -1; + len -= b; + p += b; + } + return p - (unsigned char*)buf; +} + +static int +block_write(int fd, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int b; + while(len) { + b = write(fd, p, len); + if(b < 0) + return -1; + len -= b; + p += b; + } + return p - (unsigned char*)buf; +} + +static int +sec_get_data(int fd, struct buffer *buf, int level) +{ + int len; + int b; + + b = block_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len)); + if (b == 0) + return 0; + else if (b < 0) + return -1; + len = ntohl(len); + buf->data = realloc(buf->data, len); + b = block_read(fd, buf->data, len); + if (b == 0) + return 0; + else if (b < 0) + return -1; + buf->size = (*mech->decode)(app_data, buf->data, len, data_prot); + buf->index = 0; + return 0; +} + +static size_t +buffer_read(struct buffer *buf, void *data, size_t len) +{ + len = min(len, buf->size - buf->index); + memcpy(data, (char*)buf->data + buf->index, len); + buf->index += len; + return len; +} + +static size_t +buffer_write(struct buffer *buf, void *data, size_t len) +{ + if(buf->index + len > buf->size) { + void *tmp; + if(buf->data == NULL) + tmp = malloc(1024); + else + tmp = realloc(buf->data, buf->index + len); + if(tmp == NULL) + return -1; + buf->data = tmp; + buf->size = buf->index + len; + } + memcpy((char*)buf->data + buf->index, data, len); + buf->index += len; + return len; +} + +int +sec_read(int fd, void *data, int length) +{ + size_t len; + int rx = 0; + + if(sec_complete == 0 || data_prot == 0) + return read(fd, data, length); + + if(in_buffer.eof_flag){ + in_buffer.eof_flag = 0; + return 0; + } + + len = buffer_read(&in_buffer, data, length); + length -= len; + rx += len; + data = (char*)data + len; + + while(length){ + if(sec_get_data(fd, &in_buffer, data_prot) < 0) + return -1; + if(in_buffer.size == 0) { + if(rx) + in_buffer.eof_flag = 1; + return rx; + } + len = buffer_read(&in_buffer, data, length); + length -= len; + rx += len; + data = (char*)data + len; + } + return rx; +} + +static int +sec_send(int fd, char *from, int length) +{ + int bytes; + void *buf; + bytes = (*mech->encode)(app_data, from, length, data_prot, &buf); + bytes = htonl(bytes); + block_write(fd, &bytes, sizeof(bytes)); + block_write(fd, buf, ntohl(bytes)); + free(buf); + return length; +} + +int +sec_fflush(FILE *F) +{ + if(data_prot != prot_clear) { + if(out_buffer.index > 0){ + sec_write(fileno(F), out_buffer.data, out_buffer.index); + out_buffer.index = 0; + } + sec_send(fileno(F), NULL, 0); + } + fflush(F); + return 0; +} + +int +sec_write(int fd, char *data, int length) +{ + int len = buffer_size; + int tx = 0; + + if(data_prot == prot_clear) + return write(fd, data, length); + + len -= (*mech->overhead)(app_data, data_prot, len); + while(length){ + if(length < len) + len = length; + sec_send(fd, data, len); + length -= len; + data += len; + tx += len; + } + return tx; +} + +int +sec_vfprintf2(FILE *f, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *buf; + int ret; + if(data_prot == prot_clear) + return vfprintf(f, fmt, ap); + else { + vasprintf(&buf, fmt, ap); + ret = buffer_write(&out_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); + free(buf); + return ret; + } +} + +int +sec_fprintf2(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = sec_vfprintf2(f, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +sec_putc(int c, FILE *F) +{ + char ch = c; + if(data_prot == prot_clear) + return putc(c, F); + + buffer_write(&out_buffer, &ch, 1); + if(c == '\n' || out_buffer.index >= 1024 /* XXX */) { + sec_write(fileno(F), out_buffer.data, out_buffer.index); + out_buffer.index = 0; + } + return c; +} + +int +sec_read_msg(char *s, int level) +{ + int len; + char *buf; + int code; + + buf = malloc(strlen(s)); + len = base64_decode(s + 4, buf); /* XXX */ + + len = (*mech->decode)(app_data, buf, len, level); + if(len < 0) + return -1; + + buf[len] = '\0'; + + if(buf[3] == '-') + code = 0; + else + sscanf(buf, "%d", &code); + if(buf[len-1] == '\n') + buf[len-1] = '\0'; + strcpy(s, buf); + free(buf); + return code; +} + +int +sec_vfprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *buf; + void *enc; + int len; + if(!sec_complete) + return vfprintf(f, fmt, ap); + + vasprintf(&buf, fmt, ap); + len = (*mech->encode)(app_data, buf, strlen(buf), command_prot, &enc); + free(buf); + if(len < 0) { + printf("Failed to encode command.\n"); + return -1; + } + if(base64_encode(enc, len, &buf) < 0){ + printf("Out of memory base64-encoding.\n"); + return -1; + } +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + if(command_prot == prot_safe) + fprintf(f, "631 %s\r\n", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_private) + fprintf(f, "632 %s\r\n", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_confidential) + fprintf(f, "633 %s\r\n", buf); +#else + if(command_prot == prot_safe) + fprintf(f, "MIC %s", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_private) + fprintf(f, "ENC %s", buf); + else if(command_prot == prot_confidential) + fprintf(f, "CONF %s", buf); +#endif + free(buf); + return 0; +} + +int +sec_fprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = sec_vfprintf(f, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +/* end common stuff */ + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER + +void +auth(char *auth_name) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; (mech = mechs[i]) != NULL; i++){ + if(!strcasecmp(auth_name, mech->name)){ + app_data = realloc(app_data, mech->size); + if(mech->init && (*mech->init)(app_data) != 0) { + reply(431, "Unable to accept %s at this time", mech->name); + return; + } + if(mech->auth) { + (*mech->auth)(app_data); + return; + } + if(mech->adat) + reply(334, "Send authorization data."); + else + reply(234, "Authorization complete."); + return; + } + } + free (app_data); + reply(504, "%s is unknown to me", auth_name); +} + +void +adat(char *auth_data) +{ + if(mech && !sec_complete) { + void *buf = malloc(strlen(auth_data)); + size_t len; + len = base64_decode(auth_data, buf); + (*mech->adat)(app_data, buf, len); + free(buf); + } else + reply(503, "You must %sissue an AUTH first.", mech ? "re-" : ""); +} + +void pbsz(int size) +{ + size_t new = size; + if(!sec_complete) + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); + if(mech->pbsz) + new = (*mech->pbsz)(app_data, size); + if(buffer_size != new){ + buffer_size = size; + } + if(new != size) + reply(200, "PBSZ=%lu", (unsigned long)new); + else + reply(200, "OK"); +} + +void +prot(char *pl) +{ + int p = -1; + + if(buffer_size == 0){ + reply(503, "No protection buffer size negotiated."); + return; + } + + if(!strcasecmp(pl, "C")) + p = prot_clear; + else if(!strcasecmp(pl, "S")) + p = prot_safe; + else if(!strcasecmp(pl, "E")) + p = prot_confidential; + else if(!strcasecmp(pl, "P")) + p = prot_private; + else { + reply(504, "Unrecognized protection level."); + return; + } + + if(sec_complete){ + if((*mech->check_prot)(app_data, p)){ + reply(536, "%s does not support %s protection.", + mech->name, level_to_name(p)); + }else{ + data_prot = (enum protection_level)p; + reply(200, "Data protection is %s.", level_to_name(p)); + } + }else{ + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); + } +} + +void ccc(void) +{ + if(sec_complete){ + if(mech->ccc && (*mech->ccc)(app_data) == 0) + command_prot = data_prot = prot_clear; + else + reply(534, "You must be joking."); + }else + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); +} + +void mec(char *msg, enum protection_level level) +{ + void *buf; + size_t len; + if(!sec_complete) { + reply(503, "Incomplete security data exchange."); + return; + } + buf = malloc(strlen(msg) + 2); /* XXX go figure out where that 2 + comes from :-) */ + len = base64_decode(msg, buf); + command_prot = level; + if(len == (size_t)-1) { + reply(501, "Failed to base64-decode command"); + return; + } + len = (*mech->decode)(app_data, buf, len, level); + if(len == (size_t)-1) { + reply(535, "Failed to decode command"); + return; + } + ((char*)buf)[len] = '\0'; + if(strstr((char*)buf, "\r\n") == NULL) + strcat((char*)buf, "\r\n"); + new_ftp_command(buf); +} + +/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */ + +int +sec_userok(char *user) +{ + if(sec_complete) + return (*mech->userok)(app_data, user); + return 0; +} + +char *ftp_command; + +void +new_ftp_command(char *command) +{ + ftp_command = command; +} + +void +delete_ftp_command(void) +{ + free(ftp_command); + ftp_command = NULL; +} + +int +secure_command(void) +{ + return ftp_command != NULL; +} + +enum protection_level +get_command_prot(void) +{ + return command_prot; +} + +#else /* FTP_SERVER */ + +void +sec_status(void) +{ + if(sec_complete){ + printf("Using %s for authentication.\n", mech->name); + printf("Using %s command channel.\n", level_to_name(command_prot)); + printf("Using %s data channel.\n", level_to_name(data_prot)); + if(buffer_size > 0) + printf("Protection buffer size: %lu.\n", + (unsigned long)buffer_size); + }else{ + printf("Not using any security mechanism.\n"); + } +} + +static int +sec_prot_internal(int level) +{ + int ret; + char *p; + unsigned int s = 1048576; + + int old_verbose = verbose; + verbose = 0; + + if(!sec_complete){ + printf("No security data exchange has taken place.\n"); + return -1; + } + + if(level){ + ret = command("PBSZ %u", s); + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + printf("Failed to set protection buffer size.\n"); + return -1; + } + buffer_size = s; + p = strstr(reply_string, "PBSZ="); + if(p) + sscanf(p, "PBSZ=%u", &s); + if(s < buffer_size) + buffer_size = s; + } + verbose = old_verbose; + ret = command("PROT %c", level["CSEP"]); /* XXX :-) */ + if(ret != COMPLETE){ + printf("Failed to set protection level.\n"); + return -1; + } + + data_prot = (enum protection_level)level; + return 0; +} + +enum protection_level +set_command_prot(enum protection_level level) +{ + enum protection_level old = command_prot; + command_prot = level; + return old; +} + +void +sec_prot(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int level = -1; + + if(argc < 2 || argc > 3) + goto usage; + if(!sec_complete) { + printf("No security data exchange has taken place.\n"); + code = -1; + return; + } + level = name_to_level(argv[argc - 1]); + + if(level == -1) + goto usage; + + if((*mech->check_prot)(app_data, level)) { + printf("%s does not implement %s protection.\n", + mech->name, level_to_name(level)); + code = -1; + return; + } + + if(argc == 2 || strncasecmp(argv[1], "data", strlen(argv[1])) == 0) { + if(sec_prot_internal(level) < 0){ + code = -1; + return; + } + } else if(strncasecmp(argv[1], "command", strlen(argv[1])) == 0) + set_command_prot(level); + else + goto usage; + code = 0; + return; + usage: + printf("usage: %s [command|data] [clear|safe|confidential|private]\n", + argv[0]); + code = -1; +} + +static enum protection_level request_data_prot; + +void +sec_set_protection_level(void) +{ + if(sec_complete && data_prot != request_data_prot) + sec_prot_internal(request_data_prot); +} + + +int +sec_request_prot(char *level) +{ + int l = name_to_level(level); + if(l == -1) + return -1; + request_data_prot = (enum protection_level)l; + return 0; +} + +int +sec_login(char *host) +{ + int ret; + struct sec_client_mech **m; + int old_verbose = verbose; + + verbose = -1; /* shut up all messages this will produce (they + are usually not very user friendly) */ + + for(m = mechs; *m && (*m)->name; m++) { + void *tmp; + + tmp = realloc(app_data, (*m)->size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + warnx ("realloc %u failed", (*m)->size); + return -1; + } + app_data = tmp; + + if((*m)->init && (*(*m)->init)(app_data) != 0) { + printf("Skipping %s...\n", (*m)->name); + continue; + } + printf("Trying %s...\n", (*m)->name); + ret = command("AUTH %s", (*m)->name); + if(ret != CONTINUE){ + if(code == 504){ + printf("%s is not supported by the server.\n", (*m)->name); + }else if(code == 534){ + printf("%s rejected as security mechanism.\n", (*m)->name); + }else if(ret == ERROR) { + printf("The server doesn't support the FTP " + "security extensions.\n"); + verbose = old_verbose; + return -1; + } + continue; + } + + ret = (*(*m)->auth)(app_data, host); + + if(ret == AUTH_CONTINUE) + continue; + else if(ret != AUTH_OK){ + /* mechanism is supposed to output error string */ + verbose = old_verbose; + return -1; + } + mech = *m; + sec_complete = 1; + command_prot = prot_safe; + break; + } + + verbose = old_verbose; + return *m == NULL; +} + +void +sec_end(void) +{ + if (mech != NULL) { + if(mech->end) + (*mech->end)(app_data); + memset(app_data, 0, mech->size); + free(app_data); + app_data = NULL; + } + sec_complete = 0; + data_prot = (enum protection_level)0; +} + +#endif /* FTP_SERVER */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fe0694 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftp/security.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: security.h,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:30 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __security_h__ +#define __security_h__ + +enum protection_level { + prot_clear, + prot_safe, + prot_confidential, + prot_private +}; + +struct sec_client_mech { + char *name; + size_t size; + int (*init)(void *); + int (*auth)(void *, char*); + void (*end)(void *); + int (*check_prot)(void *, int); + int (*overhead)(void *, int, int); + int (*encode)(void *, void*, int, int, void**); + int (*decode)(void *, void*, int, int); +}; + +struct sec_server_mech { + char *name; + size_t size; + int (*init)(void *); + void (*end)(void *); + int (*check_prot)(void *, int); + int (*overhead)(void *, int, int); + int (*encode)(void *, void*, int, int, void**); + int (*decode)(void *, void*, int, int); + + int (*auth)(void *); + int (*adat)(void *, void*, size_t); + size_t (*pbsz)(void *, size_t); + int (*ccc)(void*); + int (*userok)(void*, char*); +}; + +#define AUTH_OK 0 +#define AUTH_CONTINUE 1 +#define AUTH_ERROR 2 + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +extern struct sec_server_mech krb4_server_mech, gss_server_mech; +#else +extern struct sec_client_mech krb4_client_mech, gss_client_mech; +#endif + +extern int sec_complete; + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +extern char *ftp_command; +void new_ftp_command(char*); +void delete_ftp_command(void); +#endif + +/* ---- */ + + +int sec_fflush (FILE *); +int sec_fprintf (FILE *, const char *, ...); +int sec_getc (FILE *); +int sec_putc (int, FILE *); +int sec_read (int, void *, int); +int sec_read_msg (char *, int); +int sec_vfprintf (FILE *, const char *, va_list); +int sec_fprintf2(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...); +int sec_vfprintf2(FILE *, const char *, va_list); +int sec_write (int, char *, int); + +#ifdef FTP_SERVER +void adat (char *); +void auth (char *); +void ccc (void); +void mec (char *, enum protection_level); +void pbsz (int); +void prot (char *); +void delete_ftp_command (void); +void new_ftp_command (char *); +int sec_userok (char *); +int secure_command (void); +enum protection_level get_command_prot(void); +#else +void sec_end (void); +int sec_login (char *); +void sec_prot (int, char **); +int sec_request_prot (char *); +void sec_set_protection_level (void); +void sec_status (void); + +enum protection_level set_command_prot(enum protection_level); + +#endif + +#endif /* __security_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92d8e7c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.21 2000/01/06 15:10:57 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/../common $(INCLUDE_krb4) -DFTP_SERVER + +libexec_PROGRAMS = ftpd + +CHECK_LOCAL = + +if KRB4 +krb4_sources = krb4.c kauth.c +endif +if KRB5 +krb5_sources = gssapi.c gss_userok.c +endif + +ftpd_SOURCES = \ + extern.h \ + ftpcmd.y \ + ftpd.c \ + ftpd_locl.h \ + logwtmp.c \ + ls.c \ + pathnames.h \ + popen.c \ + security.c \ + $(krb4_sources) \ + $(krb5_sources) + +EXTRA_ftpd_SOURCES = krb4.c kauth.c gssapi.c gss_userok.c + +$(ftpd_OBJECTS): security.h + +security.c: + @test -f security.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/security.c . +security.h: + @test -f security.h || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/security.h . +krb4.c: + @test -f krb4.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/krb4.c . +gssapi.c: + @test -f gssapi.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/gssapi.c . + +CLEANFILES = security.c security.h krb4.c gssapi.c ftpcmd.c + +man_MANS = ftpd.8 ftpusers.5 + +LDADD = ../common/libcommon.a \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_gssapi) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(LIB_otp) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cd211b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,768 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.21 2000/01/06 15:10:57 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ 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bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat1-mans: + @ext=1;\ + foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat3-mans: + @ext=3;\ + foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +$(ftpd_OBJECTS): security.h + +security.c: + @test -f security.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/security.c . +security.h: + @test -f security.h || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/security.h . +krb4.c: + @test -f krb4.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/krb4.c . +gssapi.c: + @test -f gssapi.c || $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../ftp/gssapi.c . + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e1e0d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/extern.h @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)extern.h 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/4/94 + */ + +#ifndef _EXTERN_H_ +#define _EXTERN_H_ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef NBBY +#define NBBY CHAR_BIT +#endif + +void abor(void); +void blkfree(char **); +char **copyblk(char **); +void cwd(char *); +void do_delete(char *); +void dologout(int); +void eprt(char *); +void epsv(char *); +void fatal(char *); +int filename_check(char *); +int ftpd_pclose(FILE *); +FILE *ftpd_popen(char *, char *, int, int); +char *ftpd_getline(char *, int); +void ftpd_logwtmp(char *, char *, char *); +void lreply(int, const char *, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))) +#endif +; +void makedir(char *); +void nack(char *); +void nreply(const char *, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))) +#endif +; +void pass(char *); +void pasv(void); +void perror_reply(int, const char *); +void pwd(void); +void removedir(char *); +void renamecmd(char *, char *); +char *renamefrom(char *); +void reply(int, const char *, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))) +#endif +; +void retrieve(const char *, char *); +void send_file_list(char *); +void setproctitle(const char *, ...) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))) +#endif +; +void statcmd(void); +void statfilecmd(char *); +void do_store(char *, char *, int); +void upper(char *); +void user(char *); +void yyerror(char *); + +void list_file(char*); + +void kauth(char *, char*); +void klist(void); +void cond_kdestroy(void); +void kdestroy(void); +void krbtkfile(const char *tkfile); +void afslog(const char *cell); +void afsunlog(void); + +int find(char *); + +void builtin_ls(FILE*, const char*); + +int do_login(int code, char *passwd); +int klogin(char *name, char *password); + +const char *ftp_rooted(const char *path); + +extern struct sockaddr *ctrl_addr, *his_addr; +extern char hostname[]; + +extern struct sockaddr *data_dest; +extern int logged_in; +extern struct passwd *pw; +extern int guest; +extern int logging; +extern int type; +extern int oobflag; +extern off_t file_size; +extern off_t byte_count; +extern jmp_buf urgcatch; + +extern int form; +extern int debug; +extern int ftpd_timeout; +extern int maxtimeout; +extern int pdata; +extern char hostname[], remotehost[]; +extern char proctitle[]; +extern int usedefault; +extern int transflag; +extern char tmpline[]; + +#endif /* _EXTERN_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07ff9a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpcmd.y @@ -0,0 +1,1455 @@ +/* $NetBSD: ftpcmd.y,v 1.6 1995/06/03 22:46:45 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1988, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)ftpcmd.y 8.3 (Berkeley) 4/6/94 + */ + +/* + * Grammar for FTP commands. + * See RFC 959. + */ + +%{ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: ftpcmd.y,v 1.56 1999/10/26 11:56:23 assar Exp $"); + +off_t restart_point; + +static int cmd_type; +static int cmd_form; +static int cmd_bytesz; +char cbuf[2048]; +char *fromname; + +struct tab { + char *name; + short token; + short state; + short implemented; /* 1 if command is implemented */ + char *help; +}; + +extern struct tab cmdtab[]; +extern struct tab sitetab[]; + +static char *copy (char *); +static void help (struct tab *, char *); +static struct tab * + lookup (struct tab *, char *); +static void sizecmd (char *); +static RETSIGTYPE toolong (int); +static int yylex (void); + +/* This is for bison */ + +#if !defined(alloca) && !defined(HAVE_ALLOCA) +#define alloca(x) malloc(x) +#endif + +%} + +%union { + int i; + char *s; +} + +%token + A B C E F I + L N P R S T + + SP CRLF COMMA + + USER PASS ACCT REIN QUIT PORT + PASV TYPE STRU MODE RETR STOR + APPE MLFL MAIL MSND MSOM MSAM + MRSQ MRCP ALLO REST RNFR RNTO + ABOR DELE CWD LIST NLST SITE + sTAT HELP NOOP MKD RMD PWD + CDUP STOU SMNT SYST SIZE MDTM + EPRT EPSV + + UMASK IDLE CHMOD + + AUTH ADAT PROT PBSZ CCC MIC + CONF ENC + + KAUTH KLIST KDESTROY KRBTKFILE AFSLOG + LOCATE URL + + FEAT OPTS + + LEXERR + +%token STRING +%token NUMBER + +%type check_login check_login_no_guest check_secure octal_number byte_size +%type struct_code mode_code type_code form_code +%type pathstring pathname password username + +%start cmd_list + +%% + +cmd_list + : /* empty */ + | cmd_list cmd + { + fromname = (char *) 0; + restart_point = (off_t) 0; + } + | cmd_list rcmd + ; + +cmd + : USER SP username CRLF + { + user($3); + free($3); + } + | PASS SP password CRLF + { + pass($3); + memset ($3, 0, strlen($3)); + free($3); + } + | PORT SP host_port CRLF + { + usedefault = 0; + if (pdata >= 0) { + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + } + reply(200, "PORT command successful."); + } + | EPRT SP STRING CRLF + { + eprt ($3); + free ($3); + } + | PASV CRLF + { + pasv (); + } + | EPSV CRLF + { + epsv (NULL); + } + | EPSV SP STRING CRLF + { + epsv ($3); + free ($3); + } + | TYPE SP type_code CRLF + { + switch (cmd_type) { + + case TYPE_A: + if (cmd_form == FORM_N) { + reply(200, "Type set to A."); + type = cmd_type; + form = cmd_form; + } else + reply(504, "Form must be N."); + break; + + case TYPE_E: + reply(504, "Type E not implemented."); + break; + + case TYPE_I: + reply(200, "Type set to I."); + type = cmd_type; + break; + + case TYPE_L: +#if NBBY == 8 + if (cmd_bytesz == 8) { + reply(200, + "Type set to L (byte size 8)."); + type = cmd_type; + } else + reply(504, "Byte size must be 8."); +#else /* NBBY == 8 */ + UNIMPLEMENTED for NBBY != 8 +#endif /* NBBY == 8 */ + } + } + | STRU SP struct_code CRLF + { + switch ($3) { + + case STRU_F: + reply(200, "STRU F ok."); + break; + + default: + reply(504, "Unimplemented STRU type."); + } + } + | MODE SP mode_code CRLF + { + switch ($3) { + + case MODE_S: + reply(200, "MODE S ok."); + break; + + default: + reply(502, "Unimplemented MODE type."); + } + } + | ALLO SP NUMBER CRLF + { + reply(202, "ALLO command ignored."); + } + | ALLO SP NUMBER SP R SP NUMBER CRLF + { + reply(202, "ALLO command ignored."); + } + | RETR SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + retrieve(0, name); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | STOR SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + do_store(name, "w", 0); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | APPE SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + do_store(name, "a", 0); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | NLST CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + send_file_list("."); + } + | NLST SP STRING CRLF check_login + { + char *name = $3; + + if ($5 && name != NULL) + send_file_list(name); + if (name != NULL) + free(name); + } + | LIST CRLF check_login + { + if($3) + list_file("."); + } + | LIST SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if($5) + list_file($3); + free($3); + } + | sTAT SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + statfilecmd($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | sTAT CRLF + { + if(oobflag){ + if (file_size != (off_t) -1) + reply(213, "Status: %lu of %lu bytes transferred", + (unsigned long)byte_count, + (unsigned long)file_size); + else + reply(213, "Status: %lu bytes transferred", + (unsigned long)byte_count); + }else + statcmd(); + } + | DELE SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + do_delete($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | RNTO SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if($5){ + if (fromname) { + renamecmd(fromname, $3); + free(fromname); + fromname = (char *) 0; + } else { + reply(503, "Bad sequence of commands."); + } + } + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | ABOR CRLF + { + if(oobflag){ + reply(426, "Transfer aborted. Data connection closed."); + reply(226, "Abort successful"); + oobflag = 0; + longjmp(urgcatch, 1); + }else + reply(225, "ABOR command successful."); + } + | CWD CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + cwd(pw->pw_dir); + } + | CWD SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + cwd($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | HELP CRLF + { + help(cmdtab, (char *) 0); + } + | HELP SP STRING CRLF + { + char *cp = $3; + + if (strncasecmp(cp, "SITE", 4) == 0) { + cp = $3 + 4; + if (*cp == ' ') + cp++; + if (*cp) + help(sitetab, cp); + else + help(sitetab, (char *) 0); + } else + help(cmdtab, $3); + } + | NOOP CRLF + { + reply(200, "NOOP command successful."); + } + | MKD SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + makedir($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | RMD SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + removedir($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | PWD CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + pwd(); + } + | CDUP CRLF check_login + { + if ($3) + cwd(".."); + } + | FEAT CRLF + { + lreply(211, "Supported features:"); + lreply(0, " MDTM"); + lreply(0, " REST STREAM"); + lreply(0, " SIZE"); + reply(211, "End"); + } + | OPTS SP STRING CRLF + { + free ($3); + reply(501, "Bad options"); + } + + | SITE SP HELP CRLF + { + help(sitetab, (char *) 0); + } + | SITE SP HELP SP STRING CRLF + { + help(sitetab, $5); + } + | SITE SP UMASK CRLF check_login + { + if ($5) { + int oldmask = umask(0); + umask(oldmask); + reply(200, "Current UMASK is %03o", oldmask); + } + } + | SITE SP UMASK SP octal_number CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($7) { + if (($5 == -1) || ($5 > 0777)) { + reply(501, "Bad UMASK value"); + } else { + int oldmask = umask($5); + reply(200, + "UMASK set to %03o (was %03o)", + $5, oldmask); + } + } + } + | SITE SP CHMOD SP octal_number SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + if ($9 && $7 != NULL) { + if ($5 > 0777) + reply(501, + "CHMOD: Mode value must be between 0 and 0777"); + else if (chmod($7, $5) < 0) + perror_reply(550, $7); + else + reply(200, "CHMOD command successful."); + } + if ($7 != NULL) + free($7); + } + | SITE SP IDLE CRLF + { + reply(200, + "Current IDLE time limit is %d seconds; max %d", + ftpd_timeout, maxtimeout); + } + | SITE SP IDLE SP NUMBER CRLF + { + if ($5 < 30 || $5 > maxtimeout) { + reply(501, + "Maximum IDLE time must be between 30 and %d seconds", + maxtimeout); + } else { + ftpd_timeout = $5; + alarm((unsigned) ftpd_timeout); + reply(200, + "Maximum IDLE time set to %d seconds", + ftpd_timeout); + } + } + + | SITE SP KAUTH SP STRING CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + char *p; + + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else{ + if($7 && $5 != NULL){ + p = strpbrk($5, " \t"); + if(p){ + *p++ = 0; + kauth($5, p + strspn(p, " \t")); + }else + kauth($5, NULL); + } + } + if($5 != NULL) + free($5); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP KLIST CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if($5) + klist(); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP KDESTROY CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if($5) + kdestroy(); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP KRBTKFILE SP STRING CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else if($7 && $5) + krbtkfile($5); + if($5) + free($5); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP AFSLOG CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else if($5) + afslog(NULL); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP AFSLOG SP STRING CRLF check_login + { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(guest) + reply(500, "Can't be done as guest."); + else if($7) + afslog($5); + if($5) + free($5); +#else + reply(500, "Command not implemented."); +#endif + } + | SITE SP LOCATE SP STRING CRLF check_login + { + if($7 && $5 != NULL) + find($5); + if($5 != NULL) + free($5); + } + | SITE SP URL CRLF + { + reply(200, "http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/"); + } + | STOU SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + do_store($3, "w", 1); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | SYST CRLF + { +#if defined(unix) || defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || defined(_AIX) || defined(_CRAY) + reply(215, "UNIX Type: L%d", NBBY); +#else + reply(215, "UNKNOWN Type: L%d", NBBY); +#endif + } + + /* + * SIZE is not in RFC959, but Postel has blessed it and + * it will be in the updated RFC. + * + * Return size of file in a format suitable for + * using with RESTART (we just count bytes). + */ + | SIZE SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) + sizecmd($3); + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + + /* + * MDTM is not in RFC959, but Postel has blessed it and + * it will be in the updated RFC. + * + * Return modification time of file as an ISO 3307 + * style time. E.g. YYYYMMDDHHMMSS or YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.xxx + * where xxx is the fractional second (of any precision, + * not necessarily 3 digits) + */ + | MDTM SP pathname CRLF check_login + { + if ($5 && $3 != NULL) { + struct stat stbuf; + if (stat($3, &stbuf) < 0) + reply(550, "%s: %s", + $3, strerror(errno)); + else if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) { + reply(550, + "%s: not a plain file.", $3); + } else { + struct tm *t; + t = gmtime(&stbuf.st_mtime); + reply(213, + "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", + t->tm_year + 1900, + t->tm_mon + 1, + t->tm_mday, + t->tm_hour, + t->tm_min, + t->tm_sec); + } + } + if ($3 != NULL) + free($3); + } + | QUIT CRLF + { + reply(221, "Goodbye."); + dologout(0); + } + | error CRLF + { + yyerrok; + } + ; +rcmd + : RNFR SP pathname CRLF check_login_no_guest + { + restart_point = (off_t) 0; + if ($5 && $3) { + fromname = renamefrom($3); + if (fromname == (char *) 0 && $3) { + free($3); + } + } + } + | REST SP byte_size CRLF + { + fromname = (char *) 0; + restart_point = $3; /* XXX $3 is only "int" */ + reply(350, "Restarting at %ld. %s", + (long)restart_point, + "Send STORE or RETRIEVE to initiate transfer."); + } + | AUTH SP STRING CRLF + { + auth($3); + free($3); + } + | ADAT SP STRING CRLF + { + adat($3); + free($3); + } + | PBSZ SP NUMBER CRLF + { + pbsz($3); + } + | PROT SP STRING CRLF + { + prot($3); + } + | CCC CRLF + { + ccc(); + } + | MIC SP STRING CRLF + { + mec($3, prot_safe); + free($3); + } + | CONF SP STRING CRLF + { + mec($3, prot_confidential); + free($3); + } + | ENC SP STRING CRLF + { + mec($3, prot_private); + free($3); + } + ; + +username + : STRING + ; + +password + : /* empty */ + { + $$ = (char *)calloc(1, sizeof(char)); + } + | STRING + ; + +byte_size + : NUMBER + ; + +host_port + : NUMBER COMMA NUMBER COMMA NUMBER COMMA NUMBER COMMA + NUMBER COMMA NUMBER + { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)data_dest; + + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = htons($9 * 256 + $11); + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = + htonl(($1 << 24) | ($3 << 16) | ($5 << 8) | $7); + } + ; + +form_code + : N + { + $$ = FORM_N; + } + | T + { + $$ = FORM_T; + } + | C + { + $$ = FORM_C; + } + ; + +type_code + : A + { + cmd_type = TYPE_A; + cmd_form = FORM_N; + } + | A SP form_code + { + cmd_type = TYPE_A; + cmd_form = $3; + } + | E + { + cmd_type = TYPE_E; + cmd_form = FORM_N; + } + | E SP form_code + { + cmd_type = TYPE_E; + cmd_form = $3; + } + | I + { + cmd_type = TYPE_I; + } + | L + { + cmd_type = TYPE_L; + cmd_bytesz = NBBY; + } + | L SP byte_size + { + cmd_type = TYPE_L; + cmd_bytesz = $3; + } + /* this is for a bug in the BBN ftp */ + | L byte_size + { + cmd_type = TYPE_L; + cmd_bytesz = $2; + } + ; + +struct_code + : F + { + $$ = STRU_F; + } + | R + { + $$ = STRU_R; + } + | P + { + $$ = STRU_P; + } + ; + +mode_code + : S + { + $$ = MODE_S; + } + | B + { + $$ = MODE_B; + } + | C + { + $$ = MODE_C; + } + ; + +pathname + : pathstring + { + /* + * Problem: this production is used for all pathname + * processing, but only gives a 550 error reply. + * This is a valid reply in some cases but not in others. + */ + if (logged_in && $1 && *$1 == '~') { + glob_t gl; + int flags = + GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + if (glob($1, flags, NULL, &gl) || + gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + reply(550, "not found"); + $$ = NULL; + } else { + $$ = strdup(gl.gl_pathv[0]); + } + globfree(&gl); + free($1); + } else + $$ = $1; + } + ; + +pathstring + : STRING + ; + +octal_number + : NUMBER + { + int ret, dec, multby, digit; + + /* + * Convert a number that was read as decimal number + * to what it would be if it had been read as octal. + */ + dec = $1; + multby = 1; + ret = 0; + while (dec) { + digit = dec%10; + if (digit > 7) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + ret += digit * multby; + multby *= 8; + dec /= 10; + } + $$ = ret; + } + ; + + +check_login_no_guest : check_login + { + $$ = $1 && !guest; + if($1 && !$$) + reply(550, "Permission denied"); + } + ; + +check_login : check_secure + { + if($1) { + if(($$ = logged_in) == 0) + reply(530, "Please login with USER and PASS."); + } else + $$ = 0; + } + ; + +check_secure : /* empty */ + { + $$ = 1; + if(sec_complete && !secure_command()) { + $$ = 0; + reply(533, "Command protection level denied " + "for paranoid reasons."); + } + } + ; + +%% + +extern jmp_buf errcatch; + +#define CMD 0 /* beginning of command */ +#define ARGS 1 /* expect miscellaneous arguments */ +#define STR1 2 /* expect SP followed by STRING */ +#define STR2 3 /* expect STRING */ +#define OSTR 4 /* optional SP then STRING */ +#define ZSTR1 5 /* SP then optional STRING */ +#define ZSTR2 6 /* optional STRING after SP */ +#define SITECMD 7 /* SITE command */ +#define NSTR 8 /* Number followed by a string */ + +struct tab cmdtab[] = { /* In order defined in RFC 765 */ + { "USER", USER, STR1, 1, " username" }, + { "PASS", PASS, ZSTR1, 1, " password" }, + { "ACCT", ACCT, STR1, 0, "(specify account)" }, + { "SMNT", SMNT, ARGS, 0, "(structure mount)" }, + { "REIN", REIN, ARGS, 0, "(reinitialize server state)" }, + { "QUIT", QUIT, ARGS, 1, "(terminate service)", }, + { "PORT", PORT, ARGS, 1, " b0, b1, b2, b3, b4" }, + { "EPRT", EPRT, STR1, 1, " string" }, + { "PASV", PASV, ARGS, 1, "(set server in passive mode)" }, + { "EPSV", EPSV, OSTR, 1, "[ foo]" }, + { "TYPE", TYPE, ARGS, 1, " [ A | E | I | L ]" }, + { "STRU", STRU, ARGS, 1, "(specify file structure)" }, + { "MODE", MODE, ARGS, 1, "(specify transfer mode)" }, + { "RETR", RETR, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "STOR", STOR, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "APPE", APPE, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "MLFL", MLFL, OSTR, 0, "(mail file)" }, + { "MAIL", MAIL, OSTR, 0, "(mail to user)" }, + { "MSND", MSND, OSTR, 0, "(mail send to terminal)" }, + { "MSOM", MSOM, OSTR, 0, "(mail send to terminal or mailbox)" }, + { "MSAM", MSAM, OSTR, 0, "(mail send to terminal and mailbox)" }, + { "MRSQ", MRSQ, OSTR, 0, "(mail recipient scheme question)" }, + { "MRCP", MRCP, STR1, 0, "(mail recipient)" }, + { "ALLO", ALLO, ARGS, 1, "allocate storage (vacuously)" }, + { "REST", REST, ARGS, 1, " offset (restart command)" }, + { "RNFR", RNFR, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "RNTO", RNTO, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "ABOR", ABOR, ARGS, 1, "(abort operation)" }, + { "DELE", DELE, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "CWD", CWD, OSTR, 1, "[ directory-name ]" }, + { "XCWD", CWD, OSTR, 1, "[ directory-name ]" }, + { "LIST", LIST, OSTR, 1, "[ path-name ]" }, + { "NLST", NLST, OSTR, 1, "[ path-name ]" }, + { "SITE", SITE, SITECMD, 1, "site-cmd [ arguments ]" }, + { "SYST", SYST, ARGS, 1, "(get type of operating system)" }, + { "STAT", sTAT, OSTR, 1, "[ path-name ]" }, + { "HELP", HELP, OSTR, 1, "[ ]" }, + { "NOOP", NOOP, ARGS, 1, "" }, + { "MKD", MKD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "XMKD", MKD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "RMD", RMD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "XRMD", RMD, STR1, 1, " path-name" }, + { "PWD", PWD, ARGS, 1, "(return current directory)" }, + { "XPWD", PWD, ARGS, 1, "(return current directory)" }, + { "CDUP", CDUP, ARGS, 1, "(change to parent directory)" }, + { "XCUP", CDUP, ARGS, 1, "(change to parent directory)" }, + { "STOU", STOU, STR1, 1, " file-name" }, + { "SIZE", SIZE, OSTR, 1, " path-name" }, + { "MDTM", MDTM, OSTR, 1, " path-name" }, + + /* extensions from RFC2228 */ + { "AUTH", AUTH, STR1, 1, " auth-type" }, + { "ADAT", ADAT, STR1, 1, " auth-data" }, + { "PBSZ", PBSZ, ARGS, 1, " buffer-size" }, + { "PROT", PROT, STR1, 1, " prot-level" }, + { "CCC", CCC, ARGS, 1, "" }, + { "MIC", MIC, STR1, 1, " integrity command" }, + { "CONF", CONF, STR1, 1, " confidentiality command" }, + { "ENC", ENC, STR1, 1, " privacy command" }, + + /* RFC2389 */ + { "FEAT", FEAT, ARGS, 1, "" }, + { "OPTS", OPTS, ARGS, 1, " command [ options]" }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +struct tab sitetab[] = { + { "UMASK", UMASK, ARGS, 1, "[ umask ]" }, + { "IDLE", IDLE, ARGS, 1, "[ maximum-idle-time ]" }, + { "CHMOD", CHMOD, NSTR, 1, " mode file-name" }, + { "HELP", HELP, OSTR, 1, "[ ]" }, + + { "KAUTH", KAUTH, STR1, 1, " principal [ ticket ]" }, + { "KLIST", KLIST, ARGS, 1, "(show ticket file)" }, + { "KDESTROY", KDESTROY, ARGS, 1, "(destroy tickets)" }, + { "KRBTKFILE", KRBTKFILE, STR1, 1, " ticket-file" }, + { "AFSLOG", AFSLOG, OSTR, 1, "[ cell]" }, + + { "LOCATE", LOCATE, STR1, 1, " globexpr" }, + { "FIND", LOCATE, STR1, 1, " globexpr" }, + + { "URL", URL, ARGS, 1, "?" }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +static struct tab * +lookup(struct tab *p, char *cmd) +{ + + for (; p->name != NULL; p++) + if (strcmp(cmd, p->name) == 0) + return (p); + return (0); +} + +/* + * ftpd_getline - a hacked up version of fgets to ignore TELNET escape codes. + */ +char * +ftpd_getline(char *s, int n) +{ + int c; + char *cs; + + cs = s; +/* tmpline may contain saved command from urgent mode interruption */ + if(ftp_command){ + strlcpy(s, ftp_command, n); + if (debug) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "command: %s", s); +#ifdef XXX + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", s); +#endif + return s; + } + while ((c = getc(stdin)) != EOF) { + c &= 0377; + if (c == IAC) { + if ((c = getc(stdin)) != EOF) { + c &= 0377; + switch (c) { + case WILL: + case WONT: + c = getc(stdin); + printf("%c%c%c", IAC, DONT, 0377&c); + fflush(stdout); + continue; + case DO: + case DONT: + c = getc(stdin); + printf("%c%c%c", IAC, WONT, 0377&c); + fflush(stdout); + continue; + case IAC: + break; + default: + continue; /* ignore command */ + } + } + } + *cs++ = c; + if (--n <= 0 || c == '\n') + break; + } + if (c == EOF && cs == s) + return (NULL); + *cs++ = '\0'; + if (debug) { + if (!guest && strncasecmp("pass ", s, 5) == 0) { + /* Don't syslog passwords */ + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "command: %.5s ???", s); + } else { + char *cp; + int len; + + /* Don't syslog trailing CR-LF */ + len = strlen(s); + cp = s + len - 1; + while (cp >= s && (*cp == '\n' || *cp == '\r')) { + --cp; + --len; + } + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "command: %.*s", len, s); + } + } +#ifdef XXX + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", s); +#endif + return (s); +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +toolong(int signo) +{ + + reply(421, + "Timeout (%d seconds): closing control connection.", + ftpd_timeout); + if (logging) + syslog(LOG_INFO, "User %s timed out after %d seconds", + (pw ? pw -> pw_name : "unknown"), ftpd_timeout); + dologout(1); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +static int +yylex(void) +{ + static int cpos, state; + char *cp, *cp2; + struct tab *p; + int n; + char c; + + for (;;) { + switch (state) { + + case CMD: + signal(SIGALRM, toolong); + alarm((unsigned) ftpd_timeout); + if (ftpd_getline(cbuf, sizeof(cbuf)-1) == NULL) { + reply(221, "You could at least say goodbye."); + dologout(0); + } + alarm(0); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + if (strncasecmp(cbuf, "PASS", 4) != NULL) + setproctitle("%s: %s", proctitle, cbuf); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + if ((cp = strchr(cbuf, '\r'))) { + *cp++ = '\n'; + *cp = '\0'; + } + if ((cp = strpbrk(cbuf, " \n"))) + cpos = cp - cbuf; + if (cpos == 0) + cpos = 4; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + strupr(cbuf); + p = lookup(cmdtab, cbuf); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + if (p != 0) { + if (p->implemented == 0) { + nack(p->name); + longjmp(errcatch,0); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + state = p->state; + yylval.s = p->name; + return (p->token); + } + break; + + case SITECMD: + if (cbuf[cpos] == ' ') { + cpos++; + return (SP); + } + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + if ((cp2 = strpbrk(cp, " \n"))) + cpos = cp2 - cbuf; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + strupr(cp); + p = lookup(sitetab, cp); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + if (p != 0) { + if (p->implemented == 0) { + state = CMD; + nack(p->name); + longjmp(errcatch,0); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + state = p->state; + yylval.s = p->name; + return (p->token); + } + state = CMD; + break; + + case OSTR: + if (cbuf[cpos] == '\n') { + state = CMD; + return (CRLF); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case STR1: + case ZSTR1: + dostr1: + if (cbuf[cpos] == ' ') { + cpos++; + if(state == OSTR) + state = STR2; + else + state++; + return (SP); + } + break; + + case ZSTR2: + if (cbuf[cpos] == '\n') { + state = CMD; + return (CRLF); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case STR2: + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + n = strlen(cp); + cpos += n - 1; + /* + * Make sure the string is nonempty and \n terminated. + */ + if (n > 1 && cbuf[cpos] == '\n') { + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + yylval.s = copy(cp); + cbuf[cpos] = '\n'; + state = ARGS; + return (STRING); + } + break; + + case NSTR: + if (cbuf[cpos] == ' ') { + cpos++; + return (SP); + } + if (isdigit(cbuf[cpos])) { + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + while (isdigit(cbuf[++cpos])) + ; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + yylval.i = atoi(cp); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + state = STR1; + return (NUMBER); + } + state = STR1; + goto dostr1; + + case ARGS: + if (isdigit(cbuf[cpos])) { + cp = &cbuf[cpos]; + while (isdigit(cbuf[++cpos])) + ; + c = cbuf[cpos]; + cbuf[cpos] = '\0'; + yylval.i = atoi(cp); + cbuf[cpos] = c; + return (NUMBER); + } + switch (cbuf[cpos++]) { + + case '\n': + state = CMD; + return (CRLF); + + case ' ': + return (SP); + + case ',': + return (COMMA); + + case 'A': + case 'a': + return (A); + + case 'B': + case 'b': + return (B); + + case 'C': + case 'c': + return (C); + + case 'E': + case 'e': + return (E); + + case 'F': + case 'f': + return (F); + + case 'I': + case 'i': + return (I); + + case 'L': + case 'l': + return (L); + + case 'N': + case 'n': + return (N); + + case 'P': + case 'p': + return (P); + + case 'R': + case 'r': + return (R); + + case 'S': + case 's': + return (S); + + case 'T': + case 't': + return (T); + + } + break; + + default: + fatal("Unknown state in scanner."); + } + yyerror((char *) 0); + state = CMD; + longjmp(errcatch,0); + } +} + +static char * +copy(char *s) +{ + char *p; + + p = strdup(s); + if (p == NULL) + fatal("Ran out of memory."); + return p; +} + +static void +help(struct tab *ctab, char *s) +{ + struct tab *c; + int width, NCMDS; + char *type; + char buf[1024]; + + if (ctab == sitetab) + type = "SITE "; + else + type = ""; + width = 0, NCMDS = 0; + for (c = ctab; c->name != NULL; c++) { + int len = strlen(c->name); + + if (len > width) + width = len; + NCMDS++; + } + width = (width + 8) &~ 7; + if (s == 0) { + int i, j, w; + int columns, lines; + + lreply(214, "The following %scommands are recognized %s.", + type, "(* =>'s unimplemented)"); + columns = 76 / width; + if (columns == 0) + columns = 1; + lines = (NCMDS + columns - 1) / columns; + for (i = 0; i < lines; i++) { + strlcpy (buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + for (j = 0; j < columns; j++) { + c = ctab + j * lines + i; + snprintf (buf + strlen(buf), + sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + "%s%c", + c->name, + c->implemented ? ' ' : '*'); + if (c + lines >= &ctab[NCMDS]) + break; + w = strlen(c->name) + 1; + while (w < width) { + strlcat (buf, + " ", + sizeof(buf)); + w++; + } + } + lreply(214, "%s", buf); + } + reply(214, "Direct comments to kth-krb-bugs@pdc.kth.se"); + return; + } + strupr(s); + c = lookup(ctab, s); + if (c == (struct tab *)0) { + reply(502, "Unknown command %s.", s); + return; + } + if (c->implemented) + reply(214, "Syntax: %s%s %s", type, c->name, c->help); + else + reply(214, "%s%-*s\t%s; unimplemented.", type, width, + c->name, c->help); +} + +static void +sizecmd(char *filename) +{ + switch (type) { + case TYPE_L: + case TYPE_I: { + struct stat stbuf; + if (stat(filename, &stbuf) < 0 || !S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) + reply(550, "%s: not a plain file.", filename); + else + reply(213, "%lu", (unsigned long)stbuf.st_size); + break; + } + case TYPE_A: { + FILE *fin; + int c; + size_t count; + struct stat stbuf; + fin = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (fin == NULL) { + perror_reply(550, filename); + return; + } + if (fstat(fileno(fin), &stbuf) < 0 || !S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode)) { + reply(550, "%s: not a plain file.", filename); + fclose(fin); + return; + } + + count = 0; + while((c=getc(fin)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') /* will get expanded to \r\n */ + count++; + count++; + } + fclose(fin); + + reply(213, "%lu", (unsigned long)count); + break; + } + default: + reply(504, "SIZE not implemented for Type %c.", "?AEIL"[type]); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c51de1c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,473 @@ +.\" $NetBSD: ftpd.8,v 1.7 1995/04/11 02:44:53 cgd Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993 +.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software +.\" must display the following acknowledgement: +.\" This product includes software developed by the University of +.\" California, Berkeley and its contributors. +.\" 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors +.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +.\" without specific prior written permission. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" @(#)ftpd.8 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/19/94 +.\" +.Dd April 19, 1997 +.Dt FTPD 8 +.Os BSD 4.2 +.Sh NAME +.Nm ftpd +.Nd +Internet File Transfer Protocol server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ftpd +.Op Fl a Ar authmode +.Op Fl dilv +.Op Fl g Ar umask +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl T Ar maxtimeout +.Op Fl t Ar timeout +.Op Fl u Ar default umask +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm Ftpd +is the +Internet File Transfer Protocol +server process. The server uses the +.Tn TCP +protocol +and listens at the port specified in the +.Dq ftp +service specification; see +.Xr services 5 . +.Pp +Available options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl a +Select the level of authentication required. Kerberised login can not +be turned off. The default is to only allow kerberised login. Other +possibilities can be turned on by giving a string of comma separated +flags as argument to +.Fl a . +Recognised flags are: +.Bl -tag -width plain +.It Ar plain +Allow logging in with plaintext password. The password can be a(n) OTP +or an ordinary password. +.It Ar otp +Same as +.Ar plain , +but only OTP is allowed. +.It Ar ftp +Allow anonymous login. +.El + +The following combination modes exists for backwards compatibility: +.Bl -tag -width plain +.It Ar none +Same as +.Ar plain,ftp . +.It Ar safe +Same as +.Ar ftp . +.It Ar user +Ignored. +.El +.It Fl d +Debugging information is written to the syslog using LOG_FTP. +.It Fl g +Anonymous users will get a umask of +.Ar umask . +.It Fl i +Open a socket and wait for a connection. This is mainly used for +debugging when ftpd isn't started by inetd. +.It Fl l +Each successful and failed +.Xr ftp 1 +session is logged using syslog with a facility of LOG_FTP. +If this option is specified twice, the retrieve (get), store (put), append, +delete, make directory, remove directory and rename operations and +their filename arguments are also logged. +.It Fl p +Use +.Ar port +(a service name or number) instead of the default +.Ar ftp/tcp . +.It Fl T +A client may also request a different timeout period; +the maximum period allowed may be set to +.Ar timeout +seconds with the +.Fl T +option. +The default limit is 2 hours. +.It Fl t +The inactivity timeout period is set to +.Ar timeout +seconds (the default is 15 minutes). +.It Fl u +Set the initial umask to something else than the default 027. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +.El +.Pp +The file +.Pa /etc/nologin +can be used to disable ftp access. +If the file exists, +.Nm +displays it and exits. +If the file +.Pa /etc/ftpwelcome +exists, +.Nm +prints it before issuing the +.Dq ready +message. +If the file +.Pa /etc/motd +exists, +.Nm +prints it after a successful login. +.Pp +The ftp server currently supports the following ftp requests. +The case of the requests is ignored. +.Bl -column "Request" -offset indent +.It Request Ta "Description" +.It ABOR Ta "abort previous command" +.It ACCT Ta "specify account (ignored)" +.It ALLO Ta "allocate storage (vacuously)" +.It APPE Ta "append to a file" +.It CDUP Ta "change to parent of current working directory" +.It CWD Ta "change working directory" +.It DELE Ta "delete a file" +.It HELP Ta "give help information" +.It LIST Ta "give list files in a directory" Pq Dq Li "ls -lgA" +.It MKD Ta "make a directory" +.It MDTM Ta "show last modification time of file" +.It MODE Ta "specify data transfer" Em mode +.It NLST Ta "give name list of files in directory" +.It NOOP Ta "do nothing" +.It PASS Ta "specify password" +.It PASV Ta "prepare for server-to-server transfer" +.It PORT Ta "specify data connection port" +.It PWD Ta "print the current working directory" +.It QUIT Ta "terminate session" +.It REST Ta "restart incomplete transfer" +.It RETR Ta "retrieve a file" +.It RMD Ta "remove a directory" +.It RNFR Ta "specify rename-from file name" +.It RNTO Ta "specify rename-to file name" +.It SITE Ta "non-standard commands (see next section)" +.It SIZE Ta "return size of file" +.It STAT Ta "return status of server" +.It STOR Ta "store a file" +.It STOU Ta "store a file with a unique name" +.It STRU Ta "specify data transfer" Em structure +.It SYST Ta "show operating system type of server system" +.It TYPE Ta "specify data transfer" Em type +.It USER Ta "specify user name" +.It XCUP Ta "change to parent of current working directory (deprecated)" +.It XCWD Ta "change working directory (deprecated)" +.It XMKD Ta "make a directory (deprecated)" +.It XPWD Ta "print the current working directory (deprecated)" +.It XRMD Ta "remove a directory (deprecated)" +.El +.Pp +The following commands are specified by RFC2228. +.Bl -column Request -offset indent +.It AUTH Ta "authentication/security mechanism" +.It ADAT Ta "authentication/security data" +.It PROT Ta "data channel protection level" +.It PBSZ Ta "protection buffer size" +.It MIC Ta "integrity protected command" +.It CONF Ta "confidentiality protected command" +.It ENC Ta "privacy protected command" +.It CCC Ta "clear command channel" +.El +.Pp +The following non-standard or +.Tn UNIX +specific commands are supported +by the +SITE request. +.Pp +.Bl -column Request -offset indent +.It UMASK Ta change umask, (e.g. +.Ic "SITE UMASK 002" ) +.It IDLE Ta set idle-timer, (e.g. +.Ic "SITE IDLE 60" ) +.It CHMOD Ta change mode of a file (e.g. +.Ic "SITE CHMOD 755 filename" ) +.It FIND Ta quickly find a specific file with GNU +.Xr locate 1 . +.It HELP Ta give help information. +.El +.Pp +The following Kerberos related site commands are understood. +.Bl -column Request -offset indent +.It KAUTH Ta obtain remote tickets. +.It KLIST Ta show remote tickets +.El +.Pp +The remaining ftp requests specified in Internet RFC 959 +are +recognized, but not implemented. +MDTM and SIZE are not specified in RFC 959, but will appear in the +next updated FTP RFC. +.Pp +The ftp server will abort an active file transfer only when the +ABOR +command is preceded by a Telnet "Interrupt Process" (IP) +signal and a Telnet "Synch" signal in the command Telnet stream, +as described in Internet RFC 959. +If a +STAT +command is received during a data transfer, preceded by a Telnet IP +and Synch, transfer status will be returned. +.Pp +.Nm Ftpd +interprets file names according to the +.Dq globbing +conventions used by +.Xr csh 1 . +This allows users to utilize the metacharacters +.Dq Li \&*?[]{}~ . +.Pp +.Nm Ftpd +authenticates users according to these rules. +.Pp +.Bl -enum -offset indent +.It +If Kerberos authentication is used, the user must pass valid tickets +and the principal must be allowed to login as the remote user. +.It +The login name must be in the password data base, and not have a null +password (if kerberos is used the password field is not checked). In +this case a password must be provided by the client before any file +operations may be performed. If the user has an OTP key, the response +from a successful USER command will include an OTP challenge. The +client may choose to respond with a PASS command giving either a +standard password or an OTP one-time password. The server will +automatically determine which type of password it has been given and +attempt to authenticate accordingly. See +.Xr otp 1 +for more information on OTP authentication. +.It +The login name must not appear in the file +.Pa /etc/ftpusers . +.It +The user must have a standard shell returned by +.Xr getusershell 3 . +.It +If the user name appears in the file +.Pa /etc/ftpchroot +the session's root will be changed to the user's login directory by +.Xr chroot 2 +as for an +.Dq anonymous +or +.Dq ftp +account (see next item). However, the user must still supply a password. +This feature is intended as a compromise between a fully anonymous account +and a fully privileged account. The account should also be set up as for an +anonymous account. +.It +If the user name is +.Dq anonymous +or +.Dq ftp , +an +anonymous ftp account must be present in the password +file (user +.Dq ftp ) . +In this case the user is allowed +to log in by specifying any password (by convention an email address for +the user should be used as the password). +.El +.Pp +In the last case, +.Nm ftpd +takes special measures to restrict the client's access privileges. +The server performs a +.Xr chroot 2 +to the home directory of the +.Dq ftp +user. +In order that system security is not breached, it is recommended +that the +.Dq ftp +subtree be constructed with care, consider following these guidelines +for anonymous ftp. + +In general all files should be owned by +.Dq root , +and have non-write permissions (644 or 755 depending on the kind of +file). No files should be owned or writable by +.Dq ftp +(possibly with exception for the +.Pa ~ftp/incoming , +as specified below). +.Bl -tag -width "~ftp/pub" -offset indent +.It Pa ~ftp +The +.Dq ftp +homedirectory should be owned by root. +.It Pa ~ftp/bin +The directory for external programs (such as +.Xr ls 1 ) . +These programs must either be statically linked, or you must setup an +environment for dynamic linking when running chrooted. +These programs will be used if present: +.Bl -tag -width "locate" -offset indent +.It ls +Used when listing files. +.It compress +When retrieving a filename that ends in +.Pa .Z , +and that file isn't present, +.Nm +will try to find the filename without +.Pa .Z +and compress it on the fly. +.It gzip +Same as compress, just with files ending in +.Pa .gz . +.It gtar +Enables retrieval of whole directories as files ending in +.Pa .tar . +Can also be combined with compression. You must use GNU Tar (or some +other that supports the +.Fl z +and +.Fl Z +flags). +.It locate +Will enable ``fast find'' with the +.Ic SITE FIND +command. You must also create a +.Pa locatedb +file in +.Pa ~ftp/etc . +.El +.It Pa ~ftp/etc +If you put copies of the +.Xr passwd 5 +and +.Xr group 5 +files here, ls will be able to produce owner names rather than +numbers. Remember to remove any passwords from these files. + +The file +.Pa motd , +if present, will be printed after a successful login. +.It Pa ~ftp/dev +Put a copy of +.Xr /dev/null 7 +here. +.It Pa ~ftp/pub +Traditional place to put whatever you want to make public. +.El + +If you want guests to be able to upload files, create a +.Pa ~ftp/incoming +directory owned by +.Dq root , +and group +.Dq ftp +with mode 730 (make sure +.Dq ftp +is member of group +.Dq ftp ) . +The following restrictions apply to anonymous users: +.Bl -bullet +.It +Directories created will have mode 700. +.It +Uploaded files will be created with an umask of 777, if not changed +with the +.Fl g +option. +.It +These command are not accessible: +.Ic DELE , RMD , RNTO , RNFR , +.Ic SITE UMASK , +and +.Ic SITE CHMOD . +.It +Filenames must start with an alpha-numeric character, and consist of +alpha-numeric characters or any of the following: +.Li \&+ +(plus), +.Li \&- +(minus), +.Li \&= +(equal), +.Li \&_ +(underscore), +.Li \&. +(period), and +.Li \&, +(comma). +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width /etc/ftpwelcome -compact +.It Pa /etc/ftpusers +Access list for users. +.It Pa /etc/ftpchroot +List of normal users who should be chroot'd. +.It Pa /etc/ftpwelcome +Welcome notice. +.It Pa /etc/motd +Welcome notice after login. +.It Pa /etc/nologin +Displayed and access refused. +.It Pa ~/.klogin +Login access for Kerberos. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftp 1 , +.Xr otp 1 , +.Xr getusershell 3 , +.Xr ftpusers 5 , +.Xr syslogd 8 , +.Sh STANDARDS +.Bl -tag -compact -width "RFC 1938" +.It Cm RFC 959 +FTP PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION +.It Cm RFC 1938 +OTP Specification +.It Cm RFC 2228 +FTP Security Extensions. +.Sh BUGS +The server must run as the super-user +to create sockets with privileged port numbers. It maintains +an effective user id of the logged in user, reverting to +the super-user only when binding addresses to sockets. The +possible security holes have been extensively +scrutinized, but are possibly incomplete. +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +command appeared in +.Bx 4.2 . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c5ddf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd.c @@ -0,0 +1,2249 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#define FTP_NAMES +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#include "getarg.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ftpd.c,v 1.137 2000/01/05 13:46:04 joda Exp $"); + +static char version[] = "Version 6.00"; + +extern off_t restart_point; +extern char cbuf[]; + +struct sockaddr_storage ctrl_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *ctrl_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&ctrl_addr_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage data_source_ss; +struct sockaddr *data_source = (struct sockaddr *)&data_source_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage data_dest_ss; +struct sockaddr *data_dest = (struct sockaddr *)&data_dest_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage his_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *his_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&his_addr_ss; + +struct sockaddr_storage pasv_addr_ss; +struct sockaddr *pasv_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&pasv_addr_ss; + +int data; +jmp_buf errcatch, urgcatch; +int oobflag; +int logged_in; +struct passwd *pw; +int debug = 0; +int ftpd_timeout = 900; /* timeout after 15 minutes of inactivity */ +int maxtimeout = 7200;/* don't allow idle time to be set beyond 2 hours */ +int logging; +int guest; +int dochroot; +int type; +int form; +int stru; /* avoid C keyword */ +int mode; +int usedefault = 1; /* for data transfers */ +int pdata = -1; /* for passive mode */ +int transflag; +off_t file_size; +off_t byte_count; +#if !defined(CMASK) || CMASK == 0 +#undef CMASK +#define CMASK 027 +#endif +int defumask = CMASK; /* default umask value */ +int guest_umask = 0777; /* Paranoia for anonymous users */ +char tmpline[10240]; +char hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; +char remotehost[MaxHostNameLen]; +static char ttyline[20]; + +#define AUTH_PLAIN (1 << 0) /* allow sending passwords */ +#define AUTH_OTP (1 << 1) /* passwords are one-time */ +#define AUTH_FTP (1 << 2) /* allow anonymous login */ + +static int auth_level = 0; /* Only allow kerberos login by default */ + +/* + * Timeout intervals for retrying connections + * to hosts that don't accept PORT cmds. This + * is a kludge, but given the problems with TCP... + */ +#define SWAITMAX 90 /* wait at most 90 seconds */ +#define SWAITINT 5 /* interval between retries */ + +int swaitmax = SWAITMAX; +int swaitint = SWAITINT; + +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE +char proctitle[BUFSIZ]; /* initial part of title */ +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + +#define LOGCMD(cmd, file) \ + if (logging > 1) \ + syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s %s%s", cmd, \ + *(file) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file); +#define LOGCMD2(cmd, file1, file2) \ + if (logging > 1) \ + syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s %s%s %s%s", cmd, \ + *(file1) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file1, \ + *(file2) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file2); +#define LOGBYTES(cmd, file, cnt) \ + if (logging > 1) { \ + if (cnt == (off_t)-1) \ + syslog(LOG_INFO,"%s %s%s", cmd, \ + *(file) == '/' ? "" : curdir(), file); \ + else \ + syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s %s%s = %ld bytes", \ + cmd, (*(file) == '/') ? "" : curdir(), file, (long)cnt); \ + } + +static void ack (char *); +static void myoob (int); +static int checkuser (char *, char *); +static int checkaccess (char *); +static FILE *dataconn (const char *, off_t, const char *); +static void dolog (struct sockaddr *sa, int len); +static void end_login (void); +static FILE *getdatasock (const char *); +static char *gunique (char *); +static RETSIGTYPE lostconn (int); +static int receive_data (FILE *, FILE *); +static void send_data (FILE *, FILE *); +static struct passwd * sgetpwnam (char *); + +static char * +curdir(void) +{ + static char path[MaxPathLen+1]; /* path + '/' + '\0' */ + + if (getcwd(path, sizeof(path)-1) == NULL) + return (""); + if (path[1] != '\0') /* special case for root dir. */ + strlcat(path, "/", sizeof(path)); + /* For guest account, skip / since it's chrooted */ + return (guest ? path+1 : path); +} + +#ifndef LINE_MAX +#define LINE_MAX 1024 +#endif + +static int +parse_auth_level(char *str) +{ + char *p; + int ret = 0; + char *foo = NULL; + + for(p = strtok_r(str, ",", &foo); + p; + p = strtok_r(NULL, ",", &foo)) { + if(strcmp(p, "user") == 0) + ; +#ifdef OTP + else if(strcmp(p, "otp") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_PLAIN|AUTH_OTP; +#endif + else if(strcmp(p, "ftp") == 0 || + strcmp(p, "safe") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_FTP; + else if(strcmp(p, "plain") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_PLAIN; + else if(strcmp(p, "none") == 0) + ret |= AUTH_PLAIN|AUTH_FTP; + else + warnx("bad value for -a: `%s'", p); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Print usage and die. + */ + +static int debug_flag; +static int interactive_flag; +static char *guest_umask_string; +static char *port_string; +static char *umask_string; +static char *auth_string; + +int use_builtin_ls = -1; + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, 'a', arg_string, &auth_string, "required authentication" }, + { NULL, 'i', arg_flag, &interactive_flag, "don't assume stdin is a socket" }, + { NULL, 'p', arg_string, &port_string, "what port to listen to" }, + { NULL, 'g', arg_string, &guest_umask_string, "umask for guest logins" }, + { NULL, 'l', arg_counter, &logging, "log more stuff", "" }, + { NULL, 't', arg_integer, &ftpd_timeout, "initial timeout" }, + { NULL, 'T', arg_integer, &maxtimeout, "max timeout" }, + { NULL, 'u', arg_string, &umask_string, "umask for user logins" }, + { NULL, 'd', arg_flag, &debug_flag, "enable debugging" }, + { NULL, 'v', arg_flag, &debug_flag, "enable debugging" }, + { "builtin-ls", 'B', arg_flag, &use_builtin_ls, "use built-in ls to list files" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage (int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (code); +} + +/* output contents of a file */ +static int +show_file(const char *file, int code) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[128]; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return -1; + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)){ + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + lreply(code, "%s", buf); + } + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int his_addr_len, ctrl_addr_len, on = 1, tos; + char *cp, line[LINE_MAX]; + FILE *fd; + int port; + struct servent *sp; + + int optind = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + +#ifdef KRB4 + /* detach from any tickets and tokens */ + { + char tkfile[1024]; + snprintf(tkfile, sizeof(tkfile), + "/tmp/ftp_%u", (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile); + if(k_hasafs()) + k_setpag(); + } +#endif + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(auth_string) + auth_level = parse_auth_level(auth_string); + { + char *p; + long val = 0; + + if(guest_umask_string) { + val = strtol(guest_umask_string, &p, 8); + if (*p != '\0' || val < 0) + warnx("bad value for -g"); + else + guest_umask = val; + } + if(umask_string) { + val = strtol(umask_string, &p, 8); + if (*p != '\0' || val < 0) + warnx("bad value for -u"); + else + defumask = val; + } + } + if(port_string) { + sp = getservbyname(port_string, "tcp"); + if(sp) + port = sp->s_port; + else + if(isdigit(port_string[0])) + port = htons(atoi(port_string)); + else + warnx("bad value for -p"); + } else { + sp = getservbyname("ftp", "tcp"); + if(sp) + port = sp->s_port; + else + port = htons(21); + } + + if (maxtimeout < ftpd_timeout) + maxtimeout = ftpd_timeout; + +#if 0 + if (ftpd_timeout > maxtimeout) + ftpd_timeout = maxtimeout; +#endif + + if(interactive_flag) + mini_inetd (port); + + /* + * LOG_NDELAY sets up the logging connection immediately, + * necessary for anonymous ftp's that chroot and can't do it later. + */ + openlog("ftpd", LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY, LOG_FTP); + his_addr_len = sizeof(his_addr_ss); + if (getpeername(STDIN_FILENO, his_addr, &his_addr_len) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "getpeername (%s): %m",argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + ctrl_addr_len = sizeof(ctrl_addr_ss); + if (getsockname(STDIN_FILENO, ctrl_addr, &ctrl_addr_len) < 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "getsockname (%s): %m",argv[0]); + exit(1); + } +#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + tos = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; + if (setsockopt(STDIN_FILENO, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, + (void *)&tos, sizeof(int)) < 0) + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "setsockopt (IP_TOS): %m"); +#endif + data_source->sa_family = ctrl_addr->sa_family; + socket_set_port (data_source, + htons(ntohs(socket_get_port(ctrl_addr)) - 1)); + + /* set this here so it can be put in wtmp */ + snprintf(ttyline, sizeof(ttyline), "ftp%u", (unsigned)getpid()); + + + /* freopen(_PATH_DEVNULL, "w", stderr); */ + signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); +#ifdef SIGURG + if (signal(SIGURG, myoob) == SIG_ERR) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "signal: %m"); +#endif + + /* Try to handle urgent data inline */ +#if defined(SO_OOBINLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (setsockopt(0, SOL_SOCKET, SO_OOBINLINE, (void *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsockopt: %m"); +#endif + +#ifdef F_SETOWN + if (fcntl(fileno(stdin), F_SETOWN, getpid()) == -1) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "fcntl F_SETOWN: %m"); +#endif + dolog(his_addr, his_addr_len); + /* + * Set up default state + */ + data = -1; + type = TYPE_A; + form = FORM_N; + stru = STRU_F; + mode = MODE_S; + tmpline[0] = '\0'; + + /* If logins are disabled, print out the message. */ + if(show_file(_PATH_NOLOGIN, 530) == 0) { + reply(530, "System not available."); + exit(0); + } + show_file(_PATH_FTPWELCOME, 220); + /* reply(220,) must follow */ + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + + reply(220, "%s FTP server (%s" +#ifdef KRB5 + "+%s" +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + "+%s" +#endif + ") ready.", hostname, version +#ifdef KRB5 + ,heimdal_version +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + ,krb4_version +#endif + ); + + setjmp(errcatch); + for (;;) + yyparse(); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +lostconn(int signo) +{ + + if (debug) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "lost connection"); + dologout(-1); +} + +/* + * Helper function for sgetpwnam(). + */ +static char * +sgetsave(char *s) +{ + char *new = strdup(s); + + if (new == NULL) { + perror_reply(421, "Local resource failure: malloc"); + dologout(1); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + return new; +} + +/* + * Save the result of a getpwnam. Used for USER command, since + * the data returned must not be clobbered by any other command + * (e.g., globbing). + */ +static struct passwd * +sgetpwnam(char *name) +{ + static struct passwd save; + struct passwd *p; + + if ((p = k_getpwnam(name)) == NULL) + return (p); + if (save.pw_name) { + free(save.pw_name); + free(save.pw_passwd); + free(save.pw_gecos); + free(save.pw_dir); + free(save.pw_shell); + } + save = *p; + save.pw_name = sgetsave(p->pw_name); + save.pw_passwd = sgetsave(p->pw_passwd); + save.pw_gecos = sgetsave(p->pw_gecos); + save.pw_dir = sgetsave(p->pw_dir); + save.pw_shell = sgetsave(p->pw_shell); + return (&save); +} + +static int login_attempts; /* number of failed login attempts */ +static int askpasswd; /* had user command, ask for passwd */ +static char curname[10]; /* current USER name */ +#ifdef OTP +OtpContext otp_ctx; +#endif + +/* + * USER command. + * Sets global passwd pointer pw if named account exists and is acceptable; + * sets askpasswd if a PASS command is expected. If logged in previously, + * need to reset state. If name is "ftp" or "anonymous", the name is not in + * _PATH_FTPUSERS, and ftp account exists, set guest and pw, then just return. + * If account doesn't exist, ask for passwd anyway. Otherwise, check user + * requesting login privileges. Disallow anyone who does not have a standard + * shell as returned by getusershell(). Disallow anyone mentioned in the file + * _PATH_FTPUSERS to allow people such as root and uucp to be avoided. + */ +void +user(char *name) +{ + char *cp, *shell; + + if(auth_level == 0 && !sec_complete){ + reply(530, "No login allowed without authorization."); + return; + } + + if (logged_in) { + if (guest) { + reply(530, "Can't change user from guest login."); + return; + } else if (dochroot) { + reply(530, "Can't change user from chroot user."); + return; + } + end_login(); + } + + guest = 0; + if (strcmp(name, "ftp") == 0 || strcmp(name, "anonymous") == 0) { + if ((auth_level & AUTH_FTP) == 0 || + checkaccess("ftp") || + checkaccess("anonymous")) + reply(530, "User %s access denied.", name); + else if ((pw = sgetpwnam("ftp")) != NULL) { + guest = 1; + defumask = guest_umask; /* paranoia for incoming */ + askpasswd = 1; + reply(331, "Guest login ok, type your name as password."); + } else + reply(530, "User %s unknown.", name); + if (!askpasswd && logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "ANONYMOUS FTP LOGIN REFUSED FROM %s(%s)", + remotehost, data_addr); + } + return; + } + if((auth_level & AUTH_PLAIN) == 0 && !sec_complete){ + reply(530, "Only authorized and anonymous login allowed."); + return; + } + if ((pw = sgetpwnam(name))) { + if ((shell = pw->pw_shell) == NULL || *shell == 0) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + while ((cp = getusershell()) != NULL) + if (strcmp(cp, shell) == 0) + break; + endusershell(); + + if (cp == NULL || checkaccess(name)) { + reply(530, "User %s access denied.", name); + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, + sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, + "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "FTP LOGIN REFUSED FROM %s(%s), %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + name); + } + pw = (struct passwd *) NULL; + return; + } + } + if (logging) + strlcpy(curname, name, sizeof(curname)); + if(sec_complete) { + if(sec_userok(name) == 0) + do_login(232, name); + else + reply(530, "User %s access denied.", name); + } else { + char ss[256]; + +#ifdef OTP + if (otp_challenge(&otp_ctx, name, ss, sizeof(ss)) == 0) { + reply(331, "Password %s for %s required.", + ss, name); + askpasswd = 1; + } else +#endif + if ((auth_level & AUTH_OTP) == 0) { + reply(331, "Password required for %s.", name); + askpasswd = 1; + } else { + char *s; + +#ifdef OTP + if ((s = otp_error (&otp_ctx)) != NULL) + lreply(530, "OTP: %s", s); +#endif + reply(530, + "Only authorized, anonymous" +#ifdef OTP + " and OTP " +#endif + "login allowed."); + } + + } + /* + * Delay before reading passwd after first failed + * attempt to slow down passwd-guessing programs. + */ + if (login_attempts) + sleep(login_attempts); +} + +/* + * Check if a user is in the file "fname" + */ +static int +checkuser(char *fname, char *name) +{ + FILE *fd; + int found = 0; + char *p, line[BUFSIZ]; + + if ((fd = fopen(fname, "r")) != NULL) { + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fd) != NULL) + if ((p = strchr(line, '\n')) != NULL) { + *p = '\0'; + if (line[0] == '#') + continue; + if (strcmp(line, name) == 0) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + fclose(fd); + } + return (found); +} + + +/* + * Determine whether a user has access, based on information in + * _PATH_FTPUSERS. The users are listed one per line, with `allow' + * or `deny' after the username. If anything other than `allow', or + * just nothing, is given after the username, `deny' is assumed. + * + * If the user is not found in the file, but the pseudo-user `*' is, + * the permission is taken from that line. + * + * This preserves the old semantics where if a user was listed in the + * file he was denied, otherwise he was allowed. + * + * Return 1 if the user is denied, or 0 if he is allowed. */ + +static int +match(const char *pattern, const char *string) +{ + return fnmatch(pattern, string, FNM_NOESCAPE); +} + +static int +checkaccess(char *name) +{ +#define ALLOWED 0 +#define NOT_ALLOWED 1 + FILE *fd; + int allowed = ALLOWED; + char *user, *perm, line[BUFSIZ]; + char *foo; + + fd = fopen(_PATH_FTPUSERS, "r"); + + if(fd == NULL) + return allowed; + + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fd) != NULL) { + foo = NULL; + user = strtok_r(line, " \t\n", &foo); + if (user == NULL || user[0] == '#') + continue; + perm = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n", &foo); + if (match(user, name) == 0){ + if(perm && strcmp(perm, "allow") == 0) + allowed = ALLOWED; + else + allowed = NOT_ALLOWED; + break; + } + } + fclose(fd); + return allowed; +} +#undef ALLOWED +#undef NOT_ALLOWED + + +int do_login(int code, char *passwd) +{ + FILE *fd; + login_attempts = 0; /* this time successful */ + if (setegid((gid_t)pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't set gid."); + return -1; + } + initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid); + + /* open wtmp before chroot */ + ftpd_logwtmp(ttyline, pw->pw_name, remotehost); + logged_in = 1; + + dochroot = checkuser(_PATH_FTPCHROOT, pw->pw_name); + if (guest) { + /* + * We MUST do a chdir() after the chroot. Otherwise + * the old current directory will be accessible as "." + * outside the new root! + */ + if (chroot(pw->pw_dir) < 0 || chdir("/") < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't set guest privileges."); + return -1; + } + } else if (dochroot) { + if (chroot(pw->pw_dir) < 0 || chdir("/") < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't change root."); + return -1; + } + } else if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { + if (chdir("/") < 0) { + reply(530, "User %s: can't change directory to %s.", + pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); + return -1; + } else + lreply(code, "No directory! Logging in with home=/"); + } + if (seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid) < 0) { + reply(550, "Can't set uid."); + return -1; + } + + if(use_builtin_ls == -1) { + struct stat st; + /* if /bin/ls exist and is a regular file, use it, otherwise + use built-in ls */ + if(stat("/bin/ls", &st) == 0 && + S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) + use_builtin_ls = 0; + else + use_builtin_ls = 1; + } + + /* + * Display a login message, if it exists. + * N.B. reply(code,) must follow the message. + */ + show_file(_PATH_FTPLOGINMESG, code); + if(show_file(_PATH_ISSUE_NET, code) != 0) + show_file(_PATH_ISSUE, code); + if (guest) { + reply(code, "Guest login ok, access restrictions apply."); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + snprintf (proctitle, sizeof(proctitle), + "%s: anonymous/%s", + remotehost, + passwd); + setproctitle(proctitle); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "ANONYMOUS FTP LOGIN FROM %s(%s), %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + passwd); + } + } else { + reply(code, "User %s logged in.", pw->pw_name); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + snprintf(proctitle, sizeof(proctitle), "%s: %s", remotehost, pw->pw_name); + setproctitle(proctitle); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "FTP LOGIN FROM %s(%s) as %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + pw->pw_name); + } + } + umask(defumask); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Terminate login as previous user, if any, resetting state; + * used when USER command is given or login fails. + */ +static void +end_login(void) +{ + + seteuid((uid_t)0); + if (logged_in) + ftpd_logwtmp(ttyline, "", ""); + pw = NULL; + logged_in = 0; + guest = 0; + dochroot = 0; +} + +void +pass(char *passwd) +{ + int rval; + + /* some clients insists on sending a password */ + if (logged_in && askpasswd == 0){ + reply(230, "Dumpucko!"); + return; + } + + if (logged_in || askpasswd == 0) { + reply(503, "Login with USER first."); + return; + } + askpasswd = 0; + rval = 1; + if (!guest) { /* "ftp" is only account allowed no password */ + if (pw == NULL) + rval = 1; /* failure below */ +#ifdef OTP + else if (otp_verify_user (&otp_ctx, passwd) == 0) { + rval = 0; + } +#endif + else if((auth_level & AUTH_OTP) == 0) { +#ifdef KRB4 + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + if((rval = krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1)) == KSUCCESS) + rval = krb_verify_user(pw->pw_name, + "", realm, + passwd, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL); + if (rval == KSUCCESS ) { + chown (tkt_string(), pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + if(k_hasafs()) + krb_afslog(0, 0); + } else +#endif + rval = unix_verify_user(pw->pw_name, passwd); + } else { + char *s; + +#ifdef OTP + if ((s = otp_error(&otp_ctx)) != NULL) + lreply(530, "OTP: %s", s); +#endif + } + memset (passwd, 0, strlen(passwd)); + + /* + * If rval == 1, the user failed the authentication + * check above. If rval == 0, either Kerberos or + * local authentication succeeded. + */ + if (rval) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + reply(530, "Login incorrect."); + if (logging) + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "FTP LOGIN FAILED FROM %s(%s), %s", + remotehost, + data_addr, + curname); + pw = NULL; + if (login_attempts++ >= 5) { + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, + "repeated login failures from %s(%s)", + remotehost, + data_addr); + exit(0); + } + return; + } + } + if(!do_login(230, passwd)) + return; + + /* Forget all about it... */ + end_login(); +} + +void +retrieve(const char *cmd, char *name) +{ + FILE *fin = NULL, *dout; + struct stat st; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + char line[BUFSIZ]; + + + if (cmd == 0) { + fin = fopen(name, "r"); + closefunc = fclose; + st.st_size = 0; + if(fin == NULL){ + int save_errno = errno; + struct cmds { + const char *ext; + const char *cmd; + const char *rev_cmd; + } cmds[] = { + {".tar", "/bin/gtar cPf - %s", NULL}, + {".tar.gz", "/bin/gtar zcPf - %s", NULL}, + {".tar.Z", "/bin/gtar ZcPf - %s", NULL}, + {".gz", "/bin/gzip -c -- %s", "/bin/gzip -c -d -- %s"}, + {".Z", "/bin/compress -c -- %s", "/bin/uncompress -c -- %s"}, + {NULL, NULL} + }; + struct cmds *p; + for(p = cmds; p->ext; p++){ + char *tail = name + strlen(name) - strlen(p->ext); + char c = *tail; + + if(strcmp(tail, p->ext) == 0 && + (*tail = 0) == 0 && + access(name, R_OK) == 0){ + snprintf (line, sizeof(line), p->cmd, name); + *tail = c; + break; + } + *tail = c; + if (p->rev_cmd != NULL) { + char *ext; + + asprintf(&ext, "%s%s", name, p->ext); + if (ext != NULL) { + if (access(ext, R_OK) == 0) { + snprintf (line, sizeof(line), + p->rev_cmd, ext); + free(ext); + break; + } + free(ext); + } + } + + } + if(p->ext){ + fin = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 0, 0); + closefunc = ftpd_pclose; + st.st_size = -1; + cmd = line; + } else + errno = save_errno; + } + } else { + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), cmd, name); + name = line; + fin = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 1, 0); + closefunc = ftpd_pclose; + st.st_size = -1; + } + if (fin == NULL) { + if (errno != 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + if (cmd == 0) { + LOGCMD("get", name); + } + } + return; + } + byte_count = -1; + if (cmd == 0){ + if(fstat(fileno(fin), &st) < 0 || !S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + reply(550, "%s: not a plain file.", name); + goto done; + } + } + if (restart_point) { + if (type == TYPE_A) { + off_t i, n; + int c; + + n = restart_point; + i = 0; + while (i++ < n) { + if ((c=getc(fin)) == EOF) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + if (c == '\n') + i++; + } + } else if (lseek(fileno(fin), restart_point, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + } + dout = dataconn(name, st.st_size, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + goto done; + set_buffer_size(fileno(dout), 0); + send_data(fin, dout); + fclose(dout); + data = -1; + pdata = -1; +done: + if (cmd == 0) + LOGBYTES("get", name, byte_count); + (*closefunc)(fin); +} + +/* filename sanity check */ + +int +filename_check(char *filename) +{ + static const char good_chars[] = "+-=_,."; + char *p; + + p = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(p) + filename = p + 1; + + p = filename; + + if(isalnum(*p)){ + p++; + while(*p && (isalnum(*p) || strchr(good_chars, *p))) + p++; + if(*p == '\0') + return 0; + } + lreply(553, "\"%s\" is an illegal filename.", filename); + lreply(553, "The filename must start with an alphanumeric " + "character and must only"); + reply(553, "consist of alphanumeric characters or any of the following: %s", + good_chars); + return 1; +} + +void +do_store(char *name, char *mode, int unique) +{ + FILE *fout, *din; + struct stat st; + int (*closefunc) (FILE *); + + if(guest && filename_check(name)) + return; + if (unique && stat(name, &st) == 0 && + (name = gunique(name)) == NULL) { + LOGCMD(*mode == 'w' ? "put" : "append", name); + return; + } + + if (restart_point) + mode = "r+"; + fout = fopen(name, mode); + closefunc = fclose; + if (fout == NULL) { + perror_reply(553, name); + LOGCMD(*mode == 'w' ? "put" : "append", name); + return; + } + byte_count = -1; + if (restart_point) { + if (type == TYPE_A) { + off_t i, n; + int c; + + n = restart_point; + i = 0; + while (i++ < n) { + if ((c=getc(fout)) == EOF) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + if (c == '\n') + i++; + } + /* + * We must do this seek to "current" position + * because we are changing from reading to + * writing. + */ + if (fseek(fout, 0L, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + } else if (lseek(fileno(fout), restart_point, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + goto done; + } + } + din = dataconn(name, (off_t)-1, "r"); + if (din == NULL) + goto done; + set_buffer_size(fileno(din), 1); + if (receive_data(din, fout) == 0) { + if (unique) + reply(226, "Transfer complete (unique file name:%s).", + name); + else + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + } + fclose(din); + data = -1; + pdata = -1; +done: + LOGBYTES(*mode == 'w' ? "put" : "append", name, byte_count); + (*closefunc)(fout); +} + +static FILE * +getdatasock(const char *mode) +{ + int s, t, tries; + + if (data >= 0) + return (fdopen(data, mode)); + seteuid(0); + s = socket(ctrl_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) + goto bad; + socket_set_reuseaddr (s, 1); + /* anchor socket to avoid multi-homing problems */ + socket_set_address_and_port (data_source, + socket_get_address (ctrl_addr), + socket_get_port (data_source)); + + for (tries = 1; ; tries++) { + if (bind(s, data_source, + socket_sockaddr_size (data_source)) >= 0) + break; + if (errno != EADDRINUSE || tries > 10) + goto bad; + sleep(tries); + } + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); +#ifdef IPTOS_THROUGHPUT + socket_set_tos (s, IPTOS_THROUGHPUT); +#endif + return (fdopen(s, mode)); +bad: + /* Return the real value of errno (close may change it) */ + t = errno; + seteuid((uid_t)pw->pw_uid); + close(s); + errno = t; + return (NULL); +} + +static FILE * +dataconn(const char *name, off_t size, const char *mode) +{ + char sizebuf[32]; + FILE *file; + int retry = 0; + + file_size = size; + byte_count = 0; + if (size >= 0) + snprintf(sizebuf, sizeof(sizebuf), " (%ld bytes)", (long)size); + else + *sizebuf = '\0'; + if (pdata >= 0) { + struct sockaddr_storage from_ss; + struct sockaddr *from = (struct sockaddr *)&from_ss; + int s; + int fromlen = sizeof(from_ss); + + s = accept(pdata, from, &fromlen); + if (s < 0) { + reply(425, "Can't open data connection."); + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + return (NULL); + } + close(pdata); + pdata = s; +#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + { + int tos = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; + + setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, (void *)&tos, + sizeof(tos)); + } +#endif + reply(150, "Opening %s mode data connection for '%s'%s.", + type == TYPE_A ? "ASCII" : "BINARY", name, sizebuf); + return (fdopen(pdata, mode)); + } + if (data >= 0) { + reply(125, "Using existing data connection for '%s'%s.", + name, sizebuf); + usedefault = 1; + return (fdopen(data, mode)); + } + if (usedefault) + data_dest = his_addr; + usedefault = 1; + file = getdatasock(mode); + if (file == NULL) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (data_source->sa_family, + socket_get_address(data_source), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + reply(425, "Can't create data socket (%s,%d): %s.", + data_addr, + socket_get_port (data_source), + strerror(errno)); + return (NULL); + } + data = fileno(file); + while (connect(data, data_dest, + socket_sockaddr_size(data_dest)) < 0) { + if (errno == EADDRINUSE && retry < swaitmax) { + sleep(swaitint); + retry += swaitint; + continue; + } + perror_reply(425, "Can't build data connection"); + fclose(file); + data = -1; + return (NULL); + } + reply(150, "Opening %s mode data connection for '%s'%s.", + type == TYPE_A ? "ASCII" : "BINARY", name, sizebuf); + return (file); +} + +/* + * Tranfer the contents of "instr" to "outstr" peer using the appropriate + * encapsulation of the data subject * to Mode, Structure, and Type. + * + * NB: Form isn't handled. + */ +static void +send_data(FILE *instr, FILE *outstr) +{ + int c, cnt, filefd, netfd; + static char *buf; + static size_t bufsize; + + transflag++; + if (setjmp(urgcatch)) { + transflag = 0; + return; + } + switch (type) { + + case TYPE_A: + while ((c = getc(instr)) != EOF) { + byte_count++; + if(c == '\n') + sec_putc('\r', outstr); + sec_putc(c, outstr); + } + sec_fflush(outstr); + transflag = 0; + if (ferror(instr)) + goto file_err; + if (ferror(outstr)) + goto data_err; + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + return; + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: +#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && !defined(NO_MMAP) +#ifndef MAP_FAILED +#define MAP_FAILED (-1) +#endif + { + struct stat st; + char *chunk; + int in = fileno(instr); + if(fstat(in, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) + && st.st_size > 0) { + /* + * mmap zero bytes has potential of loosing, don't do it. + */ + chunk = mmap(0, st.st_size, PROT_READ, + MAP_SHARED, in, 0); + if((void *)chunk != (void *)MAP_FAILED) { + cnt = st.st_size - restart_point; + sec_write(fileno(outstr), chunk + restart_point, cnt); + if (munmap(chunk, st.st_size) < 0) + warn ("munmap"); + sec_fflush(outstr); + byte_count = cnt; + transflag = 0; + } + } + } +#endif + if(transflag) { + struct stat st; + + netfd = fileno(outstr); + filefd = fileno(instr); + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat(filefd, &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) { + transflag = 0; + perror_reply(451, "Local resource failure: malloc"); + return; + } + while ((cnt = read(filefd, buf, bufsize)) > 0 && + sec_write(netfd, buf, cnt) == cnt) + byte_count += cnt; + sec_fflush(outstr); /* to end an encrypted stream */ + transflag = 0; + if (cnt != 0) { + if (cnt < 0) + goto file_err; + goto data_err; + } + } + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + return; + default: + transflag = 0; + reply(550, "Unimplemented TYPE %d in send_data", type); + return; + } + +data_err: + transflag = 0; + perror_reply(426, "Data connection"); + return; + +file_err: + transflag = 0; + perror_reply(551, "Error on input file"); +} + +/* + * Transfer data from peer to "outstr" using the appropriate encapulation of + * the data subject to Mode, Structure, and Type. + * + * N.B.: Form isn't handled. + */ +static int +receive_data(FILE *instr, FILE *outstr) +{ + int cnt, bare_lfs = 0; + static char *buf; + static size_t bufsize; + struct stat st; + + transflag++; + if (setjmp(urgcatch)) { + transflag = 0; + return (-1); + } + + buf = alloc_buffer (buf, &bufsize, + fstat(fileno(outstr), &st) >= 0 ? &st : NULL); + if (buf == NULL) { + transflag = 0; + perror_reply(451, "Local resource failure: malloc"); + return -1; + } + + switch (type) { + + case TYPE_I: + case TYPE_L: + while ((cnt = sec_read(fileno(instr), buf, bufsize)) > 0) { + if (write(fileno(outstr), buf, cnt) != cnt) + goto file_err; + byte_count += cnt; + } + if (cnt < 0) + goto data_err; + transflag = 0; + return (0); + + case TYPE_E: + reply(553, "TYPE E not implemented."); + transflag = 0; + return (-1); + + case TYPE_A: + { + char *p, *q; + int cr_flag = 0; + while ((cnt = sec_read(fileno(instr), + buf + cr_flag, + bufsize - cr_flag)) > 0){ + byte_count += cnt; + cnt += cr_flag; + cr_flag = 0; + for(p = buf, q = buf; p < buf + cnt;) { + if(*p == '\n') + bare_lfs++; + if(*p == '\r') { + if(p == buf + cnt - 1){ + cr_flag = 1; + p++; + continue; + }else if(p[1] == '\n'){ + *q++ = '\n'; + p += 2; + continue; + } + } + *q++ = *p++; + } + fwrite(buf, q - buf, 1, outstr); + if(cr_flag) + buf[0] = '\r'; + } + if(cr_flag) + putc('\r', outstr); + fflush(outstr); + if (ferror(instr)) + goto data_err; + if (ferror(outstr)) + goto file_err; + transflag = 0; + if (bare_lfs) { + lreply(226, "WARNING! %d bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode\r\n" + " File may not have transferred correctly.\r\n", + bare_lfs); + } + return (0); + } + default: + reply(550, "Unimplemented TYPE %d in receive_data", type); + transflag = 0; + return (-1); + } + +data_err: + transflag = 0; + perror_reply(426, "Data Connection"); + return (-1); + +file_err: + transflag = 0; + perror_reply(452, "Error writing file"); + return (-1); +} + +void +statfilecmd(char *filename) +{ + FILE *fin; + int c; + char line[LINE_MAX]; + + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "/bin/ls -la -- %s", filename); + fin = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 1, 0); + lreply(211, "status of %s:", filename); + while ((c = getc(fin)) != EOF) { + if (c == '\n') { + if (ferror(stdout)){ + perror_reply(421, "control connection"); + ftpd_pclose(fin); + dologout(1); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + if (ferror(fin)) { + perror_reply(551, filename); + ftpd_pclose(fin); + return; + } + putc('\r', stdout); + } + putc(c, stdout); + } + ftpd_pclose(fin); + reply(211, "End of Status"); +} + +void +statcmd(void) +{ +#if 0 + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + u_char *a, *p; + + lreply(211, "%s FTP server (%s) status:", hostname, version); + printf(" %s\r\n", version); + printf(" Connected to %s", remotehost); + if (!isdigit(remotehost[0])) + printf(" (%s)", inet_ntoa(his_addr.sin_addr)); + printf("\r\n"); + if (logged_in) { + if (guest) + printf(" Logged in anonymously\r\n"); + else + printf(" Logged in as %s\r\n", pw->pw_name); + } else if (askpasswd) + printf(" Waiting for password\r\n"); + else + printf(" Waiting for user name\r\n"); + printf(" TYPE: %s", typenames[type]); + if (type == TYPE_A || type == TYPE_E) + printf(", FORM: %s", formnames[form]); + if (type == TYPE_L) +#if NBBY == 8 + printf(" %d", NBBY); +#else + printf(" %d", bytesize); /* need definition! */ +#endif + printf("; STRUcture: %s; transfer MODE: %s\r\n", + strunames[stru], modenames[mode]); + if (data != -1) + printf(" Data connection open\r\n"); + else if (pdata != -1) { + printf(" in Passive mode"); + sin = &pasv_addr; + goto printaddr; + } else if (usedefault == 0) { + printf(" PORT"); + sin = &data_dest; +printaddr: + a = (u_char *) &sin->sin_addr; + p = (u_char *) &sin->sin_port; +#define UC(b) (((int) b) & 0xff) + printf(" (%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d)\r\n", UC(a[0]), + UC(a[1]), UC(a[2]), UC(a[3]), UC(p[0]), UC(p[1])); +#undef UC + } else + printf(" No data connection\r\n"); +#endif + reply(211, "End of status"); +} + +void +fatal(char *s) +{ + + reply(451, "Error in server: %s\n", s); + reply(221, "Closing connection due to server error."); + dologout(0); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static void +int_reply(int, char *, const char *, va_list) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))) +#endif +; + +static void +int_reply(int n, char *c, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char buf[10240]; + char *p; + p=buf; + if(n){ + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf), "%d%s", n, c); + p+=strlen(p); + } + vsnprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - strlen(p), fmt, ap); + p+=strlen(p); + snprintf(p, sizeof(buf) - strlen(p), "\r\n"); + p+=strlen(p); + sec_fprintf(stdout, "%s", buf); + fflush(stdout); + if (debug) + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "<--- %s- ", buf); +} + +void +reply(int n, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + int_reply(n, " ", fmt, ap); + delete_ftp_command(); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +lreply(int n, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + int_reply(n, "-", fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +nreply(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + int_reply(0, NULL, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +static void +ack(char *s) +{ + + reply(250, "%s command successful.", s); +} + +void +nack(char *s) +{ + + reply(502, "%s command not implemented.", s); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +void +yyerror(char *s) +{ + char *cp; + + if ((cp = strchr(cbuf,'\n'))) + *cp = '\0'; + reply(500, "'%s': command not understood.", cbuf); +} + +void +do_delete(char *name) +{ + struct stat st; + + LOGCMD("delete", name); + if (stat(name, &st) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return; + } + if ((st.st_mode&S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) { + if (rmdir(name) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return; + } + goto done; + } + if (unlink(name) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return; + } +done: + ack("DELE"); +} + +void +cwd(char *path) +{ + + if (chdir(path) < 0) + perror_reply(550, path); + else + ack("CWD"); +} + +void +makedir(char *name) +{ + + LOGCMD("mkdir", name); + if(guest && filename_check(name)) + return; + if (mkdir(name, 0777) < 0) + perror_reply(550, name); + else{ + if(guest) + chmod(name, 0700); /* guest has umask 777 */ + reply(257, "MKD command successful."); + } +} + +void +removedir(char *name) +{ + + LOGCMD("rmdir", name); + if (rmdir(name) < 0) + perror_reply(550, name); + else + ack("RMD"); +} + +void +pwd(void) +{ + char path[MaxPathLen]; + char *ret; + + /* SunOS has a broken getcwd that does popen(pwd) (!!!), this + * failes miserably when running chroot + */ + ret = getcwd(path, sizeof(path)); + if (ret == NULL) + reply(550, "%s.", strerror(errno)); + else + reply(257, "\"%s\" is current directory.", path); +} + +char * +renamefrom(char *name) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (stat(name, &st) < 0) { + perror_reply(550, name); + return NULL; + } + reply(350, "File exists, ready for destination name"); + return (name); +} + +void +renamecmd(char *from, char *to) +{ + + LOGCMD2("rename", from, to); + if(guest && filename_check(to)) + return; + if (rename(from, to) < 0) + perror_reply(550, "rename"); + else + ack("RNTO"); +} + +static void +dolog(struct sockaddr *sa, int len) +{ + getnameinfo_verified (sa, len, remotehost, sizeof(remotehost), + NULL, 0, 0); +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + snprintf(proctitle, sizeof(proctitle), "%s: connected", remotehost); + setproctitle(proctitle); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + + if (logging) { + char data_addr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (his_addr->sa_family, + socket_get_address(his_addr), + data_addr, sizeof(data_addr)) == NULL) + strlcpy (data_addr, "unknown address", + sizeof(data_addr)); + + + syslog(LOG_INFO, "connection from %s(%s)", + remotehost, + data_addr); + } +} + +/* + * Record logout in wtmp file + * and exit with supplied status. + */ +void +dologout(int status) +{ + transflag = 0; + if (logged_in) { + seteuid((uid_t)0); + ftpd_logwtmp(ttyline, "", ""); +#ifdef KRB4 + cond_kdestroy(); +#endif + } + /* beware of flushing buffers after a SIGPIPE */ +#ifdef XXX + exit(status); +#else + _exit(status); +#endif +} + +void abor(void) +{ +} + +static void +myoob(int signo) +{ +#if 0 + char *cp; +#endif + + /* only process if transfer occurring */ + if (!transflag) + return; + + /* This is all XXX */ + oobflag = 1; + /* if the command resulted in a new command, + parse that as well */ + do{ + yyparse(); + } while(ftp_command); + oobflag = 0; + +#if 0 + cp = tmpline; + if (ftpd_getline(cp, 7) == NULL) { + reply(221, "You could at least say goodbye."); + dologout(0); + } + upper(cp); + if (strcmp(cp, "ABOR\r\n") == 0) { + tmpline[0] = '\0'; + reply(426, "Transfer aborted. Data connection closed."); + reply(226, "Abort successful"); + longjmp(urgcatch, 1); + } + if (strcmp(cp, "STAT\r\n") == 0) { + if (file_size != (off_t) -1) + reply(213, "Status: %ld of %ld bytes transferred", + (long)byte_count, + (long)file_size); + else + reply(213, "Status: %ld bytes transferred" + (long)byte_count); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Note: a response of 425 is not mentioned as a possible response to + * the PASV command in RFC959. However, it has been blessed as + * a legitimate response by Jon Postel in a telephone conversation + * with Rick Adams on 25 Jan 89. + */ +void +pasv(void) +{ + int len; + char *p, *a; + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + + if (ctrl_addr->sa_family != AF_INET) { + reply(425, + "You cannot do PASV with something that's not IPv4"); + return; + } + + pdata = socket(ctrl_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (pdata < 0) { + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; + } + pasv_addr->sa_family = ctrl_addr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (pasv_addr, + socket_get_address (ctrl_addr), + 0); + seteuid(0); + if (bind(pdata, pasv_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (pasv_addr)) < 0) { + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + goto pasv_error; + } + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + len = sizeof(pasv_addr_ss); + if (getsockname(pdata, pasv_addr, &len) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + if (listen(pdata, 1) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)pasv_addr; + a = (char *) &sin->sin_addr; + p = (char *) &sin->sin_port; + +#define UC(b) (((int) b) & 0xff) + + reply(227, "Entering Passive Mode (%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d)", UC(a[0]), + UC(a[1]), UC(a[2]), UC(a[3]), UC(p[0]), UC(p[1])); + return; + +pasv_error: + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; +} + +void +epsv(char *proto) +{ + int len; + + pdata = socket(ctrl_addr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (pdata < 0) { + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; + } + pasv_addr->sa_family = ctrl_addr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (pasv_addr, + socket_get_address (ctrl_addr), + 0); + seteuid(0); + if (bind(pdata, pasv_addr, socket_sockaddr_size (pasv_addr)) < 0) { + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + goto pasv_error; + } + seteuid(pw->pw_uid); + len = sizeof(pasv_addr_ss); + if (getsockname(pdata, pasv_addr, &len) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + if (listen(pdata, 1) < 0) + goto pasv_error; + + reply(229, "Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||%d|)", + ntohs(socket_get_port (pasv_addr))); + return; + +pasv_error: + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + perror_reply(425, "Can't open passive connection"); + return; +} + +void +eprt(char *str) +{ + char *end; + char sep; + int af; + int ret; + int port; + + usedefault = 0; + if (pdata >= 0) { + close(pdata); + pdata = -1; + } + + sep = *str++; + if (sep == '\0') { + reply(500, "Bad syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + af = strtol (str, &end, 0); + if (af == 0 || *end != sep) { + reply(500, "Bad syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + str = end + 1; + switch (af) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case 2 : + data_dest->sa_family = AF_INET6; + break; +#endif + case 1 : + data_dest->sa_family = AF_INET; + break; + default : + reply(522, "Network protocol %d not supported, use (1" +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + ",2" +#endif + ")", af); + return; + } + end = strchr (str, sep); + if (end == NULL) { + reply(500, "Bad syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + *end = '\0'; + ret = inet_pton (data_dest->sa_family, str, + socket_get_address (data_dest)); + + if (ret != 1) { + reply(500, "Bad address syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + str = end + 1; + port = strtol (str, &end, 0); + if (port == 0 || *end != sep) { + reply(500, "Bad port syntax in EPRT"); + return; + } + socket_set_port (data_dest, htons(port)); + reply(200, "EPRT command successful."); +} + +/* + * Generate unique name for file with basename "local". + * The file named "local" is already known to exist. + * Generates failure reply on error. + */ +static char * +gunique(char *local) +{ + static char new[MaxPathLen]; + struct stat st; + int count; + char *cp; + + cp = strrchr(local, '/'); + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + if (stat(cp ? local : ".", &st) < 0) { + perror_reply(553, cp ? local : "."); + return NULL; + } + if (cp) + *cp = '/'; + for (count = 1; count < 100; count++) { + snprintf (new, sizeof(new), "%s.%d", local, count); + if (stat(new, &st) < 0) + return (new); + } + reply(452, "Unique file name cannot be created."); + return (NULL); +} + +/* + * Format and send reply containing system error number. + */ +void +perror_reply(int code, const char *string) +{ + reply(code, "%s: %s.", string, strerror(errno)); +} + +static char *onefile[] = { + "", + 0 +}; + +void +list_file(char *file) +{ + if(use_builtin_ls) { + FILE *dout; + dout = dataconn(file, -1, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + return; + set_buffer_size(fileno(dout), 0); + builtin_ls(dout, file); + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + fclose(dout); + data = -1; + pdata = -1; + } else { +#ifdef HAVE_LS_A + const char *cmd = "/bin/ls -lA -- %s"; +#else + const char *cmd = "/bin/ls -la -- %s"; +#endif + retrieve(cmd, file); + } +} + +void +send_file_list(char *whichf) +{ + struct stat st; + DIR *dirp = NULL; + struct dirent *dir; + FILE *dout = NULL; + char **dirlist, *dirname; + int simple = 0; + int freeglob = 0; + glob_t gl; + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (strpbrk(whichf, "~{[*?") != NULL) { + int flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + freeglob = 1; + if (glob(whichf, flags, 0, &gl)) { + reply(550, "not found"); + goto out; + } else if (gl.gl_pathc == 0) { + errno = ENOENT; + perror_reply(550, whichf); + goto out; + } + dirlist = gl.gl_pathv; + } else { + onefile[0] = whichf; + dirlist = onefile; + simple = 1; + } + + if (setjmp(urgcatch)) { + transflag = 0; + goto out; + } + while ((dirname = *dirlist++)) { + if (stat(dirname, &st) < 0) { + /* + * If user typed "ls -l", etc, and the client + * used NLST, do what the user meant. + */ + if (dirname[0] == '-' && *dirlist == NULL && + transflag == 0) { + retrieve("/bin/ls -- %s", dirname); + goto out; + } + perror_reply(550, whichf); + if (dout != NULL) { + fclose(dout); + transflag = 0; + data = -1; + pdata = -1; + } + goto out; + } + + if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + if (dout == NULL) { + dout = dataconn("file list", (off_t)-1, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + goto out; + transflag++; + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s\n", dirname, + type == TYPE_A ? "\r" : ""); + sec_write(fileno(dout), buf, strlen(buf)); + byte_count += strlen(dirname) + 1; + continue; + } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + continue; + + if ((dirp = opendir(dirname)) == NULL) + continue; + + while ((dir = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + char nbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (!strcmp(dir->d_name, ".")) + continue; + if (!strcmp(dir->d_name, "..")) + continue; + + snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s/%s", dirname, dir->d_name); + + /* + * We have to do a stat to insure it's + * not a directory or special file. + */ + if (simple || (stat(nbuf, &st) == 0 && + S_ISREG(st.st_mode))) { + if (dout == NULL) { + dout = dataconn("file list", (off_t)-1, "w"); + if (dout == NULL) + goto out; + transflag++; + } + if(strncmp(nbuf, "./", 2) == 0) + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s\n", nbuf +2, + type == TYPE_A ? "\r" : ""); + else + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s\n", nbuf, + type == TYPE_A ? "\r" : ""); + sec_write(fileno(dout), buf, strlen(buf)); + byte_count += strlen(nbuf) + 1; + } + } + closedir(dirp); + } + if (dout == NULL) + reply(550, "No files found."); + else if (ferror(dout) != 0) + perror_reply(550, "Data connection"); + else + reply(226, "Transfer complete."); + + transflag = 0; + if (dout != NULL){ + sec_write(fileno(dout), buf, 0); /* XXX flush */ + + fclose(dout); + } + data = -1; + pdata = -1; +out: + if (freeglob) { + freeglob = 0; + globfree(&gl); + } +} + + +int +find(char *pattern) +{ + char line[1024]; + FILE *f; + + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), + "/bin/locate -d %s -- %s", + ftp_rooted("/etc/locatedb"), + pattern); + f = ftpd_popen(line, "r", 1, 1); + if(f == NULL){ + perror_reply(550, "/bin/locate"); + return 1; + } + lreply(200, "Output from find."); + while(fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)){ + if(line[strlen(line)-1] == '\n') + line[strlen(line)-1] = 0; + nreply("%s", line); + } + reply(200, "Done"); + ftpd_pclose(f); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cb4904 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpd_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: ftpd_locl.h,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:30 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ftpd_locl_h__ +#define __ftpd_locl_h__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +/* + * FTP server. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCCOM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_BSD_BSD_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "extern.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "security.h" + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif + +#ifdef OTP +#include +#endif + +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +extern int LIBPREFIX(fclose) (FILE *); +#endif + +/* SunOS doesn't have any declaration of fclose */ + +int fclose(FILE *stream); + +int yyparse(); + +#ifndef LOG_FTP +#define LOG_FTP LOG_DAEMON +#endif + +#endif /* __ftpd_locl_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfd66f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ftpusers.5 @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +.\" $Id: ftpusers.5,v 1.2 1997/05/07 20:11:11 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 7, 1997 +.Dt FTPUSERS 5 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Sh NAME +.Pa /etc/ftpusers +.Nd +FTP access list file. +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Pa /etc/ftpusers +contains a list of users that should be allowed or denied FTP +access. Each line contains a user, optionally followed by +.Dq allow +(anything but +.Dq allow +is ignored). The semi-user +.Dq * +matches any user. Users that has an explicit +.Dq allow , +or that does not match any line, are allowed access. Anyone else is +denied access. + +Note that this is compatible with the old format, where this file +contained a list of users that should be denied access. +.Sh EXAMPLES +This will deny anyone but +.Dq foo +and +.Dq bar +to use FTP: +.Bd -literal +foo allow +bar allow +* +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftpd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28e3596 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/gss_userok.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: gss_userok.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); + +/* XXX a bit too much of krb5 dependency here... + What is the correct way to do this? + */ + +extern krb5_context gssapi_krb5_context; + +/* XXX sync with gssapi.c */ +struct gss_data { + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl; + char *client_name; +}; + +int gss_userok(void*, char*); /* to keep gcc happy */ + +int +gss_userok(void *app_data, char *username) +{ + struct gss_data *data = app_data; + if(gssapi_krb5_context) { + krb5_principal client; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_parse_name(gssapi_krb5_context, data->client_name, &client); + if(ret) + return 1; + ret = krb5_kuserok(gssapi_krb5_context, client, username); + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, client); + return !ret; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dad4de5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/kauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kauth.c,v 1.25 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); + +static KTEXT_ST cip; +static unsigned int lifetime; +static time_t local_time; + +static krb_principal pr; + +static int do_destroy_tickets = 1; + +static int +save_tkt(const char *user, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + const void *arg, + key_proc_t key_proc, + KTEXT *cipp) +{ + local_time = time(0); + memmove(&cip, *cipp, sizeof(cip)); + return -1; +} + +static int +store_ticket(KTEXT cip) +{ + char *ptr; + des_cblock session; + krb_principal sp; + unsigned char kvno; + KTEXT_ST tkt; + int left = cip->length; + int len; + int kerror; + + ptr = (char *) cip->dat; + + /* extract session key */ + memmove(session, ptr, 8); + ptr += 8; + left -= 8; + + len = strnlen(ptr, left); + if (len == left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract server's name */ + strlcpy(sp.name, ptr, sizeof(sp.name)); + ptr += len + 1; + left -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(ptr, left); + if (len == left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract server's instance */ + strlcpy(sp.instance, ptr, sizeof(sp.instance)); + ptr += len + 1; + left -= len + 1; + + len = strnlen(ptr, left); + if (len == left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract server's realm */ + strlcpy(sp.realm, ptr, sizeof(sp.realm)); + ptr += len + 1; + left -= len + 1; + + if(left < 3) + return INTK_BADPW; + /* extract ticket lifetime, server key version, ticket length */ + /* be sure to avoid sign extension on lifetime! */ + lifetime = (unsigned char) ptr[0]; + kvno = (unsigned char) ptr[1]; + tkt.length = (unsigned char) ptr[2]; + ptr += 3; + left -= 3; + + if (tkt.length > left) + return(INTK_BADPW); + + /* extract ticket itself */ + memmove(tkt.dat, ptr, tkt.length); + ptr += tkt.length; + left -= tkt.length; + + /* Here is where the time should be verified against the KDC. + * Unfortunately everything is sent in host byte order (receiver + * makes wrong) , and at this stage there is no way for us to know + * which byteorder the KDC has. So we simply ignore the time, + * there are no security risks with this, the only thing that can + * happen is that we might receive a replayed ticket, which could + * at most be useless. + */ + +#if 0 + /* check KDC time stamp */ + { + time_t kdc_time; + + memmove(&kdc_time, ptr, sizeof(kdc_time)); + if (swap_bytes) swap_u_long(kdc_time); + + ptr += 4; + + if (abs((int)(local_time - kdc_time)) > CLOCK_SKEW) { + return(RD_AP_TIME); /* XXX should probably be better + code */ + } + } +#endif + + /* initialize ticket cache */ + + if (tf_create(TKT_FILE) != KSUCCESS) + return(INTK_ERR); + + if (tf_put_pname(pr.name) != KSUCCESS || + tf_put_pinst(pr.instance) != KSUCCESS) { + tf_close(); + return(INTK_ERR); + } + + + kerror = tf_save_cred(sp.name, sp.instance, sp.realm, session, + lifetime, kvno, &tkt, local_time); + tf_close(); + + return(kerror); +} + +void +kauth(char *principal, char *ticket) +{ + char *p; + int ret; + + if(get_command_prot() != prot_private) { + reply(500, "Request denied (bad protection level)"); + return; + } + ret = krb_parse_name(principal, &pr); + if(ret){ + reply(500, "Bad principal: %s.", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return; + } + if(pr.realm[0] == 0) + krb_get_lrealm(pr.realm, 1); + + if(ticket){ + cip.length = base64_decode(ticket, &cip.dat); + if(cip.length == -1){ + reply(500, "Failed to decode data."); + return; + } + ret = store_ticket(&cip); + if(ret){ + reply(500, "Kerberos error: %s.", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + memset(&cip, 0, sizeof(cip)); + return; + } + do_destroy_tickets = 1; + + if(k_hasafs()) + krb_afslog(0, 0); + reply(200, "Tickets will be destroyed on exit."); + return; + } + + ret = krb_get_in_tkt (pr.name, + pr.instance, + pr.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, + pr.realm, + DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, + NULL, save_tkt, NULL); + if(ret != INTK_BADPW){ + reply(500, "Kerberos error: %s.", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return; + } + if(base64_encode(cip.dat, cip.length, &p) < 0) { + reply(500, "Out of memory while base64-encoding."); + return; + } + reply(300, "P=%s T=%s", krb_unparse_name(&pr), p); + free(p); + memset(&cip, 0, sizeof(cip)); +} + + +static char * +short_date(int32_t dp) +{ + char *cp; + time_t t = (time_t)dp; + + if (t == (time_t)(-1L)) return "*** Never *** "; + cp = ctime(&t) + 4; + cp[15] = '\0'; + return (cp); +} + +void +klist(void) +{ + int err; + + char *file = tkt_string(); + + krb_principal pr; + + char buf1[128], buf2[128]; + int header = 1; + CREDENTIALS c; + + + + err = tf_init(file, R_TKT_FIL); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + tf_close(); + + /* + * We must find the realm of the ticket file here before calling + * tf_init because since the realm of the ticket file is not + * really stored in the principal section of the file, the + * routine we use must itself call tf_init and tf_close. + */ + err = krb_get_tf_realm(file, pr.realm); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + + err = tf_init(file, R_TKT_FIL); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + + err = tf_get_pname(pr.name); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + err = tf_get_pinst(pr.instance); + if(err != KSUCCESS){ + reply(500, "%s", krb_get_err_text(err)); + return; + } + + /* + * You may think that this is the obvious place to get the + * realm of the ticket file, but it can't be done here as the + * routine to do this must open the ticket file. This is why + * it was done before tf_init. + */ + + lreply(200, "Ticket file: %s", tkt_string()); + + lreply(200, "Principal: %s", krb_unparse_name(&pr)); + while ((err = tf_get_cred(&c)) == KSUCCESS) { + if (header) { + lreply(200, "%-15s %-15s %s", + " Issued", " Expires", " Principal (kvno)"); + header = 0; + } + strlcpy(buf1, short_date(c.issue_date), sizeof(buf1)); + c.issue_date = krb_life_to_time(c.issue_date, c.lifetime); + if (time(0) < (unsigned long) c.issue_date) + strlcpy(buf2, short_date(c.issue_date), sizeof(buf2)); + else + strlcpy(buf2, ">>> Expired <<< ", sizeof(buf2)); + lreply(200, "%s %s %s (%d)", buf1, buf2, + krb_unparse_name_long(c.service, c.instance, c.realm), c.kvno); + } + if (header && err == EOF) { + lreply(200, "No tickets in file."); + } + reply(200, " "); +} + +/* + * Only destroy if we created the tickets + */ + +void +cond_kdestroy(void) +{ + if (do_destroy_tickets) + dest_tkt(); + afsunlog(); +} + +void +kdestroy(void) +{ + dest_tkt(); + afsunlog(); + reply(200, "Tickets destroyed"); +} + +void +krbtkfile(const char *tkfile) +{ + do_destroy_tickets = 0; + krb_set_tkt_string(tkfile); + reply(200, "Using ticket file %s", tkfile); +} + +void +afslog(const char *cell) +{ + if(k_hasafs()) { + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + reply(200, "afslog done"); + } else { + reply(200, "no AFS present"); + } +} + +void +afsunlog(void) +{ + if(k_hasafs()) + k_unlog(); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..019cc2d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/logwtmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: logwtmp.c,v 1.14 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#include "extern.h" + +#ifndef WTMP_FILE +#ifdef _PATH_WTMP +#define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP +#else +#define WTMP_FILE "/var/adm/wtmp" +#endif +#endif + +void +ftpd_logwtmp(char *line, char *name, char *host) +{ + static int init = 0; + static int fd; +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + static int fdx; +#endif + struct utmp ut; +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + struct utmpx utx; +#endif + + memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(struct utmp)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE + if(name[0]) + ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + else + ut.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +#endif + strncpy(ut.ut_line, line, sizeof(ut.ut_line)); + strncpy(ut.ut_name, name, sizeof(ut.ut_name)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID + ut.ut_pid = getpid(); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + strncpy(ut.ut_host, host, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); +#endif + ut.ut_time = time(NULL); + +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + strncpy(utx.ut_line, line, sizeof(utx.ut_line)); + strncpy(utx.ut_user, name, sizeof(utx.ut_user)); + strncpy(utx.ut_host, host, sizeof(utx.ut_host)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN + utx.ut_syslen = strlen(host) + 1; + if (utx.ut_syslen > sizeof(utx.ut_host)) + utx.ut_syslen = sizeof(utx.ut_host); +#endif + { + struct timeval tv; + + gettimeofday (&tv, 0); + utx.ut_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; + utx.ut_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec; + } + + if(name[0]) + utx.ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + else + utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +#endif + + if(!init){ + fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0); +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + fdx = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0); +#endif + init = 1; + } + if(fd >= 0) { + write(fd, &ut, sizeof(struct utmp)); /* XXX */ +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + write(fdx, &utx, sizeof(struct utmpx)); +#endif + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c85487 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/ls.c @@ -0,0 +1,588 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "ftpd_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ls.c,v 1.14 2000/01/05 13:48:58 joda Exp $"); + +struct fileinfo { + struct stat st; + int inode; + int bsize; + char mode[11]; + int n_link; + char *user; + char *group; + char *size; + char *major; + char *minor; + char *date; + char *filename; + char *link; +}; + +static void +free_fileinfo(struct fileinfo *f) +{ + free(f->user); + free(f->group); + free(f->size); + free(f->major); + free(f->minor); + free(f->date); + free(f->filename); + free(f->link); +} + +#define LS_DIRS 1 +#define LS_IGNORE_DOT 2 +#define LS_SORT_MODE 12 +#define SORT_MODE(f) ((f) & LS_SORT_MODE) +#define LS_SORT_NAME 4 +#define LS_SORT_MTIME 8 +#define LS_SORT_SIZE 12 +#define LS_SORT_REVERSE 16 + +#define LS_SIZE 32 +#define LS_INODE 64 + +#ifndef S_ISTXT +#define S_ISTXT S_ISVTX +#endif + +#ifndef S_ISSOCK +#define S_ISSOCK(mode) (((mode) & _S_IFMT) == S_IFSOCK) +#endif + +#ifndef S_ISLNK +#define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & _S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) +#endif + +static void +make_fileinfo(const char *filename, struct fileinfo *file, int flags) +{ + char buf[128]; + struct stat *st = &file->st; + + file->inode = st->st_ino; +#ifdef S_BLKSIZE + file->bsize = st->st_blocks * S_BLKSIZE / 1024; +#else + file->bsize = st->st_blocks * 512 / 1024; +#endif + + if(S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'd'; + else if(S_ISCHR(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'c'; + else if(S_ISBLK(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'b'; + else if(S_ISREG(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = '-'; + else if(S_ISFIFO(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'p'; + else if(S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'l'; + else if(S_ISSOCK(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 's'; +#ifdef S_ISWHT + else if(S_ISWHT(st->st_mode)) + file->mode[0] = 'w'; +#endif + else + file->mode[0] = '?'; + { + char *x[] = { "---", "--x", "-w-", "-wx", + "r--", "r-x", "rw-", "rwx" }; + strcpy(file->mode + 1, x[(st->st_mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6]); + strcpy(file->mode + 4, x[(st->st_mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3]); + strcpy(file->mode + 7, x[(st->st_mode & S_IRWXO) >> 0]); + if((st->st_mode & S_ISUID)) { + if((st->st_mode & S_IXUSR)) + file->mode[3] = 's'; + else + file->mode[3] = 'S'; + } + if((st->st_mode & S_ISGID)) { + if((st->st_mode & S_IXGRP)) + file->mode[6] = 's'; + else + file->mode[6] = 'S'; + } + if((st->st_mode & S_ISTXT)) { + if((st->st_mode & S_IXOTH)) + file->mode[9] = 't'; + else + file->mode[9] = 'T'; + } + } + file->n_link = st->st_nlink; + { + struct passwd *pwd; + pwd = getpwuid(st->st_uid); + if(pwd == NULL) + asprintf(&file->user, "%u", (unsigned)st->st_uid); + else + file->user = strdup(pwd->pw_name); + } + { + struct group *grp; + grp = getgrgid(st->st_gid); + if(grp == NULL) + asprintf(&file->group, "%u", (unsigned)st->st_gid); + else + file->group = strdup(grp->gr_name); + } + + if(S_ISCHR(st->st_mode) || S_ISBLK(st->st_mode)) { +#if defined(major) && defined(minor) + asprintf(&file->major, "%u", (unsigned)major(st->st_rdev)); + asprintf(&file->minor, "%u", (unsigned)minor(st->st_rdev)); +#else + /* Don't want to use the DDI/DKI crap. */ + asprintf(&file->major, "%u", (unsigned)st->st_rdev); + asprintf(&file->minor, "%u", 0); +#endif + } else + asprintf(&file->size, "%lu", (unsigned long)st->st_size); + + { + time_t t = time(NULL); + struct tm *tm = localtime(&st->st_mtime); + if((t - st->st_mtime > 6*30*24*60*60) || + (st->st_mtime - t > 6*30*24*60*60)) + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%b %e %Y", tm); + else + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%b %e %H:%M", tm); + file->date = strdup(buf); + } + { + const char *p = strrchr(filename, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = filename; + file->filename = strdup(p); + } + if(S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) { + int n; + n = readlink((char *)filename, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if(n >= 0) { + buf[n] = '\0'; + file->link = strdup(buf); + } else + warn("%s: readlink", filename); + } +} + +static void +print_file(FILE *out, + int flags, + struct fileinfo *f, + int max_inode, + int max_bsize, + int max_n_link, + int max_user, + int max_group, + int max_size, + int max_major, + int max_minor, + int max_date) +{ + if(f->filename == NULL) + return; + + if(flags & LS_INODE) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*d", max_inode, f->inode); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + } + if(flags & LS_SIZE) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*d", max_bsize, f->bsize); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + } + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s", f->mode); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*d", max_n_link, f->n_link); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%-*s", max_user, f->user); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%-*s", max_group, f->group); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + if(f->major != NULL && f->minor != NULL) + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*s, %*s", max_major, f->major, max_minor, f->minor); + else + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*s", max_size, f->size); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%*s", max_date, f->date); + sec_fprintf2(out, " "); + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s", f->filename); + if(f->link) + sec_fprintf2(out, " -> %s", f->link); + sec_fprintf2(out, "\r\n"); +} + +static int +compare_filename(struct fileinfo *a, struct fileinfo *b) +{ + if(a->filename == NULL) + return 1; + if(b->filename == NULL) + return -1; + return strcmp(a->filename, b->filename); +} + +static int +compare_mtime(struct fileinfo *a, struct fileinfo *b) +{ + if(a->filename == NULL) + return 1; + if(b->filename == NULL) + return -1; + return a->st.st_mtime - b->st.st_mtime; +} + +static int +compare_size(struct fileinfo *a, struct fileinfo *b) +{ + if(a->filename == NULL) + return 1; + if(b->filename == NULL) + return -1; + return a->st.st_size - b->st.st_size; +} + +static void +list_dir(FILE *out, const char *directory, int flags); + +static int +log10(int num) +{ + int i = 1; + while(num > 10) { + i++; + num /= 10; + } + return i; +} + +/* + * Operate as lstat but fake up entries for AFS mount points so we don't + * have to fetch them. + */ + +static int +lstat_file (const char *file, struct stat *sb) +{ +#ifdef KRB4 + if (k_hasafs() + && strcmp(file, ".") + && strcmp(file, "..")) + { + struct ViceIoctl a_params; + char *last; + char *path_bkp; + static ino_t ino_counter = 0, ino_last = 0; + int ret; + const int maxsize = 2048; + + path_bkp = strdup (file); + if (path_bkp == NULL) + return -1; + + a_params.out = malloc (maxsize); + if (a_params.out == NULL) { + free (path_bkp); + return -1; + } + + /* If path contains more than the filename alone - split it */ + + last = strrchr (path_bkp, '/'); + if (last != NULL) { + *last = '\0'; + a_params.in = last + 1; + } else + a_params.in = (char *)file; + + a_params.in_size = strlen (a_params.in) + 1; + a_params.out_size = maxsize; + + ret = k_pioctl (last ? path_bkp : "." , + VIOC_AFS_STAT_MT_PT, &a_params, 0); + free (a_params.out); + if (ret < 0) { + free (path_bkp); + + if (errno != EINVAL) + return ret; + else + /* if we get EINVAL this is probably not a mountpoint */ + return lstat (file, sb); + } + + /* + * wow this was a mountpoint, lets cook the struct stat + * use . as a prototype + */ + + ret = lstat (path_bkp, sb); + free (path_bkp); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ino_last == sb->st_ino) + ino_counter++; + else { + ino_last = sb->st_ino; + ino_counter = 0; + } + sb->st_ino += ino_counter; + sb->st_nlink = 3; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + return lstat (file, sb); +} + +static void +list_files(FILE *out, const char **files, int n_files, int flags) +{ + struct fileinfo *fi; + int i; + + fi = calloc(n_files, sizeof(*fi)); + if (fi == NULL) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "ouf of memory\r\n"); + return; + } + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(lstat_file(files[i], &fi[i].st) < 0) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s: %s\r\n", files[i], strerror(errno)); + fi[i].filename = NULL; + } else { + if((flags & LS_DIRS) == 0 && S_ISDIR(fi[i].st.st_mode)) { + if(n_files > 1) + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s:\r\n", files[i]); + list_dir(out, files[i], flags); + } else { + make_fileinfo(files[i], &fi[i], flags); + } + } + } + switch(SORT_MODE(flags)) { + case LS_SORT_NAME: + qsort(fi, n_files, sizeof(*fi), + (int (*)(const void*, const void*))compare_filename); + break; + case LS_SORT_MTIME: + qsort(fi, n_files, sizeof(*fi), + (int (*)(const void*, const void*))compare_mtime); + break; + case LS_SORT_SIZE: + qsort(fi, n_files, sizeof(*fi), + (int (*)(const void*, const void*))compare_size); + break; + } + { + int max_inode = 0; + int max_bsize = 0; + int max_n_link = 0; + int max_user = 0; + int max_group = 0; + int max_size = 0; + int max_major = 0; + int max_minor = 0; + int max_date = 0; + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) { + if(fi[i].filename == NULL) + continue; + if(fi[i].inode > max_inode) + max_inode = fi[i].inode; + if(fi[i].bsize > max_bsize) + max_bsize = fi[i].bsize; + if(fi[i].n_link > max_n_link) + max_n_link = fi[i].n_link; + if(strlen(fi[i].user) > max_user) + max_user = strlen(fi[i].user); + if(strlen(fi[i].group) > max_group) + max_group = strlen(fi[i].group); + if(fi[i].major != NULL && strlen(fi[i].major) > max_major) + max_major = strlen(fi[i].major); + if(fi[i].minor != NULL && strlen(fi[i].minor) > max_minor) + max_minor = strlen(fi[i].minor); + if(fi[i].size != NULL && strlen(fi[i].size) > max_size) + max_size = strlen(fi[i].size); + if(strlen(fi[i].date) > max_date) + max_date = strlen(fi[i].date); + } + if(max_size < max_major + max_minor + 2) + max_size = max_major + max_minor + 2; + else if(max_size - max_minor - 2 > max_major) + max_major = max_size - max_minor - 2; + max_inode = log10(max_inode); + max_bsize = log10(max_bsize); + max_n_link = log10(max_n_link); + + if(flags & LS_SORT_REVERSE) + for(i = n_files - 1; i >= 0; i--) + print_file(out, + flags, + &fi[i], + max_inode, + max_bsize, + max_n_link, + max_user, + max_group, + max_size, + max_major, + max_minor, + max_date); + else + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) + print_file(out, + flags, + &fi[i], + max_inode, + max_bsize, + max_n_link, + max_user, + max_group, + max_size, + max_major, + max_minor, + max_date); + for(i = 0; i < n_files; i++) + free_fileinfo(&fi[i]); + free(fi); + } +} + +static void +free_files (char **files, int n) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + free (files[i]); + free (files); +} + +static void +list_dir(FILE *out, const char *directory, int flags) +{ + DIR *d = opendir(directory); + struct dirent *ent; + char **files = NULL; + int n_files = 0; + + if(d == NULL) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s: %s\r\n", directory, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + while((ent = readdir(d)) != NULL) { + void *tmp; + + if(ent->d_name[0] == '.') { + if (flags & LS_IGNORE_DOT) + continue; + if (ent->d_name[1] == 0) /* Ignore . */ + continue; + if (ent->d_name[1] == '.' && ent->d_name[2] == 0) /* Ignore .. */ + continue; + } + tmp = realloc(files, (n_files + 1) * sizeof(*files)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s: out of memory\r\n", directory); + free_files (files, n_files); + closedir (d); + return; + } + files = tmp; + asprintf(&files[n_files], "%s/%s", directory, ent->d_name); + if (files[n_files] == NULL) { + sec_fprintf2(out, "%s: out of memory\r\n", directory); + free_files (files, n_files); + closedir (d); + return; + } + ++n_files; + } + closedir(d); + list_files(out, (const char**)files, n_files, flags | LS_DIRS); +} + +void +builtin_ls(FILE *out, const char *file) +{ + int flags = LS_SORT_NAME; + + if(*file == '-') { + const char *p; + for(p = file + 1; *p; p++) { + switch(*p) { + case 'a': + case 'A': + flags &= ~LS_IGNORE_DOT; + break; + case 'C': + break; + case 'd': + flags |= LS_DIRS; + break; + case 'f': + flags = (flags & ~LS_SORT_MODE); + break; + case 'i': + flags |= flags | LS_INODE; + break; + case 'l': + break; + case 't': + flags = (flags & ~LS_SORT_MODE) | LS_SORT_MTIME; + break; + case 's': + flags |= LS_SIZE; + break; + case 'S': + flags = (flags & ~LS_SORT_MODE) | LS_SORT_SIZE; + break; + case 'r': + flags |= LS_SORT_REVERSE; + break; + } + } + file = "."; + } + list_files(out, &file, 1, flags); + sec_fflush(out); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff2041b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/pathnames.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)pathnames.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93 + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL +#define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#define _PATH_FTPUSERS "/etc/ftpusers" +#define _PATH_FTPCHROOT "/etc/ftpchroot" +#define _PATH_FTPWELCOME "/etc/ftpwelcome" +#define _PATH_FTPLOGINMESG "/etc/motd" + +#define _PATH_ISSUE "/etc/issue" +#define _PATH_ISSUE_NET "/etc/issue.net" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f36813 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/ftp/ftpd/popen.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software written by Ken Arnold and + * published in UNIX Review, Vol. 6, No. 8. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: popen.c,v 1.19 1999/09/16 20:38:45 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "extern.h" + +#include + +/* + * Special version of popen which avoids call to shell. This ensures + * no one may create a pipe to a hidden program as a side effect of a + * list or dir command. + */ +static int *pids; +static int fds; + +extern int dochroot; + +/* return path prepended with ~ftp if that file exists, otherwise + * return path unchanged + */ + +const char * +ftp_rooted(const char *path) +{ + static char home[MaxPathLen] = ""; + static char newpath[MaxPathLen]; + struct passwd *pwd; + + if(!home[0]) + if((pwd = k_getpwnam("ftp"))) + strlcpy(home, pwd->pw_dir, sizeof(home)); + snprintf(newpath, sizeof(newpath), "%s/%s", home, path); + if(access(newpath, X_OK)) + strlcpy(newpath, path, sizeof(newpath)); + return newpath; +} + + +FILE * +ftpd_popen(char *program, char *type, int do_stderr, int no_glob) +{ + char *cp; + FILE *iop; + int argc, gargc, pdes[2], pid; + char **pop, *argv[100], *gargv[1000]; + char *foo; + + if (strcmp(type, "r") && strcmp(type, "w")) + return (NULL); + + if (!pids) { + + /* This function is ugly and should be rewritten, in + * modern unices there is no such thing as a maximum + * filedescriptor. + */ + + fds = getdtablesize(); + pids = (int*)calloc(fds, sizeof(int)); + if(!pids) + return NULL; + } + if (pipe(pdes) < 0) + return (NULL); + + /* break up string into pieces */ + foo = NULL; + for (argc = 0, cp = program;; cp = NULL) { + if (!(argv[argc++] = strtok_r(cp, " \t\n", &foo))) + break; + } + + gargv[0] = (char*)ftp_rooted(argv[0]); + /* glob each piece */ + for (gargc = argc = 1; argv[argc]; argc++) { + glob_t gl; + int flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE; + + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + if (no_glob || glob(argv[argc], flags, NULL, &gl)) + gargv[gargc++] = strdup(argv[argc]); + else + for (pop = gl.gl_pathv; *pop; pop++) + gargv[gargc++] = strdup(*pop); + globfree(&gl); + } + gargv[gargc] = NULL; + + iop = NULL; + switch(pid = fork()) { + case -1: /* error */ + close(pdes[0]); + close(pdes[1]); + goto pfree; + /* NOTREACHED */ + case 0: /* child */ + if (*type == 'r') { + if (pdes[1] != STDOUT_FILENO) { + dup2(pdes[1], STDOUT_FILENO); + close(pdes[1]); + } + if(do_stderr) + dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO); + close(pdes[0]); + } else { + if (pdes[0] != STDIN_FILENO) { + dup2(pdes[0], STDIN_FILENO); + close(pdes[0]); + } + close(pdes[1]); + } + execv(gargv[0], gargv); + gargv[0] = argv[0]; + execv(gargv[0], gargv); + _exit(1); + } + /* parent; assume fdopen can't fail... */ + if (*type == 'r') { + iop = fdopen(pdes[0], type); + close(pdes[1]); + } else { + iop = fdopen(pdes[1], type); + close(pdes[0]); + } + pids[fileno(iop)] = pid; + +pfree: + for (argc = 1; gargv[argc] != NULL; argc++) + free(gargv[argc]); + + + return (iop); +} + +int +ftpd_pclose(FILE *iop) +{ + int fdes, status; + pid_t pid; + sigset_t sigset, osigset; + + /* + * pclose returns -1 if stream is not associated with a + * `popened' command, or, if already `pclosed'. + */ + if (pids == 0 || pids[fdes = fileno(iop)] == 0) + return (-1); + fclose(iop); + sigemptyset(&sigset); + sigaddset(&sigset, SIGINT); + sigaddset(&sigset, SIGQUIT); + sigaddset(&sigset, SIGHUP); + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, &osigset); + while ((pid = waitpid(pids[fdes], &status, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL); + pids[fdes] = 0; + if (pid < 0) + return (pid); + if (WIFEXITED(status)) + return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return (1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac0491f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * rkinit.c (doit_host): NAT work-around + * kauthd.c (doit): type correctness + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * kauthd.c: use getnameinfo instead of inaddr2str and inet_ntoa + +1999-08-31 Johan Danielsson + + * kauth.c: cleanup usage string; handle `kauth -h' gracefully + (print usage); add `-a' flag to get the ticket address (useful for + firewall configurations) + +Thu Apr 15 15:05:33 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * kauth.c: add `-v' + +Thu Mar 18 11:17:14 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Sun Nov 22 10:30:47 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Tue May 26 17:41:47 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kauth.c: use krb_enable_debug + +Fri May 1 07:15:18 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * rkinit.c: unifdef -DHAVE_H_ERRNO + +Thu Mar 19 16:07:18 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * kauth.c: Check for negative return value from krb_afslog(). + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5bf0fdaca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.7 1999/04/09 18:22:45 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = kauth +bin_SCRIPTS = ksrvtgt +libexec_PROGRAMS = kauthd + +EXTRA_DIST = zrefresh ksrvtgt.in + +kauth_SOURCES = \ + kauth.c \ + kauth.h \ + rkinit.c \ + marshall.c \ + encdata.c + +kauthd_SOURCES = \ + kauthd.c \ + kauth.h \ + marshall.c \ + encdata.c + +ksrvtgt: ksrvtgt.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/ksrvtgt.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +install-exec-local: + if test -f $(bindir)/zrefresh -o -r $(bindir)/zrefresh; then \ + true; \ + else \ + $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $(srcdir)/zrefresh $(bindir)/`echo zrefresh | sed '$(transform)'`; \ + fi + +LDADD = \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9c005f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,739 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.7 1999/04/09 18:22:45 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +bin_PROGRAMS = kauth +bin_SCRIPTS = ksrvtgt +libexec_PROGRAMS = kauthd + +EXTRA_DIST = zrefresh ksrvtgt.in + +kauth_SOURCES = kauth.c kauth.h rkinit.c marshall.c encdata.c + + +kauthd_SOURCES = kauthd.c kauth.h marshall.c encdata.c + + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) $(LIB_krb5) $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(LIB_roken) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +bin_PROGRAMS = kauth$(EXEEXT) +libexec_PROGRAMS = kauthd$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) $(libexec_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = 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s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +ksrvtgt: ksrvtgt.in + sed -e "s!%bindir%!$(bindir)!" $(srcdir)/ksrvtgt.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +install-exec-local: + if test -f $(bindir)/zrefresh -o -r $(bindir)/zrefresh; then \ + true; \ + else \ + $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $(srcdir)/zrefresh $(bindir)/`echo zrefresh | sed '$(transform)'`; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/encdata.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/encdata.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..886f549 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/encdata.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kauth.h" + +RCSID("$Id: encdata.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); + +int +write_encrypted (int fd, void *buf, size_t len, des_key_schedule schedule, + des_cblock *session, struct sockaddr_in *me, + struct sockaddr_in *him) +{ + void *outbuf; + int32_t outlen, l; + int i; + unsigned char tmp[4]; + + outbuf = malloc(len + 30); + if (outbuf == NULL) + return -1; + outlen = krb_mk_priv (buf, outbuf, len, schedule, session, me, him); + if (outlen < 0) { + free(outbuf); + return -1; + } + l = outlen; + for(i = 3; i >= 0; i--, l = l >> 8) + tmp[i] = l & 0xff; + if (krb_net_write (fd, tmp, 4) != 4 || + krb_net_write (fd, outbuf, outlen) != outlen) { + free(outbuf); + return -1; + } + + free(outbuf); + return 0; +} + + +int +read_encrypted (int fd, void *buf, size_t len, void **ret, + des_key_schedule schedule, des_cblock *session, + struct sockaddr_in *him, struct sockaddr_in *me) +{ + int status; + int32_t l; + MSG_DAT msg; + unsigned char tmp[4]; + + l = krb_net_read (fd, tmp, 4); + if (l != 4) + return l; + l = (tmp[0] << 24) | (tmp[1] << 16) | (tmp[2] << 8) | tmp[3]; + if (l > len) + return -1; + if (krb_net_read (fd, buf, l) != l) + return -1; + status = krb_rd_priv (buf, l, schedule, session, him, me, &msg); + if (status != RD_AP_OK) { + fprintf (stderr, "read_encrypted: %s\n", + krb_get_err_text(status)); + return -1; + } + *ret = msg.app_data; + return msg.app_length; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13448a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Little program that reads an srvtab or password and + * creates a suitable ticketfile and associated AFS tokens. + * + * If an optional command is given the command is executed in a + * new PAG and when the command exits the tickets are destroyed. + */ + +#include "kauth.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kauth.c,v 1.97 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); + +krb_principal princ; +static char srvtab[MaxPathLen]; +static int lifetime = DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE; +static char remote_tktfile[MaxPathLen]; +static char remoteuser[100]; +static char *cell = 0; + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "Usage:\n" + " %s [name]\n" + "or\n" + " %s [-ad] [-n name] [-r remoteuser] [-t remote ticketfile]\n" + " [-l lifetime (in minutes) ] [-f srvtab ] [-c AFS cell name ]\n" + " [-h hosts... [--]] [command ... ]\n\n", + __progname, __progname); + fprintf(stderr, + "A fully qualified name can be given: user[.instance][@realm]\n" + "Realm is converted to uppercase!\n"); + exit(1); +} + +#define EX_NOEXEC 126 +#define EX_NOTFOUND 127 + +static int +doexec(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret = simple_execvp(argv[0], argv); + if(ret == -2) + warn ("fork"); + if(ret == -3) + warn("waitpid"); + if(ret < 0) + return EX_NOEXEC; + if(ret == EX_NOEXEC || ret == EX_NOTFOUND) + warnx("Can't exec program ``%s''", argv[0]); + + return ret; +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +renew(int sig) +{ + int code; + + signal(SIGALRM, renew); + + code = krb_get_svc_in_tkt(princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, + princ.realm, lifetime, srvtab); + if (code) + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(code)); + else if (k_hasafs()) + { + if ((code = krb_afslog(cell, NULL)) != 0 && code != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) { + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(code)); + } + } + + alarm(krb_life_to_time(0, lifetime)/2 - 60); + SIGRETURN(0); +} + +static int +zrefresh(void) +{ + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + err (1, "Warning: Failed to fork zrefresh"); + return -1; + case 0: + /* Child */ + execlp("zrefresh", "zrefresh", 0); + execl(BINDIR "/zrefresh", "zrefresh", 0); + exit(1); + default: + /* Parent */ + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +key_to_key(const char *user, + char *instance, + const char *realm, + const void *arg, + des_cblock *key) +{ + memcpy(key, arg, sizeof(des_cblock)); + return 0; +} + +static int +get_ticket_address(krb_principal *princ, des_cblock *key) +{ + int code; + unsigned char flags; + krb_principal service; + u_int32_t addr; + struct in_addr addr2; + des_cblock session; + int life; + u_int32_t time_sec; + des_key_schedule schedule; + CREDENTIALS c; + + code = get_ad_tkt(princ->name, princ->instance, princ->realm, 0); + if(code) { + warnx("get_ad_tkt: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(code)); + return code; + } + code = krb_get_cred(princ->name, princ->instance, princ->realm, &c); + if(code) { + warnx("krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(code)); + return code; + } + + des_set_key(key, schedule); + code = decomp_ticket(&c.ticket_st, + &flags, + princ->name, + princ->instance, + princ->realm, + &addr, + session, + &life, + &time_sec, + service.name, + service.instance, + key, + schedule); + if(code) { + warnx("decomp_ticket: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(code)); + return code; + } + memset(&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + memset(schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + addr2.s_addr = addr; + fprintf(stdout, "ticket address = %s\n", inet_ntoa(addr2)); +} + + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int code, more_args; + int ret; + int c; + char *file; + int pflag = 0; + int aflag = 0; + int version_flag = 0; + char passwd[100]; + des_cblock key; + char **host; + int nhost; + char tf[MaxPathLen]; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if ((file = getenv("KRBTKFILE")) == 0) + file = TKT_FILE; + + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + memset(srvtab, 0, sizeof(srvtab)); + *remoteuser = '\0'; + nhost = 0; + host = NULL; + + /* Look for kerberos name */ + if (argc > 1 && + argv[1][0] != '-' && + krb_parse_name(argv[1], &princ) == 0) + { + argc--; argv++; + strupr(princ.realm); + } + + while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "ar:t:f:hdl:n:c:v")) != -1) + switch (c) { + case 'a': + aflag++; + break; + case 'd': + krb_enable_debug(); + _kafs_debug = 1; + aflag++; + break; + case 'f': + strlcpy(srvtab, optarg, sizeof(srvtab)); + break; + case 't': + strlcpy(remote_tktfile, optarg, sizeof(remote_tktfile)); + break; + case 'r': + strlcpy(remoteuser, optarg, sizeof(remoteuser)); + break; + case 'l': + lifetime = atoi(optarg); + if (lifetime == -1) + lifetime = 255; + else if (lifetime < 5) + lifetime = 1; + else + lifetime = krb_time_to_life(0, lifetime*60); + if (lifetime > 255) + lifetime = 255; + break; + case 'n': + if ((code = krb_parse_name(optarg, &princ)) != 0) { + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(code)); + usage(); + } + strupr(princ.realm); + pflag = 1; + break; + case 'c': + cell = optarg; + break; + case 'h': + host = argv + optind; + for(nhost = 0; optind < argc && *argv[optind] != '-'; ++optind) + ++nhost; + if(nhost == 0) + usage(); + break; + case 'v': + version_flag++; + print_version(NULL); + break; + case '?': + default: + usage(); + break; + } + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + if (princ.name[0] == '\0' && krb_get_default_principal (princ.name, + princ.instance, + princ.realm) < 0) + errx (1, "Could not get default principal"); + + /* With root tickets assume remote user is root */ + if (*remoteuser == '\0') { + if (strcmp(princ.instance, "root") == 0) + strlcpy(remoteuser, princ.instance, sizeof(remoteuser)); + else + strlcpy(remoteuser, princ.name, sizeof(remoteuser)); + } + + more_args = argc - optind; + + if (princ.realm[0] == '\0') + if (krb_get_lrealm(princ.realm, 1) != KSUCCESS) + strlcpy(princ.realm, KRB_REALM, REALM_SZ); + + if (more_args) { + int f; + + do{ + snprintf(tf, sizeof(tf), "%s%u_%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)getuid(), + (unsigned)(getpid()*time(0))); + f = open(tf, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR); + }while(f < 0); + close(f); + unlink(tf); + setenv("KRBTKFILE", tf, 1); + krb_set_tkt_string (tf); + } + + if (srvtab[0]) + { + signal(SIGALRM, renew); + + code = read_service_key (princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, 0, + srvtab, (char *)&key); + if (code == KSUCCESS) + code = krb_get_in_tkt(princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, + princ.realm, lifetime, + key_to_key, NULL, key); + alarm(krb_life_to_time(0, lifetime)/2 - 60); + } + else { + char prompt[128]; + + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's Password: ", krb_unparse_name(&princ)); + if (des_read_pw_string(passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, prompt, 0)){ + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + exit(1); + } + code = krb_get_pw_in_tkt2(princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, princ.realm, + lifetime, passwd, &key); + + memset(passwd, 0, sizeof(passwd)); + } + if (code) { + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + errx (1, "%s", krb_get_err_text(code)); + } + + if(aflag) + get_ticket_address(&princ, &key); + + if (k_hasafs()) { + if (more_args) + k_setpag(); + if ((code = krb_afslog(cell, NULL)) != 0 && code != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) { + if(code > 0) + warnx ("%s", krb_get_err_text(code)); + else + warnx ("failed to store AFS token"); + } + } + + for(ret = 0; nhost-- > 0; host++) + ret += rkinit(&princ, lifetime, remoteuser, remote_tktfile, &key, *host); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (more_args) { + ret = doexec(more_args, &argv[optind]); + dest_tkt(); + if (k_hasafs()) + k_unlog(); + } + else + zrefresh(); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32243c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauth.h @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kauth.h,v 1.21 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef SOCKS +#include +/* This doesn't belong here. */ +struct tm *localtime(const time_t *); +struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *); +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +#define KAUTH_PORT 2120 + +#define KAUTH_VERSION "RKINIT.0" + +int rkinit (krb_principal*, int, char*, char*, des_cblock*, char*); + +int write_encrypted (int, void*, size_t, des_key_schedule, + des_cblock*, struct sockaddr_in*, struct sockaddr_in*); + +int read_encrypted (int, void*, size_t, void **, des_key_schedule, + des_cblock*, struct sockaddr_in*, struct sockaddr_in*); + +int pack_args (char *, size_t, krb_principal*, int, const char*, const char*); + +int unpack_args (const char*, krb_principal*, int*, char*, char*); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauthd.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauthd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..520730a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/kauthd.c @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kauth.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kauthd.c,v 1.27 1999/12/06 16:46:05 assar Exp $"); + +krb_principal princ; +static char locuser[SNAME_SZ]; +static int lifetime; +static char tktfile[MaxPathLen]; + +struct remote_args { + int sock; + des_key_schedule *schedule; + des_cblock *session; + struct sockaddr_in *me, *her; +}; + +static int +decrypt_remote_tkt (const char *user, + const char *inst, + const char *realm, + const void *varg, + key_proc_t key_proc, + KTEXT *cipp) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + void *ptr; + int len; + KTEXT cip = *cipp; + struct remote_args *args = (struct remote_args *)varg; + + write_encrypted (args->sock, cip->dat, cip->length, + *args->schedule, args->session, args->me, + args->her); + len = read_encrypted (args->sock, buf, sizeof(buf), &ptr, *args->schedule, + args->session, args->her, args->me); + memcpy(cip->dat, ptr, cip->length); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit(int sock) +{ + int status; + KTEXT_ST ticket; + AUTH_DAT auth; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + struct sockaddr_in thisaddr, thataddr; + int addrlen; + int len; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + void *data; + struct passwd *passwd; + char version[KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN + 1]; + char remotehost[MaxHostNameLen]; + + addrlen = sizeof(thisaddr); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0 || + addrlen != sizeof(thisaddr)) { + return 1; + } + addrlen = sizeof(thataddr); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&thataddr, &addrlen) < 0 || + addrlen != sizeof(thataddr)) { + return 1; + } + + getnameinfo_verified ((struct sockaddr *)&thataddr, sizeof(thataddr), + remotehost, sizeof(remotehost), + NULL, 0, 0); + + k_getsockinst (sock, instance, sizeof(instance)); + status = krb_recvauth (KOPT_DO_MUTUAL, sock, &ticket, "rcmd", instance, + &thataddr, &thisaddr, &auth, "", schedule, + version); + if (status != KSUCCESS || + strncmp(version, KAUTH_VERSION, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) { + return 1; + } + len = read_encrypted (sock, buf, sizeof(buf), &data, schedule, + &auth.session, &thataddr, &thisaddr); + if (len < 0) { + write_encrypted (sock, "read_enc failed", + sizeof("read_enc failed") - 1, schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 1; + } + if (unpack_args(data, &princ, &lifetime, locuser, + tktfile)) { + write_encrypted (sock, "unpack_args failed", + sizeof("unpack_args failed") - 1, schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 1; + } + + if( kuserok(&auth, locuser) != 0) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s cannot get tickets for %s", + locuser, krb_unparse_name(&princ)); + syslog (LOG_ERR, buf); + write_encrypted (sock, buf, strlen(buf), schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 1; + } + passwd = k_getpwnam (locuser); + if (passwd == NULL) { + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "No user '%s'", locuser); + syslog (LOG_ERR, buf); + write_encrypted (sock, buf, strlen(buf), schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 1; + } + if (setgid (passwd->pw_gid) || + initgroups(passwd->pw_name, passwd->pw_gid) || + setuid(passwd->pw_uid)) { + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "Could not change user"); + syslog (LOG_ERR, buf); + write_encrypted (sock, buf, strlen(buf), schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 1; + } + write_encrypted (sock, "ok", sizeof("ok") - 1, schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + + if (*tktfile == 0) + snprintf(tktfile, sizeof(tktfile), "%s%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)getuid()); + krb_set_tkt_string (tktfile); + + { + struct remote_args arg; + + arg.sock = sock; + arg.schedule = &schedule; + arg.session = &auth.session; + arg.me = &thisaddr; + arg.her = &thataddr; + + status = krb_get_in_tkt (princ.name, princ.instance, princ.realm, + KRB_TICKET_GRANTING_TICKET, + princ.realm, + lifetime, NULL, decrypt_remote_tkt, &arg); + } + if (status == KSUCCESS) { + char remoteaddr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; + + getnameinfo ((struct sockaddr *)&thataddr, sizeof(thataddr), + remoteaddr, sizeof(remoteaddr), + NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); + + syslog (LOG_INFO, "from %s(%s): %s -> %s", + remotehost, remoteaddr, + locuser, + krb_unparse_name (&princ)); + write_encrypted (sock, "ok", sizeof("ok") - 1, schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 0; + } else { + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "TGT failed: %s", krb_get_err_text(status)); + syslog (LOG_NOTICE, buf); + write_encrypted (sock, buf, strlen(buf), schedule, + &auth.session, &thisaddr, &thataddr); + return 1; + } +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + openlog ("kauthd", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTH); + + if(argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "-i") == 0) + mini_inetd (k_getportbyname("kauth", "tcp", htons(KAUTH_PORT))); + return doit(STDIN_FILENO); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ksrvtgt.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ksrvtgt.in new file mode 100755 index 0000000..c2f33bb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/ksrvtgt.in @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# $Id: ksrvtgt.in,v 1.3 1997/09/13 03:39:03 joda Exp $ + +usage="Usage: `basename $0` name instance [[realm] srvtab]" + +if [ $# -lt 2 -o $# -gt 4 ]; then + echo "$usage" + exit 1 +fi + +srvtab="${4-${3-/etc/srvtab}}" +realm="${4+@$3}" + +%bindir%/kauth -n "$1.$2$realm" -l 5 -f "$srvtab" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/marshall.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/marshall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e37b8c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/marshall.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kauth.h" + +RCSID("$Id: marshall.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:31 joda Exp $"); + +int +pack_args (char *buf, + size_t sz, + krb_principal *pr, + int lifetime, + const char *locuser, + const char *tktfile) +{ + char *p = buf; + int len; + + p = buf; + + len = strlen(pr->name); + if (len >= sz) + return -1; + memcpy (p, pr->name, len + 1); + p += len + 1; + sz -= len + 1; + + len = strlen(pr->instance); + if (len >= sz) + return -1; + memcpy (p, pr->instance, len + 1); + p += len + 1; + sz -= len + 1; + + len = strlen(pr->realm); + if (len >= sz) + return -1; + memcpy(p, pr->realm, len + 1); + p += len + 1; + sz -= len + 1; + + if (sz < 1) + return -1; + *p++ = (unsigned char)lifetime; + + len = strlen(locuser); + if (len >= sz) + return -1; + memcpy (p, locuser, len + 1); + p += len + 1; + sz -= len + 1; + + len = strlen(tktfile); + if (len >= sz) + return -1; + memcpy (p, tktfile, len + 1); + p += len + 1; + sz -= len + 1; + + return p - buf; +} + +int +unpack_args (const char *buf, krb_principal *pr, int *lifetime, + char *locuser, char *tktfile) +{ + int len; + + len = strlen(buf); + if (len >= SNAME_SZ) + return -1; + strlcpy (pr->name, buf, ANAME_SZ); + buf += len + 1; + len = strlen (buf); + if (len >= INST_SZ) + return -1; + strlcpy (pr->instance, buf, INST_SZ); + buf += len + 1; + len = strlen (buf); + if (len >= REALM_SZ) + return -1; + strlcpy (pr->realm, buf, REALM_SZ); + buf += len + 1; + *lifetime = (unsigned char)*buf++; + len = strlen(buf); + if (len >= SNAME_SZ) + return -1; + strlcpy (locuser, buf, SNAME_SZ); + buf += len + 1; + len = strlen(buf); + if (len >= MaxPathLen) + return -1; + strlcpy (tktfile, buf, MaxPathLen); + buf += len + 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/rkinit.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/rkinit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4b07c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/rkinit.c @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kauth.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rkinit.c,v 1.23 1999/12/06 17:07:20 assar Exp $"); + +static struct in_addr * +getalladdrs (char *hostname, unsigned *count) +{ + struct hostent *hostent; + struct in_addr **h; + struct in_addr *addr; + unsigned naddr; + unsigned maxaddr; + + hostent = gethostbyname (hostname); + if (hostent == NULL) { + warnx ("gethostbyname '%s' failed: %s\n", + hostname, + hstrerror(h_errno)); + return NULL; + } + maxaddr = 1; + naddr = 0; + addr = malloc(sizeof(*addr) * maxaddr); + if (addr == NULL) { + warnx ("out of memory"); + return NULL; + } + for (h = (struct in_addr **)(hostent->h_addr_list); + *h != NULL; + h++) { + if (naddr >= maxaddr) { + maxaddr *= 2; + addr = realloc (addr, sizeof(*addr) * maxaddr); + if (addr == NULL) { + warnx ("out of memory"); + return NULL; + } + } + addr[naddr++] = **h; + } + addr = realloc (addr, sizeof(*addr) * naddr); + if (addr == NULL) { + warnx ("out of memory"); + return NULL; + } + *count = naddr; + return addr; +} + +static int +doit_host (krb_principal *princ, int lifetime, char *locuser, + char *tktfile, des_cblock *key, int s, char *hostname) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int inlen; + KTEXT_ST text; + CREDENTIALS cred; + MSG_DAT msg; + int status; + des_key_schedule schedule; + struct sockaddr_in thisaddr, thataddr; + int addrlen; + void *ret; + + addrlen = sizeof(thisaddr); + if (getsockname (s, (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0 || + addrlen != sizeof(thisaddr)) { + warn ("getsockname(%s)", hostname); + return 1; + } + addrlen = sizeof(thataddr); + if (getpeername (s, (struct sockaddr *)&thataddr, &addrlen) < 0 || + addrlen != sizeof(thataddr)) { + warn ("getpeername(%s)", hostname); + return 1; + } + + if (krb_get_config_bool("nat_in_use")) { + struct in_addr natAddr; + + if (krb_get_our_ip_for_realm(krb_realmofhost(hostname), + &natAddr) == KSUCCESS + || krb_get_our_ip_for_realm (NULL, &natAddr) == KSUCCESS) + thisaddr.sin_addr = natAddr; + } + + status = krb_sendauth (KOPT_DO_MUTUAL, s, &text, "rcmd", + hostname, krb_realmofhost (hostname), + getpid(), &msg, &cred, schedule, + &thisaddr, &thataddr, KAUTH_VERSION); + if (status != KSUCCESS) { + warnx ("%s: %s\n", hostname, krb_get_err_text(status)); + return 1; + } + inlen = pack_args (buf, sizeof(buf), + princ, lifetime, locuser, tktfile); + if (inlen < 0) { + warn ("cannot marshall arguments to %s", hostname); + return 1; + } + + if (write_encrypted(s, buf, inlen, schedule, &cred.session, + &thisaddr, &thataddr) < 0) { + warn ("write to %s", hostname); + return 1; + } + + inlen = read_encrypted (s, buf, sizeof(buf), &ret, schedule, + &cred.session, &thataddr, &thisaddr); + if (inlen < 0) { + warn ("read from %s failed", hostname); + return 1; + } + + if (strncmp(ret, "ok", inlen) != 0) { + warnx ("error from %s: %.*s\n", + hostname, inlen, (char *)ret); + return 1; + } + + inlen = read_encrypted (s, buf, sizeof(buf), &ret, schedule, + &cred.session, &thataddr, &thisaddr); + if (inlen < 0) { + warn ("read from %s", hostname); + return 1; + } + + { + des_key_schedule key_s; + + des_key_sched(key, key_s); + des_pcbc_encrypt(ret, ret, inlen, key_s, key, DES_DECRYPT); + memset(key_s, 0, sizeof(key_s)); + } + write_encrypted (s, ret, inlen, schedule, &cred.session, + &thisaddr, &thataddr); + + inlen = read_encrypted (s, buf, sizeof(buf), &ret, schedule, + &cred.session, &thataddr, &thisaddr); + if (inlen < 0) { + warn ("read from %s", hostname); + return 1; + } + + if (strncmp(ret, "ok", inlen) != 0) { + warnx ("error from %s: %.*s\n", + hostname, inlen, (char *)ret); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +int +rkinit (krb_principal *princ, int lifetime, char *locuser, + char *tktfile, des_cblock *key, char *hostname) +{ + struct in_addr *addr; + unsigned naddr; + unsigned i; + int port; + int success; + + addr = getalladdrs (hostname, &naddr); + if (addr == NULL) + return 1; + port = k_getportbyname ("kauth", "tcp", htons(KAUTH_PORT)); + success = 0; + for (i = 0; !success && i < naddr; ++i) { + struct sockaddr_in a; + int s; + + memset(&a, 0, sizeof(a)); + a.sin_family = AF_INET; + a.sin_port = port; + a.sin_addr = addr[i]; + + s = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) { + warn("socket"); + return 1; + } + if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&a, sizeof(a)) < 0) { + warn("connect(%s)", hostname); + continue; + } + + success = success || !doit_host (princ, lifetime, + locuser, tktfile, key, + s, hostname); + close (s); + } + return !success; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/zrefresh b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/zrefresh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..8347a1b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kauth/zrefresh @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# @(#) $Id: zrefresh,v 1.3 1996/06/09 19:21:59 joda Exp $ +# +# Substitute this script with a real zrefresh if running Zephyr. For +# instance: +# +# if [ -f "$WGFILE" ] ; then +# zctl load +# fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44b7069 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.1 1999/07/22 11:36:26 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +noinst_PROGRAMS = kf kfd + +kf_SOURCES = kf.c kf_locl.h + +kfd_SOURCES = kfd.c kf_locl.h + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c60810 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,626 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.1 1999/07/22 11:36:26 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = 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failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e85f94 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf.c @@ -0,0 +1,361 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kf_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kf.c,v 1.13 1999/12/04 18:04:09 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +const char *service = SERVICE; +const char *remote_name = NULL; +int forwardable = 0; +const char *ccache_name = NULL; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to connect to", "port" }, + { "login", 'l',arg_string, &remote_name,"remote login name","login"}, + { "ccache", 'c',arg_string, &ccache_name, "remote cred cache","ccache"}, + { "forwardable",'F',arg_flag,&forwardable, + "Forward forwardable credentials", NULL }, + { "forwardable",'G',arg_negative_flag,&forwardable, + "Don't forward forwardable credentials", NULL }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "hosts"); + exit(code); +} + +static int +client_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int port = 0; + int status; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + status = krb5_init_context (context); + if (status) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %u", status); + + forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool (*context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "forwardable", + NULL); + + if (getarg (args, num_args, *argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1, args, num_args); + + if(help_flag) + usage (0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, PORT, "tcp", PORT_NUM); + + if(*argc - optind < 1) + usage(1, args, num_args); + *argc = optind; + + return port; +} + +/* + * forward creds to `hostname'/`service' over `sock' + * return 0 iff OK + */ + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_data data_send; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_principal principal; + char ret_string[10]; + ssize_t n; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) { + krb5_warn(context, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + return 1; + } + + if (remote_name == NULL) { + remote_name = get_default_username (); + if (remote_name == NULL) + errx (1, "who are you?"); + } + + krb5_data_zero(&data_send); + data_send.data = (void *)remote_name; + data_send.length = strlen(remote_name) + 1; + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &data_send); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_write_message"); + return 1; + } + + if (ccache_name == NULL) + ccache_name = ""; + + data_send.data = (void *)ccache_name; + data_send.length = strlen(ccache_name)+1; + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &data_send); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_write_message"); + return 1; + } + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + status = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_cc_default"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + return 1; + } + + creds.client = principal; + + status = krb5_build_principal (context, + &creds.server, + strlen(principal->realm), + principal->realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + principal->realm, + NULL); + + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_build_principal"); + return 1; + } + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.forwarded = 1; + flags.b.forwardable = forwardable; + + status = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags.i, + hostname, + &creds, + &data); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_get_forwarded_creds"); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) { + krb5_warn (context, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + return 1; + } + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "krb5_net_write"); + return 1; + } + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "krb5_net_write"); + return 1; + } + + krb5_data_free (&data); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, &net_len, 4); + if (n == 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + return 1; + } + if (n < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + return 1; + } + len = ntohl(net_len); + if (len >= sizeof(ret_string)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "too long string back from %s", hostname); + return 1; + } + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, ret_string, len); + if (n == 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + return 1; + } + if (n < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + return 1; + } + ret_string[sizeof(ret_string) - 1] = '\0'; + + return(strcmp(ret_string,"ok")); +} + +static int +doit (const char *hostname, int port, const char *service) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + errx (1, "getaddrinfo(%s): %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return proto (s, hostname, service); + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int argcc,port,i; + int ret=0; + + argcc = argc; + port = client_setup(&context, &argcc, argv); + + for (i = argcc;i < argc; i++) { + ret = doit (argv[i], port, service); + warnx ("%s %s", argv[i], ret ? "failed" : "ok"); + } + return(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29f5941 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kf_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kf_locl.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:04:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define SERVICE "host" + +#define PORT "kf" +#define PORT_NUM 2110 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kfd.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kfd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ad434f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/kf/kfd.c @@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kf_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kfd.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:04:55 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; +char krb5_tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +char *service = SERVICE; +int do_inetd = 0; +static char *regpag_str=NULL; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "inetd",'i',arg_flag, &do_inetd, + "Not started from inetd", NULL }, + { "regpag",'R',arg_string,®pag_str,"path to regpag binary","regpag"}, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +static int +server_setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = 0; + int local_argc; + + local_argc = krb5_program_setup(context, argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + (*usage)(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str){ + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, PORT, "tcp", PORT_NUM); + + if(argv[local_argc] != NULL) + usage(1, args, num_args); + + return port; +} + +static void +syslog_and_die (const char *m, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, m); + vsyslog (LOG_ERR, m, args); + va_end(args); + exit (1); +} + +static void +syslog_and_cont (const char *m, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, m); + vsyslog (LOG_ERR, m, args); + va_end(args); + return; +} + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *name; + char ret_string[10]; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data remotename; + krb5_data tk_file; + + u_int32_t len, net_len; + krb5_ccache ccache; + char ccname[MAXPATHLEN]; + struct passwd *pwd; + ssize_t n; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_auth_con_init: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_auth_con_setaddr: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + if(gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + syslog_and_die("gethostname: %s",strerror(errno)); + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_sname_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_recvauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + server, + 0, + NULL, + &ticket); + if (status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_recvauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_unparse_name (context, + ticket->client, + &name); + if (status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_unparse_name: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status=krb5_read_message (context, &sock, &remotename); + if (status) { + syslog_and_die("krb5_read_message: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + } + status=krb5_read_message (context, &sock, &tk_file); + if (status) { + syslog_and_die("krb5_read_message: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + } + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, &net_len, 4); + if (n < 0) + syslog_and_die("krb5_net_read: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (n == 0) + syslog_and_die("EOF in krb5_net_read"); + + len = ntohl(net_len); + krb5_data_alloc (&packet, len); + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, packet.data, len); + if (n < 0) + syslog_and_die("krb5_net_read: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (n == 0) + syslog_and_die("EOF in krb5_net_read"); + + status = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) { + syslog_and_cont("krb5_rd_priv: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + goto out; + } + + pwd = getpwnam ((char *)(remotename.data)); + if (pwd == NULL) { + status=1; + syslog_and_cont("getpwnam: %s failed",(char *)(remotename.data)); + goto out; + } + + if(!krb5_kuserok (context, + ticket->client, + (char *)(remotename.data))) { + status=1; + syslog_and_cont("krb5_kuserok: permission denied"); + goto out; + } + + if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { + syslog_and_cont ("setgid: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if (setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0) { + syslog_and_cont ("setuid: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + if (tk_file.length != 1) + snprintf (ccname, sizeof(ccname), "%s", (char *)(tk_file.data)); + else + snprintf (ccname, sizeof(ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u",pwd->pw_uid); + + status = krb5_cc_resolve (context, ccname, &ccache); + if (status) { + syslog_and_cont("krb5_cc_resolve: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + goto out; + } + status = krb5_cc_initialize (context, ccache, ticket->client); + if (status) { + syslog_and_cont("krb5_cc_initialize: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + goto out; + } + status = krb5_rd_cred (context, auth_context, ccache, &data); + krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + if (status) { + syslog_and_cont("krb5_rd_cred: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + goto out; + + } + strlcpy(krb5_tkfile,ccname,sizeof(krb5_tkfile)); + syslog_and_cont("%s forwarded ticket to %s,%s", + name, + (char *)(remotename.data),ccname); +out: + if (status) { + strcpy(ret_string, "no"); + syslog_and_cont("failed"); + } else { + strcpy(ret_string, "ok"); + } + + krb5_data_free (&tk_file); + krb5_data_free (&remotename); + krb5_data_free (&packet); + krb5_data_free (&data); + free(name); + + len = strlen(ret_string) + 1; + net_len = htonl(len); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + return 1; + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, ret_string, len) != len) + return 1; + return status; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + if (do_inetd) + mini_inetd(port); + return proto (STDIN_FILENO, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port; + int ret; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + roken_openlog (argv[0], LOG_ODELAY | LOG_PID,LOG_AUTH); + port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + ret = doit (port, service); + closelog(); + if (ret == 0 && regpag_str != NULL) + ret = execl(regpag_str, "regpag", "-t", krb5_tkfile, "-r", NULL); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a751cae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * conf.c: remove case for not having cgetent, since it's in roken + +1999-11-05 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): conditionalize shadow stuff on getspnam + +1999-10-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (login_DEPENDENCIES): remove, it's not entirely + correct and was causing problems with non-GNU make + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (start_logout_proceess): don't examine `prog' before + setting it. + +1999-10-27 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (do_login): chown and chmod the tty. some clean-up. + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_start_session): correct the ccache to + krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_verify): use krb5_verify_user_lrealm + +1999-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: SGI capability mumbo-jumbo + +1999-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c (start_logout_process): call setproctitle + + * login_locl.h: declare struct spwd + + * login.c: add support for starting extra processes at login and + logout; always preserve TERM and TZ + + * conf.c: add configuration file support + +1999-08-07 Assar Westerlund + + * shadow.c (check_shadow): check for a NULL sp + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): move down login incorrect to disallow account + guessing + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * utmpx_login.c (utmpx_login): fix for Solaris. From Miroslav + Ruda + + * login_locl.h: add and some prototypes + + * login.c: fixes with v4 and shadow support. From Miroslav Ruda + + + * shadow.c: new file with functions for handling shadow passwords + + * Makefile.am: add shadow + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): generate a better tty name + +1999-05-25 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c (do_login): set $SHELL + +1999-05-18 Assar Westerlund + + * add login-access + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: copy the v5 ccache to a file after having done setuid + +1999-05-09 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (krb5_verify): check seteuid for errors + +Mon Apr 19 22:30:55 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c: conditionalize the kafs calls on KRB4 + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): add kafs + + * login.c: add support for getting afs tokens with v4 and v5 + +Sun Apr 18 14:12:28 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: check _PATH_NOLOGIN + + * login_locl.h: _PATH_NOLOGIN + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * login.c (main): use print_version + +Thu Apr 8 15:03:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER et.al. (moved to + config.h) + + * login_locl.h: include udb.h, sys/resource.h, and sys/category.h + +Sat Mar 27 17:58:37 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: osfc2.c + + * login.c: magic for OSF C2, and Crays + + * login_locl.h: do_osfc2_magic proto + + * osfc2.c: bsd_locl -> login_locl + + * osfc2.c: OSF C2 magic + +Tue Mar 23 14:17:40 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login_locl.h: _PATH_UTMP + +Sun Mar 21 15:02:31 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * login.c: `-h' is host, not help + +Sat Mar 20 00:11:13 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * login_locl.h: krb.h: add + + * login.c: static-size + (krb4_verify): add + +Thu Mar 18 11:36:10 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Thu Mar 11 17:53:36 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * utmpx_login.c: add some consts + + * utmp_login.c: add some consts + + * login.c: staticize + + * login_locl.h: add prototypes, and defaults for + _PATH_* + +Mon Mar 1 10:49:14 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * utmpx_login.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + + * utmp_login.c: HAVE_UT_* -> HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP*_UT_* + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22b4b62 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 1999/10/30 08:51:45 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = login + +login_SOURCES = \ + login.c \ + osfc2.c \ + read_string.c \ + utmp_login.c \ + utmpx_login.c \ + tty.c \ + stty_default.c \ + login_access.c \ + login_locl.h \ + login_proto.h \ + conf.c \ + shadow.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_security) + +$(srcdir)/login_protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o login_protos.h $(login_SOURCES) || rm -f login_protos.h + +$(login_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/login_protos.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10b75e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,645 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 1999/10/30 08:51:45 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +bin_PROGRAMS = login + +login_SOURCES = login.c osfc2.c read_string.c utmp_login.c utmpx_login.c tty.c stty_default.c login_access.c login_locl.h login_proto.h conf.c shadow.c + + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) $(LIB_security) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +bin_PROGRAMS = login$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +login_OBJECTS = login.$(OBJEXT) osfc2.$(OBJEXT) read_string.$(OBJEXT) \ +utmp_login.$(OBJEXT) utmpx_login.$(OBJEXT) tty.$(OBJEXT) \ +stty_default.$(OBJEXT) login_access.$(OBJEXT) conf.$(OBJEXT) \ +shadow.$(OBJEXT) +login_LDADD = $(LDADD) +@KRB4_TRUE@login_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@login_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +login_LDFLAGS = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +DIST_COMMON = ChangeLog Makefile.am Makefile.in + + +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) + +TAR = tar +GZIP_ENV = --best +SOURCES = $(login_SOURCES) +OBJECTS = $(login_OBJECTS) + +all: all-redirect +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .1 .3 .5 .8 .S .c .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .et .h .lo .o .obj .s .x +$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign appl/login/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +mostlyclean-binPROGRAMS: + +clean-binPROGRAMS: + -test -z "$(bin_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(bin_PROGRAMS) + +distclean-binPROGRAMS: + +maintainer-clean-binPROGRAMS: + +install-binPROGRAMS: $(bin_PROGRAMS) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) + @list='$(bin_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \ + if test -f $$p; then \ + echo " $(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'|sed '$(transform)'|sed 's/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`"; \ + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'|sed '$(transform)'|sed 's/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \ + else :; fi; \ + done + +uninstall-binPROGRAMS: + @$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL) + list='$(bin_PROGRAMS)'; 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cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o login_protos.h $(login_SOURCES) || rm -f login_protos.h + +$(login_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/login_protos.h + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/conf.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/conf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a4b2a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/conf.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: conf.c,v 1.2 1999/11/09 18:05:49 joda Exp $"); + +static char *confbuf; + +static int +login_conf_init(void) +{ + char *files[] = { _PATH_LOGIN_CONF, NULL }; + return cgetent(&confbuf, files, "default"); +} + +char * +login_conf_get_string(const char *str) +{ + char *value; + if(login_conf_init() != 0) + return NULL; + if(cgetstr(confbuf, str, &value) < 0) + return NULL; + return value; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a149449 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login.c @@ -0,0 +1,730 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_CAPABILITY_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: login.c,v 1.33 1999/12/02 17:04:55 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * the environment we will send to execle and the shell. + */ + +static char **env; +static int num_env; + +static void +extend_env(char *str) +{ + env = realloc(env, (num_env + 1) * sizeof(*env)); + if(env == NULL) + errx(1, "Out of memory!"); + env[num_env++] = str; +} + +static void +add_env(const char *var, const char *value) +{ + int i; + char *str; + asprintf(&str, "%s=%s", var, value); + if(str == NULL) + errx(1, "Out of memory!"); + for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) + if(strncmp(env[i], var, strlen(var)) == 0 && + env[i][strlen(var)] == '='){ + free(env[i]); + env[i] = str; + return; + } + + extend_env(str); +} + +static void +copy_env(void) +{ + char **p; + for(p = environ; *p; p++) + extend_env(*p); +} + +static int +start_login_process(void) +{ + char *prog, *argv0; + prog = login_conf_get_string("login_program"); + if(prog == NULL) + return 0; + argv0 = strrchr(prog, '/'); + + if(argv0) + argv0++; + else + argv0 = prog; + + return simple_execle(prog, argv0, NULL, env); +} + +static int +start_logout_process(void) +{ + char *prog, *argv0; + pid_t pid; + + prog = login_conf_get_string("logout_program"); + if(prog == NULL) + return 0; + argv0 = strrchr(prog, '/'); + + if(argv0) + argv0++; + else + argv0 = prog; + + pid = fork(); + if(pid == 0) + return 0; + if(pid == -1) + err(1, "fork"); + /* wait for the real login process to exit */ +#ifdef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + setproctitle("waitpid %d", pid); +#endif + while(1) { + int status; + int ret; + ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if(ret > 0) { + if(WIFEXITED(status) || WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + execle(prog, argv0, NULL, env); + err(1, "exec %s", prog); + } + } else if(ret < 0) + err(1, "waitpid"); + } +} + +static void +exec_shell(const char *shell, int fallback) +{ + char *sh; + const char *p; + + extend_env(NULL); + if(start_login_process() < 0) + warn("login process"); + start_logout_process(); + + p = strrchr(shell, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = shell; + asprintf(&sh, "-%s", p); + execle(shell, sh, NULL, env); + if(fallback){ + warnx("Can't exec %s, trying %s", + shell, _PATH_BSHELL); + execle(_PATH_BSHELL, "-sh", NULL, env); + err(1, "%s", _PATH_BSHELL); + } + err(1, "%s", shell); +} + +static enum { AUTH_KRB4, AUTH_KRB5 } auth; + +#ifdef KRB5 +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_ccache id, id2; + +static int +krb5_verify(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + return 1; + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, pwd->pw_name, &princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return 1; + } + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &id); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + krb5_free_context(context); + return 1; + } + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(context, + princ, + id, + password, + 1, + NULL); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + if (ret) + krb5_free_context (context); + return ret; +} + +static int +krb5_start_session (const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char residual[64]; + + /* copy credentials to file cache */ + snprintf(residual, sizeof(residual), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u", + (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid); + krb5_cc_resolve(context, residual, &id2); + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache(context, id, id2); + if (ret == 0) + add_env("KRB5CCNAME", residual); + else { + krb5_cc_destroy (context, id2); + return ret; + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if (krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "krb4_get_tickets", + NULL)) { + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + krb5_realm realm; + char krb4tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; + + krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); + krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, realm, + "krbtgt", + realm, + NULL); + free (realm); + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, id2, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(context, id2, &cred, &c); + if(ret == 0) { + snprintf(krb4tkfile,sizeof(krb4tkfile),"%s%d",TKT_ROOT, + getuid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(krb4tkfile); + tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + } + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + } + krb5_free_principal(context, mcred.server); + } +#endif + krb5_cc_close(context, id2); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, id); + return 0; +} + +static void +krb5_finish (void) +{ + krb5_free_context(context); +} + +#ifdef KRB4 + +static int pag_set = 0; + +static void +krb5_get_afs_tokens (const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + char cell[64]; + char *pw_dir; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if (!k_hasafs ()) + return; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + return; + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id2); + + if (ret == 0) { + pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir; + + if (!pag_set) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set = 1; + } + + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id2, + cell, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id2, NULL, NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_cc_close (context, id2); + } + krb5_free_context (context); +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef KRB4 + +static int +krb4_verify(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + char lrealm[REALM_SZ]; + int ret; + char ticket_file[MaxPathLen]; + + ret = krb_get_lrealm (lrealm, 1); + if (ret) + return 1; + + snprintf (ticket_file, sizeof(ticket_file), + "%s%u_%u", + TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid, (unsigned)getpid()); + + krb_set_tkt_string (ticket_file); + + ret = krb_verify_user (pwd->pw_name, "", lrealm, (char *)password, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL, NULL); + if (ret) + return 1; + + if (chown (ticket_file, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { + dest_tkt(); + return 1; + } + + add_env ("KRBTKFILE", ticket_file); + return 0; +} + +static void +krb4_get_afs_tokens (const struct passwd *pwd) +{ + char cell[64]; + char *pw_dir; + + if (!k_hasafs ()) + return; + + pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir; + + if (!pag_set) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set = 1; + } + + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog_uid_home (cell, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + + krb_afslog_uid_home (NULL, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +static int f_flag; +static int p_flag; +static int r_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +static char *remote_host; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#if 0 + { NULL, 'a' }, + { NULL, 'd' }, +#endif + { NULL, 'f', arg_flag, &f_flag, "pre-authenticated" }, + { NULL, 'h', arg_string, &remote_host, "remote host", "hostname" }, + { NULL, 'p', arg_flag, &p_flag, "don't purge environment" }, +#if 0 + { NULL, 'r', arg_flag, &r_flag, "rlogin protocol" }, +#endif + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag,&help_flag, } +}; + +int nargs = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +update_utmp(const char *username, const char *hostname, + char *tty, char *ttyn) +{ + /* + * Update the utmp files, both BSD and SYSV style. + */ + if (utmpx_login(tty, username, hostname) != 0 && !f_flag) { + printf("No utmpx entry. You must exec \"login\" from the " + "lowest level shell.\n"); + exit(1); + } + utmp_login(ttyn, username, hostname); +} + +static void +checknologin(void) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[1024]; + + f = fopen(_PATH_NOLOGIN, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return; + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stdout); + fclose(f); + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Actually log in the user. `pwd' contains all the relevant + * information about the user. `ttyn' is the complete name of the tty + * and `tty' the short name. + */ + +static void +do_login(const struct passwd *pwd, char *tty, char *ttyn) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + struct spwd *sp; +#endif + int rootlogin = (pwd->pw_uid == 0); + gid_t tty_gid; + struct group *gr; + const char *home_dir; + + if(!rootlogin) + checknologin(); + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + sp = getspnam(pwd->pw_name); +#endif + + update_utmp(pwd->pw_name, remote_host ? remote_host : "", + tty, ttyn); + + gr = getgrnam ("tty"); + if (gr != NULL) + tty_gid = gr->gr_gid; + else + tty_gid = pwd->pw_gid; + + if (chown (ttyn, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) { + warn("chown %s", ttyn); + if (rootlogin == 0) + exit (1); + } + + if (chmod (ttyn, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP) < 0) { + warn("chmod %s", ttyn); + if (rootlogin == 0) + exit (1); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOGIN + if(setlogin(pwd->pw_name)){ + warn("setlogin(%s)", pwd->pw_name); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS + if(initgroups(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid)){ + warn("initgroups(%s, %u)", pwd->pw_name, (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } +#endif + if(setgid(pwd->pw_gid)){ + warn("setgid(%u)", (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } + if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid)){ + warn("setuid(%u)", (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid); + if(rootlogin == 0) + exit(1); + } + /* all kinds of different magic */ + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + check_shadow(pwd, sp); +#endif + + if(do_osfc2_magic(pwd->pw_uid)) + exit(1); +#if defined(HAVE_GETUDBNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETLIM) + { + struct udb *udb; + long t; + const long maxcpu = 46116860184; /* some random constant */ + udb = getudbnam(pwd->pw_name); + if(udb == UDB_NULL) + errx(1, "Failed to get UDB entry."); + t = udb->ue_pcpulim[UDBRC_INTER]; + if(t == 0 || t > maxcpu) + t = CPUUNLIM; + else + t *= 100 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC; + + if(limit(C_PROC, 0, L_CPU, t) < 0) + warn("limit C_PROC"); + + t = udb->ue_jcpulim[UDBRC_INTER]; + if(t == 0 || t > maxcpu) + t = CPUUNLIM; + else + t *= 100 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC; + + if(limit(C_JOBPROCS, 0, L_CPU, t) < 0) + warn("limit C_JOBPROCS"); + + nice(udb->ue_nice[UDBRC_INTER]); + } +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SGI_GETCAPABILITYBYNAME) && defined(HAVE_CAP_SET_PROC) + /* XXX SGI capability hack IRIX 6.x (x >= 0?) has something + called capabilities, that allow you to give away + permissions (such as chown) to specific processes. From 6.5 + this is default on, and the default capability set seems to + not always be the empty set. The problem is that the + runtime linker refuses to do just about anything if the + process has *any* capabilities set, so we have to remove + them here (unless otherwise instructed by /etc/capability). + In IRIX < 6.5, these functions was called sgi_cap_setproc, + etc, but we ignore this fact (it works anyway). */ + { + struct user_cap *ucap = sgi_getcapabilitybyname(pwd->pw_name); + cap_t cap; + if(ucap == NULL) + cap = cap_from_text("all="); + else + cap = cap_from_text(ucap->ca_default); + if(cap == NULL) + err(1, "cap_from_text"); + if(cap_set_proc(cap) < 0) + err(1, "cap_set_proc"); + cap_free(cap); + free(ucap); + } +#endif + home_dir = pwd->pw_dir; + if (chdir(home_dir) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "No home directory \"%s\"!\n", pwd->pw_dir); + if (chdir("/")) + exit(0); + home_dir = "/"; + fprintf(stderr, "Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"); + } +#ifdef KRB5 + if (auth == AUTH_KRB5) { + krb5_start_session (pwd); + krb5_finish (); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + krb5_get_afs_tokens (pwd); +#endif /* KRB4 */ +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#ifdef KRB4 + krb4_get_afs_tokens (pwd); +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + add_env("HOME", home_dir); + add_env("USER", pwd->pw_name); + add_env("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name); + add_env("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell); + exec_shell(pwd->pw_shell, rootlogin); +} + +static int +check_password(struct passwd *pwd, const char *password) +{ + if(pwd->pw_passwd == NULL) + return 1; + if(pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '\0'){ +#ifdef ALLOW_NULL_PASSWORD + return password[0] != '\0'; +#else + return 1; +#endif + } + if(strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) == 0) + return 0; +#ifdef KRB5 + if(krb5_verify(pwd, password) == 0) { + auth = AUTH_KRB5; + return 0; + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if (krb4_verify (pwd, password) == 0) { + auth = AUTH_KRB4; + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +static void +usage(int status) +{ + arg_printusage(args, nargs, NULL, "[username]"); + exit(status); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int max_tries = 5; + int try; + + char username[32]; + int optind = 0; + + int ask = 1; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTH); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if (version_flag) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (geteuid() != 0) + errx(1, "only root may use login, use su"); + + /* Default tty settings. */ + stty_default(); + + if(p_flag) + copy_env(); + else { + /* this set of variables is always preserved by BSD login */ + if(getenv("TERM")) + add_env("TERM", getenv("TERM")); + if(getenv("TZ")) + add_env("TZ", getenv("TZ")); + } + + if(*argv){ + if(strchr(*argv, '=') == NULL && strcmp(*argv, "-") != 0){ + strlcpy (username, *argv, sizeof(username)); + ask = 0; + } + } + /* XXX should we care about environment on the command line? */ + for(try = 0; try < max_tries; try++){ + struct passwd *pwd; + char password[128]; + int ret; + char ttname[32]; + char *tty, *ttyn; + + if(ask){ + f_flag = r_flag = 0; + ret = read_string("login: ", username, sizeof(username), 1); + if(ret == -3) + exit(0); + if(ret == -2) + continue; + } + pwd = k_getpwnam(username); +#ifdef ALLOW_NULL_PASSWORD + if (pwd != NULL && (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '\0')) { + strcpy(password,""); + } + else +#endif + if(f_flag == 0) { + ret = read_string("Password: ", password, sizeof(password), 0); + if(ret == -3 || ret == -2) + continue; + } + + if(pwd == NULL){ + fprintf(stderr, "Login incorrect.\n"); + ask = 1; + continue; + } + + if(f_flag == 0 && check_password(pwd, password)){ + fprintf(stderr, "Login incorrect.\n"); + ask = 1; + continue; + } + ttyn = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO); + if(ttyn == NULL){ + snprintf(ttname, sizeof(ttname), "%s??", _PATH_TTY); + ttyn = ttname; + } + if (strncmp (ttyn, _PATH_DEV, strlen(_PATH_DEV)) == 0) + tty = ttyn + strlen(_PATH_DEV); + else + tty = ttyn; + + if (login_access (pwd, remote_host ? remote_host : tty) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Permission denied\n"); + if (remote_host) + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s LOGIN REFUSED FROM %s", + pwd->pw_name, remote_host); + else + syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s LOGIN REFUSED ON %s", + pwd->pw_name, tty); + exit (1); + } + do_login(pwd, tty, ttyn); + } + exit(1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_access.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_access.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86d691e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_access.c @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ + /* + * This module implements a simple but effective form of login access + * control based on login names and on host (or domain) names, internet + * addresses (or network numbers), or on terminal line names in case of + * non-networked logins. Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). + * + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: login_access.c,v 1.1 1999/05/17 22:40:05 assar Exp $"); + + /* Delimiters for fields and for lists of users, ttys or hosts. */ + +static char fs[] = ":"; /* field separator */ +static char sep[] = ", \t"; /* list-element separator */ + + /* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */ + +#define YES 1 +#define NO 0 + + /* + * A structure to bundle up all login-related information to keep the + * functional interfaces as generic as possible. + */ +struct login_info { + struct passwd *user; + char *from; +}; + +static int list_match(char *list, struct login_info *item, + int (*match_fn)(char *, struct login_info *)); +static int user_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item); +static int from_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item); +static int string_match(char *tok, char *string); + +/* login_access - match username/group and host/tty with access control file */ + +int login_access(struct passwd *user, char *from) +{ + struct login_info item; + FILE *fp; + char line[BUFSIZ]; + char *perm; /* becomes permission field */ + char *users; /* becomes list of login names */ + char *froms; /* becomes list of terminals or hosts */ + int match = NO; + int end; + int lineno = 0; /* for diagnostics */ + char *foo; + + /* + * Bundle up the arguments to avoid unnecessary clumsiness lateron. + */ + item.user = user; + item.from = from; + + /* + * Process the table one line at a time and stop at the first match. + * Blank lines and lines that begin with a '#' character are ignored. + * Non-comment lines are broken at the ':' character. All fields are + * mandatory. The first field should be a "+" or "-" character. A + * non-existing table means no access control. + */ + + if ((fp = fopen(_PATH_LOGACCESS, "r")) != 0) { + while (!match && fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) { + lineno++; + if (line[end = strlen(line) - 1] != '\n') { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: line %d: missing newline or line too long", + _PATH_LOGACCESS, lineno); + continue; + } + if (line[0] == '#') + continue; /* comment line */ + while (end > 0 && isspace((unsigned char)line[end - 1])) + end--; + line[end] = 0; /* strip trailing whitespace */ + if (line[0] == 0) /* skip blank lines */ + continue; + foo = NULL; + if (!(perm = strtok_r(line, fs, &foo)) + || !(users = strtok_r(NULL, fs, &foo)) + || !(froms = strtok_r(NULL, fs, &foo)) + || strtok_r(NULL, fs, &foo)) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: line %d: bad field count", + _PATH_LOGACCESS, + lineno); + continue; + } + if (perm[0] != '+' && perm[0] != '-') { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: line %d: bad first field", + _PATH_LOGACCESS, + lineno); + continue; + } + match = (list_match(froms, &item, from_match) + && list_match(users, &item, user_match)); + } + fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot open %s: %m", _PATH_LOGACCESS); + } + return (match == 0 || (line[0] == '+')); +} + +/* list_match - match an item against a list of tokens with exceptions */ + +static int +list_match(char *list, + struct login_info *item, + int (*match_fn)(char *, struct login_info *)) +{ + char *tok; + int match = NO; + char *foo = NULL; + + /* + * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches + * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find + * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether + * the match is affected by any exceptions. + */ + + for (tok = strtok_r(list, sep, &foo); + tok != NULL; + tok = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &foo)) { + if (strcasecmp(tok, "EXCEPT") == 0) /* EXCEPT: give up */ + break; + if ((match = (*match_fn) (tok, item)) != 0) /* YES */ + break; + } + /* Process exceptions to matches. */ + + if (match != NO) { + while ((tok = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &foo)) && strcasecmp(tok, "EXCEPT")) + /* VOID */ ; + if (tok == 0 || list_match(NULL, item, match_fn) == NO) + return (match); + } + return (NO); +} + +/* myhostname - figure out local machine name */ + +static char *myhostname(void) +{ + static char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1] = ""; + + if (name[0] == 0) { + gethostname(name, sizeof(name)); + name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = 0; + } + return (name); +} + +/* netgroup_match - match group against machine or user */ + +static int netgroup_match(char *group, char *machine, char *user) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN + static char *mydomain = 0; + + if (mydomain == 0) + yp_get_default_domain(&mydomain); + return (innetgr(group, machine, user, mydomain)); +#else + syslog(LOG_ERR, "NIS netgroup support not configured"); + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* user_match - match a username against one token */ + +static int user_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item) +{ + char *string = item->user->pw_name; + struct login_info fake_item; + struct group *group; + int i; + char *at; + + /* + * If a token has the magic value "ALL" the match always succeeds. + * Otherwise, return YES if the token fully matches the username, if the + * token is a group that contains the username, or if the token is the + * name of the user's primary group. + */ + + if ((at = strchr(tok + 1, '@')) != 0) { /* split user@host pattern */ + *at = 0; + fake_item.from = myhostname(); + return (user_match(tok, item) && from_match(at + 1, &fake_item)); + } else if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup */ + return (netgroup_match(tok + 1, (char *) 0, string)); + } else if (string_match(tok, string)) { /* ALL or exact match */ + return (YES); + } else if ((group = getgrnam(tok)) != 0) { /* try group membership */ + if (item->user->pw_gid == group->gr_gid) + return (YES); + for (i = 0; group->gr_mem[i]; i++) + if (strcasecmp(string, group->gr_mem[i]) == 0) + return (YES); + } + return (NO); +} + +/* from_match - match a host or tty against a list of tokens */ + +static int from_match(char *tok, struct login_info *item) +{ + char *string = item->from; + int tok_len; + int str_len; + + /* + * If a token has the magic value "ALL" the match always succeeds. Return + * YES if the token fully matches the string. If the token is a domain + * name, return YES if it matches the last fields of the string. If the + * token has the magic value "LOCAL", return YES if the string does not + * contain a "." character. If the token is a network number, return YES + * if it matches the head of the string. + */ + + if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup */ + return (netgroup_match(tok + 1, string, (char *) 0)); + } else if (string_match(tok, string)) { /* ALL or exact match */ + return (YES); + } else if (tok[0] == '.') { /* domain: match last fields */ + if ((str_len = strlen(string)) > (tok_len = strlen(tok)) + && strcasecmp(tok, string + str_len - tok_len) == 0) + return (YES); + } else if (strcasecmp(tok, "LOCAL") == 0) { /* local: no dots */ + if (strchr(string, '.') == 0) + return (YES); + } else if (tok[(tok_len = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.' /* network */ + && strncmp(tok, string, tok_len) == 0) { + return (YES); + } + return (NO); +} + +/* string_match - match a string against one token */ + +static int string_match(char *tok, char *string) +{ + + /* + * If the token has the magic value "ALL" the match always succeeds. + * Otherwise, return YES if the token fully matches the string. + */ + + if (strcasecmp(tok, "ALL") == 0) { /* all: always matches */ + return (YES); + } else if (strcasecmp(tok, string) == 0) { /* try exact match */ + return (YES); + } + return (NO); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d2f7fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: login_locl.h,v 1.17 1999/12/02 17:04:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __LOGIN_LOCL_H__ +#define __LOGIN_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CATEGORY_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_TTY +#define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_DEV +#define _PATH_DEV "/dev/" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_WTMP +#ifdef WTMP_FILE +#define _PATH_WTMP WTMP_FILE +#else +#define _PATH_WTMP "/var/adm/wtmp" +#endif +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_UTMP +#ifdef UTMP_FILE +#define _PATH_UTMP UTMP_FILE +#else +#define _PATH_UTMP "/var/adm/utmp" +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_LOGACCESS +#define _PATH_LOGACCESS "/etc/login.access" +#endif /* _PATH_LOGACCESS */ + +#ifndef _PATH_LOGIN_CONF +#define _PATH_LOGIN_CONF "/etc/login.conf" +#endif /* _PATH_LOGIN_CONF */ + +struct spwd; + +#include "login_protos.h" + +#endif /* __LOGIN_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_protos.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..173acc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/login_protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __login_protos_h__ +#define __login_protos_h__ + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +void +check_shadow __P(( + const struct passwd *pw, + const struct spwd *sp)); + +char * +clean_ttyname __P((char *tty)); + +int +do_osfc2_magic __P((uid_t uid)); + +int +login_access __P(( + struct passwd *user, + char *from)); + +char * +login_conf_get_string __P((const char *str)); + +char * +make_id __P((char *tty)); + +void +prepare_utmp __P(( + struct utmp *utmp, + char *tty, + const char *username, + const char *hostname)); + +int +read_string __P(( + const char *prompt, + char *buf, + size_t len, + int echo)); + +void +stty_default __P((void)); + +void +utmp_login __P(( + char *tty, + const char *username, + const char *hostname)); + +int +utmpx_login __P(( + char *line, + const char *user, + const char *host)); + +#endif /* __login_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/osfc2.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/osfc2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d4d087 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/osfc2.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: osfc2.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +int +do_osfc2_magic(uid_t uid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OSFC2 + struct es_passwd *epw; + char *argv[2]; + + /* fake */ + argv[0] = (char*)__progname; + argv[1] = NULL; + set_auth_parameters(1, argv); + + epw = getespwuid(uid); + if(epw == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_AUTHPRIV|LOG_NOTICE, + "getespwuid failed for %d", uid); + printf("Sorry.\n"); + return 1; + } + /* We don't check for auto-retired, foo-retired, + bar-retired, or any other kind of retired accounts + here; neither do we check for time-locked accounts, or + any other kind of serious C2 mumbo-jumbo. We do, + however, call setluid, since failing to do so is not + very good (take my word for it). */ + + if(!epw->uflg->fg_uid) { + syslog(LOG_AUTHPRIV|LOG_NOTICE, + "attempted login by %s (has no uid)", epw->ufld->fd_name); + printf("Sorry.\n"); + return 1; + } + setluid(epw->ufld->fd_uid); + if(getluid() != epw->ufld->fd_uid) { + syslog(LOG_AUTHPRIV|LOG_NOTICE, + "failed to set LUID for %s (%d)", + epw->ufld->fd_name, epw->ufld->fd_uid); + printf("Sorry.\n"); + return 1; + } +#endif /* HAVE_OSFC2 */ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/read_string.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/read_string.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c4b66b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/read_string.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: read_string.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +static sig_atomic_t intr_flag; + +static void +intr(int sig) +{ + intr_flag++; +} + +int +read_string(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t len, int echo) +{ + struct sigaction sigs[47]; + struct sigaction sa; + FILE *tty; + int ret = 0; + int of = 0; + int i; + int c; + char *p; + + struct termios t_new, t_old; + + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sa.sa_handler = intr; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(sigs) / sizeof(sigs[0]); i++) + sigaction(i, &sa, &sigs[i]); + + if((tty = fopen("/dev/tty", "r")) == NULL) + tty = stdin; + + fprintf(stderr, "%s", prompt); + fflush(stderr); + + if(echo == 0){ + tcgetattr(fileno(tty), &t_old); + memcpy(&t_new, &t_old, sizeof(t_new)); + t_new.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; + tcsetattr(fileno(tty), TCSANOW, &t_new); + } + intr_flag = 0; + p = buf; + while(intr_flag == 0){ + c = getc(tty); + if(c == EOF){ + if(!ferror(tty)) + ret = 1; + break; + } + if(c == '\n') + break; + if(of == 0) + *p++ = c; + of = (p == buf + len); + } + if(of) + p--; + *p = 0; + + if(echo == 0){ + printf("\n"); + tcsetattr(fileno(tty), TCSANOW, &t_old); + } + + if(tty != stdin) + fclose(tty); + + for(i = 0; i < sizeof(sigs) / sizeof(sigs[0]); i++) + sigaction(i, &sigs[i], NULL); + + if(ret) + return -3; + if(intr_flag) + return -2; + if(of) + return -1; + return 0; +} + + +#if 0 +int main() +{ + char s[128]; + int ret; + ret = read_string("foo: ", s, sizeof(s), 0); + printf("%d ->%s<-\n", ret, s); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/shadow.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/shadow.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0923831 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/shadow.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: shadow.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H + +#ifndef _PATH_CHPASS +#define _PATH_CHPASS "/usr/bin/passwd" +#endif + +static int +change_passwd(const struct passwd *who) +{ + int status; + pid_t pid; + + switch (pid = fork()) { + case -1: + printf("fork /bin/passwd"); + exit(1); + case 0: + execlp(_PATH_CHPASS, "passwd", who->pw_name, (char *) 0); + exit(1); + default: + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + return (status); + } +} + +void +check_shadow(const struct passwd *pw, const struct spwd *sp) +{ + long today; + + today = time(0)/(24L * 60 * 60); + + if (sp == NULL) + return; + + if (sp->sp_expire > 0) { + if (today >= sp->sp_expire) { + printf("Your account has expired.\n"); + sleep(1); + exit(0); + } else if (sp->sp_expire - today < 14) { + printf("Your account will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_expire - today)); + } + } + + if (sp->sp_max > 0) { + if (today >= (sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max)) { + printf("Your password has expired. Choose a new one.\n"); + change_passwd(pw); + } else if (sp->sp_warn > 0 + && (today > (sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - sp->sp_warn))) { + printf("Your password will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - today)); + } + } +} +#endif /* HAVE_SHADOW_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/stty_default.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/stty_default.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e38566 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/stty_default.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: stty_default.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +#include + +/* HP-UX 9.0 termios doesn't define these */ +#ifndef FLUSHO +#define FLUSHO 0 +#endif + +#ifndef XTABS +#define XTABS 0 +#endif + +#ifndef OXTABS +#define OXTABS XTABS +#endif + +/* Ultrix... */ +#ifndef ECHOPRT +#define ECHOPRT 0 +#endif + +#ifndef ECHOCTL +#define ECHOCTL 0 +#endif + +#ifndef ECHOKE +#define ECHOKE 0 +#endif + +#ifndef IMAXBEL +#define IMAXBEL 0 +#endif + +#define Ctl(x) ((x) ^ 0100) + +void +stty_default(void) +{ + struct termios termios; + + /* + * Finalize the terminal settings. Some systems default to 8 bits, + * others to 7, so we should leave that alone. + */ + tcgetattr(0, &termios); + + termios.c_iflag |= (BRKINT|IGNPAR|ICRNL|IXON|IMAXBEL); + termios.c_iflag &= ~IXANY; + + termios.c_lflag |= (ISIG|IEXTEN|ICANON|ECHO|ECHOE|ECHOK|ECHOCTL|ECHOKE); + termios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHOPRT|TOSTOP|FLUSHO); + + termios.c_oflag |= (OPOST|ONLCR); + termios.c_oflag &= ~OXTABS; + + termios.c_cc[VINTR] = Ctl('C'); + termios.c_cc[VERASE] = Ctl('H'); + termios.c_cc[VKILL] = Ctl('U'); + termios.c_cc[VEOF] = Ctl('D'); + + termios.c_cc[VSUSP] = Ctl('Z'); + + tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &termios); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/tty.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/tty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ffea72 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/tty.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: tty.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Clean the tty name. Return a pointer to the cleaned version. + */ + +char * +clean_ttyname (char *tty) +{ + char *res = tty; + + if (strncmp (res, _PATH_DEV, strlen(_PATH_DEV)) == 0) + res += strlen(_PATH_DEV); + if (strncmp (res, "pty/", 4) == 0) + res += 4; + if (strncmp (res, "ptym/", 5) == 0) + res += 5; + return res; +} + +/* + * Generate a name usable as an `ut_id', typically without `tty'. + */ + +char * +make_id (char *tty) +{ + char *res = tty; + + if (strncmp (res, "pts/", 4) == 0) + res += 4; + if (strncmp (res, "tty", 3) == 0) + res += 3; + return res; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmp_login.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmp_login.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b584326b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmp_login.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: utmp_login.c,v 1.17 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +void +prepare_utmp (struct utmp *utmp, char *tty, + const char *username, const char *hostname) +{ + char *ttyx = clean_ttyname (tty); + + memset(utmp, 0, sizeof(*utmp)); + utmp->ut_time = time(NULL); + strncpy(utmp->ut_line, ttyx, sizeof(utmp->ut_line)); + strncpy(utmp->ut_name, username, sizeof(utmp->ut_name)); + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER + strncpy(utmp->ut_user, username, sizeof(utmp->ut_user)); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR + if (hostname[0]) { + struct hostent *he; + if ((he = gethostbyname(hostname))) + memcpy(&utmp->ut_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], + sizeof(utmp->ut_addr)); + } +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + strncpy(utmp->ut_host, hostname, sizeof(utmp->ut_host)); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE + utmp->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID + utmp->ut_pid = getpid(); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + strncpy(utmp->ut_id, make_id(ttyx), sizeof(utmp->ut_id)); +# endif +} + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +void utmp_login(char *tty, const char *username, const char *hostname) +{ + return; +} +#else + +/* update utmp and wtmp - the BSD way */ + +void utmp_login(char *tty, const char *username, const char *hostname) +{ + struct utmp utmp; + int fd; + + prepare_utmp (&utmp, tty, username, hostname); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETUTENT + utmpname(_PATH_UTMP); + setutent(); + pututline(&utmp); + endutent(); +#else + +#ifdef HAVE_TTYSLOT + { + int ttyno; + ttyno = ttyslot(); + if (ttyno > 0 && (fd = open(_PATH_UTMP, O_WRONLY, 0)) >= 0) { + lseek(fd, (long)(ttyno * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_SET); + write(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(fd); + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_TTYSLOT */ +#endif /* HAVE_SETUTENT */ + + if ((fd = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) >= 0) { + write(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(fd); + } +} +#endif /* !HAVE_UTMPX_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmpx_login.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmpx_login.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..745d64c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/login/utmpx_login.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* Author: Wietse Venema */ + +#include "login_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: utmpx_login.c,v 1.24 1999/08/04 17:03:15 assar Exp $"); + +/* utmpx_login - update utmp and wtmp after login */ + +#ifndef HAVE_UTMPX_H +int utmpx_login(char *line, const char *user, const char *host) { return 0; } +#else + +static void +utmpx_update(struct utmpx *ut, char *line, const char *user, const char *host) +{ + struct timeval tmp; + char *clean_tty = clean_ttyname(line); + + strncpy(ut->ut_line, clean_tty, sizeof(ut->ut_line)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_ID + strncpy(ut->ut_id, make_id(clean_tty), sizeof(ut->ut_id)); +#endif + strncpy(ut->ut_user, user, sizeof(ut->ut_user)); + strncpy(ut->ut_host, host, sizeof(ut->ut_host)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN + ut->ut_syslen = strlen(host) + 1; + if (ut->ut_syslen > sizeof(ut->ut_host)) + ut->ut_syslen = sizeof(ut->ut_host); +#endif + ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + gettimeofday (&tmp, 0); + ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = tmp.tv_sec; + ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = tmp.tv_usec; + pututxline(ut); +#ifdef WTMPX_FILE + updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, ut); +#elif defined(WTMP_FILE) + { + struct utmp utmp; + int fd; + + prepare_utmp (&utmp, line, user, host); + if ((fd = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) >= 0) { + write(fd, &utmp, sizeof(struct utmp)); + close(fd); + } + } +#endif +} + +int +utmpx_login(char *line, const char *user, const char *host) +{ + struct utmpx *ut, save_ut; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); + int ret = (-1); + + /* + * SYSV4 ttymon and login use tty port names with the "/dev/" prefix + * stripped off. Rlogind and telnetd, on the other hand, make utmpx + * entries with device names like /dev/pts/nnn. We therefore cannot use + * getutxline(). Return nonzero if no utmp entry was found with our own + * process ID for a login or user process. + */ + + while ((ut = getutxent())) { + /* Try to find a reusable entry */ + if (ut->ut_pid == mypid + && ( ut->ut_type == INIT_PROCESS + || ut->ut_type == LOGIN_PROCESS + || ut->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)) { + save_ut = *ut; + utmpx_update(&save_ut, line, user, host); + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + if (ret == -1) { + /* Grow utmpx file by one record. */ + struct utmpx newut; + memset(&newut, 0, sizeof(newut)); + newut.ut_pid = mypid; + utmpx_update(&newut, line, user, host); + ret = 0; + } + endutxent(); + return (ret); +} +#endif /* HAVE_UTMPX_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f013090 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +1999-12-28 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): call k_getportbyname with port number in + network-byte-order + +1999-12-14 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_connect): remove bogus local block variable + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_connect): use `getaddrinfo' + * push.c: add --count (print number of messages and bytes at + beginning) + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c: make `-v' a arg_counter + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): redo the v4/v5 selection for consistency. -4 -> + try only v4 -5 -> try only v5 none, -45 -> try v5, v4 + +1999-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (doit): remember to step over the error message when we + discover that XDELE is not supported + +1999-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: use XDELE + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_connect): v6-ify + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c: get_default_username and the resulting const propagation + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (parse_pobox): try $USERNAME + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_v5): remove unused and non-working code + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (do_v5): call krb5_sendauth with ccache == NULL + +Wed Apr 7 23:40:00 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: fix names of hesiod variables + +Wed Mar 24 04:37:04 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (pfrom): fix typo + + * push.c (get_pobox): try to handle old and new hesiod APIs + +Mon Mar 22 22:19:40 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: hesoid -> hesiod + +Sun Mar 21 18:02:10 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: bindir -> libexecdir + +Sat Mar 20 00:12:26 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: LDADD: add missing backslash + +Thu Mar 18 15:28:35 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: clean pfrom + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Mon Mar 15 18:26:16 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: strncasecmp headers + +Mon Feb 15 22:22:09 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (pfrom): use libexecdir + + * Makefile.am: build and install pfrom + + * push.c (do_connect): init `s' + (pop_state): spell-check enums + +Tue Nov 24 23:20:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: build and install pfrom + + * pfrom.in: bindir -> libexecdir + +Sun Nov 22 15:33:52 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: eliminate some warnings + +Sun Nov 22 10:34:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Thu Nov 19 01:17:33 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * push_locl.h: add + + * Makefile.am, Makefile.in: link and include hesiod + + * push.c (get_pobox): new function. add hesiod support. + +1998-11-07 Assar Westerlund + + * push.8: updated + + * push.c: --from implementation from + +Fri Jul 10 01:14:45 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (net_{read,write}): remove + +Wed Jun 24 14:41:41 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: allow `po:user@host' mailbox syntax + +Tue Jun 2 17:35:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * push.c: quote '^From ' properly + +Mon May 25 05:22:47 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): PROGS -> PROGRAMS + +Sun Apr 26 11:42:13 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * push.c (main): better default for v4 and v5 + + * push.c (main): init context correctly + + * push.c: should work with krb4 + + * push_locl.h: krb4 compat + + * Makefile.in: new file + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07ecd0a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 1999/04/09 18:29:48 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_hesiod) + +bin_SCRIPTS = pfrom + +libexec_PROGRAMS = push + +push_SOURCES = push.c push_locl.h + +pfrom: pfrom.in + sed -e "s!%libexecdir%!$(libexecdir)!" $(srcdir)/pfrom.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +man_MANS = push.8 + +CLEANFILES = pfrom + +EXTRA_DIST = pfrom.in $(man_MANS) + +LDADD = $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LIB_hesiod) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e9fef1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,713 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 1999/04/09 18:29:48 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(INCLUDE_hesiod) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +bin_SCRIPTS = pfrom + +libexec_PROGRAMS = push + +push_SOURCES = push.c push_locl.h + +man_MANS = push.8 + +CLEANFILES = pfrom + +EXTRA_DIST = pfrom.in $(man_MANS) + +LDADD = $(LIB_krb5) $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(LIB_roken) $(LIB_hesiod) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +libexec_PROGRAMS = push$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(libexec_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +push_OBJECTS = push.$(OBJEXT) +push_LDADD = $(LDADD) +@KRB5_TRUE@push_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB5_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ +@KRB5_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la +@KRB5_FALSE@push_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la +push_LDFLAGS = +SCRIPTS = $(bin_SCRIPTS) + +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +man8dir = $(mandir)/man8 +MANS = $(man_MANS) +DIST_COMMON = ChangeLog Makefile.am Makefile.in + + +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) + +TAR = tar +GZIP_ENV = --best +SOURCES = $(push_SOURCES) +OBJECTS = $(push_OBJECTS) + +all: all-redirect +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .1 .3 .5 .8 .S .c .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .et .h .lo .o .obj .s .x +$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign appl/push/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +mostlyclean-libexecPROGRAMS: + +clean-libexecPROGRAMS: + -test -z "$(libexec_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(libexec_PROGRAMS) + +distclean-libexecPROGRAMS: + +maintainer-clean-libexecPROGRAMS: + +install-libexecPROGRAMS: $(libexec_PROGRAMS) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) 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+.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +pfrom: pfrom.in + sed -e "s!%libexecdir%!$(libexecdir)!" $(srcdir)/pfrom.in > $@ + chmod +x $@ + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/pfrom.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/pfrom.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6adf4f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/pfrom.in @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $Id: pfrom.in,v 1.2 1998/11/24 13:25:47 assar Exp $ +libexecdir=%libexecdir% +PATH=$libexecdir:$PATH +export PATH +push --from $* diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.8 b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8f4401 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.8 @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +.\" $Id: push.8,v 1.4 1999/12/05 13:00:56 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 31, 1998 +.Dt PUSH 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm push +.Nd +fetch mail via POP +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 4 | Fl -krb4 +.Op Fl 5 | Fl -krb5 +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl f | Fl -fork +.Op Fl l | -leave +.Op Fl -from +.Op Fl c | -count +.Op Fl -header +.Oo Fl p Ar port-spec \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -port= Ns Ar port-spec Oc +.Xc +.Ar po-box +.Pa filename +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +retrieves mail from the post office box +.Ar po-box , +and stores the mail in mbox format in +.Pa filename . +The +.Ar po-box +can have any of the following formats: +.Bl -hang -compact -offset indent +.It Ql hostname:username +.It Ql po:hostname:username +.It Ql username@hostname +.It Ql po:username@hostname +.It Ql hostname +.It Ql po:username +.El + +If no username is specified, +.Nm +assumes that it's the same as on the local machine; +.Ar hostname +defaults to the value of the +.Ev MAILHOST +environment variable. + +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 4 Ns , +.Fl -krb4 +.Xc +use Kerberos 4 (if compiled with support for Kerberos 4) +.It Xo +.Fl 5 Ns , +.Fl -krb5 +.Xc +use Kerberos 5 (if compiled with support for Kerberos 5) +.It Xo +.Fl f Ns , +.Fl -fork +.Xc +fork before starting to delete messages +.It Xo +.Fl l Ns , +.Fl -leave +.Xc +don't delete fetched mail +.It Xo +.Fl -from +.Xc +behave like from. +.It Xo +.Fl c Ns , +.Fl -count +.Xc +first print how many messages and bytes there are. +.It Xo +.Fl -header +.Xc +which header from should print. +.It Xo +.Fl p Ar port-spec Ns , +.Fl -port= Ns Ar port-spec +.Xc +use this port instead of the default +.Ql kpop +or +.Ql 1109 . +.El + +The default is to first try Kerberos 5 authentication and then, if +that fails, Kerberos 4. +.Sh ENVIRONMENT + +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev MAILHOST +points to the post office, if no other hostname is specified. +.El +.\".Sh FILES +.Sh EXAMPLES +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ push cornfield:roosta ~/.gnus-crash-box +.Ed + +tries to fetch mail for the user +.Ar roosta +from the post office at +.Dq cornfield , +and stores the mail in +.Pa ~/.gnus-crash-box +(you are using Gnus, aren't you?) +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ push --from -5 havregryn +.Ed + +tries to fetch +.Nm From: +lines for current user at post office +.Dq havregryn +using Kerberos 5. +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr movemail 8 , +.Xr popper 8 , +.Xr from 1 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +was written while waiting for +.Nm movemail +to finish getting the mail. +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1689a83 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push.c @@ -0,0 +1,790 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "push_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: push.c,v 1.38 1999/12/28 03:46:06 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_v4 = -1; +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int use_v5 = -1; +static krb5_context context; +#endif + +static char *port_str; +static int verbose_level; +static int do_fork; +static int do_leave; +static int do_version; +static int do_help; +static int do_from; +static int do_count; +static char *header_str; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "krb4", '4', arg_flag, &use_v4, "Use Kerberos V4", + NULL }, +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + { "krb5", '5', arg_flag, &use_v5, "Use Kerberos V5", + NULL }, +#endif + { "verbose",'v', arg_counter, &verbose_level, "Verbose", + NULL }, + { "fork", 'f', arg_flag, &do_fork, "Fork deleting proc", + NULL }, + { "leave", 'l', arg_flag, &do_leave, "Leave mail on server", + NULL }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "number-or-service" }, + { "from", 0, arg_flag, &do_from, "Behave like from", + NULL }, + { "header", 0, arg_string, &header_str, "Header string to print", NULL }, + { "count", 'c', arg_flag, &do_count, "Print number of messages", NULL}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version, "Print version", + NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help, NULL, + NULL } + +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "[[{po:username[@hostname] | hostname[:username]}] ...]" + "filename"); + exit (ret); +} + +static int +do_connect (const char *hostname, int port, int nodelay) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + int s; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo(%s): %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (a == NULL) { + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + return -1; + } + + if(setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, + (void *)&nodelay, sizeof(nodelay)) < 0) + err (1, "setsockopt TCP_NODELAY"); + return s; +} + +typedef enum { INIT = 0, GREET, USER, PASS, STAT, RETR, TOP, + DELE, XDELE, QUIT} pop_state; + +#define PUSH_BUFSIZ 65536 + +#define STEP 16 + +struct write_state { + struct iovec *iovecs; + size_t niovecs, maxiovecs, allociovecs; + int fd; +}; + +static void +write_state_init (struct write_state *w, int fd) +{ +#ifdef UIO_MAXIOV + w->maxiovecs = UIO_MAXIOV; +#else + w->maxiovecs = 16; +#endif + w->allociovecs = min(STEP, w->maxiovecs); + w->niovecs = 0; + w->iovecs = malloc(w->allociovecs * sizeof(*w->iovecs)); + if (w->iovecs == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + w->fd = fd; +} + +static void +write_state_add (struct write_state *w, void *v, size_t len) +{ + if(w->niovecs == w->allociovecs) { + if(w->niovecs == w->maxiovecs) { + if(writev (w->fd, w->iovecs, w->niovecs) < 0) + err(1, "writev"); + w->niovecs = 0; + } else { + w->allociovecs = min(w->allociovecs + STEP, w->maxiovecs); + w->iovecs = realloc (w->iovecs, + w->allociovecs * sizeof(*w->iovecs)); + if (w->iovecs == NULL) + errx (1, "realloc"); + } + } + w->iovecs[w->niovecs].iov_base = v; + w->iovecs[w->niovecs].iov_len = len; + ++w->niovecs; +} + +static void +write_state_flush (struct write_state *w) +{ + if (w->niovecs) { + if (writev (w->fd, w->iovecs, w->niovecs) < 0) + err (1, "writev"); + w->niovecs = 0; + } +} + +static void +write_state_destroy (struct write_state *w) +{ + free (w->iovecs); +} + +static int +doit(int s, + const char *host, + const char *user, + const char *outfilename, + const char *header_str, + int leavep, + int verbose, + int forkp) +{ + int ret; + char out_buf[PUSH_BUFSIZ]; + size_t out_len = 0; + char in_buf[PUSH_BUFSIZ + 1]; /* sentinel */ + size_t in_len = 0; + char *in_ptr = in_buf; + pop_state state = INIT; + unsigned count, bytes; + unsigned asked_for = 0, retrieved = 0, asked_deleted = 0, deleted = 0; + unsigned sent_xdele = 0; + int out_fd; + char from_line[128]; + size_t from_line_length; + time_t now; + struct write_state write_state; + + if (do_from) { + out_fd = -1; + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "%s@%s\n", user, host); + } else { + out_fd = open(outfilename, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, 0666); + if (out_fd < 0) + err (1, "open %s", outfilename); + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "%s@%s -> %s\n", user, host, outfilename); + } + + now = time(NULL); + from_line_length = snprintf (from_line, sizeof(from_line), + "From %s %s", "push", ctime(&now)); + + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "USER %s\r\nPASS hej\r\nSTAT\r\n", + user); + if (net_write (s, out_buf, out_len) != out_len) + err (1, "write"); + if (verbose > 1) + write (STDERR_FILENO, out_buf, out_len); + + if (!do_from) + write_state_init (&write_state, out_fd); + + while(state != QUIT) { + fd_set readset, writeset; + + FD_ZERO(&readset); + FD_ZERO(&writeset); + FD_SET(s,&readset); + if (((state == STAT || state == RETR || state == TOP) + && asked_for < count) + || (state == XDELE && !sent_xdele) + || (state == DELE && asked_deleted < count)) + FD_SET(s,&writeset); + ret = select (s + 1, &readset, &writeset, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + else + err (1, "select"); + } + + if (FD_ISSET(s, &readset)) { + char *beg, *p; + size_t rem; + int blank_line = 0; + + ret = read (s, in_ptr, sizeof(in_buf) - in_len - 1); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) + errx (1, "EOF during read"); + + in_len += ret; + in_ptr += ret; + *in_ptr = '\0'; + + beg = in_buf; + rem = in_len; + while(rem > 1 + && (p = strstr(beg, "\r\n")) != NULL) { + if (state == TOP) { + char *copy = beg; + + if (strncasecmp(copy, + header_str, + min(p - copy + 1, strlen(header_str))) == 0) { + fprintf (stdout, "%.*s\n", (int)(p - copy), copy); + } + if (beg[0] == '.' && beg[1] == '\r' && beg[2] == '\n') { + state = STAT; + if (++retrieved == count) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + } + } + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else if (state == RETR) { + char *copy = beg; + if (beg[0] == '.') { + if (beg[1] == '\r' && beg[2] == '\n') { + if(!blank_line) + write_state_add(&write_state, "\n", 1); + state = STAT; + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + if (++retrieved == count) { + write_state_flush (&write_state); + if (fsync (out_fd) < 0) + err (1, "fsync"); + close(out_fd); + if (leavep) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + } else { + if (forkp) { + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + warn ("fork"); + else if(pid != 0) { + if(verbose) + fprintf (stderr, + "(exiting)"); + return 0; + } + } + + state = XDELE; + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "deleting... "); + } + } + continue; + } else + ++copy; + } + *p = '\n'; + if(blank_line && + strncmp(copy, "From ", min(p - copy + 1, 5)) == 0) + write_state_add(&write_state, ">", 1); + write_state_add(&write_state, copy, p - copy + 1); + blank_line = (*copy == '\n'); + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else if (rem >= 3 && strncmp (beg, "+OK", 3) == 0) { + if (state == STAT) { + if (!do_from) + write_state_add(&write_state, + from_line, from_line_length); + blank_line = 0; + if (do_from) + state = TOP; + else + state = RETR; + } else if (state == XDELE) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + break; + } else if (state == DELE) { + if (++deleted == count) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + break; + } + } else if (++state == STAT) { + if(sscanf (beg + 4, "%u %u", &count, &bytes) != 2) + errx(1, "Bad STAT-line: %.*s", (int)(p - beg), beg); + if (verbose) { + fprintf (stderr, "%u message(s) (%u bytes). " + "fetching... ", + count, bytes); + if (do_from) + fprintf (stderr, "\n"); + } else if (do_count) { + fprintf (stderr, "%u message(s) (%u bytes).\n", + count, bytes); + } + if (count == 0) { + state = QUIT; + net_write (s, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + if (verbose > 1) + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, "QUIT\r\n", 6); + break; + } + } + + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else { + if(state == XDELE) { + state = DELE; + rem -= p - beg + 2; + beg = p + 2; + } else + errx (1, "Bad response: %.*s", (int)(p - beg), beg); + } + } + if (!do_from) + write_state_flush (&write_state); + + memmove (in_buf, beg, rem); + in_len = rem; + in_ptr = in_buf + rem; + } + if (FD_ISSET(s, &writeset)) { + if ((state == STAT && !do_from) || state == RETR) + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "RETR %u\r\n", ++asked_for); + else if ((state == STAT && do_from) || state == TOP) + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "TOP %u 0\r\n", ++asked_for); + else if(state == XDELE) { + out_len = snprintf(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "XDELE %u %u\r\n", 1, count); + sent_xdele++; + } + else if(state == DELE) + out_len = snprintf (out_buf, sizeof(out_buf), + "DELE %u\r\n", ++asked_deleted); + if (net_write (s, out_buf, out_len) != out_len) + err (1, "write"); + if (verbose > 1) + write (STDERR_FILENO, out_buf, out_len); + } + } + if (verbose) + fprintf (stderr, "Done\n"); + if (!do_from) + write_state_destroy (&write_state); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +do_v5 (const char *host, + int port, + const char *user, + const char *filename, + const char *header_str, + int leavep, + int verbose, + int forkp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_principal server; + int s; + + s = do_connect (host, port, 1); + if (s < 0) + return 1; + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + host, + "pop", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_sname_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &s, + "KPOPV1.0", + NULL, + server, + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_sendauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + return doit (s, host, user, filename, header_str, leavep, verbose, forkp); +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +do_v4 (const char *host, + int port, + const char *user, + const char *filename, + const char *header_str, + int leavep, + int verbose, + int forkp) +{ + KTEXT_ST ticket; + MSG_DAT msg_data; + CREDENTIALS cred; + des_key_schedule sched; + int s; + int ret; + + s = do_connect (host, port, 1); + if (s < 0) + return 1; + ret = krb_sendauth(0, + s, + &ticket, + "pop", + (char *)host, + krb_realmofhost(host), + getpid(), + &msg_data, + &cred, + sched, + NULL, + NULL, + "KPOPV0.1"); + if(ret) { + warnx("krb_sendauth: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return 1; + } + return doit (s, host, user, filename, header_str, leavep, verbose, forkp); +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +#ifdef HESIOD + +#ifdef HESIOD_INTERFACES + +static char * +hesiod_get_pobox (const char **user) +{ + void *context; + struct hesiod_postoffice *hpo; + char *ret = NULL; + + if(hesiod_init (&context) != 0) + err (1, "hesiod_init"); + + hpo = hesiod_getmailhost (context, *user); + if (hpo == NULL) { + warn ("hesiod_getmailhost %s", *user); + } else { + if (strcasecmp(hpo->hesiod_po_type, "pop") != 0) + errx (1, "Unsupported po type %s", hpo->hesiod_po_type); + + ret = strdup(hpo->hesiod_po_host); + if(ret == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + *user = strdup(hpo->hesiod_po_name); + if (*user == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + hesiod_free_postoffice (context, hpo); + } + hesiod_end (context); + return ret; +} + +#else /* !HESIOD_INTERFACES */ + +static char * +hesiod_get_pobox (const char **user) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + struct hes_postoffice *hpo; + + hpo = hes_getmailhost (*user); + if (hpo == NULL) { + warn ("hes_getmailhost %s", *user); + } else { + if (strcasecmp(hpo->po_type, "pop") != 0) + errx (1, "Unsupported po type %s", hpo->po_type); + + ret = strdup(hpo->po_host); + if(ret == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + *user = strdup(hpo->po_name); + if (*user == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + } + return ret; +} + +#endif /* HESIOD_INTERFACES */ + +#endif /* HESIOD */ + +static char * +get_pobox (const char **user) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + +#ifdef HESIOD + ret = hesiod_get_pobox (user); +#endif + + if (ret == NULL) + ret = getenv("MAILHOST"); + if (ret == NULL) + errx (1, "MAILHOST not set"); + return ret; +} + +static void +parse_pobox (char *a0, const char **host, const char **user) +{ + const char *h, *u; + char *p; + int po = 0; + + if (a0 == NULL) { + + *user = getenv ("USERNAME"); + if (*user == NULL) { + struct passwd *pwd = getpwuid (getuid ()); + + if (pwd == NULL) + errx (1, "Who are you?"); + *user = strdup (pwd->pw_name); + if (*user == NULL) + errx (1, "strdup: out of memory"); + } + *host = get_pobox (user); + return; + } + + /* if the specification starts with po:, remember this information */ + if(strncmp(a0, "po:", 3) == 0) { + a0 += 3; + po++; + } + /* if there is an `@', the hostname is after it, otherwise at the + beginning of the string */ + p = strchr(a0, '@'); + if(p != NULL) { + *p++ = '\0'; + h = p; + } else { + h = a0; + } + /* if there is a `:', the username comes before it, otherwise at + the beginning of the string */ + p = strchr(a0, ':'); + if(p != NULL) { + *p++ = '\0'; + u = p; + } else { + u = a0; + } + if(h == u) { + /* some inconsistent compatibility with various mailers */ + if(po) { + h = get_pobox (&u); + } else { + u = get_default_username (); + if (u == NULL) + errx (1, "Who are you?"); + } + } + *host = h; + *user = u; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = 0; + int optind = 0; + int ret = 1; + const char *host, *user, *filename = NULL; + char *pobox = NULL; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_init_context (&context); +#endif + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5) + if(use_v4 == -1 && use_v5 == 1) + use_v4 = 0; + if(use_v5 == -1 && use_v4 == 1) + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + + if (do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version(NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (do_from && header_str == NULL) + header_str = "From:"; + else if (header_str != NULL) + do_from = 1; + + if (do_from) { + if (argc == 0) + pobox = NULL; + else if (argc == 1) + pobox = argv[0]; + else + usage (1); + } else { + if (argc == 1) { + filename = argv[0]; + pobox = NULL; + } else if (argc == 2) { + filename = argv[1]; + pobox = argv[0]; + } else + usage (1); + } + + if (port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + if (port == 0) { +#ifdef KRB5 + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kpop", "tcp", 1109); +#elif defined(KRB4) + port = k_getportbyname ("kpop", "tcp", htons(1109)); +#else +#error must define KRB4 or KRB5 +#endif + } + + parse_pobox (pobox, &host, &user); + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret && use_v5) { + ret = do_v5 (host, port, user, filename, header_str, + do_leave, verbose_level, do_fork); + } +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && use_v4) { + ret = do_v4 (host, port, user, filename, header_str, + do_leave, verbose_level, do_fork); + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e5ca78 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/push/push_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: push_locl.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:33 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HESIOD +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c07d8d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (doit): addrinfo returned from getaddrinfo() is not usable + directly as hints. copy it and set AI_PASSIVE. + +1999-11-20 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): remember to close the priviledged sockets before + calling rlogin + +1999-11-02 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): redo the v4/v5 selection for consistency. -4 -> + try only v4 -5 -> try only v5 none, -45 -> try v5, v4 + +1999-10-26 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (main): ignore SIGPIPE + + * common.c (do_read): the encoded length can be longer than the + buffer being used, allocate memory for it dynamically. From Brian + A May + +1999-10-14 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (proto): be more careful and don't print errno when read() + returns 0 + +1999-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (recv_krb4_auth): set `iv' + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (do_read): be careful with the return value from + krb5_net_read + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: call freehostent + + * rsh.c: remove some dead code + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c: re-write the handling of forwarded credentials and + stuff. From Miroslav Ruda + + * rsh_locl.h: always include kafs.h + + * rsh.c: add `-z' and `-G' options + + * rsh.c (loop): shutdown one side of the TCP connection on EOF. + From Brian A May + + * common.c (do_read): handle EOF. From Brian A May + + +1999-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: const fixes + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c: v6-ify + + * rsh.c: v6-ify + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh_locl.h: move around kafs.h + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh_locl.h: + + * rsh.c, rshd.c: improve forwarding and implement unique ccache on + server. From Miroslav Ruda + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (construct_command): handle argc == 0 for generality + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: new option `-e' for not trying to open an stderr socket + +1999-06-17 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh_locl.h (RSH_BUFSIZ): bump to 16 * 1024 to be sure that we + don't leave any data inside des_enc_read. (that constant should + really be exported in some way...) + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: use get_default_username and resulting const pollution + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): try $USERNAME + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (doit): afslog correctly + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (main): add fallback to rlogin + +1999-05-10 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (send_krb5_auth): call krb5_sendauth with ccache == NULL. + check return value from krb5_crypto_init + + * common.c (do_write, do_read): always return -1 for failure + (net_write, net_read): remove. they already exist in libroken + +1999-05-09 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: make sure it tries with all other authentication methods + after one has failed + * rsh.c (main): detect the case of no command given. + +1999-04-11 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c: new option --forwardable. use print_version + +Sat Apr 10 17:10:55 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * rshd.c (setup_copier): use `socketpair' instead of `pipe'. Some + shells don't think it's a rsh session if they find a pipe at the + other end. + (setup_environment): add SSH_CLIENT just to make bash happy + + * common.c (do_read): use krb5_get_wrapped_length + +Wed Mar 24 03:59:42 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * rsh.c (loop): more braces to make gcc happy + +Tue Mar 23 17:08:32 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * rsh_locl.h: kafs.h + + * rshd.c: add `-P', `-v', and `-L' flags + +Thu Mar 18 11:37:24 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Tue Dec 1 14:44:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: update to new crypto framework + + * appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h: update to new crypto framework + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: update to new crypto framework + + * appl/rsh/common.c: update to new crypto framework + +Mon Nov 2 01:15:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c (main): initialize host + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c (recv_krb5_auth): disable `do_encrypt' if not + encrypting. + +Thu Jul 30 23:12:17 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: kludges for parsing `rsh hostname -l user' + +Thu Jul 23 19:49:03 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: use krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum + +Sat Apr 18 21:13:06 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: Don't try v5 if (only) `-4' is specified. + +Sun Dec 21 09:44:05 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c (recv_krb5_auth): swap the order of the + `local_user' and the `remote_user' + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c (send_krb5_auth): swap the order of the + `local_user' and the `remote_user' + +Sat Nov 29 07:10:11 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: updated to use getarg. + changed `struct fd_set' to `fd_set'. + implemented broken/BSD authentication (requires iruserok) + +Wed Nov 12 02:35:57 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h: add AUTH_BROKEN and PATH_RSH + + * appl/rsh/Makefile.am: set BINDIR + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: implemented BSD-style reserved port + `authentication' + +Sun Aug 24 08:06:54 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: syslog remote shells + +Tue Aug 12 01:29:46 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rshd/rshd.c: Use `krb5_sock_to_principal'. Send server + parameter to krb5_rd_req/krb5_recvauth. Set addresses in + auth_context. + +Fri Jul 25 17:32:12 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: implement forwarding + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: Use getarg. Implement forwarding. + +Sun Jul 13 00:32:16 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh: Conditionalize the krb4-support. + +Wed Jul 9 06:58:00 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rsh.c: use the correct user for the checksum + +Mon Jul 7 11:15:51 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh/rshd.c: Now works. Also implementd encryption and + `-p'. + + * appl/rsh/common.c: new file + +Mon Jun 30 06:08:14 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * appl/rsh: New program. + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0875f9f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 1999/04/09 18:24:05 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = rsh + +libexec_PROGRAMS = rshd + +rsh_SOURCES = rsh.c common.c rsh_locl.h + +rshd_SOURCES = rshd.c common.c rsh_locl.h + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(LIB_krb5) \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1800c7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,698 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 1999/04/09 18:24:05 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = 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@LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +bin_PROGRAMS = rsh + +libexec_PROGRAMS = rshd + +rsh_SOURCES = rsh.c common.c rsh_locl.h + +rshd_SOURCES = rshd.c common.c rsh_locl.h + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) $(LIB_krb5) $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(LIB_roken) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +bin_PROGRAMS = rsh$(EXEEXT) +libexec_PROGRAMS = rshd$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) $(libexec_PROGRAMS) 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+ chmod 0 $$x; fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " cp $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + cp $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + 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dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat1-mans: + @ext=1;\ + foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat3-mans: + @ext=3;\ + foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo 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's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/common.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6614137 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rsh_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +ssize_t +do_read (int fd, + void *buf, + size_t sz) +{ + int ret; + + if (do_encrypt) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (auth_method == AUTH_KRB4) { + return des_enc_read (fd, buf, sz, schedule, &iv); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB5) { + u_int32_t len, outer_len; + int status; + krb5_data data; + void *edata; + + ret = krb5_net_read (context, &fd, &len, 4); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + len = ntohl(len); + if (len > sz) + abort (); + outer_len = krb5_get_wrapped_length (context, crypto, len); + edata = malloc (outer_len); + if (edata == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: cannot allocate %u bytes", outer_len); + ret = krb5_net_read (context, &fd, edata, outer_len); + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + + status = krb5_decrypt(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED, + edata, outer_len, &data); + free (edata); + + if (status) + errx (1, "%s", krb5_get_err_text (context, status)); + memcpy (buf, data.data, len); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return len; + } else { + abort (); + } + } else + return read (fd, buf, sz); +} + +ssize_t +do_write (int fd, void *buf, size_t sz) +{ + if (do_encrypt) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB4) { + return des_enc_write (fd, buf, sz, schedule, &iv); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + if(auth_method == AUTH_KRB5) { + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_data data; + u_int32_t len; + int ret; + + status = krb5_encrypt(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED, + buf, sz, &data); + + if (status) + errx (1, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + assert (krb5_get_wrapped_length (context, crypto, + sz) == data.length); + + len = htonl(sz); + ret = krb5_net_write (context, &fd, &len, 4); + if (ret != 4) + return ret; + ret = krb5_net_write (context, &fd, data.data, data.length); + if (ret != data.length) + return ret; + free (data.data); + return sz; + } else { + abort(); + } + } else + return write (fd, buf, sz); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..444748e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh.c @@ -0,0 +1,948 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rsh_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: rsh.c,v 1.46 1999/12/16 11:53:50 assar Exp $"); + +enum auth_method auth_method; +int do_encrypt; +int do_forward; +int do_forwardable; +int do_unique_tkfile = 0; +char *unique_tkfile = NULL; +char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN]; +krb5_context context; +krb5_keyblock *keyblock; +krb5_crypto crypto; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock iv; + + +/* + * + */ + +static int input = 1; /* Read from stdin */ + +static int +loop (int s, int errsock) +{ + fd_set real_readset; + int count = 1; + + FD_ZERO(&real_readset); + FD_SET(s, &real_readset); + if (errsock != -1) { + FD_SET(errsock, &real_readset); + ++count; + } + if(input) + FD_SET(STDIN_FILENO, &real_readset); + + for (;;) { + int ret; + fd_set readset; + char buf[RSH_BUFSIZ]; + + readset = real_readset; + ret = select (max(s, errsock) + 1, &readset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + err (1, "select"); + } + if (FD_ISSET(s, &readset)) { + ret = do_read (s, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (s); + FD_CLR(s, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + return 0; + } else + net_write (STDOUT_FILENO, buf, ret); + } + if (errsock != -1 && FD_ISSET(errsock, &readset)) { + ret = do_read (errsock, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (errsock); + FD_CLR(errsock, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + return 0; + } else + net_write (STDERR_FILENO, buf, ret); + } + if (FD_ISSET(STDIN_FILENO, &readset)) { + ret = read (STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (STDIN_FILENO); + FD_CLR(STDIN_FILENO, &real_readset); + shutdown (s, SHUT_WR); + } else + do_write (s, buf, ret); + } + } +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +send_krb4_auth(int s, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd) +{ + KTEXT_ST text; + CREDENTIALS cred; + MSG_DAT msg; + int status; + size_t len; + + status = krb_sendauth (do_encrypt ? KOPT_DO_MUTUAL : 0, + s, &text, "rcmd", + (char *)hostname, krb_realmofhost (hostname), + getpid(), &msg, &cred, schedule, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thisaddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr, + KCMD_VERSION); + if (status != KSUCCESS) { + warnx ("%s: %s", hostname, krb_get_err_text(status)); + return 1; + } + memcpy (iv, cred.session, sizeof(iv)); + + len = strlen(remote_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, remote_user, len) != len) { + warn("write"); + return 1; + } + if (net_write (s, cmd, cmd_len) != cmd_len) { + warn("write"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +/* + * Send forward information on `s' for host `hostname', them being + * forwardable themselves if `forwardable' + */ + +static int +krb5_forward_cred (krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int s, + const char *hostname, + int forwardable) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_data out_data; + krb5_principal principal; + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_cc_default: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_cc_get_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + creds.client = principal; + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &creds.server, + strlen(principal->realm), + principal->realm, + "krbtgt", + principal->realm, + NULL); + + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_build_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + creds.times.endtime = 0; + + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.forwarded = 1; + flags.b.forwardable = forwardable; + + ret = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags.i, + hostname, + &creds, + &out_data); + if (ret) { + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_get_forwarded_creds: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, + (void *)&s, + &out_data); + krb5_data_free (&out_data); + + if (ret) + warnx ("could not forward creds: krb5_write_message: %s", + krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return 0; +} + +static int +send_krb5_auth(int s, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd) +{ + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data cksum_data; + int status; + size_t len; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, + hostname, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) { + warnx ("%s: %s", hostname, krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + cksum_data.length = asprintf ((char **)&cksum_data.data, + "%u:%s%s%s", + ntohs(socket_get_port(thataddr)), + do_encrypt ? "-x " : "", + cmd, + remote_user); + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &s, + KCMD_VERSION, + NULL, + server, + do_encrypt ? AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED : 0, + &cksum_data, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) { + warnx ("%s: %s", hostname, krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_auth_con_getkey (context, auth_context, &keyblock); + if (status) { + warnx ("krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &s); + if (status) { + warnx("krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return(1); + } + + status = krb5_crypto_init(context, keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if(status) { + warnx ("krb5_crypto_init: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + return 1; + } + + len = strlen(remote_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, remote_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + if (do_encrypt && net_write (s, "-x ", 3) != 3) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + if (net_write (s, cmd, cmd_len) != cmd_len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + + if (do_unique_tkfile) { + if (net_write (s, tkfile, strlen(tkfile)) != strlen(tkfile)) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + } + len = strlen(local_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, local_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + + if (!do_forward + || krb5_forward_cred (auth_context, s, hostname, do_forwardable)) { + /* Empty forwarding info */ + + u_char zero[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0}; + write (s, &zero, 4); + } + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + return 0; +} + +static int +send_broken_auth(int s, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd) +{ + size_t len; + + len = strlen(local_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, local_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + len = strlen(remote_user) + 1; + if (net_write (s, remote_user, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + if (net_write (s, cmd, cmd_len) != cmd_len) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +proto (int s, int errsock, + const char *hostname, const char *local_user, const char *remote_user, + const char *cmd, size_t cmd_len, + int (*auth_func)(int s, + struct sockaddr *this, struct sockaddr *that, + const char *hostname, const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd)) +{ + int errsock2; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + char *p; + size_t len; + char reply; + struct sockaddr_storage thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thataddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage erraddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *erraddr = (struct sockaddr *)&erraddr_ss; + int addrlen; + int ret; + + addrlen = sizeof(thisaddr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname(%s)", hostname); + return 1; + } + addrlen = sizeof(thataddr_ss); + if (getpeername (s, thataddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("getpeername(%s)", hostname); + return 1; + } + + if (errsock != -1) { + + addrlen = sizeof(erraddr_ss); + if (getsockname (errsock, erraddr, &addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("getsockname"); + return 1; + } + + if (listen (errsock, 1) < 0) { + warn ("listen"); + return 1; + } + + p = buf; + snprintf (p, sizeof(buf), "%u", + ntohs(socket_get_port(erraddr))); + len = strlen(buf) + 1; + if(net_write (s, buf, len) != len) { + warn ("write"); + close (errsock); + return 1; + } + + errsock2 = accept (errsock, NULL, NULL); + if (errsock2 < 0) { + warn ("accept"); + close (errsock); + return 1; + } + close (errsock); + + } else { + if (net_write (s, "0", 2) != 2) { + warn ("write"); + return 1; + } + errsock2 = -1; + } + + if ((*auth_func)(s, thisaddr, thataddr, hostname, + remote_user, local_user, + cmd_len, cmd)) { + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } + + ret = net_read (s, &reply, 1); + if (ret < 0) { + warn ("read"); + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } else if (ret == 0) { + warnx ("unexpected EOF from %s", hostname); + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } + if (reply != 0) { + + warnx ("Error from rshd at %s:", hostname); + + while ((ret = read (s, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) + write (STDOUT_FILENO, buf, ret); + write (STDOUT_FILENO,"\n",1); + close (errsock2); + return 1; + } + + return loop (s, errsock2); +} + +/* + * Return in `res' a copy of the concatenation of `argc, argv' into + * malloced space. + */ + +static size_t +construct_command (char **res, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + size_t len = 0; + char *tmp; + + for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) + len += strlen(argv[i]) + 1; + len = max (1, len); + tmp = malloc (len); + if (tmp == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc %u failed", len); + + *tmp = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; ++i) { + strcat (tmp, argv[i]); + strcat (tmp, " "); + } + if (argc > 0) + strcat (tmp, argv[argc-1]); + *res = tmp; + return len; +} + +static char * +print_addr (const struct sockaddr_in *sin) +{ + char addr_str[256]; + char *res; + + inet_ntop (AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)); + res = strdup(addr_str); + if (res == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + return res; +} + +static int +doit_broken (int argc, + char **argv, + int optind, + const char *host, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + int port, + int priv_socket1, + int priv_socket2, + const char *cmd, + size_t cmd_len) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + if (priv_socket1 < 0) { + warnx ("unable to bind reserved port: is rsh setuid root?"); + return 1; + } + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + hints.ai_family = AF_INET; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (host, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + warnx ("%s: %s", host, gai_strerror(error)); + return 1; + } + + if (connect (priv_socket1, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + if (ai->ai_next == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; + } + + close(priv_socket1); + close(priv_socket2); + + for (a = ai->ai_next; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + err (1, "fork"); + else if(pid == 0) { + char **new_argv; + int i = 0; + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)a->ai_addr; + + new_argv = malloc((argc + 2) * sizeof(*new_argv)); + if (new_argv == NULL) + errx (1, "malloc: out of memory"); + new_argv[i] = argv[i]; + ++i; + if (optind == i) + new_argv[i++] = print_addr (sin); + new_argv[i++] = "-K"; + for(; i <= argc; ++i) + new_argv[i] = argv[i - 1]; + if (optind > 1) + new_argv[optind + 1] = print_addr(sin); + new_argv[argc + 1] = NULL; + execv(PATH_RSH, new_argv); + err(1, "execv(%s)", PATH_RSH); + } else { + int status; + + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + ; + if(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0) + return 0; + } + } + return 1; + } else { + int ret; + + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + ret = proto (priv_socket1, priv_socket2, + argv[optind], + local_user, remote_user, + cmd, cmd_len, + send_broken_auth); + return ret; + } +} + +static int +doit (const char *hostname, + const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, + int port, + const char *cmd, + size_t cmd_len, + int do_errsock, + int (*auth_func)(int s, + struct sockaddr *this, struct sockaddr *that, + const char *hostname, const char *remote_user, + const char *local_user, size_t cmd_len, + const char *cmd)) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + int ret; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + errx (1, "%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + int errsock; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + if (do_errsock) { + struct addrinfo *ea; + struct addrinfo hints; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = a->ai_socktype; + hints.ai_protocol = a->ai_protocol; + hints.ai_family = a->ai_family; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + error = getaddrinfo (NULL, "0", &hints, &ea); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + errsock = socket (ea->ai_family, ea->ai_socktype, ea->ai_protocol); + if (errsock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + if (bind (errsock, ea->ai_addr, ea->ai_addrlen) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + freeaddrinfo (ea); + } else + errsock = -1; + + freeaddrinfo (ai); + ret = proto (s, errsock, + hostname, + local_user, remote_user, + cmd, cmd_len, auth_func); + close (s); + return ret; + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return -1; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int use_v4 = -1; +#endif +static int use_v5 = -1; +static int use_only_broken = 0; +static int use_broken = 1; +static char *port_str; +static const char *user; +static int do_version; +static int do_help; +static int do_errsock = 1; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "krb4", '4', arg_flag, &use_v4, "Use Kerberos V4", + NULL }, +#endif + { "krb5", '5', arg_flag, &use_v5, "Use Kerberos V5", + NULL }, + { "broken", 'K', arg_flag, &use_only_broken, "Use priv port", + NULL }, + { "input", 'n', arg_negative_flag, &input, "Close stdin", + NULL }, + { "encrypt", 'x', arg_flag, &do_encrypt, "Encrypt connection", + NULL }, + { "encrypt", 'z', arg_negative_flag, &do_encrypt, + "Don't encrypt connection", NULL }, + { "forward", 'f', arg_flag, &do_forward, "Forward credentials", + NULL }, + { "forward", 'G', arg_negative_flag,&do_forward, "Forward credentials", + NULL }, + { "forwardable", 'F', arg_flag, &do_forwardable, + "Forward forwardable credentials", NULL }, + { "unique", 'u', arg_flag, &do_unique_tkfile, + "Use unique remote tkfile", NULL }, + { "tkfile", 'U', arg_string, &unique_tkfile, + "Use that remote tkfile", NULL }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "number-or-service" }, + { "user", 'l', arg_string, &user, "Run as this user", + NULL }, + { "stderr", 'e', arg_negative_flag, &do_errsock, "don't open stderr"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version, "Print version", + NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help, NULL, + NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "host [command]"); + exit (ret); +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int priv_port1, priv_port2; + int priv_socket1, priv_socket2; + int port = 0; + int optind = 0; + int ret = 1; + char *cmd; + size_t cmd_len; + const char *local_user; + char *host = NULL; + int host_index = -1; + int status; + + priv_port1 = priv_port2 = IPPORT_RESERVED-1; + priv_socket1 = rresvport(&priv_port1); + priv_socket2 = rresvport(&priv_port2); + setuid(getuid()); + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if (argc >= 2 && argv[1][0] != '-') { + host = argv[host_index = 1]; + optind = 1; + } + + status = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (status) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %u", status); + + do_forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "forwardable", + NULL); + + do_forward = krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "forward", + NULL); + + do_encrypt = krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "encrypt", + NULL); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + if (do_forwardable) + do_forward = 1; + +#if defined(KRB4) && defined(KRB5) + if(use_v4 == -1 && use_v5 == 1) + use_v4 = 0; + if(use_v5 == -1 && use_v4 == 1) + use_v5 = 0; +#endif + + if (use_only_broken) { +#ifdef KRB4 + use_v4 = 0; +#endif + use_v5 = 0; + } + + if (do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + if (do_unique_tkfile && unique_tkfile != NULL) + errx (1, "Only one of -u and -U allowed."); + + if (do_unique_tkfile) + strcpy(tkfile,"-u "); + else if (unique_tkfile != NULL) { + if (strchr(unique_tkfile,' ') != NULL) { + warnx("Space is not allowed in tkfilename"); + usage(1); + } + do_unique_tkfile = 1; + snprintf (tkfile, sizeof(tkfile), "-U %s ", unique_tkfile); + } + + if (host == NULL) { + if (argc - optind < 1) + usage (1); + else + host = argv[host_index = optind++]; + } + + if (optind == argc) { + close (priv_socket1); + close (priv_socket2); + argv[0] = "rlogin"; + execvp ("rlogin", argv); + err (1, "execvp rlogin"); + } + + if (port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + local_user = get_default_username (); + if (local_user == NULL) + errx (1, "who are you?"); + + if (user == NULL) + user = local_user; + + cmd_len = construct_command(&cmd, argc - optind, argv + optind); + + /* + * Try all different authentication methods + */ + + if (ret && use_v5) { + int tmp_port; + + if (port) + tmp_port = port; + else + tmp_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kshell", "tcp", 544); + + auth_method = AUTH_KRB5; + ret = doit (host, user, local_user, tmp_port, cmd, cmd_len, + do_errsock, + send_krb5_auth); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if (ret && use_v4) { + int tmp_port; + + if (port) + tmp_port = port; + else if (do_encrypt) + tmp_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "ekshell", "tcp", 545); + else + tmp_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kshell", "tcp", 544); + + auth_method = AUTH_KRB4; + ret = doit (host, user, local_user, tmp_port, cmd, cmd_len, + do_errsock, + send_krb4_auth); + } +#endif + if (ret && use_broken) { + int tmp_port; + + if(port) + tmp_port = port; + else + tmp_port = krb5_getportbyname(context, "shell", "tcp", 514); + auth_method = AUTH_BROKEN; + ret = doit_broken (argc, argv, host_index, host, + user, local_user, + tmp_port, + priv_socket1, + do_errsock ? priv_socket2 : -1, + cmd, cmd_len); + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecf0f85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rsh_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: rsh_locl.h,v 1.22 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +#define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEFPATH +#define _PATH_DEFPATH "/usr/bin:/bin" +#endif + +/* + * + */ + +enum auth_method { AUTH_KRB4, AUTH_KRB5, AUTH_BROKEN }; + +extern enum auth_method auth_method; +extern int do_encrypt; +extern krb5_context context; +extern krb5_keyblock *keyblock; +extern krb5_crypto crypto; +extern des_key_schedule schedule; +extern des_cblock iv; + +#define KCMD_VERSION "KCMDV0.1" + +#define USERNAME_SZ 16 +#define COMMAND_SZ 1024 + +#define RSH_BUFSIZ (16 * 1024) + +#define PATH_RSH BINDIR "/rsh" + +ssize_t do_read (int fd, void *buf, size_t sz); +ssize_t do_write (int fd, void *buf, size_t sz); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rshd.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rshd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9b6857 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/rsh/rshd.c @@ -0,0 +1,850 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "rsh_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: rshd.c,v 1.29 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +enum auth_method auth_method; + +krb5_context context; +krb5_keyblock *keyblock; +krb5_crypto crypto; +des_key_schedule schedule; +des_cblock iv; + +krb5_ccache ccache, ccache2; +int kerberos_status = 0; + +int do_encrypt = 0; + +static int do_unique_tkfile = 0; +static char tkfile[MAXPATHLEN] = ""; + +static int do_inetd = 1; +static char *port_str; +static int do_rhosts; +static int do_kerberos = 0; +static int do_vacuous = 0; +static int do_log = 1; +static int do_newpag = 1; +static int do_version; +static int do_help = 0; + +static void +syslog_and_die (const char *m, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, m); + vsyslog (LOG_ERR, m, args); + va_end(args); + exit (1); +} + +static void +fatal (int sock, const char *m, ...) +{ + va_list args; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + size_t len; + + *buf = 1; + va_start(args, m); + len = vsnprintf (buf + 1, sizeof(buf) - 1, m, args); + va_end(args); + syslog (LOG_ERR, buf + 1); + net_write (sock, buf, len + 1); + exit (1); +} + +static void +read_str (int s, char *str, size_t sz, char *expl) +{ + while (sz > 0) { + if (net_read (s, str, 1) != 1) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + if (*str == '\0') + return; + --sz; + ++str; + } + fatal (s, "%s too long", expl); +} + +static int +recv_bsd_auth (int s, u_char *buf, + struct sockaddr_in *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr_in *thataddr, + char *client_username, + char *server_username, + char *cmd) +{ + struct passwd *pwd; + + read_str (s, client_username, USERNAME_SZ, "local username"); + read_str (s, server_username, USERNAME_SZ, "remote username"); + read_str (s, cmd, COMMAND_SZ, "command"); + pwd = getpwnam(server_username); + if (pwd == NULL) + fatal(s, "Login incorrect."); + if (iruserok(thataddr->sin_addr.s_addr, pwd->pw_uid == 0, + client_username, server_username)) + fatal(s, "Login incorrect."); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +recv_krb4_auth (int s, u_char *buf, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + char *client_username, + char *server_username, + char *cmd) +{ + int status; + int32_t options; + KTEXT_ST ticket; + AUTH_DAT auth; + char instance[INST_SZ + 1]; + char version[KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN + 1]; + + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, 4) != 0) + return -1; + if (net_read (s, buf + 4, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) != + KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN - 4) + syslog_and_die ("reading auth info: %m"); + if (memcmp (buf, KRB_SENDAUTH_VERS, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) + syslog_and_die("unrecognized auth protocol: %.8s", buf); + + options = KOPT_IGNORE_PROTOCOL; + if (do_encrypt) + options |= KOPT_DO_MUTUAL; + k_getsockinst (s, instance, sizeof(instance)); + status = krb_recvauth (options, + s, + &ticket, + "rcmd", + instance, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thisaddr, + &auth, + "", + schedule, + version); + if (status != KSUCCESS) + syslog_and_die ("recvauth: %s", krb_get_err_text(status)); + if (strncmp (version, KCMD_VERSION, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0) + syslog_and_die ("bad version: %s", version); + + read_str (s, server_username, USERNAME_SZ, "remote username"); + if (kuserok (&auth, server_username) != 0) + fatal (s, "Permission denied"); + read_str (s, cmd, COMMAND_SZ, "command"); + + syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, + "kerberos v4 shell from %s on %s as %s, cmd '%.80s'", + krb_unparse_name_long(auth.pname, auth.pinst, auth.prealm), + + inet_ntoa(((struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr)->sin_addr), + server_username, + cmd); + + memcpy (iv, auth.session, sizeof(iv)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +static int +save_krb5_creds (int s, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_principal client) + +{ + int ret; + krb5_data remote_cred; + + krb5_data_zero (&remote_cred); + ret= krb5_read_message (context, (void *)&s, &remote_cred); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free(&remote_cred); + return 0; + } + if (remote_cred.length == 0) + return 0; + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free(&remote_cred); + return 0; + } + + krb5_cc_initialize(context,ccache,client); + ret = krb5_rd_cred(context, auth_context, ccache,&remote_cred); + krb5_data_free (&remote_cred); + if (ret) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static void +krb5_start_session (void) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_cc_resolve (context, tkfile, &ccache2); + if (ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache (context, ccache, ccache2); + if (ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return ; + } + + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache2); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return; +} + +static int +recv_krb5_auth (int s, u_char *buf, + struct sockaddr *thisaddr, + struct sockaddr *thataddr, + char *client_username, + char *server_username, + char *cmd) +{ + u_int32_t len; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_data cksum_data; + krb5_principal server; + + if (memcmp (buf, "\x00\x00\x00\x13", 4) != 0) + return -1; + len = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | (buf[3]); + + if (net_read(s, buf, len) != len) + syslog_and_die ("reading auth info: %m"); + if (len != sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + || memcmp (buf, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) != 0) + syslog_and_die ("bad sendauth version: %.8s", buf); + + status = krb5_sock_to_principal (context, + s, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_sock_to_principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_recvauth(context, + &auth_context, + &s, + KCMD_VERSION, + server, + KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + NULL, + &ticket); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_recvauth: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + read_str (s, server_username, USERNAME_SZ, "remote username"); + read_str (s, cmd, COMMAND_SZ, "command"); + read_str (s, client_username, COMMAND_SZ, "local username"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_getkey (context, auth_context, &keyblock); + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_auth_con_getkey: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_crypto_init(context, keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if(status) + syslog_and_die("krb5_crypto_init: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + + cksum_data.length = asprintf ((char **)&cksum_data.data, + "%u:%s%s", + ntohs(socket_get_port (thisaddr)), + cmd, + server_username); + + status = krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum(context, + auth_context, + cksum_data.data, + cksum_data.length); + + if (status) + syslog_and_die ("krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + free (cksum_data.data); + + if (strncmp (client_username, "-u ", 3) == 0) { + do_unique_tkfile = 1; + memmove (client_username, client_username + 3, + strlen(client_username) - 2); + } + + if (strncmp (client_username, "-U ", 3) == 0) { + char *end, *temp_tkfile; + + do_unique_tkfile = 1; + if (strncmp (server_username + 3, "FILE:", 5) == 0) { + temp_tkfile = tkfile; + } else { + strcpy (tkfile, "FILE:"); + temp_tkfile = tkfile + 5; + } + end = strchr(client_username + 3,' '); + strncpy(temp_tkfile, client_username + 3, end - client_username - 3); + temp_tkfile[end - client_username - 3] = '\0'; + memmove (client_username, end +1, strlen(end+1)+1); + } + + kerberos_status = save_krb5_creds (s, auth_context, ticket->client); + + if(!krb5_kuserok (context, + ticket->client, + server_username)) + fatal (s, "Permission denied"); + + if (strncmp (cmd, "-x ", 3) == 0) { + do_encrypt = 1; + memmove (cmd, cmd + 3, strlen(cmd) - 2); + } else { + do_encrypt = 0; + } + + { + char *name; + + if (krb5_unparse_name (context, ticket->client, &name) == 0) { + char addr_str[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (thataddr->sa_family, + socket_get_address (thataddr), + addr_str, sizeof(addr_str)) == NULL) + strlcpy (addr_str, "unknown address", + sizeof(addr_str)); + + syslog(LOG_INFO|LOG_AUTH, + "kerberos v5 shell from %s on %s as %s, cmd '%.80s'", + name, + addr_str, + server_username, + cmd); + free (name); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void +loop (int from0, int to0, + int to1, int from1, + int to2, int from2) +{ + fd_set real_readset; + int max_fd; + int count = 2; + + FD_ZERO(&real_readset); + FD_SET(from0, &real_readset); + FD_SET(from1, &real_readset); + FD_SET(from2, &real_readset); + max_fd = max(from0, max(from1, from2)) + 1; + for (;;) { + int ret; + fd_set readset = real_readset; + char buf[RSH_BUFSIZ]; + + ret = select (max_fd, &readset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + syslog_and_die ("select: %m"); + } + if (FD_ISSET(from0, &readset)) { + ret = do_read (from0, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (from0); + close (to0); + FD_CLR(from0, &real_readset); + } else + net_write (to0, buf, ret); + } + if (FD_ISSET(from1, &readset)) { + ret = read (from1, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (from1); + close (to1); + FD_CLR(from1, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + exit (0); + } else + do_write (to1, buf, ret); + } + if (FD_ISSET(from2, &readset)) { + ret = read (from2, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret < 0) + syslog_and_die ("read: %m"); + else if (ret == 0) { + close (from2); + close (to2); + FD_CLR(from2, &real_readset); + if (--count == 0) + exit (0); + } else + do_write (to2, buf, ret); + } + } +} + +/* + * Used by `setup_copier' to create some pipe-like means of + * communcation. Real pipes would probably be the best thing, but + * then the shell doesn't understand it's talking to rshd. If + * socketpair doesn't work everywhere, some autoconf magic would have + * to be added here. + * + * If it fails creating the `pipe', it aborts by calling fatal. + */ + +static void +pipe_a_like (int fd[2]) +{ + if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fd) < 0) + fatal (STDOUT_FILENO, "socketpair: %m"); +} + +/* + * Start a child process and leave the parent copying data to and from it. */ + +static void +setup_copier (void) +{ + int p0[2], p1[2], p2[2]; + pid_t pid; + + pipe_a_like(p0); + pipe_a_like(p1); + pipe_a_like(p2); + pid = fork (); + if (pid < 0) + fatal (STDOUT_FILENO, "fork: %m"); + if (pid == 0) { /* child */ + close (p0[1]); + close (p1[0]); + close (p2[0]); + dup2 (p0[0], STDIN_FILENO); + dup2 (p1[1], STDOUT_FILENO); + dup2 (p2[1], STDERR_FILENO); + close (p0[0]); + close (p1[1]); + close (p2[1]); + } else { /* parent */ + close (p0[0]); + close (p1[1]); + close (p2[1]); + + if (net_write (STDOUT_FILENO, "", 1) != 1) + fatal (STDOUT_FILENO, "write failed"); + + loop (STDIN_FILENO, p0[1], + STDOUT_FILENO, p1[0], + STDERR_FILENO, p2[0]); + } +} + +/* + * Is `port' a ``reserverd'' port? + */ + +static int +is_reserved(u_short port) +{ + return ntohs(port) < IPPORT_RESERVED; +} + +/* + * Set the necessary part of the environment in `env'. + */ + +static void +setup_environment (char *env[7], struct passwd *pwd) +{ + asprintf (&env[0], "USER=%s", pwd->pw_name); + asprintf (&env[1], "HOME=%s", pwd->pw_dir); + asprintf (&env[2], "SHELL=%s", pwd->pw_shell); + asprintf (&env[3], "PATH=%s", _PATH_DEFPATH); + asprintf (&env[4], "SSH_CLIENT=only_to_make_bash_happy"); + if (do_unique_tkfile) + asprintf (&env[5], "KRB5CCNAME=%s", tkfile); + else env[5] = NULL; + env[6] = NULL; +} + +static void +doit (int do_kerberos, int check_rhosts) +{ + u_char buf[BUFSIZ]; + u_char *p; + struct sockaddr_storage thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thisaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thisaddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *thataddr = (struct sockaddr *)&thataddr_ss; + struct sockaddr_storage erraddr_ss; + struct sockaddr *erraddr = (struct sockaddr *)&erraddr_ss; + int addrlen; + int port; + int errsock = -1; + char client_user[COMMAND_SZ], server_user[USERNAME_SZ]; + char cmd[COMMAND_SZ]; + struct passwd *pwd; + int s = STDIN_FILENO; + char *env[7]; + + addrlen = sizeof(thisaddr_ss); + if (getsockname (s, thisaddr, &addrlen) < 0) + syslog_and_die("getsockname: %m"); + addrlen = sizeof(thataddr_ss); + if (getpeername (s, thataddr, &addrlen) < 0) + syslog_and_die ("getpeername: %m"); + + if (!do_kerberos && !is_reserved(socket_get_port(thataddr))) + fatal(s, "Permission denied"); + + p = buf; + port = 0; + for(;;) { + if (net_read (s, p, 1) != 1) + syslog_and_die ("reading port number: %m"); + if (*p == '\0') + break; + else if (isdigit(*p)) + port = port * 10 + *p - '0'; + else + syslog_and_die ("non-digit in port number: %c", *p); + } + + if (!do_kerberos && !is_reserved(htons(port))) + fatal(s, "Permission denied"); + + if (port) { + int priv_port = IPPORT_RESERVED - 1; + + /* + * There's no reason to require a ``privileged'' port number + * here, but for some reason the brain dead rsh clients + * do... :-( + */ + + erraddr->sa_family = thataddr->sa_family; + socket_set_address_and_port (erraddr, + socket_get_address (thataddr), + htons(port)); + + /* + * we only do reserved port for IPv4 + */ + + if (erraddr->sa_family == AF_INET) + errsock = rresvport (&priv_port); + else + errsock = socket (erraddr->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (errsock < 0) + syslog_and_die ("socket: %m"); + if (connect (errsock, + erraddr, + socket_sockaddr_size (erraddr)) < 0) + syslog_and_die ("connect: %m"); + } + + if(do_kerberos) { + if (net_read (s, buf, 4) != 4) + syslog_and_die ("reading auth info: %m"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (recv_krb4_auth (s, buf, thisaddr, thataddr, + client_user, + server_user, + cmd) == 0) + auth_method = AUTH_KRB4; + else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + if(recv_krb5_auth (s, buf, thisaddr, thataddr, + client_user, + server_user, + cmd) == 0) + auth_method = AUTH_KRB5; + else + syslog_and_die ("unrecognized auth protocol: %x %x %x %x", + buf[0], buf[1], buf[2], buf[3]); + } else { + if(recv_bsd_auth (s, buf, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thisaddr, + (struct sockaddr_in *)thataddr, + client_user, + server_user, + cmd) == 0) { + auth_method = AUTH_BROKEN; + if(do_vacuous) { + printf("Remote host requires Kerberos authentication\n"); + exit(0); + } + } else + syslog_and_die("recv_bsd_auth failed"); + } + + pwd = getpwnam (server_user); + if (pwd == NULL) + fatal (s, "Login incorrect."); + + if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0') + pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + if (pwd->pw_uid != 0 && access (_PATH_NOLOGIN, F_OK) == 0) + fatal (s, "Login disabled."); + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + { + struct spwd *sp; + long today; + + sp = getspnam(server_user); + today = time(0)/(24L * 60 * 60); + if (sp->sp_expire > 0) + if (today > sp->sp_expire) + fatal(s, "Account has expired."); + } +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOGIN + if (setlogin(pwd->pw_name) < 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setlogin() failed: %m"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED + if (setpcred (pwd->pw_name, NULL) == -1) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "setpcred() failure: %m"); +#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ + if (initgroups (pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal (s, "Login incorrect."); + + if (setgid(pwd->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal (s, "Login incorrect."); + + if (setuid (pwd->pw_uid) < 0) + fatal (s, "Login incorrect."); + +#ifdef KRB5 + { + int fd; + + if (!do_unique_tkfile) + snprintf(tkfile,sizeof(tkfile),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u",pwd->pw_uid); + else if (*tkfile=='\0') { + snprintf(tkfile,sizeof(tkfile),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_XXXXXX"); + fd = mkstemp(tkfile+5); + close(fd); + unlink(tkfile+5); + } + + if (kerberos_status) + krb5_start_session(); + } +#endif + + if (chdir (pwd->pw_dir) < 0) + fatal (s, "Remote directory."); + + if (errsock >= 0) { + if (dup2 (errsock, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) + fatal (s, "Dup2 failed."); + close (errsock); + } + + setup_environment (env, pwd); + + if (do_encrypt) { + setup_copier (); + } else { + if (net_write (s, "", 1) != 1) + fatal (s, "write failed"); + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if(k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + + if(do_newpag) + k_setpag(); + if (k_afs_cell_of_file (pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog_uid_home (cell, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + + krb_afslog_uid_home(NULL, NULL, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + +#ifdef KRB5 + /* XXX */ + { + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_error_code status; + + status = krb5_cc_resolve (context, tkfile, &ccache); + if (!status) { + krb5_afslog_uid_home(context,ccache,NULL,NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + } + } +#endif /* KRB5 */ + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + execle (pwd->pw_shell, pwd->pw_shell, "-c", cmd, NULL, env); + err(1, "exec %s", pwd->pw_shell); +} + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "inetd", 'i', arg_negative_flag, &do_inetd, + "Not started from inetd" }, + { "kerberos", 'k', arg_flag, &do_kerberos, + "Implement kerberised services" }, + { "encrypt", 'x', arg_flag, &do_encrypt, + "Implement encrypted service" }, + { "rhosts", 'l', arg_flag, &do_rhosts, + "Check users .rhosts" }, + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "Use this port", + "port" }, + { "vacuous", 'v', arg_flag, &do_vacuous, + "Don't accept non-kerberised connections" }, + { NULL, 'P', arg_negative_flag, &do_newpag, + "Don't put process in new PAG" }, + /* compatibility flag: */ + { NULL, 'L', arg_flag, &do_log }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &do_version }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &do_help } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + if(isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + ""); + else + syslog (LOG_ERR, "Usage: %s [-ikxlvPL] [-p port]", __progname); + exit (ret); +} + + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int port = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + roken_openlog ("rshd", LOG_ODELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH); + + if (getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage(1); + + if(do_help) + usage (0); + + if (do_version) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_init_context (&context); +#endif + + if(port_str) { + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname (port_str, "tcp"); + + if (s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + syslog_and_die("Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (do_encrypt) + do_kerberos = 1; + + if (!do_inetd) { + if (port == 0) { + if (do_kerberos) { + if (do_encrypt) + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "ekshell", "tcp", 545); + else + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kshell", "tcp", 544); + } else { + port = krb5_getportbyname(context, "shell", "tcp", 514); + } + } + mini_inetd (port); + } + + signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + doit (do_kerberos, do_rhosts); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..030808d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: use LIB_roken + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (krb5_verify): use krb5_verify_user_lrealm + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c: add support for shadow passwords and rewrite some logic. + From Miroslav Ruda + + * Makefile.am: add libkafs + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (main): conditionalize `getlogin' + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (verfiy_krb5): get the name out of the ccache before + closing it + +1999-05-05 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c: some more error checking + +Wed Apr 21 21:04:36 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * su.c (-f): implement + + * su.c: implement -i + (verify_krb5): correct the ownership on the credential cache + +Tue Apr 20 13:26:13 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * su.c: don't depend on paths.h + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0fe379 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.3 1999/10/19 23:00:37 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +noinst_PROGRAMS = su +#bin_SUIDS = su +su_SOURCES = su.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72b8198 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,620 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.3 1999/10/19 23:00:37 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ 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$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +noinst_PROGRAMS = su +#bin_SUIDS = su +su_SOURCES = su.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +noinst_PROGRAMS = su$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +su_OBJECTS = su.$(OBJEXT) +su_LDADD = $(LDADD) +@KRB4_TRUE@su_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la \ 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banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/su.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/su.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..049a4d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/su/su.c @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: su.c,v 1.10 1999/09/28 02:34:17 assar Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef _PATH_DEFPATH +#define _PATH_DEFPATH "/usr/bin:/bin" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +int kerberos_flag = 1; +int csh_f_flag; +int full_login; +int env_flag; +char *kerberos_instance = "root"; +int help_flag; +int version_flag; +char *cmd; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "kerberos", 'K', arg_negative_flag, &kerberos_flag, + "don't use kerberos" }, + { NULL, 'f', arg_flag, &csh_f_flag, + "don't read .cshrc" }, + { "full", 'l', arg_flag, &full_login, + "simulate full login" }, + { NULL, 'm', arg_flag, &env_flag, + "leave environment unmodified" }, + { "instance", 'i', arg_string, &kerberos_instance, + "root instance to use" }, + { "command", 'c', arg_string, &cmd, + "command to execute" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, +}; + + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[login [shell arguments]]"); + exit (ret); +} + +static struct passwd* +make_info(struct passwd *pwd) +{ + struct passwd *info; + info = malloc(sizeof(*info)); + if(info == NULL) + return NULL; + info->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name); + info->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd); + info->pw_uid = pwd->pw_uid; + info->pw_gid = pwd->pw_gid; + info->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir); + info->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell); + if(info->pw_name == NULL || info->pw_passwd == NULL || + info->pw_dir == NULL || info->pw_shell == NULL) + return NULL; + return info; +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_ccache ccache; +#endif + +static int +krb5_verify(struct passwd *login_info, struct passwd *su_info, + const char *kerberos_instance) +{ +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal p; + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) { +#if 0 + warnx("krb5_init_context failed: %u", ret); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (strcmp (su_info->pw_name, "root") == 0) + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &p, NULL, + login_info->pw_name, + kerberos_instance, + NULL); + else + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &p, NULL, + su_info->pw_name, + NULL); + if(ret) + return 1; + + if(su_info->pw_uid != 0 || krb5_kuserok(context, p, su_info->pw_name)) { + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); + if(ret) { +#if 1 + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_gen_new"); +#endif + return 1; + } + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(context, p, ccache, NULL, TRUE, NULL); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, p); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + switch (ret) { + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: + krb5_warnx(context, "Password incorrect"); + break; + default : + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_verify_user"); + break; + } + return 1; + } + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +krb5_start_session(void) +{ + krb5_ccache ccache2; + char *cc_name; + int ret; + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache2); + if (ret) { + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_copy_cache(context, ccache, ccache2); + + asprintf(&cc_name, "%s:%s", krb5_cc_get_type(context, ccache2), + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache2)); + setenv("KRB5CCNAME", cc_name, 1); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if(k_hasafs()) { + if (k_setpag() == 0) + krb5_afslog(context, ccache2, NULL, NULL); + } +#endif + + krb5_cc_close(context, ccache2); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int +verify_unix(struct passwd *su) +{ + char prompt[128]; + char pw_buf[1024]; + char *pw; + int r; + if(su->pw_passwd != NULL && *su->pw_passwd != '\0') { + sprintf(prompt, "%s's password: ", su->pw_name); + r = des_read_pw_string(pw_buf, sizeof(pw_buf), prompt, 0); + if(r != 0) + exit(0); + pw = crypt(pw_buf, su->pw_passwd); + memset(pw_buf, 0, sizeof(pw_buf)); + if(strcmp(pw, su->pw_passwd) != 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, optind = 0; + char *su_user; + struct passwd *su_info; + char *login_user = NULL; + struct passwd *login_info; + + struct passwd *pwd; + + char *shell; + + int ok = 0; + int kerberos_error=1; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + for (i=0; i < optind; i++) + if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0) { + full_login = 1; + break; + } + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + if(optind >= argc) + su_user = "root"; + else + su_user = argv[optind++]; + + pwd = k_getpwnam(su_user); + if(pwd == NULL) + errx (1, "unknown login %s", su_user); + if (pwd->pw_uid == 0 && strcmp ("root", su_user) != 0) { + syslog (LOG_ALERT, "NIS attack, user %s has uid 0", su_user); + errx (1, "unknown login %s", su_user); + } + su_info = make_info(pwd); + +#if defined(HAVE_GETLOGIN) && !defined(POSIX_GETLOGIN) + login_user = getlogin(); +#endif + if(login_user == NULL || (pwd = getpwnam(login_user)) == NULL) + pwd = getpwuid(getuid()); + if(pwd == NULL) + errx(1, "who are you?"); + login_info = make_info(pwd); + if(env_flag) + shell = login_info->pw_shell; + else + shell = su_info->pw_shell; + if(shell == NULL || *shell == '\0') + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + if(kerberos_flag && ok == 0 && + (kerberos_error=krb5_verify(login_info, su_info, kerberos_instance)) == 0) + ok++; + + if(ok == 0 && login_info->pw_uid && verify_unix(su_info) != 0) { + printf("Sorry!\n"); + exit(1); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM + { struct spwd *sp; + long today; + + sp=getspnam(su_info->pw_name); + if (sp==NULL) + errx(1,"Have not rights to read shadow passwords!"); + today = time(0)/(24L * 60 * 60); + if (sp->sp_expire > 0) { + if (today >= sp->sp_expire) { + if (login_info->pw_uid) + errx(1,"Your account has expired."); + else + printf("Your account has expired."); + } + else if (sp->sp_expire - today < 14) + printf("Your account will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_expire - today)); + } + if (sp->sp_max > 0) { + if (today >= sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max) { + if (login_info->pw_uid) + errx(1,"Your password has expired. Choose a new one."); + else + printf("Your password has expired. Choose a new one."); + } + else if (today >= sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - sp->sp_warn) + printf("Your account will expire in %d days.\n", + (int)(sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max -today)); + } + } +#endif + { + char *tty = ttyname (STDERR_FILENO); + syslog (LOG_NOTICE | LOG_AUTH, tty ? "%s to %s" : "%s to %s on %s", + login_info->pw_name, su_info->pw_name, tty); + } + + + if(!env_flag) { + if(full_login) { + char *t = getenv ("TERM"); + + environ = malloc (10 * sizeof (char *)); + if (environ == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + environ[0] = NULL; + setenv ("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1); + if (t) + setenv ("TERM", t, 1); + if (chdir (su_info->pw_dir) < 0) + errx (1, "no directory"); + } + if (full_login || su_info->pw_uid) + setenv ("USER", su_info->pw_name, 1); + setenv("HOME", su_info->pw_dir, 1); + setenv("SHELL", shell, 1); + } + + { + int i; + char **args; + char *p; + + p = strrchr(shell, '/'); + if(p) + p++; + else + p = shell; + + if (strcmp(p, "csh") != 0) + csh_f_flag = 0; + + args = malloc(((cmd ? 2 : 0) + 1 + argc - optind + 1 + csh_f_flag) * sizeof(*args)); + if (args == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + i = 0; + if(full_login) + asprintf(&args[i++], "-%s", p); + else + args[i++] = p; + if (cmd) { + args[i++] = "-c"; + args[i++] = cmd; + } + + if (csh_f_flag) + args[i++] = "-f"; + + for (argv += optind; *argv; ++argv) + args[i++] = *argv; + args[i] = NULL; + + if(setgid(su_info->pw_gid) < 0) + err(1, "setgid"); + if (initgroups (su_info->pw_name, su_info->pw_gid) < 0) + err (1, "initgroups"); + if(setuid(su_info->pw_uid) < 0) + err(1, "setuid"); + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (!kerberos_error) + krb5_start_session(); +#endif + execv(shell, args); + } + + exit(1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ae5cba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 1999/09/21 05:06:19 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +noinst_PROGRAMS = tcp_client tcp_server gssapi_server gssapi_client \ + uu_server uu_client nt_gss_server nt_gss_client + +tcp_client_SOURCES = tcp_client.c common.c test_locl.h + +tcp_server_SOURCES = tcp_server.c common.c test_locl.h + +gssapi_server_SOURCES = gssapi_server.c gss_common.c common.c \ + gss_common.h test_locl.h + +gssapi_client_SOURCES = gssapi_client.c gss_common.c common.c \ + gss_common.h test_locl.h + +uu_server_SOURCES = uu_server.c common.c test_locl.h + +uu_client_SOURCES = uu_client.c common.c test_locl.h + +gssapi_server_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la $(LDADD) + +gssapi_client_LDADD = $(gssapi_server_LDADD) + +nt_gss_client_SOURCES = nt_gss_client.c nt_gss_common.c common.c + +nt_gss_server_SOURCES = nt_gss_server.c nt_gss_common.c + +nt_gss_client_LDADD = $(gssapi_server_LDADD) + +nt_gss_server_LDADD = $(nt_gss_client_LDADD) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..acada82 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,708 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.13 1999/09/21 05:06:19 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +noinst_PROGRAMS = tcp_client tcp_server gssapi_server gssapi_client uu_server uu_client nt_gss_server nt_gss_client + + +tcp_client_SOURCES = tcp_client.c common.c test_locl.h + +tcp_server_SOURCES = tcp_server.c common.c test_locl.h + +gssapi_server_SOURCES = gssapi_server.c gss_common.c common.c gss_common.h test_locl.h + + +gssapi_client_SOURCES = gssapi_client.c gss_common.c common.c gss_common.h test_locl.h + + +uu_server_SOURCES = uu_server.c common.c test_locl.h + +uu_client_SOURCES = uu_client.c common.c test_locl.h + +gssapi_server_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la $(LDADD) + +gssapi_client_LDADD = $(gssapi_server_LDADD) + +nt_gss_client_SOURCES = nt_gss_client.c nt_gss_common.c common.c + +nt_gss_server_SOURCES = nt_gss_server.c nt_gss_common.c + +nt_gss_client_LDADD = $(gssapi_server_LDADD) + +nt_gss_server_LDADD = $(nt_gss_client_LDADD) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +noinst_PROGRAMS = tcp_client$(EXEEXT) tcp_server$(EXEEXT) \ +gssapi_server$(EXEEXT) gssapi_client$(EXEEXT) uu_server$(EXEEXT) \ +uu_client$(EXEEXT) nt_gss_server$(EXEEXT) nt_gss_client$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +tcp_client_OBJECTS = tcp_client.$(OBJEXT) common.$(OBJEXT) +tcp_client_LDADD = $(LDADD) +tcp_client_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +tcp_client_LDFLAGS = +tcp_server_OBJECTS = tcp_server.$(OBJEXT) common.$(OBJEXT) +tcp_server_LDADD = $(LDADD) +tcp_server_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +tcp_server_LDFLAGS = +gssapi_server_OBJECTS = gssapi_server.$(OBJEXT) gss_common.$(OBJEXT) \ +common.$(OBJEXT) +gssapi_server_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +gssapi_server_LDFLAGS = +gssapi_client_OBJECTS = gssapi_client.$(OBJEXT) gss_common.$(OBJEXT) \ +common.$(OBJEXT) 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variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/common.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cd4e85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.9 1999/12/16 10:29:18 assar Exp $"); + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +char *service = SERVICE; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "service", 's', arg_string, &service, "service to use", "service" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +server_usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +static void +client_usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "host"); + exit(code); +} + + +static int +common_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int)) +{ + int port = 0; + *argc = krb5_program_setup(context, *argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + (*usage)(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str){ + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, PORT, "tcp", 4711); + + return port; +} + +int +server_setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = common_setup(context, &argc, argv, server_usage); + if(argv[argc] != NULL) + server_usage(1, args, num_args); + return port; +} + +int +client_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = *argc; + int port = common_setup(context, &optind, argv, client_usage); + if(*argc - optind != 1) + client_usage(1, args, num_args); + *argc = optind; + return port; +} + +int +client_doit (const char *hostname, int port, const char *service, + int (*func)(int, const char *hostname, const char *service)) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + errx (1, "%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return (*func) (s, hostname, service); + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c82ba13 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "gss_common.h" +RCSID("$Id: gss_common.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $"); + +void +write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + u_int32_t len, net_len; + OM_uint32 min_stat; + + len = buf->length; + + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (write (sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "write"); + if (write (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "write"); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, buf); +} + +void +read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + u_int32_t len, net_len; + + if (read(sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "read"); + len = ntohl(net_len); + buf->length = len; + buf->value = malloc(len); + if (read (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "read"); +} + +void +gss_print_errors (int min_stat) +{ + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + OM_uint32 ret; + + do { + ret = gss_display_status (&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", (char *)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer (&new_stat, &status_string); + } while (!GSS_ERROR(ret) && msg_ctx != 0); +} + +void +gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + vwarnx (fmt, ap); + gss_print_errors (status); + exit (exitval); +} + +void +gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + gss_verr (exitval, status, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..775126b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gss_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gss_common.h,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:04:56 joda Exp $ */ + +void write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); +void read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); + +void gss_print_errors (int min_stat); + +void gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))); + +void gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_client.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d15b99 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "gss_common.h" +RCSID("$Id: gssapi_client.c,v 1.10 1999/12/04 18:15:50 assar Exp $"); + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + int addrlen; + + int context_established = 0; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_t input_token, output_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t server; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + + name_token.length = asprintf ((char **)&name_token.value, + "%s@%s", service, hostname); + + maj_stat = gss_import_name (&min_stat, + &name_token, + GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &server); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, + "Error importing name `%s@%s':\n", service, hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname(%s)", hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername(%s)", hostname); + + input_token = &real_input_token; + output_token = &real_output_token; + + input_token->length = 0; + output_token->length = 0; + + while(!context_established) { + maj_stat = + gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &context_hdl, + server, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, + 0, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_init_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + read_token (sock, input_token); + } else { + context_established = 1; + } + + } + + /* get_mic */ + + input_token->length = 3; + input_token->value = strdup("hej"); + + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, + context_hdl, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_get_mic"); + + write_token (sock, input_token); + write_token (sock, output_token); + + /* wrap */ + + input_token->length = 7; + input_token->value = "hemligt"; + + + maj_stat = gss_wrap (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + 1, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_wrap"); + + write_token (sock, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; /* XXX */ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_server.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a17ce3e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/gssapi_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "gss_common.h" +RCSID("$Id: gssapi_server.c,v 1.10 1999/12/16 10:29:41 assar Exp $"); + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + int addrlen; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_t input_token, output_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t client_name; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname)"); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername"); + + input_token = &real_input_token; + output_token = &real_output_token; + + do { + read_token (sock, input_token); + maj_stat = + gss_accept_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + input_token, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + &client_name, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_accept_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + } while(maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + maj_stat = gss_display_name (&min_stat, + client_name, + &name_token, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_display_name"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%.*s'\n", (int)name_token.length, + (char *)name_token.value); + + /* gss_verify_mic */ + + read_token (sock, input_token); + read_token (sock, output_token); + + maj_stat = gss_verify_mic (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + input_token, + output_token, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_verify_mic"); + + fprintf (stderr, "gss_verify_mic: %.*s\n", (int)input_token->length, + (char *)input_token->value); + + /* gss_unwrap */ + + read_token (sock, input_token); + + maj_stat = gss_unwrap (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + input_token, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_unwrap"); + + fprintf (stderr, "gss_unwrap: %.*s\n", (int)output_token->length, + (char *)output_token->value); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + int sock, sock2; + struct sockaddr_in my_addr; + int one = 1; + + sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + + memset (&my_addr, 0, sizeof(my_addr)); + my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + my_addr.sin_port = port; + my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); + + if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(my_addr)) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + + if (listen (sock, 1) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + + sock2 = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); + if (sock2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + + return proto (sock2, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context = NULL; /* XXX */ + int port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e77f9f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "nt_gss_common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: nt_gss_client.c,v 1.3 1999/12/04 18:16:19 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * This program tries to act as a client for the sample in `Sample + * SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + */ + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + int addrlen; + + int context_established = 0; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_t input_token, output_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t server; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + + name_token.length = asprintf ((char **)&name_token.value, + "%s@%s", service, hostname); + + maj_stat = gss_import_name (&min_stat, + &name_token, + GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, + &server); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, + "Error importing name `%s@%s':\n", service, hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname(%s)", hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername(%s)", hostname); + + input_token = &real_input_token; + output_token = &real_output_token; + + input_token->length = 0; + output_token->length = 0; + + while(!context_established) { + maj_stat = + gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + &context_hdl, + server, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, + 0, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_init_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + nt_read_token (sock, input_token); + } else { + context_established = 1; + } + + } + + /* get_mic */ + + input_token->length = 3; + input_token->value = strdup("hej"); + + maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, + context_hdl, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_get_mic"); + + nt_write_token (sock, input_token); + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + /* wrap */ + + input_token->length = 7; + input_token->value = "hemligt"; + + + maj_stat = gss_wrap (&min_stat, + context_hdl, + 1, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + input_token, + NULL, + output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_wrap"); + + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; /* XXX */ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab10355 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include "nt_gss_common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: nt_gss_common.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * These are functions that are needed to interoperate with the + * `Sample SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + */ + +/* + * Write the `gss_buffer_t' in `buf' onto the fd `sock', but remember that + * the length is written in little-endian-order. + */ + +void +nt_write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + unsigned char net_len[4]; + u_int32_t len; + OM_uint32 min_stat; + + len = buf->length; + + net_len[0] = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + net_len[1] = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + net_len[2] = (len >> 16) & 0xFF; + net_len[3] = (len >> 24) & 0xFF; + + if (write (sock, net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "write"); + if (write (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "write"); + + gss_release_buffer (&min_stat, buf); +} + +/* + * + */ + +void +nt_read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf) +{ + unsigned char net_len[4]; + u_int32_t len; + + if (read(sock, net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "read"); + len = (net_len[0] << 0) + | (net_len[1] << 8) + | (net_len[2] << 16) + | (net_len[3] << 24); + + buf->length = len; + buf->value = malloc(len); + if (read (sock, buf->value, len) != len) + err (1, "read"); +} + +void +gss_print_errors (int min_stat) +{ + OM_uint32 new_stat; + OM_uint32 msg_ctx = 0; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + OM_uint32 ret; + + do { + ret = gss_display_status (&new_stat, + min_stat, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &msg_ctx, + &status_string); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", (char *)status_string.value); + gss_release_buffer (&new_stat, &status_string); + } while (!GSS_ERROR(ret) && msg_ctx != 0); +} + +void +gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + vwarnx (fmt, ap); + gss_print_errors (status); + exit (exitval); +} + +void +gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + gss_verr (exitval, status, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07428dd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: nt_gss_common.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $ */ + +void nt_write_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); +void nt_read_token (int sock, gss_buffer_t buf); + +void gss_print_errors (int min_stat); + +void gss_verr(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))); + +void gss_err(int exitval, int status, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9781ed1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/nt_gss_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include "nt_gss_common.h" + +RCSID("$Id: nt_gss_server.c,v 1.3 1999/12/16 10:29:58 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * This program tries to act as a server for the sample in `Sample + * SSPI Code' in Windows 2000 RC1 SDK. + * + * use --dump-add to get a binary dump of the authorization data in the ticket + */ + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *port_str; +char *service = SERVICE; +static char *auth_file; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "port", 'p', arg_string, &port_str, "port to listen to", "port" }, + { "service", 's', arg_string, &service, "service to use", "service" }, + { "dump-auth", 0, arg_string, &auth_file, "dump authorization data", + "file" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + int addrlen; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + gss_buffer_t input_token, output_token; + gss_buffer_desc real_input_token, real_output_token; + OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; + gss_name_t client_name; + gss_buffer_desc name_token; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname)"); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername"); + + input_token = &real_input_token; + output_token = &real_output_token; + + do { + nt_read_token (sock, input_token); + maj_stat = + gss_accept_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + input_token, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + &client_name, + NULL, + output_token, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if(GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_accept_sec_context"); + if (output_token->length != 0) + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context (&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + } + } while(maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + if (auth_file != NULL) { + int fd = open (auth_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0666); + krb5_ticket *ticket = context_hdl->ticket; + krb5_data *data = &ticket->ticket.authorization_data->val[0].ad_data; + + if(fd < 0) + err (1, "open %s", auth_file); + if (write (fd, data->data, data->length) != data->length) + errx (1, "write to %s failed", auth_file); + if (close (fd)) + err (1, "close %s", auth_file); + } + + maj_stat = gss_display_name (&min_stat, + client_name, + &name_token, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) + gss_err (1, min_stat, "gss_display_name"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%.*s'\n", (int)name_token.length, + (char *)name_token.value); + + /* write something back */ + + output_token->value = strdup ("hejsan"); + output_token->length = strlen (output_token->value) + 1; + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + output_token->value = strdup ("hoppsan"); + output_token->length = strlen (output_token->value) + 1; + nt_write_token (sock, output_token); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + int sock, sock2; + struct sockaddr_in my_addr; + int one = 1; + + sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + + memset (&my_addr, 0, sizeof(my_addr)); + my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + my_addr.sin_port = port; + my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); + + if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(my_addr)) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + + if (listen (sock, 1) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + + sock2 = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); + if (sock2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + + return proto (sock2, service); +} + +static void +usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +static int +common_setup(krb5_context *context, int *argc, char **argv, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int)) +{ + int port = 0; + *argc = krb5_program_setup(context, *argc, argv, args, num_args, usage); + + if(help_flag) + (*usage)(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(port_str){ + struct servent *s = roken_getservbyname(port_str, "tcp"); + if(s) + port = s->s_port; + else { + char *ptr; + + port = strtol (port_str, &ptr, 10); + if (port == 0 && ptr == port_str) + errx (1, "Bad port `%s'", port_str); + port = htons(port); + } + } + + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (*context, PORT, "tcp", 4711); + + return port; +} + +static int +setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = common_setup(context, &argc, argv, usage); + if(argv[argc] != NULL) + usage(1, args, num_args); + return port; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context = NULL; /* XXX */ + int port = setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_client.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7affc43 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: tcp_client.c,v 1.15 1999/12/16 10:30:17 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data packet; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd"); + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + status = krb5_sendauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + + data.data = "hej"; + data.length = 3; + + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_safe (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe"); + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + + data.data = "hemligt"; + data.length = 7; + + krb5_data_free (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + + len = packet.length; + net_len = htonl(len); + + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, &net_len, 4) != 4) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + if (krb5_net_write (context, &sock, packet.data, len) != len) + err (1, "krb5_net_write"); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_server.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4469c58 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/tcp_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: tcp_server.c,v 1.16 1999/12/16 10:31:08 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *name; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_data data; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + ssize_t n; + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + auth_context, + &sock); + + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd"); + + if(gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "gethostname"); + + status = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hostname, + service, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + status = krb5_recvauth (context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + server, + 0, + NULL, + &ticket); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_recvauth"); + + status = krb5_unparse_name (context, + ticket->client, + &name); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%s'\n", name); + free (name); + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, &net_len, 4); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + len = ntohl(net_len); + + krb5_data_alloc (&packet, len); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, packet.data, len); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + status = krb5_rd_safe (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_rd_safe"); + + fprintf (stderr, "safe packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, &net_len, 4); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + len = ntohl(net_len); + + krb5_data_alloc (&packet, len); + + n = krb5_net_read (context, &sock, packet.data, len); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + + status = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err (context, 1, status, "krb5_rd_priv"); + + fprintf (stderr, "priv packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + mini_inetd (port); + + return proto (STDIN_FILENO, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/test_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/test_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..045d060 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/test_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: test_locl.h,v 1.7 1999/12/04 18:17:07 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define SERVICE "test" + +#define PORT "test" + +extern char *service; +int server_setup(krb5_context*, int, char**); +int client_setup(krb5_context*, int*, char**); +int client_doit (const char *hostname, int port, const char *service, + int (*func)(int, const char *hostname, const char *service)); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_client.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..204f919 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: uu_client.c,v 1.5 1999/12/04 18:17:26 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *hostname, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + int addrlen; + krb5_address remote_addr, local_addr; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname(%s)", hostname); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername(%s)", hostname); + + status = krb5_init_context(&context); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_init_context"); + + status = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_cc_default"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + + local_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + local_addr.address.length = sizeof(local.sin_addr); + local_addr.address.data = &local.sin_addr; + + remote_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + remote_addr.address.length = sizeof(remote.sin_addr); + remote_addr.address.data = &remote.sin_addr; + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + &local_addr, + &remote_addr); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + + status = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &client); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + status = krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, + *krb5_princ_realm(context, client), + "krbtgt", + *krb5_princ_realm(context, client), + NULL); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_make_principal"); + + status = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_cc_retrieve_cred"); + + { + char *client_name; + krb5_data data; + status = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred.client, &client_name); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_unparse_name"); + data.data = client_name; + data.length = strlen(client_name) + 1; + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &data); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + free(client_name); + } + + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &cred.ticket); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_setuserkey(context, auth_context, &cred.session); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_auth_con_setuserkey"); + + status = krb5_recvauth(context, &auth_context, &sock, + VERSION, client, 0, NULL, NULL); + + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_recvauth"); + + data.data = "hej"; + data.length = 3; + + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_safe (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_safe"); + + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + + data.data = "hemligt"; + data.length = 7; + + krb5_data_free (&packet); + + status = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_mk_priv"); + + status = krb5_write_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_write_message"); + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = client_setup(&context, &argc, argv); + return client_doit (argv[argc], port, service, proto); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_server.c b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fabfea2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/appl/test/uu_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "test_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: uu_server.c,v 1.6 1999/12/16 10:32:44 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +static int +proto (int sock, const char *service) +{ + struct sockaddr_in remote, local; + int addrlen; + krb5_address remote_addr, local_addr; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + krb5_error_code status; + krb5_data packet; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data client_name; + krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds; + + addrlen = sizeof(local); + if (getsockname (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&local, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(local)) + err (1, "getsockname)"); + + addrlen = sizeof(remote); + if (getpeername (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&remote, &addrlen) < 0 + || addrlen != sizeof(remote)) + err (1, "getpeername"); + + status = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_auth_con_init: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + local_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + local_addr.address.length = sizeof(local.sin_addr); + local_addr.address.data = &local.sin_addr; + + remote_addr.addr_type = AF_INET; + remote_addr.address.length = sizeof(remote.sin_addr); + remote_addr.address.data = &remote.sin_addr; + + status = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + &local_addr, + &remote_addr); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &client_name); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + status = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache); + status = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &in_creds.client); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &in_creds.second_ticket); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + status = krb5_parse_name(context, client_name.data, &in_creds.server); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_parse_name"); + + status = krb5_get_credentials(context, KRB5_GC_USER_USER, ccache, + &in_creds, &out_creds); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_get_credentials"); + + status = krb5_cc_default(context, &ccache); + + status = krb5_sendauth(context, + &auth_context, + &sock, + VERSION, + in_creds.client, + in_creds.server, + AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY, + NULL, + out_creds, + ccache, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + + if (status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_sendauth"); + + fprintf (stderr, "User is `%.*s'\n", (int)client_name.length, + (char *)client_name.data); + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + krb5_data_zero (&packet); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + status = krb5_rd_safe (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_rd_safe: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + fprintf (stderr, "safe packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + status = krb5_read_message(context, &sock, &packet); + if(status) + krb5_err(context, 1, status, "krb5_read_message"); + + status = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &packet, + &data, + NULL); + if (status) + errx (1, "krb5_rd_priv: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, status)); + + fprintf (stderr, "priv packet: %.*s\n", (int)data.length, + (char *)data.data); + + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (int port, const char *service) +{ + int sock, sock2; + struct sockaddr_in my_addr; + int one = 1; + + sock = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + + memset (&my_addr, 0, sizeof(my_addr)); + my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + my_addr.sin_port = port; + my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (void *)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); + + if (bind (sock, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, sizeof(my_addr)) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + + if (listen (sock, 1) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + + sock2 = accept (sock, NULL, NULL); + if (sock2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + + return proto (sock2, service); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int port = server_setup(&context, argc, argv); + return doit (port, service); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/cf/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c21ce2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +2000-01-08 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-bigendian.m4: new file, replacement for ac_c_bigendian + +2000-01-01 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: re-organize: test for type of stack first so that + we can find the libraries that we might have to link the test + program against. not linking the test program means we don't know + if the right stuff is in the libraries. also cosmetic changes to + make sure we print the checking for... nicely + +1999-12-21 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: try linking, not only compiling + * krb-ipv6.m4: add --without-ipv6 make sure we have `in6addr_any' + which we use in the code. This test avoids false positives on + OpenBSD + +1999-11-05 Assar Westerlund + + * check-x.m4: include X_PRE_LIBS and X_EXTRA_LIBS when testing + +1999-11-01 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install-build-headers): use `cp' instead of + INSTALL_DATA for copying header files inside the build tree. The + user might have redefined INSTALL_DATA to specify owners and other + information. + +1999-10-30 Assar Westerlund + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: add yet another argument to allow specify + linker flags that will be added _before_ the library when trying + to link + + * find-func-no-libs.m4: add yet another argument to allow specify + linker flags that will be added _before_ the library when trying + to link + +1999-10-12 Assar Westerlund + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4 (AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2): new argument + `extra libs' + + * find-func-no-libs.m4 (AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS): new argument `extra + libs' + +1999-09-01 Johan Danielsson + + * capabilities.m4: sgi capabilities + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * have-struct-field.m4: quote macros when undefining + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install-build-headers): add dependencies + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * have-type.m4: try to get autoheader to co-operate + + * have-type.m4: stolen from Arla + + * krb-struct-sockaddr-sa-len.m4: not used any longer. removed. + +1999-06-13 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-struct-spwd.m4: consequent name of cache variables + + * krb-func-getlogin.m4: new file for testing for posix (broken) + getlogin + + * shared-libs.m4 (freebsd[34]): don't use ld -Bshareable + +1999-06-02 Johan Danielsson + + * check-x.m4: extended test for X + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4: proper autoheader tricks + + * check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4: new file for checking for + netinet/{ip,tcp}.h. These are special as they on Irix 6.5.3 + require to be included in advance. + + * check-xau.m4: we also need to check for XauFilename since it's + used by appl/kx. And on Irix 6.5 that function requires linking + with -lX11. + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-find-db.m4: try with more header files than ndbm.h + +1999-04-19 Assar Westerlund + + * test-package.m4: try to handle the case of --without-package + correctly + +1999-04-17 Assar Westerlund + + * make-aclocal: removed. Not used anymore, being replaced by + aclocal from automake. + +Thu Apr 15 14:17:26 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * make-proto.pl: handle __attribute__ + +Fri Apr 9 20:37:18 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * shared-libs.m4: quote $@ + (freebsd3): add install_symlink_command2 + +Wed Apr 7 20:40:22 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * shared-libs.m4 (hpux): no library dependencies + +Mon Apr 5 16:13:08 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * test-package.m4: compile and link, rather than looking for + files; also export more information, so it's possible to add rpath + information + +Tue Mar 30 13:49:54 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: CFLAGS -> AM_CFLAGS + +Mon Mar 29 16:51:12 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * check-xau.m4: check for XauWriteAuth before checking for + XauReadAuth to catch -lX11:s not containing XauWriteAuth, and IRIX + 6.5 that doesn't work with -lXau + +Sat Mar 27 18:03:58 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * osfc2.m4: --enable-osfc2 + +Fri Mar 19 15:34:52 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * shared-libs.m4: move shared lib stuff here + +Wed Mar 24 23:24:51 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install-build-headers): simplify loop + +Tue Mar 23 17:31:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4: check for getpwnam_r, and if it's + posix or not + +Tue Mar 23 00:00:13 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am.common (install_build_headers): try to make it work + better when list of headers is empty. handle make rewriting the + filenames. + + * Makefile.am.common: hesoid -> hesiod + +Sun Mar 21 14:48:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * grok-type.m4: + + * Makefile.am.common: fix for automake bug/feature; add more LIB_* + + * test-package.m4: fix typo + + * check-man.m4: fix some typos + + * auth-modules.m4: tests for authentication modules + +Thu Mar 18 11:02:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am.common: make install-build-headers a multi + dependency target + + * Makefile.am.common: remove include_dir hack + + * Makefile.am.common: define LIB_kafs and LIB_gssapi + + * krb-find-db.m4: subst DBLIB also + + * check-xau.m4: test for Xau{Read,Write}Auth + +Wed Mar 10 19:29:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * wflags.m4: AC_WFLAGS + +Mon Mar 1 11:23:41 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * have-struct-field.m4: remove extra AC_MSG_RESULT + + * proto-compat.m4: typo + + * krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4: update to autoconf 2.13 + + * krb-find-db.m4: update to autoconf 2.13 + + * check-declaration.m4: typo + + * have-pragma-weak.m4: update to autoconf 2.13 + + * have-struct-field.m4: better handling of types with spaces + +Mon Feb 22 20:05:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * broken-glob.m4: check for broken glob + +Sun Jan 31 06:50:33 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: more magic for different v6 implementations. From + Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino + +Sun Nov 22 12:16:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-struct-spwd.m4: new file + +Thu Jun 4 04:07:41 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * find-func-no-libs2.m4: new file + +Fri May 1 23:31:28 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * c-attribute.m4, c-function.m4: new files (from arla) + +Wed Mar 18 23:11:29 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * krb-ipv6.m4: rename HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 to HAVE_IPV6 + +Thu Feb 26 02:37:49 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * make-proto.pl: should work with perl4 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/Makefile.am.common b/crypto/heimdal/cf/Makefile.am.common new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7d747b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/Makefile.am.common @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS += $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +## set build_HEADERZ to headers that should just be installed in build tree + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +## these aren't detected by automake +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +install-suid-programs: + @foo='$(bin_SUIDS)'; \ + for file in $$foo; do \ + x=$(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/$$file; \ + if chown 0:0 $$x && chmod u+s $$x; then :; else \ + chmod 0 $$x; fi; done + +install-exec-hook: install-suid-programs + +install-build-headers:: $(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ) + @foo='$(include_HEADERS) $(build_HEADERZ)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo " cp $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f"; \ + cp $$file $(buildinclude)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +all-local: install-build-headers + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +SUFFIXES += .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii +#NROFF_MAN = nroff -man +.1.cat1: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.3.cat3: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.5.cat5: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ +.8.cat8: + $(NROFF_MAN) $< > $@ + +## MAINTAINERCLEANFILES += + +dist-cat1-mans: + @foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat3-mans: + @foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat5-mans: + @foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-cat8-mans: + @foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done ;\ + for i in $$foo; do \ + x=`echo $$i | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + echo "$(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat1-mans: + @ext=1;\ + foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat3-mans: + @ext=3;\ + foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +if KRB4 +LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) +endif + +if KRB5 +LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la +endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/auth-modules.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/auth-modules.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f11c73 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/auth-modules.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +dnl $Id: auth-modules.m4,v 1.1 1999/03/21 13:48:00 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl Figure what authentication modules should be built + +AC_DEFUN(AC_AUTH_MODULES,[ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(which authentication modules should be built) + +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS= + +if test "$ac_cv_header_siad_h" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS sia" +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_header_security_pam_modules_h" = yes -a "$enable_shared" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS pam" +fi + +case "${host}" in +changequote(,)dnl +*-*-irix[56]*) LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS afskauthlib" ;; +changequote([,])dnl +esac + +AC_MSG_RESULT($LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS) + +AC_SUBST(LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-glob.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-glob.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d52792 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-glob.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl $Id: broken-glob.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:15 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for glob(3) +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN_GLOB,[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working glob, ac_cv_func_glob_working, +ac_cv_func_glob_working=yes +AC_TRY_LINK([ +#include +#include ],[ +glob(NULL, GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE, NULL, NULL); +],:,ac_cv_func_glob_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GLOB, 1, [define if you have a glob() that groks + GLOB_BRACE, GLOB_NOCHECK, GLOB_QUOTE, and GLOB_TILDE]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include +#include ],glob) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efd69f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken-snprintf.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +dnl $Id: broken-snprintf.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 09:52:22 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF, [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working snprintf,ac_cv_func_snprintf_working, +ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=yes +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +int main() +{ +changequote(`,')dnl + char foo[3]; +changequote([,])dnl + snprintf(foo, 2, "12"); + return strcmp(foo, "1"); +}],:,ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_SNPRINTF, 1, [define if you have a working snprintf]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ],snprintf) +fi +]) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN_VSNPRINTF,[ +AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working vsnprintf,ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working, +ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=yes +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#include + +int foo(int num, ...) +{ +changequote(`,')dnl + char bar[3]; +changequote([,])dnl + va_list arg; + va_start(arg, num); + vsnprintf(bar, 2, "%s", arg); + va_end(arg); + return strcmp(bar, "1"); +} + + +int main() +{ + return foo(0, "12"); +}],:,ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=no,:)) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(HAVE_VSNPRINTF, 1, [define if you have a working vsnprintf]) +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ],vsnprintf) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4044064 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/broken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +dnl $Id: broken.m4,v 1.3 1998/03/16 22:16:19 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Same as AC _REPLACE_FUNCS, just define HAVE_func if found in normal +dnl libraries + +AC_DEFUN(AC_BROKEN, +[for ac_func in $1 +do +AC_CHECK_FUNC($ac_func, [ +ac_tr_func=HAVE_[]upcase($ac_func) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func)],[LIBOBJS[]="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o"]) +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs $1"@@@ +END +done +AC_SUBST(LIBOBJS)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/c-attribute.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/c-attribute.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87cea03 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/c-attribute.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: c-attribute.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test for __attribute__ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_C___ATTRIBUTE__, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for __attribute__) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv___attribute__, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +], +[ +static void foo(void) __attribute__ ((noreturn)); + +static void +foo(void) +{ + exit(1); +} +], +ac_cv___attribute__=yes, +ac_cv___attribute__=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv___attribute__" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__, 1, [define if your compiler has __attribute__]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv___attribute__) +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/c-function.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/c-function.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b16d556 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/c-function.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: c-function.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test for __FUNCTION__ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_C___FUNCTION__, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for __FUNCTION__) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv___function__, [ +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include + +static char *foo() +{ + return __FUNCTION__; +} + +int main() +{ + return strcmp(foo(), "foo") != 0; +} +], +ac_cv___function__=yes, +ac_cv___function__=no, +ac_cv___function__=no)]) +if test "$ac_cv___function__" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE___FUNCTION__, 1, [define if your compiler has __FUNCTION__]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv___function__) +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/capabilities.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/capabilities.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d2669b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/capabilities.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: capabilities.m4,v 1.2 1999/09/01 11:02:26 joda Exp $ +dnl + +dnl +dnl Test SGI capabilities +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(KRB_CAPABILITIES,[ + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(capability.h sys/capability.h) + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(sgi_getcapabilitybyname cap_set_proc) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-declaration.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-declaration.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f584e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-declaration.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +dnl $Id: check-declaration.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 13:03:08 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if we need the declaration of a variable +dnl + +dnl AC_HAVE_DECLARATION(includes, variable) +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_DECLARATION, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $2 is properly declared]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_var_$2_declaration, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1 +extern struct { int foo; } $2;], +[$2.foo = 1;], +eval "ac_cv_var_$2_declaration=no", +eval "ac_cv_var_$2_declaration=yes") +]) + +define(foo, [HAVE_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_DECLARATION]) + +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_var_$2_declaration) +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_$2_declaration\" = yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if your system declares $2]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc75666 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +dnl $Id: check-getpwnam_r-posix.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/23 16:47:31 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for getpwnam_r, and if it's posix or not + +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_GETPWNAM_R_POSIX,[ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(getpwnam_r,c_r) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r" = yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(if getpwnam_r is posix,ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix, + ac_libs="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $LIB_getpwnam_r" + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +int main() +{ + struct passwd pw, *pwd; + return getpwnam_r("", &pw, NULL, 0, &pwd) < 0; +} +],ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=yes,ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=no,:) +LIBS="$ac_libs") +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(POSIX_GETPWNAM_R, 1, [Define if getpwnam_r has POSIX flavour.]) +fi +fi +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-man.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-man.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2133069 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-man.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +dnl $Id: check-man.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/21 14:30:50 joda Exp $ +dnl check how to format manual pages +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_MAN, +[AC_PATH_PROG(NROFF, nroff) +AC_PATH_PROG(GROFF, groff) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(how to format man pages,ac_cv_sys_man_format, +[cat > conftest.1 << END +.Dd January 1, 1970 +.Dt CONFTEST 1 +.Sh NAME +.Nm conftest +.Nd +foobar +END + +if test "$NROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$NROFF" $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$NROFF $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format" = "" -a "$GROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$GROFF" -Tascii $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$GROFF -Tascii $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$ac_cv_sys_man_format \[$]< > \[$]@" +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + CATMAN="$ac_cv_sys_man_format" + AC_SUBST(CATMAN) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(CATMAN, test "$CATMAN") +AC_CACHE_CHECK(extension of pre-formatted manual pages,ac_cv_sys_catman_ext, +[if grep _suffix /etc/man.conf > /dev/null 2>&1; then + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=0 +else + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=number +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_sys_catman_ext" = number; then + CATMANEXT='$$ext' +else + CATMANEXT=0 +fi +AC_SUBST(CATMANEXT) + +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cb529d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: check-netinet-ip-and-tcp.m4,v 1.2 1999/05/14 13:15:40 assar Exp $ +dnl + +dnl extra magic check for netinet/{ip.h,tcp.h} because on irix 6.5.3 +dnl you have to include standards.h before including these files + +AC_DEFUN(CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP, +[ +AC_CHECK_HEADERS(standards.h) +for i in netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h; do + +cv=`echo "$i" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $i]) +AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_header_$cv], +[AC_TRY_CPP([\ +#ifdef HAVE_STANDARDS_H +#include +#endif +#include <$i> +], +eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=yes", +eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=no")]) +AC_MSG_RESULT(`eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv`) +changequote(, )dnl +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $i | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` +changequote([, ])dnl + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_hdr, 1) +fi +done +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +: << END +@@@headers="$headers netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h"@@@ +END + +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-type-extra.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-type-extra.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6af4bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-type-extra.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +dnl $Id: check-type-extra.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl ac_check_type + extra headers + +dnl AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA(TYPE, DEFAULT, HEADERS) +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA, +[AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC])dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_type_$1, +[AC_EGREP_CPP(dnl +changequote(<<,>>)dnl +<<$1[^a-zA-Z_0-9]>>dnl +changequote([,]), [#include +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +$3], ac_cv_type_$1=yes, ac_cv_type_$1=no)])dnl +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_type_$1) +if test $ac_cv_type_$1 = no; then + AC_DEFINE($1, $2, [Define this to what the type $1 should be.]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-var.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-var.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f37366 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-var.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +dnl $Id: check-var.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_CHECK_VAR(includes, variable) +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_VAR, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $2) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_var_$2, [ +AC_TRY_LINK([extern int $2; +int foo() { return $2; }], + [foo()], + ac_cv_var_$2=yes, ac_cv_var_$2=no) +]) +define([foo], [HAVE_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])) + +AC_MSG_RESULT(`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_$2`) +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_$2` = yes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(foo, 1, [define if you have $2]) + AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([$1],[$2]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-x.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-x.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1791e5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-x.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +dnl +dnl See if there is any X11 present +dnl +dnl $Id: check-x.m4,v 1.2 1999/11/05 04:25:23 assar Exp $ + +AC_DEFUN(KRB_CHECK_X,[ +AC_PATH_XTRA + +# try to figure out if we need any additional ld flags, like -R +# and yes, the autoconf X test is utterly broken +if test "$no_x" != yes; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for special X linker flags,krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath,[ + ac_save_libs="$LIBS" + ac_save_cflags="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $X_CFLAGS" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs="" + for rflag in "" "-R" "-R " "-rpath "; do + if test "$rflag" = ""; then + foo="$X_LIBS" + else + foo="" + for flag in $X_LIBS; do + case $flag in + -L*) + foo="$foo $flag `echo $flag | sed \"s/-L/$rflag/\"`" + ;; + *) + foo="$foo $flag" + ;; + esac + done + fi + LIBS="$ac_save_libs $foo $X_PRE_LIBS -lX11 $X_EXTRA_LIBS" + AC_TRY_RUN([ + #include + foo() + { + XOpenDisplay(NULL); + } + main() + { + return 0; + } + ], krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="$rflag"; krb_cv_sys_x_libs="$foo"; break,:) + done + LIBS="$ac_save_libs" + CFLAGS="$ac_save_cflags" + ]) + X_LIBS="$krb_cv_sys_x_libs" +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-xau.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-xau.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bad2a60 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/check-xau.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +dnl $Id: check-xau.m4,v 1.3 1999/05/14 01:17:06 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for Xau{Read,Write}Auth and XauFileName +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_XAU,[ +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$X_CFLAGS $CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +dnl LIBS="$X_LIBS $X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +LIBS="$X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $X_LIBS" + +## check for XauWriteAuth first, so we detect the case where +## XauReadAuth is in -lX11, but XauWriteAuth is only in -lXau this +## could be done by checking for XauReadAuth in -lXau first, but this +## breaks in IRIX 6.5 + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauWriteAuth, X11 Xau) +ac_xxx="$LIBS" +LIBS="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIBS" +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauReadAuth, X11 Xau) +LIBS="$LIB_XauReadAauth $LIBS" +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(XauFileName, X11 Xau) +LIBS="$ac_xxx" + +## set LIB_XauReadAuth to union of these tests, since this is what the +## Makefiles are using +case "$ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth" = yes; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + else + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +if test "$AUTOMAKE" != ""; then + AM_CONDITIONAL(NEED_WRITEAUTH, test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes") +else + AC_SUBST(NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE) + AC_SUBST(NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE) + if test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes"; then + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE= + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE='#' + else + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE='#' + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE= + fi +fi +CFLAGS=$save_CFLAGS +LIBS=$save_LIBS +LDFLAGS=$save_LDFLAGS +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3deab02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl $Id: find-func-no-libs.m4,v 1.5 1999/10/30 21:08:18 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Look for function in any of the specified libraries +dnl + +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(func, libraries, includes, arguments, extra libs, extra args) +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS, [ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2([$1], ["" $2], [$3], [$4], [$5], [$6])]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c404a7c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func-no-libs2.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +dnl $Id: find-func-no-libs2.m4,v 1.3 1999/10/30 21:09:53 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Look for function in any of the specified libraries +dnl + +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2(func, libraries, includes, arguments, extra libs, extra args) +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS2, [ + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for $1]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_funclib_$1, +[ +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_$1\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in $2; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS="$6 $ac_lib $5 $ac_save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$3],[$1($4)],eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_$1=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_$1=yes; fi";break) + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_$1=\${ac_cv_funclib_$1-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi +]) + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_$1" + +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs $1"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs $2"@@@ +END + +# $1 +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_[]upcase($1)" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB[]upcase($ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//')" +eval "LIB_$1=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=yes" + eval "LIB_$1=" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=no" + eval "LIB_$1=" + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_$1=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_func) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_lib) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes, in $ac_res]) + ;; +esac +AC_SUBST(LIB_$1) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb2b3ac --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-func.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +dnl $Id: find-func.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:58:58 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_FIND_FUNC(func, libraries, includes, arguments) +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_FUNC, [ +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS([$1], [$2], [$3], [$4]) +if test -n "$LIB_$1"; then + LIBS="$LIB_$1 $LIBS" +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e855ec7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/find-if-not-broken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +dnl $Id: find-if-not-broken.m4,v 1.2 1998/03/16 22:16:27 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Mix between AC_FIND_FUNC and AC_BROKEN +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN, +[AC_FIND_FUNC([$1], [$2], [$3], [$4]) +if eval "test \"$ac_cv_func_$1\" != yes"; then +LIBOBJS[]="$LIBOBJS $1.o" +fi +AC_SUBST(LIBOBJS)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/grok-type.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/grok-type.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bc6a66 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/grok-type.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +dnl $Id: grok-type.m4,v 1.4 1999/11/29 11:16:48 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_GROK_TYPE, [ +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_type_$1, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H +#include +#endif +], +$i x; +, +eval ac_cv_type_$1=yes, +eval ac_cv_type_$1=no))]) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_GROK_TYPES, [ +for i in $1; do + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $i) + AC_GROK_TYPE($i) + eval ac_res=\$ac_cv_type_$i + if test "$ac_res" = yes; then + type=HAVE_[]upcase($i) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($type) + fi + AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) +done +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..330e601 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-pragma-weak.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +dnl $Id: have-pragma-weak.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 11:55:25 joda Exp $ +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_HAVE_PRAGMA_WEAK, [ +if test "${enable_shared}" = "yes"; then +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for pragma weak) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_have_pragma_weak, [ +ac_have_pragma_weak=no +cat > conftest_foo.$ac_ext <<'EOF' +[#]line __oline__ "configure" +#include "confdefs.h" +#pragma weak foo = _foo +int _foo = 17; +EOF +cat > conftest_bar.$ac_ext <<'EOF' +[#]line __oline__ "configure" +#include "confdefs.h" +extern int foo; + +int t() { + return foo; +} + +int main() { + return t(); +} +EOF +if AC_TRY_EVAL('CC -o conftest $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest_foo.$ac_ext conftest_bar.$ac_ext 1>&AC_FD_CC'); then +ac_have_pragma_weak=yes +fi +rm -rf conftest* +]) +if test "$ac_have_pragma_weak" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PRAGMA_WEAK, 1, [Define this if your compiler supports \`#pragma weak.'])dnl +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_have_pragma_weak) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-struct-field.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-struct-field.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88ad5c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-struct-field.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +dnl $Id: have-struct-field.m4,v 1.6 1999/07/29 01:44:32 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for fields in a structure +dnl +dnl AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct, field, headers) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD, [ +define(cache_val, translit(ac_cv_type_$1_$2, [A-Z ], [a-z_])) +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for $2 in $1], cache_val,[ +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$3],[$1 x; x.$2;], +cache_val=yes, +cache_val=no)]) +if test "$cache_val" = yes; then + define(foo, translit(HAVE_$1_$2, [a-z ], [A-Z_])) + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [Define if $1 has field $2.]) + undefine([foo]) +fi +undefine([cache_val]) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-type.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-type.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e882847 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-type.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +dnl $Id: have-type.m4,v 1.5 1999/12/31 03:10:22 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl check for existance of a type + +dnl AC_HAVE_TYPE(TYPE,INCLUDES) +AC_DEFUN(AC_HAVE_TYPE, [ +AC_REQUIRE([AC_HEADER_STDC]) +cv=`echo "$1" | sed 'y%./+- %__p__%'` +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) +AC_CACHE_VAL([ac_cv_type_$cv], +AC_TRY_COMPILE( +[#include +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +$2], +[$1 foo;], +eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes", +eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no"))dnl +AC_MSG_RESULT(`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`) +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $1 | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` +dnl autoheader tricks *sigh* +define(foo,translit($1, [ ], [_])) +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs foo"@@@ +END +undefine([foo]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($ac_tr_hdr, 1) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-types.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-types.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c85c5d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/have-types.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: have-types.m4,v 1.1 1999/07/24 18:38:58 assar Exp $ +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_HAVE_TYPES, [ +for i in $1; do + AC_HAVE_TYPE($i) +done +: << END +changequote(`,')dnl +@@@funcs="$funcs $1"@@@ +changequote([,])dnl +END +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0efbbd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-bigendian.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: krb-bigendian.m4,v 1.5 2000/01/08 10:34:44 assar Exp $ +dnl + +dnl check if this computer is little or big-endian +dnl if we can figure it out at compile-time then don't define the cpp symbol +dnl otherwise test for it and define it. also allow options for overriding +dnl it when cross-compiling + +AC_DEFUN(KRB_C_BIGENDIAN, [ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(bigendian, +[ --enable-bigendian the target is big endian], +krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(littleendian, +[ --enable-littleendian the target is little endian], +krb_cv_c_bigendian=no) +AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether byte order is known at compile time, +krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile, +[AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include ],[ +#if !BYTE_ORDER || !BIG_ENDIAN || !LITTLE_ENDIAN + bogus endian macros +#endif], krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=yes, krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=no)]) +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "no"; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(whether byte ordering is bigendian, krb_cv_c_bigendian,[ + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = ""; then + krb_cv_c_bigendian=unknown + fi + AC_TRY_COMPILE([ +#include +#include ],[ +#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN + not big endian +#endif], krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes, krb_cv_c_bigendian=no) + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "unknown"; then + AC_TRY_RUN([main () { + /* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */ + union + { + long l; + char c[sizeof (long)]; + } u; + u.l = 1; + exit (u.c[sizeof (long) - 1] == 1); + }], krb_cv_c_bigendian=no, krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes, + AC_MSG_ERROR([specify either --enable-bigendian or --enable-littleendian])) + fi + ]) + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(WORDS_BIGENDIAN, 1, [define if target is big endian])dnl + fi +fi +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H, 1, [define if sys/param.h defines the endiness])dnl +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-find-db.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-find-db.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5080049 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-find-db.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-find-db.m4,v 1.5 1999/05/08 02:24:04 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl find a suitable database library +dnl +dnl AC_FIND_DB(libraries) +AC_DEFUN(KRB_FIND_DB, [ + +lib_dbm=no +lib_db=no + +for i in $1; do + + if test "$i"; then + m="lib$i" + l="-l$i" + else + m="libc" + l="" + fi + + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for dbm_open in $m) + AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_krb_dbm_open_$m, [ + + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$l $LIBS" + AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_NDBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_RPCSVC_DBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#define DB_DBM_HSEARCH 1 +#include +#endif +int main() +{ + DBM *d; + + d = dbm_open("conftest", O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666); + if(d == NULL) + return 1; + dbm_close(d); + return 0; +}], [ + if test -f conftest.db; then + ac_res=db + else + ac_res=dbm + fi], ac_res=no, ac_res=no) + + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + + eval ac_cv_krb_dbm_open_$m=$ac_res]) + eval ac_res=\$ac_cv_krb_dbm_open_$m + AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) + + if test "$lib_dbm" = no -a $ac_res = dbm; then + lib_dbm="$l" + elif test "$lib_db" = no -a $ac_res = db; then + lib_db="$l" + break + fi +done + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for NDBM library) +ac_ndbm=no +if test "$lib_db" != no; then + LIB_DBM="$lib_db" + ac_ndbm=yes + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NEW_DB, 1, [Define if NDBM really is DB (creates files ending in .db).]) + if test "$LIB_DBM"; then + ac_res="yes, $LIB_DBM" + else + ac_res=yes + fi +elif test "$lib_dbm" != no; then + LIB_DBM="$lib_dbm" + ac_ndbm=yes + if test "$LIB_DBM"; then + ac_res="yes, $LIB_DBM" + else + ac_res=yes + fi +else + LIB_DBM="" + ac_res=no +fi +test "$ac_ndbm" = yes && AC_DEFINE(NDBM, 1, [Define if you have NDBM (and not DBM)])dnl +AC_SUBST(LIB_DBM) +DBLIB="$LIB_DBM" +AC_SUBST(DBLIB) +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) + +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d248922 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-func-getcwd-broken.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 13:03:32 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl test for broken getcwd in (SunOS braindamage) +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_FUNC_GETCWD_BROKEN, [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_getcwd" = yes; then +AC_MSG_CHECKING(if getcwd is broken) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken, [ +ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken=no + +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +char *getcwd(char*, int); + +void *popen(char *cmd, char *mode) +{ + errno = ENOTTY; + return 0; +} + +int main() +{ + char *ret; + ret = getcwd(0, 1024); + if(ret == 0 && errno == ENOTTY) + return 0; + return 1; +} +], ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken=yes,:,:) +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETCWD, 1, [Define if getcwd is broken (like in SunOS 4).])dnl + LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS getcwd.o" + AC_SUBST(LIBOBJS)dnl + AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_func_getcwd_broken) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([seems ok]) +fi +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..921c5ab --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-func-getlogin.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: krb-func-getlogin.m4,v 1.1 1999/07/13 17:45:30 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for POSIX (broken) getlogin +dnl + + +AC_DEFUN(AC_FUNC_GETLOGIN, [ +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getlogin setlogin) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes; then +AC_CACHE_CHECK(if getlogin is posix, ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix, [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes -a "$ac_cv_func_setlogin" = yes; then + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=no +else + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=yes +fi +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(POSIX_GETLOGIN, 1, [Define if getlogin has POSIX flavour (and not BSD).]) +fi +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1644da3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-ipv6.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-ipv6.m4,v 1.8 2000/01/01 11:44:45 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl test for IPv6 +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_IPV6, [ +AC_ARG_WITH(ipv6, +[ --without-ipv6 do not enable IPv6 support],[ +if test "$withval" = "no"; then + ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no +fi]) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_lib_ipv6, +[dnl check for different v6 implementations (by itojun) +v6type=unknown +v6lib=none + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([ipv6 stack type]) +for i in v6d toshiba kame inria zeta linux; do + case $i in + v6d) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef __V6D__ +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=v6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-I/usr/local/v6/include $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + toshiba) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef _TOSHIBA_INET6 +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + kame) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef __KAME__ +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + inria) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef IPV6_INRIA_VERSION +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + zeta) + AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, [dnl +#include +#ifdef _ZETA_MINAMI_INET6 +yes +#endif], + [v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS"]) + ;; + linux) + if test -d /usr/inet6; then + v6type=$i + v6lib=inet6 + v6libdir=/usr/inet6 + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" + fi + ;; + esac + if test "$v6type" != "unknown"; then + break + fi +done +AC_MSG_RESULT($v6type) + +if test "$v6lib" != "none"; then + for dir in $v6libdir /usr/local/v6/lib /usr/local/lib; do + if test -d $dir -a -f $dir/lib$v6lib.a; then + LIBS="-L$dir -l$v6lib $LIBS" + break + fi + done +fi +AC_TRY_LINK([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +], +[ + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + int s; + + s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_port = htons(17); + sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); +], +ac_cv_lib_ipv6=yes, +ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no)]) +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for IPv6) +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_lib_ipv6) +if test "$ac_cv_lib_ipv6" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_IPV6, 1, [Define if you have IPv6.]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efb706e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ln-s.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-prog-ln-s.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:01 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Better test for ln -s, ln or cp +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S, +[AC_MSG_CHECKING(for ln -s or something else) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_prog_LN_S, +[rm -f conftestdata +if ln -s X conftestdata 2>/dev/null +then + rm -f conftestdata + ac_cv_prog_LN_S="ln -s" +else + touch conftestdata1 + if ln conftestdata1 conftestdata2; then + rm -f conftestdata* + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=ln + else + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=cp + fi +fi])dnl +LN_S="$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_prog_LN_S) +AC_SUBST(LN_S)dnl +]) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd1d3db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-ranlib.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-prog-ranlib.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:01 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Also look for EMXOMF for OS/2 +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_PROG_RANLIB, +[AC_CHECK_PROGS(RANLIB, ranlib EMXOMF, :)]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28ae59c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-prog-yacc.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-prog-yacc.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:02 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl We prefer byacc or yacc because they do not use `alloca' +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_PROG_YACC, +[AC_CHECK_PROGS(YACC, byacc yacc 'bison -y')]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ab81fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-spwd.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-struct-spwd.m4,v 1.3 1999/07/13 21:04:11 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl Test for `struct spwd' + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_STRUCT_SPWD, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for struct spwd) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_struct_spwd, [ +AC_TRY_COMPILE( +[#include +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif], +[struct spwd foo;], +ac_cv_struct_spwd=yes, +ac_cv_struct_spwd=no) +]) +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_struct_spwd) + +if test "$ac_cv_struct_spwd" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD, 1, [define if you have struct spwd]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f89f683 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-struct-winsize.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-struct-winsize.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:23 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Search for struct winsize +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_STRUCT_WINSIZE, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for struct winsize) +AC_CACHE_VAL(ac_cv_struct_winsize, [ +ac_cv_struct_winsize=no +for i in sys/termios.h sys/ioctl.h; do +AC_EGREP_HEADER( +changequote(, )dnl +struct[ ]*winsize,dnl +changequote([,])dnl +$i, ac_cv_struct_winsize=yes; break)dnl +done +]) +if test "$ac_cv_struct_winsize" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE, 1, [define if struct winsize is declared in sys/termios.h]) +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_cv_struct_winsize) +AC_EGREP_HEADER(ws_xpixel, termios.h, + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WS_XPIXEL, 1, [define if struct winsize has ws_xpixel])) +AC_EGREP_HEADER(ws_ypixel, termios.h, + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_WS_YPIXEL, 1, [define if struct winsize has ws_ypixel])) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a538005 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-aix.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-sys-aix.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:02 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl AIX have a very different syscall convention +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_SYS_AIX, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for AIX) +AC_CACHE_VAL(krb_cv_sys_aix, +AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, +[#ifdef _AIX + yes +#endif +], krb_cv_sys_aix=yes, krb_cv_sys_aix=no) ) +AC_MSG_RESULT($krb_cv_sys_aix) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31dc907 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-sys-nextstep.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-sys-nextstep.m4,v 1.2 1998/06/03 23:48:40 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl NEXTSTEP is not posix compliant by default, +dnl you need a switch -posix to the compiler +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_SYS_NEXTSTEP, [ +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for NEXTSTEP) +AC_CACHE_VAL(krb_cv_sys_nextstep, +AC_EGREP_CPP(yes, +[#if defined(NeXT) && !defined(__APPLE__) + yes +#endif +], krb_cv_sys_nextstep=yes, krb_cv_sys_nextstep=no) ) +if test "$krb_cv_sys_nextstep" = "yes"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -posix" + LIBS="$LIBS -posix" +fi +AC_MSG_RESULT($krb_cv_sys_nextstep) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-version.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-version.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4a1221 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/krb-version.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +dnl $Id: krb-version.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:03 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl output a C header-file with some version strings +dnl +AC_DEFUN(AC_KRB_VERSION,[ +dnl AC_OUTPUT_COMMANDS([ +cat > include/newversion.h.in </dev/null | sed 1q` + Date=`date` + mv -f include/newversion.h.in include/version.h.in + sed -e "s/@USER@/$User/" -e "s/@HOST@/$Host/" -e "s/@DATE@/$Date/" include/version.h.in > include/version.h +fi +dnl ],host=$host PACKAGE=$PACKAGE VERSION=$VERSION) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/make-proto.pl b/crypto/heimdal/cf/make-proto.pl new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a47aed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/make-proto.pl @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +# Make prototypes from .c files +# $Id: make-proto.pl,v 1.11 1999/04/15 12:37:54 joda Exp $ + +##use Getopt::Std; +require 'getopts.pl'; + +$brace = 0; +$line = ""; +$debug = 0; + +do Getopts('o:p:d') || die "foo"; + +if($opt_d) { + $debug = 1; +} + +while(<>) { + print $brace, " ", $_ if($debug); + if(/^\#if 0/) { + $if_0 = 1; + } + if($if_0 && /^\#endif/) { + $if_0 = 0; + } + if($if_0) { next } + if(/^\s*\#/) { + next; + } + if(/^\s*$/) { + $line = ""; + next; + } + if(/\{/){ + $_ = $line; + while(s/\*\//\ca/){ + s/\/\*(.|\n)*\ca//; + } + s/^\s*//; + s/\s$//; + s/\s+/ /g; + if($line =~ /\)\s$/){ + if(!/^static/ && !/^PRIVATE/){ + if(/(.*)(__attribute__\s?\(.*\))/) { + $attr = $2; + $_ = $1; + } else { + $attr = ""; + } + # remove outer () + s/\s*\(/@/; + s/\)\s?$/@/; + # remove , within () + while(s/\(([^()]*),(.*)\)/($1\$$2)/g){} + s/,\s*/,\n\t/g; + # fix removed , + s/\$/,/g; + # match function name + /([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)\s*@/; + $f = $1; + # only add newline if more than one parameter + $LP = "(("; # XXX workaround for indentation bug in emacs + $RP = "))"; + $P = "__P(("; + if(/,/){ + s/@/ __P$LP\n\t/; + }else{ + s/@/ __P$LP/; + } + s/@/$RP/; + # insert newline before function name + s/(.*)\s([a-zA-Z0-9_]+ __P)/$1\n$2/; + if($attr ne "") { + $_ .= "\n $attr"; + } + $_ = $_ . ";"; + $funcs{$f} = $_; + } + } + $line = ""; + $brace++; + } + if(/\}/){ + $brace--; + } + if(/^\}/){ + $brace = 0; + } + if($brace == 0) { + $line = $line . " " . $_; + } +} + +sub foo { + local ($arg) = @_; + $_ = $arg; + s/.*\/([^\/]*)/$1/; + s/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/_/g; + "__" . $_ . "__"; +} + +if($opt_o) { + open(OUT, ">$opt_o"); + $block = &foo($opt_o); +} else { + $block = "__public_h__"; +} + +if($opt_p) { + open(PRIV, ">$opt_p"); + $private = &foo($opt_p); +} else { + $private = "__private_h__"; +} + +$public_h = ""; +$private_h = ""; + +$public_h_header = "/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef $block +#define $block + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +"; + +$private_h_header = "/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef $private +#define $private + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +"; + +foreach(sort keys %funcs){ + if(/^(main)$/) { next } + if(/^_/) { + $private_h .= $funcs{$_} . "\n\n"; + if($funcs{$_} =~ /__attribute__/) { + $private_attribute_seen = 1; + } + } else { + $public_h .= $funcs{$_} . "\n\n"; + if($funcs{$_} =~ /__attribute__/) { + $public_attribute_seen = 1; + } + } +} + +if ($public_attribute_seen) { + $public_h_header .= "#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +"; +} + +if ($private_attribute_seen) { + $private_h_header .= "#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +"; +} + + +if ($public_h ne "") { + $public_h = $public_h_header . $public_h . "#endif /* $block */\n"; +} +if ($private_h ne "") { + $private_h = $private_h_header . $private_h . "#endif /* $private */\n"; +} + +if($opt_o) { + print OUT $public_h; +} +if($opt_p) { + print PRIV $private_h; +} + +close OUT; +close PRIV; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/mips-abi.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/mips-abi.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7b8815 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/mips-abi.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +dnl $Id: mips-abi.m4,v 1.4 1998/05/16 20:44:15 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check for MIPS/IRIX ABI flags. Sets $abi and $abilibdirext to some +dnl value. + +AC_DEFUN(AC_MIPS_ABI, [ +AC_ARG_WITH(mips_abi, +[ --with-mips-abi=abi ABI to use for IRIX (32, n32, or 64)]) + +case "$host_os" in +irix*) +with_mips_abi="${with_mips_abi:-yes}" +if test -n "$GCC"; then + +# GCC < 2.8 only supports the O32 ABI. GCC >= 2.8 has a flag to select +# which ABI to use, but only supports (as of 2.8.1) the N32 and 64 ABIs. +# +# Default to N32, but if GCC doesn't grok -mabi=n32, we assume an old +# GCC and revert back to O32. The same goes if O32 is asked for - old +# GCCs doesn't like the -mabi option, and new GCCs can't output O32. +# +# Don't you just love *all* the different SGI ABIs? + +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-mabi=32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-mabi=n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-mabi=64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) AC_ERROR("Invalid ABI specified") ;; +esac +if test -n "$abi" ; then +ac_foo=krb_cv_gcc_`echo $abi | tr =- __` +dnl +dnl can't use AC_CACHE_CHECK here, since it doesn't quote CACHE-ID to +dnl AC_MSG_RESULT +dnl +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports the $abi option]) +AC_CACHE_VAL($ac_foo, [ +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $abi" +AC_TRY_COMPILE(,int x;, eval $ac_foo=yes, eval $ac_foo=no) +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +]) +ac_res=`eval echo \\\$$ac_foo` +AC_MSG_RESULT($ac_res) +if test $ac_res = no; then +# Try to figure out why that failed... +case $abi in + -mabi=32) + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -mabi=n32" + AC_TRY_COMPILE(,int x;, ac_res=yes, ac_res=no) + CLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + if test $ac_res = yes; then + # New GCC + AC_ERROR([$CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI]) + fi + # Old GCC + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + ;; + -mabi=n32|-mabi=64) + if test $with_mips_abi = yes; then + # Old GCC, default to O32 + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + else + # Some broken GCC + AC_ERROR([$CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI]) + fi + ;; +esac +fi #if test $ac_res = no; then +fi #if test -n "$abi" ; then +else +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) AC_ERROR("Invalid ABI specified") ;; +esac +fi #if test -n "$GCC"; then +;; +esac +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/misc.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/misc.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0be97a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/misc.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +dnl $Id: misc.m4,v 1.1 1997/12/14 15:59:04 joda Exp $ +dnl +define(upcase,`echo $1 | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`)dnl diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/need-proto.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/need-proto.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c8d1d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/need-proto.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +dnl $Id: need-proto.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/01 09:52:24 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if we need the prototype for a function +dnl + +dnl AC_NEED_PROTO(includes, function) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_NEED_PROTO, [ +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_$2" = yes; then +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $2 needs a prototype], ac_cv_func_$2_noproto, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1], +[struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int $2 (struct foo*); +$2(&xx); +], +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_noproto=yes", +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_noproto=no")) +define([foo], [NEED_]translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_PROTO]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2_noproto" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if the system is missing a prototype for $2()]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +fi +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/osfc2.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/osfc2.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8cb2e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/osfc2.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +dnl $Id: osfc2.m4,v 1.2 1999/03/27 17:28:16 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl enable OSF C2 stuff + +AC_DEFUN(AC_CHECK_OSFC2,[ +AC_ARG_ENABLE(osfc2, +[ --enable-osfc2 enable some OSF C2 support]) +LIB_security= +if test "$enable_osfc2" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OSFC2, 1, [Define to enable basic OSF C2 support.]) + LIB_security=-lsecurity +fi +AC_SUBST(LIB_security) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/proto-compat.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/proto-compat.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..942f658 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/proto-compat.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +dnl $Id: proto-compat.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/01 13:03:48 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl +dnl Check if the prototype of a function is compatible with another one +dnl + +dnl AC_PROTO_COMPAT(includes, function, prototype) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_PROTO_COMPAT, [ +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if $2 is compatible with system prototype], +ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat, +AC_TRY_COMPILE([$1], +[$3;], +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat=yes", +eval "ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat=no")) +define([foo], translit($2, [a-z], [A-Z])[_PROTO_COMPATIBLE]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_$2_proto_compat" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(foo, 1, [define if prototype of $2 is compatible with + $3]) +fi +undefine([foo]) +]) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/shared-libs.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/shared-libs.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9fe576f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/shared-libs.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +dnl +dnl $Id: shared-libs.m4,v 1.4 1999/07/13 17:47:09 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl Shared library stuff has to be different everywhere +dnl + +AC_DEFUN(AC_SHARED_LIBS, [ + +dnl Check if we want to use shared libraries +AC_ARG_ENABLE(shared, +[ --enable-shared create shared libraries for Kerberos]) + +AC_SUBST(CFLAGS)dnl +AC_SUBST(LDFLAGS)dnl + +case ${enable_shared} in + yes ) enable_shared=yes;; + no ) enable_shared=no;; + * ) enable_shared=no;; +esac + +# NOTE: Building shared libraries may not work if you do not use gcc! +# +# OS $SHLIBEXT +# HP-UX sl +# Linux so +# NetBSD so +# FreeBSD so +# OSF so +# SunOS5 so +# SunOS4 so.0.5 +# Irix so +# +# LIBEXT is the extension we should build (.a or $SHLIBEXT) +LINK='$(CC)' +AC_SUBST(LINK) +lib_deps=yes +REAL_PICFLAGS="-fpic" +LDSHARED='$(CC) $(PICFLAGS) -shared' +LIBPREFIX=lib +build_symlink_command=@true +install_symlink_command=@true +install_symlink_command2=@true +REAL_SHLIBEXT=so +changequote({,})dnl +SHLIB_VERSION=`echo $VERSION | sed 's/\([0-9.]*\).*/\1/'` +SHLIB_SONAME=`echo $VERSION | sed 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/'` +changequote([,])dnl +case "${host}" in +*-*-hpux*) + REAL_SHLIBEXT=sl + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,+b$(libdir)' + if test -z "$GCC"; then + LDSHARED="ld -b" + REAL_PICFLAGS="+z" + fi + lib_deps=no + ;; +*-*-linux*) + LDSHARED='$(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$(LIBNAME).so.'"${SHLIB_SONAME}" + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,-rpath,$(libdir)' + REAL_SHLIBEXT=so.$SHLIB_VERSION + build_symlink_command='$(LN_S) -f [$][@] $(LIBNAME).so' + install_symlink_command='$(LN_S) -f $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$(LIBNAME).so.'"${SHLIB_SONAME}"';$(LN_S) -f $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$(LIBNAME).so' + install_symlink_command2='$(LN_S) -f $(LIB2) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$(LIBNAME2).so.'"${SHLIB_SONAME}"';$(LN_S) -f $(LIB2) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$(LIBNAME2).so' + ;; +changequote(,)dnl +*-*-freebsd[34]*) +changequote([,])dnl + REAL_SHLIBEXT=so.$SHLIB_VERSION + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,-R$(libdir)' + build_symlink_command='$(LN_S) -f [$][@] $(LIBNAME).so' + install_symlink_command='$(LN_S) -f $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$(LIBNAME).so' + install_symlink_command2='$(LN_S) -f $(LIB2) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$(LIBNAME2).so' + ;; +*-*-*bsd*) + REAL_SHLIBEXT=so.$SHLIB_VERSION + LDSHARED='ld -Bshareable' + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,-R$(libdir)' + ;; +*-*-osf*) + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,-rpath,$(libdir)' + REAL_PICFLAGS= + LDSHARED='ld -shared -expect_unresolved \*' + ;; +*-*-solaris2*) + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,-R$(libdir)' + if test -z "$GCC"; then + LDSHARED='$(CC) -G' + REAL_PICFLAGS="-Kpic" + fi + ;; +*-fujitsu-uxpv*) + REAL_LD_FLAGS='' # really: LD_RUN_PATH=$(libdir) cc -o ... + REAL_LINK='LD_RUN_PATH=$(libdir) $(CC)' + LDSHARED='$(CC) -G' + REAL_PICFLAGS="-Kpic" + lib_deps=no # fails in mysterious ways + ;; +*-*-sunos*) + REAL_SHLIBEXT=so.$SHLIB_VERSION + REAL_LD_FLAGS='-Wl,-L$(libdir)' + lib_deps=no + ;; +*-*-irix*) + libdir="${libdir}${abilibdirext}" + REAL_LD_FLAGS="${abi} -Wl,-rpath,\$(libdir)" + LD_FLAGS="${abi} -Wl,-rpath,\$(libdir)" + LDSHARED="\$(CC) -shared ${abi}" + REAL_PICFLAGS= + CFLAGS="${abi} ${CFLAGS}" + ;; +*-*-os2*) + LIBPREFIX= + EXECSUFFIX='.exe' + RANLIB=EMXOMF + LD_FLAGS=-Zcrtdll + REAL_SHLIBEXT=nobuild + ;; +*-*-cygwin32*) + EXECSUFFIX='.exe' + REAL_SHLIBEXT=nobuild + ;; +*) REAL_SHLIBEXT=nobuild + REAL_PICFLAGS= + ;; +esac + +if test "${enable_shared}" != "yes" ; then + PICFLAGS="" + SHLIBEXT="nobuild" + LIBEXT="a" + build_symlink_command=@true + install_symlink_command=@true + install_symlink_command2=@true +else + PICFLAGS="$REAL_PICFLAGS" + SHLIBEXT="$REAL_SHLIBEXT" + LIBEXT="$SHLIBEXT" + AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether to use -rpath) + case "$libdir" in + /lib | /usr/lib | /usr/local/lib) + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + REAL_LD_FLAGS= + LD_FLAGS= + ;; + *) + LD_FLAGS="$REAL_LD_FLAGS" + test "$REAL_LINK" && LINK="$REAL_LINK" + AC_MSG_RESULT($LD_FLAGS) + ;; + esac +fi + +if test "$lib_deps" = yes; then + lib_deps_yes="" + lib_deps_no="# " +else + lib_deps_yes="# " + lib_deps_no="" +fi +AC_SUBST(lib_deps_yes) +AC_SUBST(lib_deps_no) + +# use supplied ld-flags, or none if `no' +if test "$with_ld_flags" = no; then + LD_FLAGS= +elif test -n "$with_ld_flags"; then + LD_FLAGS="$with_ld_flags" +fi + +AC_SUBST(REAL_PICFLAGS) dnl +AC_SUBST(REAL_SHLIBEXT) dnl +AC_SUBST(REAL_LD_FLAGS) dnl + +AC_SUBST(PICFLAGS) dnl +AC_SUBST(SHLIBEXT) dnl +AC_SUBST(LDSHARED) dnl +AC_SUBST(LD_FLAGS) dnl +AC_SUBST(LIBEXT) dnl +AC_SUBST(LIBPREFIX) dnl +AC_SUBST(EXECSUFFIX) dnl + +AC_SUBST(build_symlink_command)dnl +AC_SUBST(install_symlink_command)dnl +AC_SUBST(install_symlink_command2)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/test-package.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/test-package.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bae158 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/test-package.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +dnl $Id: test-package.m4,v 1.7 1999/04/19 13:33:05 assar Exp $ +dnl +dnl AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW(package,headers,libraries,extra libs,default locations) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_TEST_PACKAGE,[AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW($1,[#include <$2>],$4,,$5)]) + +AC_DEFUN(AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW,[ +AC_ARG_WITH($1, +[ --with-$1=dir use $1 in dir]) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-lib, +[ --with-$1-lib=dir use $1 libraries in dir], +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-lib]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) +AC_ARG_WITH($1-include, +[ --with-$1-include=dir use $1 headers in dir], +[if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([No argument for --with-$1-include]) +elif test "X$with_$1" = "X"; then + with_$1=yes +fi]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1) + +case "$with_$1" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +"") ;; +*) if test "$with_$1_include" = ""; then + with_$1_include="$with_$1/include" + fi + if test "$with_$1_lib" = ""; then + with_$1_lib="$with_$1/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + ;; +esac +header_dirs= +lib_dirs= +d='$5' +for i in $d; do + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include" + lib_dirs="$lib_dirs $i/lib$abilibdirext" +done + +case "$with_$1_include" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) header_dirs="$with_$1_include $header_dirs";; +esac +case "$with_$1_lib" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) lib_dirs="$with_$1_lib $lib_dirs";; +esac + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +ires= lres= +for i in $header_dirs; do + CFLAGS="-I$i $save_CFLAGS" + AC_TRY_COMPILE([$2],,ires=$i;break) +done +for i in $lib_dirs; do + LIBS="-L$i $3 $4 $save_LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK([$2],,lres=$i;break) +done +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +LIBS="$save_LIBS" + +if test "$ires" -a "$lres" -a "$with_$1" != "no"; then + $1_includedir="$ires" + $1_libdir="$lres" + INCLUDE_$1="-I$$1_includedir" + LIB_$1="-L$$1_libdir $3" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(upcase($1),1,[Define if you have the $1 package.]) + with_$1=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([headers $ires, libraries $lres]) +else + INCLUDE_$1= + LIB_$1= + with_$1=no + AC_MSG_RESULT($with_$1) +fi +AC_SUBST(INCLUDE_$1) +AC_SUBST(LIB_$1) +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/cf/wflags.m4 b/crypto/heimdal/cf/wflags.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d9e073 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/cf/wflags.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +dnl $Id: wflags.m4,v 1.3 1999/03/11 12:11:41 joda Exp $ +dnl +dnl set WFLAGS + +AC_DEFUN(AC_WFLAGS,[ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="" +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="" +if test -z "$WFLAGS" -a "$GCC" = "yes"; then + # -Wno-implicit-int for broken X11 headers + # leave these out for now: + # -Wcast-align doesn't work well on alpha osf/1 + # -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast + # -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs + WFLAGS="ifelse($#, 0,-Wall, $1)" + WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="-Wno-unused" + WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="-Wno-implicit-int" +fi +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS)dnl +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS_NOUNUSED)dnl +AC_SUBST(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT)dnl +]) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/config.guess b/crypto/heimdal/config.guess new file mode 100755 index 0000000..4e5345f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/config.guess @@ -0,0 +1,973 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Attempt to guess a canonical system name. +# Copyright (C) 1992, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Written by Per Bothner . +# The master version of this file is at the FSF in /home/gd/gnu/lib. +# +# This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to +# config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and +# exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1. +# +# The plan is that this can be called by configure scripts if you +# don't specify an explicit system type (host/target name). +# +# Only a few systems have been added to this list; please add others +# (but try to keep the structure clean). +# + +# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. +# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 8/24/94.) +if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH +fi + +UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown +UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown +UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown +UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown + +dummy=dummy-$$ +trap 'rm -f $dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy; exit 1' 1 2 15 + +# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive. + +case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in + alpha:OSF1:*:*) + if test $UNAME_RELEASE = "V4.0"; then + UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'` + fi + # A Vn.n version is a released version. + # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. + # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. + # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. + cat <$dummy.s + .globl main + .ent main +main: + .frame \$30,0,\$26,0 + .prologue 0 + .long 0x47e03d80 # implver $0 + lda \$2,259 + .long 0x47e20c21 # amask $2,$1 + srl \$1,8,\$2 + sll \$2,2,\$2 + sll \$0,3,\$0 + addl \$1,\$0,\$0 + addl \$2,\$0,\$0 + ret \$31,(\$26),1 + .end main +EOF + ${CC-cc} $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + ./$dummy + case "$?" in + 7) + UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" + ;; + 15) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" + ;; + 14) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" + ;; + 10) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" + ;; + 16) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" + ;; + esac + fi + rm -f $dummy.s $dummy + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[VTX]//' | tr [[A-Z]] [[a-z]]` + exit 0 ;; + 21064:Windows_NT:50:3) + echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5 + exit 0 ;; + Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*) + echo m68k-cbm-sysv4 + exit 0;; + amiga:NetBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-cbm-netbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + amiga:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos + exit 0 ;; + arc64:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mips64el-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + arc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + hkmips:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mips-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + pmax:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sgi:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mips-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + wgrisc:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo mipsel-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*) + echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0;; + arm32:NetBSD:*:*) + echo arm-unknown-netbsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` + exit 0 ;; + SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp + exit 0;; + Pyramid*:OSx*:*:*|MIS*:OSx*:*:*|MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*) + # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE. + if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then + echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 + else + echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + NILE:*:*:dcosx) + echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 + exit 0 ;; + sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + i86pc:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo i386-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:6*:*) + # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize + # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but + # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4. + echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + sun4*:SunOS:*:*) + case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in + Series*|S4*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v` + ;; + esac + # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'. + echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'` + exit 0 ;; + sun3*:SunOS:*:*) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`(head -1 /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` + test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3 + case "`/bin/arch`" in + sun3) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + sun4) + echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + esac + exit 0 ;; + aushp:SunOS:*:*) + echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + atari*:NetBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-netbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + atari*:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun3*:NetBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-sun-netbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sun3*:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mac68k:NetBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-netbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mac68k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvme68k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mvme88k:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m88k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + powerpc:machten:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + macppc:NetBSD:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-netbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + RISC*:Mach:*:*) + echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3 + exit 0 ;; + RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*) + echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*) + echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + 2020:CLIX:*:*) + echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos) + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + int main (argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { + #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB) + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #endif + exit (-1); + } +EOF + ${CC-cc} $dummy.c -o $dummy \ + && ./$dummy `echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` \ + && rm $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) + echo powerpc-harris-powerunix + exit 0 ;; + m88k:CX/UX:7*:*) + echo m88k-harris-cxux7 + exit 0 ;; + m88k:*:4*:R4*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + m88k:*:3*:R3*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + AViiON:dgux:*:*) + # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` + if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 -o $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ] ; then + if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx \ + -o ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ] ; then + echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + else echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3) + echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + M88*:*:R3*:*) + # Delta 88k system running SVR3 + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3) + echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD) + echo m68k-tektronix-bsd + exit 0 ;; + *:IRIX*:*:*) + echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'` + exit 0 ;; + ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX. + echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id + exit 0 ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX ' + i?86:AIX:*:*) + echo i386-ibm-aix + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:2:3) + if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + + main() + { + if (!__power_pc()) + exit(1); + puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5"); + exit(0); + } +EOF + ${CC-cc} $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 + elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 + else + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2 + fi + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:*:4) + IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | head -1 | awk '{ print $1 }'` + if /usr/sbin/lsattr -EHl ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep POWER >/dev/null 2>&1; then + IBM_ARCH=rs6000 + else + IBM_ARCH=powerpc + fi + if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` + else + IBM_REV=4.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit 0 ;; + *:AIX:*:*) + echo rs6000-ibm-aix + exit 0 ;; + ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) + echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4 + exit 0 ;; + ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC NetBSD and + echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to + exit 0 ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3 + *:BOSX:*:*) + echo rs6000-bull-bosx + exit 0 ;; + DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*) + echo m68k-bull-sysv3 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*) + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;; + 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;; + 9000/6?? | 9000/7?? | 9000/80[24] | 9000/8?[13679] | 9000/892 ) + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + #include + + int main () + { + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS); + #endif + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + switch (bits) + { + case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break; + case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break; + default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + } break; + #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */ + puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + #endif + default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + } + exit (0); + } +EOF + (${CC-cc} $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null ) && HP_ARCH=`./$dummy` + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + esac + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit 0 ;; + 3050*:HI-UX:*:*) + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + int + main () + { + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns + true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct + results, however. */ + if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu)) + { + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + } + } + else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu)) + puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + exit (0); + } +EOF + ${CC-cc} $dummy.c -o $dummy && ./$dummy && rm $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 + exit 0 ;; + 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd + exit 0 ;; + hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-osf + exit 0 ;; + hp8??:OSF1:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-osf + exit 0 ;; + i?86:OSF1:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1 + fi + exit 0 ;; + parisc*:Lites*:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hp-lites + exit 0 ;; + C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*X-MP:*:*:*) + echo xmp-cray-unicos + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) + echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \ + | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \ + -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*TS:*:*:*) + echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + CRAY*T3E:*:*:*) + echo t3e-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + CRAY-2:*:*:*) + echo cray2-cray-unicos + exit 0 ;; + F300:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr [A-Z] [a-z] | sed -e 's/\///'` + FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'` + echo "f300-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" + exit 0 ;; + F301:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + echo f301-fujitsu-uxpv`echo $UNAME_RELEASE | sed 's/ .*//'` + exit 0 ;; + hp3[0-9][05]:NetBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-hp-netbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + hp300:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + i?86:BSD/386:*:* | i?86:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:FreeBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` + exit 0 ;; + *:NetBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-netbsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` + exit 0 ;; + *:OpenBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-openbsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` + exit 0 ;; + i*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin + exit 0 ;; + i*:MINGW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32 + exit 0 ;; + p*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin + exit 0 ;; + prep*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit 0 ;; + *:GNU:*:*) + echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'` + exit 0 ;; + *:Linux:*:*) + # uname on the ARM produces all sorts of strangeness, and we need to + # filter it out. + case "$UNAME_MACHINE" in + arm* | sa110*) UNAME_MACHINE="arm" ;; + esac + + # The BFD linker knows what the default object file format is, so + # first see if it will tell us. + ld_help_string=`ld --help 2>&1` + ld_supported_emulations=`echo $ld_help_string \ + | sed -ne '/supported emulations:/!d + s/[ ][ ]*/ /g + s/.*supported emulations: *// + s/ .*// + p'` + case "$ld_supported_emulations" in + i?86linux) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuaout" ; exit 0 ;; + i?86coff) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnucoff" ; exit 0 ;; + sparclinux) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnuaout" ; exit 0 ;; + armlinux) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnuaout" ; exit 0 ;; + m68klinux) echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnuaout" ; exit 0 ;; + elf32ppc) echo "powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu" ; exit 0 ;; + esac + + if test "${UNAME_MACHINE}" = "alpha" ; then + sed 's/^ //' <$dummy.s + .globl main + .ent main + main: + .frame \$30,0,\$26,0 + .prologue 0 + .long 0x47e03d80 # implver $0 + lda \$2,259 + .long 0x47e20c21 # amask $2,$1 + srl \$1,8,\$2 + sll \$2,2,\$2 + sll \$0,3,\$0 + addl \$1,\$0,\$0 + addl \$2,\$0,\$0 + ret \$31,(\$26),1 + .end main +EOF + LIBC="" + ${CC-cc} $dummy.s -o $dummy 2>/dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + ./$dummy + case "$?" in + 7) + UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" + ;; + 15) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" + ;; + 14) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" + ;; + 10) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" + ;; + 16) + UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" + ;; + esac + + objdump --private-headers $dummy | \ + grep ld.so.1 > /dev/null + if test "$?" = 0 ; then + LIBC="libc1" + fi + fi + rm -f $dummy.s $dummy + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC} ; exit 0 + elif test "${UNAME_MACHINE}" = "mips" ; then + cat >$dummy.c </dev/null && ./$dummy "${UNAME_MACHINE}" && rm $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + else + # Either a pre-BFD a.out linker (linux-gnuoldld) + # or one that does not give us useful --help. + # GCC wants to distinguish between linux-gnuoldld and linux-gnuaout. + # If ld does not provide *any* "supported emulations:" + # that means it is gnuoldld. + echo "$ld_help_string" | grep >/dev/null 2>&1 "supported emulations:" + test $? != 0 && echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-gnuoldld" && exit 0 + + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + i?86) + VENDOR=pc; + ;; + *) + VENDOR=unknown; + ;; + esac + # Determine whether the default compiler is a.out or elf + cat >$dummy.c < +main(argc, argv) + int argc; + char *argv[]; +{ +#ifdef __ELF__ +# ifdef __GLIBC__ +# if __GLIBC__ >= 2 + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnu\n", argv[1]); +# else + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnulibc1\n", argv[1]); +# endif +# else + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnulibc1\n", argv[1]); +# endif +#else + printf ("%s-${VENDOR}-linux-gnuaout\n", argv[1]); +#endif + return 0; +} +EOF + ${CC-cc} $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy "${UNAME_MACHINE}" && rm $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 + rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + fi ;; +# ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there. earlier versions +# are messed up and put the nodename in both sysname and nodename. + i?86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) + echo i386-sequent-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + i?86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*) + # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version + # number series starting with 2... + # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this, + # I just have to hope. -- rms. + # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION} + exit 0 ;; + i?86:*:4.*:* | i?86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*) + if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + i?86:*:3.2:*) + if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then + UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' /dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|egrep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` + (/bin/uname -X|egrep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 + (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32 + fi + exit 0 ;; + i?86:UnixWare:*:*) + if /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then + (/bin/uname -X|egrep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unixware-${UNAME_RELEASE}-${UNAME_VERSION} + exit 0 ;; + pc:*:*:*) + # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about + # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i386. + echo i386-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit 0 ;; + Intel:Mach:3*:*) + echo i386-pc-mach3 + exit 0 ;; + paragon:*:*:*) + echo i860-intel-osf1 + exit 0 ;; + i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4 + if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4 + else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered. + echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4 + fi + exit 0 ;; + mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*) + # "miniframe" + echo m68010-convergent-sysv + exit 0 ;; + M68*:*:R3V[567]*:*) + test -r /sysV68 && echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv' && exit 0 ;; + 3[34]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0) + OS_REL='' + test -r /etc/.relid \ + && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ + && echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL} && exit 0 ;; + 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*) + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && echo i486-ncr-sysv4 && exit 0 ;; + m68*:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) + echo m68k-atari-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + i?86:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*) + echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + RM*:SINIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:SINIX-*:*:*) + if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4 + else + echo ns32k-sni-sysv + fi + exit 0 ;; + PENTIUM:CPunix:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort + # says + echo i586-unisys-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*) + # From Gerald Hewes . + # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm + echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + *:*:*:FTX*) + # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com. + echo i860-stratus-sysv4 + exit 0 ;; + mc68*:A/UX:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + news*:NEWS-OS:*:6*) + echo mips-sony-newsos6 + exit 0 ;; + R3000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SV:*:*) + if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then + echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit 0 ;; + BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only. + echo powerpc-be-beos + exit 0 ;; + BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only. + echo powerpc-apple-beos + exit 0 ;; + BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible. + echo i586-pc-beos + exit 0 ;; + SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + Power*:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; + *:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit 0 ;; +esac + +#echo '(No uname command or uname output not recognized.)' 1>&2 +#echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" 1>&2 + +cat >$dummy.c < +# include +#endif +main () +{ +#if defined (sony) +#if defined (MIPSEB) + /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". Perhaps BFD should be changed, + I don't know.... */ + printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#else +#include + printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n", +#ifdef NEWSOS4 + "4" +#else + "" +#endif + ); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (__arm) && defined (__acorn) && defined (__unix) + printf ("arm-acorn-riscix"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (hp300) && !defined (hpux) + printf ("m68k-hp-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (NeXT) +#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__) +#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k" +#endif + int version; + version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`; + if (version < 4) + printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version); + else + printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version); + exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16) +#if defined (UMAXV) + printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0); +#else +#if defined (CMU) + printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0); +#else + printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (__386BSD__) + printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + +#if defined (sequent) +#if defined (i386) + printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#if defined (ns32000) + printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (_SEQUENT_) + struct utsname un; + + uname(&un); + + if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) { + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0); + } + if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */ + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0); + } + printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0); + +#endif + +#if defined (vax) +#if !defined (ultrix) + printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#else + printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860) + printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0); +#endif + + exit (1); +} +EOF + +${CC-cc} $dummy.c -o $dummy 2>/dev/null && ./$dummy && rm $dummy.c $dummy && exit 0 +rm -f $dummy.c $dummy + +# Apollos put the system type in the environment. + +test -d /usr/apollo && { echo ${ISP}-apollo-${SYSTYPE}; exit 0; } + +# Convex versions that predate uname can use getsysinfo(1) + +if [ -x /usr/convex/getsysinfo ] +then + case `getsysinfo -f cpu_type` in + c1*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c2*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit 0 ;; + c34*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c38*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + c4*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit 0 ;; + esac +fi + +#echo '(Unable to guess system type)' 1>&2 + +exit 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/config.sub b/crypto/heimdal/config.sub new file mode 100755 index 0000000..7a40495 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/config.sub @@ -0,0 +1,957 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Configuration validation subroutine script, version 1.1. +# Copyright (C) 1991, 92-97, 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This file is (in principle) common to ALL GNU software. +# The presence of a machine in this file suggests that SOME GNU software +# can handle that machine. It does not imply ALL GNU software can. +# +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, +# Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type. +# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument. +# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1. +# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed. + +# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages +# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases +# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software. +# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations +# it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish +# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless +# configuration. + +# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given +# machine specification into a single specification in the form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# or in some cases, the newer four-part form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification. + +if [ x$1 = x ] +then + echo Configuration name missing. 1>&2 + echo "Usage: $0 CPU-MFR-OPSYS" 1>&2 + echo "or $0 ALIAS" 1>&2 + echo where ALIAS is a recognized configuration type. 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# First pass through any local machine types. +case $1 in + *local*) + echo $1 + exit 0 + ;; + *) + ;; +esac + +# Separate what the user gave into CPU-COMPANY and OS or KERNEL-OS (if any). +# Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations. +maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'` +case $maybe_os in + linux-gnu*) + os=-$maybe_os + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'` + ;; + *) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/-[^-]*$//'` + if [ $basic_machine != $1 ] + then os=`echo $1 | sed 's/.*-/-/'` + else os=; fi + ;; +esac + +### Let's recognize common machines as not being operating systems so +### that things like config.sub decstation-3100 work. We also +### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we +### can provide default operating systems below. +case $os in + -sun*os*) + # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input. + ;; + -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \ + -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \ + -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \ + -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\ + -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \ + -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \ + -apple) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -hiux*) + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + -sco5) + os=sco3.2v5 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco4) + os=-sco3.2v4 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2.[4-9]*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'` + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2v[4-9]*) + # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco*) + os=-sco3.2v2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -isc) + os=-isc2.2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -clix*) + basic_machine=clipper-intergraph + ;; + -isc*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -lynx*) + os=-lynxos + ;; + -ptx*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'` + ;; + -windowsnt*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'` + ;; + -psos*) + os=-psos + ;; +esac + +# Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations. +case $basic_machine in + # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name. + # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below. + tahoe | i860 | m32r | m68k | m68000 | m88k | ns32k | arc | arm \ + | arme[lb] | pyramid | mn10200 | mn10300 | tron | a29k \ + | 580 | i960 | h8300 | hppa | hppa1.0 | hppa1.1 | hppa2.0 \ + | alpha | alphaev5 | alphaev56 | we32k | ns16k | clipper \ + | i370 | sh | powerpc | powerpcle | 1750a | dsp16xx | pdp11 \ + | mips64 | mipsel | mips64el | mips64orion | mips64orionel \ + | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ + | sparc | sparclet | sparclite | sparc64 | v850) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + ;; + # We use `pc' rather than `unknown' + # because (1) that's what they normally are, and + # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users. + i[34567]86) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc + ;; + # Object if more than one company name word. + *-*-*) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name. + vax-* | tahoe-* | i[34567]86-* | i860-* | m32r-* | m68k-* | m68000-* \ + | m88k-* | sparc-* | ns32k-* | fx80-* | arc-* | arm-* | c[123]* \ + | mips-* | pyramid-* | tron-* | a29k-* | romp-* | rs6000-* \ + | power-* | none-* | 580-* | cray2-* | h8300-* | i960-* \ + | xmp-* | ymp-* | hppa-* | hppa1.0-* | hppa1.1-* | hppa2.0-* \ + | alpha-* | alphaev5-* | alphaev56-* | we32k-* | cydra-* \ + | ns16k-* | pn-* | np1-* | xps100-* | clipper-* | orion-* \ + | sparclite-* | pdp11-* | sh-* | powerpc-* | powerpcle-* \ + | sparc64-* | mips64-* | mipsel-* \ + | mips64el-* | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ + | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* \ + | f301-*) + ;; + # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand + # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS. + 3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc) + basic_machine=m68000-att + ;; + 3b*) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + alliant | fx80) + basic_machine=fx80-alliant + ;; + altos | altos3068) + basic_machine=m68k-altos + ;; + am29k) + basic_machine=a29k-none + os=-bsd + ;; + amdahl) + basic_machine=580-amdahl + os=-sysv + ;; + amiga | amiga-*) + basic_machine=m68k-cbm + ;; + amigaos | amigados) + basic_machine=m68k-cbm + os=-amigaos + ;; + amigaunix | amix) + basic_machine=m68k-cbm + os=-sysv4 + ;; + apollo68) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-sysv + ;; + aux) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + os=-aux + ;; + balance) + basic_machine=ns32k-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + convex-c1) + basic_machine=c1-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c2) + basic_machine=c2-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c32) + basic_machine=c32-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c34) + basic_machine=c34-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c38) + basic_machine=c38-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + cray | ymp) + basic_machine=ymp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + cray2) + basic_machine=cray2-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + [ctj]90-cray) + #basic_machine=c90-cray + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/\(unicos[0-9]*\.[0-9]*\).*/\1/'` + #os=-unicos + ;; + crds | unos) + basic_machine=m68k-crds + ;; + da30 | da30-*) + basic_machine=m68k-da30 + ;; + decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn) + basic_machine=mips-dec + ;; + delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \ + | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola) + basic_machine=m68k-motorola + ;; + delta88) + basic_machine=m88k-motorola + os=-sysv3 + ;; + dpx20 | dpx20-*) + basic_machine=rs6000-bull + os=-bosx + ;; + dpx2* | dpx2*-bull) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv3 + ;; + ebmon29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-ebmon + ;; + elxsi) + basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi + os=-bsd + ;; + encore | umax | mmax) + basic_machine=ns32k-encore + ;; + fx2800) + basic_machine=i860-alliant + ;; + genix) + basic_machine=ns32k-ns + ;; + gmicro) + basic_machine=tron-gmicro + os=-sysv + ;; + h3050r* | hiux*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + h8300hms) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + harris) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-sysv3 + ;; + hp300-*) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp300bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-bsd + ;; + hp300hpux) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-hpux + ;; + hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9]) + basic_machine=m68000-hp + ;; + hp9k3[2-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp9k7[0-9][0-9] | hp7[0-9][0-9] | hp9k8[0-9]7 | hp8[0-9]7) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hppa-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + i370-ibm* | ibm*) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + os=-mvs + ;; +# I'm not sure what "Sysv32" means. Should this be sysv3.2? + i[34567]86v32) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv32 + ;; + i[34567]86v4*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv4 + ;; + i[34567]86v) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv + ;; + i[34567]86sol2) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-solaris2 + ;; + iris | iris4d) + basic_machine=mips-sgi + case $os in + -irix*) + ;; + *) + os=-irix4 + ;; + esac + ;; + isi68 | isi) + basic_machine=m68k-isi + os=-sysv + ;; + m88k-omron*) + basic_machine=m88k-omron + ;; + magnum | m3230) + basic_machine=mips-mips + os=-sysv + ;; + merlin) + basic_machine=ns32k-utek + os=-sysv + ;; + miniframe) + basic_machine=m68000-convergent + ;; + mipsel*-linux*) + basic_machine=mipsel-unknown + os=-linux-gnu + ;; + mips*-linux*) + basic_machine=mips-unknown + os=-linux-gnu + ;; + mips3*-*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'` + ;; + mips3*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown + ;; + ncr3000) + basic_machine=i486-ncr + os=-sysv4 + ;; + news | news700 | news800 | news900) + basic_machine=m68k-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news1000) + basic_machine=m68030-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news-3600 | risc-news) + basic_machine=mips-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + next | m*-next ) + basic_machine=m68k-next + case $os in + -nextstep* ) + ;; + -ns2*) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + *) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + esac + ;; + nh3000) + basic_machine=m68k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nh[45]000) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nindy960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-nindy + ;; + np1) + basic_machine=np1-gould + ;; + pa-hitachi) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + paragon) + basic_machine=i860-intel + os=-osf + ;; + pbd) + basic_machine=sparc-tti + ;; + pbb) + basic_machine=m68k-tti + ;; + pc532 | pc532-*) + basic_machine=ns32k-pc532 + ;; + pentium | p5 | k5 | nexen) + basic_machine=i586-pc + ;; + pentiumpro | p6 | k6 | 6x86) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentiumii | pentium2) + basic_machine=i786-pc + ;; + pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | nexen-*) + basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumpro-* | p6-* | k6-* | 6x86-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumii-* | pentium2-*) + basic_machine=i786-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pn) + basic_machine=pn-gould + ;; + power) basic_machine=rs6000-ibm + ;; + ppc) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + ;; + ppc-*) basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little) + basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown + ;; + ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*) + basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ps2) + basic_machine=i386-ibm + ;; + rm[46]00) + basic_machine=mips-siemens + ;; + rtpc | rtpc-*) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + sequent) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + ;; + sh) + basic_machine=sh-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + sps7) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv2 + ;; + spur) + basic_machine=spur-unknown + ;; + sun2) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + ;; + sun2os3) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun2os4) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun3os3) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun3os4) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4os3) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun4os4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4sol2) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-solaris2 + ;; + sun3 | sun3-*) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + ;; + sun4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner) + basic_machine=i386-sun + ;; + symmetry) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + tx39) + basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown + ;; + tx39el) + basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown + ;; + tower | tower-32) + basic_machine=m68k-ncr + ;; + udi29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + ultra3) + basic_machine=a29k-nyu + os=-sym1 + ;; + vaxv) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-sysv + ;; + vms) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-vms + ;; + vpp*|vx|vx-*) + basic_machine=f301-fujitsu + ;; + vxworks960) + basic_machine=i960-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks68) + basic_machine=m68k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks29k) + basic_machine=a29k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + xmp) + basic_machine=xmp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + xps | xps100) + basic_machine=xps100-honeywell + ;; + none) + basic_machine=none-none + os=-none + ;; + +# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in +# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular. + mips) + if [ x$os = x-linux-gnu ]; then + basic_machine=mips-unknown + else + basic_machine=mips-mips + fi + ;; + romp) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + rs6000) + basic_machine=rs6000-ibm + ;; + vax) + basic_machine=vax-dec + ;; + pdp11) + basic_machine=pdp11-dec + ;; + we32k) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + sparc) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + cydra) + basic_machine=cydra-cydrome + ;; + orion) + basic_machine=orion-highlevel + ;; + orion105) + basic_machine=clipper-highlevel + ;; + *) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers. +case $basic_machine in + *-digital*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'` + ;; + *-commodore*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'` + ;; + *) + ;; +esac + +# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems. + +if [ x"$os" != x"" ] +then +case $os in + # First match some system type aliases + # that might get confused with valid system types. + # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception. + -solaris1 | -solaris1.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'` + ;; + -solaris) + os=-solaris2 + ;; + -svr4*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -unixware*) + os=-sysv4.2uw + ;; + -gnu/linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + # First accept the basic system types. + # The portable systems comes first. + # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number. + # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4. + -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \ + | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\ + | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -solaris* | -sym* \ + | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \ + | -aos* \ + | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \ + | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \ + | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -netbsd* | -openbsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* \ + | -lynxos* | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* \ + | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \ + | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \ + | -cygwin* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \ + | -mingw32* | -linux-gnu* | -uxpv* | -beos* | -rhapsody* \ + | -openstep*) + # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number. + ;; + -linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + -sunos5*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'` + ;; + -sunos6*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'` + ;; + -osfrose*) + os=-osfrose + ;; + -osf*) + os=-osf + ;; + -utek*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -dynix*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -acis*) + os=-aos + ;; + -ctix* | -uts*) + os=-sysv + ;; + -ns2 ) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + # Preserve the version number of sinix5. + -sinix5.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'` + ;; + -sinix*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -triton*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -oss*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -svr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -svr3) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -sysvr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + # This must come after -sysvr4. + -sysv*) + ;; + -xenix) + os=-xenix + ;; + -none) + ;; + *) + # Get rid of the `-' at the beginning of $os. + os=`echo $os | sed 's/[^-]*-//'` + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': system \`$os\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac +else + +# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines. +# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their +# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine. + +# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say, +# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top +# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system. Otherwise, code above +# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating +# system, and we'll never get to this point. + +case $basic_machine in + *-acorn) + os=-riscix1.2 + ;; + arm*-semi) + os=-aout + ;; + pdp11-*) + os=-none + ;; + *-dec | vax-*) + os=-ultrix4.2 + ;; + m68*-apollo) + os=-domain + ;; + i386-sun) + os=-sunos4.0.2 + ;; + m68000-sun) + os=-sunos3 + # This also exists in the configure program, but was not the + # default. + # os=-sunos4 + ;; + *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os. + os=-sysv3 + ;; + sparc-* | *-sun) + os=-sunos4.1.1 + ;; + *-be) + os=-beos + ;; + *-ibm) + os=-aix + ;; + *-hp) + os=-hpux + ;; + *-hitachi) + os=-hiux + ;; + i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-cbm) + os=-amigaos + ;; + *-dg) + os=-dgux + ;; + *-dolphin) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + m68k-ccur) + os=-rtu + ;; + m88k-omron*) + os=-luna + ;; + *-next ) + os=-nextstep + ;; + *-sequent) + os=-ptx + ;; + *-crds) + os=-unos + ;; + *-ns) + os=-genix + ;; + i370-*) + os=-mvs + ;; + *-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + *-gould) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-highlevel) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-encore) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-sgi) + os=-irix + ;; + *-siemens) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + *-masscomp) + os=-rtu + ;; + f301-fujitsu) + os=-uxpv + ;; + *) + os=-none + ;; +esac +fi + +# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the +# manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer. +vendor=unknown +case $basic_machine in + *-unknown) + case $os in + -riscix*) + vendor=acorn + ;; + -sunos*) + vendor=sun + ;; + -aix*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -hpux*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -hiux*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -unos*) + vendor=crds + ;; + -dgux*) + vendor=dg + ;; + -luna*) + vendor=omron + ;; + -genix*) + vendor=ns + ;; + -mvs*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -ptx*) + vendor=sequent + ;; + -vxsim* | -vxworks*) + vendor=wrs + ;; + -aux*) + vendor=apple + ;; + esac + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"` + ;; +esac + +echo $basic_machine$os diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/configure b/crypto/heimdal/configure new file mode 100755 index 0000000..a871362 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/configure @@ -0,0 +1,12371 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +# From configure.in Revision: 1.215 + + + + + +# Like AC_CONFIG_HEADER, but automatically create stamp file. + + + +# Do all the work for Automake. This macro actually does too much -- +# some checks are only needed if your package does certain things. +# But this isn't really a big deal. + +# serial 1 + + + + +# +# Check to make sure that the build environment is sane. +# + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +# serial 25 AM_PROG_LIBTOOL + + +# AM_ENABLE_SHARED - implement the --enable-shared flag +# Usage: AM_ENABLE_SHARED[(DEFAULT)] +# Where DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. If omitted, it defaults to +# `yes'. + + +# AM_DISABLE_SHARED - set the default shared flag to --disable-shared + + +# AM_DISABLE_STATIC - set the default static flag to --disable-static + + +# AM_ENABLE_STATIC - implement the --enable-static flag +# Usage: AM_ENABLE_STATIC[(DEFAULT)] +# Where DEFAULT is either `yes' or `no'. 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"$ac_site_file" + fi +done + +if test -r "$cache_file"; then + echo "loading cache $cache_file" + . $cache_file +else + echo "creating cache $cache_file" + > $cache_file +fi + +ac_ext=c +# CFLAGS is not in ac_cpp because -g, -O, etc. are not valid cpp options. +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='${CC-cc} -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext 1>&5' +ac_link='${CC-cc} -o conftest${ac_exeext} $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS 1>&5' +cross_compiling=$ac_cv_prog_cc_cross + +ac_exeext= +ac_objext=o +if (echo "testing\c"; echo 1,2,3) | grep c >/dev/null; then + # Stardent Vistra SVR4 grep lacks -e, says ghazi@caip.rutgers.edu. + if (echo -n testing; echo 1,2,3) | sed s/-n/xn/ | grep xn >/dev/null; then + ac_n= ac_c=' +' ac_t=' ' + else + ac_n=-n ac_c= ac_t= + fi +else + ac_n= ac_c='\c' ac_t= +fi + + + + + + +ac_aux_dir= +for ac_dir in $srcdir $srcdir/.. $srcdir/../..; do + if test -f $ac_dir/install-sh; then + ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir + ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install-sh -c" + break + elif test -f $ac_dir/install.sh; then + ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir + ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install.sh -c" + break + fi +done +if test -z "$ac_aux_dir"; then + { echo "configure: error: can not find install-sh or install.sh in $srcdir $srcdir/.. $srcdir/../.." 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi +ac_config_guess=$ac_aux_dir/config.guess +ac_config_sub=$ac_aux_dir/config.sub +ac_configure=$ac_aux_dir/configure # This should be Cygnus configure. + +# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster), +# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or +# incompatible versions: +# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install +# SunOS /usr/etc/install +# IRIX /sbin/install +# AIX /bin/install +# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag +# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args +# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff" +# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh. +echo $ac_n "checking for a BSD compatible install""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:776: checking for a BSD compatible install" >&5 +if test -z "$INSTALL"; then +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_path_install'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_IFS="$IFS"; IFS=":" + for ac_dir in $PATH; do + # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements. + case "$ac_dir/" in + /|./|.//|/etc/*|/usr/sbin/*|/usr/etc/*|/sbin/*|/usr/afsws/bin/*|/usr/ucb/*) ;; + *) + # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install. + # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root + # by default. + for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_prog; then + if test $ac_prog = install && + grep dspmsg $ac_dir/$ac_prog >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention. + : + else + ac_cv_path_install="$ac_dir/$ac_prog -c" + break 2 + fi + fi + done + ;; + esac + done + IFS="$ac_save_IFS" + +fi + if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then + INSTALL="$ac_cv_path_install" + else + # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. We don't cache a + # path for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will + # break other packages using the cache if that directory is + # removed, or if the path is relative. + INSTALL="$ac_install_sh" + fi +fi +echo "$ac_t""$INSTALL" 1>&6 + +# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}. +# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution. +test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}' + +test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL_PROGRAM}' + +test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644' + +echo $ac_n "checking whether build environment is sane""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:829: checking whether build environment is sane" >&5 +# Just in case +sleep 1 +echo timestamp > conftestfile +# Do `set' in a subshell so we don't clobber the current shell's +# arguments. Must try -L first in case configure is actually a +# symlink; some systems play weird games with the mod time of symlinks +# (eg FreeBSD returns the mod time of the symlink's containing +# directory). +if ( + set X `ls -Lt $srcdir/configure conftestfile 2> /dev/null` + if test "$*" = "X"; then + # -L didn't work. + set X `ls -t $srcdir/configure conftestfile` + fi + if test "$*" != "X $srcdir/configure conftestfile" \ + && test "$*" != "X conftestfile $srcdir/configure"; then + + # If neither matched, then we have a broken ls. This can happen + # if, for instance, CONFIG_SHELL is bash and it inherits a + # broken ls alias from the environment. This has actually + # happened. Such a system could not be considered "sane". + { echo "configure: error: ls -t appears to fail. Make sure there is not a broken +alias in your environment" 1>&2; exit 1; } + fi + + test "$2" = conftestfile + ) +then + # Ok. + : +else + { echo "configure: error: newly created file is older than distributed files! +Check your system clock" 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi +rm -f conftest* +echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 +if test "$program_transform_name" = s,x,x,; then + program_transform_name= +else + # Double any \ or $. echo might interpret backslashes. + cat <<\EOF_SED > conftestsed +s,\\,\\\\,g; s,\$,$$,g +EOF_SED + program_transform_name="`echo $program_transform_name|sed -f conftestsed`" + rm -f conftestsed +fi +test "$program_prefix" != NONE && + program_transform_name="s,^,${program_prefix},; $program_transform_name" +# Use a double $ so make ignores it. +test "$program_suffix" != NONE && + program_transform_name="s,\$\$,${program_suffix},; $program_transform_name" + +# sed with no file args requires a program. +test "$program_transform_name" = "" && program_transform_name="s,x,x," + +echo $ac_n "checking whether ${MAKE-make} sets \${MAKE}""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:886: checking whether ${MAKE-make} sets \${MAKE}" >&5 +set dummy ${MAKE-make}; ac_make=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_make_${ac_make}_set'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftestmake <<\EOF +all: + @echo 'ac_maketemp="${MAKE}"' +EOF +# GNU make sometimes prints "make[1]: Entering...", which would confuse us. +eval `${MAKE-make} -f conftestmake 2>/dev/null | grep temp=` +if test -n "$ac_maketemp"; then + eval ac_cv_prog_make_${ac_make}_set=yes +else + eval ac_cv_prog_make_${ac_make}_set=no +fi +rm -f conftestmake +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_prog_make_'${ac_make}_set`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + SET_MAKE= +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + SET_MAKE="MAKE=${MAKE-make}" +fi + + +PACKAGE=heimdal + +VERSION=0.2m + +if test "`cd $srcdir && pwd`" != "`pwd`" && test -f $srcdir/config.status; then + { echo "configure: error: source directory already configured; run "make distclean" there first" 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi +cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:932: checking for working aclocal" >&5 +# Run test in a subshell; some versions of sh will print an error if +# an executable is not found, even if stderr is redirected. +# Redirect stdin to placate older versions of autoconf. Sigh. +if (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + ACLOCAL=aclocal + echo "$ac_t""found" 1>&6 +else + ACLOCAL="$missing_dir/missing aclocal" + echo "$ac_t""missing" 1>&6 +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for working autoconf""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:945: checking for working autoconf" >&5 +# Run test in a subshell; some versions of sh will print an error if +# an executable is not found, even if stderr is redirected. +# Redirect stdin to placate older versions of autoconf. Sigh. +if (autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + AUTOCONF=autoconf + echo "$ac_t""found" 1>&6 +else + AUTOCONF="$missing_dir/missing autoconf" + echo "$ac_t""missing" 1>&6 +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for working automake""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:958: checking for working automake" >&5 +# Run test in a subshell; some versions of sh will print an error if +# an executable is not found, even if stderr is redirected. +# Redirect stdin to placate older versions of autoconf. Sigh. +if (automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + AUTOMAKE=automake + echo "$ac_t""found" 1>&6 +else + AUTOMAKE="$missing_dir/missing automake" + echo "$ac_t""missing" 1>&6 +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for working autoheader""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:971: checking for working autoheader" >&5 +# Run test in a subshell; some versions of sh will print an error if +# an executable is not found, even if stderr is redirected. +# Redirect stdin to placate older versions of autoconf. Sigh. +if (autoheader --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + AUTOHEADER=autoheader + echo "$ac_t""found" 1>&6 +else + AUTOHEADER="$missing_dir/missing autoheader" + echo "$ac_t""missing" 1>&6 +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for working makeinfo""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:984: checking for working makeinfo" >&5 +# Run test in a subshell; some versions of sh will print an error if +# an executable is not found, even if stderr is redirected. +# Redirect stdin to placate older versions of autoconf. Sigh. +if (makeinfo --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + MAKEINFO=makeinfo + echo "$ac_t""found" 1>&6 +else + MAKEINFO="$missing_dir/missing makeinfo" + echo "$ac_t""missing" 1>&6 +fi + + + + + + +# Make sure we can run config.sub. +if ${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $ac_config_sub sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1; then : +else { echo "configure: error: can not run $ac_config_sub" 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking host system type""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1007: checking host system type" >&5 + +host_alias=$host +case "$host_alias" in +NONE) + case $nonopt in + NONE) + if host_alias=`${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $ac_config_guess`; then : + else { echo "configure: error: can not guess host type; you must specify one" 1>&2; exit 1; } + fi ;; + *) host_alias=$nonopt ;; + esac ;; +esac + +host=`${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $ac_config_sub $host_alias` +host_cpu=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\1/'` +host_vendor=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\2/'` +host_os=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\3/'` +echo "$ac_t""$host" 1>&6 + +CANONICAL_HOST=$host + + +sunos=no +case "$host" in +*-*-sunos4*) + sunos=40 + ;; +*-*-solaris2.7) + sunos=57 + ;; +*-*-solaris2*) + sunos=50 + ;; +esac +if test "$sunos" != no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:1064: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_CC'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="gcc" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +fi +fi +CC="$ac_cv_prog_CC" +if test -n "$CC"; then + echo "$ac_t""$CC" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +if test -z "$CC"; then + # Extract the first word of "cc", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy cc; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1094: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_CC'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_prog_rejected=no + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + if test "$ac_dir/$ac_word" = "/usr/ucb/cc"; then + ac_prog_rejected=yes + continue + fi + ac_cv_prog_CC="cc" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +if test $ac_prog_rejected = yes; then + # We found a bogon in the path, so make sure we never use it. + set dummy $ac_cv_prog_CC + shift + if test $# -gt 0; then + # We chose a different compiler from the bogus one. + # However, it has the same basename, so the bogon will be chosen + # first if we set CC to just the basename; use the full file name. + shift + set dummy "$ac_dir/$ac_word" "$@" + shift + ac_cv_prog_CC="$@" + fi +fi +fi +fi +CC="$ac_cv_prog_CC" +if test -n "$CC"; then + echo "$ac_t""$CC" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + if test -z "$CC"; then + case "`uname -s`" in + *win32* | *WIN32*) + # Extract the first word of "cl", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy cl; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1145: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_CC'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="cl" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +fi +fi +CC="$ac_cv_prog_CC" +if test -n "$CC"; then + echo "$ac_t""$CC" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + ;; + esac + fi + test -z "$CC" && { echo "configure: error: no acceptable cc found in \$PATH" 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking whether the C compiler ($CC $CFLAGS $LDFLAGS) works""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1177: checking whether the C compiler ($CC $CFLAGS $LDFLAGS) works" >&5 + +ac_ext=c +# CFLAGS is not in ac_cpp because -g, -O, etc. are not valid cpp options. +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='${CC-cc} -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext 1>&5' +ac_link='${CC-cc} -o conftest${ac_exeext} $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS 1>&5' +cross_compiling=$ac_cv_prog_cc_cross + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext << EOF + +#line 1188 "configure" +#include "confdefs.h" + +main(){return(0);} +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:1193: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_works=yes + # If we can't run a trivial program, we are probably using a cross compiler. + if (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_cross=no + else + ac_cv_prog_cc_cross=yes + fi +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + ac_cv_prog_cc_works=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +ac_ext=c +# CFLAGS is not in ac_cpp because -g, -O, etc. are not valid cpp options. +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='${CC-cc} -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext 1>&5' +ac_link='${CC-cc} -o conftest${ac_exeext} $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS 1>&5' +cross_compiling=$ac_cv_prog_cc_cross + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_cc_works" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_prog_cc_works = no; then + { echo "configure: error: installation or configuration problem: C compiler cannot create executables." 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi +echo $ac_n "checking whether the C compiler ($CC $CFLAGS $LDFLAGS) is a cross-compiler""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1219: checking whether the C compiler ($CC $CFLAGS $LDFLAGS) is a cross-compiler" >&5 +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_cc_cross" 1>&6 +cross_compiling=$ac_cv_prog_cc_cross + +echo $ac_n "checking whether we are using GNU C""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1224: checking whether we are using GNU C" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_gcc'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.c <&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; }; } | egrep yes >/dev/null 2>&1; then + ac_cv_prog_gcc=yes +else + ac_cv_prog_gcc=no +fi +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_gcc" 1>&6 + +if test $ac_cv_prog_gcc = yes; then + GCC=yes +else + GCC= +fi + +ac_test_CFLAGS="${CFLAGS+set}" +ac_save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS= +echo $ac_n "checking whether ${CC-cc} accepts -g""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1252: checking whether ${CC-cc} accepts -g" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_cc_g'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + echo 'void f(){}' > conftest.c +if test -z "`${CC-cc} -g -c conftest.c 2>&1`"; then + ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes +else + ac_cv_prog_cc_g=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_cc_g" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_test_CFLAGS" = set; then + CFLAGS="$ac_save_CFLAGS" +elif test $ac_cv_prog_cc_g = yes; then + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + CFLAGS="-g -O2" + else + CFLAGS="-g" + fi +else + if test "$GCC" = yes; then + CFLAGS="-O2" + else + CFLAGS= + fi +fi + + +echo $ac_n "checking for Cygwin environment""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1285: checking for Cygwin environment" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_cygwin'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_cygwin=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_cygwin=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_cygwin" 1>&6 +CYGWIN= +test "$ac_cv_cygwin" = yes && CYGWIN=yes +echo $ac_n "checking for object suffix""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1318: checking for object suffix" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_objext'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + rm -f conftest* +echo 'int i = 1;' > conftest.$ac_ext +if { (eval echo configure:1324: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + for ac_file in conftest.*; do + case $ac_file in + *.c) ;; + *) ac_cv_objext=`echo $ac_file | sed -e s/conftest.//` ;; + esac + done +else + { echo "configure: error: installation or configuration problem; compiler does not work" 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_objext" 1>&6 +OBJEXT=$ac_cv_objext +ac_objext=$ac_cv_objext + +echo $ac_n "checking for mingw32 environment""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1342: checking for mingw32 environment" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_mingw32'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_mingw32=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_mingw32=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_mingw32" 1>&6 +MINGW32= +test "$ac_cv_mingw32" = yes && MINGW32=yes + + +echo $ac_n "checking for executable suffix""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1373: checking for executable suffix" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_exeext'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test "$CYGWIN" = yes || test "$MINGW32" = yes; then + ac_cv_exeext=.exe +else + rm -f conftest* + echo 'int main () { return 0; }' > conftest.$ac_ext + ac_cv_exeext= + if { (eval echo configure:1383: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; }; then + for file in conftest.*; do + case $file in + *.c | *.o | *.obj) ;; + *) ac_cv_exeext=`echo $file | sed -e s/conftest//` ;; + esac + done + else + { echo "configure: error: installation or configuration problem: compiler cannot create executables." 1>&2; exit 1; } + fi + rm -f conftest* + test x"${ac_cv_exeext}" = x && ac_cv_exeext=no +fi +fi + +EXEEXT="" +test x"${ac_cv_exeext}" != xno && EXEEXT=${ac_cv_exeext} +echo "$ac_t""${ac_cv_exeext}" 1>&6 +ac_exeext=$EXEEXT + + +for ac_prog in 'bison -y' byacc +do +# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1409: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_YACC'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$YACC"; then + ac_cv_prog_YACC="$YACC" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_YACC="$ac_prog" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +fi +fi +YACC="$ac_cv_prog_YACC" +if test -n "$YACC"; then + echo "$ac_t""$YACC" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +test -n "$YACC" && break +done +test -n "$YACC" || YACC="yacc" + +echo $ac_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1440: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5 +# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory. +if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then + CPP= +fi +if test -z "$CPP"; then +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_CPP'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + # This must be in double quotes, not single quotes, because CPP may get + # substituted into the Makefile and "${CC-cc}" will confuse make. + CPP="${CC-cc} -E" + # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser, + # not just through cpp. + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +Syntax Error +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:1461: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + : +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + CPP="${CC-cc} -E -traditional-cpp" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +Syntax Error +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:1478: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + : +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + CPP="${CC-cc} -nologo -E" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +Syntax Error +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:1495: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + : +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + CPP=/lib/cpp +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +rm -f conftest* + ac_cv_prog_CPP="$CPP" +fi + CPP="$ac_cv_prog_CPP" +else + ac_cv_prog_CPP="$CPP" +fi +echo "$ac_t""$CPP" 1>&6 + +missing_dir=`cd $ac_aux_dir && pwd` +for ac_prog in flex lex +do +# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1525: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_LEX'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$LEX"; then + ac_cv_prog_LEX="$LEX" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_LEX="$ac_prog" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +fi +fi +LEX="$ac_cv_prog_LEX" +if test -n "$LEX"; then + echo "$ac_t""$LEX" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +test -n "$LEX" && break +done +test -n "$LEX" || LEX=""$missing_dir/missing flex"" + +# Extract the first word of "flex", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy flex; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1558: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_LEX'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$LEX"; then + ac_cv_prog_LEX="$LEX" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_LEX="flex" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_cv_prog_LEX" && ac_cv_prog_LEX="lex" +fi +fi +LEX="$ac_cv_prog_LEX" +if test -n "$LEX"; then + echo "$ac_t""$LEX" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +if test -z "$LEXLIB" +then + case "$LEX" in + flex*) ac_lib=fl ;; + *) ac_lib=l ;; + esac + echo $ac_n "checking for yywrap in -l$ac_lib""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1592: checking for yywrap in -l$ac_lib" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo $ac_lib'_'yywrap | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-l$ac_lib $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + LEXLIB="-l$ac_lib" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking lex output file root""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1634: checking lex output file root" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_lex_root'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + # The minimal lex program is just a single line: %%. But some broken lexes +# (Solaris, I think it was) want two %% lines, so accommodate them. +echo '%% +%%' | $LEX +if test -f lex.yy.c; then + ac_cv_prog_lex_root=lex.yy +elif test -f lexyy.c; then + ac_cv_prog_lex_root=lexyy +else + { echo "configure: error: cannot find output from $LEX; giving up" 1>&2; exit 1; } +fi +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_lex_root" 1>&6 +LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT=$ac_cv_prog_lex_root + +echo $ac_n "checking whether yytext is a pointer""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1655: checking whether yytext is a pointer" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_lex_yytext_pointer'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + # POSIX says lex can declare yytext either as a pointer or an array; the +# default is implementation-dependent. Figure out which it is, since +# not all implementations provide the %pointer and %array declarations. +ac_cv_prog_lex_yytext_pointer=no +echo 'extern char *yytext;' >>$LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT.c +ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="$LIBS $LEXLIB" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_prog_lex_yytext_pointer=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +rm -f "${LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT}.c" + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_lex_yytext_pointer" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_prog_lex_yytext_pointer = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define YYTEXT_POINTER 1 +EOF + +fi + +# Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1698: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_RANLIB'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="ranlib" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB" && ac_cv_prog_RANLIB=":" +fi +fi +RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB" +if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + echo "$ac_t""$RANLIB" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +for ac_prog in mawk gawk nawk awk +do +# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1730: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_AWK'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$AWK"; then + ac_cv_prog_AWK="$AWK" # Let the user override the test. +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +fi +fi +AWK="$ac_cv_prog_AWK" +if test -n "$AWK"; then + echo "$ac_t""$AWK" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +test -n "$AWK" && break +done + +echo $ac_n "checking for ln -s or something else""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1760: checking for ln -s or something else" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_LN_S'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + rm -f conftestdata +if ln -s X conftestdata 2>/dev/null +then + rm -f conftestdata + ac_cv_prog_LN_S="ln -s" +else + touch conftestdata1 + if ln conftestdata1 conftestdata2; then + rm -f conftestdata* + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=ln + else + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=cp + fi +fi +fi +LN_S="$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" 1>&6 + + + +# Check whether --with-mips_abi or --without-mips_abi was given. +if test "${with_mips_abi+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_mips_abi" + : +fi + + +case "$host_os" in +irix*) +with_mips_abi="${with_mips_abi:-yes}" +if test -n "$GCC"; then + +# GCC < 2.8 only supports the O32 ABI. GCC >= 2.8 has a flag to select +# which ABI to use, but only supports (as of 2.8.1) the N32 and 64 ABIs. +# +# Default to N32, but if GCC doesn't grok -mabi=n32, we assume an old +# GCC and revert back to O32. The same goes if O32 is asked for - old +# GCCs doesn't like the -mabi option, and new GCCs can't output O32. +# +# Don't you just love *all* the different SGI ABIs? + +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-mabi=32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-mabi=n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-mabi=64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) { echo "configure: error: "Invalid ABI specified"" 1>&2; exit 1; } ;; +esac +if test -n "$abi" ; then +ac_foo=krb_cv_gcc_`echo $abi | tr =- __` +echo $ac_n "checking if $CC supports the $abi option""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1815: checking if $CC supports the $abi option" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'$ac_foo'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $abi" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval $ac_foo=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval $ac_foo=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + +fi + +ac_res=`eval echo \\\$$ac_foo` +echo "$ac_t""$ac_res" 1>&6 +if test $ac_res = no; then +# Try to figure out why that failed... +case $abi in + -mabi=32) + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -mabi=n32" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_res=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_res=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + CLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + if test $ac_res = yes; then + # New GCC + { echo "configure: error: $CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI" 1>&2; exit 1; } + fi + # Old GCC + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + ;; + -mabi=n32|-mabi=64) + if test $with_mips_abi = yes; then + # Old GCC, default to O32 + abi='' + abilibdirext='' + else + # Some broken GCC + { echo "configure: error: $CC does not support the $with_mips_abi ABI" 1>&2; exit 1; } + fi + ;; +esac +fi #if test $ac_res = no; then +fi #if test -n "$abi" ; then +else +case "${with_mips_abi}" in + 32|o32) abi='-32'; abilibdirext='' ;; + n32|yes) abi='-n32'; abilibdirext='32' ;; + 64) abi='-64'; abilibdirext='64' ;; + no) abi=''; abilibdirext='';; + *) { echo "configure: error: "Invalid ABI specified"" 1>&2; exit 1; } ;; +esac +fi #if test -n "$GCC"; then +;; +esac + +CC="$CC $abi" +libdir="$libdir$abilibdirext" + + +echo $ac_n "checking for __attribute__""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:1909: checking for __attribute__" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv___attribute__'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + +int main() { + +static void foo(void) __attribute__ ((noreturn)); + +static void +foo(void) +{ + exit(1); +} + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:1932: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv___attribute__=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv___attribute__=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if test "$ac_cv___attribute__" = "yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ 1 +EOF + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv___attribute__" 1>&6 + + +# Check whether --enable-shared or --disable-shared was given. +if test "${enable_shared+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_shared" + p=${PACKAGE-default} +case "$enableval" in +yes) enable_shared=yes ;; +no) enable_shared=no ;; +*) + enable_shared=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:," + for pkg in $enableval; do + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_shared=yes + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + ;; +esac +else + enable_shared=no +fi + +# Check whether --enable-static or --disable-static was given. +if test "${enable_static+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_static" + p=${PACKAGE-default} +case "$enableval" in +yes) enable_static=yes ;; +no) enable_static=no ;; +*) + enable_static=no + # Look at the argument we got. We use all the common list separators. + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:," + for pkg in $enableval; do + if test "X$pkg" = "X$p"; then + enable_static=yes + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + ;; +esac +else + enable_static=yes +fi + +# Check whether --with-gnu-ld or --without-gnu-ld was given. +if test "${with_gnu_ld+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_gnu_ld" + test "$withval" = no || with_gnu_ld=yes +else + with_gnu_ld=no +fi + + +ac_prog=ld +if test "$ac_cv_prog_gcc" = yes; then + # Check if gcc -print-prog-name=ld gives a path. + echo $ac_n "checking for ld used by GCC""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2012: checking for ld used by GCC" >&5 + ac_prog=`($CC -print-prog-name=ld) 2>&5` + case "$ac_prog" in + # Accept absolute paths. + /* | [A-Za-z]:\\*) + test -z "$LD" && LD="$ac_prog" + ;; + "") + # If it fails, then pretend we aren't using GCC. + ac_prog=ld + ;; + *) + # If it is relative, then search for the first ld in PATH. + with_gnu_ld=unknown + ;; + esac +elif test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + echo $ac_n "checking for GNU ld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2030: checking for GNU ld" >&5 +else + echo $ac_n "checking for non-GNU ld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2033: checking for non-GNU ld" >&5 +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_path_LD'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -z "$LD"; then + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for ac_dir in $PATH; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f "$ac_dir/$ac_prog"; then + ac_cv_path_LD="$ac_dir/$ac_prog" + # Check to see if the program is GNU ld. I'd rather use --version, + # but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. + # Break only if it was the GNU/non-GNU ld that we prefer. + if "$ac_cv_path_LD" -v 2>&1 < /dev/null | egrep '(GNU|with BFD)' > /dev/null; then + test "$with_gnu_ld" != no && break + else + test "$with_gnu_ld" != yes && break + fi + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" +else + ac_cv_path_LD="$LD" # Let the user override the test with a path. +fi +fi + +LD="$ac_cv_path_LD" +if test -n "$LD"; then + echo "$ac_t""$LD" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi +test -z "$LD" && { echo "configure: error: no acceptable ld found in \$PATH" 1>&2; exit 1; } + +echo $ac_n "checking if the linker ($LD) is GNU ld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2069: checking if the linker ($LD) is GNU ld" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + # I'd rather use --version here, but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. +if $LD -v 2>&1 &5; then + ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld=yes +else + ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld=no +fi +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld" 1>&6 + + +echo $ac_n "checking for BSD-compatible nm""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2085: checking for BSD-compatible nm" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_path_NM'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if test -n "$NM"; then + # Let the user override the test. + ac_cv_path_NM="$NM" +else + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for ac_dir in /usr/ucb /usr/ccs/bin $PATH /bin; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/nm; then + # Check to see if the nm accepts a BSD-compat flag. + # Adding the `sed 1q' prevents false positives on HP-UX, which says: + # nm: unknown option "B" ignored + if ($ac_dir/nm -B /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'; exit 0) | egrep /dev/null >/dev/null; then + ac_cv_path_NM="$ac_dir/nm -B" + elif ($ac_dir/nm -p /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'; exit 0) | egrep /dev/null >/dev/null; then + ac_cv_path_NM="$ac_dir/nm -p" + else + ac_cv_path_NM="$ac_dir/nm" + fi + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + test -z "$ac_cv_path_NM" && ac_cv_path_NM=nm +fi +fi + +NM="$ac_cv_path_NM" +echo "$ac_t""$NM" 1>&6 + + +echo $ac_n "checking whether ln -s works""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2120: checking whether ln -s works" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_prog_LN_S'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + rm -f conftestdata +if ln -s X conftestdata 2>/dev/null +then + rm -f conftestdata + ac_cv_prog_LN_S="ln -s" +else + ac_cv_prog_LN_S=ln +fi +fi +LN_S="$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" +if test "$ac_cv_prog_LN_S" = "ln -s"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +# Always use our own libtool. +LIBTOOL='$(top_builddir)/libtool' + +# Check for any special flags to pass to ltconfig. +libtool_flags= +test "$enable_shared" = no && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --disable-shared" +test "$enable_static" = no && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --disable-static" +test "$silent" = yes && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --silent" +test "$ac_cv_prog_gcc" = yes && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --with-gcc" +test "$ac_cv_prog_gnu_ld" = yes && libtool_flags="$libtool_flags --with-gnu-ld" + +# Some flags need to be propagated to the compiler or linker for good +# libtool support. +case "$host" in +*-*-irix6*) + # Find out which ABI we are using. + echo '#line 2156 "configure"' > conftest.$ac_ext + if { (eval echo configure:2157: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + case "`/usr/bin/file conftest.o`" in + *32-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -32" + ;; + *N32*) + LD="${LD-ld} -n32" + ;; + *64-bit*) + LD="${LD-ld} -64" + ;; + esac + fi + rm -rf conftest* + ;; + +*-*-sco3.2v5*) + # On SCO OpenServer 5, we need -belf to get full-featured binaries. + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" + ;; +esac + +# Actually configure libtool. ac_aux_dir is where install-sh is found. +CC="$CC" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" \ +LD="$LD" NM="$NM" RANLIB="$RANLIB" LN_S="$LN_S" \ +${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $ac_aux_dir/ltconfig --no-reexec \ +$libtool_flags --no-verify $ac_aux_dir/ltmain.sh $host \ +|| { echo "configure: error: libtool configure failed" 1>&2; exit 1; } + +# Redirect the config.log output again, so that the ltconfig log is not +# clobbered by the next message. +exec 5>>./config.log + + + +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="" +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="" +if test -z "$WFLAGS" -a "$GCC" = "yes"; then + # -Wno-implicit-int for broken X11 headers + # leave these out for now: + # -Wcast-align doesn't work well on alpha osf/1 + # -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast + # -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs + WFLAGS="-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs" + WFLAGS_NOUNUSED="-Wno-unused" + WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT="-Wno-implicit-int" +fi + + +berkeley_db=db +# Check whether --with-berkeley-db or --without-berkeley-db was given. +if test "${with_berkeley_db+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_berkeley_db" + +if test "$withval" = no; then + berkeley_db="" +fi + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-krb4 or --without-krb4 was given. +if test "${with_krb4+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_krb4" + : +fi + +# Check whether --with-krb4-lib or --without-krb4-lib was given. +if test "${with_krb4_lib+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_krb4_lib" + if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: No argument for --with-krb4-lib" 1>&2; exit 1; } +elif test "X$with_krb4" = "X"; then + with_krb4=yes +fi +fi + +# Check whether --with-krb4-include or --without-krb4-include was given. +if test "${with_krb4_include+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_krb4_include" + if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: No argument for --with-krb4-include" 1>&2; exit 1; } +elif test "X$with_krb4" = "X"; then + with_krb4=yes +fi +fi + + +echo $ac_n "checking for krb4""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2247: checking for krb4" >&5 + +case "$with_krb4" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +"") ;; +*) if test "$with_krb4_include" = ""; then + with_krb4_include="$with_krb4/include" + fi + if test "$with_krb4_lib" = ""; then + with_krb4_lib="$with_krb4/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + ;; +esac +header_dirs= +lib_dirs= +d='/usr/athena' +for i in $d; do + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include" + lib_dirs="$lib_dirs $i/lib$abilibdirext" +done + +case "$with_krb4_include" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) header_dirs="$with_krb4_include $header_dirs";; +esac +case "$with_krb4_lib" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) lib_dirs="$with_krb4_lib $lib_dirs";; +esac + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +ires= lres= +for i in $header_dirs; do + CFLAGS="-I$i $save_CFLAGS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:2293: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ires=$i;break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done +for i in $lib_dirs; do + LIBS="-L$i -lkrb -ldes $save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:2312: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + lres=$i;break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +LIBS="$save_LIBS" + +if test "$ires" -a "$lres" -a "$with_krb4" != "no"; then + krb4_includedir="$ires" + krb4_libdir="$lres" + INCLUDE_krb4="-I$krb4_includedir" + LIB_krb4="-L$krb4_libdir -lkrb" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +else + INCLUDE_krb4= + LIB_krb4= + with_krb4=no + echo "$ac_t""$with_krb4" 1>&6 +fi + + + + +LIB_kdb= +if test "$with_krb4" != "no"; then + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $INCLUDE_krb4" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIB_krb4 -ldes $LIBS" + EXTRA_LIB45=lib45.a + + echo $ac_n "checking for four valued krb_put_int""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2354: checking for four valued krb_put_int" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + + char tmp[4]; + krb_put_int(17, tmp, 4, sizeof(tmp)); +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:2368: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four" 1>&6 + if test "$ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT 1 +EOF + + fi + echo $ac_n "checking for KRB_VERIFY_SECURE""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2389: checking for KRB_VERIFY_SECURE" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + + int x = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:2402: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure" 1>&6 + if test "$ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure" != yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define KRB_VERIFY_SECURE 1 +EOF + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL 2 +EOF + + fi + echo $ac_n "checking for KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2427: checking for KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + + int x = KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:2440: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure" 1>&6 + if test "$ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure" != yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE 0 +EOF + + fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for krb_enable_debug""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2465: checking for krb_enable_debug" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_krb_enable_debug'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_krb_enable_debug\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" ; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_krb_enable_debug=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_krb_enable_debug=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_krb_enable_debug=\${ac_cv_funclib_krb_enable_debug-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_krb_enable_debug" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs krb_enable_debug"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" "@@@ +END + +# krb_enable_debug +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo krb_enable_debug | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_krb_enable_debug=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_enable_debug=yes" + eval "LIB_krb_enable_debug=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_enable_debug=no" + eval "LIB_krb_enable_debug=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_enable_debug=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_krb_enable_debug"; then + LIBS="$LIB_krb_enable_debug $LIBS" +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for krb_disable_debug""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2555: checking for krb_disable_debug" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_krb_disable_debug'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_krb_disable_debug\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" ; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_krb_disable_debug=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_krb_disable_debug=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_krb_disable_debug=\${ac_cv_funclib_krb_disable_debug-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_krb_disable_debug" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs krb_disable_debug"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" "@@@ +END + +# krb_disable_debug +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo krb_disable_debug | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_krb_disable_debug=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_disable_debug=yes" + eval "LIB_krb_disable_debug=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_disable_debug=no" + eval "LIB_krb_disable_debug=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_disable_debug=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_krb_disable_debug"; then + LIBS="$LIB_krb_disable_debug $LIBS" +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for krb_get_our_ip_for_realm""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2645: checking for krb_get_our_ip_for_realm" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" ; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=\${ac_cv_funclib_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs krb_get_our_ip_for_realm"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" "@@@ +END + +# krb_get_our_ip_for_realm +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo krb_get_our_ip_for_realm | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=yes" + eval "LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=no" + eval "LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm"; then + LIBS="$LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm $LIBS" +fi + + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + LIB_kdb="-lkdb -lkrb" + if test "$krb4_libdir"; then + LIB_krb4="-rpath $krb4_libdir $LIB_krb4" + LIB_kdb="-rpath $krb4_libdir -L$krb4_libdir $LIB_kdb" + fi +fi + + +if test "$with_krb4" != "no"; then + KRB4_TRUE= + KRB4_FALSE='#' +else + KRB4_TRUE='#' + KRB4_FALSE= +fi + + +if true; then + KRB5_TRUE= + KRB5_FALSE='#' +else + KRB5_TRUE='#' + KRB5_FALSE= +fi +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define KRB5 1 +EOF + + +if test "$aix" != no; then + AIX_TRUE= + AIX_FALSE='#' +else + AIX_TRUE='#' + AIX_FALSE= +fi + +if test "$aix" = 4; then + AIX4_TRUE= + AIX4_FALSE='#' +else + AIX4_TRUE='#' + AIX4_FALSE= +fi +aix_dynamic_afs=yes + + +if test "$aix_dynamic_afs" = yes; then + AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE= + AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE='#' +else + AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE='#' + AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE= +fi + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for dlopen""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2790: checking for dlopen" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_dlopen'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_dlopen\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" dl; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_dlopen=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_dlopen=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_dlopen=\${ac_cv_funclib_dlopen-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs dlopen"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" dl"@@@ +END + +# dlopen +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo dlopen | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_dlopen=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_dlopen=yes" + eval "LIB_dlopen=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_dlopen=no" + eval "LIB_dlopen=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_dlopen=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + +if test "$aix" != no; then + if test "$aix_dynamic_afs" = yes; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" = yes; then + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS= + elif test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" != no; then + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS="$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" + else + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS=-lld + fi + else + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS= + fi +fi + + + +if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" != no; then + HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE= + HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE='#' +else + HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE='#' + HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE= +fi +# Check whether --enable-kaserver or --disable-kaserver was given. +if test "${enable_kaserver+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_kaserver" + : +fi + +if test "$enable_kaserver" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define KASERVER 1 +EOF + + if test "$with_krb4" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: kaserver requires krb4" 1>&2; exit 1; } + exit 1 + fi +fi + +# Check whether --enable-kaserver-db or --disable-kaserver-db was given. +if test "${enable_kaserver_db+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_kaserver_db" + : +fi + +if test "$enable_kaserver_db" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define KASERVER_DB 1 +EOF + + if test "$with_krb4" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: kaserver-db requires krb4" 1>&2; exit 1; } + exit 1 + fi +fi + +otp=yes +# Check whether --enable-otp or --disable-otp was given. +if test "${enable_otp+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_otp" + +if test "$enableval" = "no"; then + otp=no +fi + +fi + +if test "$otp" = "yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define OTP 1 +EOF + + LIB_otp='$(top_builddir)/lib/otp/libotp.la' +fi + + + +if test "$otp" = yes; then + OTP_TRUE= + OTP_FALSE='#' +else + OTP_TRUE='#' + OTP_FALSE= +fi + +# Check whether --enable-osfc2 or --disable-osfc2 was given. +if test "${enable_osfc2+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_osfc2" + : +fi + +LIB_security= +if test "$enable_osfc2" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_OSFC2 1 +EOF + + LIB_security=-lsecurity +fi + + + +# Extract the first word of "nroff", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy nroff; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:2978: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_path_NROFF'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + case "$NROFF" in + /*) + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + ?:/*) + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a dos path. + ;; + *) + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$ac_dir/$ac_word" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + ;; +esac +fi +NROFF="$ac_cv_path_NROFF" +if test -n "$NROFF"; then + echo "$ac_t""$NROFF" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy groff; ac_word=$2 +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_word""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3013: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_path_GROFF'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + case "$GROFF" in + /*) + ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + ?:/*) + ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a dos path. + ;; + *) + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=":" + ac_dummy="$PATH" + for ac_dir in $ac_dummy; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/$ac_word; then + ac_cv_path_GROFF="$ac_dir/$ac_word" + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + ;; +esac +fi +GROFF="$ac_cv_path_GROFF" +if test -n "$GROFF"; then + echo "$ac_t""$GROFF" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking how to format man pages""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3046: checking how to format man pages" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_sys_man_format'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.1 << END +.Dd January 1, 1970 +.Dt CONFTEST 1 +.Sh NAME +.Nm conftest +.Nd +foobar +END + +if test "$NROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$NROFF" $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$NROFF $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format" = "" -a "$GROFF" ; then + for i in "-mdoc" "-mandoc"; do + if "$GROFF" -Tascii $i conftest.1 2> /dev/null | \ + grep Jan > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$GROFF -Tascii $i" + break + fi + done +fi +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + ac_cv_sys_man_format="$ac_cv_sys_man_format \$< > \$@" +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_sys_man_format" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_sys_man_format"; then + CATMAN="$ac_cv_sys_man_format" + +fi + + +if test "$CATMAN"; then + CATMAN_TRUE= + CATMAN_FALSE='#' +else + CATMAN_TRUE='#' + CATMAN_FALSE= +fi +echo $ac_n "checking extension of pre-formatted manual pages""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3098: checking extension of pre-formatted manual pages" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_sys_catman_ext'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + if grep _suffix /etc/man.conf > /dev/null 2>&1; then + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=0 +else + ac_cv_sys_catman_ext=number +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_sys_catman_ext" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_sys_catman_ext" = number; then + CATMANEXT='$$ext' +else + CATMANEXT=0 +fi + + + + + +# Check whether --with-readline or --without-readline was given. +if test "${with_readline+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_readline" + : +fi + +# Check whether --with-readline-lib or --without-readline-lib was given. +if test "${with_readline_lib+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_readline_lib" + if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: No argument for --with-readline-lib" 1>&2; exit 1; } +elif test "X$with_readline" = "X"; then + with_readline=yes +fi +fi + +# Check whether --with-readline-include or --without-readline-include was given. +if test "${with_readline_include+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_readline_include" + if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: No argument for --with-readline-include" 1>&2; exit 1; } +elif test "X$with_readline" = "X"; then + with_readline=yes +fi +fi + + +echo $ac_n "checking for readline""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3149: checking for readline" >&5 + +case "$with_readline" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +"") ;; +*) if test "$with_readline_include" = ""; then + with_readline_include="$with_readline/include" + fi + if test "$with_readline_lib" = ""; then + with_readline_lib="$with_readline/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + ;; +esac +header_dirs= +lib_dirs= +d='' +for i in $d; do + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include" + lib_dirs="$lib_dirs $i/lib$abilibdirext" +done + +case "$with_readline_include" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) header_dirs="$with_readline_include $header_dirs";; +esac +case "$with_readline_lib" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) lib_dirs="$with_readline_lib $lib_dirs";; +esac + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +ires= lres= +for i in $header_dirs; do + CFLAGS="-I$i $save_CFLAGS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + #include +int main() { + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3196: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ires=$i;break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done +for i in $lib_dirs; do + LIBS="-L$i -lreadline $save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + #include +int main() { + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3216: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + lres=$i;break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +LIBS="$save_LIBS" + +if test "$ires" -a "$lres" -a "$with_readline" != "no"; then + readline_includedir="$ires" + readline_libdir="$lres" + INCLUDE_readline="-I$readline_includedir" + LIB_readline="-L$readline_libdir -lreadline" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +else + INCLUDE_readline= + LIB_readline= + with_readline=no + echo "$ac_t""$with_readline" 1>&6 +fi + + + + + +# Check whether --with-hesiod or --without-hesiod was given. +if test "${with_hesiod+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_hesiod" + : +fi + +# Check whether --with-hesiod-lib or --without-hesiod-lib was given. +if test "${with_hesiod_lib+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_hesiod_lib" + if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: No argument for --with-hesiod-lib" 1>&2; exit 1; } +elif test "X$with_hesiod" = "X"; then + with_hesiod=yes +fi +fi + +# Check whether --with-hesiod-include or --without-hesiod-include was given. +if test "${with_hesiod_include+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_hesiod_include" + if test "$withval" = "yes" -o "$withval" = "no"; then + { echo "configure: error: No argument for --with-hesiod-include" 1>&2; exit 1; } +elif test "X$with_hesiod" = "X"; then + with_hesiod=yes +fi +fi + + +echo $ac_n "checking for hesiod""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3278: checking for hesiod" >&5 + +case "$with_hesiod" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +"") ;; +*) if test "$with_hesiod_include" = ""; then + with_hesiod_include="$with_hesiod/include" + fi + if test "$with_hesiod_lib" = ""; then + with_hesiod_lib="$with_hesiod/lib$abilibdirext" + fi + ;; +esac +header_dirs= +lib_dirs= +d='' +for i in $d; do + header_dirs="$header_dirs $i/include" + lib_dirs="$lib_dirs $i/lib$abilibdirext" +done + +case "$with_hesiod_include" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) header_dirs="$with_hesiod_include $header_dirs";; +esac +case "$with_hesiod_lib" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) lib_dirs="$with_hesiod_lib $lib_dirs";; +esac + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +ires= lres= +for i in $header_dirs; do + CFLAGS="-I$i $save_CFLAGS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3324: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ires=$i;break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done +for i in $lib_dirs; do + LIBS="-L$i -lhesiod $save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3343: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + lres=$i;break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +LIBS="$save_LIBS" + +if test "$ires" -a "$lres" -a "$with_hesiod" != "no"; then + hesiod_includedir="$ires" + hesiod_libdir="$lres" + INCLUDE_hesiod="-I$hesiod_includedir" + LIB_hesiod="-L$hesiod_libdir -lhesiod" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +else + INCLUDE_hesiod= + LIB_hesiod= + with_hesiod=no + echo "$ac_t""$with_hesiod" 1>&6 +fi + + + + + +# Check whether --enable-bigendian or --disable-bigendian was given. +if test "${enable_bigendian+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_bigendian" + krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes +fi + +# Check whether --enable-littleendian or --disable-littleendian was given. +if test "${enable_littleendian+set}" = set; then + enableval="$enable_littleendian" + krb_cv_c_bigendian=no +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking whether byte order is known at compile time""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3390: checking whether byte order is known at compile time" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { + +#if !BYTE_ORDER || !BIG_ENDIAN || !LITTLE_ENDIAN + bogus endian macros +#endif +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3407: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" 1>&6 +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "no"; then + echo $ac_n "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3422: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'krb_cv_c_bigendian'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = ""; then + krb_cv_c_bigendian=unknown + fi + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { + +#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN + not big endian +#endif +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3443: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + krb_cv_c_bigendian=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "unknown"; then + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + { echo "configure: error: specify either --enable-bigendian or --enable-littleendian" 1>&2; exit 1; } +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + krb_cv_c_bigendian=no +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + krb_cv_c_bigendian=yes +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + + fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$krb_cv_c_bigendian" 1>&6 + if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian" = "yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 +EOF + fi +fi +if test "$krb_cv_c_bigendian_compile" = "yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H 1 +EOF +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for inline""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3501: checking for inline" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_c_inline'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_cv_c_inline=no +for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw; break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* +done + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_c_inline" 1>&6 +case "$ac_cv_c_inline" in + inline | yes) ;; + no) cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define inline +EOF + ;; + *) cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:3546: checking for X" >&5 + +# Check whether --with-x or --without-x was given. +if test "${with_x+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_x" + : +fi + +# $have_x is `yes', `no', `disabled', or empty when we do not yet know. +if test "x$with_x" = xno; then + # The user explicitly disabled X. + have_x=disabled +else + if test "x$x_includes" != xNONE && test "x$x_libraries" != xNONE; then + # Both variables are already set. + have_x=yes + else +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_have_x'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + # One or both of the vars are not set, and there is no cached value. +ac_x_includes=NO ac_x_libraries=NO +rm -fr conftestdir +if mkdir conftestdir; then + cd conftestdir + # Make sure to not put "make" in the Imakefile rules, since we grep it out. + cat > Imakefile <<'EOF' +acfindx: + @echo 'ac_im_incroot="${INCROOT}"; ac_im_usrlibdir="${USRLIBDIR}"; ac_im_libdir="${LIBDIR}"' +EOF + if (xmkmf) >/dev/null 2>/dev/null && test -f Makefile; then + # GNU make sometimes prints "make[1]: Entering...", which would confuse us. + eval `${MAKE-make} acfindx 2>/dev/null | grep -v make` + # Open Windows xmkmf reportedly sets LIBDIR instead of USRLIBDIR. + for ac_extension in a so sl; do + if test ! -f $ac_im_usrlibdir/libX11.$ac_extension && + test -f $ac_im_libdir/libX11.$ac_extension; then + ac_im_usrlibdir=$ac_im_libdir; break + fi + done + # Screen out bogus values from the imake configuration. They are + # bogus both because they are the default anyway, and because + # using them would break gcc on systems where it needs fixed includes. + case "$ac_im_incroot" in + /usr/include) ;; + *) test -f "$ac_im_incroot/X11/Xos.h" && ac_x_includes="$ac_im_incroot" ;; + esac + case "$ac_im_usrlibdir" in + /usr/lib | /lib) ;; + *) test -d "$ac_im_usrlibdir" && ac_x_libraries="$ac_im_usrlibdir" ;; + esac + fi + cd .. + rm -fr conftestdir +fi + +if test "$ac_x_includes" = NO; then + # Guess where to find include files, by looking for this one X11 .h file. + test -z "$x_direct_test_include" && x_direct_test_include=X11/Intrinsic.h + + # First, try using that file with no special directory specified. +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:3613: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + # We can compile using X headers with no special include directory. +ac_x_includes= +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + # Look for the header file in a standard set of common directories. +# Check X11 before X11Rn because it is often a symlink to the current release. + for ac_dir in \ + /usr/X11/include \ + /usr/X11R6/include \ + /usr/X11R5/include \ + /usr/X11R4/include \ + \ + /usr/include/X11 \ + /usr/include/X11R6 \ + /usr/include/X11R5 \ + /usr/include/X11R4 \ + \ + /usr/local/X11/include \ + /usr/local/X11R6/include \ + /usr/local/X11R5/include \ + /usr/local/X11R4/include \ + \ + /usr/local/include/X11 \ + /usr/local/include/X11R6 \ + /usr/local/include/X11R5 \ + /usr/local/include/X11R4 \ + \ + /usr/X386/include \ + /usr/x386/include \ + /usr/XFree86/include/X11 \ + \ + /usr/include \ + /usr/local/include \ + /usr/unsupported/include \ + /usr/athena/include \ + /usr/local/x11r5/include \ + /usr/lpp/Xamples/include \ + \ + /usr/openwin/include \ + /usr/openwin/share/include \ + ; \ + do + if test -r "$ac_dir/$x_direct_test_include"; then + ac_x_includes=$ac_dir + break + fi + done +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi # $ac_x_includes = NO + +if test "$ac_x_libraries" = NO; then + # Check for the libraries. + + test -z "$x_direct_test_library" && x_direct_test_library=Xt + test -z "$x_direct_test_function" && x_direct_test_function=XtMalloc + + # See if we find them without any special options. + # Don't add to $LIBS permanently. + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="-l$x_direct_test_library $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +# We can link X programs with no special library path. +ac_x_libraries= +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +# First see if replacing the include by lib works. +# Check X11 before X11Rn because it is often a symlink to the current release. +for ac_dir in `echo "$ac_x_includes" | sed s/include/lib/` \ + /usr/X11/lib \ + /usr/X11R6/lib \ + /usr/X11R5/lib \ + /usr/X11R4/lib \ + \ + /usr/lib/X11 \ + /usr/lib/X11R6 \ + /usr/lib/X11R5 \ + /usr/lib/X11R4 \ + \ + /usr/local/X11/lib \ + /usr/local/X11R6/lib \ + /usr/local/X11R5/lib \ + /usr/local/X11R4/lib \ + \ + /usr/local/lib/X11 \ + /usr/local/lib/X11R6 \ + /usr/local/lib/X11R5 \ + /usr/local/lib/X11R4 \ + \ + /usr/X386/lib \ + /usr/x386/lib \ + /usr/XFree86/lib/X11 \ + \ + /usr/lib \ + /usr/local/lib \ + /usr/unsupported/lib \ + /usr/athena/lib \ + /usr/local/x11r5/lib \ + /usr/lpp/Xamples/lib \ + /lib/usr/lib/X11 \ + \ + /usr/openwin/lib \ + /usr/openwin/share/lib \ + ; \ +do + for ac_extension in a so sl; do + if test -r $ac_dir/lib${x_direct_test_library}.$ac_extension; then + ac_x_libraries=$ac_dir + break 2 + fi + done +done +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi # $ac_x_libraries = NO + +if test "$ac_x_includes" = NO || test "$ac_x_libraries" = NO; then + # Didn't find X anywhere. Cache the known absence of X. + ac_cv_have_x="have_x=no" +else + # Record where we found X for the cache. + ac_cv_have_x="have_x=yes \ + ac_x_includes=$ac_x_includes ac_x_libraries=$ac_x_libraries" +fi +fi + fi + eval "$ac_cv_have_x" +fi # $with_x != no + +if test "$have_x" != yes; then + echo "$ac_t""$have_x" 1>&6 + no_x=yes +else + # If each of the values was on the command line, it overrides each guess. + test "x$x_includes" = xNONE && x_includes=$ac_x_includes + test "x$x_libraries" = xNONE && x_libraries=$ac_x_libraries + # Update the cache value to reflect the command line values. + ac_cv_have_x="have_x=yes \ + ac_x_includes=$x_includes ac_x_libraries=$x_libraries" + echo "$ac_t""libraries $x_libraries, headers $x_includes" 1>&6 +fi + + +if test "$no_x" = yes; then + # Not all programs may use this symbol, but it does not hurt to define it. + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define X_DISPLAY_MISSING 1 +EOF + + X_CFLAGS= X_PRE_LIBS= X_LIBS= X_EXTRA_LIBS= +else + if test -n "$x_includes"; then + X_CFLAGS="$X_CFLAGS -I$x_includes" + fi + + # It would also be nice to do this for all -L options, not just this one. + if test -n "$x_libraries"; then + X_LIBS="$X_LIBS -L$x_libraries" + # For Solaris; some versions of Sun CC require a space after -R and + # others require no space. Words are not sufficient . . . . + case "`(uname -sr) 2>/dev/null`" in + "SunOS 5"*) + echo $ac_n "checking whether -R must be followed by a space""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3796: checking whether -R must be followed by a space" >&5 + ac_xsave_LIBS="$LIBS"; LIBS="$LIBS -R$x_libraries" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_R_nospace=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_R_nospace=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + if test $ac_R_nospace = yes; then + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + X_LIBS="$X_LIBS -R$x_libraries" + else + LIBS="$ac_xsave_LIBS -R $x_libraries" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_R_space=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_R_space=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + if test $ac_R_space = yes; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_LIBS="$X_LIBS -R $x_libraries" + else + echo "$ac_t""neither works" 1>&6 + fi + fi + LIBS="$ac_xsave_LIBS" + esac + fi + + # Check for system-dependent libraries X programs must link with. + # Do this before checking for the system-independent R6 libraries + # (-lICE), since we may need -lsocket or whatever for X linking. + + if test "$ISC" = yes; then + X_EXTRA_LIBS="$X_EXTRA_LIBS -lnsl_s -linet" + else + # Martyn.Johnson@cl.cam.ac.uk says this is needed for Ultrix, if the X + # libraries were built with DECnet support. And karl@cs.umb.edu says + # the Alpha needs dnet_stub (dnet does not exist). + echo $ac_n "checking for dnet_ntoa in -ldnet""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3861: checking for dnet_ntoa in -ldnet" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo dnet'_'dnet_ntoa | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-ldnet $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_EXTRA_LIBS="$X_EXTRA_LIBS -ldnet" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + if test $ac_cv_lib_dnet_dnet_ntoa = no; then + echo $ac_n "checking for dnet_ntoa in -ldnet_stub""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3902: checking for dnet_ntoa in -ldnet_stub" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo dnet_stub'_'dnet_ntoa | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-ldnet_stub $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_EXTRA_LIBS="$X_EXTRA_LIBS -ldnet_stub" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + fi + + # msh@cis.ufl.edu says -lnsl (and -lsocket) are needed for his 386/AT, + # to get the SysV transport functions. + # chad@anasazi.com says the Pyramis MIS-ES running DC/OSx (SVR4) + # needs -lnsl. + # The nsl library prevents programs from opening the X display + # on Irix 5.2, according to dickey@clark.net. + echo $ac_n "checking for gethostbyname""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3950: checking for gethostbyname" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_gethostbyname'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char gethostbyname(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_gethostbyname) || defined (__stub___gethostbyname) +choke me +#else +gethostbyname(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:3978: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'gethostbyname`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + : +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + if test $ac_cv_func_gethostbyname = no; then + echo $ac_n "checking for gethostbyname in -lnsl""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:3999: checking for gethostbyname in -lnsl" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo nsl'_'gethostbyname | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-lnsl $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_EXTRA_LIBS="$X_EXTRA_LIBS -lnsl" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + fi + + # lieder@skyler.mavd.honeywell.com says without -lsocket, + # socket/setsockopt and other routines are undefined under SCO ODT + # 2.0. But -lsocket is broken on IRIX 5.2 (and is not necessary + # on later versions), says simon@lia.di.epfl.ch: it contains + # gethostby* variants that don't use the nameserver (or something). + # -lsocket must be given before -lnsl if both are needed. + # We assume that if connect needs -lnsl, so does gethostbyname. + echo $ac_n "checking for connect""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4048: checking for connect" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_connect'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char connect(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_connect) || defined (__stub___connect) +choke me +#else +connect(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:4076: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_connect=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_connect=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'connect`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + : +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + if test $ac_cv_func_connect = no; then + echo $ac_n "checking for connect in -lsocket""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4097: checking for connect in -lsocket" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo socket'_'connect | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-lsocket $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_EXTRA_LIBS="-lsocket $X_EXTRA_LIBS" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + fi + + # gomez@mi.uni-erlangen.de says -lposix is necessary on A/UX. + echo $ac_n "checking for remove""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4140: checking for remove" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_remove'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char remove(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_remove) || defined (__stub___remove) +choke me +#else +remove(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:4168: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_remove=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_remove=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'remove`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + : +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + if test $ac_cv_func_remove = no; then + echo $ac_n "checking for remove in -lposix""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4189: checking for remove in -lposix" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo posix'_'remove | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-lposix $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_EXTRA_LIBS="$X_EXTRA_LIBS -lposix" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + fi + + # BSDI BSD/OS 2.1 needs -lipc for XOpenDisplay. + echo $ac_n "checking for shmat""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4232: checking for shmat" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_shmat'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char shmat(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_shmat) || defined (__stub___shmat) +choke me +#else +shmat(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:4260: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_shmat=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_shmat=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'shmat`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + : +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + if test $ac_cv_func_shmat = no; then + echo $ac_n "checking for shmat in -lipc""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4281: checking for shmat in -lipc" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo ipc'_'shmat | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-lipc $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_EXTRA_LIBS="$X_EXTRA_LIBS -lipc" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + fi + fi + + # Check for libraries that X11R6 Xt/Xaw programs need. + ac_save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + test -n "$x_libraries" && LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L$x_libraries" + # SM needs ICE to (dynamically) link under SunOS 4.x (so we have to + # check for ICE first), but we must link in the order -lSM -lICE or + # we get undefined symbols. So assume we have SM if we have ICE. + # These have to be linked with before -lX11, unlike the other + # libraries we check for below, so use a different variable. + # --interran@uluru.Stanford.EDU, kb@cs.umb.edu. + echo $ac_n "checking for IceConnectionNumber in -lICE""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4333: checking for IceConnectionNumber in -lICE" >&5 +ac_lib_var=`echo ICE'_'IceConnectionNumber | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="-lICE $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_lib_$ac_lib_var=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" + +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_lib_'$ac_lib_var`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + X_PRE_LIBS="$X_PRE_LIBS -lSM -lICE" +else + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 +fi + + LDFLAGS="$ac_save_LDFLAGS" + +fi + + +# try to figure out if we need any additional ld flags, like -R +# and yes, the autoconf X test is utterly broken +if test "$no_x" != yes; then + echo $ac_n "checking for special X linker flags""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4381: checking for special X linker flags" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + + ac_save_libs="$LIBS" + ac_save_cflags="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $X_CFLAGS" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="" + krb_cv_sys_x_libs="" + for rflag in "" "-R" "-R " "-rpath "; do + if test "$rflag" = ""; then + foo="$X_LIBS" + else + foo="" + for flag in $X_LIBS; do + case $flag in + -L*) + foo="$foo $flag `echo $flag | sed \"s/-L/$rflag/\"`" + ;; + *) + foo="$foo $flag" + ;; + esac + done + fi + LIBS="$ac_save_libs $foo $X_PRE_LIBS -lX11 $X_EXTRA_LIBS" + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + { echo "configure: error: can not run test program while cross compiling" 1>&2; exit 1; } +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + foo() + { + XOpenDisplay(NULL); + } + main() + { + return 0; + } + +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:4426: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath="$rflag"; krb_cv_sys_x_libs="$foo"; break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + : +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + + done + LIBS="$ac_save_libs" + CFLAGS="$ac_save_cflags" + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$krb_cv_sys_x_libs_rpath" 1>&6 + X_LIBS="$krb_cv_sys_x_libs" +fi + + +if test "$no_x" = "yes" ; then + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS="" + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS="" + MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS="" +else + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS='$(X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS)' + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS='$(X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS)' + MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS='$(X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS)' +fi + + +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$X_CFLAGS $CFLAGS" +save_LIBS="$LIBS" +LIBS="$X_PRE_LIBS $X_EXTRA_LIBS $LIBS" +save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $X_LIBS" + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for XauWriteAuth""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4472: checking for XauWriteAuth" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" X11 Xau; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth=\${ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs XauWriteAuth"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" X11 Xau"@@@ +END + +# XauWriteAuth +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo XauWriteAuth | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_XauWriteAuth=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth=yes" + eval "LIB_XauWriteAuth=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth=no" + eval "LIB_XauWriteAuth=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +ac_xxx="$LIBS" +LIBS="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIBS" + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for XauReadAuth""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4559: checking for XauReadAuth" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_XauReadAuth\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" X11 Xau; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth=\${ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs XauReadAuth"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" X11 Xau"@@@ +END + +# XauReadAuth +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo XauReadAuth | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_XauReadAuth=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauReadAuth=yes" + eval "LIB_XauReadAuth=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauReadAuth=no" + eval "LIB_XauReadAuth=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauReadAuth=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +LIBS="$LIB_XauReadAauth $LIBS" + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for XauFileName""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4645: checking for XauFileName" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_XauFileName\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" X11 Xau; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName=\${ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs XauFileName"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" X11 Xau"@@@ +END + +# XauFileName +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo XauFileName | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_XauFileName=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauFileName=yes" + eval "LIB_XauFileName=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauFileName=no" + eval "LIB_XauFileName=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_XauFileName=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +LIBS="$ac_xxx" + +case "$ac_cv_funclib_XauWriteAuth" in +yes) ;; +no) ;; +*) if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauReadAuth" = yes; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + else + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_XauFileName" = yes; then + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth" + else + LIB_XauReadAuth="$LIB_XauReadAuth $LIB_XauWriteAuth $LIB_XauFileName" + fi + fi + ;; +esac + +if test "$AUTOMAKE" != ""; then + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes"; then + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE= + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE='#' +else + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE='#' + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE= +fi +else + + + if test "$ac_cv_func_XauWriteAuth" != "yes"; then + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE= + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE='#' + else + NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE='#' + NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE= + fi +fi +CFLAGS=$save_CFLAGS +LIBS=$save_LIBS +LDFLAGS=$save_LDFLAGS + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for working const""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4775: checking for working const" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_c_const'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <j = 5; +} +{ /* ULTRIX-32 V3.1 (Rev 9) vcc rejects this */ + const int foo = 10; +} + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:4829: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_c_const=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_c_const=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_c_const" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_c_const = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define const +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for ANSI C header files""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4850: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_stdc'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +#include +#include +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:4863: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=yes +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI. +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + : +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI. +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + : +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # /bin/cc in Irix-4.0.5 gets non-ANSI ctype macros unless using -ansi. +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + : +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z') +#define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c)) +#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f))) +int main () { int i; for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) +if (XOR (islower (i), ISLOWER (i)) || toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i)) exit(2); +exit (0); } + +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:4930: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + : +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +fi +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_header_stdc" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define STDC_HEADERS 1 +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for off_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4954: checking for off_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_off_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "(^|[^a-zA-Z_0-9])off_t[^a-zA-Z_0-9]" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_off_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_off_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_off_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_off_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define off_t long +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for size_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:4987: checking for size_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_size_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "(^|[^a-zA-Z_0-9])size_t[^a-zA-Z_0-9]" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_size_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_size_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_size_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_size_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define size_t unsigned +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for ssize_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5020: checking for ssize_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_ssize_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "ssize_t[^a-zA-Z_0-9]" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_ssize_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_ssize_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_ssize_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_ssize_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define ssize_t int +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for pid_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5054: checking for pid_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_pid_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "(^|[^a-zA-Z_0-9])pid_t[^a-zA-Z_0-9]" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_pid_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_pid_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_pid_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_pid_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define pid_t int +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for uid_t in sys/types.h""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5087: checking for uid_t in sys/types.h" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_uid_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "uid_t" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_uid_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_uid_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_uid_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_uid_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define uid_t int +EOF + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define gid_t int +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for mode_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5121: checking for mode_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_mode_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif + +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "mode_t[^a-zA-Z_0-9]" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_mode_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_mode_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_mode_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_mode_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define mode_t unsigned short +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for sig_atomic_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5155: checking for sig_atomic_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "sig_atomic_t[^a-zA-Z_0-9]" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t=yes +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t = no; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define sig_atomic_t int +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking whether time.h and sys/time.h may both be included""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5189: checking whether time.h and sys/time.h may both be included" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_time'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +#include +int main() { +struct tm *tp; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:5203: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_time=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_time=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_header_time" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_header_time = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME 1 +EOF + +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking whether struct tm is in sys/time.h or time.h""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5224: checking whether struct tm is in sys/time.h or time.h" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_struct_tm'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct tm *tp; tp->tm_sec; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:5237: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_struct_tm=time.h +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_struct_tm=sys/time.h +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_struct_tm" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_struct_tm = sys/time.h; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define TM_IN_SYS_TIME 1 +EOF + +fi + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ANSI C header files""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5259: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_stdc'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +#include +#include +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:5272: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=yes +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI. +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + : +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI. +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + : +else + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # /bin/cc in Irix-4.0.5 gets non-ANSI ctype macros unless using -ansi. +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + : +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z') +#define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c)) +#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f))) +int main () { int i; for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) +if (XOR (islower (i), ISLOWER (i)) || toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i)) exit(2); +exit (0); } + +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:5339: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + : +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +fi +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_header_stdc" 1>&6 +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define STDC_HEADERS 1 +EOF + +fi + + +if test "$berkeley_db"; then + for ac_hdr in \ + db.h \ + db_185.h \ + +do +ac_safe=`echo "$ac_hdr" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_hdr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5371: checking for $ac_hdr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_$ac_safe'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:5381: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=yes" +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_header_'$ac_safe`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $ac_hdr | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +fi + +for ac_hdr in \ + arpa/ftp.h \ + arpa/inet.h \ + arpa/nameser.h \ + arpa/telnet.h \ + bind/bitypes.h \ + bsdsetjmp.h \ + crypt.h \ + curses.h \ + dbm.h \ + dirent.h \ + dlfcn.h \ + err.h \ + errno.h \ + fcntl.h \ + fnmatch.h \ + grp.h \ + inttypes.h \ + io.h \ + limits.h \ + maillock.h \ + ndbm.h \ + net/if.h \ + netdb.h \ + netinet/in.h \ + netinet/in6.h \ + netinet/in6_machtypes.h \ + netinet/in6_var.h \ + netinet/in_systm.h \ + netinet6/in6.h \ + netinfo/ni.h \ + paths.h \ + pthread.h \ + pty.h \ + pwd.h \ + resolv.h \ + rpcsvc/dbm.h \ + sac.h \ + security/pam_modules.h \ + sgtty.h \ + shadow.h \ + siad.h \ + signal.h \ + stropts.h \ + sys/bitypes.h \ + sys/category.h \ + sys/file.h \ + sys/filio.h \ + sys/ioccom.h \ + sys/ioctl.h \ + sys/param.h \ + sys/proc.h \ + sys/pty.h \ + sys/ptyio.h \ + sys/ptyvar.h \ + sys/resource.h \ + sys/select.h \ + sys/socket.h \ + sys/sockio.h \ + sys/stat.h \ + sys/str_tty.h \ + sys/stream.h \ + sys/stropts.h \ + sys/strtty.h \ + sys/syscall.h \ + sys/sysctl.h \ + sys/termio.h \ + sys/time.h \ + sys/timeb.h \ + sys/times.h \ + sys/tty.h \ + sys/types.h \ + sys/uio.h \ + sys/un.h \ + sys/utsname.h \ + sys/wait.h \ + syslog.h \ + term.h \ + termio.h \ + termios.h \ + time.h \ + tmpdir.h \ + udb.h \ + unistd.h \ + util.h \ + utmp.h \ + utmpx.h \ + +do +ac_safe=`echo "$ac_hdr" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_hdr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5500: checking for $ac_hdr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_$ac_safe'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:5510: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=yes" +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_header_'$ac_safe`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $ac_hdr | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + + + +for ac_hdr in standards.h +do +ac_safe=`echo "$ac_hdr" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_hdr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5542: checking for $ac_hdr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_$ac_safe'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:5552: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=yes" +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_header_'$ac_safe`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $ac_hdr | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for i in netinet/ip.h netinet/tcp.h; do + +cv=`echo "$i" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + +echo $ac_n "checking for $i""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5583: checking for $i" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_$cv'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#include <$i> + +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:5598: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=yes" +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$cv=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_header_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $i | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_NETINFO 1 +EOF + +fi + + + +if test "$ac_cv_header_err_h" = yes; then + have_err_h_TRUE= + have_err_h_FALSE='#' +else + have_err_h_TRUE='#' + have_err_h_FALSE= +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_header_fnmatch_h" = yes; then + have_fnmatch_h_TRUE= + have_fnmatch_h_FALSE='#' +else + have_fnmatch_h_TRUE='#' + have_fnmatch_h_FALSE= +fi + + +# Check whether --with-ipv6 or --without-ipv6 was given. +if test "${with_ipv6+set}" = set; then + withval="$with_ipv6" + +if test "$withval" = "no"; then + ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no +fi +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_lib_ipv6'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + v6type=unknown +v6lib=none + +echo $ac_n "checking ipv6 stack type""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5679: checking ipv6 stack type" >&5 +for i in v6d toshiba kame inria zeta linux; do + case $i in + v6d) + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef __V6D__ +yes +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "yes" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + v6type=$i; v6lib=v6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-I/usr/local/v6/include $CFLAGS" +fi +rm -f conftest* + + ;; + toshiba) + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef _TOSHIBA_INET6 +yes +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "yes" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" +fi +rm -f conftest* + + ;; + kame) + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef __KAME__ +yes +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "yes" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" +fi +rm -f conftest* + + ;; + inria) + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef IPV6_INRIA_VERSION +yes +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "yes" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + v6type=$i; CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" +fi +rm -f conftest* + + ;; + zeta) + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef _ZETA_MINAMI_INET6 +yes +#endif +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "yes" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + v6type=$i; v6lib=inet6; + v6libdir=/usr/local/v6/lib; + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" +fi +rm -f conftest* + + ;; + linux) + if test -d /usr/inet6; then + v6type=$i + v6lib=inet6 + v6libdir=/usr/inet6 + CFLAGS="-DINET6 $CFLAGS" + fi + ;; + esac + if test "$v6type" != "unknown"; then + break + fi +done +echo "$ac_t""$v6type" 1>&6 + +if test "$v6lib" != "none"; then + for dir in $v6libdir /usr/local/v6/lib /usr/local/lib; do + if test -d $dir -a -f $dir/lib$v6lib.a; then + LIBS="-L$dir -l$v6lib $LIBS" + break + fi + done +fi +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { + + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + int s; + + s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6.sin6_port = htons(17); + sin6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sin6, sizeof(sin6)); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:5834: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_ipv6=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_lib_ipv6=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking for IPv6""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5847: checking for IPv6" >&5 +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_lib_ipv6" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_lib_ipv6" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_IPV6 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for socket""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5863: checking for socket" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_socket'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_socket\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" socket; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_socket=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_socket=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_socket=\${ac_cv_funclib_socket-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_socket" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs socket"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" socket"@@@ +END + +# socket +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo socket | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_socket=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_socket=yes" + eval "LIB_socket=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_socket=no" + eval "LIB_socket=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_socket=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_socket"; then + LIBS="$LIB_socket $LIBS" +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for gethostbyname""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:5953: checking for gethostbyname" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_gethostbyname\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" nsl; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname=\${ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs gethostbyname"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" nsl"@@@ +END + +# gethostbyname +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo gethostbyname | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_gethostbyname=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname=yes" + eval "LIB_gethostbyname=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname=no" + eval "LIB_gethostbyname=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_gethostbyname"; then + LIBS="$LIB_gethostbyname $LIBS" +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for syslog""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6043: checking for syslog" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_syslog'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_syslog\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" syslog; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_syslog=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_syslog=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_syslog=\${ac_cv_funclib_syslog-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_syslog" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs syslog"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" syslog"@@@ +END + +# syslog +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo syslog | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_syslog=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_syslog=yes" + eval "LIB_syslog=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_syslog=no" + eval "LIB_syslog=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_syslog=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_syslog"; then + LIBS="$LIB_syslog $LIBS" +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for logwtmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6133: checking for logwtmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_logwtmp'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_logwtmp\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" util; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_logwtmp=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_logwtmp=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_logwtmp=\${ac_cv_funclib_logwtmp-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_logwtmp" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs logwtmp"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" util"@@@ +END + +# logwtmp +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo logwtmp | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_logwtmp=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_logwtmp=yes" + eval "LIB_logwtmp=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_logwtmp=no" + eval "LIB_logwtmp=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_logwtmp=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for tgetent""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6218: checking for tgetent" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_tgetent'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_tgetent\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" termcap ncurses curses; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_tgetent=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_tgetent=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_tgetent=\${ac_cv_funclib_tgetent-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_tgetent" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs tgetent"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" termcap ncurses curses"@@@ +END + +# tgetent +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo tgetent | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_tgetent=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_tgetent=yes" + eval "LIB_tgetent=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_tgetent=no" + eval "LIB_tgetent=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_tgetent=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for gethostbyname2""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6304: checking for gethostbyname2" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname2'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_gethostbyname2\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" inet6 ip6; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname2=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname2=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname2=\${ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname2-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_gethostbyname2" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs gethostbyname2"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" inet6 ip6"@@@ +END + +# gethostbyname2 +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo gethostbyname2 | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_gethostbyname2=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname2=yes" + eval "LIB_gethostbyname2=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname2=no" + eval "LIB_gethostbyname2=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname2=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_gethostbyname2"; then + LIBS="$LIB_gethostbyname2 $LIBS" +fi + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for res_search""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6395: checking for res_search" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_res_search'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_res_search\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" resolv; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +res_search(0,0,0,0,0) +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6431: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_res_search=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_res_search=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_res_search=\${ac_cv_funclib_res_search-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_res_search" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs res_search"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" resolv"@@@ +END + +# res_search +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo res_search | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_res_search=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_res_search=yes" + eval "LIB_res_search=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_res_search=no" + eval "LIB_res_search=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_res_search=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_res_search"; then + LIBS="$LIB_res_search $LIBS" +fi + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for dn_expand""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6500: checking for dn_expand" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_dn_expand'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_dn_expand\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" resolv; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +dn_expand(0,0,0,0,0) +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6536: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_dn_expand=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_dn_expand=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_dn_expand=\${ac_cv_funclib_dn_expand-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_dn_expand" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs dn_expand"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" resolv"@@@ +END + +# dn_expand +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo dn_expand | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_dn_expand=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_dn_expand=yes" + eval "LIB_dn_expand=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_dn_expand=no" + eval "LIB_dn_expand=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_dn_expand=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_dn_expand"; then + LIBS="$LIB_dn_expand $LIBS" +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for working snprintf""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6603: checking for working snprintf" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_snprintf_working'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=yes +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + : +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() +{ + char foo[3]; + snprintf(foo, 2, "12"); + return strcmp(foo, "1"); +} +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6624: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + : +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + ac_cv_func_snprintf_working=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_working" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:6650: checking if snprintf needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_snprintf_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int snprintf (struct foo*); +snprintf(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6665: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_snprintf_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_snprintf_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_snprintf_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_snprintf_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_SNPRINTF_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + +fi + + +echo $ac_n "checking for working vsnprintf""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6692: checking for working vsnprintf" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=yes +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + : +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +#include + +int foo(int num, ...) +{ + char bar[3]; + va_list arg; + va_start(arg, num); + vsnprintf(bar, 2, "%s", arg); + va_end(arg); + return strcmp(bar, "1"); +} + + +int main() +{ + return foo(0, "12"); +} +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6724: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + : +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_working" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:6750: checking if vsnprintf needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int vsnprintf (struct foo*); +vsnprintf(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6765: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_VSNPRINTF_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + +fi + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for working glob""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6793: checking for working glob" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_glob_working'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_cv_func_glob_working=yes +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { + +glob(NULL, GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_QUOTE|GLOB_TILDE, NULL, NULL); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6810: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + : +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_glob_working=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_glob_working" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_GLOB 1 +EOF + +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_glob" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if glob needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6834: checking if glob needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_glob_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int glob (struct foo*); +glob(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:6850: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_glob_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_glob_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_glob_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_GLOB_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" != yes; then + LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS glob.o" +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes; then + have_glob_h_TRUE= + have_glob_h_FALSE='#' +else + have_glob_h_TRUE='#' + have_glob_h_FALSE= +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for dbopen""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6894: checking for dbopen" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_dbopen'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_dbopen\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" $berkeley_db; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_dbopen=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_dbopen=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_dbopen=\${ac_cv_funclib_dbopen-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_dbopen" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs dbopen"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" $berkeley_db"@@@ +END + +# dbopen +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo dbopen | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_dbopen=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_dbopen=yes" + eval "LIB_dbopen=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_dbopen=no" + eval "LIB_dbopen=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_dbopen=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for dbm_firstkey""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:6979: checking for dbm_firstkey" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" $berkeley_db gdbm ndbm; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey=\${ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_dbm_firstkey" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs dbm_firstkey"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" $berkeley_db gdbm ndbm"@@@ +END + +# dbm_firstkey +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo dbm_firstkey | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_dbm_firstkey=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey=yes" + eval "LIB_dbm_firstkey=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey=no" + eval "LIB_dbm_firstkey=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_dbm_firstkey=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + +DBLIB="$LIB_dbopen" +if test "$LIB_dbopen" != "$LIB_dbm_firstkey"; then + DBLIB="$DBLIB $LIB_dbm_firstkey" +fi + +for ac_func in _getpty _scrsize asnprintf asprintf cgetent fcntl +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7069: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7097: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in getmsg getrlimit getspnam gettimeofday getuid +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7124: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7152: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in grantpt mktime ptsname rand random setproctitle +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7179: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7207: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in revoke select setitimer setpcred setpgid +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7234: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7262: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in setregid setresgid setresuid setreuid setutent +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7289: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7317: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in setsid sigaction strstr +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7344: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7372: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in sysconf sysctl timegm ttyname ttyslot umask uname +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7399: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7427: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in unlockpt vasnprintf vasprintf vhangup +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7454: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7482: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +for ac_func in yp_get_default_domain +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7509: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7537: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_cgetent" = no; then + LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS getcap.o" +fi + + +for ac_func in getlogin setlogin +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7570: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7598: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if getlogin is posix""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7624: checking if getlogin is posix" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin" = yes -a "$ac_cv_func_setlogin" = yes; then + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=no +else + ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix=yes +fi + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_func_getlogin_posix" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define POSIX_GETLOGIN 1 +EOF + +fi +fi + + + + +for ac_hdr in capability.h sys/capability.h +do +ac_safe=`echo "$ac_hdr" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_hdr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7653: checking for $ac_hdr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_header_$ac_safe'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext >/dev/null 2>conftest.out" +{ (eval echo configure:7663: \"$ac_try\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; } +ac_err=`grep -v '^ *+' conftest.out | grep -v "^conftest.${ac_ext}\$"` +if test -z "$ac_err"; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=yes" +else + echo "$ac_err" >&5 + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_header_$ac_safe=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_header_'$ac_safe`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo $ac_hdr | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./-%ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ___%'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + + +for ac_func in sgi_getcapabilitybyname cap_set_proc +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7693: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7721: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for getpwnam_r""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7752: checking for getpwnam_r" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_getpwnam_r'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" c_r; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_getpwnam_r=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_getpwnam_r=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_getpwnam_r=\${ac_cv_funclib_getpwnam_r-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_getpwnam_r" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs getpwnam_r"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" c_r"@@@ +END + +# getpwnam_r +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo getpwnam_r | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_getpwnam_r=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r=yes" + eval "LIB_getpwnam_r=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r=no" + eval "LIB_getpwnam_r=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r" = yes; then + echo $ac_n "checking if getpwnam_r is posix""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7835: checking if getpwnam_r is posix" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + ac_libs="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $LIB_getpwnam_r" + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + : +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() +{ + struct passwd pw, *pwd; + return getpwnam_r("", &pw, NULL, 0, &pwd) < 0; +} + +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7856: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix=no +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + +LIBS="$ac_libs" +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_func_getpwnam_r_posix" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define POSIX_GETPWNAM_R 1 +EOF + +fi +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for getsockopt""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7885: checking for getsockopt" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_getsockopt'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_getsockopt\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" ; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +int main() { +getsockopt(0,0,0,0,0) +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:7912: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_getsockopt=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_getsockopt=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_getsockopt=\${ac_cv_funclib_getsockopt-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_getsockopt" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs getsockopt"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" "@@@ +END + +# getsockopt +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo getsockopt | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_getsockopt=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_getsockopt=yes" + eval "LIB_getsockopt=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_getsockopt=no" + eval "LIB_getsockopt=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_getsockopt=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for setsockopt""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:7975: checking for setsockopt" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_setsockopt'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_setsockopt\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" ; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +int main() { +setsockopt(0,0,0,0,0) +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8002: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_setsockopt=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_setsockopt=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_setsockopt=\${ac_cv_funclib_setsockopt-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_setsockopt" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs setsockopt"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" "@@@ +END + +# setsockopt +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo setsockopt | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_setsockopt=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_setsockopt=yes" + eval "LIB_setsockopt=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_setsockopt=no" + eval "LIB_setsockopt=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_setsockopt=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + +for ac_func in getudbnam setlim +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8065: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8093: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +fi +done + + +echo $ac_n "checking return type of signal handlers""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8119: checking return type of signal handlers" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_signal'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +#ifdef signal +#undef signal +#endif +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" void (*signal (int, void (*)(int)))(int); +#else +void (*signal ()) (); +#endif + +int main() { +int i; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8141: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_signal=void +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_signal=int +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_signal" 1>&6 +cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define VOID_RETSIGTYPE 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for hstrerror""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8172: checking for hstrerror" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_hstrerror'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_hstrerror\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" resolv; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +int main() { +hstrerror(17) +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8196: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_hstrerror=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_hstrerror=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_hstrerror=\${ac_cv_funclib_hstrerror-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_hstrerror" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs hstrerror"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" resolv"@@@ +END + +# hstrerror +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo hstrerror | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_hstrerror=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_hstrerror=yes" + eval "LIB_hstrerror=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_hstrerror=no" + eval "LIB_hstrerror=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_hstrerror=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test -n "$LIB_hstrerror"; then + LIBS="$LIB_hstrerror $LIBS" +fi + +if eval "test \"$ac_cv_func_hstrerror\" != yes"; then +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS hstrerror.o" +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_func_hstrerror" = yes; then + +if test "$ac_cv_func_hstrerror+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_hstrerror" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if hstrerror needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8267: checking if hstrerror needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_hstrerror_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int hstrerror (struct foo*); +hstrerror(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8285: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_hstrerror_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_hstrerror_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_hstrerror_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_hstrerror_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_HSTRERROR_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_func_asprintf" = yes; then + +if test "$ac_cv_func_asprintf+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_asprintf" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if asprintf needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8314: checking if asprintf needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_asprintf_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int asprintf (struct foo*); +asprintf(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8331: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_asprintf_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_asprintf_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_asprintf_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_asprintf_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_ASPRINTF_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasprintf" = yes; then + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasprintf+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_vasprintf" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if vasprintf needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8358: checking if vasprintf needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_vasprintf_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int vasprintf (struct foo*); +vasprintf(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8375: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_vasprintf_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_vasprintf_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_vasprintf_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasprintf_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_VASPRINTF_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_asnprintf" = yes; then + +if test "$ac_cv_func_asnprintf+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_asnprintf" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if asnprintf needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8402: checking if asnprintf needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_asnprintf_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int asnprintf (struct foo*); +asnprintf(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8419: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_asnprintf_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_asnprintf_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_asnprintf_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_asnprintf_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_ASNPRINTF_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasnprintf" = yes; then + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasnprintf+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_vasnprintf" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if vasnprintf needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8446: checking if vasnprintf needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_vasnprintf_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int vasnprintf (struct foo*); +vasnprintf(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8463: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_vasnprintf_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_vasnprintf_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_vasnprintf_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasnprintf_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_VASNPRINTF_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi +fi + +for ac_func in chown copyhostent daemon err errx fchown flock fnmatch +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8490: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8518: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs chown copyhostent daemon err errx fchown flock fnmatch"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in freeaddrinfo freehostent gai_strerror getaddrinfo +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8551: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8579: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs freeaddrinfo freehostent gai_strerror getaddrinfo"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in getcwd getdtablesize gethostname getipnodebyaddr getipnodebyname +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8612: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8640: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs getcwd getdtablesize gethostname getipnodebyaddr getipnodebyname"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in geteuid getgid getegid +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8673: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8701: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs geteuid getgid getegid"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in getnameinfo getopt getusershell +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8734: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8762: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs getnameinfo getopt getusershell"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in inet_aton inet_ntop inet_pton initgroups innetgr iruserok lstat +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8795: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8823: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs inet_aton inet_ntop inet_pton initgroups innetgr iruserok lstat"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in memmove +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8856: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8884: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs memmove"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in mkstemp putenv rcmd readv recvmsg sendmsg setegid setenv seteuid +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8917: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:8945: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs mkstemp putenv rcmd readv recvmsg sendmsg setegid setenv seteuid"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in strcasecmp strncasecmp strdup strerror strftime +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:8978: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9006: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs strcasecmp strncasecmp strdup strerror strftime"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in strlcat strlcpy strlwr +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9039: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9067: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs strlcat strlcpy strlwr"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in strndup strnlen strptime strsep strtok_r strupr +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9100: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9128: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs strndup strnlen strptime strsep strtok_r strupr"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in swab unsetenv verr verrx vsyslog +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9161: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9189: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs swab unsetenv verr verrx vsyslog"@@@ +END +done + +for ac_func in vwarn vwarnx warn warnx writev +do +echo $ac_n "checking for $ac_func""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9222: checking for $ac_func" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_$ac_func'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */ +/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2 + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +char $ac_func(); + +int main() { + +/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements + to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named + something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */ +#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func) +choke me +#else +$ac_func(); +#endif + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9250: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_$ac_func=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +if eval "test \"`echo '$ac_cv_func_'$ac_func`\" = yes"; then + echo "$ac_t""yes" 1>&6 + +ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo $ac_func | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` +cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS ${ac_func}.o" +fi + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs vwarn vwarnx warn warnx writev"@@@ +END +done + + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_setenv+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_setenv" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if setenv needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9284: checking if setenv needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_setenv_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int setenv (struct foo*); +setenv(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9299: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_setenv_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_setenv_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_setenv_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_setenv_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_SETENV_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_unsetenv+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_unsetenv" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if unsetenv needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9325: checking if unsetenv needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_unsetenv_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int unsetenv (struct foo*); +unsetenv(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9340: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_unsetenv_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_unsetenv_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_unsetenv_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_unsetenv_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_UNSETENV_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_gethostname+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_gethostname" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if gethostname needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9366: checking if gethostname needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_gethostname_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int gethostname (struct foo*); +gethostname(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9381: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostname_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostname_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_gethostname_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_gethostname_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_GETHOSTNAME_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_mkstemp+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_mkstemp" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if mkstemp needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9407: checking if mkstemp needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_mkstemp_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int mkstemp (struct foo*); +mkstemp(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9422: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_mkstemp_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_mkstemp_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_mkstemp_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_mkstemp_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_MKSTEMP_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getusershell+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_getusershell" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if getusershell needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9448: checking if getusershell needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_getusershell_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int getusershell (struct foo*); +getusershell(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9463: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_getusershell_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_getusershell_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_getusershell_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getusershell_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_GETUSERSHELL_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_inet_aton+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_inet_aton" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if inet_aton needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9490: checking if inet_aton needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_inet_aton_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int inet_aton (struct foo*); +inet_aton(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9517: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_inet_aton_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_inet_aton_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_inet_aton_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_inet_aton_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for crypt""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9545: checking for crypt" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_crypt'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_crypt\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" crypt; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_crypt=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_crypt=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_crypt=\${ac_cv_funclib_crypt-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_crypt" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs crypt"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" crypt"@@@ +END + +# crypt +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo crypt | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_crypt=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_crypt=yes" + eval "LIB_crypt=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_crypt=no" + eval "LIB_crypt=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_crypt=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + + +LIB_roken='$(top_builddir)/lib/roken/libroken.la $(LIB_crypt) $(LIB_dbopen)' + +echo $ac_n "checking if realloc if broken""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9630: checking if realloc if broken" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_realloc_broken'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +ac_cv_func_realloc_broken=no +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + : +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include + +int main() +{ + return realloc(NULL, 17) == NULL; +} + +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9652: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext} && (./conftest; exit) 2>/dev/null +then + : +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -fr conftest* + ac_cv_func_realloc_broken=yes +fi +rm -fr conftest* +fi + + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_realloc_broken" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_func_realloc_broken" = yes ; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define BROKEN_REALLOC 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if gethostbyname is compatible with system prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9679: checking if gethostbyname is compatible with system prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_gethostbyname_proto_compat'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *); +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9707: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname_proto_compat=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyname_proto_compat=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_gethostbyname_proto_compat" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_gethostbyname_proto_compat" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define GETHOSTBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if gethostbyaddr is compatible with system prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9732: checking if gethostbyaddr is compatible with system prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_gethostbyaddr_proto_compat'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const void *, size_t, int); +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9760: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyaddr_proto_compat=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_gethostbyaddr_proto_compat=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_gethostbyaddr_proto_compat" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_gethostbyaddr_proto_compat" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define GETHOSTBYADDR_PROTO_COMPATIBLE 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if getservbyname is compatible with system prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9785: checking if getservbyname is compatible with system prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_getservbyname_proto_compat'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +struct servent *getservbyname(const char *, const char *); +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9813: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_getservbyname_proto_compat=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_getservbyname_proto_compat=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_getservbyname_proto_compat" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_getservbyname_proto_compat" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define GETSERVBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if openlog is compatible with system prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9838: checking if openlog is compatible with system prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_openlog_proto_compat'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif + +int main() { +void openlog(const char *, int, int); +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9854: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_openlog_proto_compat=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_openlog_proto_compat=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_openlog_proto_compat" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_openlog_proto_compat" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define OPENLOG_PROTO_COMPATIBLE 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_crypt+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_crypt" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if crypt needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9880: checking if crypt needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_crypt_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int crypt (struct foo*); +crypt(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9902: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_crypt_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_crypt_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_crypt_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_crypt_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_CRYPT_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_strtok_r+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_strtok_r" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if strtok_r needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9929: checking if strtok_r needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_strtok_r_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int strtok_r (struct foo*); +strtok_r(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9946: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_strtok_r_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_strtok_r_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_strtok_r_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_strtok_r_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_STRTOK_R_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_strsep+set" != set -o "$ac_cv_func_strsep" = yes; then +echo $ac_n "checking if strsep needs a prototype""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:9973: checking if strsep needs a prototype" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_strsep_noproto'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + +int main() { +struct foo { int foo; } xx; +extern int strsep (struct foo*); +strsep(&xx); + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:9990: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_strsep_noproto=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_func_strsep_noproto=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_strsep_noproto" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_func_strsep_noproto" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define NEED_STRSEP_PROTO 1 +EOF + +fi + +fi + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for h_errno""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10016: checking for h_errno" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_h_errno'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_h_errno=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_h_errno=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_h_errno`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_h_errno` = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:10053: checking if h_errno is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_h_errno_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } h_errno; +int main() { +h_errno.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10072: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_h_errno_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_h_errno_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_h_errno_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_h_errno_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_H_ERRNO_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for h_errlist""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10103: checking for h_errlist" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_h_errlist'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_h_errlist=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_h_errlist=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_h_errlist`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_h_errlist` = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:10140: checking if h_errlist is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_h_errlist_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } h_errlist; +int main() { +h_errlist.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10156: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_h_errlist_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_h_errlist_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_h_errlist_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_h_errlist_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_H_ERRLIST_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for h_nerr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10187: checking for h_nerr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_h_nerr'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_h_nerr=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_h_nerr=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_h_nerr`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_h_nerr` = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:10224: checking if h_nerr is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_h_nerr_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } h_nerr; +int main() { +h_nerr.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10240: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_h_nerr_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_h_nerr_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_h_nerr_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_h_nerr_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_H_NERR_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for __progname""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10271: checking for __progname" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var___progname'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var___progname=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var___progname=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var___progname`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var___progname` = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:10308: checking if __progname is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var___progname_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } __progname; +int main() { +__progname.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10324: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var___progname_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var___progname_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var___progname_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var___progname_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE___PROGNAME_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if optarg is properly declared""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10355: checking if optarg is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_optarg_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } optarg; +int main() { +optarg.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10372: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_optarg_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_optarg_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_optarg_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_optarg_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_OPTARG_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if optind is properly declared""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10399: checking if optind is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_optind_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } optind; +int main() { +optind.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10416: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_optind_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_optind_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_optind_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_optind_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_OPTIND_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if opterr is properly declared""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10443: checking if opterr is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_opterr_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } opterr; +int main() { +opterr.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10460: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_opterr_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_opterr_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_opterr_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_opterr_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_OPTERR_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if optopt is properly declared""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10487: checking if optopt is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_optopt_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +extern struct { int foo; } optopt; +int main() { +optopt.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10504: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_optopt_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_optopt_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_optopt_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_optopt_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_OPTOPT_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking if environ is properly declared""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10532: checking if environ is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_environ_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +extern struct { int foo; } environ; +int main() { +environ.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10546: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_environ_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_environ_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_environ_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_environ_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_ENVIRON_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_addr in struct utmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10576: checking for ut_addr in struct utmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_addr'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmp x; x.ut_addr; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10589: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_addr=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_addr=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_addr" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_addr" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_host in struct utmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10615: checking for ut_host in struct utmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_host'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmp x; x.ut_host; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10628: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_host=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_host=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_host" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_host" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_id in struct utmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10654: checking for ut_id in struct utmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_id'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmp x; x.ut_id; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10667: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_id=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_id=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_id" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_id" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_pid in struct utmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10693: checking for ut_pid in struct utmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_pid'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmp x; x.ut_pid; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10706: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_pid=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_pid=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_pid" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_pid" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_type in struct utmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10732: checking for ut_type in struct utmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_type'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmp x; x.ut_type; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10745: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_type=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_type=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_type" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_type" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_user in struct utmp""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10771: checking for ut_user in struct utmp" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_user'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmp x; x.ut_user; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10784: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_user=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_user=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_user" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmp_ut_user" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_exit in struct utmpx""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10810: checking for ut_exit in struct utmpx" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_exit'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmpx x; x.ut_exit; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10823: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_exit=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_exit=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_exit" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_exit" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_EXIT 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for ut_syslen in struct utmpx""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10849: checking for ut_syslen in struct utmpx" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_syslen'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct utmpx x; x.ut_syslen; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10862: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_syslen=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_syslen=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_syslen" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_utmpx_ut_syslen" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for tm_gmtoff in struct tm""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10890: checking for tm_gmtoff in struct tm" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_gmtoff'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct tm x; x.tm_gmtoff; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10903: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_gmtoff=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_gmtoff=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_gmtoff" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_gmtoff" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_GMTOFF 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for tm_zone in struct tm""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10929: checking for tm_zone in struct tm" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_zone'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +int main() { +struct tm x; x.tm_zone; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:10942: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_zone=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_zone=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_zone" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_tm_tm_zone" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_ZONE 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for timezone""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:10969: checking for timezone" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_timezone'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_timezone=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_var_timezone=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_timezone`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_var_timezone` = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:11006: checking if timezone is properly declared" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_var_timezone_declaration'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +extern struct { int foo; } timezone; +int main() { +timezone.foo = 1; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11020: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_timezone_declaration=no" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_var_timezone_declaration=yes" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + + + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_var_timezone_declaration" 1>&6 +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_var_timezone_declaration\" = yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_TIMEZONE_DECLARATION 1 +EOF + +fi + + +fi + + + + + +cv=`echo "sa_family_t" | sed 'y%./+- %__p__%'` +echo $ac_n "checking for sa_family_t""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11053: checking for sa_family_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$cv'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +int main() { +sa_family_t foo; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11070: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo sa_family_t | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs sa_family_t"@@@ +END + + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:11100: checking for socklen_t" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$cv'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +int main() { +socklen_t foo; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11117: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo socklen_t | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs socklen_t"@@@ +END + + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:11147: checking for struct sockaddr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$cv'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +int main() { +struct sockaddr foo; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11164: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo struct sockaddr | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs struct_sockaddr"@@@ +END + + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:11194: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$cv'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +int main() { +struct sockaddr_storage foo; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11211: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo struct sockaddr_storage | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs struct_sockaddr_storage"@@@ +END + + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:11241: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$cv'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#if STDC_HEADERS +#include +#include +#endif +#include +int main() { +struct addrinfo foo; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11258: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=yes" +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval "ac_cv_type_$cv=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi +echo "$ac_t""`eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv`" 1>&6 +if test `eval echo \\$ac_cv_type_$cv` = yes; then + ac_tr_hdr=HAVE_`echo struct addrinfo | sed 'y%abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz./- %ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ____%'` + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs struct_addrinfo"@@@ +END + + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +echo "configure:11287: checking for struct winsize" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_struct_winsize'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +ac_cv_struct_winsize=no +for i in sys/termios.h sys/ioctl.h; do +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "struct[ ]*winsize" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_struct_winsize=yes; break +fi +rm -f conftest* +done + +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_struct_winsize" = "yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE 1 +EOF + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_struct_winsize" 1>&6 +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "ws_xpixel" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_WS_XPIXEL 1 +EOF + +fi +rm -f conftest* + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +EOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + egrep "ws_ypixel" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + rm -rf conftest* + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_WS_YPIXEL 1 +EOF + +fi +rm -f conftest* + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for struct spwd""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11351: checking for struct spwd" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_struct_spwd'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif +int main() { +struct spwd foo; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11367: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_struct_spwd=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_struct_spwd=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_struct_spwd" 1>&6 + +if test "$ac_cv_struct_spwd" = "yes"; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD 1 +EOF + +fi + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for sa_len in struct sockaddr""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11394: checking for sa_len in struct sockaddr" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_struct_sockaddr_sa_len'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#include +int main() { +struct sockaddr x; x.sa_len; +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11408: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_sockaddr_sa_len=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_type_struct_sockaddr_sa_len=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_type_struct_sockaddr_sa_len" 1>&6 +if test "$ac_cv_type_struct_sockaddr_sa_len" = yes; then + + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN 1 +EOF + + +fi + + + + + +for i in int8_t int16_t int32_t int64_t; do + echo $ac_n "checking for $i""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11436: checking for $i" >&5 + +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$i'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +$i x; + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11466: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval ac_cv_type_$i=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval ac_cv_type_$i=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + + eval ac_res=\$ac_cv_type_$i + if test "$ac_res" = yes; then + type=HAVE_`echo $i | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +done + + +for i in u_int8_t u_int16_t u_int32_t u_int64_t; do + echo $ac_n "checking for $i""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11492: checking for $i" >&5 + +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_type_$i'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H +#include +#endif + +int main() { +$i x; + +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11522: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval ac_cv_type_$i=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + eval ac_cv_type_$i=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + + eval ac_res=\$ac_cv_type_$i + if test "$ac_res" = yes; then + type=HAVE_`echo $i | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ` + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 +done + + + + + + + +echo $ac_n "checking for el_init""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11552: checking for el_init" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_funclib_el_init'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + +if eval "test \"\$ac_cv_func_el_init\" != yes" ; then + ac_save_LIBS="$LIBS" + for ac_lib in "" edit; do + if test -n "$ac_lib"; then + ac_lib="-l$ac_lib" + else + ac_lib="" + fi + LIBS=" $ac_lib $LIB_tgetent $ac_save_LIBS" + cat > conftest.$ac_ext <&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest${ac_exeext}; then + rm -rf conftest* + eval "if test -n \"$ac_lib\";then ac_cv_funclib_el_init=$ac_lib; else ac_cv_funclib_el_init=yes; fi";break +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 +fi +rm -f conftest* + done + eval "ac_cv_funclib_el_init=\${ac_cv_funclib_el_init-no}" + LIBS="$ac_save_LIBS" +fi + +fi + + +eval "ac_res=\$ac_cv_funclib_el_init" + +: << END +@@@funcs="$funcs el_init"@@@ +@@@libs="$libs "" edit"@@@ +END + +# el_init +eval "ac_tr_func=HAVE_`echo el_init | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "ac_tr_lib=HAVE_LIB`echo $ac_res | sed -e 's/-l//' | tr abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ`" +eval "LIB_el_init=$ac_res" + +case "$ac_res" in + yes) + eval "ac_cv_func_el_init=yes" + eval "LIB_el_init=" + cat >> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; + no) + eval "ac_cv_func_el_init=no" + eval "LIB_el_init=" + echo "$ac_t""no" 1>&6 + ;; + *) + eval "ac_cv_func_el_init=yes" + eval "ac_cv_lib_`echo "$ac_res" | sed 's/-l//'`=yes" + cat >> confdefs.h <> confdefs.h <&6 + ;; +esac + + +if test "$ac_cv_func_el_init" = yes ; then + echo $ac_n "checking for four argument el_init""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11635: checking for four argument el_init" >&5 +if eval "test \"`echo '$''{'ac_cv_func_el_init_four'+set}'`\" = set"; then + echo $ac_n "(cached) $ac_c" 1>&6 +else + + cat > conftest.$ac_ext < + #include +int main() { +el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); +; return 0; } +EOF +if { (eval echo configure:11649: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; }; then + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_el_init_four=yes +else + echo "configure: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + rm -rf conftest* + ac_cv_func_el_init_four=no +fi +rm -f conftest* +fi + +echo "$ac_t""$ac_cv_func_el_init_four" 1>&6 + if test "$ac_cv_func_el_init_four" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_EL_INIT 1 +EOF + + fi +fi + + +ac_foo=no +if test "$with_readline" = yes; then + : +elif test "$ac_cv_func_readline" = yes; then + : +elif test "$ac_cv_func_el_init" = yes; then + ac_foo=yes + LIB_readline="\$(top_builddir)/lib/editline/libel_compat.a $LIB_el_init" +else + LIB_readline='$(top_builddir)/lib/editline/libeditline.a' +fi + + +if test "$ac_foo" = yes; then + el_compat_TRUE= + el_compat_FALSE='#' +else + el_compat_TRUE='#' + el_compat_FALSE= +fi +if test "$readline_libdir"; then + LIB_readline="-rpath $readline_libdir $LIB_readline" +fi +LIB_readline="$LIB_readline \$(LIB_tgetent)" +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define HAVE_READLINE 1 +EOF + + +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define AUTHENTICATION 1 +EOF +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define ENCRYPTION 1 +EOF +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define DES_ENCRYPTION 1 +EOF +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define DIAGNOSTICS 1 +EOF +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define OLD_ENVIRON 1 +EOF +if false; then +cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define ENV_HACK 1 +EOF + +fi + +# Simple test for streamspty, based on the existance of getmsg(), alas +# this breaks on SunOS4 which have streams but BSD-like ptys +# +# And also something wierd has happend with dec-osf1, fallback to bsd-ptys + +echo $ac_n "checking for streamspty""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11728: checking for streamspty" >&5 +case "$host" in +*-*-aix3*|*-*-sunos4*|*-*-osf*|*-*-hpux10*) + krb_cv_sys_streamspty=no + ;; +*) + krb_cv_sys_streamspty="$ac_cv_func_getmsg" + ;; +esac +if test "$krb_cv_sys_streamspty" = yes; then + cat >> confdefs.h <<\EOF +#define STREAMSPTY 1 +EOF + +fi +echo "$ac_t""$krb_cv_sys_streamspty" 1>&6 + + +echo $ac_n "checking which authentication modules should be built""... $ac_c" 1>&6 +echo "configure:11747: checking which authentication modules should be built" >&5 + +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS= + +if test "$ac_cv_header_siad_h" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS sia" +fi + +if test "$ac_cv_header_security_pam_modules_h" = yes -a "$enable_shared" = yes; then + LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS pam" +fi + +case "${host}" in +*-*-irix[56]*) LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS="$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS afskauthlib" ;; +esac + +echo "$ac_t""$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS" 1>&6 + + + + +test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix +test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}' + +for i in bin lib libexec sbin; do + i=${i}dir + foo=`echo $i | tr 'xindiscernible' 'XINDISCERNIBLE'` + x="\$${i}" + eval y="$x" + while test "x$y" != "x$x"; do + x="$y" + eval y="$x" + done + cat >> confdefs.h < confcache <<\EOF +# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure +# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure +# scripts and configure runs. It is not useful on other systems. +# If it contains results you don't want to keep, you may remove or edit it. +# +# By default, configure uses ./config.cache as the cache file, +# creating it if it does not exist already. You can give configure +# the --cache-file=FILE option to use a different cache file; that is +# what configure does when it calls configure scripts in +# subdirectories, so they share the cache. +# Giving --cache-file=/dev/null disables caching, for debugging configure. +# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it the +# --recheck option to rerun configure. +# +EOF +# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values, +# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient. +# So, don't put newlines in cache variables' values. +# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly, +# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars. +(set) 2>&1 | + case `(ac_space=' '; set | grep ac_space) 2>&1` in + *ac_space=\ *) + # `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes (double-quote substitution + # turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \). + sed -n \ + -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g" \ + -e "s/^\\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*_cv_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1=\${\\1='\\2'}/p" + ;; + *) + # `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes. + sed -n -e 's/^\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*_cv_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=\(.*\)/\1=${\1=\2}/p' + ;; + esac >> confcache +if cmp -s $cache_file confcache; then + : +else + if test -w $cache_file; then + echo "updating cache $cache_file" + cat confcache > $cache_file + else + echo "not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" + fi +fi +rm -f confcache + +trap 'rm -fr conftest* confdefs* core core.* *.core $ac_clean_files; exit 1' 1 2 15 + +test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix +# Let make expand exec_prefix. +test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}' + +# Any assignment to VPATH causes Sun make to only execute +# the first set of double-colon rules, so remove it if not needed. +# If there is a colon in the path, we need to keep it. +if test "x$srcdir" = x.; then + ac_vpsub='/^[ ]*VPATH[ ]*=[^:]*$/d' +fi + +trap 'rm -f $CONFIG_STATUS conftest*; exit 1' 1 2 15 + +DEFS=-DHAVE_CONFIG_H + +# Without the "./", some shells look in PATH for config.status. +: ${CONFIG_STATUS=./config.status} + +echo creating $CONFIG_STATUS +rm -f $CONFIG_STATUS +cat > $CONFIG_STATUS </dev/null | sed 1q`: +# +# $0 $ac_configure_args +# +# Compiler output produced by configure, useful for debugging +# configure, is in ./config.log if it exists. + +ac_cs_usage="Usage: $CONFIG_STATUS [--recheck] [--version] [--help]" +for ac_option +do + case "\$ac_option" in + -recheck | --recheck | --rechec | --reche | --rech | --rec | --re | --r) + echo "running \${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $0 $ac_configure_args --no-create --no-recursion" + exec \${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $0 $ac_configure_args --no-create --no-recursion ;; + -version | --version | --versio | --versi | --vers | --ver | --ve | --v) + echo "$CONFIG_STATUS generated by autoconf version 2.13" + exit 0 ;; + -help | --help | --hel | --he | --h) + echo "\$ac_cs_usage"; exit 0 ;; + *) echo "\$ac_cs_usage"; exit 1 ;; + esac +done + +ac_given_srcdir=$srcdir +ac_given_INSTALL="$INSTALL" + +trap 'rm -fr `echo "Makefile \ + include/Makefile \ + include/kadm5/Makefile \ + lib/Makefile \ + lib/45/Makefile \ + lib/auth/Makefile \ + lib/auth/afskauthlib/Makefile \ + lib/auth/pam/Makefile \ + lib/auth/sia/Makefile \ + lib/asn1/Makefile \ + lib/com_err/Makefile \ + lib/des/Makefile \ + lib/editline/Makefile \ + lib/gssapi/Makefile \ + lib/hdb/Makefile \ + lib/kadm5/Makefile \ + lib/kafs/Makefile \ + lib/krb5/Makefile \ + lib/otp/Makefile \ + lib/roken/Makefile \ + lib/sl/Makefile \ + kuser/Makefile \ + kpasswd/Makefile \ + kadmin/Makefile \ + admin/Makefile \ + kdc/Makefile \ + appl/Makefile \ + appl/afsutil/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/common/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile \ + appl/kauth/Makefile \ + appl/kx/Makefile \ + appl/login/Makefile \ + appl/otp/Makefile \ + appl/popper/Makefile \ + appl/push/Makefile \ + appl/rsh/Makefile \ + appl/su/Makefile \ + appl/xnlock/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile \ + appl/test/Makefile \ + appl/kf/Makefile \ + doc/Makefile \ + include/config.h" | sed "s/:[^ ]*//g"` conftest*; exit 1' 1 2 15 +EOF +cat >> $CONFIG_STATUS < conftest.subs <<\\CEOF +$ac_vpsub +$extrasub +s%@SHELL@%$SHELL%g +s%@CFLAGS@%$CFLAGS%g +s%@CPPFLAGS@%$CPPFLAGS%g +s%@CXXFLAGS@%$CXXFLAGS%g +s%@FFLAGS@%$FFLAGS%g +s%@DEFS@%$DEFS%g +s%@LDFLAGS@%$LDFLAGS%g +s%@LIBS@%$LIBS%g +s%@exec_prefix@%$exec_prefix%g +s%@prefix@%$prefix%g +s%@program_transform_name@%$program_transform_name%g +s%@bindir@%$bindir%g +s%@sbindir@%$sbindir%g +s%@libexecdir@%$libexecdir%g +s%@datadir@%$datadir%g +s%@sysconfdir@%$sysconfdir%g +s%@sharedstatedir@%$sharedstatedir%g +s%@localstatedir@%$localstatedir%g +s%@libdir@%$libdir%g +s%@includedir@%$includedir%g +s%@oldincludedir@%$oldincludedir%g +s%@infodir@%$infodir%g +s%@mandir@%$mandir%g +s%@INSTALL_PROGRAM@%$INSTALL_PROGRAM%g +s%@INSTALL_SCRIPT@%$INSTALL_SCRIPT%g +s%@INSTALL_DATA@%$INSTALL_DATA%g +s%@PACKAGE@%$PACKAGE%g +s%@VERSION@%$VERSION%g +s%@ACLOCAL@%$ACLOCAL%g +s%@AUTOCONF@%$AUTOCONF%g +s%@AUTOMAKE@%$AUTOMAKE%g +s%@AUTOHEADER@%$AUTOHEADER%g +s%@MAKEINFO@%$MAKEINFO%g +s%@SET_MAKE@%$SET_MAKE%g +s%@host@%$host%g +s%@host_alias@%$host_alias%g +s%@host_cpu@%$host_cpu%g +s%@host_vendor@%$host_vendor%g +s%@host_os@%$host_os%g +s%@CANONICAL_HOST@%$CANONICAL_HOST%g +s%@CC@%$CC%g +s%@OBJEXT@%$OBJEXT%g +s%@EXEEXT@%$EXEEXT%g +s%@YACC@%$YACC%g +s%@LEX@%$LEX%g +s%@LEXLIB@%$LEXLIB%g +s%@CPP@%$CPP%g +s%@LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT@%$LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT%g +s%@RANLIB@%$RANLIB%g +s%@AWK@%$AWK%g +s%@LN_S@%$LN_S%g +s%@LD@%$LD%g +s%@NM@%$NM%g +s%@LIBTOOL@%$LIBTOOL%g +s%@WFLAGS@%$WFLAGS%g +s%@WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@%$WFLAGS_NOUNUSED%g +s%@WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@%$WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT%g +s%@INCLUDE_krb4@%$INCLUDE_krb4%g +s%@LIB_krb4@%$LIB_krb4%g +s%@EXTRA_LIB45@%$EXTRA_LIB45%g +s%@LIB_krb_enable_debug@%$LIB_krb_enable_debug%g +s%@LIB_krb_disable_debug@%$LIB_krb_disable_debug%g +s%@LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm@%$LIB_krb_get_our_ip_for_realm%g +s%@KRB4_TRUE@%$KRB4_TRUE%g +s%@KRB4_FALSE@%$KRB4_FALSE%g +s%@KRB5_TRUE@%$KRB5_TRUE%g +s%@KRB5_FALSE@%$KRB5_FALSE%g +s%@LIB_kdb@%$LIB_kdb%g +s%@AIX_TRUE@%$AIX_TRUE%g +s%@AIX_FALSE@%$AIX_FALSE%g +s%@AIX4_TRUE@%$AIX4_TRUE%g +s%@AIX4_FALSE@%$AIX4_FALSE%g +s%@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@%$AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE%g +s%@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@%$AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE%g +s%@LIB_dlopen@%$LIB_dlopen%g +s%@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@%$HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE%g +s%@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@%$HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE%g +s%@AFS_EXTRA_LD@%$AFS_EXTRA_LD%g +s%@AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@%$AIX_EXTRA_KAFS%g +s%@LIB_otp@%$LIB_otp%g +s%@OTP_TRUE@%$OTP_TRUE%g +s%@OTP_FALSE@%$OTP_FALSE%g +s%@LIB_security@%$LIB_security%g +s%@NROFF@%$NROFF%g +s%@GROFF@%$GROFF%g +s%@CATMAN@%$CATMAN%g +s%@CATMAN_TRUE@%$CATMAN_TRUE%g +s%@CATMAN_FALSE@%$CATMAN_FALSE%g +s%@CATMANEXT@%$CATMANEXT%g +s%@INCLUDE_readline@%$INCLUDE_readline%g +s%@LIB_readline@%$LIB_readline%g +s%@INCLUDE_hesiod@%$INCLUDE_hesiod%g +s%@LIB_hesiod@%$LIB_hesiod%g +s%@X_CFLAGS@%$X_CFLAGS%g +s%@X_PRE_LIBS@%$X_PRE_LIBS%g +s%@X_LIBS@%$X_LIBS%g +s%@X_EXTRA_LIBS@%$X_EXTRA_LIBS%g +s%@MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@%$MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS%g +s%@MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@%$MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS%g +s%@MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@%$MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS%g +s%@LIB_XauWriteAuth@%$LIB_XauWriteAuth%g +s%@LIB_XauReadAuth@%$LIB_XauReadAuth%g +s%@LIB_XauFileName@%$LIB_XauFileName%g +s%@NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@%$NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE%g +s%@NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@%$NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE%g +s%@have_err_h_TRUE@%$have_err_h_TRUE%g +s%@have_err_h_FALSE@%$have_err_h_FALSE%g +s%@have_fnmatch_h_TRUE@%$have_fnmatch_h_TRUE%g +s%@have_fnmatch_h_FALSE@%$have_fnmatch_h_FALSE%g +s%@LIB_socket@%$LIB_socket%g +s%@LIB_gethostbyname@%$LIB_gethostbyname%g +s%@LIB_syslog@%$LIB_syslog%g +s%@LIB_logwtmp@%$LIB_logwtmp%g +s%@LIB_tgetent@%$LIB_tgetent%g +s%@LIB_gethostbyname2@%$LIB_gethostbyname2%g +s%@LIB_res_search@%$LIB_res_search%g +s%@LIB_dn_expand@%$LIB_dn_expand%g +s%@have_glob_h_TRUE@%$have_glob_h_TRUE%g +s%@have_glob_h_FALSE@%$have_glob_h_FALSE%g +s%@LIB_dbopen@%$LIB_dbopen%g +s%@LIB_dbm_firstkey@%$LIB_dbm_firstkey%g +s%@DBLIB@%$DBLIB%g +s%@LIB_getpwnam_r@%$LIB_getpwnam_r%g +s%@LIB_getsockopt@%$LIB_getsockopt%g +s%@LIB_setsockopt@%$LIB_setsockopt%g +s%@VOID_RETSIGTYPE@%$VOID_RETSIGTYPE%g +s%@LIB_hstrerror@%$LIB_hstrerror%g +s%@LIBOBJS@%$LIBOBJS%g +s%@LIB_crypt@%$LIB_crypt%g +s%@LIB_roken@%$LIB_roken%g +s%@LIB_el_init@%$LIB_el_init%g +s%@el_compat_TRUE@%$el_compat_TRUE%g +s%@el_compat_FALSE@%$el_compat_FALSE%g +s%@LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@%$LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS%g +s%@LTLIBOBJS@%$LTLIBOBJS%g + +CEOF +EOF + +cat >> $CONFIG_STATUS <<\EOF + +# Split the substitutions into bite-sized pieces for seds with +# small command number limits, like on Digital OSF/1 and HP-UX. +ac_max_sed_cmds=90 # Maximum number of lines to put in a sed script. +ac_file=1 # Number of current file. +ac_beg=1 # First line for current file. +ac_end=$ac_max_sed_cmds # Line after last line for current file. +ac_more_lines=: +ac_sed_cmds="" +while $ac_more_lines; do + if test $ac_beg -gt 1; then + sed "1,${ac_beg}d; ${ac_end}q" conftest.subs > conftest.s$ac_file + else + sed "${ac_end}q" conftest.subs > conftest.s$ac_file + fi + if test ! -s conftest.s$ac_file; then + ac_more_lines=false + rm -f conftest.s$ac_file + else + if test -z "$ac_sed_cmds"; then + ac_sed_cmds="sed -f conftest.s$ac_file" + else + ac_sed_cmds="$ac_sed_cmds | sed -f conftest.s$ac_file" + fi + ac_file=`expr $ac_file + 1` + ac_beg=$ac_end + ac_end=`expr $ac_end + $ac_max_sed_cmds` + fi +done +if test -z "$ac_sed_cmds"; then + ac_sed_cmds=cat +fi +EOF + +cat >> $CONFIG_STATUS <> $CONFIG_STATUS <<\EOF +for ac_file in .. $CONFIG_FILES; do if test "x$ac_file" != x..; then + # Support "outfile[:infile[:infile...]]", defaulting infile="outfile.in". + case "$ac_file" in + *:*) ac_file_in=`echo "$ac_file"|sed 's%[^:]*:%%'` + ac_file=`echo "$ac_file"|sed 's%:.*%%'` ;; + *) ac_file_in="${ac_file}.in" ;; + esac + + # Adjust a relative srcdir, top_srcdir, and INSTALL for subdirectories. + + # Remove last slash and all that follows it. Not all systems have dirname. + ac_dir=`echo $ac_file|sed 's%/[^/][^/]*$%%'` + if test "$ac_dir" != "$ac_file" && test "$ac_dir" != .; then + # The file is in a subdirectory. + test ! -d "$ac_dir" && mkdir "$ac_dir" + ac_dir_suffix="/`echo $ac_dir|sed 's%^\./%%'`" + # A "../" for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix. + ac_dots=`echo $ac_dir_suffix|sed 's%/[^/]*%../%g'` + else + ac_dir_suffix= ac_dots= + fi + + case "$ac_given_srcdir" in + .) srcdir=. + if test -z "$ac_dots"; then top_srcdir=. + else top_srcdir=`echo $ac_dots|sed 's%/$%%'`; fi ;; + /*) srcdir="$ac_given_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix"; top_srcdir="$ac_given_srcdir" ;; + *) # Relative path. + srcdir="$ac_dots$ac_given_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix" + top_srcdir="$ac_dots$ac_given_srcdir" ;; + esac + + case "$ac_given_INSTALL" in + [/$]*) INSTALL="$ac_given_INSTALL" ;; + *) INSTALL="$ac_dots$ac_given_INSTALL" ;; + esac + + echo creating "$ac_file" + rm -f "$ac_file" + configure_input="Generated automatically from `echo $ac_file_in|sed 's%.*/%%'` by configure." + case "$ac_file" in + *Makefile*) ac_comsub="1i\\ +# $configure_input" ;; + *) ac_comsub= ;; + esac + + ac_file_inputs=`echo $ac_file_in|sed -e "s%^%$ac_given_srcdir/%" -e "s%:% $ac_given_srcdir/%g"` + sed -e "$ac_comsub +s%@configure_input@%$configure_input%g +s%@srcdir@%$srcdir%g +s%@top_srcdir@%$top_srcdir%g +s%@INSTALL@%$INSTALL%g +" $ac_file_inputs | (eval "$ac_sed_cmds") > $ac_file +fi; done +rm -f conftest.s* + +# These sed commands are passed to sed as "A NAME B NAME C VALUE D", where +# NAME is the cpp macro being defined and VALUE is the value it is being given. +# +# ac_d sets the value in "#define NAME VALUE" lines. +ac_dA='s%^\([ ]*\)#\([ ]*define[ ][ ]*\)' +ac_dB='\([ ][ ]*\)[^ ]*%\1#\2' +ac_dC='\3' +ac_dD='%g' +# ac_u turns "#undef NAME" with trailing blanks into "#define NAME VALUE". +ac_uA='s%^\([ ]*\)#\([ ]*\)undef\([ ][ ]*\)' +ac_uB='\([ ]\)%\1#\2define\3' +ac_uC=' ' +ac_uD='\4%g' +# ac_e turns "#undef NAME" without trailing blanks into "#define NAME VALUE". +ac_eA='s%^\([ ]*\)#\([ ]*\)undef\([ ][ ]*\)' +ac_eB='$%\1#\2define\3' +ac_eC=' ' +ac_eD='%g' + +if test "${CONFIG_HEADERS+set}" != set; then +EOF +cat >> $CONFIG_STATUS <> $CONFIG_STATUS <<\EOF +fi +for ac_file in .. $CONFIG_HEADERS; do if test "x$ac_file" != x..; then + # Support "outfile[:infile[:infile...]]", defaulting infile="outfile.in". + case "$ac_file" in + *:*) ac_file_in=`echo "$ac_file"|sed 's%[^:]*:%%'` + ac_file=`echo "$ac_file"|sed 's%:.*%%'` ;; + *) ac_file_in="${ac_file}.in" ;; + esac + + echo creating $ac_file + + rm -f conftest.frag conftest.in conftest.out + ac_file_inputs=`echo $ac_file_in|sed -e "s%^%$ac_given_srcdir/%" -e "s%:% $ac_given_srcdir/%g"` + cat $ac_file_inputs > conftest.in + +EOF + +# Transform confdefs.h into a sed script conftest.vals that substitutes +# the proper values into config.h.in to produce config.h. And first: +# Protect against being on the right side of a sed subst in config.status. +# Protect against being in an unquoted here document in config.status. +rm -f conftest.vals +cat > conftest.hdr <<\EOF +s/[\\&%]/\\&/g +s%[\\$`]%\\&%g +s%#define \([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*\) *\(.*\)%${ac_dA}\1${ac_dB}\1${ac_dC}\2${ac_dD}%gp +s%ac_d%ac_u%gp +s%ac_u%ac_e%gp +EOF +sed -n -f conftest.hdr confdefs.h > conftest.vals +rm -f conftest.hdr + +# This sed command replaces #undef with comments. This is necessary, for +# example, in the case of _POSIX_SOURCE, which is predefined and required +# on some systems where configure will not decide to define it. +cat >> conftest.vals <<\EOF +s%^[ ]*#[ ]*undef[ ][ ]*[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*%/* & */% +EOF + +# Break up conftest.vals because some shells have a limit on +# the size of here documents, and old seds have small limits too. + +rm -f conftest.tail +while : +do + ac_lines=`grep -c . conftest.vals` + # grep -c gives empty output for an empty file on some AIX systems. + if test -z "$ac_lines" || test "$ac_lines" -eq 0; then break; fi + # Write a limited-size here document to conftest.frag. + echo ' cat > conftest.frag <> $CONFIG_STATUS + sed ${ac_max_here_lines}q conftest.vals >> $CONFIG_STATUS + echo 'CEOF + sed -f conftest.frag conftest.in > conftest.out + rm -f conftest.in + mv conftest.out conftest.in +' >> $CONFIG_STATUS + sed 1,${ac_max_here_lines}d conftest.vals > conftest.tail + rm -f conftest.vals + mv conftest.tail conftest.vals +done +rm -f conftest.vals + +cat >> $CONFIG_STATUS <<\EOF + rm -f conftest.frag conftest.h + echo "/* $ac_file. Generated automatically by configure. */" > conftest.h + cat conftest.in >> conftest.h + rm -f conftest.in + if cmp -s $ac_file conftest.h 2>/dev/null; then + echo "$ac_file is unchanged" + rm -f conftest.h + else + # Remove last slash and all that follows it. Not all systems have dirname. + ac_dir=`echo $ac_file|sed 's%/[^/][^/]*$%%'` + if test "$ac_dir" != "$ac_file" && test "$ac_dir" != .; then + # The file is in a subdirectory. + test ! -d "$ac_dir" && mkdir "$ac_dir" + fi + rm -f $ac_file + mv conftest.h $ac_file + fi +fi; done + +EOF +cat >> $CONFIG_STATUS <> $CONFIG_STATUS <<\EOF +test -z "$CONFIG_HEADERS" || echo timestamp > include/stamp-h + +exit 0 +EOF +chmod +x $CONFIG_STATUS +rm -fr confdefs* $ac_clean_files +test "$no_create" = yes || ${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} $CONFIG_STATUS || exit 1 + + +HEIMDALVERSION="$PACKAGE-$VERSION" + +cat > include/newversion.h.in </dev/null | sed 1q` + Date=`date` + mv -f include/newversion.h.in include/version.h.in + sed -e "s/@USER@/$User/" -e "s/@HOST@/$Host/" -e "s/@DATE@/$Date/" include/version.h.in > include/version.h +fi diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/configure.in b/crypto/heimdal/configure.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f406c03 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/configure.in @@ -0,0 +1,934 @@ +dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script. +AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.215 $) +AC_INIT(lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c) +AM_CONFIG_HEADER(include/config.h) + +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(heimdal,0.2m) + +AC_PREFIX_DEFAULT(/usr/heimdal) + +AC_CANONICAL_HOST +CANONICAL_HOST=$host +AC_SUBST(CANONICAL_HOST) + +sunos=no +case "$host" in +*-*-sunos4*) + sunos=40 + ;; +*-*-solaris2.7) + sunos=57 + ;; +*-*-solaris2*) + sunos=50 + ;; +esac +if test "$sunos" != no; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SunOS, $sunos, + [Define to what version of SunOS you are running.]) +fi + +aix=no +case "$host" in +*-*-aix3*) + aix=3 + ;; +*-*-aix4*) + aix=4 + ;; +esac + +#test -z "$CFLAGS" && CFLAGS="-g" + +dnl Checks for programs. +AC_PROG_CC + +AC_CYGWIN +AC_OBJEXT +AC_EXEEXT + +dnl AC_KRB_PROG_YACC +AC_PROG_YACC +AM_PROG_LEX +AC_PROG_RANLIB +AC_PROG_AWK +AC_KRB_PROG_LN_S + +AC_MIPS_ABI +CC="$CC $abi" +libdir="$libdir$abilibdirext" + +AC_C___ATTRIBUTE__ + +AM_DISABLE_SHARED +AM_PROG_LIBTOOL + +AC_WFLAGS(-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs) + +berkeley_db=db +AC_ARG_WITH(berkeley-db, +[ --without-berkeley-db if you don't want berkeley db],[ +if test "$withval" = no; then + berkeley_db="" +fi +]) + +AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW(krb4,[#include ],-lkrb,-ldes,/usr/athena) + +LIB_kdb= +if test "$with_krb4" != "no"; then + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $INCLUDE_krb4" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIB_krb4 -ldes $LIBS" + EXTRA_LIB45=lib45.a + AC_SUBST(EXTRA_LIB45) + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for four valued krb_put_int, ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four, + [AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ],[ + char tmp[4]; + krb_put_int(17, tmp, 4, sizeof(tmp));], + ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four=yes, + ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four=no) + ]) + if test "$ac_cv_func_krb_put_int_four" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT, 1, + [define if krb_put_int takes four arguments.]) + fi + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure, + [AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ],[ + int x = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE], + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure=yes, + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure=no) + ]) + if test "$ac_cv_func_krb_verify_secure" != yes; then + AC_DEFINE(KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, 1, + [Define to one if your krb.h doesn't]) + AC_DEFINE(KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL, 2, + [Define to two if your krb.h doesn't]) + fi + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE, + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure, + [AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ],[ + int x = KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE], + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure=yes, + ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure=no) + ]) + if test "$ac_cv_func_krb_verify_not_secure" != yes; then + AC_DEFINE(KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE, 0, + [Define to zero if your krb.h doesn't]) + fi + AC_FIND_FUNC(krb_enable_debug) + AC_FIND_FUNC(krb_disable_debug) + AC_FIND_FUNC(krb_get_our_ip_for_realm) + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + LIB_kdb="-lkdb -lkrb" + if test "$krb4_libdir"; then + LIB_krb4="-rpath $krb4_libdir $LIB_krb4" + LIB_kdb="-rpath $krb4_libdir -L$krb4_libdir $LIB_kdb" + fi +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(KRB4, test "$with_krb4" != "no") +AM_CONDITIONAL(KRB5, true) +AC_DEFINE(KRB5, 1, [Enable Kerberos 5 support in applications.])dnl +AC_SUBST(LIB_kdb)dnl +AM_CONDITIONAL(AIX, test "$aix" != no)dnl +AM_CONDITIONAL(AIX4, test "$aix" = 4) +aix_dynamic_afs=yes +AM_CONDITIONAL(AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS, test "$aix_dynamic_afs" = yes)dnl + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dlopen, dl) + +if test "$aix" != no; then + if test "$aix_dynamic_afs" = yes; then + if test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" = yes; then + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS= + elif test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" != no; then + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS="$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" + else + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS=-lld + fi + else + AIX_EXTRA_KAFS= + fi +fi + +AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DLOPEN, test "$ac_cv_funclib_dlopen" != no)dnl +AC_SUBST(AFS_EXTRA_LD)dnl +AC_SUBST(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS)dnl + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(kaserver, +[ --enable-kaserver if you want the KDC to try to emulate a kaserver]) +if test "$enable_kaserver" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(KASERVER, 1, + [Define if you want to use the KDC as a kaserver.]) + if test "$with_krb4" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR(kaserver requires krb4) + exit 1 + fi +fi + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(kaserver-db, +[ --enable-kaserver-db if you want support for reading kaserver databases in hprop]) +if test "$enable_kaserver_db" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(KASERVER_DB, 1, + [Define if you want support in hprop for reading kaserver databases]) + if test "$with_krb4" = "no"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR(kaserver-db requires krb4) + exit 1 + fi +fi + +otp=yes +AC_ARG_ENABLE(otp, +[ --disable-otp if you don't want OTP support], +[ +if test "$enableval" = "no"; then + otp=no +fi +]) +if test "$otp" = "yes"; then + AC_DEFINE(OTP, 1, [Define if you want OTP support in applications.]) + LIB_otp='$(top_builddir)/lib/otp/libotp.la' +fi +AC_SUBST(LIB_otp) +AM_CONDITIONAL(OTP, test "$otp" = yes)dnl + +AC_CHECK_OSFC2 + +AC_CHECK_MAN + +AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW(readline, +[#include + #include ],-lreadline) + +AC_TEST_PACKAGE_NEW(hesiod,[#include ],-lhesiod) + +KRB_C_BIGENDIAN +AC_C_INLINE + +KRB_CHECK_X + +if test "$no_x" = "yes" ; then + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS="" + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS="" + MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS="" +else + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS='$(X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS)' + MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS='$(X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS)' + MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS='$(X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS)' +fi +AC_SUBST(MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS)dnl +AC_SUBST(MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS)dnl +AC_SUBST(MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS)dnl + +AC_CHECK_XAU + +dnl AM_C_PROTOTYPES + +dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics. +AC_C_CONST +AC_TYPE_OFF_T +AC_TYPE_SIZE_T +AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA(ssize_t, int, [#include ]) +AC_TYPE_PID_T +AC_TYPE_UID_T +AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA(mode_t, unsigned short, []) +AC_CHECK_TYPE_EXTRA(sig_atomic_t, int, [#include ]) +AC_HEADER_TIME +AC_STRUCT_TM + +dnl Checks for header files. +AC_HEADER_STDC + +if test "$berkeley_db"; then + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + db.h \ + db_185.h \ + ]) +fi + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([\ + arpa/ftp.h \ + arpa/inet.h \ + arpa/nameser.h \ + arpa/telnet.h \ + bind/bitypes.h \ + bsdsetjmp.h \ + crypt.h \ + curses.h \ + dbm.h \ + dirent.h \ + dlfcn.h \ + err.h \ + errno.h \ + fcntl.h \ + fnmatch.h \ + grp.h \ + inttypes.h \ + io.h \ + limits.h \ + maillock.h \ + ndbm.h \ + net/if.h \ + netdb.h \ + netinet/in.h \ + netinet/in6.h \ + netinet/in6_machtypes.h \ + netinet/in6_var.h \ + netinet/in_systm.h \ + netinet6/in6.h \ + netinfo/ni.h \ + paths.h \ + pthread.h \ + pty.h \ + pwd.h \ + resolv.h \ + rpcsvc/dbm.h \ + sac.h \ + security/pam_modules.h \ + sgtty.h \ + shadow.h \ + siad.h \ + signal.h \ + stropts.h \ + sys/bitypes.h \ + sys/category.h \ + sys/file.h \ + sys/filio.h \ + sys/ioccom.h \ + sys/ioctl.h \ + sys/param.h \ + sys/proc.h \ + sys/pty.h \ + sys/ptyio.h \ + sys/ptyvar.h \ + sys/resource.h \ + sys/select.h \ + sys/socket.h \ + sys/sockio.h \ + sys/stat.h \ + sys/str_tty.h \ + sys/stream.h \ + sys/stropts.h \ + sys/strtty.h \ + sys/syscall.h \ + sys/sysctl.h \ + sys/termio.h \ + sys/time.h \ + sys/timeb.h \ + sys/times.h \ + sys/tty.h \ + sys/types.h \ + sys/uio.h \ + sys/un.h \ + sys/utsname.h \ + sys/wait.h \ + syslog.h \ + term.h \ + termio.h \ + termios.h \ + time.h \ + tmpdir.h \ + udb.h \ + unistd.h \ + util.h \ + utmp.h \ + utmpx.h \ +]) + +CHECK_NETINET_IP_AND_TCP + + +AC_ARG_ENABLE(netinfo, +[ --enable-netinfo enable netinfo for configuration lookup]) + +if test "$ac_cv_header_netinfo_ni_h" = yes -a "$enable_netinfo" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_NETINFO, 1, + [Define if you want to use Netinfo instead of krb5.conf.]) +fi + +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_err_h, test "$ac_cv_header_err_h" = yes) +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_fnmatch_h, test "$ac_cv_header_fnmatch_h" = yes) + +AC_KRB_IPV6 + +dnl Checks for libraries. + +AC_FIND_FUNC(socket, socket) +AC_FIND_FUNC(gethostbyname, nsl) +AC_FIND_FUNC(syslog, syslog) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(logwtmp, util) +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(tgetent, termcap ncurses curses) +AC_FIND_FUNC(gethostbyname2, inet6 ip6) + +AC_FIND_FUNC(res_search, resolv, +[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +], +[0,0,0,0,0]) + +AC_FIND_FUNC(dn_expand, resolv, +[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +], +[0,0,0,0,0]) + +dnl Checks for library functions. + +AC_BROKEN_SNPRINTF +AC_BROKEN_VSNPRINTF + +AC_BROKEN_GLOB + +if test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" != yes; then + LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS glob.o" +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(have_glob_h, test "$ac_cv_func_glob_working" = yes) + +dnl these should happen after tests for *snprintf + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dbopen, $berkeley_db) +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(dbm_firstkey, $berkeley_db gdbm ndbm) + +DBLIB="$LIB_dbopen" +if test "$LIB_dbopen" != "$LIB_dbm_firstkey"; then + DBLIB="$DBLIB $LIB_dbm_firstkey" +fi +AC_SUBST(DBLIB)dnl + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(_getpty _scrsize asnprintf asprintf cgetent fcntl) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getmsg getrlimit getspnam gettimeofday getuid) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(grantpt mktime ptsname rand random setproctitle) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(revoke select setitimer setpcred setpgid) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setregid setresgid setresuid setreuid setutent) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setsid sigaction strstr) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(sysconf sysctl timegm ttyname ttyslot umask uname) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(unlockpt vasnprintf vasprintf vhangup) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(yp_get_default_domain) + +if test "$ac_cv_func_cgetent" = no; then + LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS getcap.o" +fi + +AC_FUNC_GETLOGIN + +KRB_CAPABILITIES + +AC_CHECK_GETPWNAM_R_POSIX + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(getsockopt,, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif], +[0,0,0,0,0]) +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(setsockopt,, +[#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif], +[0,0,0,0,0]) + +dnl Cray stuff +AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getudbnam setlim) + +AC_TYPE_SIGNAL +if test "$ac_cv_type_signal" = "void" ; then + AC_DEFINE(VOID_RETSIGTYPE, 1, [Define if signal handlers return void.]) +fi +AC_SUBST(VOID_RETSIGTYPE) + +AC_FIND_IF_NOT_BROKEN(hstrerror, resolv, +[#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +17) +if test "$ac_cv_func_hstrerror" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +hstrerror) +fi + +dnl sigh, wish this could be done in a loop +if test "$ac_cv_func_asprintf" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#include +#include ], +asprintf)dnl +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasprintf" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#include +#include ], +vasprintf)dnl +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_asnprintf" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#include +#include ], +asnprintf)dnl +fi +if test "$ac_cv_func_vasnprintf" = yes; then +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#include +#include ], +vasnprintf)dnl +fi + +AC_BROKEN(chown copyhostent daemon err errx fchown flock fnmatch) +AC_BROKEN(freeaddrinfo freehostent gai_strerror getaddrinfo) +AC_BROKEN(getcwd getdtablesize gethostname getipnodebyaddr getipnodebyname) +AC_BROKEN(geteuid getgid getegid) +AC_BROKEN(getnameinfo getopt getusershell) +AC_BROKEN(inet_aton inet_ntop inet_pton initgroups innetgr iruserok lstat) +AC_BROKEN(memmove) +AC_BROKEN(mkstemp putenv rcmd readv recvmsg sendmsg setegid setenv seteuid) +AC_BROKEN(strcasecmp strncasecmp strdup strerror strftime) +AC_BROKEN(strlcat strlcpy strlwr) +AC_BROKEN(strndup strnlen strptime strsep strtok_r strupr) +AC_BROKEN(swab unsetenv verr verrx vsyslog) +AC_BROKEN(vwarn vwarnx warn warnx writev) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], setenv) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], unsetenv) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], gethostname) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], mkstemp) +AC_NEED_PROTO([#include ], getusershell) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif], +inet_aton) + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(crypt, crypt)dnl + +dnl +dnl libroken references crypt and dbopen +dnl + +LIB_roken='$(top_builddir)/lib/roken/libroken.la $(LIB_crypt) $(LIB_dbopen)' +AC_SUBST(LIB_roken)dnl + +AC_CACHE_CHECK(if realloc if broken, ac_cv_func_realloc_broken, [ +ac_cv_func_realloc_broken=no +AC_TRY_RUN([ +#include +#include + +int main() +{ + return realloc(NULL, 17) == NULL; +} +],:, ac_cv_func_realloc_broken=yes, :) +]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_realloc_broken" = yes ; then + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALLOC, 1, [Define if realloc(NULL) doesn't work.]) +fi + +dnl AC_KRB_FUNC_GETCWD_BROKEN + +dnl +dnl Checks for prototypes and declarations +dnl + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +], +gethostbyname, struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +], +gethostbyaddr, struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const void *, size_t, int)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +], +getservbyname, struct servent *getservbyname(const char *, const char *)) + +AC_PROTO_COMPAT([ +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +], +openlog, void openlog(const char *, int, int)) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +], +crypt) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#include +], +strtok_r) + +AC_NEED_PROTO([ +#include +], +strsep) + +AC_CHECK_VAR([#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +h_errno) + +AC_CHECK_VAR([#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +h_errlist) + +AC_CHECK_VAR([#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif], +h_nerr) + +AC_CHECK_VAR([#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +#include +#endif],[__progname]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], optarg) +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], optind) +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], opterr) +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif], optopt) + +AC_CHECK_DECLARATION([#include ], environ) + +dnl +dnl Check for fields in struct utmp +dnl + +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmp, ut_addr, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmp, ut_host, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmp, ut_id, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmp, ut_pid, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmp, ut_type, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmp, ut_user, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmpx, ut_exit, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct utmpx, ut_syslen, [#include ]) + +dnl +dnl Check for fields in struct tm +dnl + +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct tm, tm_gmtoff, [#include ]) +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct tm, tm_zone, [#include ]) + +dnl +dnl or do we have a variable `timezone' ? +dnl + +AC_CHECK_VAR( +[#include ], +timezone) + +AC_HAVE_TYPE([sa_family_t],[#include ]) + +AC_HAVE_TYPE([socklen_t],[#include ]) + +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct sockaddr], [#include ]) + +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct sockaddr_storage], [#include ]) + +AC_HAVE_TYPE([struct addrinfo], [#include ]) + +dnl +dnl Check for struct winsize +dnl + +AC_KRB_STRUCT_WINSIZE + +dnl +dnl Check for struct spwd +dnl + +AC_KRB_STRUCT_SPWD + +dnl +dnl Check for sa_len in struct sockaddr +dnl + +AC_HAVE_STRUCT_FIELD(struct sockaddr, sa_len, [#include +#include ]) + + +AC_GROK_TYPES(int8_t int16_t int32_t int64_t) +AC_GROK_TYPES(u_int8_t u_int16_t u_int32_t u_int64_t) + +dnl +dnl Tests for editline +dnl + +dnl el_init + +AC_FIND_FUNC_NO_LIBS(el_init, edit, [], [], [$LIB_tgetent]) +if test "$ac_cv_func_el_init" = yes ; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK(for four argument el_init, ac_cv_func_el_init_four,[ + AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include + #include ], + [el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);], + ac_cv_func_el_init_four=yes, + ac_cv_func_el_init_four=no)]) + if test "$ac_cv_func_el_init_four" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_EL_INIT, 1, [Define if el_init takes four arguments.]) + fi +fi + +dnl readline + +ac_foo=no +if test "$with_readline" = yes; then + : +elif test "$ac_cv_func_readline" = yes; then + : +elif test "$ac_cv_func_el_init" = yes; then + ac_foo=yes + LIB_readline="\$(top_builddir)/lib/editline/libel_compat.a $LIB_el_init" +else + LIB_readline='$(top_builddir)/lib/editline/libeditline.a' +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(el_compat, test "$ac_foo" = yes) +if test "$readline_libdir"; then + LIB_readline="-rpath $readline_libdir $LIB_readline" +fi +LIB_readline="$LIB_readline \$(LIB_tgetent)" +AC_DEFINE(HAVE_READLINE, 1, + [Define if you have a readline compatible library.])dnl + +dnl telnet muck -------------------------------------------------- + +AC_DEFINE(AUTHENTICATION, 1, + [Define if you want authentication support in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(ENCRYPTION, 1, + [Define if you want encryption support in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(DES_ENCRYPTION, 1, + [Define if you want to use DES encryption in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(DIAGNOSTICS, 1, + [Define this to enable diagnostics in telnet.])dnl +AC_DEFINE(OLD_ENVIRON, 1, + [Define this to enable old environment option in telnet.])dnl +if false; then +AC_DEFINE(ENV_HACK, 1, + [Define this if you want support for broken ENV_{VAR,VAL} telnets.]) +fi + +# Simple test for streamspty, based on the existance of getmsg(), alas +# this breaks on SunOS4 which have streams but BSD-like ptys +# +# And also something wierd has happend with dec-osf1, fallback to bsd-ptys + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for streamspty) +case "$host" in +*-*-aix3*|*-*-sunos4*|*-*-osf*|*-*-hpux10*) + krb_cv_sys_streamspty=no + ;; +*) + krb_cv_sys_streamspty="$ac_cv_func_getmsg" + ;; +esac +if test "$krb_cv_sys_streamspty" = yes; then + AC_DEFINE(STREAMSPTY, 1, [Define if you have streams ptys.]) +fi +dnl AC_SUBST(STREAMSPTY) +AC_MSG_RESULT($krb_cv_sys_streamspty) + +AC_AUTH_MODULES + +dnl This is done by AC_OUTPUT but we need the result here. + +test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix +test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}' + +for i in bin lib libexec sbin; do + i=${i}dir + foo=`echo $i | tr 'xindiscernible' 'XINDISCERNIBLE'` + x="\$${i}" + eval y="$x" + while test "x$y" != "x$x"; do + x="$y" + eval y="$x" + done + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED($foo,"$x") +done + +if false; then + # hack to shut up automake + LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS make-print-version.o" +fi +LTLIBOBJS=`echo "$LIBOBJS" | sed 's/\.o/\.lo/g'` +AC_SUBST(LTLIBOBJS) +AC_OUTPUT(Makefile \ + include/Makefile \ + include/kadm5/Makefile \ + lib/Makefile \ + lib/45/Makefile \ + lib/auth/Makefile \ + lib/auth/afskauthlib/Makefile \ + lib/auth/pam/Makefile \ + lib/auth/sia/Makefile \ + lib/asn1/Makefile \ + lib/com_err/Makefile \ + lib/des/Makefile \ + lib/editline/Makefile \ + lib/gssapi/Makefile \ + lib/hdb/Makefile \ + lib/kadm5/Makefile \ + lib/kafs/Makefile \ + lib/krb5/Makefile \ + lib/otp/Makefile \ + lib/roken/Makefile \ + lib/sl/Makefile \ + kuser/Makefile \ + kpasswd/Makefile \ + kadmin/Makefile \ + admin/Makefile \ + kdc/Makefile \ + appl/Makefile \ + appl/afsutil/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/common/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/ftp/Makefile \ + appl/ftp/ftpd/Makefile \ + appl/kauth/Makefile \ + appl/kx/Makefile \ + appl/login/Makefile \ + appl/otp/Makefile \ + appl/popper/Makefile \ + appl/push/Makefile \ + appl/rsh/Makefile \ + appl/su/Makefile \ + appl/xnlock/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/libtelnet/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/telnet/Makefile \ + appl/telnet/telnetd/Makefile \ + appl/test/Makefile \ + appl/kf/Makefile \ + doc/Makefile \ +) + +dnl +dnl This is the release version name-number[beta] +dnl +HEIMDALVERSION="$PACKAGE-$VERSION" + +cat > include/newversion.h.in </dev/null | sed 1q` + Date=`date` + mv -f include/newversion.h.in include/version.h.in + sed -e "s/@USER@/$User/" -e "s/@HOST@/$Host/" -e "s/@DATE@/$Date/" include/version.h.in > include/version.h +fi diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..734bf62 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:16 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS += no-texinfo.tex + +info_TEXINFOS = heimdal.texi +heimdal_TEXINFOS = intro.texi install.texi setup.texi kerberos4.texi diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..710abb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,620 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:16 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies no-texinfo.tex + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +info_TEXINFOS = heimdal.texi +heimdal_TEXINFOS = intro.texi install.texi setup.texi kerberos4.texi +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +TEXI2DVI = texi2dvi +INFO_DEPS = heimdal.info +DVIS = heimdal.dvi +TEXINFOS = heimdal.texi +DIST_COMMON = $(heimdal_TEXINFOS) Makefile.am Makefile.in mdate-sh + + +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) + +TAR = tar +GZIP_ENV = --best +all: all-redirect +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .dvi .et .h .info .ps .texi .texinfo .txi .x +$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign doc/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +heimdal.info: heimdal.texi $(heimdal_TEXINFOS) +heimdal.dvi: heimdal.texi $(heimdal_TEXINFOS) + + +DVIPS = dvips + +.texi.info: + @cd $(srcdir) && rm -f $@ $@-[0-9] $@-[0-9][0-9] + cd $(srcdir) \ + && $(MAKEINFO) `echo $< | sed 's,.*/,,'` + +.texi.dvi: + TEXINPUTS=.:$$TEXINPUTS \ + MAKEINFO='$(MAKEINFO) -I $(srcdir)' $(TEXI2DVI) $< + +.texi: + @cd $(srcdir) && rm -f $@ $@-[0-9] $@-[0-9][0-9] + cd $(srcdir) \ + && $(MAKEINFO) `echo $< | sed 's,.*/,,'` + +.texinfo.info: + @cd $(srcdir) && rm -f $@ $@-[0-9] $@-[0-9][0-9] + cd $(srcdir) \ + && $(MAKEINFO) `echo $< | sed 's,.*/,,'` + +.texinfo: + @cd $(srcdir) && rm -f $@ $@-[0-9] $@-[0-9][0-9] + cd $(srcdir) \ + && $(MAKEINFO) `echo $< | sed 's,.*/,,'` + +.texinfo.dvi: + TEXINPUTS=.:$$TEXINPUTS \ + MAKEINFO='$(MAKEINFO) -I $(srcdir)' $(TEXI2DVI) $< + +.txi.info: + @cd $(srcdir) && rm -f $@ $@-[0-9] $@-[0-9][0-9] + cd $(srcdir) \ + && $(MAKEINFO) `echo $< | sed 's,.*/,,'` + +.txi.dvi: + TEXINPUTS=.:$$TEXINPUTS \ + MAKEINFO='$(MAKEINFO) -I $(srcdir)' $(TEXI2DVI) $< + +.txi: + @cd $(srcdir) && rm -f $@ $@-[0-9] $@-[0-9][0-9] + cd $(srcdir) \ + && $(MAKEINFO) `echo $< | sed 's,.*/,,'` +.dvi.ps: + $(DVIPS) $< -o $@ + +install-info-am: $(INFO_DEPS) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(infodir) + @list='$(INFO_DEPS)'; \ + for file in $$list; do \ + d=$(srcdir); \ + for ifile in `cd $$d && echo $$file $$file-[0-9] $$file-[0-9][0-9]`; do \ + if test -f $$d/$$ifile; then \ + echo " $(INSTALL_DATA) $$d/$$ifile $(DESTDIR)$(infodir)/$$ifile"; \ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $$d/$$ifile $(DESTDIR)$(infodir)/$$ifile; \ + else : ; fi; \ + done; \ + done + @$(POST_INSTALL) + @if $(SHELL) -c 'install-info --version | sed 1q | fgrep -s -v -i debian' >/dev/null 2>&1; then \ + list='$(INFO_DEPS)'; \ + for file in $$list; do \ + echo " install-info --info-dir=$(DESTDIR)$(infodir) $(DESTDIR)$(infodir)/$$file";\ + install-info --info-dir=$(DESTDIR)$(infodir) $(DESTDIR)$(infodir)/$$file || :;\ + done; \ + else : ; fi + +uninstall-info: + $(PRE_UNINSTALL) + @if $(SHELL) -c 'install-info --version | sed 1q | fgrep -s -v -i debian' >/dev/null 2>&1; then \ + ii=yes; \ + else ii=; fi; \ + list='$(INFO_DEPS)'; \ + for file in $$list; do \ 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+.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/ack.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/ack.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfb03b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/ack.texi @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +@node Acknowledgments, , Windows 2000 compatability, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@appendix Acknowledgments + +Eric Young wrote ``libdes''. + +The University of California at Berkeley initially wrote @code{telnet}, +and @code{telnetd}. The authentication and encryption code of +@code{telnet} and @code{telnetd} was added by David Borman (then of Cray +Research, Inc). The encryption code was removed when this was exported +and then added back by Juha Eskelinen, @email{esc@@magic.fi}. + +The @code{popper} was also a Berkeley program initially. + +Some of the functions in @file{libroken} also come from Berkeley by way +of NetBSD/FreeBSD. + +@code{editline} was written by Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. + +Bugfixes, documentation, encouragement, and code has been contributed by: +@table @asis +@item Derrick J Brashear +@email{shadow@@dementia.org} +@item Ken Hornstein +@email{kenh@@cmf.nrl.navy.mil} +@item Johan Ihrén +@email{johani@@pdc.kth.se} +@item Love Hörnquist-Åstrand +@email{e96_lho@@e.kth.se} +@item Magnus Ahltorp +@email{map@@stacken.kth.se} +@item Mark Eichin +@email{eichin@@cygnus.com} +@item Marc Horowitz +@email{marc@@cygnus.com} +@item Luke Howard +@email{lukeh@@xedoc.com.au} +@item Brandon S. Allbery KF8NH +@email{allbery@@kf8nh.apk.net} +@item Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino +@email{itojun@@kame.net} +@item Daniel Kouril +@email{kouril@@informatics.muni.cz} +@item Åke Sandgren +@email{ake@@cs.umu.se} +@item Michal Vocu +@email{michal@@karlin.mff.cuni.cz} +@item Miroslav Ruda +@email{ruda@@ics.muni.cz} +@item Brian A May +@email{bmay@@snoopy.apana.org.au} +@item and we hope that those not mentioned here will forgive us. +@end table + +All bugs were introduced by ourselves. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/heimdal.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/heimdal.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cf1b3f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/heimdal.texi @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +\input texinfo @c -*- texinfo -*- +@c %**start of header +@c $Id: heimdal.texi,v 1.14 2000/01/02 04:09:00 assar Exp $ +@setfilename heimdal.info +@settitle HEIMDAL +@iftex +@afourpaper +@end iftex +@c some sensible characters, please? +@tex +\input latin1.tex +@end tex +@setchapternewpage on +@syncodeindex pg cp +@c %**end of header + +@c not yet @include version.texi +@set UPDATED $Date: 2000/01/02 04:09:00 $ +@set EDITION 0.0 +@set VERSION 0.2k + +@ifinfo +@dircategory Heimdal +@direntry +* Heimdal: (heimdal). The Kerberos 5 distribution from KTH +@end direntry +@end ifinfo + +@c title page +@titlepage +@title Heimdal +@subtitle Kerberos 5 from KTH +@subtitle Edition @value{EDITION}, for version @value{VERSION} +@subtitle 1999 +@author Johan Danielsson +@author Assar Westerlund +@author last updated @value{UPDATED} + +@def@copynext{@vskip 20pt plus 1fil@penalty-1000} +@def@copyrightstart{} +@def@copyrightend{} +@page +@copyrightstart +Copyright (c) 1997-2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +(Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +@copynext + +Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@@mincom.oz.au) +All rights reserved. + +This package is an DES implementation written by Eric Young (eay@@mincom.oz.au). +The implementation was written so as to conform with MIT's libdes. + +This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as +the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions +apply to all code found in this distribution. + +Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in +the code are not to be removed. +If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution +as the author of that the SSL library. This can be in the form of a textual +message at program startup or in documentation (online or textual) provided +with the package. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + This product includes software developed by Eric Young (eay@@mincom.oz.au) + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +@copynext + +Copyright (C) 1990 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + +Export of this software from the United States of America may +require a specific license from the United States Government. +It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating +export to obtain such a license before exporting. + +WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and +distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and +without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright +notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and +this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that +the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining +to distribution of the software without specific, written prior +permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of +this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express +or implied warranty. + +@copynext + +Copyright (c) 1988, 1990, 1993 + The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + This product includes software developed by the University of + California, Berkeley and its contributors. + +4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +SUCH DAMAGE. + +@copynext + +Copyright 1992 Simmule Turner and Rich Salz. All rights reserved. + +This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone +and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + +Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on +any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it freely, subject +to the following restrictions: + +1. The authors are not responsible for the consequences of use of this + software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + +2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by + explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, + credits must appear in the documentation. + +3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be + misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users + ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + +4. This notice may not be removed or altered. + +@copyrightend +@end titlepage + +@c Less filling! Tastes great! +@iftex +@parindent=0pt +@global@parskip 6pt plus 1pt +@global@chapheadingskip = 15pt plus 4pt minus 2pt +@global@secheadingskip = 12pt plus 3pt minus 2pt +@global@subsecheadingskip = 9pt plus 2pt minus 2pt +@end iftex +@ifinfo +@paragraphindent 0 +@end ifinfo + +@ifinfo +@node Top, Introduction, (dir), (dir) +@top Heimdal +@end ifinfo + +@menu +* Introduction:: +* What is Kerberos?:: +* Building and Installing:: +* Setting up a realm:: +* Things in search for a better place:: +* Kerberos 4 issues:: +* Windows 2000 compatability:: +* Acknowledgments:: + +@end menu + +@include intro.texi +@include whatis.texi +@include install.texi +@include setup.texi +@include misc.texi +@include kerberos4.texi +@include win2k.texi +@include ack.texi + +@c @shortcontents +@contents + +@bye diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/init-creds b/crypto/heimdal/doc/init-creds new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13667e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/init-creds @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +Currently, getting an initial ticket for a user involves many function +calls, especially when a full set of features including password +expiration and challenge preauthentication is desired. In order to +solve this problem, a new api is proposed. + +typedef struct _krb5_prompt { + char *prompt; + int hidden; + krb5_data *reply; +} krb5_prompt; + +typedef int (*krb5_prompter_fct)(krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]); + +typedef struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_deltat tkt_life; + krb5_deltat renew_life; + int forwardable; + int proxiable; + krb5_enctype *etype_list; + int etype_list_length; + krb5_address **address_list; + /* XXX the next three should not be used, as they may be + removed later */ + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list; + int preauth_list_length; + krb5_data *salt; +} krb5_get_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE 0x0001 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE 0x0002 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE 0x0004 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE 0x0008 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST 0x0010 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST 0x0020 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST 0x0040 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT 0x0080 + +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt); + +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat tkt_life); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat renew_life); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int forwardable); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int proxiable); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_enctype *etype_list, + int etype_list_length); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_address **addresses); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list, + int preauth_list_length); +void krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_data *salt); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_password(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_deltat start_time, + char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options); + +This function will attempt to acquire an initial ticket. The function +will perform whatever tasks are necessary to do so. This may include +changing an expired password, preauthentication. + +The arguments divide into two types. Some arguments are basically +invariant and arbitrary across all initial tickets, and if not +specified are determined by configuration or library defaults. Some +arguments are different for each execution or application, and if not +specified can be determined correctly from system configuration or +environment. The former arguments are contained in a structure whose +pointer is passed to the function. A bitmask specifies which elements +of the structure should be used. In most cases, a NULL pointer can be +used. The latter arguments are specified as individual arguments to +the function. + +If a pointer to a credential is specified, the initial credential is +filled in. If the caller only wishes to do a simple password check +and will not be doing any other kerberos functions, then a NULL +pointer may be specified, and the credential will be destroyed. + +If the client name is non-NULL, the initial ticket requested will be +for that principal. Otherwise, the principal will be the the username +specified by the USER environment variable, or if the USER environment +variable is not set, the username corresponding to the real user id of +the caller. + +If the password is non-NULL, then this string is used as the password. +Otherwise, the prompter function will be used to prompt the user for +the password. + +If a prompter function is non-NULL, it will be used if additional user +input is required, such as if the user's password has expired and +needs to be changed, or if input preauthentication is necessary. If +no function is specified and input is required, then the login will +fail. + + The context argument is the same as that passed to krb5_login. + The data argument is passed unmodified to the prompter + function and is intended to be used to pass application data + (such as a display handle) to the prompter function. + + The banner argument, if non-NULL, will indicate what sort of + input is expected from the user (for example, "Password has + expired and must be changed" or "Enter Activcard response for + challenge 012345678"), and should be displayed accordingly. + + The num_prompts argument indicates the number of values which + should be prompted for. If num_prompts == 0, then the banner + contains an informational message which should be displayed to + the user. + + The prompts argument contains an array describing the values + for which the user should be prompted. The prompt member + indicates the prompt for each value ("Enter new + password"/"Enter it again", or "Challenge response"). The + hidden member is nonzero if the response should not be + displayed back to the user. The reply member is a pointer to + krb5_data structure which has already been allocated. The + prompter should fill in the structure with the NUL-terminated + response from the user. + + If the response data does not fit, or if any other error + occurs, then the prompter function should return a non-zero + value which will be returned by the krb5_get_init_creds + function. Otherwise, zero should be returned. + + The library function krb5_prompter_posix() implements + a prompter using a posix terminal for user in. This function + does not use the data argument. + +If the start_time is zero, then the requested ticket will be valid +beginning immediately. Otherwise, the start_time indicates how far in +the future the ticket should be postdated. + +If the in_tkt_service name is non-NULL, that principal name will be +used as the server name for the initial ticket request. The realm of +the name specified will be ignored and will be set to the realm of the +client name. If no in_tkt_service name is specified, +krbtgt/CLIENT-REALM@CLIENT-REALM will be used. + +For the rest of arguments, a configuration or library default will be +used if no value is specified in the options structure. + +If a tkt_life is specified, that will be the lifetime of the ticket. +The library default is 10 hours; there is no configuration variable +(there should be, but it's not there now). + +If a renew_life is specified and non-zero, then the RENEWABLE option +on the ticket will be set, and the value of the argument will be the +the renewable lifetime. The configuration variable [libdefaults] +"renew_lifetime" is the renewable lifetime if none is passed in. The +library default is not to set the RENEWABLE option. + +If forwardable is specified, the FORWARDABLE option on the ticket will +be set if and only if forwardable is non-zero. The configuration +variable [libdefaults] "forwardable" is used if no value is passed in. +The option will be set if and only if the variable is "y", "yes", +"true", "t", "1", or "on", case insensitive. The library default is +not to set the FORWARDABLE option. + +If proxiable is specified, the PROXIABLE option on the ticket will be +set if and only if proxiable is non-zero. The configuration variable +[libdefaults] "proxiable" is used if no value is passed in. The +option will be set if and only if the variable is "y", "yes", "true", +"t", "1", or "on", case insensitive. The library default is not to +set the PROXIABLE option. + +If etype_list is specified, it will be used as the list of desired +encryption algorithms in the request. The configuration variable +[libdefaults] "default_tkt_enctypes" is used if no value is passed in. +The library default is "des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-crc". + +If address_list is specified, it will be used as the list of addresses +for which the ticket will be valid. The library default is to use all +local non-loopback addresses. There is no configuration variable. + +If preauth_list is specified, it names preauth data types which will +be included in the request. The library default is to interact with +the kdc to determine the required preauth types. There is no +configuration variable. + +If salt is specified, it specifies the salt which will be used when +converting the password to a key. The library default is to interact +with the kdc to determine the correct salt. There is no configuration +variable. + +================================================================ + +typedef struct _krb5_verify_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + int ap_req_nofail; +} krb5_verify_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL 0x0001 + +void krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_init_creds_opt *options); +void krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(krb5_init_creds_opt *options, + int ap_req_nofail); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_init_creds(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal ap_req_server, + krb5_keytab ap_req_keytab, + krb5_ccache *ccache, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options); + +This function will use the initial ticket in creds to make an AP_REQ +and verify it to insure that the AS_REP has not been spoofed. + +If the ap_req_server name is non-NULL, then this service name will be +used for the AP_REQ; otherwise, the default host key +(host/hostname.domain@LOCAL-REALM) will be used. + +If ap_req_keytab is non-NULL, the service key for the verification +will be read from that keytab; otherwise, the service key will be read +from the default keytab. + +If the service of the ticket in creds is the same as the service name +for the AP_REQ, then this ticket will be used directly. If the ticket +is a tgt, then it will be used to obtain credentials for the service. +Otherwise, the verification will fail, and return an error. + +Other failures of the AP_REQ verification may or may not be considered +errors, as described below. + +If a pointer to a credential cache handle is specified, and the handle +is NULL, a credential cache handle referring to all credentials +obtained in the course of verifying the user will be returned. In +order to avoid potential setuid race conditions and other problems +related to file system access, this handle will refer to a memory +credential cache. If the handle is non-NULL, then the credentials +will be added to the existing ccache. If the caller only wishes to +verify the password and will not be doing any other kerberos +functions, then a NULL pointer may be specified, and the credentials +will be deleted before the function returns. + +If ap_req_nofail is specified, then failures of the AP_REQ +verification are considered errors if and only if ap_req_nofail is +non-zero. + +Whether or not AP_REQ validation is performed and what failures mean +depends on these inputs: + + A) The appropriate keytab exists and contains the named key. + + B) An AP_REQ request to the kdc succeeds, and the resulting AP_REQ +can be decrypted and verified. + + C) The administrator has specified in a configuration file that +AP_REQ validation must succeed. This is basically a paranoid bit, and +can be overridden by the application based on a command line flag or +other application-specific info. This flag is especially useful if +the admin is concerned that DNS might be spoofed while determining the +host/FQDN name. The configuration variable [libdefaults] +"verify_ap_req_nofail" is used if no value is passed in. The library +default is not to set this option. + +Initial ticket verification will succeed if and only if: + + - A && B or + - !A && !C + +================================================================ + +For illustrative purposes, here's the invocations I expect some +programs will use. Of course, error checking needs to be added. + +kinit: + + /* Fill in client from the command line || existing ccache, and, + start_time, and options.{tkt_life,renew_life,forwardable,proxiable} + from the command line. Some or all may remain unset. */ + + krb5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_posix, NULL, + start_time, NULL, &options); + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, &creds); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + +login: + + krb5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_posix, NULL, + 0, NULL, NULL); + krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, &vcc, NULL); + /* setuid */ + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, &creds); + krb5_cc_copy(context, vcc, ccache); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, vcc); + +xdm: + + krb5_get_initial_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_xt, (void *) &xtstuff, + 0, NULL, NULL); + krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, &vcc, NULL); + /* setuid */ + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, &creds); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + krb5_cc_copy(context, vcc, ccache); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, vcc); + +passwd: + + krb5_init_creds_opt_init(&options); + krb5_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life = 300; + krb5_get_initial_creds(context, &creds, client, + krb5_initial_prompter_posix, NULL, + 0, "kadmin/changepw", &options); + /* change password */ + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + +pop3d (simple password validator when no user interation possible): + + krb5_get_initial_creds(context, &creds, client, + NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, &vcc, NULL); + krb5_cc_destroy(context, vcc); + +================================================================ + +password expiration has a subtlety. When a password expires and is +changed, there is a delay between when the master gets the new key +(immediately), and the slaves (propogation interval). So, when +getting an in_tkt, if the password is expired, the request should be +reissued to the master (this kind of sucks if you have SAM, oh well). +If this says expired, too, then the password should be changed, and +then the initial ticket request should be issued to the master again. +If the master times out, then a message that the password has expired +and cannot be changed due to the master being unreachable should be +displayed. + +================================================================ + +get_init_creds reads config stuff from: + +[libdefaults] + varname1 = defvalue + REALM = { + varname1 = value + varname2 = value + } + +typedef struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_deltat tkt_life; /* varname = "ticket_lifetime" */ + krb5_deltat renew_life; /* varname = "renew_lifetime" */ + int forwardable; /* varname = "forwardable" */ + int proxiable; /* varname = "proxiable" */ + krb5_enctype *etype_list; /* varname = "default_tkt_enctypes" */ + int etype_list_length; + krb5_address **address_list; /* no varname */ + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list; /* no varname */ + int preauth_list_length; + krb5_data *salt; +} krb5_get_init_creds_opt; + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/install.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/install.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d195a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/install.texi @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +@node Building and Installing, Setting up a realm, What is Kerberos?, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Building and Installing + +Heimdal uses GNU Autoconf to configure for specific hosts, and GNU +Automake to manage makefiles. If this is new to you, the short +instruction is to run the @code{configure} script in the top level +directory, and when that finishes @code{make}. + +If you want to build the distribution in a different directory from the +source directory, you will need a make that implements VPATH correctly, +such as GNU make. + +You will need to build the distribution: + +@itemize @bullet +@item +A compiler that supports a ``loose'' ANSI C mode, such as @code{gcc}. +@item +lex or flex +@item +awk +@item +yacc or bison +@item +a socket library +@item +NDBM or Berkeley DB for building the server side. +@end itemize + +When everything is built, you can install by doing @kbd{make +install}. The default location for installation is @file{/usr/heimdal}, +but this can be changed by running @code{configure} with +@samp{--prefix=/some/other/place}. + +If you need to change the default behavior, configure understands the +following options: + +@table @asis +@item @kbd{--without-berkeley-db} +DB is preferred before NDBM, but if you for some reason want to use NDBM +instead, you can use this option. + +@item @kbd{--with-krb4=@file{dir}} +Gives the location of Kerberos 4 libraries and headers. This enables +Kerberos 4 support in the applications (telnet, rsh, popper, etc) and +the KDC. It is automatically check for in @file{/usr/athena}. If you +keep libraries and headers in different places, you can instead give the +path to each with the @kbd{--with-krb4-lib=@file{dir}}, and +@kbd{--with-krb4-include=@file{dir}} options. + +You will need a fairly recent version of our Kerberos 4 distribution for +@code{rshd} and @code{popper} to support version 4 clients. + +@item @kbd{--enable-kaserver} +Enables experimental kaserver support in the KDC. This is the protocol +used by the ``KDC'' in AFS. Requires Kerberos 4 support. + +@item @kbd{--enable-kaserver-db} +Enables experimental support for reading kaserver databases in hprop. +This is useful when migrating from a kaserver to a Heimdal KDC. + +@item @kbd{--disable-otp} +By default some of the application programs will build with support for +one-time passwords (OTP). Use this option to disable that support. + +@item @kbd{--enable-osfc2} +Enable some C2 support for OSF/Digital Unix/Tru64. Use this option if +you are running your OSF operating system in C2 mode. + +@item @kbd{--with-readline=@file{dir}} +Gives the path for the GNU Readline library, which will be used in some +programs. If no readline library is found, the (simpler) editline +library will be used instead. + +@item @kbd{--with-hesiod=@file{dir}} +Enables hesiod support in push. + +@item @kbd{--enable-netinfo} +Add support for using netinfo to lookup configuration information. +Probably only useful (and working) on NextStep/Mac OS X. + +@item @kbd{--without-ipv6} +Disable the IPv6 support. + +@end table diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/intro.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/intro.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..518aada --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/intro.texi @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +@node Introduction, What is Kerberos?, Top, Top +@c @node Introduction, What is Kerberos?, Top, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Introduction + +@heading What is Heimdal? + +Heimdal is a free implementation of Kerberos 5. The goals are to: + +@itemize @bullet +@item +have an implementation that can be freely used by anyone +@item +be protocol compatible with existing implementations and, if not in +conflict, with RFC 1510 (and any future updated RFC) +@item +be reasonably compatible with the M.I.T Kerberos V5 API +@item +have support for Kerberos V5 over GSS-API (RFC1964) +@item +include the most important and useful application programs (rsh, telnet, +popper, etc.) +@item +include enough backwards compatibility with Kerberos V4 +@end itemize + +@heading Status + +Heimdal has the following features (this does not mean any of this +works): + +@itemize @bullet +@item +a stub generator and a library to encode/decode/whatever ASN.1/DER +stuff +@item +a @code{libkrb5} library that should be possible to get to work with +simple applications +@item +a GSS-API library that should have all the important functions for +building applications +@item +Eric Young's @file{libdes} +@item +@file{kinit}, @file{klist}, @file{kdestroy} +@item +@file{telnet}, @file{telnetd} +@item +@file{rsh}, @file{rshd} +@item +@file{popper}, @file{push} (a movemail equivalent) +@item +@file{ftp}, and @file{ftpd} +@item +a library @file{libkafs} for authenticating to AFS and a program +@file{afslog} that uses it +@item +some simple test programs +@item +a KDC that supports most things; optionally, it may also support +Kerberos V4 and kaserver, +@item +simple programs for distributing databases between a KDC master and +slaves +@item +a password changing daemon @file{kpasswdd}, library functions for +changing passwords and a simple client +@item +some kind of administration system +@item +Kerberos V4 support in many of the applications. +@end itemize + +@heading Bug reports + +If you find bugs in this software, make sure it is a genuine bug and not +just a part of the code that isn't implemented. + +Bug reports should be sent to @email{heimdal-bugs@@pdc.kth.se}. Please +include information on what machine and operating system (including +version) you are running, what you are trying to do, what happens, what +you think should have happened, an example for us to repeat, the output +you get when trying the example, and a patch for the problem if you have +one. Please make any patches with @code{diff -u} or @code{diff -c}. + +Suggestions, comments and other non bug reports are also welcome. + +@heading Mailing list + +There are two mailing lists with talk about +Heimdal. @email{heimdal-announce@@sics.se} is a low-volume announcement +list, while @email{heimdal-discuss@@sics.se} is for general discussion. +Send a message to @email{majordomo@@sics.se} to subscribe. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/kerberos4.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/kerberos4.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93671f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/kerberos4.texi @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +@node Kerberos 4 issues, Windows 2000 compatability, Things in search for a better place, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Kerberos 4 issues + +If compiled with version 4 support, the KDC can serve requests from a +Kerberos 4 client. There are a few things you must do for this to work. + +@menu +* Principal conversion issues:: +* Converting a version 4 database:: +@end menu + +@node Principal conversion issues, Converting a version 4 database, Kerberos 4 issues, Kerberos 4 issues +@section Principal conversion issues + +First, Kerberos 4 and Kerberos 5 principals are different. A version 4 +principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A version 5 +principal has one or more components, and a realm (the terms ``name'' +and ``instance'' are still used, for the first and second component, +respectively). Also, in some cases the name of a version 4 principal +differs from the first component of the corresponding version 5 +principal. One notable example is the ``host'' type principals, where +the version 4 name is @samp{rcmd} (for ``remote command''), and the +version 5 name is @samp{host}. For the class of principals that has a +hostname as instance, there is an other major difference, Kerberos 4 +uses only the first component of the hostname, whereas Kerberos 5 uses +the fully qualified hostname. + +Because of this it can be hard or impossible to correctly convert a +version 4 principal to a version 5 principal @footnote{the other way is +not always trivial either, but usually easier}. The biggest problem is +to know if the conversion resulted in a valid principal. To give an +example, suppose you want to convert the principal @samp{rcmd.foo}. + +The @samp{rcmd} name suggests that the instance is a hostname (even if +there are exceptions to this rule). To correctly convert the instance +@samp{foo} to a hostname, you have to know which host it is referring +to. You can to this by either guessing (from the realm) which domain +name to append, or you have to have a list of possible hostnames. In the +simplest cases you can cover most principals with the first rule. If you +have several domains sharing a single realm this will not usually +work. If the exceptions are few you can probably come by with a lookup +table for the exceptions. + +In a complex scenario you will need some kind of host lookup mechanism. +Using DNS for this is tempting, but DNS is error prone, slow and unsafe +@footnote{at least until secure DNS is commonly available}. + +Fortunately, the KDC has a trump on hand: it can easily tell if a +principal exists in the database. The KDC will use +@code{krb5_425_conv_principal_ext} to convert principals when handling +to version 4 requests. + +@node Converting a version 4 database, , Principal conversion issues, Kerberos 4 issues +@section Converting a version 4 database + +If you want to convert an existing version 4 database, the principal +conversion issue arises too. + +If you decide to convert your database once and for all, you will only +have to do this conversion once. It is also possible to run a version 5 +KDC as a slave to a version 4 KDC. In this case this conversion will +happen every time the database is propagated. When doing this +conversion, there are a few things to look out for. If you have stale +entries in the database, these entries will not be converted. This might +be because these principals are not used anymore, or it might be just +because the principal couldn't be converted. + +You might also see problems with a many-to-one mapping of +principals. For instance, if you are using DNS lookups and you have two +principals @samp{rcmd.foo} and @samp{rcmd.bar}, where `foo' is a CNAME +for `bar', the resulting principals will be the same. Since the +conversion function can't tell which is correct, these conflicts will +have to be resolved manually. + +@subsection Conversion example + +Given the following set of hosts and services: + +@example +foo.se rcmd +mail.foo.se rcmd, pop +ftp.bar.se rcmd, ftp +@end example + +you have a database that consists of the following principals: + +@samp{rcmd.foo}, @samp{rcmd.mail}, @samp{pop.mail}, @samp{rcmd.ftp}, and +@samp{ftp.ftp}. + +lets say you also got these extra principals: @samp{rcmd.gone}, +@samp{rcmd.old-mail}, where @samp{gone.foo.se} was a machine that has +now passed away, and @samp{old-mail.foo.se} was an old mail machine that +is now a CNAME for @samp{mail.foo.se}. + +When you convert this database you want the following conversions to be +done: +@example +rcmd.foo host/foo.se +rcmd.mail host/mail.foo.se +pop.mail pop/mail.foo.se +rcmd.ftp host/ftp.bar.se +ftp.ftp ftp/ftp.bar.se +rcmd.gone @i{removed} +rcmd.old-mail @i{removed} +@end example + +A @file{krb5.conf} that does this looks like: + +@example +[realms] + FOO.SE = @{ + v4_name_convert = @{ + host = @{ + ftp = ftp + pop = pop + rcmd = host + @} + @} + v4_instance_convert = @{ + foo = foo.se + ftp = ftp.bar.se + @} + default_domain = foo.se + @} +@end example + +The @samp{v4_name_convert} section says which names should be considered +having an instance consisting of a hostname, and it also says how the +names should be converted (for instance @samp{rcmd} should be converted +to @samp{host}). The @samp{v4_instance_convert} section says how a +hostname should be qualified (this is just a hosts-file in +disguise). Host-instances that aren't covered by +@samp{v4_instance_convert} are qualified by appending the contents of +the @samp{default_domain}. + +Actually, this example doesn't work. Or rather, it works to well. Since +it has no way of knowing which hostnames are valid and which are not, it +will happily convert @samp{rcmd.gone} to @samp{host/gone.foo.se}. This +isn't a big problem, but if you have run your kerberos realm for a few +years, chances are big that you have quite a few `junk' principals. + +If you don't want this you can remove the @samp{default_domain} +statement, but then you will have to add entries for @emph{all} your hosts +in the @samp{v4_instance_convert} section. + +Instead of doing this you can use DNS to convert instances. This is not +a solution without problems, but it is probably easier than adding lots +of static host entries. + +To enable DNS lookup you should turn on @samp{v4_instance_resolve} in +the @samp{[libdefaults]} section. + +@subsection Converting a database + +The database conversion is done with @samp{hprop}. Assuming that you +have the @samp{kadmin/hprop} key in the keytab @file{hprop.keytab}, you +can run this command to propagate the database to the machine called +@samp{slave-server} (which should be running a @samp{hpropd}). + +@example +hprop -4 -E -k hprop.keytab slave-server +@end example + +@section Version 4 Kadmin + +@samp{kadmind} can act as a version 4 kadmind, and you can do most +operations, but with some restrictions (since the version 4 kadmin +protocol is, lets say, very ad hoc.) One example is that it only passes +des keys when creating principals and changing passwords (modern kpasswd +clients do send the password, so it's possible to to password quality +checks). Because of this you can only create principals with des keys, +and you can't set any flags or do any other fancy stuff. + +To get this to work, you have to create a @samp{changepw/kerberos} +principal (if you are converting a version 4 data you should have this +principal), and add it to the keytab the @samp{kadmind} is using. You +then have to add another entry to inetd (since version 4 uses port 751, +not 749). + +@emph{And then there are a many more things you can do; more on this in +a later version of this manual. Until then, UTSL.} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/latin1.tex b/crypto/heimdal/doc/latin1.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e683dd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/latin1.tex @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +% ISO Latin 1 (ISO 8859/1) encoding for Computer Modern fonts. +% Jan Michael Rynning 1990-10-12 +\def\inmathmode#1{\relax\ifmmode#1\else$#1$\fi} +\global\catcode`\^^a0=\active \global\let^^a0=~ % no-break space +\global\catcode`\^^a1=\active \global\def^^a1{!`} % inverted exclamation mark +\global\catcode`\^^a2=\active \global\def^^a2{{\rm\rlap/c}} % cent sign +\global\catcode`\^^a3=\active \global\def^^a3{{\it\$}} % pound sign +% currency sign, yen sign, broken bar +\global\catcode`\^^a7=\active \global\let^^a7=\S % section sign +\global\catcode`\^^a8=\active \global\def^^a8{\"{}} % diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^a9=\active \global\let^^a9=\copyright % copyright sign +% feminine ordinal indicator, left angle quotation mark +\global\catcode`\^^ac=\active \global\def^^ac{\inmathmode\neg}% not sign +\global\catcode`\^^ad=\active \global\let^^ad=\- % soft hyphen +% registered trade mark sign +\global\catcode`\^^af=\active \global\def^^af{\={}} % macron +% ... +\global\catcode`\^^b1=\active \global\def^^b1{\inmathmode\pm} % plus minus +\global\catcode`\^^b2=\active \global\def^^b2{\inmathmode{{^2}}} +\global\catcode`\^^b3=\active \global\def^^b3{\inmathmode{{^3}}} +\global\catcode`\^^b4=\active \global\def^^b4{\'{}} % acute accent +\global\catcode`\^^b5=\active \global\def^^b5{\inmathmode\mu} % mu +\global\catcode`\^^b6=\active \global\let^^b6=\P % pilcroy +\global\catcode`\^^b7=\active \global\def^^b7{\inmathmode{{\cdot}}} +\global\catcode`\^^b8=\active \global\def^^b8{\c{}} % cedilla +\global\catcode`\^^b9=\active \global\def^^b9{\inmathmode{{^1}}} +% ... +\global\catcode`\^^bc=\active \global\def^^bc{\inmathmode{{1\over4}}} +\global\catcode`\^^bd=\active \global\def^^bd{\inmathmode{{1\over2}}} +\global\catcode`\^^be=\active \global\def^^be{\inmathmode{{3\over4}}} +\global\catcode`\^^bf=\active \global\def^^bf{?`} % inverted question mark +\global\catcode`\^^c0=\active \global\def^^c0{\`A} +\global\catcode`\^^c1=\active \global\def^^c1{\'A} +\global\catcode`\^^c2=\active \global\def^^c2{\^A} +\global\catcode`\^^c3=\active \global\def^^c3{\~A} +\global\catcode`\^^c4=\active \global\def^^c4{\"A} % capital a with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^c5=\active \global\let^^c5=\AA % capital a with ring above +\global\catcode`\^^c6=\active \global\let^^c6=\AE +\global\catcode`\^^c7=\active \global\def^^c7{\c C} +\global\catcode`\^^c8=\active \global\def^^c8{\`E} +\global\catcode`\^^c9=\active \global\def^^c9{\'E} +\global\catcode`\^^ca=\active \global\def^^ca{\^E} +\global\catcode`\^^cb=\active \global\def^^cb{\"E} +\global\catcode`\^^cc=\active \global\def^^cc{\`I} +\global\catcode`\^^cd=\active \global\def^^cd{\'I} +\global\catcode`\^^ce=\active \global\def^^ce{\^I} +\global\catcode`\^^cf=\active \global\def^^cf{\"I} +% capital eth +\global\catcode`\^^d1=\active \global\def^^d1{\~N} +\global\catcode`\^^d2=\active \global\def^^d2{\`O} +\global\catcode`\^^d3=\active \global\def^^d3{\'O} +\global\catcode`\^^d4=\active \global\def^^d4{\^O} +\global\catcode`\^^d5=\active \global\def^^d5{\~O} +\global\catcode`\^^d6=\active \global\def^^d6{\"O} % capital o with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^d7=\active \global\def^^d7{\inmathmode\times}% multiplication sign +\global\catcode`\^^d8=\active \global\let^^d8=\O +\global\catcode`\^^d9=\active \global\def^^d9{\`U} +\global\catcode`\^^da=\active \global\def^^da{\'U} +\global\catcode`\^^db=\active \global\def^^db{\^U} +\global\catcode`\^^dc=\active \global\def^^dc{\"U} +\global\catcode`\^^dd=\active \global\def^^dd{\'Y} +% capital thorn +\global\catcode`\^^df=\active \global\def^^df{\ss} +\global\catcode`\^^e0=\active \global\def^^e0{\`a} +\global\catcode`\^^e1=\active \global\def^^e1{\'a} +\global\catcode`\^^e2=\active \global\def^^e2{\^a} +\global\catcode`\^^e3=\active \global\def^^e3{\~a} +\global\catcode`\^^e4=\active \global\def^^e4{\"a} % small a with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^e5=\active \global\let^^e5=\aa % small a with ring above +\global\catcode`\^^e6=\active \global\let^^e6=\ae +\global\catcode`\^^e7=\active \global\def^^e7{\c c} +\global\catcode`\^^e8=\active \global\def^^e8{\`e} +\global\catcode`\^^e9=\active \global\def^^e9{\'e} +\global\catcode`\^^ea=\active \global\def^^ea{\^e} +\global\catcode`\^^eb=\active \global\def^^eb{\"e} +\global\catcode`\^^ec=\active \global\def^^ec{\`\i} +\global\catcode`\^^ed=\active \global\def^^ed{\'\i} +\global\catcode`\^^ee=\active \global\def^^ee{\^\i} +\global\catcode`\^^ef=\active \global\def^^ef{\"\i} +% small eth +\global\catcode`\^^f1=\active \global\def^^f1{\~n} +\global\catcode`\^^f2=\active \global\def^^f2{\`o} +\global\catcode`\^^f3=\active \global\def^^f3{\'o} +\global\catcode`\^^f4=\active \global\def^^f4{\^o} +\global\catcode`\^^f5=\active \global\def^^f5{\~o} +\global\catcode`\^^f6=\active \global\def^^f6{\"o} % small o with diaeresis +\global\catcode`\^^f7=\active \global\def^^f7{\inmathmode\div}% division sign +\global\catcode`\^^f8=\active \global\let^^f8=\o +\global\catcode`\^^f9=\active \global\def^^f9{\`u} +\global\catcode`\^^fa=\active \global\def^^fa{\'u} +\global\catcode`\^^fb=\active \global\def^^fb{\^u} +\global\catcode`\^^fc=\active \global\def^^fc{\"u} +\global\catcode`\^^fd=\active \global\def^^fd{\'y} +% capital thorn +\global\catcode`\^^ff=\active \global\def^^ff{\"y} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/layman.asc b/crypto/heimdal/doc/layman.asc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4fbe64 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/layman.asc @@ -0,0 +1,1855 @@ +A Layman's Guide to a Subset of ASN.1, BER, and DER + +An RSA Laboratories Technical Note +Burton S. Kaliski Jr. +Revised November 1, 1993 + + +Supersedes June 3, 1991 version, which was also published as +NIST/OSI Implementors' Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-17. +PKCS documents are available by electronic mail to +. + +Copyright (C) 1991-1993 RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA +Data Security, Inc. License to copy this document is granted +provided that it is identified as "RSA Data Security, Inc. +Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)" in all material +mentioning or referencing this document. +003-903015-110-000-000 + + +Abstract. This note gives a layman's introduction to a +subset of OSI's Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), Basic +Encoding Rules (BER), and Distinguished Encoding Rules +(DER). The particular purpose of this note is to provide +background material sufficient for understanding and +implementing the PKCS family of standards. + + +1. Introduction + +It is a generally accepted design principle that abstraction +is a key to managing software development. With abstraction, +a designer can specify a part of a system without concern +for how the part is actually implemented or represented. +Such a practice leaves the implementation open; it +simplifies the specification; and it makes it possible to +state "axioms" about the part that can be proved when the +part is implemented, and assumed when the part is employed +in another, higher-level part. Abstraction is the hallmark +of most modern software specifications. + +One of the most complex systems today, and one that also +involves a great deal of abstraction, is Open Systems +Interconnection (OSI, described in X.200). OSI is an +internationally standardized architecture that governs the +interconnection of computers from the physical layer up to +the user application layer. Objects at higher layers are +defined abstractly and intended to be implemented with +objects at lower layers. For instance, a service at one +layer may require transfer of certain abstract objects +between computers; a lower layer may provide transfer +services for strings of ones and zeroes, using encoding +rules to transform the abstract objects into such strings. +OSI is called an open system because it supports many +different implementations of the services at each layer. + +OSI's method of specifying abstract objects is called ASN.1 +(Abstract Syntax Notation One, defined in X.208), and one +set of rules for representing such objects as strings of +ones and zeros is called the BER (Basic Encoding Rules, +defined in X.209). ASN.1 is a flexible notation that allows +one to define a variety data types, from simple types such +as integers and bit strings to structured types such as sets +and sequences, as well as complex types defined in terms of +others. BER describes how to represent or encode values of +each ASN.1 type as a string of eight-bit octets. There is +generally more than one way to BER-encode a given value. +Another set of rules, called the Distinguished Encoding +Rules (DER), which is a subset of BER, gives a unique +encoding to each ASN.1 value. + +The purpose of this note is to describe a subset of ASN.1, +BER and DER sufficient to understand and implement one OSI- +based application, RSA Data Security, Inc.'s Public-Key +Cryptography Standards. The features described include an +overview of ASN.1, BER, and DER and an abridged list of +ASN.1 types and their BER and DER encodings. Sections 2-4 +give an overview of ASN.1, BER, and DER, in that order. +Section 5 lists some ASN.1 types, giving their notation, +specific encoding rules, examples, and comments about their +application to PKCS. Section 6 concludes with an example, +X.500 distinguished names. + +Advanced features of ASN.1, such as macros, are not +described in this note, as they are not needed to implement +PKCS. For information on the other features, and for more +detail generally, the reader is referred to CCITT +Recommendations X.208 and X.209, which define ASN.1 and BER. + +Terminology and notation. In this note, an octet is an eight- +bit unsigned integer. Bit 8 of the octet is the most +significant and bit 1 is the least significant. + +The following meta-syntax is used for in describing ASN.1 +notation: + + BIT monospace denotes literal characters in the type + and value notation; in examples, it generally + denotes an octet value in hexadecimal + + n1 bold italics denotes a variable + + [] bold square brackets indicate that a term is + optional + + {} bold braces group related terms + + | bold vertical bar delimits alternatives with a + group + + ... bold ellipsis indicates repeated occurrences + + = bold equals sign expresses terms as subterms + + +2. Abstract Syntax Notation One + +Abstract Syntax Notation One, abbreviated ASN.1, is a +notation for describing abstract types and values. + +In ASN.1, a type is a set of values. For some types, there +are a finite number of values, and for other types there are +an infinite number. A value of a given ASN.1 type is an +element of the type's set. ASN.1 has four kinds of type: +simple types, which are "atomic" and have no components; +structured types, which have components; tagged types, which +are derived from other types; and other types, which include +the CHOICE type and the ANY type. Types and values can be +given names with the ASN.1 assignment operator (::=) , and +those names can be used in defining other types and values. + +Every ASN.1 type other than CHOICE and ANY has a tag, which +consists of a class and a nonnegative tag number. ASN.1 +types are abstractly the same if and only if their tag +numbers are the same. In other words, the name of an ASN.1 +type does not affect its abstract meaning, only the tag +does. There are four classes of tag: + + Universal, for types whose meaning is the same in all + applications; these types are only defined in + X.208. + + Application, for types whose meaning is specific to an + application, such as X.500 directory services; + types in two different applications may have the + same application-specific tag and different + meanings. + + Private, for types whose meaning is specific to a given + enterprise. + + Context-specific, for types whose meaning is specific + to a given structured type; context-specific tags + are used to distinguish between component types + with the same underlying tag within the context of + a given structured type, and component types in + two different structured types may have the same + tag and different meanings. + +The types with universal tags are defined in X.208, which +also gives the types' universal tag numbers. Types with +other tags are defined in many places, and are always +obtained by implicit or explicit tagging (see Section 2.3). +Table 1 lists some ASN.1 types and their universal-class +tags. + + Type Tag number Tag number + (decimal) (hexadecimal) + INTEGER 2 02 + BIT STRING 3 03 + OCTET STRING 4 04 + NULL 5 05 + OBJECT IDENTIFIER 6 06 + SEQUENCE and SEQUENCE OF 16 10 + SET and SET OF 17 11 + PrintableString 19 13 + T61String 20 14 + IA5String 22 16 + UTCTime 23 17 + + Table 1. Some types and their universal-class tags. + +ASN.1 types and values are expressed in a flexible, +programming-language-like notation, with the following +special rules: + + o Layout is not significant; multiple spaces and + line breaks can be considered as a single space. + + o Comments are delimited by pairs of hyphens (--), + or a pair of hyphens and a line break. + + o Identifiers (names of values and fields) and type + references (names of types) consist of upper- and + lower-case letters, digits, hyphens, and spaces; + identifiers begin with lower-case letters; type + references begin with upper-case letters. + +The following four subsections give an overview of simple +types, structured types, implicitly and explicitly tagged +types, and other types. Section 5 describes specific types +in more detail. + + +2.1 Simple types + +Simple types are those not consisting of components; they +are the "atomic" types. ASN.1 defines several; the types +that are relevant to the PKCS standards are the following: + + BIT STRING, an arbitrary string of bits (ones and + zeroes). + + IA5String, an arbitrary string of IA5 (ASCII) + characters. + + INTEGER, an arbitrary integer. + + NULL, a null value. + + OBJECT IDENTIFIER, an object identifier, which is a + sequence of integer components that identify an + object such as an algorithm or attribute type. + + OCTET STRING, an arbitrary string of octets (eight-bit + values). + + PrintableString, an arbitrary string of printable + characters. + + T61String, an arbitrary string of T.61 (eight-bit) + characters. + + UTCTime, a "coordinated universal time" or Greenwich + Mean Time (GMT) value. + +Simple types fall into two categories: string types and non- +string types. BIT STRING, IA5String, OCTET STRING, +PrintableString, T61String, and UTCTime are string types. + +String types can be viewed, for the purposes of encoding, as +consisting of components, where the components are +substrings. This view allows one to encode a value whose +length is not known in advance (e.g., an octet string value +input from a file stream) with a constructed, indefinite- +length encoding (see Section 3). + +The string types can be given size constraints limiting the +length of values. + + +2.2 Structured types + +Structured types are those consisting of components. ASN.1 +defines four, all of which are relevant to the PKCS +standards: + + SEQUENCE, an ordered collection of one or more types. + + SEQUENCE OF, an ordered collection of zero or more + occurrences of a given type. + + SET, an unordered collection of one or more types. + + SET OF, an unordered collection of zero or more + occurrences of a given type. + +The structured types can have optional components, possibly +with default values. + + +2.3 Implicitly and explicitly tagged types + +Tagging is useful to distinguish types within an +application; it is also commonly used to distinguish +component types within a structured type. For instance, +optional components of a SET or SEQUENCE type are typically +given distinct context-specific tags to avoid ambiguity. + +There are two ways to tag a type: implicitly and explicitly. + +Implicitly tagged types are derived from other types by +changing the tag of the underlying type. Implicit tagging is +denoted by the ASN.1 keywords [class number] IMPLICIT (see +Section 5.1). + +Explicitly tagged types are derived from other types by +adding an outer tag to the underlying type. In effect, +explicitly tagged types are structured types consisting of +one component, the underlying type. Explicit tagging is +denoted by the ASN.1 keywords [class number] EXPLICIT (see +Section 5.2). + +The keyword [class number] alone is the same as explicit +tagging, except when the "module" in which the ASN.1 type is +defined has implicit tagging by default. ("Modules" are +among the advanced features not described in this note.) + +For purposes of encoding, an implicitly tagged type is +considered the same as the underlying type, except that the +tag is different. An explicitly tagged type is considered +like a structured type with one component, the underlying +type. Implicit tags result in shorter encodings, but +explicit tags may be necessary to avoid ambiguity if the tag +of the underlying type is indeterminate (e.g., the +underlying type is CHOICE or ANY). + + +2.4 Other types + +Other types in ASN.1 include the CHOICE and ANY types. The +CHOICE type denotes a union of one or more alternatives; the +ANY type denotes an arbitrary value of an arbitrary type, +where the arbitrary type is possibly defined in the +registration of an object identifier or integer value. + + +3. Basic Encoding Rules + +The Basic Encoding Rules for ASN.1, abbreviated BER, give +one or more ways to represent any ASN.1 value as an octet +string. (There are certainly other ways to represent ASN.1 +values, but BER is the standard for interchanging such +values in OSI.) + +There are three methods to encode an ASN.1 value under BER, +the choice of which depends on the type of value and whether +the length of the value is known. The three methods are +primitive, definite-length encoding; constructed, definite- +length encoding; and constructed, indefinite-length +encoding. Simple non-string types employ the primitive, +definite-length method; structured types employ either of +the constructed methods; and simple string types employ any +of the methods, depending on whether the length of the value +is known. Types derived by implicit tagging employ the +method of the underlying type and types derived by explicit +tagging employ the constructed methods. + +In each method, the BER encoding has three or four parts: + + Identifier octets. These identify the class and tag + number of the ASN.1 value, and indicate whether + the method is primitive or constructed. + + Length octets. For the definite-length methods, these + give the number of contents octets. For the + constructed, indefinite-length method, these + indicate that the length is indefinite. + + Contents octets. For the primitive, definite-length + method, these give a concrete representation of + the value. For the constructed methods, these + give the concatenation of the BER encodings of the + components of the value. + + End-of-contents octets. For the constructed, indefinite- + length method, these denote the end of the + contents. For the other methods, these are absent. + +The three methods of encoding are described in the following +sections. + + +3.1 Primitive, definite-length method + +This method applies to simple types and types derived from +simple types by implicit tagging. It requires that the +length of the value be known in advance. The parts of the +BER encoding are as follows: + +Identifier octets. There are two forms: low tag number (for +tag numbers between 0 and 30) and high tag number (for tag +numbers 31 and greater). + + Low-tag-number form. One octet. Bits 8 and 7 specify + the class (see Table 2), bit 6 has value "0," + indicating that the encoding is primitive, and + bits 5-1 give the tag number. + + Class Bit Bit + 8 7 + universal 0 0 + application 0 1 + context-specific 1 0 + private 1 1 + + Table 2. Class encoding in identifier octets. + + High-tag-number form. Two or more octets. First octet + is as in low-tag-number form, except that bits 5-1 + all have value "1." Second and following octets + give the tag number, base 128, most significant + digit first, with as few digits as possible, and + with the bit 8 of each octet except the last set + to "1." + +Length octets. There are two forms: short (for lengths +between 0 and 127), and long definite (for lengths between 0 +and 21008-1). + + Short form. One octet. Bit 8 has value "0" and bits 7-1 + give the length. + + Long form. Two to 127 octets. Bit 8 of first octet has + value "1" and bits 7-1 give the number of + additional length octets. Second and following + octets give the length, base 256, most significant + digit first. + +Contents octets. These give a concrete representation of the +value (or the value of the underlying type, if the type is +derived by implicit tagging). Details for particular types +are given in Section 5. + + +3.2 Constructed, definite-length method + +This method applies to simple string types, structured +types, types derived simple string types and structured +types by implicit tagging, and types derived from anything +by explicit tagging. It requires that the length of the +value be known in advance. The parts of the BER encoding are +as follows: + +Identifier octets. As described in Section 3.1, except that +bit 6 has value "1," indicating that the encoding is +constructed. + +Length octets. As described in Section 3.1. + +Contents octets. The concatenation of the BER encodings of +the components of the value: + + o For simple string types and types derived from + them by implicit tagging, the concatenation of the + BER encodings of consecutive substrings of the + value (underlying value for implicit tagging). + + o For structured types and types derived from them + by implicit tagging, the concatenation of the BER + encodings of components of the value (underlying + value for implicit tagging). + + o For types derived from anything by explicit + tagging, the BER encoding of the underlying value. + +Details for particular types are given in Section 5. + + +3.3 Constructed, indefinite-length method + +This method applies to simple string types, structured +types, types derived simple string types and structured +types by implicit tagging, and types derived from anything +by explicit tagging. It does not require that the length of +the value be known in advance. The parts of the BER encoding +are as follows: + +Identifier octets. As described in Section 3.2. + +Length octets. One octet, 80. + +Contents octets. As described in Section 3.2. + +End-of-contents octets. Two octets, 00 00. + +Since the end-of-contents octets appear where an ordinary +BER encoding might be expected (e.g., in the contents octets +of a sequence value), the 00 and 00 appear as identifier and +length octets, respectively. Thus the end-of-contents octets +is really the primitive, definite-length encoding of a value +with universal class, tag number 0, and length 0. + + +4. Distinguished Encoding Rules + +The Distinguished Encoding Rules for ASN.1, abbreviated DER, +are a subset of BER, and give exactly one way to represent +any ASN.1 value as an octet string. DER is intended for +applications in which a unique octet string encoding is +needed, as is the case when a digital signature is computed +on an ASN.1 value. DER is defined in Section 8.7 of X.509. + +DER adds the following restrictions to the rules given in +Section 3: + + 1. When the length is between 0 and 127, the short + form of length must be used + + 2. When the length is 128 or greater, the long form + of length must be used, and the length must be + encoded in the minimum number of octets. + + 3. For simple string types and implicitly tagged + types derived from simple string types, the + primitive, definite-length method must be + employed. + + 4. For structured types, implicitly tagged types + derived from structured types, and explicitly + tagged types derived from anything, the + constructed, definite-length method must be + employed. + +Other restrictions are defined for particular types (such as +BIT STRING, SEQUENCE, SET, and SET OF), and can be found in +Section 5. + + +5. Notation and encodings for some types + +This section gives the notation for some ASN.1 types and +describes how to encode values of those types under both BER +and DER. + +The types described are those presented in Section 2. They +are listed alphabetically here. + +Each description includes ASN.1 notation, BER encoding, and +DER encoding. The focus of the encodings is primarily on the +contents octets; the tag and length octets follow Sections 3 +and 4. The descriptions also explain where each type is used +in PKCS and related standards. ASN.1 notation is generally +only for types, although for the type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, +value notation is given as well. + + +5.1 Implicitly tagged types + +An implicitly tagged type is a type derived from another +type by changing the tag of the underlying type. + +Implicit tagging is used for optional SEQUENCE components +with underlying type other than ANY throughout PKCS, and for +the extendedCertificate alternative of PKCS #7's +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +[[class] number] IMPLICIT Type + +class = UNIVERSAL | APPLICATION | PRIVATE + +where Type is a type, class is an optional class name, and +number is the tag number within the class, a nonnegative +integer. + +In ASN.1 "modules" whose default tagging method is implicit +tagging, the notation [[class] number] Type is also +acceptable, and the keyword IMPLICIT is implied. (See +Section 2.3.) For definitions stated outside a module, the +explicit inclusion of the keyword IMPLICIT is preferable to +prevent ambiguity. + +If the class name is absent, then the tag is context- +specific. Context-specific tags can only appear in a +component of a structured or CHOICE type. + +Example: PKCS #8's PrivateKeyInfo type has an optional +attributes component with an implicit, context-specific tag: + +PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version Version, + privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + privateKey PrivateKey, + attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } + +Here the underlying type is Attributes, the class is absent +(i.e., context-specific), and the tag number within the +class is 0. + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed, depending on the +underlying type. Contents octets are as for the BER encoding +of the underlying value. + +Example: The BER encoding of the attributes component of a +PrivateKeyInfo value is as follows: + + o the identifier octets are 80 if the underlying + Attributes value has a primitive BER encoding and + a0 if the underlying Attributes value has a + constructed BER encoding + + o the length and contents octets are the same as the + length and contents octets of the BER encoding of + the underlying Attributes value + +DER encoding. Primitive or constructed, depending on the +underlying type. Contents octets are as for the DER encoding +of the underlying value. + + +5.2 Explicitly tagged types + +Explicit tagging denotes a type derived from another type by +adding an outer tag to the underlying type. + +Explicit tagging is used for optional SEQUENCE components +with underlying type ANY throughout PKCS, and for the +version component of X.509's Certificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +[[class] number] EXPLICIT Type + +class = UNIVERSAL | APPLICATION | PRIVATE + +where Type is a type, class is an optional class name, and +number is the tag number within the class, a nonnegative +integer. + +If the class name is absent, then the tag is context- +specific. Context-specific tags can only appear in a +component of a SEQUENCE, SET or CHOICE type. + +In ASN.1 "modules" whose default tagging method is explicit +tagging, the notation [[class] number] Type is also +acceptable, and the keyword EXPLICIT is implied. (See +Section 2.3.) For definitions stated outside a module, the +explicit inclusion of the keyword EXPLICIT is preferable to +prevent ambiguity. + +Example 1: PKCS #7's ContentInfo type has an optional +content component with an explicit, context-specific tag: + +ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + contentType ContentType, + content + [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } + +Here the underlying type is ANY DEFINED BY contentType, the +class is absent (i.e., context-specific), and the tag number +within the class is 0. + +Example 2: X.509's Certificate type has a version component +with an explicit, context-specific tag, where the EXPLICIT +keyword is omitted: + +Certificate ::= ... + version [0] Version DEFAULT v1988, +... + +The tag is explicit because the default tagging method for +the ASN.1 "module" in X.509 that defines the Certificate +type is explicit tagging. + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the BER +encoding of the underlying value. + +Example: the BER encoding of the content component of a +ContentInfo value is as follows: + + o identifier octets are a0 + + o length octets represent the length of the BER + encoding of the underlying ANY DEFINED BY + contentType value + + o contents octets are the BER encoding of the + underlying ANY DEFINED BY contentType value + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the DER +encoding of the underlying value. + + +5.3 ANY + +The ANY type denotes an arbitrary value of an arbitrary +type, where the arbitrary type is possibly defined in the +registration of an object identifier or associated with an +integer index. + +The ANY type is used for content of a particular content +type in PKCS #7's ContentInfo type, for parameters of a +particular algorithm in X.509's AlgorithmIdentifier type, +and for attribute values in X.501's Attribute and +AttributeValueAssertion types. The Attribute type is used by +PKCS #6, #7, #8, #9 and #10, and the AttributeValueAssertion +type is used in X.501 distinguished names. + +ASN.1 notation: + +ANY [DEFINED BY identifier] + +where identifier is an optional identifier. + +In the ANY form, the actual type is indeterminate. + +The ANY DEFINED BY identifier form can only appear in a +component of a SEQUENCE or SET type for which identifier +identifies some other component, and that other component +has type INTEGER or OBJECT IDENTIFIER (or a type derived +from either of those by tagging). In that form, the actual +type is determined by the value of the other component, +either in the registration of the object identifier value, +or in a table of integer values. + +Example: X.509's AlgorithmIdentifier type has a component of +type ANY: + +AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + +Here the actual type of the parameter component depends on +the value of the algorithm component. The actual type would +be defined in the registration of object identifier values +for the algorithm component. + +BER encoding. Same as the BER encoding of the actual value. + +Example: The BER encoding of the value of the parameter +component is the BER encoding of the value of the actual +type as defined in the registration of object identifier +values for the algorithm component. + +DER encoding. Same as the DER encoding of the actual value. + + +5.4 BIT STRING + +The BIT STRING type denotes an arbitrary string of bits +(ones and zeroes). A BIT STRING value can have any length, +including zero. This type is a string type. + +The BIT STRING type is used for digital signatures on +extended certificates in PKCS #6's ExtendedCertificate type, +for digital signatures on certificates in X.509's +Certificate type, and for public keys in certificates in +X.509's SubjectPublicKeyInfo type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +BIT STRING + +Example: X.509's SubjectPublicKeyInfo type has a component +of type BIT STRING: + +SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + publicKey BIT STRING } + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the first contents octet gives the number of bits +by which the length of the bit string is less than the next +multiple of eight (this is called the "number of unused +bits"). The second and following contents octets give the +value of the bit string, converted to an octet string. The +conversion process is as follows: + + 1. The bit string is padded after the last bit with + zero to seven bits of any value to make the length + of the bit string a multiple of eight. If the + length of the bit string is a multiple of eight + already, no padding is done. + + 2. The padded bit string is divided into octets. The + first eight bits of the padded bit string become + the first octet, bit 8 to bit 1, and so on through + the last eight bits of the padded bit string. + +In a constructed encoding, the contents octets give the +concatenation of the BER encodings of consecutive substrings +of the bit string, where each substring except the last has +a length that is a multiple of eight bits. + +Example: The BER encoding of the BIT STRING value +"011011100101110111" can be any of the following, among +others, depending on the choice of padding bits, the form of +length octets, and whether the encoding is primitive or +constructed: + +03 04 06 6e 5d c0 DER encoding + +03 04 06 6e 5d e0 padded with "100000" + +03 81 04 06 6e 5d c0 long form of length octets + +23 09 constructed encoding: "0110111001011101" + "11" + 03 03 00 6e 5d + 03 02 06 c0 + +DER encoding. Primitive. The contents octects are as for a +primitive BER encoding, except that the bit string is padded +with zero-valued bits. + +Example: The DER encoding of the BIT STRING value +"011011100101110111" is + +03 04 06 6e 5d c0 + + +5.5 CHOICE + +The CHOICE type denotes a union of one or more alternatives. + +The CHOICE type is used to represent the union of an +extended certificate and an X.509 certificate in PKCS #7's +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +CHOICE { + [identifier1] Type1, + ..., + [identifiern] Typen } + +where identifier1 , ..., identifiern are optional, distinct +identifiers for the alternatives, and Type1, ..., Typen are +the types of the alternatives. The identifiers are primarily +for documentation; they do not affect values of the type or +their encodings in any way. + +The types must have distinct tags. This requirement is +typically satisfied with explicit or implicit tagging on +some of the alternatives. + +Example: PKCS #7's ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate type is +a CHOICE type: + +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { + certificate Certificate, -- X.509 + extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate +} + +Here the identifiers for the alternatives are certificate +and extendedCertificate, and the types of the alternatives +are Certificate and [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate. + +BER encoding. Same as the BER encoding of the chosen +alternative. The fact that the alternatives have distinct +tags makes it possible to distinguish between their BER +encodings. + +Example: The identifier octets for the BER encoding are 30 +if the chosen alternative is certificate, and a0 if the +chosen alternative is extendedCertificate. + +DER encoding. Same as the DER encoding of the chosen +alternative. + + +5.6 IA5String + +The IA5String type denotes an arbtrary string of IA5 +characters. IA5 stands for International Alphabet 5, which +is the same as ASCII. The character set includes non- +printing control characters. An IA5String value can have any +length, including zero. This type is a string type. + +The IA5String type is used in PKCS #9's electronic-mail +address, unstructured-name, and unstructured-address +attributes. + +ASN.1 notation: + +IA5String + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the IA5 +string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed encoding, the +contents octets give the concatenation of the BER encodings +of consecutive substrings of the IA5 string. + +Example: The BER encoding of the IA5String value +"test1@rsa.com" can be any of the following, among others, +depending on the form of length octets and whether the +encoding is primitive or constructed: + +16 0d 74 65 73 74 31 40 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d DER encoding + +16 81 0d long form of length octets + 74 65 73 74 31 40 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d + +36 13 constructed encoding: "test1" + "@" + "rsa.com" + 16 05 74 65 73 74 31 + 16 01 40 + 16 07 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The DER encoding of the IA5String value +"test1@rsa.com" is + +16 0d 74 65 73 74 31 40 72 73 61 2e 63 6f 6d + + +5.7 INTEGER + +The INTEGER type denotes an arbitrary integer. INTEGER +values can be positive, negative, or zero, and can have any +magnitude. + +The INTEGER type is used for version numbers throughout +PKCS, cryptographic values such as modulus, exponent, and +primes in PKCS #1's RSAPublicKey and RSAPrivateKey types and +PKCS #3's DHParameter type, a message-digest iteration count +in PKCS #5's PBEParameter type, and version numbers and +serial numbers in X.509's Certificate type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +INTEGER [{ identifier1(value1) ... identifiern(valuen) }] + +where identifier1, ..., identifiern are optional distinct +identifiers and value1, ..., valuen are optional integer +values. The identifiers, when present, are associated with +values of the type. + +Example: X.509's Version type is an INTEGER type with +identified values: + +Version ::= INTEGER { v1988(0) } + +The identifier v1988 is associated with the value 0. X.509's +Certificate type uses the identifier v1988 to give a default +value of 0 for the version component: + +Certificate ::= ... + version Version DEFAULT v1988, +... + +BER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets give the value of +the integer, base 256, in two's complement form, most +significant digit first, with the minimum number of octets. +The value 0 is encoded as a single 00 octet. + +Some example BER encodings (which also happen to be DER +encodings) are given in Table 3. + + Integer BER encoding + value + 0 02 01 00 + 127 02 01 7F + 128 02 02 00 80 + 256 02 02 01 00 + -128 02 01 80 + -129 02 02 FF 7F + + Table 3. Example BER encodings of INTEGER values. + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + + +5.8 NULL + +The NULL type denotes a null value. + +The NULL type is used for algorithm parameters in several +places in PKCS. + +ASN.1 notation: + +NULL + +BER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are empty. + +Example: The BER encoding of a NULL value can be either of +the following, as well as others, depending on the form of +the length octets: + +05 00 + +05 81 00 + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are empty; the DER +encoding of a NULL value is always 05 00. + + +5.9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER + +The OBJECT IDENTIFIER type denotes an object identifier, a +sequence of integer components that identifies an object +such as an algorithm, an attribute type, or perhaps a +registration authority that defines other object +identifiers. An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value can have any number +of components, and components can generally have any +nonnegative value. This type is a non-string type. + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER values are given meanings by registration +authorities. Each registration authority is responsible for +all sequences of components beginning with a given sequence. +A registration authority typically delegates responsibility +for subsets of the sequences in its domain to other +registration authorities, or for particular types of object. +There are always at least two components. + +The OBJECT IDENTIFIER type is used to identify content in +PKCS #7's ContentInfo type, to identify algorithms in +X.509's AlgorithmIdentifier type, and to identify attributes +in X.501's Attribute and AttributeValueAssertion types. The +Attribute type is used by PKCS #6, #7, #8, #9, and #10, and +the AttributeValueAssertion type is used in X.501 +distinguished names. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values are defined +throughout PKCS. + +ASN.1 notation: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER + +The ASN.1 notation for values of the OBJECT IDENTIFIER type +is + +{ [identifier] component1 ... componentn } + +componenti = identifieri | identifieri (valuei) | valuei + +where identifier, identifier1, ..., identifiern are +identifiers, and value1, ..., valuen are optional integer +values. + +The form without identifier is the "complete" value with all +its components; the form with identifier abbreviates the +beginning components with another object identifier value. +The identifiers identifier1, ..., identifiern are intended +primarily for documentation, but they must correspond to the +integer value when both are present. These identifiers can +appear without integer values only if they are among a small +set of identifiers defined in X.208. + +Example: The following values both refer to the object +identifier assigned to RSA Data Security, Inc.: + +{ iso(1) member-body(2) 840 113549 } +{ 1 2 840 113549 } + +(In this example, which gives ASN.1 value notation, the +object identifier values are decimal, not hexadecimal.) +Table 4 gives some other object identifier values and their +meanings. + + Object identifier value Meaning + { 1 2 } ISO member bodies + { 1 2 840 } US (ANSI) + { 1 2 840 113549 } RSA Data Security, Inc. + { 1 2 840 113549 1 } RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS + { 2 5 } directory services (X.500) + { 2 5 8 } directory services-algorithms + + Table 4. Some object identifier values and their meanings. + +BER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as follows, +where value1, ..., valuen denote the integer values of the +components in the complete object identifier: + + 1. The first octet has value 40 * value1 + value2. + (This is unambiguous, since value1 is limited to + values 0, 1, and 2; value2 is limited to the range + 0 to 39 when value1 is 0 or 1; and, according to + X.208, n is always at least 2.) + + 2. The following octets, if any, encode value3, ..., + valuen. Each value is encoded base 128, most + significant digit first, with as few digits as + possible, and the most significant bit of each + octet except the last in the value's encoding set + to "1." + +Example: The first octet of the BER encoding of RSA Data +Security, Inc.'s object identifier is 40 * 1 + 2 = 42 = +2a16. The encoding of 840 = 6 * 128 + 4816 is 86 48 and the +encoding of 113549 = 6 * 1282 + 7716 * 128 + d16 is 86 f7 +0d. This leads to the following BER encoding: + +06 06 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + + +5.10 OCTET STRING + +The OCTET STRING type denotes an arbitrary string of octets +(eight-bit values). An OCTET STRING value can have any +length, including zero. This type is a string type. + +The OCTET STRING type is used for salt values in PKCS #5's +PBEParameter type, for message digests, encrypted message +digests, and encrypted content in PKCS #7, and for private +keys and encrypted private keys in PKCS #8. + +ASN.1 notation: + +OCTET STRING [SIZE ({size | size1..size2})] + +where size, size1, and size2 are optional size constraints. +In the OCTET STRING SIZE (size) form, the octet string must +have size octets. In the OCTET STRING SIZE (size1..size2) +form, the octet string must have between size1 and size2 +octets. In the OCTET STRING form, the octet string can have +any size. + +Example: PKCS #5's PBEParameter type has a component of type +OCTET STRING: + +PBEParameter ::= SEQUENCE { + salt OCTET STRING SIZE(8), + iterationCount INTEGER } + +Here the size of the salt component is always eight octets. + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the value of the octet +string, first octet to last octet. In a constructed +encoding, the contents octets give the concatenation of the +BER encodings of substrings of the OCTET STRING value. + +Example: The BER encoding of the OCTET STRING value 01 23 45 +67 89 ab cd ef can be any of the following, among others, +depending on the form of length octets and whether the +encoding is primitive or constructed: + +04 08 01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef DER encoding + +04 81 08 01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef long form of length octets + +24 0c constructed encoding: 01 ... 67 + 89 ... ef + 04 04 01 23 45 67 + 04 04 89 ab cd ef + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The BER encoding of the OCTET STRING value 01 23 45 +67 89 ab cd ef is + +04 08 01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef + + +5.11 PrintableString + +The PrintableString type denotes an arbitrary string of +printable characters from the following character set: + + A, B, ..., Z + a, b, ..., z + 0, 1, ..., 9 + (space) ' ( ) + , - . / : = ? + +This type is a string type. + +The PrintableString type is used in PKCS #9's challenge- +password and unstructuerd-address attributes, and in several +X.521 distinguished names attributes. + +ASN.1 notation: + +PrintableString + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the +printable string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed +encoding, the contents octets give the concatenation of the +BER encodings of consecutive substrings of the string. + +Example: The BER encoding of the PrintableString value "Test +User 1" can be any of the following, among others, depending +on the form of length octets and whether the encoding is +primitive or constructed: + +13 0b 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 DER encoding + +13 81 0b long form of length octets + 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + +33 0f constructed encoding: "Test " + "User 1" + 13 05 54 65 73 74 20 + 13 06 55 73 65 72 20 31 + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The DER encoding of the PrintableString value "Test +User 1" is + +13 0b 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + + +5.12 SEQUENCE + +The SEQUENCE type denotes an ordered collection of one or +more types. + +The SEQUENCE type is used throughout PKCS and related +standards. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SEQUENCE { + [identifier1] Type1 [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT value1}], + ..., + [identifiern] Typen [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT valuen}]} + +where identifier1 , ..., identifiern are optional, distinct +identifiers for the components, Type1, ..., Typen are the +types of the components, and value1, ..., valuen are optional +default values for the components. The identifiers are +primarily for documentation; they do not affect values of +the type or their encodings in any way. + +The OPTIONAL qualifier indicates that the value of a +component is optional and need not be present in the +sequence. The DEFAULT qualifier also indicates that the +value of a component is optional, and assigns a default +value to the component when the component is absent. + +The types of any consecutive series of components with the +OPTIONAL or DEFAULT qualifier, as well as of any component +immediately following that series, must have distinct tags. +This requirement is typically satisfied with explicit or +implicit tagging on some of the components. + +Example: X.509's Validity type is a SEQUENCE type with two +components: + +Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + start UTCTime, + end UTCTime } + +Here the identifiers for the components are start and end, +and the types of the components are both UTCTime. + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +components of the sequence, in order of definition, with the +following rules for components with the OPTIONAL and DEFAULT +qualifiers: + + o if the value of a component with the OPTIONAL or + DEFAULT qualifier is absent from the sequence, + then the encoding of that component is not + included in the contents octets + + o if the value of a component with the DEFAULT + qualifier is the default value, then the encoding + of that component may or may not be included in + the contents octets + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the same as +the BER encoding, except that if the value of a component +with the DEFAULT qualifier is the default value, the +encoding of that component is not included in the contents +octets. + + +5.13 SEQUENCE OF + +The SEQUENCE OF type denotes an ordered collection of zero +or more occurrences of a given type. + +The SEQUENCE OF type is used in X.501 distinguished names. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SEQUENCE OF Type + +where Type is a type. + +Example: X.501's RDNSequence type consists of zero or more +occurences of the RelativeDistinguishedName type, most +significant occurrence first: + +RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +occurrences in the collection, in order of occurence. + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the DER encodings of the values of the +occurrences in the collection, in order of occurence. + + +5.14 SET + +The SET type denotes an unordered collection of one or more +types. + +The SET type is not used in PKCS. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SET { + [identifier1] Type1 [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT value1}], + ..., + [identifiern] Typen [{OPTIONAL | DEFAULT valuen}]} + +where identifier1, ..., identifiern are optional, distinct +identifiers for the components, Type1, ..., Typen are the +types of the components, and value1, ..., valuen are +optional default values for the components. The identifiers +are primarily for documentation; they do not affect values +of the type or their encodings in any way. + +The OPTIONAL qualifier indicates that the value of a +component is optional and need not be present in the set. +The DEFAULT qualifier also indicates that the value of a +component is optional, and assigns a default value to the +component when the component is absent. + +The types must have distinct tags. This requirement is +typically satisfied with explicit or implicit tagging on +some of the components. + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +components of the set, in any order, with the following +rules for components with the OPTIONAL and DEFAULT +qualifiers: + + o if the value of a component with the OPTIONAL or + DEFAULT qualifier is absent from the set, then the + encoding of that component is not included in the + contents octets + + o if the value of a component with the DEFAULT + qualifier is the default value, then the encoding + of that component may or may not be included in + the contents octets + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the same as +for the BER encoding, except that: + + 1. If the value of a component with the DEFAULT + qualifier is the default value, the encoding of + that component is not included. + + 2. There is an order to the components, namely + ascending order by tag. + + +5.15 SET OF + +The SET OF type denotes an unordered collection of zero or +more occurrences of a given type. + +The SET OF type is used for sets of attributes in PKCS #6, +#7, #8, #9 and #10, for sets of message-digest algorithm +identifiers, signer information, and recipient information +in PKCS #7, and in X.501 distinguished names. + +ASN.1 notation: + +SET OF Type + +where Type is a type. + +Example: X.501's RelativeDistinguishedName type consists of +zero or more occurrences of the AttributeValueAssertion +type, where the order is unimportant: + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + SET OF AttributeValueAssertion + +BER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the +concatenation of the BER encodings of the values of the +occurrences in the collection, in any order. + +DER encoding. Constructed. Contents octets are the same as +for the BER encoding, except that there is an order, namely +ascending lexicographic order of BER encoding. Lexicographic +comparison of two different BER encodings is done as +follows: Logically pad the shorter BER encoding after the +last octet with dummy octets that are smaller in value than +any normal octet. Scan the BER encodings from left to right +until a difference is found. The smaller-valued BER encoding +is the one with the smaller-valued octet at the point of +difference. + + +5.16 T61String + +The T61String type denotes an arbtrary string of T.61 +characters. T.61 is an eight-bit extension to the ASCII +character set. Special "escape" sequences specify the +interpretation of subsequent character values as, for +example, Japanese; the initial interpretation is Latin. The +character set includes non-printing control characters. The +T61String type allows only the Latin and Japanese character +interepretations, and implementors' agreements for directory +names exclude control characters [NIST92]. A T61String value +can have any length, including zero. This type is a string +type. + +The T61String type is used in PKCS #9's unstructured-address +and challenge-password attributes, and in several X.521 +attributes. + +ASN.1 notation: + +T61String + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the +T.61 string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed encoding, +the contents octets give the concatenation of the BER +encodings of consecutive substrings of the T.61 string. + +Example: The BER encoding of the T61String value "cl'es +publiques" (French for "public keys") can be any of the +following, among others, depending on the form of length +octets and whether the encoding is primitive or constructed: + +14 0f DER encoding + 63 6c c2 65 73 20 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + +14 81 0f long form of length octets + 63 6c c2 65 73 20 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + +34 15 constructed encoding: "cl'es" + " " + "publiques" + 14 05 63 6c c2 65 73 + 14 01 20 + 14 09 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + +The eight-bit character c2 is a T.61 prefix that adds an +acute accent (') to the next character. + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + +Example: The DER encoding of the T61String value "cl'es +publiques" is + +14 0f 63 6c c2 65 73 20 70 75 62 6c 69 71 75 65 73 + + +5.17 UTCTime + +The UTCTime type denotes a "coordinated universal time" or +Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) value. A UTCTime value includes +the local time precise to either minutes or seconds, and an +offset from GMT in hours and minutes. It takes any of the +following forms: + +YYMMDDhhmmZ +YYMMDDhhmm+hh'mm' +YYMMDDhhmm-hh'mm' +YYMMDDhhmmssZ +YYMMDDhhmmss+hh'mm' +YYMMDDhhmmss-hh'mm' + +where: + + YY is the least significant two digits of the year + + MM is the month (01 to 12) + + DD is the day (01 to 31) + + hh is the hour (00 to 23) + + mm are the minutes (00 to 59) + + ss are the seconds (00 to 59) + + Z indicates that local time is GMT, + indicates that + local time is later than GMT, and - indicates that + local time is earlier than GMT + + hh' is the absolute value of the offset from GMT in + hours + + mm' is the absolute value of the offset from GMT in + minutes + +This type is a string type. + +The UTCTime type is used for signing times in PKCS #9's +signing-time attribute and for certificate validity periods +in X.509's Validity type. + +ASN.1 notation: + +UTCTime + +BER encoding. Primitive or constructed. In a primitive +encoding, the contents octets give the characters in the +string, encoded in ASCII. In a constructed encoding, the +contents octets give the concatenation of the BER encodings +of consecutive substrings of the string. (The constructed +encoding is not particularly interesting, since UTCTime +values are so short, but the constructed encoding is +permitted.) + +Example: The time this sentence was originally written was +4:45:40 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time on May 6, 1991, which can +be represented with either of the following UTCTime values, +among others: + +"910506164540-0700" + +"910506234540Z" + +These values have the following BER encodings, among others: + +17 0d 39 31 30 35 30 36 32 33 34 35 34 30 5a + +17 11 39 31 30 35 30 36 31 36 34 35 34 30 2D 30 37 30 + 30 + +DER encoding. Primitive. Contents octets are as for a +primitive BER encoding. + + +6. An example + +This section gives an example of ASN.1 notation and DER +encoding: the X.501 type Name. + + +6.1 Abstract notation + +This section gives the ASN.1 notation for the X.501 type +Name. + +Name ::= CHOICE { + RDNSequence } + +RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + SET OF AttributeValueAssertion + +AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE { + AttributeType, + AttributeValue } + +AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + +AttributeValue ::= ANY + +The Name type identifies an object in an X.500 directory. +Name is a CHOICE type consisting of one alternative: +RDNSequence. (Future revisions of X.500 may have other +alternatives.) + +The RDNSequence type gives a path through an X.500 directory +tree starting at the root. RDNSequence is a SEQUENCE OF type +consisting of zero or more occurences of +RelativeDistinguishedName. + +The RelativeDistinguishedName type gives a unique name to an +object relative to the object superior to it in the +directory tree. RelativeDistinguishedName is a SET OF type +consisting of zero or more occurrences of +AttributeValueAssertion. + +The AttributeValueAssertion type assigns a value to some +attribute of a relative distinguished name, such as country +name or common name. AttributeValueAssertion is a SEQUENCE +type consisting of two components, an AttributeType type and +an AttributeValue type. + +The AttributeType type identifies an attribute by object +identifier. The AttributeValue type gives an arbitrary +attribute value. The actual type of the attribute value is +determined by the attribute type. + + +6.2 DER encoding + +This section gives an example of a DER encoding of a value +of type Name, working from the bottom up. + +The name is that of the Test User 1 from the PKCS examples +[Kal93]. The name is represented by the following path: + + (root) + | + countryName = "US" + | + organizationName = "Example Organization" + | + commonName = "Test User 1" + +Each level corresponds to one RelativeDistinguishedName +value, each of which happens for this name to consist of one +AttributeValueAssertion value. The AttributeType value is +before the equals sign, and the AttributeValue value (a +printable string for the given attribute types) is after the +equals sign. + +The countryName, organizationName, and commonUnitName are +attribute types defined in X.520 as: + +attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4 } + +countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { attributeType 6 } +organizationName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { attributeType 10 } +commonUnitName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= + { attributeType 3 } + + +6.2.1 AttributeType + +The three AttributeType values are OCTET STRING values, so +their DER encoding follows the primitive, definite-length +method: + +06 03 55 04 06 countryName + +06 03 55 04 0a organizationName + +06 03 55 04 03 commonName + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag form, since the tag +is 6 for OBJECT IDENTIFIER. Bits 8 and 7 have value "0," +indicating universal class, and bit 6 has value "0," +indicating that the encoding is primitive. The length octets +follow the short form. The contents octets are the +concatenation of three octet strings derived from +subidentifiers (in decimal): 40 * 2 + 5 = 85 = 5516; 4; and +6, 10, or 3. + + +6.2.2 AttributeValue + +The three AttributeValue values are PrintableString values, +so their encodings follow the primitive, definite-length +method: + +13 02 55 53 "US" + +13 14 "Example Organization" + 45 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 20 4f 72 67 61 6e 69 7a 61 + 74 69 6f 6e + +13 0b "Test User 1" + 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for PrintableString, 19 (decimal), is between 0 and +30. Bits 8 and 7 have value "0" since PrintableString is in +the universal class. Bit 6 has value "0" since the encoding +is primitive. The length octets follow the short form, and +the contents octets are the ASCII representation of the +attribute value. + + +6.2.3 AttributeValueAssertion + +The three AttributeValueAssertion values are SEQUENCE +values, so their DER encodings follow the constructed, +definite-length method: + +30 09 countryName = "US" + 06 03 55 04 06 + 13 02 55 53 + +30 1b organizationName = "Example Organizaiton" + 06 03 55 04 0a + 13 14 ... 6f 6e + +30 12 commonName = "Test User 1" + 06 03 55 04 0b + 13 0b ... 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for SEQUENCE, 16 (decimal), is between 0 and 30. +Bits 8 and 7 have value "0" since SEQUENCE is in the +universal class. Bit 6 has value "1" since the encoding is +constructed. The length octets follow the short form, and +the contents octets are the concatenation of the DER +encodings of the attributeType and attributeValue +components. + + +6.2.4 RelativeDistinguishedName + +The three RelativeDistinguishedName values are SET OF +values, so their DER encodings follow the constructed, +definite-length method: + +31 0b + 30 09 ... 55 53 + +31 1d + 30 1b ... 6f 6e + +31 14 + 30 12 ... 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for SET OF, 17 (decimal), is between 0 and 30. Bits +8 and 7 have value "0" since SET OF is in the universal +class Bit 6 has value "1" since the encoding is constructed. +The lengths octets follow the short form, and the contents +octets are the DER encodings of the respective +AttributeValueAssertion values, since there is only one +value in each set. + + +6.2.5 RDNSequence + +The RDNSequence value is a SEQUENCE OF value, so its DER +encoding follows the constructed, definite-length method: + +30 42 + 31 0b ... 55 53 + 31 1d ... 6f 6e + 31 14 ... 20 31 + +The identifier octets follow the low-tag-number form, since +the tag for SEQUENCE OF, 16 (decimal), is between 0 and 30. +Bits 8 and 7 have value "0" since SEQUENCE OF is in the +universal class. Bit 6 has value "1" since the encoding is +constructed. The lengths octets follow the short form, and +the contents octets are the concatenation of the DER +encodings of the three RelativeDistinguishedName values, in +order of occurrence. + + +6.2.6 Name + +The Name value is a CHOICE value, so its DER encoding is the +same as that of the RDNSequence value: + +30 42 + 31 0b + 30 09 + 06 03 55 04 06 attributeType = countryName + 13 02 55 53 attributeValue = "US" + 31 1d + 30 1b + 06 03 55 04 0a attributeType = organizationName + 13 14 attributeValue = "Example Organization" + 45 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 20 4f 72 67 61 6e 69 7a 61 + 74 69 6f 6e + + 31 14 + 30 12 + 06 03 55 04 03 attributeType = commonName + 13 0b attributeValue = "Test User 1" + 54 65 73 74 20 55 73 65 72 20 31 + + +References + +PKCS #1 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1: RSA Encryption + Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #3 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key- + Agreement Standard. Version 1.4, November 1993. + +PKCS #5 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #5: Password-Based + Encryption Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #6 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate + Syntax Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #7 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message + Syntax Standard. Version 1.5, November 1993. + +PKCS #8 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information + Syntax Standard. Version 1.2, November 1993. + +PKCS #9 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #9: Selected Attribute + Types. Version 1.1, November 1993. + +PKCS #10 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #10: Certification Request + Syntax Standard. Version 1.0, November 1993. + +X.200 CCITT. Recommendation X.200: Reference Model of + Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT + Applications. 1984. + +X.208 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of + Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. + +X.209 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of + Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1). 1988. + +X.500 CCITT. Recommendation X.500: The + Directory--Overview of Concepts, Models and + Services. 1988. + +X.501 CCITT. Recommendation X.501: The Directory-- + Models. 1988. + +X.509 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory-- + Authentication Framework. 1988. + +X.520 CCITT. Recommendation X.520: The Directory-- + Selected Attribute Types. 1988. + +[Kal93] Burton S. Kaliski Jr. Some Examples of the PKCS + Standards. RSA Laboratories, November 1993. + +[NIST92] NIST. Special Publication 500-202: Stable + Implementation Agreements for Open Systems + Interconnection Protocols. Part 11 (Directory + Services Protocols). December 1992. + + +Revision history + + +June 3, 1991 version + +The June 3, 1991 version is part of the initial public +release of PKCS. It was published as NIST/OSI Implementors' +Workshop document SEC-SIG-91-17. + + +November 1, 1993 version + +The November 1, 1993 version incorporates several editorial +changes, including the addition of a revision history. It is +updated to be consistent with the following versions of the +PKCS documents: + + PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard. Version 1.5, November + 1993. + + PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard. Version + 1.4, November 1993. + + PKCS #5: Password-Based Encryption Standard. Version + 1.5, November 1993. + + PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard. Version + 1.5, November 1993. + + PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard. Version + 1.5, November 1993. + + PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Standard. + Version 1.2, November 1993. + + PKCS #9: Selected Attribute Types. Version 1.1, + November 1993. + + PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Standard. + Version 1.0, November 1993. + +The following substantive changes were made: + + Section 5: Description of T61String type is added. + + Section 6: Names are changed, consistent with other + PKCS examples. + + +Author's address + +Burton S. Kaliski Jr., Ph.D. +Chief Scientist +RSA Laboratories (415) 595-7703 +100 Marine Parkway (415) 595-4126 (fax) +Redwood City, CA 94065 USA burt@rsa.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/mdate-sh b/crypto/heimdal/doc/mdate-sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..37171f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/mdate-sh @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Get modification time of a file or directory and pretty-print it. +# Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# written by Ulrich Drepper , June 1995 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) +# any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +# GNU General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, +# Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. + +# Prevent date giving response in another language. +LANG=C +export LANG +LC_ALL=C +export LC_ALL +LC_TIME=C +export LC_TIME + +# Get the extended ls output of the file or directory. +# On HPUX /bin/sh, "set" interprets "-rw-r--r--" as options, so the "x" below. +if ls -L /dev/null 1>/dev/null 2>&1; then + set - x`ls -L -l -d $1` +else + set - x`ls -l -d $1` +fi +# The month is at least the fourth argument +# (3 shifts here, the next inside the loop). +shift +shift +shift + +# Find the month. Next argument is day, followed by the year or time. +month= +until test $month +do + shift + case $1 in + Jan) month=January; nummonth=1;; + Feb) month=February; nummonth=2;; + Mar) month=March; nummonth=3;; + Apr) month=April; nummonth=4;; + May) month=May; nummonth=5;; + Jun) month=June; nummonth=6;; + Jul) month=July; nummonth=7;; + Aug) month=August; nummonth=8;; + Sep) month=September; nummonth=9;; + Oct) month=October; nummonth=10;; + Nov) month=November; nummonth=11;; + Dec) month=December; nummonth=12;; + esac +done + +day=$2 + +# Here we have to deal with the problem that the ls output gives either +# the time of day or the year. +case $3 in + *:*) set `date`; eval year=\$$# + case $2 in + Jan) nummonthtod=1;; + Feb) nummonthtod=2;; + Mar) nummonthtod=3;; + Apr) nummonthtod=4;; + May) nummonthtod=5;; + Jun) nummonthtod=6;; + Jul) nummonthtod=7;; + Aug) nummonthtod=8;; + Sep) nummonthtod=9;; + Oct) nummonthtod=10;; + Nov) nummonthtod=11;; + Dec) nummonthtod=12;; + esac + # For the first six month of the year the time notation can also + # be used for files modified in the last year. + if (expr $nummonth \> $nummonthtod) > /dev/null; + then + year=`expr $year - 1` + fi;; + *) year=$3;; +esac + +# The result. +echo $day $month $year diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/misc.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/misc.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e926536 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/misc.texi @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +@node Things in search for a better place, Kerberos 4 issues, Setting up a realm, Top +@chapter Things in search for a better place + +@section Making things work on Ciscos + +Modern versions of Cisco IOS has some support for authenticating via +Kerberos 5. This can be used both to verify passwords via a ticket +exchange Kerberos 5 (boring), and to use Kerberos authenticated telnet +to access your router (less boring). The following has been tested on +IOS 11.2(12), things might be different with other versions. Old +versions are known to have bugs. + +To make this work, you will first have to configure your router to use +Kerberos (this is explained in the documentation). A sample +configuration looks like the following: + +@example +aaa new-model +aaa authentication login default krb5-telnet krb5 enable +aaa authorization exec krb5-instance +kerberos local-realm FOO.SE +kerberos srvtab entry host/router.foo.se 0 891725446 4 1 8 012345678901234567 +kerberos server FOO.SE 10.0.0.1 +kerberos instance map admin 15 +@end example + +This tells you (among other things) that the when logging in, the router +should try to authenticate with kerberized telnet, and if that fails try +to verify a plain text password via a Kerberos ticket exchange (as +opposed to a local database or RADIUS or something similar), and if that +fails try the local enable password. If you're not careful when you +specify the `login default' authentication mechanism, you might not be +able to login. The `instance map' and `authorization exec' lines says +that people with `admin' instances should be given `enabled' shells when +logging in. + +To make the Heimdal KDC produce tickets that the Cisco can decode you +might have to turn on the @samp{encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep} flag in the +KDC. You will also have to specify that the router can't handle anything +but @samp{des-cbc-crc}. There currently isn't an easy way to do +this. The best you can do is to dump your database (with @samp{kadmin -l +dump}), remove all entries for keys other than @samp{des-cbc-crc}, and +then reloading the database (@samp{kadmin -l load}). An example should +clarify this. You should have something like (again, truncated): +@example +host/router.foo.se@@FOO.SE 4:0:1:...:-:... - - - - - - - 126 +@end example +Change this to: +@example +host/router.foo.se@@FOO.SE 4:0:1:...:- - - - - - - - 126 +@end example + +This all fine and so, but unless you have an IOS version with encryption +(available only in the U.S) it doesn't really solve any problems. Sure +you don't have to send your password over the wire, but since the telnet +connection isn't protected it's still possible for someone to steal your +session. This won't be fixed until someone adds integrity to the telnet +protocol. + +A working solution would be to hook up a machine with a real operating +system to the console of the Cisco and then use it as a backwards +terminal server. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/setup.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/setup.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a43eb7e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/setup.texi @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +@node Setting up a realm, Things in search for a better place, Building and Installing, Top +@chapter Setting up a realm + +A +@cindex realm +realm is an administrative domain. The name of a Kerberos realm is +usually the Internet domain name in uppercase. Call your realm the same +as your Internet domain name if you do not have strong reasons for not +doing so. It will make life easier for you and everyone else. + +@section Configuration file + +To setup a realm you will first have to create a configuration file: +@file{/etc/krb5.conf}. The @file{krb5.conf} file can contain many +configuration options, some of which are described here. + +There is a sample @file{krb5.conf} supplied with the distribution. + +The configuration file is a hierarchical structure consisting of +sections, each containing a list of bindings (either variable +assignments or subsections). A section starts with +@samp{[section-name]}. A binding consists of a left hand side, an equal +(@samp{=}) and a right hand side (the left hand side tag must be +separated from the equal with some whitespace.) Subsections has a +@samp{@{} as the first non-whitespace character after the equal. All +other bindings are treated as variable assignments. The value of a +variable extends to the end of the line. + +@example +[section1] + a-subsection = @{ + var = value1 + other-var = value with @{@} + sub-sub-section = @{ + var = 123 + @} + @} + var = some other value +[section2] + var = yet another value +@end example + +In this manual, names of sections and bindings will be given as strings +separated by slashes (@samp{/}). The @samp{other-var} variable will thus +be @samp{section1/a-subsection/other-var}. + +For in-depth information about the contents of the config file, refer to +the @file{krb5.conf} manual page. Some of the more important sections +are briefly described here. + +The @samp{libdefaults} section contains a list of library configuration +parameters, such as the default realm and the timeout for kdc +responses. The @samp{realms} section contains information about specific +realms, such as where they hide their KDC. This section serves the same +purpose as the Kerberos 4 @file{krb.conf} file, but can contain more +information. Finally the @samp{domain_realm} section contains a list of +mappings from domains to realms, equivalent to the Kerberos 4 +@file{krb.realms} file. + +To continue with the realm setup, you will have to create a config file, +with contents similar to the following. + +@example +[libdefaults] + default_realm = MY.REALM +[realms] + MY.REALM = @{ + kdc = my.kdc + @} +[domain_realm] + .my.domain = MY.REALM + +@end example + +If you use a realm name equal to your domain name, you can omit the +@samp{libdefaults}, and @samp{domain_realm}, sections. If you have a +SRV-record for your realm, or your kerberos server has CNAME called +@samp{kerberos.my.realm}, you can omit the @samp{realms} section too. + +@section Creating the database + +The database library will look for the database in @file{/var/heimdal}, +so you should probably create that directory. + +The keys of all the principals are stored in the database. If you +choose to, these can be encrypted with a master key. You do not have to +remember this key (or password), but just to enter it once and it will +be stored in a file (@file{/var/heimdal/m-key}). If you want to have a +master key, run @samp{kstash} to create this master key: + +@example +# kstash +Master key: +Verifying password - Master key: +@end example + +To initialise the database use the @code{kadmin} program, with the +@samp{-l} option (to enable local database mode). First issue a +@kbd{init MY.REALM} command. This will create the database and insert +default principals for that realm. You can have more than one realm in +one database, so @samp{init} does not destroy any old database. + +Before creating the database, @samp{init} will ask you some questions +about max ticket lifetimes. + +After creating the database you should probably add yourself to it. You +do this with the @samp{add} command. It takes as argument the name of a +principal. The principal should contain a realm, so if you haven't setup +a default realm, you will need to explicitly include the realm. + +@example +# kadmin -l +kadmin> init MY.REALM +Realm max ticket life [unlimited]: +Realm max renewable ticket life [unlimited]: +kadmin> add me +Max ticket life [unlimited]: +Max renewable life [unlimited]: +Attributes []: +Password: +Verifying password - Password: +@end example + +Now start the KDC and try getting a ticket. + +@example +# kdc & +# kinit me +me@@MY.REALMS's Password: +# klist +Credentials cache: /tmp/krb5cc_0 + Principal: me@@MY.REALM + + Issued Expires Principal +Aug 25 07:25:55 Aug 25 17:25:55 krbtgt/MY.REALM@@MY.REALM +@end example + +If you are curious you can use the @samp{dump} command to list all the +entries in the database. It should look something similar to the +following example (note that the entries here are truncated for +typographical reasons): + +@smallexample +kadmin> dump +me@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:0b01d3cb7c293b57:-:0:7:8aec316b9d1629e3baf8 ... +kadmin/admin@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:e5c8a2675b37a443:-:0:7:cb913ebf85 ... +krbtgt/MY.REALM@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:52b53b61c875ce16:-:0:7:c8943be ... +kadmin/changepw@@MY.REALM 1:0:1:f48c8af2b340e9fb:-:0:7:e3e6088 ... +@end smallexample + +@section keytabs + +To extract a service ticket from the database and put it in a keytab you +need to first create the principal in the database with @samp{ank} +(using the @kbd{--random} flag to get a random password) and then +extract it with @samp{ext_keytab}. + +@example +kadmin> add --random host/my.host.name +Max ticket life [unlimited]: +Max renewable life [unlimited]: +Attributes []: +kadmin> ext host/my.host.name +# ktutil list +Version Type Principal + 1 des-cbc-md5 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM + 1 des-cbc-md4 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM + 1 des-cbc-crc host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM + 1 des3-cbc-sha1 host/my.host.name@@MY.REALM +@end example + +@section Remote administration + +The administration server, @samp{kadmind}, is started by @samp{inetd} +and you should add a line similar to the one below to your +@file{/etc/inetd.conf}. + +@example +kerberos-adm stream tcp nowait root /usr/heimdal/libexec/kadmind kadmind +@end example + +You might need to add @samp{kerberos-adm} to your @file{/etc/services} +as 749/tcp. + +Access to the admin server is controlled by an acl-file, (default +@file{/var/heimdal/kadmind.acl}.) The lines in the access file, has the +following syntax: +@smallexample +principal [priv1,priv2,...] +@end smallexample + +The privileges you can assign to a principal are: @samp{add}, +@samp{change-password} (or @samp{cpw} for short), @samp{delete}, +@samp{get}, @samp{list}, and @samp{modify}, or the special privilege +@samp{all}. All of these roughly corresponds to the different commands +in @samp{kadmin}. + +@section Password changing + +To allow users to change their passwords, you should run @samp{kpasswdd}. +It is not run from @samp{inetd}. + +You might need to add @samp{kpasswd} to your @file{/etc/services} as +464/udp. + +@subsection Password quality assurance + +It is important that users have good passwords, both to make it harder +to guess them and to avoid off-line attacks (pre-authentication provides +some defense against off-line attacks). To ensure that the users choose +good passwords, you can enable password quality controls in +@samp{kpasswdd}. The controls themselves are done in a shared library +that is used by @samp{kpasswdd}. To configure in these controls, add +lines similar to the following to your @file{/etc/krb5.conf}: + +@example +[password_quality] + check_library = @var{library} + check_function = @var{function} +@end example + +The function @var{function} in the shared library @var{library} will be +called for proposed new passwords. The function should be declared as: + +@example +const char * +function(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal, krb5_data *pwd); +@end example + +The function should verify that @var{pwd} is a good password for +@var{principal} and if so return @code{NULL}. If it is deemed to be of +low quality, it should return a string explaining why that password +should not be used. + +Code for a password quality checking function that uses the cracklib +library can be found in @file{kpasswd/sample_password_check.c} in the +source code distribution. It requires the cracklib library built with +the patch available at +@url{ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/krb/src/cracklib.patch}. + +If no password quality checking function is configured, it is only +verified that it is at least six characters of length. + +@section Testing clients and servers + +Now you should be able to run all the clients and servers. Refer to the +appropriate man pages for information on how to use them. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a97ef9d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,412 @@ +CAT working group M. Swift +Internet Draft J. Brezak +Document: draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-01.txt Microsoft +Category: Informational October 1999 + + + The Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption type + + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. Internet-Drafts are + working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are + draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be + updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It + is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to + cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + +1. Abstract + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos introduces a new + encryption type based on the RC4 encryption algorithm and using an + MD5 HMAC for checksum. This is offered as an alternative to using + the existing DES based encryption types. + + The RC4-HMAC encryption types are used to ease upgrade of existing + Windows NT environments, provide strong crypto (128-bit key + lengths), and provide exportable (meet United States government + export restriction requirements) encryption. + + The Windows 2000 implementation of Kerberos contains new encryption + and checksum types for two reasons: for export reasons early in the + development process, 56 bit DES encryption could not be exported, + and because upon upgrade from Windows NT 4.0 to Windows 2000, + accounts will not have the appropriate DES keying material to do the + standard DES encryption. Furthermore, 3DES is not available for + export, and there was a desire to use a single flavor of encryption + in the product for both US and international products. + + As a result, there are two new encryption types and one new checksum + type introduced in Windows 2000. + + +2. Conventions used in this document + + + +Swift Category - Informational 1 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [2]. + +3. Key Generation + + On upgrade from existing Windows NT domains, the user accounts would + not have a DES based key available to enable the use of DES base + encryption types specified in RFC 1510. The key used for RC4-HMAC is + the same as the existing Windows NT key (NT Password Hash) for + compatibility reasons. Once the account password is changed, the DES + based keys are created and maintained. Once the DES keys are + available DES based encryption types can be used with Kerberos. + + The RC4-HMAC String to key function is defined as follow: + + String2Key(password) + + K = MD4(UNICODE(password)) + + The RC4-HMAC keys are generated by using the Windows UNICODE version + of the password. Each Windows UNICODE character is encoded in + little-endian format of 2 octets each. Then performing an MD4 [6] + hash operation on just the UNICODE characters of the password (not + including the terminating zero octets). + +4. Basic Operations + + The MD5 HMAC function is defined in [3]. It is used in this + encryption type for checksum operations. Refer to [3] for details on + its operation. In this document this function is referred to as + HMAC(Key, Data) returning the checksum using the specified key on + the data. + + The basic MD5 hash operation is used in this encryption type and + defined in [7]. In this document this function is referred to as + MD5(Data) returning the checksum of the data. + + The basic RC4 encryption operation is used in this encryption type + and defined in [8]. In this document the function is referred to as + RC4(Key, Data) returning the encrypted data using the specified key + on the data. + + These encryption types use key derivation as defined in [9] (RFC- + 1510BIS) in Section titled "Key Derivation". With each message, the + message type (T) is used as a component of the keying material. + + All strings in this document are ASCII unless otherwise specified. + The lengths of ASCII encoded character strings include the trailing + terminator character (0). + + The concat(a,b,c,...) function will return the logical concatenation + (left to right) of the values of the arguments. + +Swift Category - Informational 2 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + + The nonce(n) function returns a pseudo-random number of "n" octets. + +5. Checksum Types + + There is one checksum type used in this encryption type. The + Kerberos constant for this type is: + #define KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5 (-138) + + The function is defined as follows: + + K - is the Key + T - the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer + + CHKSUM(K, T, data) + + Ksign = HMAC(K, "signature key") //includes zero octet at end + tmp = MD5(concat(T, data)) + CHKSUM = HMAC(Ksign, tmp) + + +6. Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types used in these encryption types. The + Kerberos constants for these types are: + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC 23 + #define KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP 24 + + The basic encryption function is defined as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + + ENCRYPT(K, T, data) + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + L = concat("fortybits", T) //includes zero octet at + //end of string constant + Else + L = T + Ksign = HMAC(K,L) + Confounder = nonce(8) // get an 8 octet nonce for a confounder + Checksum = HMAC(Ksign, concat(Confounder, data)) + Ke = Ksign + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + memset(&Ke[7], 0x0ab, 9) + Ke2 = HMAC(Ke, Checksum) + data = RC4(Ke2, data) + + The header field on the encrypted data in KDC messages is: + + typedef struct _RC4_MDx_HEADER { + UCHAR Checksum[16]; + UCHAR Confounder[8]; + } RC4_MDx_HEADER, *PRC4_MDx_HEADER; + +Swift Category - Informational 3 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +7. Key Strength Negotiation + + A Kerberos client and server can negotiate over key length if they + are using mutual authentication. If the client is unable to perform + full strength encryption, it may propose a key in the "subkey" field + of the authenticator, using a weaker encryption type. The server + must then either return the same key or suggest its own key in the + subkey field of the AP reply message. The key used to encrypt data + is derived from the key returned by the server. If the client is + able to perform strong encryption but the server is not, it may + propose a subkey in the AP reply without first being sent a subkey + in the authenticator. + +8. GSSAPI Kerberos V5 Mechanism Type + +8.1 Mechanism Specific Changes + + The GSSAPI per-message tokens also require new checksum and + encryption types. The GSS-API per-message tokens must be changed to + support these new encryption types (See [5] Section 1.2.2). The + sealing algorithm identifier (SEAL_ALG) for an RC4 based encryption + is: + Byte 4..5 SEAL_ALG 0x10 0x00 - RC4 + + The signing algorithm identifier (SGN_ALG) for MD5 HMAC is: + Byte 2..3 SGN ALG 0x11 0x00 - HMAC + + The only support quality of protection is: + #define GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0x0 + + In addition, when using an RC4 based encryption type, the sequence + number is sent in big-endian rather than little-endian order. + +8.2 GSSAPI Checksum Type + + The GSSAPI checksum type and algorithm is defined in Section 5. Only + the first 8 octets of the checksum are used. The resulting checksum + is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field (See [5] Section 1.2) for + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(conf_flag=FALSE). + +8.3 GSSAPI Encryption Types + + There are two encryption types for GSSAPI message tokens, one that + is 128 bits in strength, and one that is 56 bits in strength as + defined in Section 6. + + + +Swift Category - Informational 4 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + All padding is rounded up to 1 byte. One byte is needed to say that + there is 1 byte of padding. The DES based mechanism type uses 8 byte + padding. See [5] Section 1.2.2.3. + + The encryption mechanism used for GSS based messages is as follow: + + T = the message type, encoded as a little-endian four byte integer. + + GSS-ENCRYPT(K, T, data) + IV = SND_SEQ + K = XOR(K, 0xf0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0) + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + L = concat("fortybits", T) //includes zero octet at end + else + L = T + Ksign = HMAC(K, L) + Ke = Ksign + if (K.enctype == KERB_ETYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP) + memset(&Ke[7], 0x0ab, 9) + Ke2 = HMAC(Ke, IV) + Data = RC4(Ke2, data) + SND_SEQ = RC4(Ke, seq#) + + The sequence number (SND_SEQ) and IV are used as defined in [5] + Section 1.2.2. + + The character constant "fortybits" evolved from the time when a 40- + bit key length was all that was exportable from the United States. + It is now used to recognize that the key length is of "exportable" + length. In this description, the key size is actually 56-bits. + +8. Security Considerations + + Care must be taken in implementing this encryption type because it + uses a stream cipher. If a different IV isnÆt used in each direction + when using a session key, the encryption is weak. By using the + sequence number as an IV, this is avoided. + +9. References + + 1 Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP + 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. + + 2 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + 3 Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.,"HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for + Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997 + + 4 Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993 + + + +Swift Category - Informational 5 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + + 5 Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC-1964, + June 1996 + + 6 R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1320, April + 1992 + + 7 R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC-1321, April + 1992 + + 8 RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under license + from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information, + contact: + RSA Data Security, Inc. + 100 Marine Parkway + Redwood City, CA 94065-1031 + + 9 Neuman, C., Kohl, J., Ts'o, T., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions- + 04.txt, June 25, 1999 + + +10. Author's Addresses + + Mike Swift + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: mikesw@microsoft.com + + John Brezak + Microsoft + One Microsoft Way + Redmond, Washington + Email: jbrezak@microsoft.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 6 + + Windows 2000 RC4-HMAC Kerberos E-Type October 1999 + + + +11. Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph + are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Swift Category - Informational 7 + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8174d46 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft October, 1997 +Expire in six months + + Kerberos over IPv6 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + This document specifies the address types and transport types + necessary for using Kerberos [RFC1510] over IPv6 [RFC1883]. + +Specification + + IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). + + The following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any + Kerberos packet: + + the Unspecified Address + the Loopback Address + Link-Local addresses + + IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type + 2. + + + + +Westerlund [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over IPv6 October, 1997 + + + Communication with the KDC over IPv6 MUST be done as in section 8.2.1 + of [RFC1510]. + +Discussion + + [RFC1510] suggests using the address family constants in + from BSD. This cannot be done for IPv6 as these + numbers have diverged and are different on different BSD-derived + systems. [RFC2133] does not either specify a value for AF_INET6. + Thus a value has to be decided and the implementations have to + convert between the value used in Kerberos HostAddress and the local + AF_INET6. + + There are a few different address types in IPv6, see [RFC1884]. Some + of these are used for quite special purposes and it makes no sense to + include them in Kerberos packets. + + It is necessary to represent IPv4-mapped addresses as Internet + addresses (type 2) to be compatible with Kerberos implementations + that only support IPv4. + +Security considerations + + This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in + addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + [RFC1883] Deering, S., Hinden, R., "Internet Protocol, Version 6 + (IPv6) Specification", RFC 1883, December 1995. + + [RFC1884] Hinden, R., Deering, S., "IP Version 6 Addressing + Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995. + + [RFC2133] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., Stevens, W., "Basic + Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC2133, April 1997. + +Author's Address + + Assar Westerlund + Swedish Institute of Computer Science + Box 1263 + S-164 29 KISTA + Sweden + + + + +Westerlund [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over IPv6 October, 1997 + + + Phone: +46-8-7521526 + Fax: +46-8-7517230 + EMail: assar@sics.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Westerlund [Page 3] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62b109a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo.ms @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +.pl 10.0i +.po 0 +.ll 7.2i +.lt 7.2i +.nr LL 7.2i +.nr LT 7.2i +.ds LF Westerlund +.ds RF [Page %] +.ds CF +.ds LH Internet Draft +.ds RH October, 1997 +.ds CH Kerberos over IPv6 +.hy 0 +.ad l +.in 0 +.ta \n(.luR +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft October, 1997 +Expire in six months + +.ce +Kerberos over IPv6 + +.ti 0 +Status of this Memo + +.in 3 +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its +areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also +distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six +months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other +documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- +Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as +"work in progress." + +To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check +the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net +(Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East +Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + +Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +.ti 0 +Abstract + +.in 3 +This document specifies the address types and transport types +necessary for using Kerberos [RFC1510] over IPv6 [RFC1883]. + +.ti 0 +Specification + +.in 3 +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). + +The following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any +Kerberos packet: + +the Unspecified Address +.br +the Loopback Address +.br +Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +Communication with the KDC over IPv6 MUST be done as in section +8.2.1 of [RFC1510]. + +.ti 0 +Discussion + +.in 3 +[RFC1510] suggests using the address family constants in + from BSD. This cannot be done for IPv6 as these +numbers have diverged and are different on different BSD-derived +systems. [RFC2133] does not either specify a value for AF_INET6. +Thus a value has to be decided and the implementations have to convert +between the value used in Kerberos HostAddress and the local AF_INET6. + +There are a few different address types in IPv6, see [RFC1884]. Some +of these are used for quite special purposes and it makes no sense to +include them in Kerberos packets. + +It is necessary to represent IPv4-mapped addresses as Internet +addresses (type 2) to be compatible with Kerberos implementations that +only support IPv4. + +.ti 0 +Security considerations + +.in 3 +This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in +addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +.ti 0 +References + +.in 3 +[RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network +Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +[RFC1883] Deering, S., Hinden, R., "Internet Protocol, Version 6 +(IPv6) Specification", RFC 1883, December 1995. + +[RFC1884] Hinden, R., Deering, S., "IP Version 6 Addressing +Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995. + +[RFC2133] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., Stevens, W., "Basic +Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC2133, April 1997. + +.ti 0 +Author's Address + +Assar Westerlund +.br +Swedish Institute of Computer Science +.br +Box 1263 +.br +S-164 29 KISTA +.br +Sweden + +Phone: +46-8-7521526 +.br +Fax: +46-8-7517230 +.br +EMail: assar@sics.se diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fa695f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2 @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +November, 1997 PDC, KTH +Expire in six months + + Kerberos over TCP + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + This document specifies how the communication should be done between + a client and a KDC using Kerberos [RFC1510] with TCP as the transport + protocol. + +Specification + + This draft specifies an extension to section 8.2.1 of RFC1510. + + A Kerberos server MAY accept requests on TCP port 88 (decimal). + + The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes + containing the length, in network byte order, of the Kerberos + request, followed by the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The + reply from the KDC should consist of the length of the reply packet + (4 bytes, network byte order) followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, + TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR). + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over TCP November, 1997 + + + C->S: Open connection to TCP port 88 at the server + C->S: length of request + C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ + S->C: length of reply + S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR + +Discussion + + Even though the preferred way of sending kerberos packets is over UDP + there are several occasions when it's more practical to use TCP. + + Mainly, it's usually much less cumbersome to get TCP through + firewalls than UDP. + + In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that + information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos + packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to + decode the ASN.1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read. + + Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be + to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the + reply. This does not work well with all kinds of firewalls. + +Security considerations + + This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in + addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +Authors' Addresses + + Assar Westerlund + Swedish Institute of Computer Science + Box 1263 + S-164 29 KISTA + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7521526 + Fax: +46-8-7517230 + EMail: assar@sics.se + + Johan Danielsson + PDC, KTH + S-100 44 STOCKHOLM + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos over TCP November, 1997 + + + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7907885 + Fax: +46-8-247784 + EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 3] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e0fa0a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo2.ms @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.pl 10.0i +.po 0 +.ll 7.2i +.lt 7.2i +.nr LL 7.2i +.nr LT 7.2i +.ds LF Westerlund, Danielsson +.ds RF [Page %] +.ds CF +.ds LH Internet Draft +.ds RH November, 1997 +.ds CH Kerberos over TCP +.hy 0 +.ad l +.in 0 +.ta \n(.luR +.nf +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +November, 1997 PDC, KTH +Expire in six months +.fi + +.ce +Kerberos over TCP + +.ti 0 +Status of this Memo + +.in 3 +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its +areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also +distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six +months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other +documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- +Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as +"work in progress." + +To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check +the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net +(Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East +Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + +Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +.ti 0 +Abstract + +.in 3 +This document specifies how the communication should be done between a +client and a KDC using Kerberos [RFC1510] with TCP as the transport +protocol. + +.ti 0 +Specification + +This draft specifies an extension to section 8.2.1 of RFC1510. + +A Kerberos server MAY accept requests on TCP port 88 (decimal). + +The data sent from the client to the KDC should consist of 4 bytes +containing the length, in network byte order, of the Kerberos request, +followed by the request (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) itself. The reply from +the KDC should consist of the length of the reply packet (4 bytes, +network byte order) followed by the packet itself (AS-REP, TGS-REP, or +KRB-ERROR). + +.nf +C->S: Open connection to TCP port 88 at the server +C->S: length of request +C->S: AS-REQ or TGS-REQ +S->C: length of reply +S->C: AS-REP, TGS-REP, or KRB-ERROR +.fi + +.ti 0 +Discussion + +Even though the preferred way of sending kerberos packets is over UDP +there are several occasions when it's more practical to use TCP. + +Mainly, it's usually much less cumbersome to get TCP through firewalls +than UDP. + +In theory, there's no reason for having explicit length fields, that +information is already encoded in the ASN1 encoding of the Kerberos +packets. But having explicit lengths makes it unnecessary to have to +decode the ASN.1 encoding just to know how much data has to be read. + +Another way of signaling the end of the request of the reply would be +to do a half-close after the request and a full-close after the reply. +This does not work well with all kinds of firewalls. + +.ti 0 +Security considerations + +.in 3 +This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in +addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +.ti 0 +References + +.in 3 +[RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network +Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + +.ti 0 +Authors' Addresses + +Assar Westerlund +.br +Swedish Institute of Computer Science +.br +Box 1263 +.br +S-164 29 KISTA +.br +Sweden + +Phone: +46-8-7521526 +.br +Fax: +46-8-7517230 +.br +EMail: assar@sics.se + +Johan Danielsson +.br +PDC, KTH +.br +S-100 44 STOCKHOLM +.br +Sweden + +Phone: +46-8-7907885 +.br +Fax: +46-8-247784 +.br +EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b8b7bb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3 @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +November, 1997 PDC, KTH +Expire in six months + + Kerberos vs firewalls + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the + "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or + ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + +Introduction + + Kerberos[RFC1510] is a protocol for authenticating parties + communicating over insecure networks. + + Firewalling is a technique for achieving an illusion of security by + putting restrictions on what kinds of packets and how these are sent + between the internal (so called "secure") network and the global (or + "insecure") Internet. + +Definitions + + client: the user, process, and host acquiring tickets from the KDC + and authenticating itself to the kerberised server. + + KDC: the Kerberos Key Distribution Center + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997 + + + Kerberised server: the server using Kerberos to authenticate the + client, for example telnetd. + +Firewalls + + A firewall is usually placed between the "inside" and the "outside" + networks, and is supposed to protect the inside from the evils on the + outside. There are different kinds of firewalls. The main + differences are in the way they forward packets. + + o+ The most straight forward type is the one that just imposes + restrictions on incoming packets. Such a firewall could be + described as a router that filters packets that match some + criteria. + + o+ They may also "hide" some or all addresses on the inside of the + firewall, replacing the addresses in the outgoing packets with the + address of the firewall (aka network address translation, or NAT). + NAT can also be used without any packet filtering, for instance + when you have more than one host sharing a single address (for + example, with a dialed-in PPP connection). + + There are also firewalls that does NAT both on the inside and the + outside (a server on the inside will see this as a connection from + the firewall). + + o+ A third type is the proxy type firewall, that parses the contents + of the packets, basically acting as a server to the client, and as + a client to the server (man-in-the-middle). If Kerberos is to be + used with this kind of firewall, a protocol module that handles + KDC requests has to be written. + + This type of firewall might also cause extra trouble when used with + kerberised versions of protocols that the proxy understands, in + addition to the ones mentioned below. This is the case with the FTP + Security Extensions [RFC2228], that adds a new set of commands to the + FTP protocol [RFC959], for integrity, confidentiality, and privacy + protecting commands. When transferring data, the FTP protocol uses a + separate data channel, and an FTP proxy will have to look out for + commands that start a data transfer. If all commands are encrypted, + this is impossible. A protocol that doesn't suffer from this is the + Telnet Authentication Option [RFC1416] that does all authentication + and encryption in-bound. + +Scenarios + + Here the different scenarios we have considered are described, the + problems they introduce and the proposed ways of solving them. + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997 + + + Combinations of these can also occur. + + Client behind firewall + + This is the most typical and common scenario. First of all the + client needs some way of communicating with the KDC. This can be + done with whatever means and is usually much simpler when the KDC is + able to communicate over TCP. + + Apart from that, the client needs to be sure that the ticket it will + acquire from the KDC can be used to authenticate to a server outside + its firewall. For this, it needs to add the address(es) of potential + firewalls between itself and the KDC/server, to the list of its own + addresses when requesting the ticket. We are not aware of any + protocol for determining this set of addresses, thus this will have + to be manually configured in the client. + + The client could also request a ticket with no addresses, but some + KDCs and servers might not accept such a ticket. + + With the ticket in possession, communication with the kerberised + server will not need to be any different from communicating between a + non-kerberised client and server. + + Kerberised server behind firewall + + The kerberised server does not talk to the KDC at all so nothing + beyond normal firewall-traversal techniques for reaching the server + itself needs to be applied. + + The kerberised server needs to be able to retrieve the original + address (before its firewall) that the request was sent for. If this + is done via some out-of-band mechanism or it's directly able to see + it doesn't matter. + + KDC behind firewall + + The same restrictions applies for a KDC as for any other server. + +Specification + +Security considerations + + This memo does not introduce any known security considerations in + addition to those mentioned in [RFC1510]. + +References + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Kerberos vs firewalls November, 1997 + + + [RFC959] Postel, J. and Reynolds, J., "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)", + RFC 969, October 1985 + + [RFC1416] Borman, D., "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 1416, + February 1993. + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + [RFC2228] Horowitz, M. and Lunt, S., "FTP Security Extensions", + RFC2228, October 1997. + +Authors' Addresses + + Assar Westerlund + Swedish Institute of Computer Science + Box 1263 + S-164 29 KISTA + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7521526 + Fax: +46-8-7517230 + EMail: assar@sics.se + + Johan Danielsson + PDC, KTH + S-100 44 STOCKHOLM + Sweden + + Phone: +46-8-7907885 + Fax: +46-8-247784 + EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Westerlund, Danielsson [Page 4] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c024ca3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-foo3.ms @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +.\" even if this file is called .ms, it's using the me macros. +.\" to format try something like `nroff -me' +.\" level 2 heading +.de HH +.$p "\\$2" "" "\\$1" +.$0 "\\$2" +.. +.\" make sure footnotes produce the right thing with nroff +.ie t \ +\{\ +.ds { \v'-0.4m'\x'\\n(0x=0*-0.2m'\s-3 +.ds } \s0\v'0.4m' +.\} +.el \ +\{\ +.ds { [ +.ds } ] +.\} +.ds * \\*{\\n($f\\*}\k* +.\" page footer +.fo 'Westerlund, Danielsson''[Page %]' +.\" date +.ds RH \*(mo, 19\n(yr +.\" left margin +.nr lm 6 +.\" heading indent per level +.nr si 3n +.\" footnote indent +.nr fi 0 +.\" paragraph indent +.nr po 0 +.\" don't hyphenate +.hy 0 +.\" left adjustment +.ad l +.\" indent 0 +.in 0 +.\" line length 16cm and page length 25cm (~10 inches) +.ll 16c +.pl 25c +.ta \n(.luR +.nf +Network Working Group Assar Westerlund + SICS +Internet-Draft Johan Danielsson +\*(RH PDC, KTH +Expire in six months +.fi + +.\" page header, has to be set here so it won't appear on page 1 +.he 'Internet Draft'Kerberos vs firewalls'\*(RH' +.ce +.b "Kerberos vs firewalls" + +.HH 1 "Status of this Memo" +.lp +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working +documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, +and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute +working documents as Internet-Drafts. +.lp +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months +and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any +time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference +material or to cite them other than as \*(lqwork in progress.\*(rq +.lp +To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the +\*(lq1id-abstracts.txt\*(rq listing contained in the Internet-Drafts +Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Europe), +munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). +.lp +Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. +.HH 1 "Abstract" +.lp +Kerberos and firewalls both deal with security, but doesn't get along +very well. This memo discusses ways to use Kerberos in a firewalled +environment. +.HH 1 "Introduction" +.lp +Kerberos[RFC1510] +.(d +[RFC1510] +Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., \*(lqThe Kerberos Network Authentication +Service (V5)\*(rq, RFC 1510, September 1993. +.)d +is a protocol for authenticating parties communicating over insecure +networks. Firewalling is a technique for achieving an illusion of +security by putting restrictions on what kinds of packets and how +these are sent between the internal (so called \*(lqsecure\*(rq) +network and the global (or \*(lqinsecure\*(rq) Internet. The problems +with firewalls are many, but to name a few: +.np +Firewalls usually doesn't allow people to use UDP. The reason for this +is that UDP is (by firewall advocates) considered insecure. This +belief is probably based on the fact that many \*(lqinsecure\*(rq +protocols (like NFS) use UDP. UDP packets are also considered easy to +fake. +.np +Firewalls usually doesn't allow people to connect to arbitrary ports, +such as the ports used when talking to the KDC. +.np +In many non-computer organisations, the computer staff isn't what +you'd call \*(lqwizards\*(rq; a typical case is an academic +institution, where someone is taking care of the computers part time, +and is doing research the rest of the time. Adding a complex device +like a firewall to an environment like this, often leads to poorly run +systems that is more a hindrance for the legitimate users than to +possible crackers. +.lp +The easiest way to deal with firewalls is to ignore them, however in +some cases this just isn't possible. You might have users that are +stuck behind a firewall, but also has to access your system, or you +might find yourself behind a firewall, for instance when out +travelling. +.lp +To make it possible for people to use Kerberos from behind a firewall, +there are several things to consider. +.(q +.i +Add things to do when stuck behind a firewall, like talking about the +problem with local staff, making them open some port in the firewall, +using some other port, or proxy. +.r +.)q +.HH 1 "Firewalls" +.lp +A firewall is usually placed between the \*(lqinside\*(rq and the +\*(lqoutside\*(rq networks, and is supposed to protect the inside from the +evils on the outside. There are different kinds of firewalls. The +main differences are in the way they forward (or doesn't) packets. +.ip \(bu +The most straight forward type is the one that just imposes +restrictions on incoming packets. Such a firewall could be described +as a router that filters packets that match some criteria. +.ip \(bu +They may also \*(lqhide\*(rq some or all addresses on the inside of the +firewall, replacing the addresses in the outgoing packets with the +address of the firewall (aka network address translation, or NAT). NAT +can also be used without any packet filtering, for instance when you +have more than one host sharing a single address (e.g with a dialed-in +PPP connection). +.ip +There are also firewalls that does NAT both on the inside and the +outside (a server on the inside will see this as a connection from the +firewall). +.ip \(bu +A third type is the proxy type firewall, that parses the contents of +the packets, basically acting as a server to the client, and as a +client to the server (man-in-the-middle). If Kerberos is to be used +with this kind of firewall, a protocol module that handles KDC +requests has to be written\**. +.(f +\**Instead of writing a new module for Kerberos, it can be possible to +hitch a ride on some other protocol, that's already beeing handled by +the proxy. +.)f +.lp +The last type of firewall might also cause extra trouble when used +with kerberised versions of protocols that the proxy understands, in +addition to the ones mentioned below. This is the case with the FTP +Security Extensions [RFC2228], +.(d +[RFC2228] +Horowitz, M. and Lunt, S., \*(lqFTP Security Extensions\*(rq, RFC2228, +October 1997. +.)d +that adds a new set of commands to the FTP protocol [RFC959], +.(d +[RFC959] Postel, J. and Reynolds, J., \*(lqFile Transfer Protocol +(FTP)\*(rq, RFC 969, October 1985 +.)d +for integrity, confidentiality, and privacy protecting commands, and +data. When transferring data, the FTP protocol uses a separate data +channel, and an FTP proxy will have to look out for commands that +start a data transfer. If all commands are encrypted, this is +impossible. A protocol that doesn't suffer from this is the Telnet +Authentication Option [RFC1416] +.(d +[RFC1416] +Borman, D., \*(lqTelnet Authentication Option\*(rq, RFC 1416, February +1993. +.)d +that does all +authentication and encryption in-bound. +.HH 1 "Scenarios" +.lp +Here the different scenarios we have considered are described, the +problems they introduce and the proposed ways of solving them. +Combinations of these can also occur. +.HH 2 "Client behind firewall" +.lp +This is the most typical and common scenario. First of all the client +needs some way of communicating with the KDC. This can be done with +whatever means and is usually much simpler when the KDC is able to +communicate over TCP. +.lp +Apart from that, the client needs to be sure that the ticket it will +acquire from the KDC can be used to authenticate to a server outside +its firewall. For this, it needs to add the address(es) of potential +firewalls between itself and the KDC/server, to the list of its own +addresses when requesting the ticket. We are not aware of any +protocol for determining this set of addresses, thus this will have to +be manually configured in the client. +.lp +The client could also request a ticket with no addresses. This is not +a recommended way to solve this problem. The address was put into the +ticket to make it harder to use a stolen ticket. A ticket without +addresses will therefore be less \*(lqsecure.\*(rq RFC1510 also says that +the KDC may refuse to issue, and the server may refuse to accept an +address-less ticket. +.lp +With the ticket in possession, communication with the kerberised +server will not need to be any different from communicating between a +non-kerberised client and server. +.HH 2 "Kerberised server behind firewall" +.lp +The kerberised server does not talk to the KDC at all, so nothing +beyond normal firewall-traversal techniques for reaching the server +itself needs to be applied. +.lp +If the firewall rewrites the clients address, the server will have to +use some other (possibly firewall specific) protocol to retrieve the +original address. If this is not possible, the address field will have +to be ignored. This has the same effect as if there were no addresses +in the ticket (see the discussion above). +.HH 2 "KDC behind firewall" +.lp +The KDC is in this respect basically just like any other server. +.\" .uh "Specification" +.HH 1 "Security considerations" +.lp +Since the whole network behind a NAT-type firewall looks like one +computer from the outside, any security added by the addresses in the +ticket will be lost. +.HH 1 "References" +.lp +.pd +.HH 1 "Authors' Addresses" +.lp +.nf +Assar Westerlund +Swedish Institute of Computer Science +Box 1263 +S-164 29 KISTA +.sp +Phone: +46-8-7521526 +Fax: +46-8-7517230 +EMail: assar@sics.se +.sp 2 +Johan Danielsson +Center for Parallel Computers +KTH +S-100 44 STOCKHOLM +.sp +Phone: +46-8-7906356 +Fax: +46-8-247784 +EMail: joda@pdc.kth.se +.fi \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4dcff48 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-horowitz-key-derivation-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions +Internet-Draft March, 1997 + + + Key Derivation for Authentication, Integrity, and Privacy + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + author. + +Abstract + + Recent advances in cryptography have made it desirable to use longer + cryptographic keys, and to make more careful use of these keys. In + particular, it is considered unwise by some cryptographers to use the + same key for multiple purposes. Since most cryptographic-based + systems perform a range of functions, such as authentication, key + exchange, integrity, and encryption, it is desirable to use different + cryptographic keys for these purposes. + + This RFC does not define a particular protocol, but defines a set of + cryptographic transformations for use with arbitrary network + protocols and block cryptographic algorithm. + + +Deriving Keys + + In order to use multiple keys for different functions, there are two + possibilities: + + - Each protocol ``key'' contains multiple cryptographic keys. The + implementation would know how to break up the protocol ``key'' for + use by the underlying cryptographic routines. + + - The protocol ``key'' is used to derive the cryptographic keys. + The implementation would perform this derivation before calling + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation March, 1997 + + + the underlying cryptographic routines. + + In the first solution, the system has the opportunity to provide + separate keys for different functions. This has the advantage that + if one of these keys is broken, the others remain secret. However, + this comes at the cost of larger ``keys'' at the protocol layer. In + addition, since these ``keys'' may be encrypted, compromising the + cryptographic key which is used to encrypt them compromises all the + component keys. Also, the not all ``keys'' are used for all possible + functions. Some ``keys'', especially those derived from passwords, + are generated from limited amounts of entropy. Wasting some of this + entropy on cryptographic keys which are never used is unwise. + + The second solution uses keys derived from a base key to perform + cryptographic operations. By carefully specifying how this key is + used, all of the advantages of the first solution can be kept, while + eliminating some disadvantages. In particular, the base key must be + used only for generating the derived keys, and this derivation must + be non-invertible and entropy-preserving. Given these restrictions, + compromise of one derived keys does not compromise the other subkeys. + Attack of the base key is limited, since it is only used for + derivation, and is not exposed to any user data. + + Since the derived key has as much entropy as the base keys (if the + cryptosystem is good), password-derived keys have the full benefit of + all the entropy in the password. + + To generate a derived key from a base key: + + Derived Key = DK(Base Key, Well-Known Constant) + + where + + DK(Key, Constant) = n-truncate(E(Key, Constant)) + + In this construction, E(Key, Plaintext) is a block cipher, Constant + is a well-known constant defined by the protocol, and n-truncate + truncates its argument by taking the first n bits; here, n is the key + size of E. + + If the output of E is is shorter than n bits, then some entropy in + the key will be lost. If the Constant is smaller than the block size + of E, then it must be padded so it may be encrypted. If the Constant + is larger than the block size, then it must be folded down to the + block size to avoid chaining, which affects the distribution of + entropy. + + In any of these situations, a variation of the above construction is + used, where the folded Constant is encrypted, and the resulting + output is fed back into the encryption as necessary (the | indicates + concatentation): + + K1 = E(Key, n-fold(Constant)) + K2 = E(Key, K1) + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation March, 1997 + + + K3 = E(Key, K2) + K4 = ... + + DK(Key, Constant) = n-truncate(K1 | K2 | K3 | K4 ...) + + n-fold is an algorithm which takes m input bits and ``stretches'' + them to form n output bits with no loss of entropy, as described in + [Blumenthal96]. In this document, n-fold is always used to produce n + bits of output, where n is the key size of E. + + If the size of the Constant is not equal to the block size of E, then + the Constant must be n-folded to the block size of E. This number is + used as input to E. If the block size of E is less than the key + size, then the output from E is taken as input to a second invocation + of E. This process is repeated until the number of bits accumulated + is greater than or equal to the key size of E. When enough bits have + been computed, the first n are taken as the derived key. + + Since the derived key is the result of one or more encryptions in the + base key, deriving the base key from the derived key is equivalent to + determining the key from a very small number of plaintext/ciphertext + pairs. Thus, this construction is as strong as the cryptosystem + itself. + + +Deriving Keys from Passwords + + When protecting information with a password or other user data, it is + necessary to convert an arbitrary bit string into an encryption key. + In addition, it is sometimes desirable that the transformation from + password to key be difficult to reverse. A simple variation on the + construction in the prior section can be used: + + Key = DK(n-fold(Password), Well-Known Constant) + + The n-fold algorithm is reversible, so recovery of the n-fold output + is equivalent to recovery of Password. However, recovering the n- + fold output is difficult for the same reason recovering the base key + from a derived key is difficult. + + + + Traditionally, the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext, or + vice versa, is determined by the cryptographic algorithm and the key. + A simple way to think of derived keys is that the transformation is + determined by the cryptographic algorithm, the constant, and the key. + + For interoperability, the constants used to derive keys for different + purposes must be specified in the protocol specification. The + constants must not be specified on the wire, or else an attacker who + determined one derived key could provide the associated constant and + spoof data using that derived key, rather than the one the protocol + designer intended. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation March, 1997 + + + Determining which parts of a protocol require their own constants is + an issue for the designer of protocol using derived keys. + + +Security Considerations + + This entire document deals with security considerations relating to + the use of cryptography in network protocols. + + +Acknowledgements + + I would like to thank Uri Blumenthal, Hugo Krawczyk, and Bill + Sommerfeld for their contributions to this document. + + +References + + [Blumenthal96] Blumenthal, U., "A Better Key Schedule for DES-Like + Ciphers", Proceedings of PRAGOCRYPT '96, 1996. + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + Email: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-08.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-08.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccba35e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-08.txt @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ + + +A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries. + + + RFC 2078 + + Title: Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface, Version 2 + Author: J. Linn + Date: January 1997 + Mailbox: John.Linn@ov.com + Pages: 85 + Characters: 185990 + Obsoletes: 1508 + + URL: ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc2078.txt + + +This memo revises RFC-1508, making specific, incremental changes in +response to implementation experience and liaison requests. It is +intended, therefore, that this memo or a successor version thereto +will become the basis for subsequent progression of the GSS-API +specification on the standards track. This document is a product of +the Common Authentication Technology Working Group. + +This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol. + +This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the +Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for +improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet +Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and +status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +This announcement is sent to the IETF list and the RFC-DIST list. +Requests to be added to or deleted from the IETF distribution list +should be sent to IETF-REQUEST@CNRI.RESTON.VA.US. Requests to be +added to or deleted from the RFC-DIST distribution list should +be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@ISI.EDU. + +Details on obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending +an EMAIL message to rfc-info@ISI.EDU with the message body +help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example: + + To: rfc-info@ISI.EDU + Subject: getting rfcs + + help: ways_to_get_rfcs + +Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the +author of the RFC in question, or to admin@DS.INTERNIC.NET. Unless +specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for +unlimited distribution. + +Submissions for Requests for Comments should be sent to +RFC-EDITOR@ISI.EDU. Please consult RFC 1543, Instructions to RFC +Authors, for further information. + + +Joyce K. Reynolds and Mary Kennedy +USC/Information Sciences Institute + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-cbind-04.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-cbind-04.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..518f4c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-cbind-04.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6188 @@ + + Internet draft J.Wray + IETF Common Authentication Technology WG Digital Equipment Corporation + March 1997 + + + + Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings + + + 1. STATUS OF THIS MEMO + + This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and + its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working + documents as Internet Drafts. Internet Drafts are draft documents valid + for a maximum of six months. Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, + or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is not appropriate to + use Internet Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as + a "working draft" or "work in progress." Please check the I-D abstract + listing contained in each Internet Draft directory to learn the current + status of this or any other Internet Draft. + + Comments on this document should be sent to "cat-ietf@MIT.EDU", the IETF + Common Authentication Technology WG discussion list. + + + 2. ABSTRACT + + This draft document specifies C language bindings for Version 2 of the + Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSSAPI), which + is described at a language-independent conceptual level in other drafts + [GSSAPI]. It revises RFC-1509, making specific incremental changes in + response to implementation experience and liaison requests. It is + intended, therefore, that this draft or a successor version thereof will + become the basis for subsequent progression of the GSS-API specification + on the standards track. + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface provides + security services to its callers, and is intended for implementation + atop a variety of underlying cryptographic mechanisms. Typically, + GSSAPI callers will be application protocols into which security + enhancements are integrated through invocation of services provided by + the GSSAPI. The GSSAPI allows a caller application to authenticate a + principal identity associated with a peer application, to delegate + rights to a peer, and to apply security services such as confidentiality + and integrity on a per-message basis. + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 1] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 3. INTRODUCTION + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface [GSSAPI] + provides security services to calling applications. It allows a + communicating application to authenticate the user associated with + another application, to delegate rights to another application, and to + apply security services such as confidentiality and integrity on a per- + message basis. + + There are four stages to using the GSSAPI: + + (a) The application acquires a set of credentials with which it may + prove its identity to other processes. The application's + credentials vouch for its global identity, which may or may not be + related to any local username under which it may be running. + + (b) A pair of communicating applications establish a joint security + context using their credentials. The security context is a pair + of GSSAPI data structures that contain shared state information, + which is required in order that per-message security services may + be provided. Examples of state that might be shared between + applications as part of a security context are cryptographic keys, + and message sequence numbers. As part of the establishment of a + security context, the context initiator is authenticated to the + responder, and may require that the responder is authenticated in + turn. The initiator may optionally give the responder the right + to initiate further security contexts, acting as an agent or + delegate of the initiator. This transfer of rights is termed + delegation, and is achieved by creating a set of credentials, + similar to those used by the initiating application, but which may + be used by the responder. + + To establish and maintain the shared information that makes up the + security context, certain GSSAPI calls will return a token data + structure, which is a cryptographically protected opaque data + type. The caller of such a GSSAPI routine is responsible for + transferring the token to the peer application, encapsulated if + necessary in an application-application protocol. On receipt of + such a token, the peer application should pass it to a + corresponding GSSAPI routine which will decode the token and + extract the information, updating the security context state + information accordingly. + + (c) Per-message services are invoked to apply either: + + (i) integrity and data origin authentication, or + + (ii) confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication + + to application data, which are treated by GSSAPI as arbitrary + octet-strings. An application transmitting a message that it + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 2] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + wishes to protect will call the appropriate GSSAPI routine + (gss_get_mic or gss_wrap) to apply protection, specifying the + appropriate security context, and send the resulting token to the + receiving application. The receiver will pass the received token + (and, in the case of data protected by gss_get_mic, the + accompanying message-data) to the corresponding decoding routine + (gss_verify_mic or gss_unwrap) to remove the protection and + validate the data. + + (d) At the completion of a communications session (which may extend + across several transport connections), each application calls a + GSSAPI routine to delete the security context. Multiple contexts + may also be used (either successively or simultaneously) within a + single communications association, at the option of the + applications. + + + 4. GSSAPI ROUTINES + + This section lists the routines that make up the GSSAPI, and offers a + brief description of the purpose of each routine. Detailed descriptions + of each routine are listed in alphabetical order in section 7. + + Table 4-1 GSSAPI Credential-management Routines + + ROUTINE SECTION FUNCTION + + gss_acquire_cred 7.2 Assume a global identity; + Obtain a GSSAPI credential + handle for pre-existing + credentials. + + gss_add_cred 7.3 Construct credentials + incrementally + + gss_inquire_cred 7.21 Obtain information about + a credential. + + gss_inquire_cred_by_mech 7.22 Obtain per-mechanism information + about a credential. + + gss_release_cred 7.27 Discard a credential handle. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 3] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Table 4-2 GSSAPI Context-level Routines + + ROUTINE SECTION FUNCTION + + gss_init_sec_context 7.19 Initiate a security context + with a peer application + + + gss_accept_sec_context 7.1 Accept a security context + initiated by a peer + application + + gss_delete_sec_context 7.9 Discard a security context + + gss_process_context_token 7.25 Process a token on a security + context from a peer + application + + gss_context_time 7.7 Determine for how long a + context will remain valid + + gss_inquire_context 7.20 Obtain information about a + security context + + gss_wrap_size_limit 7.33 Determine token-size limit for + gss_wrap on a context + + gss_export_sec_context 7.14 Transfer a security context to + another process + + gss_import_sec_context 7.17 Import a transferred context + + + + + Table 4-3 GSSAPI Per-message Routines + + ROUTINE SECTION FUNCTION + + gss_get_mic 7.15 Calculate a cryptographic + Message Integrity Code (MIC) + for a message; integrity service + + gss_verify_mic 7.32 Check a MIC against a message; + verify integrity of a received + message + + gss_wrap 7.36 Attach a MIC to a message, and + optionally encrypt the message + content; confidentiality service + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 4] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_unwrap 7.31 Verify a message with attached + MIC, and decrypt message + content if necessary. + + + + + Table 4-4 GSSAPI Name manipulation Routines + + ROUTINE SECTION FUNCTION + + gss_import_name 7.16 Convert a contiguous string name + to internal-form + + gss_display_name 7.10 Convert internal-form name + to text + + gss_compare_name 7.6 Compare two internal-form names + + gss_release_name 7.28 Discard an internal-form name + + gss_inquire_names_for_mech 7.24 List the name-types supported + by a specified mechanism + + gss_inquire_mechs_for_name 7.23 List mechanisms that support + a given nametype + + gss_canonicalize_name 7.5 Convert an internal name to + an MN. + + gss_export_name 7.13 Convert an MN to export form + + gss_duplicate_name 7.12 Create a copy of an internal name + + + + + Table 4-5 GSSAPI Miscellaneous Routines + + ROUTINE SECTION FUNCTION + + gss_display_status 7.11 Convert a GSSAPI status code + to text + + gss_indicate_mechs 7.18 Determine available underlying + authentication mechanisms + + gss_release_buffer 7.26 Discard a buffer + + gss_release_oid_set 7.29 Discard a set of object + identifiers + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 5] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_create_empty_oid_set 7.8 Create a set containing no + object identifiers + + gss_add_oid_set_member 7.4 Add an object identifier to + a set + + gss_test_oid_set_member 7.30 Determines whether an object + identifier is a member of a set + + + + + + Individual GSSAPI implementations may augment these routines by + providing additional mechanism-specific routines if required + functionality is not available from the generic forms. Applications are + encouraged to use the generic routines wherever possible on portability + grounds. + + + 5. DATA TYPES AND CALLING CONVENTIONS + + The following conventions are used by the GSSAPI C-language bindings: + + 5.1. Integer types + + GSSAPI uses the following integer data type: + + OM_uint32 32-bit unsigned integer + + Where guaranteed minimum bit-count is important, this portable data type + is used by the GSSAPI routine definitions. Individual GSSAPI + implementations will include appropriate typedef definitions to map this + type onto a built-in data type. If the platform supports the X/Open + xom.h header file, the OM_uint32 definition contained therein should be + used; the GSSAPI header file in Appendix A contains logic that will + detect the prior inclusion of xom.h, and will not attempt to re-declare + OM_uint32. If the X/Open header file is not available on the platform, + the GSSAPI implementation should use the smallest natural unsigned + integer type that provides at least 32 bits of precision. + + 5.2. String and similar data + + Many of the GSSAPI routines take arguments and return values that + describe contiguous octet-strings. All such data is passed between the + GSSAPI and the caller using the gss_buffer_t data type. This data type + is a pointer to a buffer descriptor, which consists of a length field + that contains the total number of bytes in the datum, and a value field + which contains a pointer to the actual datum: + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 6] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + Storage for data returned to the application by a GSSAPI routine using + the gss_buffer_t conventions is allocated by the GSSAPI routine. The + application may free this storage by invoking the gss_release_buffer + routine. Allocation of the gss_buffer_desc object is always the + responsibility of the application; unused gss_buffer_desc objects may + be initialized to the value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER. + + 5.2.1. Opaque data types + + Certain multiple-word data items are considered opaque data types at the + GSSAPI, because their internal structure has no significance either to + the GSSAPI or to the caller. Examples of such opaque data types are the + input_token parameter to gss_init_sec_context (which is opaque to the + caller), and the input_message parameter to gss_wrap (which is opaque to + the GSSAPI). Opaque data is passed between the GSSAPI and the + application using the gss_buffer_t datatype. + + 5.2.2. Character strings + + Certain multiple-word data items may be regarded as simple ISO Latin-1 + character strings. Examples are the printable strings passed to + gss_import_name via the input_name_buffer parameter. Some GSSAPI + routines also return character strings. All such character strings are + passed between the application and the GSSAPI implementation using the + gss_buffer_t datatype, which is a pointer to a gss_buffer_desc object. + + When a gss_buffer_desc object describes a printable string, the length + field of the gss_buffer_desc should only count printable characters + within the string. In particular, a trailing NUL character should NOT + be included in the length count, nor should either the GSSAPI + implementation or the application assume the presence of an uncounted + trailing NUL. + + 5.3. Object Identifiers + + Certain GSSAPI procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID, or Object + identifier. This is a type containing ISO-defined tree-structured + values, and is used by the GSSAPI caller to select an underlying + security mechanism and to specify namespaces. A value of type gss_OID + has the following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 7] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + The elements field of this structure points to the first byte of an + octet string containing the ASN.1 BER encoding of the value portion of + the normal BER TLV encoding of the gss_OID. The length field contains + the number of bytes in this value. For example, the gss_OID value + corresponding to {iso(1) identified-organization(3) icd-ecma(12) + member-company(2) dec(1011) cryptoAlgorithms(7) DASS(5)}, meaning the + DASS X.509 authentication mechanism, has a length field of 7 and an + elements field pointing to seven octets containing the following octal + values: 53,14,2,207,163,7,5. GSSAPI implementations should provide + constant gss_OID values to allow applications to request any supported + mechanism, although applications are encouraged on portability grounds + to accept the default mechanism. gss_OID values should also be provided + to allow applications to specify particular name types (see section + 5.10). Applications should treat gss_OID_desc values returned by GSSAPI + routines as read-only. In particular, the application should not + attempt to deallocate them with free(). The gss_OID_desc datatype is + equivalent to the X/Open OM_object_identifier datatype[XOM]. + + 5.4. Object Identifier Sets + + Certain GSSAPI procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID_set. This + type represents one or more object identifiers (section 5.3). A + gss_OID_set object has the following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + size_t count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + The count field contains the number of OIDs within the set. The + elements field is a pointer to an array of gss_OID_desc objects, each of + which describes a single OID. gss_OID_set values are used to name the + available mechanisms supported by the GSSAPI, to request the use of + specific mechanisms, and to indicate which mechanisms a given credential + supports. + + All OID sets returned to the application by GSSAPI are dynamic objects + (the gss_OID_set_desc, the "elements" array of the set, and the + "elements" array of each member OID are all dynamically allocated), and + this storage must be deallocated by the application using the + gss_release_oid_set() routine. + + + 5.5. Credentials + + A credential handle is a caller-opaque atomic datum that identifies a + GSSAPI credential data structure. It is represented by the caller- + opaque type gss_cred_id_t, which should be implemented as a pointer or + arithmetic type. If a pointer implementation is chosen, care must be + taken to ensure that two gss_cred_id_t values may be compared with the + == operator. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 8] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSSAPI credentials can contain mechanism-specific principal + authentication data for multiple mechanisms. A GSSAPI credential is + composed of a set of credential-elements, each of which is applicable to + a single mechanism. A credential may contain at most one credential- + element for each supported mechanism. A credential-element identifies + the data needed by a single mechanism to authenticate a single + principal, and conceptually contains two credential-references that + describing the actual mechanism-specific authentication data, one to be + used by GSSAPI for initiating contexts, and one to be used for + accepting contexts. For mechanisms that do not distinguish between + acceptor and initiator credentials, both references would point to the + same underlying mechanism-specific authentication data. + + Credentials describe a set of mechanism-specific principals, and give + their holder the ability to act as any of those principals. All + principal identities asserted by a single GSSAPI credential should + belong to the same entity, although enforcement of this property is an + implementation-specific matter. The GSSAPI does not make the actual + credentials available to applications; instead a credential handle is + used to identify a particular credential, held internally by GSSAPI. + The combination of GSSAPI credential handle and mechanism identifies the + principal whose identity will be asserted by the credential when used + with that mechanism. + + The gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context routines allow the + value GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to be specified as their credential handle + parameter. This special credential-handle indicates a desire by the + application to act as a default principal. While individual GSSAPI + implementations are free to determine such default behavior as + appropriate to the mechanism, the following default behavior by these + routines is recommended for portability: + + (a) gss_init_sec_context + + (i) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating + security contexts for the chosen mechanism that the + application is authorized to act on behalf of, then that + principal shall be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network- + identity for the chosen mechanism, and if the application is + authorized to act on behalf of that identity for the purpose + of initiating security contexts, then the principal + corresponding to that identity shall be used, otherwise + + (iii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local + identity, and provides a means to map local identities into + network-identities for the chosen mechanism, and if the + application is authorized to act on behalf of the network- + identity image of the default local identity for the purpose + of initiating security contexts using the chosen mechanism, + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 9] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + then the principal corresponding to that identity shall be + used, otherwise + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity should be used. + + (b) gss_accept_sec_context + + (i) If there is only a single authorized principal identity + capable of accepting security contexts for the chosen + mechanism, then that principal shall be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target + principal by examining the context-establishment token, and + if the accepting application is authorized to act as that + principal for the purpose of accepting security contexts + using the chosen mechanism, then that principal identity + shall be used, otherwise + + (iii) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any + principal, and if mutual authentication was not requested, + any principal that the application is authorized to accept + security contexts under using the chosen mechanism may be + used, otherwise + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity shall be used. + + The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be + established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior + wherever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are likely + to be more portable across mechanisms and platforms than ones that use + gss_acquire_cred to request a specific identity. + + 5.6. Contexts + + The gss_ctx_id_t data type contains a caller-opaque atomic value that + identifies one end of a GSSAPI security context. It should be + implemented as a pointer or arithmetic type. If a pointer type is + chosen, care should be taken to ensure that two gss_ctx_id_t values may + be compared with the == operator. + + The security context holds state information about each end of a peer + communication, including cryptographic state information. + + 5.7. Authentication tokens + + A token is a caller-opaque type that GSSAPI uses to maintain + synchronization between the context data structures at each end of a + GSSAPI security context. The token is a cryptographically protected + octet-string, generated by the underlying mechanism at one end of a + GSSAPI security context for use by the peer mechanism at the other end. + Encapsulation (if required) and transfer of the token are the + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 10] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + responsibility of the peer applications. A token is passed between the + GSSAPI and the application using the gss_buffer_t conventions. + + 5.8. Interprocess tokens + + Certain GSSAPI routines are intended to transfer data between processes + in multi-process programs. These routines use a caller-opaque octet- + string, generated by the GSSAPI in one process for use by the GSSAPI in + another process. The calling application is responsible for + transferring such tokens between processes in an OS-specific manner. + Note that, while GSSAPI implementors are encouraged to avoid placing + sensitive information within interprocess tokens, or to + cryptographically protect them, many implementations will be unable to + avoid placing key material or other sensitive data within them. It is + the application's responsibility to ensure that interprocess tokens are + protected in transit, and transferred only to processes that are + trustworthy. An interprocess token is passed between the GSSAPI and the + application using the gss_buffer_t conventions. + + 5.9. Status values + + One or more status codes are returned by each GSSAPI routine. Two + distinct sorts of status codes are returned. These are termed GSS + status codes and Mechanism status codes. + + 5.9.1. GSS status codes + + GSSAPI routines return GSS status codes as their OM_uint32 function + value. These codes indicate errors that are independent of the + underlying mechanism(s) used to provide the security service. The + errors that can be indicated via a GSS status code are either generic + API routine errors (errors that are defined in the GSS-API + specification) or calling errors (errors that are specific to these + language bindings). + + A GSS status code can indicate a single fatal generic API error from the + routine and a single calling error. In addition, supplementary status + information may be indicated via the setting of bits in the + supplementary info field of a GSS status code. + + These errors are encoded into the 32-bit GSS status code as follows: + + MSB LSB + |------------------------------------------------------------| + | Calling Error | Routine Error | Supplementary Info | + |------------------------------------------------------------| + Bit 31 24 23 16 15 0 + + + Hence if a GSS-API routine returns a GSS status code whose upper 16 bits + contain a non-zero value, the call failed. If the calling error field + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 11] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + is non-zero, the invoking application's call of the routine was + erroneous. Calling errors are defined in table 5-1. If the routine + error field is non-zero, the routine failed for one of the routine- + specific reasons listed below in table 5-2. Whether or not the upper 16 + bits indicate a failure or a success, the routine may indicate + additional information by setting bits in the supplementary info field + of the status code. The meaning of individual bits is listed below in + table 5-3. + + Table 5-1 Calling Errors + + Name Value in Meaning + Field + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ 1 A required input + parameter could + not be read. + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE 2 A required output + parameter could + not be written. + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE 3 A parameter was + malformed + + + + + Table 5-2 Routine Errors + + Name Value in Meaning + Field + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH 1 An unsupported mechanism was + requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME 2 An invalid name was supplied + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 3 A supplied name was of an + unsupported type + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS 4 Incorrect channel bindings + were supplied + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 5 An invalid status code was + supplied + GSS_S_BAD_SIG 6 A token had an invalid + GSS_S_BAD_MIC MIC + GSS_S_NO_CRED 7 No credentials were supplied, + or the credentials were + unavailable or inaccessible. + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 8 No context has been + established + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 9 A token was invalid + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 10 A credential was invalid + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 11 The referenced credentials + have expired + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 12] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 12 The context has expired + GSS_S_FAILURE 13 Miscellaneous failure + (see text) + GSS_S_BAD_QOP 14 The quality-of-protection + requested could not be + provide + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED 15 The operation is forbidden by + local security policy + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE 16 The operation or option is not + available + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT 17 The requested credential element + already exists + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN 18 The provided name was not a + mechanism name. + + + + + + Table 5-3 Supplementary Status Bits + + Name Bit Number Meaning + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED 0 (LSB) The routine must be called + again to complete its function. + See routine documentation for + detailed description. + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN 1 The token was a duplicate of + an earlier token + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 2 The token's validity period + has expired + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 3 A later token has already been + processed + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN 4 An expected per-message token + was not received + + + The routine documentation also uses the name GSS_S_COMPLETE, which is a + zero value, to indicate an absence of any API errors or supplementary + information bits. + + All GSS_S_xxx symbols equate to complete OM_uint32 status codes, rather + than to bitfield values. For example, the actual value of the symbol + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (value 3 in the routine error field) is 3 << 16. + + The macros GSS_CALLING_ERROR(), GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR() and + GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO() are provided, each of which takes a GSS status + code and removes all but the relevant field. For example, the value + obtained by applying GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR to a status code removes the + calling errors and supplementary info fields, leaving only the routine + errors field. The values delivered by these macros may be directly + compared with a GSS_S_xxx symbol of the appropriate type. The macro + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 13] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_ERROR() is also provided, which when applied to a GSS status code + returns a non-zero value if the status code indicated a calling or + routine error, and a zero value otherwise. All macros defined by GSS- + API evaluate their argument(s) exactly once. + + A GSS-API implementation may choose to signal calling errors in a + platform-specific manner instead of, or in addition to the routine + value; routine errors and supplementary info should be returned via + routine status values only. + + 5.9.2. Mechanism-specific status codes + + GSS-API routines return a minor_status parameter, which is used to + indicate specialized errors from the underlying security mechanism. + This parameter may contain a single mechanism-specific error, indicated + by a OM_uint32 value. + + The minor_status parameter will always be set by a GSS-API routine, even + if it returns a calling error or one of the generic API errors indicated + above as fatal, although most other output parameters may remain unset + in such cases. However, output parameters that are expected to return + pointers to storage allocated by a routine must always be set by the + routine, even in the event of an error, although in such cases the GSS- + API routine may elect to set the returned parameter value to NULL to + indicate that no storage was actually allocated. Any length field + associated with such pointers (as in a gss_buffer_desc structure) should + also be set to zero in such cases. + + The GSS status code GSS_S_FAILURE is used to indicate that the + underlying mechanism detected an error for which no specific GSS status + code is defined. The mechanism status code will provide more details + about the error. + + 5.10. Names + + A name is used to identify a person or entity. GSS-API authenticates + the relationship between a name and the entity claiming the name. + + Since different authentication mechanisms may employ different + namespaces for identifying their principals, GSSAPI's naming support is + necessarily complex in multi-mechanism environments (or even in some + single-mechanism environments where the underlying mechanism supports + multiple namespaces). + + Two distinct representations are defined for names: + + (a) An internal form. This is the GSSAPI "native" format for names, + represented by the implementation-specific gss_name_t type. It is + opaque to GSSAPI callers. A single gss_name_t object may contain + multiple names from different namespaces, but all names should + refer to the same entity. An example of such an internal name + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 14] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + would be the name returned from a call to the gss_inquire_cred + routine, when applied to a credential containing credential + elements for multiple authentication mechanisms employing + different namespaces. This gss_name_t object will contain a + distinct name for the entity for each authentication mechanism. + + For GSSAPI implementations supporting multiple namespaces, objects + of type gss_name_t must contain sufficient information to + determine the namespace to which each primitive name belongs. + + (b) Mechanism-specific contiguous octet-string forms. A format + capable of containing a single name (from a single namespace). + Contiguous string names are always accompanied by an object + identifier specifying the namespace to which the name belongs, and + their format is dependent on the authentication mechanism that + employs the name. Many, but not all, contiguous string names will + be printable, and may therefore be used by GSSAPI applications for + communication with their users. + + Routines (gss_import_name and gss_display_name) are provided to convert + names between contiguous string representations and the internal + gss_name_t type. gss_import_name may support multiple syntaxes for each + supported namespace, allowing users the freedom to choose a preferred + name representation. gss_display_name should use an implementation- + chosen printable syntax for each supported name-type. + + If an application calls gss_display_name(), passing the internal name + resulting from a call to gss_import_name(), there is no guarantee the + the resulting contiguous string name will be the same as the original + imported string name. Nor do name-space identifiers necessarily survive + unchanged after a journey through the internal name-form. An example of + this might be a mechanism that authenticates X.500 names, but provides + an algorithmic mapping of Internet DNS names into X.500. That + mechanism's implementation of gss_import_name() might, when presented + with a DNS name, generate an internal name that contained both the + original DNS name and the equivalent X.500 name. Alternatively, it might + only store the X.500 name. In the latter case, gss_display_name() would + most likely generate a printable X.500 name, rather than the original + DNS name. + + The process of authentication delivers to the context acceptor an + internal name. Since this name has been authenticated by a single + mechanism, it contains only a single name (even if the internal name + presented by the context initiator to gss_init_sec_context had multiple + components). Such names are termed internal mechanism names, or "MN"s + and the names emitted by gss_accept_sec_context() are always of this + type. Since some applications may require MNs without wanting to incur + the overhead of an authentication operation, a second function, + gss_canonicalize_name(), is provided to convert a general internal name + into an MN. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 15] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Comparison of internal-form names may be accomplished via the + gss_compare_name() routine, which returns true if the two names being + compared refer to the same entity. This removes the need for the + application program to understand the syntaxes of the various printable + names that a given GSS-API implementation may support. Since GSSAPI + assumes that all primitive names contained within a given internal name + refer to the same entity, gss_compare_name() can return true if the two + names have at least one primitive name in common. If the implementation + embodies knowledge of equivalence relationships between names taken from + different namespaces, this knowledge may also allow successful + comparison of internal names containing no overlapping primitive + elements. + + When used in large access control lists, the overhead of invoking + gss_import_name() and gss_compare_name() on each name from the ACL may + be prohibitive. As an alternative way of supporting this case, GSSAPI + defines a special form of the contiguous string name which may be + compared directly (e.g. with memcmp()). Contigous names suitable for + comparison are generated by the gss_export_name() routine, which + requires an MN as input. Exported names may be re-imported by the + gss_import_name() routine, and the resulting internal name will also be + an MN. The gss_OID constant GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME indentifies the + "export name" type, and the value of this constant is given in Appendix + A. Structurally, an exported name object consists of a header + containing an OID identifying the mechanism that authenticated the name, + and a trailer containing the name itself, where the syntax of the + trailer is defined by the individual mechanism specification. The + precise format of an export name is defined in the language-independent + GSSAPI specification [GSSAPI]. + + Note that the results obtained by using gss_compare_name() will in + general be different from those obtained by invoking + gss_canonicalize_name() and gss_export_name(), and then comparing the + exported names. The first series of operation determines whether two + (unauthenticated) names identify the same principal; the second whether + a particular mechanism would authenticate them as the same principal. + These two operations will in general give the same results only for MNs. + + The gss_name_t datatype should be implemented as a pointer type. To + allow the compiler to aid the application programmer by performing + type-checking, the use of (void *) is discouraged. A pointer to an + implementation-defined type is the preferred choice. + + Storage is allocated by routines that return gss_name_t values. A + procedure, gss_release_name, is provided to free storage associated with + an internal-form name. + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 16] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 5.11. Channel Bindings + + GSS-API supports the use of user-specified tags to identify a given + context to the peer application. These tags are intended to be used to + identify the particular communications channel that carries the context. + Channel bindings are communicated to the GSS-API using the following + structure: + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + The initiator_addrtype and acceptor_addrtype fields denote the type of + addresses contained in the initiator_address and acceptor_address + buffers. The address type should be one of the following: + + GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC Unspecified address type + GSS_C_AF_LOCAL Host-local address type + GSS_C_AF_INET Internet address type (e.g. IP) + GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK ARPAnet IMP address type + GSS_C_AF_PUP pup protocols (eg BSP) address type + GSS_C_AF_CHAOS MIT CHAOS protocol address type + GSS_C_AF_NS XEROX NS address type + GSS_C_AF_NBS nbs address type + GSS_C_AF_ECMA ECMA address type + GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT datakit protocols address type + GSS_C_AF_CCITT CCITT protocols + GSS_C_AF_SNA IBM SNA address type + GSS_C_AF_DECnet DECnet address type + GSS_C_AF_DLI Direct data link interface address type + GSS_C_AF_LAT LAT address type + GSS_C_AF_HYLINK NSC Hyperchannel address type + GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK AppleTalk address type + GSS_C_AF_BSC BISYNC 2780/3780 address type + GSS_C_AF_DSS Distributed system services address type + GSS_C_AF_OSI OSI TP4 address type + GSS_C_AF_X25 X25 + GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR No address specified + + Note that these symbols name address families rather than specific + addressing formats. For address families that contain several + alternative address forms, the initiator_address and acceptor_address + fields must contain sufficient information to determine which address + form is used. When not otherwise specified, addresses should be + specified in network byte-order (that is, native byte-ordering for the + address family). + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 17] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Conceptually, the GSS-API concatenates the initiator_addrtype, + initiator_address, acceptor_addrtype, acceptor_address and + application_data to form an octet string. The mechanism calculates a + MIC over this octet string, and binds the MIC to the context + establishment token emitted by gss_init_sec_context. The same bindings + are presented by the context acceptor to gss_accept_sec_context, and a + MIC is calculated in the same way. The calculated MIC is compared with + that found in the token, and if the MICs differ, gss_accept_sec_context + will return a GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS error, and the context will not be + established. Some mechanisms may include the actual channel binding + data in the token (rather than just a MIC); applications should + therefore not use confidential data as channel-binding components. + Individual mechanisms may impose additional constraints on addresses and + address types that may appear in channel bindings. For example, a + mechanism may verify that the initiator_address field of the channel + bindings presented to gss_init_sec_context contains the correct network + address of the host system. Portable applications should therefore + ensure that they either provide correct information for the address + fields, or omit addressing information, specifying GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR as + the address-types. + + 5.12. Optional parameters + + Various parameters are described as optional. This means that they + follow a convention whereby a default value may be requested. The + following conventions are used for omitted parameters. These + conventions apply only to those parameters that are explicitly + documented as optional. + + 5.12.1. gss_buffer_t types + + Specify GSS_C_NO_BUFFER as a value. For an input parameter this + signifies that default behavior is requested, while for an output + parameter it indicates that the information that would be returned via + the parameter is not required by the application. + + 5.12.2. Integer types (input) + + Individual parameter documentation lists values to be used to indicate + default actions. + + 5.12.3. Integer types (output) + + Specify NULL as the value for the pointer. + + 5.12.4. Pointer types + + Specify NULL as the value. + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 18] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 5.12.5. Object IDs + + Specify GSS_C_NO_OID as the value. + + 5.12.6. Object ID Sets + + Specify GSS_C_NO_OID_SET as the value. + + 5.12.7. Channel Bindings + + Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS to indicate that channel bindings are + not to be used. + + + 6. ADDITIONAL CONTROLS + + This section discusses the optional services that a context initiator + may request of the GSS-API at context establishment. Each of these + services is requested by setting a flag in the req_flags input parameter + to gss_init_sec_context. + + The optional services currently defined are: + + Delegation - The (usually temporary) transfer of rights from initiator + to acceptor, enabling the acceptor to authenticate itself as an + agent of the initiator. + + Mutual Authentication - In addition to the initiator authenticating its + identity to the context acceptor, the context acceptor should also + authenticate itself to the initiator. + + Replay detection - In addition to providing message integrity services, + gss_get_mic and gss_wrap should include message numbering + information to enable gss_verify_mic and gss_unwrap to detect if a + message has been duplicated. + + Out-of-sequence detection - In addition to providing message integrity + services, gss_get_mic and gss_wrap should include message + sequencing information to enable gss_verify_mic and gss_unwrap to + detect if a message has been received out of sequence. + + Anonymous authentication - The establishment of the security context + should not reveal the initiator's identity to the context + acceptor. + + Any currently undefined bits within such flag arguments should be + ignored by GSS-API implementations when presented by an application, and + should be set to zero when returned to the application by the GSS-API + implementation. + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 19] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Some mechanisms may not support all optional services, and some + mechanisms may only support some services in conjunction with others. + Both gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context inform the + applications which services will be available from the context when the + establishment phase is complete, via the ret_flags output parameter. In + general, if the security mechanism is capable of providing a requested + service, it should do so, even if additional services must be enabled in + order to provide the requested service. If the mechanism is incapable + of providing a requested service, it should proceed without the service, + leaving the application to abort the context establishment process if it + considers the requested service to be mandatory. + + Some mechanisms may specify that support for some services is optional, + and that implementors of the mechanism need not provide it. This is + most commonly true of the confidentiality service, often because of + legal restrictions on the use of data-encryption, but may apply to any + of the services. Such mechanisms are required to send at least one + token from acceptor to initiator during context establishment when the + initiator indicates a desire to use such a service, so that the + initiating GSSAPI can correctly indicate whether the service is + supported by the acceptor's GSSAPI. + + 6.1. Delegation + + The GSS-API allows delegation to be controlled by the initiating + application via a boolean parameter to gss_init_sec_context(), the + routine that establishes a security context. Some mechanisms do not + support delegation, and for such mechanisms attempts by an application + to enable delegation are ignored. + + The acceptor of a security context for which the initiator enabled + delegation will receive (via the delegated_cred_handle parameter of + gss_accept_sec_context) a credential handle that contains the delegated + identity, and this credential handle may be used to initiate subsequent + GSSAPI security contexts as an agent or delegate of the initiator. If + the original initiator's identity is "A" and the delegate's identity is + "B", then, depending on the underlying mechanism, the identity embodied + by the delegated credential may be either "A" or "B acting for A". + + For many mechanisms that support delegation, a simple boolean does not + provide enough control. Examples of additional aspects of delegation + control that a mechanism might provide to an application are duration of + delegation, network addresses from which delegation is valid, and + constraints on the tasks that may be performed by a delegate. Such + controls are presently outside the scope of the GSS-API. GSS-API + implementations supporting mechanisms offering additional controls + should provide extension routines that allow these controls to be + exercised (perhaps by modifying the initiator's GSS-API credential prior + to its use in establishing a context). However, the simple delegation + control provided by GSS-API should always be able to over-ride other + mechanism-specific delegation controls - If the application instructs + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 20] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_init_sec_context() that delegation is not desired, then the + implementation must not permit delegation to occur. This is an + exception to the general rule that a mechanism may enable services even + if they are not requested - delegation may only be provide at the + explicit request of the application. + + 6.2. Mutual authentication + + Usually, a context acceptor will require that a context initiator + authenticate itself so that the acceptor may make an access-control + decision prior to performing a service for the initiator. In some + cases, the initiator may also request that the acceptor authenticate + itself. GSS-API allows the initiating application to request this + mutual authentication service by setting a flag when calling + gss_init_sec_context. + + The initiating application is informed as to whether or not mutual + authentication is being requested of the context acceptor. Note that + some mechanisms may not support mutual authentication, and other + mechanisms may always perform mutual authentication, whether or not the + initiating application requests it. In particular, mutual + authentication my be required by some mechanisms in order to support + replay or out-of-sequence message detection, and for such mechanisms a + request for either of these services will automatically enable mutual + authentication. + + 6.3. Replay and out-of-sequence detection + + The GSS-API may provide detection of mis-ordered message once a security + context has been established. Protection may be applied to messages by + either application, by calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap, and + verified by the peer application by calling gss_verify_mic or + gss_unwrap. + + gss_get_mic calculates a cryptographic checksum of an application + message, and returns that checksum in a token. The application should + pass both the token and the message to the peer application, which + presents them to gss_verify_mic. + + gss_wrap calculates a cryptographic checksum of an application message, + and places both the checksum and the message inside a single token. The + application should pass the token to the peer application, which + presents it to gss_unwrap to extract the message and verify the + checksum. + + Either pair of routines may be capable of detecting out-of-sequence + message delivery, or duplication of messages. Details of such mis- + ordered messages are indicated through supplementary status bits in the + major status code returned by gss_verify_mic or gss_unwrap. The + relevant supplementary bits are: + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 21] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN - The token is a duplicate of one that has already + been received and processed. Contexts that do not claim to + provide replay detection may still set this bit if the duplicate + message is processed immediately after the original, with no + intervening messages. + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN - The token is too old to determine whether or not it is + a duplicate. Contexts supporting out-of-sequence detection but + not replay detection should always set this bit if + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN is set; contexts that support replay detection + should only set this bit if the token is so old that it cannot be + checked for duplication. + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN - A later token has already been processed. + + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN - An earlier token has not yet been received. + + A mechanism need not maintain a list of all tokens that have been + processed in order to support these status codes. A typical mechanism + might retain information about only the most recent "N" tokens + processed, allowing it to distinguish duplicates and missing tokens + within the most recent "N" messages; the receipt of a token older than + the most recent "N" would result in a GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN status. + + 6.4. Anonymous Authentication + + In certain situations, an application may wish to initiate the + authentication process to authenticate a peer, without revealing its own + identity. As an example, consider an application providing access to a + database containing medical information, and offering unrestricted + access to the service. A client of such a service might wish to + authenticate the service (in order to establish trust in any information + retrieved from it), but might not wish the service to be able to obtain + the client's identity (perhaps due to privacy concerns about the + specific inquiries, or perhaps simply to avoid being placed on mailing- + lists). + + In normal use of the GSS-API, the initiator's identity is made available + to the acceptor as a result of the context establishment process. + However, context initiators may request that their identity not be + revealed to the context acceptor. Many mechanisms do not support + anonymous authentication, and for such mechanisms the request will not + be honored. An authentication token will be still be generated, but the + application is always informed if a requested service is unavailable, + and has the option to abort context establishment if anonymity is valued + above the other security services that would require a context to be + established. + + In addition to informing the application that a context is established + anonymously (via the ret_flags outputs from gss_init_sec_context and + gss_accept_sec_context), the optional src_name output from + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 22] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_accept_sec_context and gss_inquire_context will, for such contexts, + return a reserved internal-form name, defined by the implementation. + When presented to gss_display_name, this reserved internal-form name + will result in a printable name that is syntactically distinguishable + from any valid principal name supported by the implementation, + associated with a name-type object identifier with the value + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS, whose value us given in Appendix A. The printable + form of an anonymous name should be chosen such that it implies + anonymity, since this name may appear in, for example, audit logs. For + example, the string "" might be a good choice, if no valid + printable names supported by the implementation can begin with "<" and + end with ">". + + 6.5. Confidentiality + + If a context supports the confidentiality service, gss_wrap may be used + to encrypt application messages. Messages are selectively encrypted, + under the control of the conf_req_flag input parameter to gss_wrap. + + 6.6. Inter-process context transfer + + GSSAPI V2 provides routines (gss_export_sec_context and + gss_import_sec_context) which allow a security context to be transferred + between processes on a single machine. The most common use for such a + feature is a client-server design where the server is implemented as a + single process that accepts incoming security contexts, which then + launches child processes to deal with the data on these contexts. In + such a design, the child processes must have access to the security + context data structure created within the parent by its call to + gss_accept_sec_context so that they can use per-message protection + services and delete the security context when the communication session + ends. + + Since the security context data structure is expected to contain + sequencing information, it is impractical in general to share a context + between processes. Thus GSSAPI provides a call (gss_export_sec_context) + that the process which currently owns the context can call to declare + that it has no intention to use the context subsequently, and to create + an inter-process token containing information needed by the adopting + process to successfully import the context. After successful completion + of this call, the original security context is made inaccessible to the + calling process by GSSAPI, and any context handles referring to this + context are no longer valid. The originating process transfers the + inter-process token to the adopting process, which passes it to + gss_import_sec_context, and a fresh gss_ctx_id_t is created such that it + is functionally identical to the original context. + + The inter-process token may contain sensitive data from the original + security context (including cryptographic keys). Applications using + inter-process tokens to transfer security contexts must take appropriate + steps to protect these tokens in transit. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 23] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Implementations are not required to support the inter-process transfer + of security contexts. The ability to transfer a security context is + indicated when the context is created, by gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context setting the GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bit in their + ret_flags parameter. + + + 6.7. The use of incomplete contexts + + Some mechanisms may allow the per-message services to be used before the + context establishment process is complete. For example, a mechanism may + include sufficient information in its initial context-level token for + the context acceptor to immediately decode messages protected with + gss_wrap or gss_get_mic. For such a mechanism, the initiating + application need not wait until subsequent context-level tokens have + been sent and received before invoking the per-message protection + services. + + The ability of a context to provide per-message services in advance of + complete context establishment is indicated by the setting of the + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG bit in the ret_flags parameter from + gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context. Applications wishing + to use per-message protection services on partially-established contexts + should check this flag before attempting to invoke gss_wrap or + gss_get_mic. + + + + 7. GSS-API routine descriptions + + In addition to the explicit major status codes documented here, the code + GSS_S_FAILURE may be returned by any routine, indicating an + implementation-specific or mechanism-specific error condition, further + details of which are reported via the minor_status parameter. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 24] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.1. gss_accept_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + const gss_channel_bindings_t + input_chan_bindings, + const gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_OID * mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application and + a remote peer to be established. The routine may return a output_token + which should be transferred to the peer application, where the peer + application will present it to gss_init_sec_context. If no token need + be sent, gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this by setting the length + field of the output_token argument to zero. To complete the context + establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the peer + application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context will return a status flag of + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in which case it should be called again when the + reply token is received from the peer application, passing the token to + gss_accept_sec_context via the input_token parameters. + + Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and + return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited + for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke + gss_accept_sec_context within a loop: + + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + ... + + do { + receive_token_from_peer(input_token); + maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + cred_hdl, + input_token, + input_bindings, + &client_name, + &mech_type, + output_token, + &ret_flags, + &time_rec, + &deleg_cred); + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 25] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + report_error(maj_stat, min_stat); + }; + if (output_token->length != 0) { + send_token_to_peer(output_token); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, + output_token) + }; + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + }; + } while (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + + Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the + following restrictions apply to the output parameters: + + (a) The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined + + (b) Unless the accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be + applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value + returned via the mech_type parameter may be undefined until the + routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + (c) The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_CONF_FLAG, + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the + ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the + implementation expects would be valid if context establishment + were to succeed. + + The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits + within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time + gss_accept_sec_context returns, whether or not the context is + fully established. + + Although this requires that GSSAPI implementations set the + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags returned to a caller + (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code), + applications should not rely on this behavior as the flag was not + defined in Version 1 of the GSSAPI. Instead, applications should + be prepared to use per-message services after a successful context + establishment, according to the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 26] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to + zero. + + + While the routine returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the values returned via + the ret_flags argument indicate the services that the implementation + expects to be available from the established context. + + If the initial call of gss_accept_sec_context() fails, the + implementation should not create a context object, and should leave the + value of the context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to + indicate this. In the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the + implementation is permitted to delete the "half-built" security context + (in which case it should set the context_handle parameter to + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), but the preferred behavior is to leave the security + context (and the context_handle parameter) untouched for the application + to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context). + + Parameters: + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned in subsequent calls. Once + gss_accept_sec_context() has returned a value + via this parameter, resources have been assigned + to the corresponding context, and must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_delete_sec_context(). + + + acceptor_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + Credential handle claimed by context acceptor. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to accept the + context as a default principal. If + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified, but no + default acceptor principal is defined, + GSS_S_NO_CRED will be returned. + + input_token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token obtained from remote application. + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read, optional + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. If channel bindings are not + used, specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS. + + src_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + Authenticated name of context initiator. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 27] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + After use, this name should be deallocated by + passing it to gss_release_name(). If not + required, specify NULL. + + mech_type Object ID, modify, optional + Security mechanism used. The returned + OID value will be a pointer into static + storage, and should be treated as read-only + by the caller (in particular, it does not + need to be freed). If not required, specify + NULL. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + Token to be passed to peer application. If the + length field of the returned token buffer is 0, + then no token need be passed to the peer + application. If a non-zero length field is + returned, the associated storage must be freed + after use by the application with a call to + gss_release_buffer(). + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify, optional + Contains various independent flags, each of + which indicates that the context supports a + specific service option. If not needed, + specify NULL. Symbolic names are + provided for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags + should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags + value to test whether a given option is + supported by the context. The flags are: + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegated credentials are available + via the delegated_cred_handle + parameter + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer asked for mutual + authentication + False - Remote peer did not ask for mutual + authentication + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of protected messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence protected + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 28] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be invoked + by calling the gss_wrap routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap + routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - The initiator does not wish to + be authenticated; the src_name + parameter (if requested) contains + an anonymous internal name. + False - The initiator has been + authenticated normally. + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG + True - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + if the accompanying major status return + value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. + False - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + only if the accompanying major status + return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE. + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG + True - The resultant security context may + be transferred to other processes via + a call to gss_export_sec_context(). + False - The security context is not + transferrable. + All other bits should be set to zero. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. Specify NULL if not required. + + delegated_cred_handle + gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + credential handle for credentials received from + context initiator. Only valid if deleg_flag in + ret_flags is true, in which case an explicit + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 29] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + credential handle (i.e. not GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + will be returned; if deleg_flag is false, + gss_accept_context() will set this parameter to + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL. If a credential handle is + returned, the associated resources must be released + by the application after use with a call to + gss_release_cred(). Specify NULL if not required. + + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer application + is required to complete the context, and that + gss_accept_sec_context must be called again with that + token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed on the + input_token failed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks performed + on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for context + acceptance, or the credential handle did not reference + any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel bindings + to those specified via the input_chan_bindings + parameter. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did not + refer to a valid context. + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid MIC. + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error + during context establishment. + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of a + token already processed. This is a fatal error during + context establishment. + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 30] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The received token specified a mechanism that is not + supported by the implementation or the provided + credential. + + + + + + + + 7.2. gss_acquire_cred + + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * time_rec) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing credential + by name. GSS-API implementations must impose a local access-control + policy on callers of this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from + acquiring credentials to which they are not entitled. This routine is + not intended to provide a ``login to the network'' function, as such a + function would involve the creation of new credentials rather than + merely acquiring a handle to existing credentials. Such functions, if + required, should be defined in implementation-specific extensions to the + API. + + If desired_name is GSS_C_NO_NAME, the call is interpreted as a request + for a credential handle that will invoke default behavior when passed to + gss_init_sec_context() (if cred_usage is GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH) + or gss_accept_sec_context() (if cred_usage is GSS_C_ACCEPT or + GSS_C_BOTH). + + This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, + since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways of + obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login process. + Some implementations may therefore not support the acquisition of + GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via gss_acquire_cred for any + name other than an empty name. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may chooses to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g. by gss_init_sec_context or + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 31] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call of + gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of gss_acquire_cred must + return valid credential data, and may therefore incur the overhead of a + deferred credential acquisition. + + Parameters: + + desired_name gss_name_t, read + Name of principal whose credential + should be acquired + + time_req Integer, read, optional + number of seconds that credentials + should remain valid. Specify GSS_C_INDEFINITE + to request that the credentials have the maximum + permitted lifetime. + + desired_mechs Set of Object IDs, read, optional + set of underlying security mechanisms that + may be used. GSS_C_NO_OID_SET may be used + to obtain an implementation-specific default. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, read + GSS_C_BOTH - Credentials may be used + either to initiate or accept + security contexts. + GSS_C_INITIATE - Credentials will only be + used to initiate security + contexts. + GSS_C_ACCEPT - Credentials will only be used to + accept security contexts. + + output_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify + The returned credential handle. Resources + associated with this credential handle must + be released by the application after use + with a call to gss_release_cred(). + + actual_mechs Set of Object IDs, modify, optional + The set of mechanisms for which the + credential is valid. Storage associated + with the returned OID-set must be released by + the application after use with a call to + gss_release_oid_set(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid. If the + implementation does not support expiration of + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 32] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will + be returned. Specify NULL if not required + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Unavailable mechanism requested + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE Type contained within desired_name parameter is not + supported + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME Value supplied for desired_name parameter is ill- + formed. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The credentials could not be acquired because + they have expired. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED No credentials were found for the specified name. + + + + + + + + 7.3. gss_add_cred + + + OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + const gss_OID desired_mech, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + OM_uint32 initiator_time_req, + OM_uint32 acceptor_time_req, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * initiator_time_rec, + OM_uint32 * acceptor_time_rec) + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 33] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Purpose: + + Adds a credential-element to a credential. The credential-element is + identified by the name of the principal to which it refers. GSSAPI + implementations must impose a local access-control policy on callers of + this routine to prevent unauthorized callers from acquiring credential- + elements to which they are not entitled. This routine is not intended to + provide a ``login to the network'' function, as such a function would + involve the creation of new mechanism-specific authentication data, + rather than merely acquiring a GSSAPI handle to existing data. Such + functions, if required, should be defined in implementation-specific + extensions to the API. + + This routine is expected to be used primarily by context acceptors, + since implementations are likely to provide mechanism-specific ways of + obtaining GSS-API initiator credentials from the system login process. + Some implementations may therefore not support the acquisition of + GSS_C_INITIATE or GSS_C_BOTH credentials via gss_acquire_cred. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may chooses to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g. by gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call of + gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of gss_acquire_cred must + return valid credential data, and may therefore incur the overhead of a + deferred credential acquisition. + + This routine can be used to either create a new credential containing + all credential-elements of the original in addition to the newly-acquire + credential-element, or to add the new credential-element to an existing + credential. If NULL is specified for the output_cred_handle parameter + argument, the new credential-element will be added to the credential + identified by input_cred_handle; if a valid pointer is specified for the + output_cred_handle parameter, a new credential and handle will be + created. + + If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as the input_cred_handle, the + gss_add_cred will create its output_cred_handle based on default + behavior. That is, the call will have the same effect as if the + application had first made a call to gss_acquire_cred(), specifying the + same usage and passing GSS_C_NO_NAME as the desired_name parameter to + obtain an explicit credential handle embodying default behavior, passed + this credential handle to gss_add_cred(), and finally called + gss_release_cred() on the first credential handle. + + If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is specified as the input_cred_handle parameter, + a non-NULL output_cred_handle must be supplied. + + Parameters: + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 34] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + input_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + The credential to which a credential-element + will be added. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is + specified, the routine will create the new + credential based on default behavior (see + description above). Note that, while the + credential-handle is not modified by + gss_add_cred(), the underlying credential + will be modified if output_credential_handle + is NULL. + + desired_name gss_name_t, read. + Name of principal whose credential + should be acquired. + + desired_mech Object ID, read + Underlying security mechanism with which the + credential may be used. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, read + GSS_C_BOTH - Credential may be used + either to initiate or accept + security contexts. + GSS_C_INITIATE - Credential will only be + used to initiate security + contexts. + GSS_C_ACCEPT - Credential will only be used to + accept security contexts. + + initiator_time_req Integer, read, optional + number of seconds that the credential + should remain valid for initiating security + contexts. This argument is ignored if the + created credentials are of type GSS_C_ACCEPT. + Specify GSS_C_INDEFINITE to request that the + credentials have the maximum permitted initiator + lifetime. + + acceptor_time_req Integer, read, optional + number of seconds that the credential + should remain valid for accepting security + contexts. This argument is ignored if the + created credentials are of type GSS_C_INITIATE. + Specify GSS_C_INDEFINITE to request that the + credentials have the maximum permitted initiator + lifetime. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 35] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + output_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + The returned credential handle, containing + the new credential-element and all the + credential-elements from input_cred_handle. + If a valid pointer to a gss_cred_id_t is + supplied for this parameter, gss_add_cred + creates a new credential handle containing all + credential-elements from the input_cred_handle + and the newly acquired credential-element; if + NULL is specified for this parameter, the newly + acquired credential-element will be added + to the credential identified by input_cred_handle. + The resources associated with any credential + handle returned via this parameter must be + released by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_cred(). + + actual_mechs Set of Object IDs, modify, optional + The complete set of mechanisms for which + the new credential is valid. Storage for + the returned OID-set must be freed by the + application after use with a call to + gss_release_oid_set(). Specify NULL if + not required. + + initiator_time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid for + initiating contexts using the specified + mechanism. If the implementation or mechanism + does not support expiration of credentials, the + value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required + + acceptor_time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid for + accepting security contexts using the specified + mechanism. If the implementation or mechanism + does not support expiration of credentials, the + value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Unavailable mechanism requested + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE Type contained within desired_name parameter is not + supported + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 36] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME Value supplied for desired_name parameter is ill- + formed. + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT The credential already contains an element for + the requested mechanism with overlapping usage and + validity period. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The required credentials could not be added + because they have expired. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED No credentials were found for the specified name. + + + + + + + + 7.4. gss_add_oid_set_member + + OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member_oid, + gss_OID_set * oid_set) + + Purpose: + + Add an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine is + intended for use in conjunction with gss_create_empty_oid_set when + constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to gss_acquire_cred. + + The oid_set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was created by + GSSAPI (e.g. a set returned by gss_create_empty_oid_set()). GSSAPI + creates a copy of the member_oid and inserts this copy into the set, + expanding the storage allocated to the OID-set's elements array if + necessary. The routine may add the new member OID anywhere within the + elements array, and implementations should verify that the new + member_oid is not already contained within the elements array. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + member_oid Object ID, read + The object identifier to copied into + the set. + + oid_set Set of Object ID, modify + The set in which the object identifier + should be inserted. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 37] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + 7.5. gss_canonicalize_name + + OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * output_name) + + Purpose: + + Generate a canonical mechanism name (MN) from an arbitrary internal + name. The mechanism name is the name that would be returned to a + context acceptor on successful authentication of a context where the + initiator used the input_name in a successful call to gss_acquire_cred, + specifying an OID set containing as its only member, + followed by a call to gss_init_sec_context, specifying as + the authentication mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name gss_name_t, read + The name for which a canonical form is + desired + + mech_type Object ID, read + The authentication mechanism for which the + canonical form of the name is desired. The + desired mechanism must be specified explicitly; + no default is provided. + + output_name gss_name_t, modify + The resultant canonical name. Storage + associated with this name must be freed by + the application after use with a call to + gss_release_name(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 38] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion. + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The identified mechanism is not supported. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The provided internal name contains no elements that + could be processed by the sepcified mechanism. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided internal name was ill-formed. + + + + + + + + 7.6. gss_compare_name + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t name1, + const gss_name_t name2, + int * name_equal) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to compare two internal-form names to determine + whether they refer to the same entity. + + If either name presented to gss_compare_name denotes an anonymous + principal, the routines should indicate that the two names do not refer + to the same identity. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + name1 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name2 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name_equal boolean, modify + non-zero - names refer to same entity + zero - names refer to different entities + (strictly, the names are not known + to refer to the same identity). + + Function value: GSS status code + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 39] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The two names were of incomparable types. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME One or both of name1 or name2 was ill-formed + + + + + + + + 7.7. gss_context_time + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 * time_rec) + + Purpose: + + Determines the number of seconds for which the specified context will + remain valid. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context to be interrogated. + + time_rec Integer, modify + Number of seconds that the context will remain + valid. If the context has already expired, + zero will be returned. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a valid + context + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 40] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.8. gss_create_empty_oid_set + + OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * oid_set) + + Purpose: + + Create an object-identifier set containing no object identifiers, to + which members may be subsequently added using the + gss_add_oid_set_member() routine. These routines are intended to be + used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to + gss_acquire_cred. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + oid_set Set of Object IDs, modify + The empty object identifier set. + The routine will allocate the + gss_OID_set_desc object, which the + application must free after use with + a call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + 7.9. gss_delete_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token) + + Purpose: + + Delete a security context. gss_delete_sec_context will delete the local + data structures associated with the specified security context, and may + generate an output_token, which when passed to the peer + gss_process_context_token will instruct it to do likewise. If no token + is required by the mechanism, the GSS-API should set the length field of + the output_token (if provided) to zero. No further security services + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 41] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + may be obtained using the context specified by context_handle. + + In addition to deleting established security contexts, + gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" security + contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + gss_init_sec_context()/gss_accept_sec_context() calls. + + The output_token parameter is retained for compatibility with version 1 + of the GSS-API. It is recommended that both peer applications invoke + gss_delete_sec_context passing the value GSS_C_NO_BUFFER for the + output_token parameter, indicating that no token is required, and that + gss_delete_sec_context should simply delete local context data + structures. If the application does pass a valid buffer to + gss_delete_sec_context, mechanisms are encouraged to return a zero- + length token, indicating that no peer action is necessary, and that no + token should be transferred by the application. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle identifying context to delete. + After deleting the context, the GSSAPI will set + this context handle to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify, optional + token to be sent to remote application to + instruct it to also delete the context. It + is recommended that applications specify + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER for this parameter, requesting + local deletion only. If a buffer parameter is + provided by the application, the mechanism may + return a token in it; mechanisms that implement + only local deletion should set the length field of + this token to zero to indicate to the application + that no token is to be sent to the peer. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT No valid context was supplied + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 42] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.10. gss_display_name + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID * output_name_type) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque + internal-form name for display purposes. The syntax of a printable + name is defined by the GSS-API implementation. + + If input_name denotes an anonymous principal, the implementation should + return the gss_OID value GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS as the output_name_type, and + a textual name that is syntactically distinct from all valid supported + printable names in output_name_buffer. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + input_name gss_name_t, read + name to be displayed + + output_name_buffer buffer, character-string, modify + buffer to receive textual name string. + The application must free storage associated + with this name after use with a call to + gss_release_buffer(). + + output_name_type Object ID, modify, optional + The type of the returned name. The returned + gss_OID will be a pointer into static storage, + and should be treated as read-only by the caller + (in particular, it does not need to be freed). + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME input_name was ill-formed + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 43] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.11. gss_display_status + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + OM_uint32 status_value, + int status_type, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 * message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSS-API + status code, for display to the user or for logging purposes. Since + some status values may indicate multiple conditions, applications may + need to call gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating a + single text string. The message_context parameter is used by + gss_acquire_cred to store state information about which error messages + have already been extracted from a given status_value; message_context + must be initialized to 0 by the application prior to the first call, and + gss_display_status will return a non-zero value in this parameter if + there are further messages to extract. The message_context parameter + contains all state information required by gss_display_status in order + to extract further messages from the status_value; even when a non-zero + value is returned in this parameter, the application is not required to + call gss_display_status again unless subsequent messages are desired. + The following code extracts all messages from a given status code and + prints them to stderr: + + + OM_uint32 message_context; + OM_uint32 status_code; + OM_uint32 maj_status; + OM_uint32 min_status; + gss_buffer_desc status_string; + + ... + + message_context = 0; + + do { + + maj_status = gss_display_status (&min_status, + status_code, + GSS_C_GSS_CODE, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + &message_context, + &status_string) + + fprintf(stderr, + "%.*s\n", + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 44] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + status_string.length, + status_string.value); + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, + &status_string); + + } while (message_context != 0); + + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + status_value Integer, read + Status value to be converted + + status_type Integer, read + GSS_C_GSS_CODE - status_value is a GSS status + code + GSS_C_MECH_CODE - status_value is a mechanism + status code + + mech_type Object ID, read, optional + Underlying mechanism (used to interpret a + minor status value) Supply GSS_C_NO_OID to + obtain the system default. + + message_context Integer, read/modify + Should be initialized to zero by the + application prior to the first call. + On return from gss_display_status(), + a non-zero status_value parameter indicates + that additional messages may be extracted + from the status code via subsequent calls + to gss_display_status(), passing the same + status_value, status_type, mech_type, and + message_context parameters. + + status_string buffer, character string, modify + textual interpretation of the status_value. + Storage associated with this parameter must + be freed by the application after use with + a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 45] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Indicates that translation in accordance with an + unsupported mechanism type was requested + + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS The status value was not recognized, or the status + type was neither GSS_C_GSS_CODE nor GSS_C_MECH_CODE. + + + + + + + + 7.12. gss_duplicate_name + + OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t src_name, + gss_name_t * dest_name) + + Purpose: + + Create an exact duplicate of the existing internal name src_name. The + new dest_name will be independent of src_name (i.e. src_name and + dest_name must both be released, and the release of one shall not affect + the validity of the other). + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + src_name gss_name_t, read + internal name to be duplicated. + + dest_name gss_name_t, modify + The resultant copy of . + Storage associated with this name must + be freed by the application after use + with a call to gss_release_name(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The src_name parameter was ill-formed. + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 46] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.13. gss_export_name + + OM_uint32 gss_export_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t exported_name) + + Purpose: + + To produce a canonical contiguous string representation of a mechanism + name (MN), suitable for direct comparison (e.g. with memcmp) for use in + authorization functions (e.g. matching entries in an access-control + list). + + The parameter must specify a valid MN (i.e. an internal + name generated by gss_accept_sec_context or by gss_canonicalize_name). + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name gss_name_t, read + The MN to be exported + + exported_name gss_buffer_t, octet-string, modify + The canonical contiguous string form of + . Storage associated with + this string must freed by the application + after use with gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN The provided internal name was not a mechanism name. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provide internal name was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The internal name was of a type not supported by the + GSSAPI implementation. + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 47] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.14. gss_export_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t interprocess_token) + + Purpose: + + Provided to support the sharing of work between multiple processes. + This routine will typically be used by the context-acceptor, in an + application where a single process receives incoming connection requests + and accepts security contexts over them, then passes the established + context to one or more other processes for message exchange. + gss_export_sec_context() deactivates the security context for the + calling process and creates an interprocess token which, when passed to + gss_import_sec_context in another process, will re-activate the context + in the second process. Only a single instantiation of a given context + may be active at any one time; a subsequent attempt by a context + exporter to access the exported security context will fail. + + The implementation may constrain the set of processes by which the + interprocess token may be imported, either as a function of local + security policy, or as a result of implementation decisions. For + example, some implementations may constrain contexts to be passed only + between processes that run under the same account, or which are part of + the same process group. + + The interprocess token may contain security-sensitive information (for + example cryptographic keys). While mechanisms are encouraged to either + avoid placing such sensitive information within interprocess tokens, or + to encrypt the token before returning it to the application, in a + typical object-library GSSAPI implementation this may not be possible. + Thus the application must take care to protect the interprocess token, + and ensure that any process to which the token is transferred is + trustworthy. + + If creation of the interprocess token is succesful, the implementation + shall deallocate all process-wide resources associated with the security + context, and set the context_handle to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. In the event + of an error that makes it impossible to complete the export of the + security context, the implementation must not return an interprocess + token, and should strive to leave the security context referenced by the + context_handle parameter untouched. If this is impossible, it is + permissible for the implementation to delete the security context, + providing it also sets the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 48] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle identifying the context to transfer. + + interprocess_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be transferred to target process. + Storage associated with this token must be + freed by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context was invalid + + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE The operation is not supported. + + + + + + + + 7.15. gss_get_mic + + OM_uint32 gss_get_mic ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t msg_token) + + Purpose: + + Generates a cryptographic MIC for the supplied message, and places the + MIC in a token for transfer to the peer application. The qop_req + parameter allows a choice between several cryptographic algorithms, if + supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + will be sent + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 49] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + qop_req gss_qop_t, read, optional + Specifies requested quality of protection. + Callers are encouraged, on portability grounds, + to accept the default quality of protection + offered by the chosen mechanism, which may be + requested by specifying GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT for + this parameter. If an unsupported protection + strength is requested, gss_get_mic will return a + major_status of GSS_S_BAD_QOP. + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be protected + + msg_token buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive token. The application must + free storage associated with this buffer after + use with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a valid + context + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP The specified QOP is not supported by the mechanism. + + + + + + + + 7.16. gss_import_name + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + const gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t * output_name) + + Purpose: + + Convert a contiguous string name to internal form. In general, the + internal name returned (via the parameter) will not be an + MN; the exception to this is if the indicates that the + contiguous string provided via the parameter is of + type GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, in which case the returned internal name will + be an MN for the mechanism that exported the name. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 50] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name_buffer buffer, octet-string, read + buffer containing contiguous string name to convert + + input_name_type Object ID, read, optional + Object ID specifying type of printable + name. Applications may specify either + GSS_C_NO_OID to use a mechanism-specific + default printable syntax, or an OID registered + by the GSS-API implementation to name a + specific namespace. + + output_name gss_name_t, modify + returned name in internal form. Storage + associated with this name must be freed + by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_name(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The input_name_type was unrecognized + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The input_name parameter could not be interpreted as a + name of the specified type + + + + + + + + + 7.17. gss_import_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_import_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle) + + Purpose: + + Allows a process to import a security context established by another + process. A given interprocess token may be imported only once. See + gss_export_sec_context. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 51] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + interprocess_token buffer, opaque, modify + token received from exporting process + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle of newly reactivated context. + Resources associated with this context handle + must be released by the application after use + with a call to gss_delete_sec_context(). + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The token did not contain a valid context reference. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token was invalid. + + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE The operation is unavailable. + + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED Local policy prevents the import of this context by + the current process.. + + + + + + + + 7.18. gss_indicate_mechs + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * mech_set) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to determine which underlying security mechanisms + are available. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 52] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + mech_set set of Object IDs, modify + set of implementation-supported mechanisms. + The returned gss_OID_set value will be a + dynamically-allocated OID set, that should + be released by the caller after use with a + call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + 7.19. gss_init_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t + input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec ) + + Purpose: + + Initiates the establishment of a security context between the + application and a remote peer. Initially, the input_token parameter + should be specified either as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or as a pointer to a + gss_buffer_desc object whose length field contains the value zero. The + routine may return a output_token which should be transferred to the + peer application, where the peer application will present it to + gss_accept_sec_context. If no token need be sent, gss_init_sec_context + will indicate this by setting the length field of the output_token + argument to zero. To complete the context establishment, one or more + reply tokens may be required from the peer application; if so, + gss_init_sec_context will return a status containing the supplementary + information bit GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. In this case, + gss_init_sec_context should be called again when the reply token is + received from the peer application, passing the reply token to + gss_init_sec_context via the input_token parameters. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 53] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Portable applications should be constructed to use the token length and + return status to determine whether a token needs to be sent or waited + for. Thus a typical portable caller should always invoke + gss_init_sec_context within a loop: + + int context_established = 0; + gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + ... + input_token->length = 0; + + while (!context_established) { + maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, + cred_hdl, + &context_hdl, + target_name, + desired_mech, + desired_services, + desired_time, + input_bindings, + input_token, + &actual_mech, + output_token, + &actual_services, + &actual_time); + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + report_error(maj_stat, min_stat); + }; + if (output_token->length != 0) { + send_token_to_peer(output_token); + gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, + output_token) + }; + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) { + if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, + &context_hdl, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + break; + }; + if (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { + receive_token_from_peer(input_token); + } else { + context_established = 1; + }; + }; + + Whenever the routine returns a major status that includes the value + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context is not fully established and the + following restrictions apply to the output parameters: + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 54] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + (a) The value returned via the time_rec parameter is undefined + + (b) Unless the accompanying ret_flags parameter contains the bit + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG, indicating that per-message services may be + applied in advance of a successful completion status, the value + returned via the actual_mech_type parameter is undefined until the + routine returns a major status value of GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + (c) The values of the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, GSS_C_CONF_FLAG, + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and GSS_C_ANON_FLAG bits returned via the + ret_flags parameter should contain the values that the + implementation expects would be valid if context establishment + were to succeed. In particular, if the application has requested + a service such as delegation or anonymous authentication via the + req_flags argument, and such a service is unavailable from the + underlying mechanism, gss_init_sec_context should generate a token + that will not provide the service, and indicate via the ret_flags + argument that the service will not be supported. The application + may choose to abort the context establishment by calling + gss_delete_sec_context (if it cannot continue in the absence of + the service), or it may choose to transmit the token and continue + context establishment (if the service was merely desired but not + mandatory). + + The values of the GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG and GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG bits + within ret_flags should indicate the actual state at the time + gss_init_sec_context returns, whether or not the context is fully + established. + + Although this requires that GSSAPI implementations set the + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG in the final ret_flags returned to a caller + (i.e. when accompanied by a GSS_S_COMPLETE status code), + applications should not rely on this behavior as the flag was not + defined in Version 1 of the GSSAPI. Instead, applications should + be prepared to use per-message services after a successful context + establishment, according to the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG and + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG values. + + All other bits within the ret_flags argument should be set to + zero. + + If the initial call of gss_init_sec_context() fails, the implementation + should not create a context object, and should leave the value of the + context_handle parameter set to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT to indicate this. In + the event of a failure on a subsequent call, the implementation is + permitted to delete the "half-built" security context (in which case it + should set the context_handle parameter to GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT), but the + preferred behavior is to leave the security context untouched for the + application to delete (using gss_delete_sec_context). + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 55] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + initiator_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + handle for credentials claimed. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to act as a default + initiator principal. If no default + initiator is defined, the function will + return GSS_S_NO_CRED. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned by first call in continuation calls. + Resources associated with this context-handle + must be released by the application after use + with a call to gee_delete_sec_context(). + + target_name gss_name_t, read + Name of target + + mech_type OID, read, optional + Object ID of desired mechanism. Supply + GSS_C_NO_OID to obtain an implementation + specific default + + req_flags bit-mask, read + Contains various independent flags, each of + which requests that the context support a + specific service option. Symbolic + names are provided for each flag, and the + symbolic names corresponding to the required + flags should be logically-ORed + together to form the bit-mask value. The + flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegate credentials to remote peer + False - Don't delegate + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Request that remote peer + authenticate itself + False - Authenticate self to remote peer + only + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - Enable replay detection for + messages protected with gss_wrap + or gss_get_mic + False - Don't attempt to detect + replayed messages + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 56] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - Enable detection of out-of-sequence + protected messages + False - Don't attempt to detect + out-of-sequence messages + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - Do not reveal the initiator's + identity to the acceptor. + False - Authenticate normally. + + time_req Integer, read, optional + Desired number of seconds for which context + should remain valid. Supply 0 to request a + default validity period. + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read, optional + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS + if channel bindings are not used. + + input_token buffer, opaque, read, optional (see text) + Token received from peer application. + Supply GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, or a pointer to + a buffer containing the value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER + on initial call. + + actual_mech_type OID, modify, optional + Actual mechanism used. The OID returned via + this parameter will be a pointer to static + storage that should be treated as read-only; + In particular the application should not attempt + to free it. Specify NULL if not required. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be sent to peer application. If + the length field of the returned buffer is + zero, no token need be sent to the peer + application. Storage associated with this + buffer must be freed by the application + after use with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify, optional + Contains various independent flags, each of which + indicates that the context supports a specific + service option. Specify NULL if not + required. Symbolic names are provided + for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags should be + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 57] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + logically-ANDed with the ret_flags value to test + whether a given option is supported by the + context. The flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Credentials were delegated to + the remote peer + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer has been asked to + authenticated itself + False - Remote peer has not been asked to + authenticate itself + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of protected messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence protected + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will + not be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling gss_wrap routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap + routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - The initiator's identity has not been + revealed, and will not be revealed if + any emitted token is passed to the + acceptor. + False - The initiator's identity has been or + will be authenticated normally. + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG + True - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available for + use if the accompanying major status + return value is either GSS_S_COMPLETE or + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 58] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + False - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + only if the accompanying major status + return value is GSS_S_COMPLETE. + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG + True - The resultant security context may + be transferred to other processes via + a call to gss_export_sec_context(). + False - The security context is not + transferrable. + All other bits should be set to zero. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. If the implementation does + not support context expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer application + is required to complete the context, and that + gss_init_sec_context must be called again with that + token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed on the + input_token failed + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks performed + on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for context + initiation, or the credential handle did not reference + any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel bindings + to those specified via the input_chan_bindings + parameter + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid MIC, or a MIC that + could not be verified + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error + during context establishment + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 59] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of a + token already processed. This is a fatal error during + context establishment. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did not + refer to a valid context + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The provided target_name parameter contained an + invalid or unsupported type of name + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided target_name parameter was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH The specified mechanism is not supported by the + provided credential, or is unrecognized by the + implementation. + + + + + + + + 7.20. gss_inquire_context + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_name_t * targ_name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime_rec, + gss_OID * mech_type, + OM_uint32 * ctx_flags, + int * locally_initiated, + int * open ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains information about a security context. The caller must already + have obtained a handle that refers to the context, although the context + need not be fully established. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the security context. + + src_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name of the context initiator. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 60] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + If the context was established using anonymous + authentication, and if the application invoking + gss_inquire_context is the context acceptor, + an anonymous name will be returned. Storage + associated with this name must be freed by the + application after use with a call to + gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + targ_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name of the context acceptor. + Storage associated with this name must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not + Specify NULL if not required. + + lifetime_rec Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. If the context has + expired, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support + context expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + mech_type gss_OID, modify, optional + The security mechanism providing the + context. The returned OID will be a + pointer to static storage that should + be treated as read-only by the application; + in particular the application should not + attempt to free it. Specify NULL if not + required. + + ctx_flags bit-mask, modify, optional + Contains various independent flags, each of + which indicates that the context supports + (or is expected to support, if ctx_open is + false) a specific service option. If not + needed, specify NULL. Symbolic names are + provided for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags + should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags + value to test whether a given option is + supported by the context. The flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Credentials were delegated from + the initiator to the acceptor. + False - No credentials were delegated + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 61] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - The acceptor was authenticated + to the initiator + False - The acceptor did not authenticate + itself. + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of protected messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence protected + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be invoked + by calling gss_wrap routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + gss_wrap) available. gss_wrap will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_get_mic or gss_wrap + routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + GSS_C_ANON_FLAG + True - The initiator's identity will not + be revealed to the acceptor. + The src_name parameter (if + requested) contains an anonymous + internal name. + False - The initiator has been + authenticated normally. + GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG + True - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + for use. + False - Protection services (as specified + by the states of the GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) are available + only if the context is fully + established (i.e. if the open parameter + is non-zero). + GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG + True - The resultant security context may + be transferred to other processes via + a call to gss_export_sec_context(). + False - The security context is not + transferrable. + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 62] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + + + locally_initiated Boolean, modify + Non-zero if the invoking application is the + context initiator. + Specify NULL if not required. + + open Boolean, modify + Non-zero if the context is fully established; + Zero if a context-establishment token + is expected from the peer application. + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The referenced context could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has expired. If the lifetime_rec + parameter was requested, it will be set to 0. + + + + + + + + 7.21. gss_inquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage, + gss_OID_set * mechanisms ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains information about a credential. The caller must already have + obtained a handle that refers to the credential. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the target credential. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to inquire about + the default initiator principal. + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 63] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + + name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name whose identity the credential asserts. + Storage associated with this name should be freed + by the application after use with a call to + gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not required. + + lifetime Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain valid. If the credential has + expired, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support + credential expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, modify, optional + How the credential may be used. One of the + following: + GSS_C_INITIATE + GSS_C_ACCEPT + GSS_C_BOTH + Specify NULL if not required. + + mechanisms gss_OID_set, modify, optional + Set of mechanisms supported by the credential. + Storage associated with this OID set must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_oid_set(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The referenced credentials could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL The referenced credentials were invalid. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. If + the lifetime parameter was not passed as NULL, it will + be set to 0. + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 64] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.22. gss_inquire_cred_by_mech + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * initiator_lifetime, + OM_uint32 * acceptor_lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains per-mechanism information about a credential. The caller must + already have obtained a handle that refers to the credential. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the target credential. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to inquire about + the default initiator principal. + + mech_type gss_OID, read + The mechanism for which information should be + returned. + + name gss_name_t, modify, optional + The name whose identity the credential asserts. + Storage associated with this name must be + freed by the application after use with a call + to gss_release_name(). Specify NULL if not + required. + + initiator_lifetime Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain capable of initiating security contexts + under the specified mechanism. If the credential + can no longer be used to initiate contexts, or if + the credential usage for this mechanism is + GSS_C_ACCEPT, + this parameter will be set to zero. If the + implementation does not support expiration of + initiator credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE + will be returned. Specify NULL if not required. + + acceptor_lifetime Integer, modify, optional + The number of seconds for which the credential + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 65] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + will remain capable of accepting security contexts + under the specified mechanism. If the credential + can no longer be used to accept contexts, or if + the credential usage for this mechanism is + GSS_C_INITIATE, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support expiration + of acceptor credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE + will be returned. Specify NULL if not required. + + cred_usage gss_cred_usage_t, modify, optional + How the credential may be used with the specified + mechanism. One of the following: + GSS_C_INITIATE + GSS_C_ACCEPT + GSS_C_BOTH + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The referenced credentials could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL The referenced credentials were invalid. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. If + the lifetime parameter was not passed as NULL, it will + be set to 0. + + + + + + + + 7.23. gss_inquire_mechs_for_name + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_OID_set * mech_types ) + + Purpose: + + Returns the set of mechanisms supported by the GSSAPI implementation + that may be able to process the specified name. + + Each mechanism returned will recognize at least one element within the + name. It is permissible for this routine to be implemented within a + mechanism-independent GSSAPI layer, using the type information contained + within the presented name, and based on registration information + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 66] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + provided by individual mechanism implementations. This means that the + returned mech_types set may indicate that a particular mechanism will + understand the name when in fact it would refuse to accept the name as + input to gss_canonicalize_name, gss_init_sec_context, gss_acquire_cred + or gss_add_cred (due to some property of the specific name, as opposed + to the name type). Thus this routine should be used only as a pre- + filter for a call to a subsequent mechanism-specific routine. + + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + input_name gss_name_t, read + The name to which the inquiry relates. + + mech_types gss_OID_set, modify + Set of mechanisms that may support the + specified name. The returned OID set + must be freed by the caller after use + with a call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The input_name parameter was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The input_name parameter contained an invalid or + unsupported type of name + + + + + + + 7.24. gss_inquire_names_for_mech + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID mechanism, + gss_OID_set * name_types) + + Purpose: + + Returns the set of nametypes supported by the specified mechanism. + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 67] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + mechanism gss_OID, read + The mechanism to be interrogated. + + name_types gss_OID_set, modify + Set of name-types supported by the specified + mechanism. The returned OID set must be + freed by the application after use with a + call to gss_release_oid_set(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + 7.25. gss_process_context_token + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer) + + Purpose: + + Provides a way to pass a token to the security service. Used with + tokens emitted by gss_delete_sec_context. Note that mechanisms are + encouraged to perform local deletion, and not emit tokens from + gss_delete_sec_context. This routine, therefore, is primarily for + backwards compatibility with V1 applications. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + context handle of context on which token is to + be processed + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token to process + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 68] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed on the + token failed + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle did not refer to a valid context + + + + + + + + 7.26. gss_release_buffer + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer) + + Purpose: + + Free storage associated with a buffer. The storage must have been + allocated by a GSS-API routine. In addition to freeing the associated + storage, the routine will zero the length field in the descriptor to + which the buffer parameter refers. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + buffer buffer, modify + The storage associated with the buffer will be + deleted. The gss_buffer_desc object will not + be freed, but its length field will be zeroed. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 69] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.27. gss_release_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Informs GSS-API that the specified credential handle is no longer + required by the application, and frees associated resources. + + Parameters: + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + Opaque handle identifying credential + to be released. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL + is supplied, the routine will complete + successfully, but will do nothing. + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED Credentials could not be accessed. + + + + + + + + 7.28. gss_release_name + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t * name) + + Purpose: + + Free GSSAPI-allocated storage by associated with an internal-form name. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + name gss_name_t, modify + The name to be deleted + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 70] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The name parameter did not contain a valid name + + + + + + + + 7.29. gss_release_oid_set + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * set) + + Purpose: + + Free storage associated with a GSSAPI-generated gss_OID_set object. The + set parameter must refer to an OID-set that was returned from a GSSAPI + routine. gss_release_oid_set() will free the storage associated with + each individual member OID, the OID set's elements array, and the + gss_OID_set_desc. + + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + set Set of Object IDs, modify + The storage associated with the gss_OID_set + will be deleted. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 71] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + 7.30. gss_test_oid_set_member + + OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member, + const gss_OID_set set, + int * present) + + Purpose: + + Interrogate an Object Identifier set to determine whether a specified + Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to be used with + OID sets returned by gss_indicate_mechs(), gss_acquire_cred(), and + gss_inquire_cred(), but will also work with user-generated sets. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + member Object ID, read + The object identifier whose presence + is to be tested. + + set Set of Object ID, read + The Object Identifier set. + + present Boolean, modify + non-zero if the specified OID is a member + of the set, zero if not. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + + + + + + + 7.31. gss_unwrap + + OM_uint32 gss_unwrap ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state) + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 72] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Purpose: + + Converts a message previously protected by gss_wrap back to a usable + form, verifying the embedded MIC. The conf_state parameter indicates + whether the message was encrypted; the qop_state parameter indicates the + strength of protection that was used to provide the confidentiality and + integrity services. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + protected message + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + Buffer to receive unwrapped message. + Storage associated with this buffer must + be freed by the application after use use + with a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + conf_state boolean, modify, optional + Non-zero - Confidentiality and integrity protection + were used + Zero - Integrity service only was used + Specify NULL if not required + + qop_state gss_qop_t, modify, optional + Quality of protection gained from MIC. + Specify NULL if not required + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The MIC was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but it had already been processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC for + the message, but it is too old to check for + duplication. + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 73] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC for + the message, but has been verified out of sequence; a + later token has already been received. + + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC for + the message, but has been verified out of sequence; + an earlier expected token has not yet been received. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a valid + context + + + + + + + + 7.32. gss_verify_mic + + OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state) + + Purpose: + + Verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, + fits the supplied message. The qop_state parameter allows a message + recipient to determine the strength of protection that was applied to + the message. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + Message to be verified + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + Token associated with message + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 74] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + qop_state gss_qop_t, modify, optional + quality of protection gained from MIC + Specify NULL if not required + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The MIC was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC + for the message, but it had already been processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC for + the message, but it is too old to check for + duplication. + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC for + the message, but has been verified out of sequence; a + later token has already been received. + + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct MIC for + the message, but has been verified out of sequence; + an earlier expected token has not yet been received. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a valid + context + + + + + + + + 7.33. gss_wrap + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer ) + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 75] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + Purpose: + + Attaches a cryptographic MIC and optionally encrypts the specified + input_message. The output_message contains both the MIC and the + message. The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several + cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Since some application-level protocols may wish to use tokens emitted by + gss_wrap() to provide "secure framing", implementations should support + the wrapping of zero-length messages. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context on which the message + will be sent + + conf_req_flag boolean, read + Non-zero - Both confidentiality and integrity + services are requested + Zero - Only integrity service is requested + + qop_req gss_qop_t, read, optional + Specifies required quality of protection. A + mechanism-specific default may be requested by + setting qop_req to GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT. If an + unsupported protection strength is requested, + gss_wrap will return a major_status of + GSS_S_BAD_QOP. + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + Message to be protected + + conf_state boolean, modify, optional + Non-zero - Confidentiality, data origin + authentication and integrity + services have been applied + Zero - Integrity and data origin services only + has been applied. + Specify NULL if not required + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + Buffer to receive protected message. + Storage associated with this message must + be freed by the application after use with + a call to gss_release_buffer(). + + Function value: GSS status code + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 76] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a valid + context + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP The specified QOP is not supported by the mechanism. + + + + + + + + 7.34. gss_wrap_size_limit + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 * max_input_size) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to determine the maximum message size that, if + presented to gss_wrap with the same conf_req_flag and qop_req + parameters, will result in an output token containing no more than + req_output_size bytes. + + This call is intended for use by applications that communicate over + protocols that impose a maximum message size. It enables the + application to fragment messages prior to applying protection. + + Successful completion of this call does not guarantee that gss_wrap will + be able to protect a message of length max_input_size bytes, since this + ability may depend on the availability of system resources at the time + that gss_wrap is called. However, if the implementation itself imposes + an upper limit on the length of messages that may be processed by + gss_wrap, the implementation should not return a value via + max_input_bytes that is greater than this length. + + Parameters: + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the security over + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 77] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + which the messages will be sent. + + conf_req_flag Boolean, read + Indicates whether gss_wrap will be asked + to apply confidentiality protection in + addition to integrity protection. See + the routine description for gss_wrap + for more details. + + qop_req gss_qop_t, read + Indicates the level of protection that + gss_wrap will be asked to provide. See + the routine description for gss_wrap for + more details. + + req_output_size Integer, read + The desired maximum size for tokens emitted + by gss_wrap. + + max_input_size Integer, modify + The maximum input message size that may + be presented to gss_wrap in order to + guarantee that the emitted token shall + be no larger than req_output_size bytes. + + Function value: GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The referenced context could not be accessed. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has expired. + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP The specified QOP is not supported by the mechanism. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 78] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + APPENDIX A. GSS-API C header file gssapi.h + + C-language GSS-API implementations should include a copy of the + following header-file. + + #ifndef GSSAPI_H_ + #define GSSAPI_H_ + + + + /* + * First, include stddef.h to get size_t defined. + */ + #include + + /* + * If the platform supports the xom.h header file, it should be + * included here. + */ + #include + + + + /* + * Now define the three implementation-dependent types. + */ + typedef gss_ctx_id_t; + typedef gss_cred_id_t; + typedef gss_name_t; + + /* + * The following type must be defined as the smallest natural + * unsigned integer supported by the platform that has at least + * 32 bits of precision. + */ + typedef gss_uint32; + + + #ifdef OM_STRING + /* + * We have included the xom.h header file. Verify that OM_uint32 + * is defined correctly. + */ + + #if sizeof(gss_uint32) != sizeof(OM_uint32) + #error Incompatible definition of OM_uint32 from xom.h + #endif + + typedef OM_object_identifier gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + #else + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 79] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + /* + * We can't use X/Open definitions, so roll our own. + */ + + typedef gss_uint32 OM_uint32; + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + #endif + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + size_t count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + + /* + * For now, define a QOP-type as an OM_uint32 + */ + typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t; + + typedef int gss_cred_usage_t; + + /* + * Flag bits for context-level services. + */ + #define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 1 + #define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 2 + #define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 4 + #define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 8 + #define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 16 + #define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 32 + #define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG 64 + #define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG 128 + #define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG 256 + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 80] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + /* + * Credential usage options + */ + #define GSS_C_BOTH 0 + #define GSS_C_INITIATE 1 + #define GSS_C_ACCEPT 2 + + /* + * Status code types for gss_display_status + */ + #define GSS_C_GSS_CODE 1 + #define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2 + + /* + * The constant definitions for channel-bindings address families + */ + #define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC 0 + #define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL 1 + #define GSS_C_AF_INET 2 + #define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK 3 + #define GSS_C_AF_PUP 4 + #define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS 5 + #define GSS_C_AF_NS 6 + #define GSS_C_AF_NBS 7 + #define GSS_C_AF_ECMA 8 + #define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT 9 + #define GSS_C_AF_CCITT 10 + #define GSS_C_AF_SNA 11 + #define GSS_C_AF_DECnet 12 + #define GSS_C_AF_DLI 13 + #define GSS_C_AF_LAT 14 + #define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK 15 + #define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK 16 + #define GSS_C_AF_BSC 17 + #define GSS_C_AF_DSS 18 + #define GSS_C_AF_OSI 19 + #define GSS_C_AF_X25 21 + + #define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR 255 + + /* + * Various Null values + */ + #define GSS_C_NO_NAME ((gss_name_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_OID ((gss_OID) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL} + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 81] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + /* + * Some alternate names for a couple of the above + * values. These are defined for V1 compatibility. + */ + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID GSS_C_NO_OID + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET GSS_C_NO_OID_SET + + /* + * Define the default Quality of Protection for per-message + * services. Note that an implementation that offers multiple + * levels of QOP may define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT to be either zero + * (as done here) to mean "default protection", or to a specific + * explicit QOP value. However, a value of 0 should always be + * interpreted by a GSSAPI implementation as a request for the + * default protection level. + */ + #define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0 + + /* + * Expiration time of 2^32-1 seconds means infinite lifetime for a + * credential or security context + */ + #define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user_name(1)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME; + + /* + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 82] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 2(gss-host-based-services)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE; + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 3(gss-anonymous-name)}. The constant + * and GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS; + + + + /* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 4(gss-api-exported-name)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME; + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 83] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + /* Major status codes */ + + #define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0 + + /* + * Some "helper" definitions to make the status code macros obvious. + */ + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24 + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16 + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0 + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul + + /* + * The macros that test status codes for error conditions. + * Note that the GSS_ERROR() macro has changed slightly from + * the V1 GSSAPI so that it now evaluates its argument + * only once. + */ + #define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK << GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ERROR(x) \ + (x & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | \ + (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))) + + + /* + * Now the actual status code definitions + */ + + /* + * Calling errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ \ + (1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE \ + (2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE \ + (3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Routine errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_BAD_MECH (1ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAME (2ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (3ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 84] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + #define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS (4ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS (5ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_SIG (6ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_MIC GSS_S_BAD_SIG + #define GSS_S_NO_CRED (7ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT (8ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN (9ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED (11ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (12ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_FAILURE (13ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_QOP (14ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED (15ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE (16ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT (17ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN (18ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Supplementary info bits: + */ + #define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0)) + #define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1)) + #define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2)) + #define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3)) + #define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4)) + + + /* + * Finally, function prototypes for the GSS-API routines. + */ + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* desired_name */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + const gss_OID_set, /* desired_mechs */ + gss_cred_usage_t, /* cred_usage */ + gss_cred_id_t *, /* output_cred_handle */ + gss_OID_set *, /* actual_mechs */ + OM_uint32 * /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t * /* cred_handle */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* initiator_cred_handle */ + gss_ctx_id_t *, /* context_handle */ + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 85] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + const gss_name_t, /* target_name */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + OM_uint32, /* req_flags */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + const gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_token */ + gss_OID *, /* actual_mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + OM_uint32 *, /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32 * /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t *, /* context_handle */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* acceptor_cred_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_token_buffer */ + const gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + gss_name_t *, /* src_name */ + gss_OID *, /* mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + OM_uint32 *, /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32 *, /* time_rec */ + gss_cred_id_t * /* delegated_cred_handle */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t /* token_buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t *, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_token */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + OM_uint32 * /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_get_mic + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_qop_t, /* qop_req */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 86] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_buffer_t /* message_token */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* token_buffer */ + gss_qop_t * /* qop_state */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + gss_qop_t, /* qop_req */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + int *, /* conf_state */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_message_buffer */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_unwrap + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_message_buffer */ + int *, /* conf_state */ + gss_qop_t * /* qop_state */ + ); + + + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + OM_uint32, /* status_value */ + int, /* status_type */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + OM_uint32 *, /* message_context */ + gss_buffer_t /* status_string */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set * /* mech_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* name1 */ + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 87] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + const gss_name_t, /* name2 */ + int * /* name_equal */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_name_buffer */ + gss_OID * /* output_name_type */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* input_name_buffer */ + const gss_OID, /* input_name_type */ + gss_name_t * /* output_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_export_name + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_buffer_t /* exported_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t * /* input_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_buffer_t /* buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set * /* set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* cred_handle */ + gss_name_t *, /* name */ + OM_uint32 *, /* lifetime */ + gss_cred_usage_t *, /* cred_usage */ + gss_OID_set * /* mechanisms */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 88] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + gss_name_t *, /* src_name */ + gss_name_t *, /* targ_name */ + OM_uint32 *, /* lifetime_rec */ + gss_OID *, /* mech_type */ + OM_uint32 *, /* ctx_flags */ + int *, /* locally_initiated */ + int * /* open */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + gss_qop_t, /* qop_req */ + OM_uint32, /* req_output_size */ + OM_uint32 * /* max_input_size */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* input_cred_handle */ + const gss_name_t, /* desired_name */ + const gss_OID, /* desired_mech */ + gss_cred_usage_t, /* cred_usage */ + OM_uint32, /* initiator_time_req */ + OM_uint32, /* acceptor_time_req */ + gss_cred_id_t *, /* output_cred_handle */ + gss_OID_set *, /* actual_mechs */ + OM_uint32 *, /* initiator_time_rec */ + OM_uint32 * /* acceptor_time_rec */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_cred_id_t, /* cred_handle */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + gss_name_t *, /* name */ + OM_uint32 *, /* initiator_lifetime */ + OM_uint32 *, /* acceptor_lifetime */ + gss_cred_usage_t * /* cred_usage */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t *, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* interprocess_token */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_sec_context ( + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 89] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_buffer_t, /* interprocess_token */ + gss_ctx_id_t * /* context_handle */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set * /* oid_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_OID, /* member_oid */ + gss_OID_set * /* oid_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_OID, /* member */ + const gss_OID_set, /* set */ + int * /* present */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_OID, /* mechanism */ + gss_OID_set * /* name_types */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_OID_set * /* mech_types */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + const gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + gss_name_t * /* output_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + const gss_name_t, /* src_name */ + gss_name_t * /* dest_name */ + ); + + /* + * The following routines are obsolete variants of gss_get_mic, + * gss_verify_mic, gss_wrap and gss_unwrap. They should be + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 90] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + * provided by GSSAPI V2 implementations for backwards + * compatibility with V1 applications. Distinct entrypoints + * (as opposed to #defines) should be provided, both to allow + * GSSAPI V1 applications to link against GSSAPI V2 implementations, + * and to retain the slight parameter type differences between the + * obsolete versions of these routines and their current forms. + */ + + OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t /* message_token */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* token_buffer */ + int * /* qop_state */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + int *, /* conf_state */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_message_buffer */ + ); + + + OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_message_buffer */ + int *, /* conf_state */ + int * /* qop_state */ + ); + + + + + #endif /* GSSAPI_H_ */ + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 91] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + APPENDIX B. Additional constraints for application binary portability + + The purpose of this C-bindings document is to encourage source-level + portability of applications across GSS-API implementations on different + platforms and atop different mechanisms. Additional goals that have not + been explicitly addressed by this document are link-time and run-time + portability. + + Link-time portability provides the ability to compile an application + against one implementation of GSS-API, and then link it against a + different implementation on the same platform. It is a stricter + requirement than source-level portability. + + Run-time portability differs from link-time portability only on those + platforms that implement dynamically loadable GSS-API implementations, + but do not offer load-time symbol resolution. On such platforms, run- + time portability is a stricter requirement than link-time portability, + and will typically include the precise placement of the various GSS-API + routines within library entrypoint vectors. + + Individual platforms will impose their own rules that must be followed + to achieve link-time (and run-time, if different) portability. In order + to ensure either form of binary portability, an ABI specification must + be written for GSS-API implementations on that platform. However, it is + recognized that there are some issues that are likely to be common to + all such ABI specifications. This appendix is intended to be a + repository for such common issues, and contains some suggestions that + individual ABI specifications may choose to reference. Since machine + architectures vary greatly, it may not be possible or desirable to + follow these suggestions on all platforms. + + B.1. Pointers + + While ANSI-C provides a single pointer type for each declared type, plus + a single (void *) type, some platforms (notably those using segmented + memory architectures) augment this with various modified pointer types + (e.g. far pointers, near pointers). These language bindings assume + ANSI-C, and thus do not address such non-standard implementations. + GSS-API implementations for such platforms must choose an appropriate + memory model, and should use it consistently throughout. For example, + if a memory model is chosen that requires the use of far pointers when + passing routine parameters, then far pointers should also be used within + the structures defined by GSS-API. + + B.2. Internal structure alignment + + GSS-API defines several data-structures containing differently-sized + fields. An ABI specification should include a detailed description of + how the fields of such structures are aligned, and if there is any + internal padding in these data structures. The use of compiler defaults + for the platform is recommended. + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 92] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + B.3. Handle types + + The C bindings specify that the gss_cred_id_t and gss_ctx_id_t types + should be implemented as either pointer or arithmetic types, and that if + pointer types are used, care should be taken to ensure that two handles + may be compared with the == operator. Note that ANSI-C does not + guarantee that two pointer values may be compared with the == operator + unless either the two pointers point to members of a single array, or at + least one of the pointers contains a NULL value. + + For binary portability, additional constraints are required. The + following is an attempt at defining platform-independent constraints. + + (a) The size of the handle type must be the same as sizeof(void *), + using the appropriate memory model. + + (b) The == operator for the chosen type must be a simple bit-wise + comparison. That is, for two in-memory handle objects h1 and h2, + the boolean value of the expression + + (h1 == h2) + + should always be the same as the boolean value of the expression + + (memcmp(&h1, &h2, sizeof(h1)) == 0) + + (c) The actual use of the type (void *) for handle types is + discouraged, not for binary portability reasons, but since it + effectively disables much of the compile-time type-checking that + the compiler can otherwise perform, and is therefore not + "programmer-friendly". If a pointer implementation is desired, + and if the platform's implementation of pointers permits, the + handles should be implemented as pointers to distinct + implementation-defined types. + + B.4. The gss_name_t type + + The gss_name_t type, representing the internal name object, should be + implemented as a pointer type. The use of the (void *) type is + discouraged as it does not allow the compiler to perform strong type- + checking. However, the pointer type chosen should be of the same size + as the (void *) type. Provided this rule is obeyed, ABI specifications + need not further constrain the implementation of gss_name_t objects. + + B.5. The int and size_t types + + Some platforms may support differently sized implementations of the + "int" and "size_t" types, perhaps chosen through compiler switches, and + perhaps dependent on memory model. An ABI specification for such a + platform should include required implementations for these types. It is + recommended that the default implementation (for the chosen memory + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 93] + + + + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT GSS-API V2 - C bindings March 1997 + + + + model, if appropriate) is chosen. + + B.6. Procedure-calling conventions + + Some platforms support a variety of different binary conventions for + calling procedures. Such conventions cover things like the format of + the stack frame, the order in which the routine parameters are pushed + onto the stack, whether or not a parameter count is pushed onto the + stack, whether some argument(s) or return values are to be passed in + registers, and whether the called routine or the caller is responsible + for removing the stack frame on return. For such platforms, an ABI + specification should specify which calling convention is to be used for + GSSAPI implementations. + + + REFERENCES + + [GSSAPI] J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface, Version 2", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-cat-gssv2- + 08, 26 August 1996. (This Internet-Draft, like all other + Internet-Drafts, is not an archival document and is subject + to change or deletion. It is available at the time of this + writing by anonymous ftp from ds.internic.net, directory + internet-drafts. Would-be readers should check for successor + Internet-Draft versions or Internet RFCs before relying on + this document.) + + [XOM] OSI Object Management API Specification, Version 2.0 t", + X.400 API Association & X/Open Company Limited, August 24, + 1990. Specification of datatypes and routines for + manipulating information objects. + + + AUTHOR'S ADDRESS + + John Wray Internet email: Wray@tuxedo.enet.dec.com + Digital Equipment Corporation Telephone: +1-508-486-5210 + 550 King Street, LKG2-2/Z7 + Littleton, MA 01460 + USA + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Wray Document Expiration: 1 September 1997 [Page 94] + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e235bec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Stonecast, Inc. +Internet-Draft August, 1998 + + Kerberos Change Password Protocol + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + The Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] does not describe any mechanism + for users to change their own passwords. In order to promote + interoperability between workstations, personal computers, terminal + servers, routers, and KDC's from multiple vendors, a common password + changing protocol is required. + + + +Overview + + When a user wishes to change his own password, or is required to by + local policy, a simple request of a password changing service is + necessary. This service must be implemented on at least one host for + each Kerberos realm, probably on one of the kdc's for that realm. + The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 (kpasswd), and may + accept requests on TCP port 464 as well. + + The protocol itself consists of a single request message followed by + a single reply message. For UDP transport, each message must be + fully contained in a single UDP packet. + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Request Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REQ length | AP-REQ data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + message length (16 bits) + Contains the length of the message, including this field, in bytes + (big-endian integer) + protocol version number (16 bits) + Contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian integer) + AP-REQ length (16 bits) + length (big-endian integer) of AP-REQ data, in bytes. + AP-REQ data, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + This AP-REQ must be for the service principal + kadmin/changepw@REALM, where REALM is the REALM of the user who + wishes to change his password. The Ticket in the AP-REQ must be + derived from an AS request (thus having the INITIAL flag set), and + must include a subkey in the Authenticator. + KRB-PRIV message, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + This KRB-PRIV message must be generated using the subkey in the + Authenticator in the AP-REQ data. The user-data component of the + message must consist of the user's new password. + + The server must verify the AP-REQ message, decrypt the new password, + perform any local policy checks (such as password quality, history, + authorization, etc.) required, then set the password to the new value + specified. + + The principal whose password is to be changed is the principal which + authenticated to the password changing service. This protocol does + not address administrators who want to change passwords of principal + besides their own. + + +Reply Message + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | message length | protocol version number | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | AP_REP length | AP-REP data / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + / KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + message length (16 bits) + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + + Contains the length of the message, including this field, in bytes + (big-endian integer), + protocol version number (16 bits) + Contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian integer) + AP-REP length (16 bits) + length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the the length is zero, then + the last field will contain a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB- + PRIV message. + AP-REP data, as described in RFC1510 (variable length) + The AP-REP corresponding to the AP-REQ in the request packet. + KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message, as described in RFC1510 (variable + length) + If the AP-REP length is zero, then this field contains a KRB-ERROR + message. Otherwise, it contains a KRB-PRIV message. This KRB- + PRIV message must be generated using the subkey in the + Authenticator in the AP-REQ data. + + The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data + component of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following + data: + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | result code | result string / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + result code (16 bits) + The result code must have one of the following values (big- + endian integer): + 0x0000 if the request succeeds. (This value is not permitted + in a KRB-ERROR message.) + 0x0001 if the request fails due to being malformed + 0x0002 if the request fails due to a "hard" error processing + the request (for example, there is a resource or other + problem causing the request to fail) + 0x0003 if the request fails due to an error in authentication + processing + 0x0004 if the request fails due to a "soft" error processing + the request (for example, some policy or other similar + consideration is causing the request to be rejected). + 0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason. + Although only a few non-zero result codes are specified here, + the client should accept any non-zero result code as indicating + failure. + result string (variable length) + This field should contain information which the server thinks + might be useful to the user, such as feedback about policy + failures. The string must be encoded in UTF-8. It may be + omitted if the server does not wish to include it. If it is + present, the client should display the string to the user. + This field is analogous to the string which follows the numeric + code in SMTP, FTP, and similar protocols. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Dropped and Modified Messages + + An attacker (or simply a lossy network) could cause either the + request or reply to be dropped, or modified by substituting a KRB- + ERROR message in the reply. + + If a request is dropped, no modification of the password/key database + will take place. If a reply is dropped, the server will (assuming a + valid request) make the password change. However, the client cannot + distinguish between these two cases. + + In this situation, the client should construct a new authenticator, + re-encrypt the request, and retransmit. If the original request was + lost, the server will treat this as a valid request, and the password + will be changed normally. If the reply was lost, then the server + should take care to notice that the request was a duplicate of the + prior request, because the "new" password is the current password, + and the password change time is within some implementation-defined + replay time window. The server should then return a success reply + (an AP-REP message with result code == 0x0000) without actually + changing the password or any other information (such as modification + timestamps). + + If a success reply was replaced with an error reply, then the + application performing the request would return an error to the user. + In this state, the user's password has been changed, but the user + believes that it has not. If the user attempts to change the + password again, this will probably fail, because the user cannot + successfully provide the old password to get an INITIAL ticket to + make the request. This situation requires administrative + intervention as if a password was lost. This situation is, + unfortunately, impossible to prevent. + + +Security Considerations + + This document deals with changing passwords for Kerberos. Because + Kerberos is used for authentication and key distribution, it is + important that this protocol use the highest level of security + services available to a particular installation. Mutual + authentication is performed, so that the server knows the request is + valid, and the client knows that the request has been received and + processed by the server. + + There are also security issues relating to dropped or modified + messages which are addressed explicitly. + + +References + + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Change Password Protocol August, 1998 + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Stonecast, Inc. + 108 Stow Road + Harvard, MA 01451 + + Phone: +1 978 456 9103 + Email: marc@stonecast.net + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 5] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2583a84 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-des3-hmac-sha1-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions +Internet-Draft November, 1996 + + + Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + This document defines a new encryption type and a new checksum type + for use with Kerberos V5 [RFC1510]. This encryption type is based on + the Triple DES cryptosystem and the HMAC-SHA1 [Krawczyk96] message + authentication algorithm. + + The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value 7. + The hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 12. + + +Encryption Type des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 + + EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC + mode. The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. Unless otherwise + specified, a zero IV must be used. If the length of the input data + is not a multiple of the block size, zero octets must be used to pad + the plaintext to the next eight-octet boundary. The counfounder must + be eight random octets (one block). + + +Checksum Type hmac-sha1-des3 + + Checksums using this type must be generated as described in + [Horowitz96]. The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Kerberos Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 November, 1996 + + +Common Requirements + + Where the Triple DES key is represented as an EncryptionKey, it shall + be represented as three DES keys, with parity bits, concatenated + together. The key shall be represented with the most significant bit + first. + + When keys are generated by the derivation function, a key length of + 168 bits shall be used. The output bit string will be converted to a + valid Triple DES key by inserting DES parity bits after every seventh + bit. + + Any implementation which implements either of the encryption or + checksum types in this document must support both. + + +Security Considerations + + This entire document defines encryption and checksum types for use + with Kerberos V5. + + +References + + [Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt, November 1996. + [Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + Email: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46a4158 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions +Internet-Draft November, 1996 + + + Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the + ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow + Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net + (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim). + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Please send comments to the + mailing list. + +Abstract + + In the Kerberos protocol [RFC1510], cryptographic keys are used in a + number of places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a + key, it is desirable to use a different key for each of these places. + Key derivation [Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys + for each operation from the keys transported on the network. For + this to be possible, a small change to the specification is + necessary. + + +Overview + + Under RFC1510 as stated, key derivation could be specified as a set + of encryption types which share the same key type. The constant for + each derivation would be a function of the encryption type. However, + it is generally accepted that, for interoperability, key types and + encryption types must map one-to-one onto each other. (RFC 1510 is + being revised to address this issue.) Therefore, to use key + derivcation with Kerberos V5 requires a small change to the + specification. + + For each place where a key is used in Kerberos, a ``key usage'' must + be specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, and + encryption/checksum type together describe the transformation from + plaintext to ciphertext, or plaintext to checksum. For backward + + + +Horowitz [Page 1] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 November, 1996 + + + compatibility, old encryption types would be defined independently of + the key usage. + + +Key Usage Values + + This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos + protocol, with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) + + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) + + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) + + 16. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be encrypted using an RFC1510 encryption type. + 17. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be checksummed using an RFC1510 checksum type. + + A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service + which receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket + was part of an AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always + + + +Horowitz [Page 2] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 November, 1996 + + + be used for generating a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- + REQ or TGS-REQ. + + There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of + the RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would + not know about key usages. In order that these documents continue to + be meaningful until they are updated, key usages 16 and 17 must be + used to derive keys for encryption and checksums, respectively. New + protocols defined in terms of the Kerberos encryption and checksum + types should use their own key usages. Key usages may be registered + with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key usages shall be unsigned 32 bit + integers. Zero is not permitted. + + +Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + + Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be + tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption + and integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. + So, for each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for + encryption (Ke), and one for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + + where the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network + byte order. The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as + follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) + + The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm + E. + + When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or + padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be + generated from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + + MAC = H(Kc, length | plaintext) + + Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and + a keyed hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a + keyed hash algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is + recommended for use as H. + + +Security Considerations + + This entire document addresses shortcomings in the use of + cryptographic keys in Kerberos V5. + + + + +Horowitz [Page 3] + +Internet Draft Key Derivation for Kerberos V5 November, 1996 + + +Acknowledgements + + I would like to thank Uri Blumenthal, Sam Hartman, and Bill + Sommerfeld for their contributions to this document. + + +References + + [Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-00.txt, + November 1996. [RFC1510] Kohl, J. and Neuman, C., "The Kerberos + Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + +Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + Email: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz [Page 4] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5e4d05 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Ari Medvinsky +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-err-msg-00.txt Matt Hur +Updates: RFC 1510 Dominique Brezinski +expires September 30, 1997 CyberSafe Corporation + Gene Tsudik + Brian Tung + ISI + +Integrity Protection for the Kerberos Error Message + +0. Status Of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt, and expires June xx, 1997. + Please send comments to the authors. + +1. Abstract + + The Kerberos error message, as defined in RFC 1510, is transmitted + to the client without any integrity assurance. Therefore, the + client has no means to distinguish between a valid error message + sent from the KDC and one sent by an attacker. This draft describes + a method for assuring the integrity of Kerberos error messages, and + proposes a consistent format for the e-data field in the KRB_ERROR + message. This e-data format enables the storage of cryptographic + checksums by providing an extensible mechanism for specifying e-data + types. + + +2. Motivation + + In the Kerberos protocol [1], if an error occurs for AS_REQ, + TGS_REQ, or AP_REQ, a clear text error message is returned to the + client. An attacker may exploit this vulnerability by sending a + false error message as a reply to any of the above requests. For + example, an attacker may send the KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED error message + in order to force a user to change their password in hope that the + new key will not be as strong as the current key, and thus, easier + to break. + + Since false error messages may be utilized by an attacker, a + Kerberos client should have a means for determining how much trust + to place in a given error message. The rest of this draft + describes a method for assuring the integrity of Kerberos error + messages. + + +3. Approach + + We propose taking a cryptographic checksum over the entire KRB-ERROR + message. This checksum would be returned as part of the error + message and would enable the client to verify the integrity of the + error message. For interoperability reasons, no new fields are + added to the KRB-ERROR message. Instead, the e-data field (see + figure 1) is utilized to carry the cryptographic checksum. + + +3.1 Cryptographic checksums in error messages for AS_REQ, + TGS_REQ & AP_REQ + + If an error occurs for the AS request, the only key that is + available to the KDC is the shared secret (the key derived from the + clients password) registered in the KDCs database. The KDC will + use this key to sign the error message, if and only if, the client + already proved knowledge of the shared secret in the AS request + (e.g. via PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP in preauth data). This policy is needed + to prevent an attacker from getting the KDC to send a signed error + message and then launching an off-line attack in order to obtain a + key of a given principal. + + If an error occurs for a TGS or an AP request, the server will use + the session key sealed in the clients ticket granting ticket to + compute the checksum over the error message. If the checksum could + not be computed (e.g. error while decrypting the ticket) the error + message is returned to the client without the checksum. The client + then has the option to treat unprotected error messages differently. + + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] integer, + msg-type [1] integer, + ctime [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime [4] KerberosTime, + susec [5] INTEGER, + error-code [6] INTEGER, + crealm [7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname [8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm [9] Realm, --Correct realm + sname [10] PrincipalName, --Correct name + e-text [11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + Figure 1 + + +3.2 Format of the e-data field + + We propose to place the cryptographic checksum in the e-data field. + First, we review the format of the e-data field, as specified in + RFC 1510. The format of e-data is specified only in two cases [2]. + "If the error code is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data + field will contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields": + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type [1] INTEGER, + padata-value [2] OCTET STRING + } + + The second case deals with the KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD error code. The + e-data field will contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type [0] INTEGER, + method-data [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type indicates the required alternate authentication method. + + It should be noted that, in the case of KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, a signed + checksum is not returned as part of the error message, since the + error code indicates that the Kerberos credentials provided in the + AP_REQ message are unacceptable. + + We propose that the e-data field have the following format for all + error-codes (except KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD): + + E-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type [1] INTEGER, + data-value [2] OCTET STRING, + } + + The data-type field specifies the type of information that is + carried in the data-value field. Thus, to send a cryptographic + checksum back to the client, the data-type is set to CHECKSUM, the + data-value is set to the ASN.1 encoding of the following sequence: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype [0] INTEGER, + checksum [1] OCTET STRING + } + + +3.3 Computing the checksum + + After the error message is filled out, the error structure is + converted into ASN.1 representation. A cryptographic checksum is + then taken over the encoded error message; the result is placed in + the error message structure, as the last item in the e-data field. + To send the error message, ASN.1 encoding is again performed over + the error message, which now includes the cryptographic checksum. + + +3.4 Verifying the integrity of the error message + + In addition to verifying the cryptographic checksum for the error + message, the client must verify that the error message is bound to + its request. This is done by comparing the ctime field in the + error message to its counterpart in the request message. + + +4. E-DATA types + + Since the e-data types must not conflict with preauthentication data + types, we propose that the preauthentication data types in the range + of 2048 and above be reserved for use as e-data types. + + We define the following e-data type in support of integrity checking + for the Kerberos error message: + + CHECKSUM = 2048 -- the keyed checksum described above + + +5. Discussion + + +5.1 e-data types + + The extension for Kerberos error messages, as outlined above, is + extensible to allow for definition of other error data types. + We propose that the following e-data types be reserved: + + KDCTIME = 2049 + The error data would consist of the KDCs time in KerberosTime. + This data would be used by the client to adjust for clock skew. + + REDIRECT = 2050 + The error data would consist of a hostname. The hostname would + indicate the authoritative KDC from which to obtain a TGT. + + +5.2 e-data types vs. error code specific data formats + + Since RFC 1510 does not define an error data type, the data format + must be explicitly specified for each error code. This draft has + proposed an extension to RFC 1510 that would introduce the concept + of error data types. This would allow for a manageable set of data + types to be used for any error message. The authors assume that + the introduction of this e-data structure will not break any + existing Kerberos implementations. + + +6. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments: 1510 + [2] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments: 1510 p.67 + + +7. Authors + + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + Dominique Brezinski + + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road + Suite 310 + Issaquah, WA 98027-5378 + Phone: (206) 391-6000 + Fax: (206) 391-0508 + http:/www.cybersafe.com + + + Brian Tung + Gene Tsudik + + USC Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695 + Phone: (310) 822-1511 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b193c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Brian Tung +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt Tatyana Ryutov +Updates: RFC 1510 Clifford Neuman +expires September 30, 1997 Gene Tsudik + ISI + Bill Sommerfeld + Hewlett-Packard + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + + + Public Key Cryptography for Cross-Realm Authentication in Kerberos + + +0. Status Of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in + progress.'' + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-cross-01.txt, and expires September 30, + 1997. Please send comments to the authors. + + +1. Abstract + + This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510, "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", September 1993) to provide a method for using + public key cryptography during cross-realm authentication. The + methods defined here specify the way in which message exchanges + are to be used to transport cross-realm secret keys protected by + encryption under public keys certified as belonging to KDCs. + + +2. Motivation + + The advantages provided by public key cryptography--ease of + recoverability in the event of a compromise, the possibility of + an autonomous authentication infrastructure, to name a few--have + produced a demand for use by Kerberos authentication protocol. A + draft describing the use of public key cryptography in the initial + authentication exchange in Kerberos has already been submitted. + This draft describes its use in cross-realm authentication. + + The principal advantage provided by public key cryptography in + cross-realm authentication lies in the ability to leverage the + existing public key infrastructure. It frees the Kerberos realm + administrator from having to maintain separate keys for each other + realm with which it wishes to exchange authentication information, + or to utilize a hierarchical arrangement, which may pose problems + of trust. + + Even with the multi-hop cross-realm authentication, there must be + some way to locate the path by which separate realms are to be + transited. The current method, which makes use of the DNS-like + realm names typical to Kerberos, requires trust of the intermediate + KDCs. + + The methods described in this draft allow a realm to specify, at + the time of authentication, which certification paths it will + trust. A shared key for cross-realm authentication can be + established, for a period of time. Furthermore, these methods are + transparent to the client, so that only the KDC's need to be + modified to use them. + + It is not necessary to implement the changes described in the + "Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication" draft to make + use of the changes in this draft. We solicit comments about the + interaction between the two protocol changes, but as of this + writing, the authors do not perceive any obstacles to using both. + + +3. Protocol Amendments + + We assume that the user has already obtained a TGT. To perform + cross-realm authentication, the user sends a request to the local + KDC as per RFC 1510. If the two realms share a secret key, then + cross-realm authentication proceeds as usual. Otherwise, the + local KDC may attempt to establish a shared key with the remote + KDC using public key cryptography, and exchange this key through + the cross-realm ticket granting ticket. + + We will consider the specific channel on which the message + exchanges take place in Section 5 below. + + +3.1. Changes to the Cross-Realm Ticket Granting Ticket + + In order to avoid the need for changes to the "installed base" of + Kerberos application clients and servers, the only protocol change + is to the way in which cross-realm ticket granting tickets (TGTs) + are encrypted; as these tickets are opaque to clients and servers, + the only change visible to them will be the increased size of the + tickets. + + Cross-realm TGTs are granted by a local KDC to authenticate a user + to a remote KDC's ticket granting service. In standard Kerberos, + they are encrypted using a shared secret key manually configured + into each KDC. + + In order to incorporate public key cryptography, we define a new + encryption type, "ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS". Operationally, this encryption + type transforms an OCTET STRING of plaintext (normally an EncTktPart) + into the following SEQUENCE: + + PKCrossOutput ::= SEQUENCE { + certificate [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + -- public key certificate + -- of local KDC + encSharedKey [1] EncryptedData, + -- of type EncryptionKey + -- containing random symmetric key + -- encrypted using public key + -- of remote KDC + sigSharedKey [2] Signature, + -- of encSharedKey + -- using signature key + -- of local KDC + pkEncData [3] EncryptedData, + -- (normally) of type EncTktPart + -- encrypted using encryption key + -- found in encSharedKey + } + + PKCROSS operates as follows: when a client submits a request for + cross-realm authentication, the local KDC checks to see if it has + a long-term shared key established for that realm. If so, it uses + this key as per RFC 1510. + + If not, it sends a request for information to the remote KDC. The + content of this message is immaterial, as it does not need to be + processed by the remote KDC; for the sake of consistency, we define + it as follows: + + RemoteRequest ::= [APPLICATION 41] SEQUENCE { + nonce [0] INTEGER + } + + The remote KDC replies with a list of all trusted certifiers and + all its (the remote KDC's) certificates. We note that this response + is universal and does not depend on which KDC makes the request: + + RemoteReply ::= [APPLICATION 42] SEQUENCE { + trustedCertifiers [0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName, + certificates[1] SEQUENCE OF Certificate, + encTypeToUse [1] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER + -- encryption types usable + -- for encrypting pkEncData + } + + Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + CertType [0] INTEGER, + -- type of certificate + -- 1 = X.509v3 (DER encoding) + -- 2 = PGP (per PGP draft) + CertData [1] OCTET STRING + -- actual certificate + -- type determined by CertType + } -- from pk-init draft + + Upon receiving this reply, the local KDC determines whether it has + a certificate the remote KDC trusts, and whether the remote KDC has + a certificate the local KDC trusts. If so, it issues a ticket + encrypted using the ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS encryption type defined above. + + +3.2. Profile Caches + + We observe that using PKCROSS as specified above requires two + private key operations: a signature generation by the local KDC and + a decryption by the remote KDC. This cost can be reduced in the + long term by judicious caching of the encSharedKey and the + sigSharedKey. + + Let us define a "profile" as the encSharedKey and sigSharedKey, in + conjunction with the associated remote realm name and decrypted + shared key (the key encrypted in the encSharedKey). + + To optimize these interactions, each KDC maintains two caches, one + for outbound profiles and one for inbound profiles. When generating + an outbound TGT for another realm, the local KDC first checks to see + if the corresponding entry exists in the outbound profile cache; if + so, it uses its contents to form the first three fields of the + PKCrossOutput; the shared key is used to encrypt the data for the + fourth field. If not, the components are generated fresh and stored + in the outbound profile cache. + + Upon receipt of the TGT, the remote realm checks its inbound profile + cache for the corresponding entry. If it exists, then it uses the + contents of the entry to decrypt the data encrypted in the pkEncData. + If not, then it goes through the full process of verifying and + extracting the shared key; if this is successful, then a new entry + is created in the inbound profile cache. + + The inbound profile cache should support multiple entries per realm, + in the event that the initiating realm is replicated. + + +4. Finding Realms Supporting PKCROSS + + If either the local realm or the destination realm does not support + PKCROSS, or both do not, the mechanism specified in Section 3 can + still be used in obtaining the desired remote TGT. + + In the reference Kerberos implementations, the default behavior is + to traverse a path up and down the realm name hierarchy, if the + two realms do not share a key. There is, however, the possibility + of using cross links--i.e., keys shared between two realms that + are non-contiguous in the realm name hierarchy--to shorten the + path, both to minimize delay and the number of intermediate realms + that need to be trusted. + + PKCROSS can be used as a way to provide cross-links even in the + absence of shared keys. If the client is aware that one or two + intermediate realms support PKCROSS, then a combination of + PKCROSS and conventional cross-realm authentication can be used + to reach the final destination realm. + + We solicit discussion on the best methods for clients and KDCs to + determine or advertise support for PKCROSS. + + +5. Message Ports + + We have not specified the port on which KDCs supporting PKCROSS + should listen to receive the request for information messages noted + above. We solicit discussion on which port should be used. We + propose to use the standard Kerberos ports (well-known 88 or 750), + but another possibility is to use a completely different port. + + We also solicit discussion on what other approaches can be taken to + obtain the information in the RemoteReply (e.g., secure DNS or some + other repository). + + +6. Expiration Date + + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 1997. + + +7. Authors' Addresses + + Brian Tung + Tatyana Ryutov + Clifford Neuman + Gene Tsudik + USC/Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695 + Phone: +1 310 822 1511 + E-Mail: {brian, tryutov, bcn, gts}@isi.edu + + Bill Sommerfeld + Hewlett Packard + 300 Apollo Drive + Chelmsford MA 01824 + Phone: +1 508 436 4352 + E-Mail: sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com + + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road Suite 310 + Issaquah WA 98027-5378 + Phone: +1 206 391 6000 + E-mail: {ari.medvinsky, matt.hur}@cybersafe.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d91c087 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,589 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt Brian Tung +Updates: RFC 1510 ISI +expires September 30, 1997 John Wray + Digital Equipment Corporation + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + Jonathan Trostle + Novell + + + Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos + + +0. Status Of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check + the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), + nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or + munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as + draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-03.txt, and expires September 30, + 1997. Please send comments to the authors. + + +1. Abstract + + This document defines extensions (PKINIT) to the Kerberos protocol + specification (RFC 1510 [1]) to provide a method for using public + key cryptography during initial authentication. The methods + defined specify the ways in which preauthentication data fields and + error data fields in Kerberos messages are to be used to transport + public key data. + + +2. Introduction + + The popularity of public key cryptography has produced a desire for + its support in Kerberos [2]. The advantages provided by public key + cryptography include simplified key management (from the Kerberos + perspective) and the ability to leverage existing and developing + public key certification infrastructures. + + Public key cryptography can be integrated into Kerberos in a number + of ways. One is to to associate a key pair with each realm, which + can then be used to facilitate cross-realm authentication; this is + the topic of another draft proposal. Another way is to allow users + with public key certificates to use them in initial authentication. + This is the concern of the current document. + + One of the guiding principles in the design of PKINIT is that + changes should be as minimal as possible. As a result, the basic + mechanism of PKINIT is as follows: The user sends a request to the + KDC as before, except that if that user is to use public key + cryptography in the initial authentication step, his certificate + accompanies the initial request, in the preauthentication fields. + + Upon receipt of this request, the KDC verifies the certificate and + issues a ticket granting ticket (TGT) as before, except that instead + of being encrypted in the user's long-term key (which is derived + from a password), it is encrypted in a randomly-generated key. This + random key is in turn encrypted using the public key certificate + that came with the request and signed using the KDC's signature key, + and accompanies the reply, in the preauthentication fields. + + PKINIT also allows for users with only digital signature keys to + authenticate using those keys, and for users to store and retrieve + private keys on the KDC. + + The PKINIT specification may also be used for direct peer to peer + authentication without contacting a central KDC. This application + of PKINIT is described in PKTAPP [4] and is based on concepts + introduced in [5, 6]. For direct client-to-server authentication, + the client uses PKINIT to authenticate to the end server (instead + of a central KDC), which then issues a ticket for itself. This + approach has an advantage over SSL [7] in that the server does not + need to save state (cache session keys). Furthermore, an + additional benefit is that Kerberos tickets can facilitate + delegation (see [8]). + + +3. Proposed Extensions + + This section describes extensions to RFC 1510 for supporting the + use of public key cryptography in the initial request for a ticket + granting ticket (TGT). + + In summary, the following changes to RFC 1510 are proposed: + + --> Users may authenticate using either a public key pair or a + conventional (symmetric) key. If public key cryptography is + used, public key data is transported in preauthentication + data fields to help establish identity. + --> Users may store private keys on the KDC for retrieval during + Kerberos initial authentication. + + This proposal addresses two ways that users may use public key + cryptography for initial authentication. Users may present public + key certificates, or they may generate their own session key, + signed by their digital signature key. In either case, the end + result is that the user obtains an ordinary TGT that may be used for + subsequent authentication, with such authentication using only + conventional cryptography. + + Section 3.1 provides definitions to help specify message formats. + Section 3.2 and 3.3 describe the extensions for the two initial + authentication methods. Section 3.3 describes a way for the user to + store and retrieve his private key on the KDC. + + +3.1. Definitions + + Hash and encryption types will be specified using ENCTYPE tags; we + propose the addition of the following types: + + #define ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE 0x0011 + #define ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_VERIFY 0x0012 + #define ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV 0x0021 + #define ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB 0x0022 + + allowing further signature types to be defined in the range 0x0011 + through 0x001f, and further encryption types to be defined in the + range 0x0021 through 0x002f. + + The extensions involve new preauthentication fields. The + preauthentication data types are in the range 17 through 21. + These values are also specified along with their corresponding + ASN.1 definition. + + #define PA-PK-AS-REQ 17 + #define PA-PK-AS-REP 18 + #define PA-PK-AS-SIGN 19 + #define PA-PK-KEY-REQ 20 + #define PA-PK-KEY-REP 21 + + The extensions also involve new error types. The new error types + are in the range 227 through 229. They are: + + #define KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 227 + #define KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 228 + #define KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 229 + + In the exposition below, we use the following terms: encryption key, + decryption key, signature key, verification key. It should be + understood that encryption and verification keys are essentially + public keys, and decryption and signature keys are essentially + private keys. The fact that they are logically distinct does + not preclude the assignment of bitwise identical keys. + + +3.2. Standard Public Key Authentication + + Implementation of the changes in this section is REQUIRED for + compliance with pk-init. + + It is assumed that all public keys are signed by some certification + authority (CA). The initial authentication request is sent as per + RFC 1510, except that a preauthentication field containing data + signed by the user's signature key accompanies the request: + + PA-PK-AS-REQ ::- SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 17 + signedPKAuth [0] SignedPKAuthenticator, + userCert [1] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL, + -- the user's certificate + -- optionally followed by that + -- certificate's certifier chain + trustedCertifiers [2] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName OPTIONAL + -- CAs that the client trusts + } + + SignedPKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE { + pkAuth [0] PKAuthenticator, + pkAuthSig [1] Signature, + -- of pkAuth + -- using user's signature key + } + + PKAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE { + cusec [0] INTEGER, + -- for replay prevention + ctime [1] KerberosTime, + -- for replay prevention + nonce [2] INTEGER, + -- binds response to this request + kdcName [3] PrincipalName, + clientPubValue [4] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, + -- for Diffie-Hellman algorithm + } + + Signature ::= SEQUENCE { + signedHash [0] EncryptedData + -- of type Checksum + -- encrypted under signature key + } + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype [0] INTEGER, + checksum [1] OCTET STRING + } -- as specified by RFC 1510 + + SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm [0] algorithmIdentifier, + subjectPublicKey [1] BIT STRING + } -- as specified by the X.509 recommendation [9] + + Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + CertType [0] INTEGER, + -- type of certificate + -- 1 = X.509v3 (DER encoding) + -- 2 = PGP (per PGP draft) + CertData [1] OCTET STRING + -- actual certificate + -- type determined by CertType + } + + Note: If the signature uses RSA keys, then it is to be performed + as per PKCS #1. + + The PKAuthenticator carries information to foil replay attacks, + to bind the request and response, and to optionally pass the + client's Diffie-Hellman public value (i.e. for using DSA in + combination with Diffie-Hellman). The PKAuthenticator is signed + with the private key corresponding to the public key in the + certificate found in userCert (or cached by the KDC). + + In the PKAuthenticator, the client may specify the KDC name in one + of two ways: 1) a Kerberos principal name, or 2) the name in the + KDC's certificate (e.g., an X.500 name, or a PGP name). Note that + case #1 requires that the certificate name and the Kerberos principal + name be bound together (e.g., via an X.509v3 extension). + + The userCert field is a sequence of certificates, the first of which + must be the user's public key certificate. Any subsequent + certificates will be certificates of the certifiers of the user's + certificate. These cerificates may be used by the KDC to verify the + user's public key. This field is empty if the KDC already has the + user's certifcate. + + The trustedCertifiers field contains a list of certification + authorities trusted by the client, in the case that the client does + not possess the KDC's public key certificate. + + Upon receipt of the AS_REQ with PA-PK-AS-REQ pre-authentication + type, the KDC attempts to verify the user's certificate chain + (userCert), if one is provided in the request. This is done by + verifying the certification path against the KDC's policy of + legitimate certifiers. This may be based on a certification + hierarchy, or it may be simply a list of recognized certifiers in a + system like PGP. If the certification path does not match one of + the KDC's trusted certifiers, the KDC sends back an error message of + type KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED, and it includes in the error data + field a list of its own trusted certifiers, upon which the client + resends the request. + + If trustedCertifiers is provided in the PA-PK-AS-REQ, the KDC + verifies that it has a certificate issued by one of the certifiers + trusted by the client. If it does not have a suitable certificate, + the KDC returns an error message of type KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED + to the client. + + If a trust relationship exists, the KDC then verifies the client's + signature on PKAuthenticator. If that fails, the KDC returns an + error message of type KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG. Otherwise, the KDC + uses the timestamp in the PKAuthenticator to assure that the request + is not a replay. The KDC also verifies that its name is specified + in PKAuthenticator. + + Assuming no errors, the KDC replies as per RFC 1510, except that it + encrypts the reply not with the user's key, but with a random key + generated only for this particular response. This random key + is sealed in the preauthentication field: + + PA-PK-AS-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 18 + kdcCert [0] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL, + -- the KDC's certificate + -- optionally followed by that + -- certificate's certifier chain + encPaReply [1] EncryptedData, + -- of type PaReply + -- using either the client public + -- key or the Diffie-Hellman key + -- specified by SignedDHPublicValue + signedDHPublicValue [2] SignedDHPublicValue OPTIONAL + } + + + PaReply ::= SEQUENCE { + replyEncKeyPack [0] ReplyEncKeyPack, + replyEncKeyPackSig [1] Signature, + -- of replyEncKeyPack + -- using KDC's signature key + } + + ReplyEncKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE { + replyEncKey [0] EncryptionKey, + -- used to encrypt main reply + nonce [1] INTEGER + -- binds response to the request + -- passed in the PKAuthenticator + } + + SignedDHPublicValue ::= SEQUENCE { + dhPublicValue [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo, + dhPublicValueSig [1] Signature + -- of dhPublicValue + -- using KDC's signature key + } + + The kdcCert field is a sequence of certificates, the first of which + must have as its root certifier one of the certifiers sent to the + KDC in the PA-PK-AS-REQ. Any subsequent certificates will be + certificates of the certifiers of the KDC's certificate. These + cerificates may be used by the client to verify the KDC's public + key. This field is empty if the client did not send to the KDC a + list of trusted certifiers (the trustedCertifiers field was empty). + + Since each certifier in the certification path of a user's + certificate is essentially a separate realm, the name of each + certifier shall be added to the transited field of the ticket. The + format of these realm names shall follow the naming constraints set + forth in RFC 1510 (sections 7.1 and 3.3.3.1). Note that this will + require new nametypes to be defined for PGP certifiers and other + types of realms as they arise. + + The KDC's certificate must bind the public key to a name derivable + from the name of the realm for that KDC. The client then extracts + the random key used to encrypt the main reply. This random key (in + encPaReply) is encrypted with either the client's public key or + with a key derived from the DH values exchanged between the client + and the KDC. + + +3.3. Digital Signature + + Implementation of the changes in this section are OPTIONAL for + compliance with pk-init. + + We offer this option with the warning that it requires the client to + generate a random key; the client may not be able to guarantee the + same level of randomness as the KDC. + + If the user registered a digital signature key with the KDC instead + of an encryption key, then a separate exchange must be used. The + client sends a request for a TGT as usual, except that it (rather + than the KDC) generates the random key that will be used to encrypt + the KDC response. This key is sent to the KDC along with the + request in a preauthentication field: + + PA-PK-AS-SIGN ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 19 + encSignedKeyPack [0] EncryptedData + -- of SignedKeyPack + -- using the KDC's public key + } + + SignedKeyPack ::= SEQUENCE { + signedKey [0] KeyPack, + signedKeyAuth [1] PKAuthenticator, + signedKeySig [2] Signature + -- of signedKey.signedKeyAuth + -- using user's signature key + } + + KeyPack ::= SEQUENCE { + randomKey [0] EncryptionKey, + -- will be used to encrypt reply + nonce [1] INTEGER + } + + where the nonce is copied from the request. + + Upon receipt of the PA-PK-AS-SIGN, the KDC decrypts then verifies + the randomKey. It then replies as per RFC 1510, except that the + reply is encrypted not with a password-derived user key, but with + the randomKey sent in the request. Since the client already knows + this key, there is no need to accompany the reply with an extra + preauthentication field. The transited field of the ticket should + specify the certification path as described in Section 3.2. + + +3.4. Retrieving the Private Key From the KDC + + Implementation of the changes in this section is RECOMMENDED for + compliance with pk-init. + + When the user's private key is not stored local to the user, he may + choose to store the private key (normally encrypted using a + password-derived key) on the KDC. We provide this option to present + the user with an alternative to storing the private key on local + disk at each machine where he expects to authenticate himself using + pk-init. It should be noted that it replaces the added risk of + long-term storage of the private key on possibly many workstations + with the added risk of storing the private key on the KDC in a + form vulnerable to brute-force attack. + + In order to obtain a private key, the client includes a + preauthentication field with the AS-REQ message: + + PA-PK-KEY-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 20 + patimestamp [0] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + -- used to address replay attacks. + pausec [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + -- used to address replay attacks. + nonce [2] INTEGER, + -- binds the reply to this request + privkeyID [3] SEQUENCE OF KeyID OPTIONAL + -- constructed as a hash of + -- public key corresponding to + -- desired private key + } + + KeyID ::= SEQUENCE { + KeyIdentifier [0] OCTET STRING + } + + The client may request a specific private key by sending the + corresponding ID. If this field is left empty, then all + private keys are returned. + + If all checks out, the KDC responds as described in the above + sections, except that an additional preauthentication field, + containing the user's private key, accompanies the reply: + + PA-PK-KEY-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + -- PA TYPE 21 + nonce [0] INTEGER, + -- binds the reply to the request + KeyData [1] SEQUENCE OF KeyPair + } + + KeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { + privKeyID [0] OCTET STRING, + -- corresponding to encPrivKey + encPrivKey [1] OCTET STRING + } + + +3.4.1. Additional Protection of Retrieved Private Keys + + We solicit discussion on the following proposal: that the client may + optionally include in its request additional data to encrypt the + private key, which is currently only protected by the user's + password. One possibility is that the client might generate a + random string of bits, encrypt it with the public key of the KDC (as + in the SignedKeyPack, but with an ordinary OCTET STRING in place of + an EncryptionKey), and include this with the request. The KDC then + XORs each returned key with this random bit string. (If the bit + string is too short, the KDC could either return an error, or XOR + the returned key with a repetition of the bit string.) + + In order to make this work, additional means of preauthentication + need to be devised in order to prevent attackers from simply + inserting their own bit string. One way to do this is to store + a hash of the password-derived key (the one used to encrypt the + private key). This hash is then used in turn to derive a second + key (called the hash-key); the hash-key is used to encrypt an ASN.1 + structure containing the generated bit string and a nonce value + that binds it to the request. + + Since the KDC possesses the hash, it can generate the hash-key and + verify this (weaker) preauthentication, and yet cannot reproduce + the private key itself, since the hash is a one-way function. + + +4. Logistics and Policy Issues + + We solicit discussion on how clients and KDCs should be configured + in order to determine which of the options described above (if any) + should be used. One possibility is to set the user's database + record to indicate that authentication is to use public key + cryptography; this will not work, however, in the event that the + client needs to know before making the initial request. + +5. Compatibility with One-Time Passcodes + + We solicit discussion on how the protocol changes proposed in this + draft will interact with the proposed use of one-time passcodes + discussed in draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-passwords-00.txt. + + +6. Strength of Cryptographic Schemes + + In light of recent findings on the strength of MD5 and DES, + we solicit discussion on which encryption types to incorporate + into the protocol changes. + + +7. Bibliography + + [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5). Request for Comments: 1510 + + [2] B.C. Neuman, Theodore Ts'o. Kerberos: An Authentication Service + for Computer Networks, IEEE Communications, 32(9):33-38. + September 1994. + + [3] A. Medvinsky, M. Hur. Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to + Transport Layer Security (TLS). + draft-ietf-tls-kerb-cipher-suites-00.txt + + [4] A. Medvinsky, M. Hur, B. Clifford Neuman. Public Key Utilizing + Tickets for Application Servers (PKTAPP). + draft-ietf-cat-pktapp-00.txt + + [5] M. Sirbu, J. Chuang. Distributed Authentication in Kerberos Using + Public Key Cryptography. Symposium On Network and Distributed System + Security, 1997. + + [6] B. Cox, J.D. Tygar, M. Sirbu. NetBill Security and Transaction + Protocol. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, + July 1995. + + [7] Alan O. Freier, Philip Karlton and Paul C. Kocher. + The SSL Protocol, Version 3.0 - IETF Draft. + + [8] B.C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May 1993 + + [9] ITU-T (formerly CCITT) + Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - + The Directory: Authentication Framework Recommendation X.509 + ISO/IEC 9594-8 + + +8. Acknowledgements + + Some of the ideas on which this proposal is based arose during + discussions over several years between members of the SAAG, the IETF + CAT working group, and the PSRG, regarding integration of Kerberos + and SPX. Some ideas have also been drawn from the DASS system. + These changes are by no means endorsed by these groups. This is an + attempt to revive some of the goals of those groups, and this + proposal approaches those goals primarily from the Kerberos + perspective. Lastly, comments from groups working on similar ideas + in DCE have been invaluable. + + +9. Expiration Date + + This draft expires September 30, 1997. + + +10. Authors + + Clifford Neuman + Brian Tung + USC Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 + Marina del Rey CA 90292-6695 + Phone: +1 310 822 1511 + E-mail: {bcn, brian}@isi.edu + + John Wray + Digital Equipment Corporation + 550 King Street, LKG2-2/Z7 + Littleton, MA 01460 + Phone: +1 508 486 5210 + E-mail: wray@tuxedo.enet.dec.com + + Ari Medvinsky + Matthew Hur + CyberSafe Corporation + 1605 NW Sammamish Road Suite 310 + Issaquah WA 98027-5378 + Phone: +1 206 391 6000 + E-mail: {ari.medvinsky, matt.hur}@cybersafe.com + + Jonathan Trostle + Novell + E-mail: jonathan.trostle@novell.com diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2284c3c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,8277 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + 11 July 1997 + + + + The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts +are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force +(IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other +groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- +Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum +of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by +other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use +Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other +than as "work in progress." + + To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, +please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in +the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ds.internic.net +(US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), ftp.isi.edu (US +West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + + The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is +filed as draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-00.txt, and expires +11 January 1998. Please send comments to: + + krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + + + This document provides an overview and specification of +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to +clarify aspects of the protocol and its intended use that +require more detailed or clearer explanation than was pro- +vided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a +detailed description of the protocol, suitable for implemen- +tation, together with descriptions of the appropriate use of +protocol messages and fields within those messages. + + This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to +__________________________ +Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of +the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No +commercial use of these trademarks may be made without +prior written permission of MIT. + + + +Overview - 1 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +the end user, system administrator, or application +developer. Higher level papers describing Version 5 of the +Kerberos system [1] and documenting version 4 [23], are +available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + + This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model +upon which the Kerberos network authentication system is +based. It also specifies Version 5 of the Kerberos proto- +col. + + The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale +behind most design decisions are treated cursorily; they are +more fully described in a paper available in IEEE communica- +tions [1] and earlier in the Kerberos portion of the Athena +Technical Plan [2]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft +standard through the IETF standard process. Comments are +encouraged on the presentation, but only minor refinements +to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit within +current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + + Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for +discussion of Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed +to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. This mailing list is gatewayed +onto the Usenet as the group comp.protocols.kerberos. +Requests for further information, including documents and +code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + + The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and +Schroeder's trusted third-party authentication protocol [4] +and on modifications suggested by Denning and Sacco [5]. +The original design and implementation of Kerberos Versions +1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff +members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and +Clifford Neuman (now at the Information Sciences Institute +of the University of Southern California), along with Jerome +Saltzer, Technical Director of Project Athena, and Jeffrey +Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members of +Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Ker- +beros. + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this +document) has evolved from Version 4 based on new require- +ments and desires for features not available in Version 4. +The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was led by +Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the com- +munity. The development of the MIT reference implementation +was led at MIT by John Kohl and Theodore T'so, with help and +contributed code from many others. Reference implementa- +tions of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are pub- +licly available and commercial implementations have been + +Overview - 2 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +developed and are widely used. + + Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 +and 5 can be found in [6]. + +1. Introduction + + Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities +of principals, (e.g. a workstation user or a network server) +on an open (unprotected) network. This is accomplished +without relying on assertions by the host operating system, +without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring +physical security of all the hosts on the network, and under +the assumption that packets traveling along the network can +be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. Kerberos per- +forms authentication under these conditions as a trusted +third-party authentication service by using conventional +(shared secret key[2]) cryptography. Kerberos extensions +have been proposed and implemented that provide for the use +of public key cryptography during certain phases of the +authentication protocol. These extensions provide for +authentication of users registered with public key certifi- +cation authorities, and allow the system to provide certain +benefits of public key cryptography in situations where they +are needed. + + The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as +follows: A client sends a request to the authentication +server (AS) requesting "credentials" for a given server. +The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the +client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a "ticket" for +the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a +"session key"). The client transmits the ticket (which con- +tains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, +all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The ses- +sion key (now shared by the client and server) is used to +authenticate the client, and may optionally be used to +__________________________ +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' +functions only upon the initiation of a stream-based +network connection. Unless an application subsequently +provides integrity protection for the data stream, the +identity verification applies only to the initiation of +the connection, and does not guarantee that subsequent +messages on the connection originate from the same +principal. +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably +in the literature. In our usage, it takes two (or +more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key is a +secret key. Something is only private when no one but +its owner knows it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, +one has a public and a private key. + + + +Section 1. - 3 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authenticate the server. It may also be used to encrypt +further communication between the two parties or to exchange +a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further +communication. + + Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or +more authentication servers running on physically secure +hosts. The authentication servers maintain a database of +principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret keys. +Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos +protocol. In order to add authentication to its transac- +tions, a typical network application adds one or two calls +to the Kerberos library directly or through the Generic +Security Services Application Programming Interface, GSSAPI, +described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authenti- +cation. + + The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols +(or exchanges). There are two basic methods by which a +client can ask a Kerberos server for credentials. In the +first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for a +ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent +encrypted in the client's secret key. Usually this request +is for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) which can later be +used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). In the second +method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client +uses the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same +manner as if it were contacting any other application server +that requires Kerberos authentication. The reply is +encrypted in the session key from the TGT. Though the pro- +tocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different pro- +tocol entry points within a single Kerberos server. + + Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the +identity of the principals in a transaction, to ensure the +integrity of messages exchanged between them, or to preserve +privacy of the messages. The application is free to choose +whatever protection may be necessary. + + To verify the identities of the principals in a tran- +saction, the client transmits the ticket to the application +server. Since the ticket is sent "in the clear" (parts of +it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart replay) +and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, addi- +tional information is sent to prove that the message ori- +ginated with the principal to whom the ticket was issued. +This information (called the authenticator) is encrypted in +the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp +proves that the message was recently generated and is not a +replay. Encrypting the authenticator in the session key +proves that it was generated by a party possessing the ses- +sion key. Since no one except the requesting principal and + + +Section 1. - 4 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +the server know the session key (it is never sent over the +network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the +client. + + The integrity of the messages exchanged between princi- +pals can also be guaranteed using the session key (passed in +the ticket and contained in the credentials). This approach +provides detection of both replay attacks and message stream +modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a +hash or digest function) of the client's message, keyed with +the session key. Privacy and integrity of the messages +exchanged between principals can be secured by encrypting +the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + + The authentication exchanges mentioned above require +read-only access to the Kerberos database. Sometimes, how- +ever, the entries in the database must be modified, such as +when adding new principals or changing a principal's key. +This is done using a protocol between a client and a third +Kerberos server, the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). +There is also a protocol for maintaining multiple copies of +the Kerberos database. Neither of these protocols are +described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + + The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across +organizational boundaries. A client in one organization can +be authenticated to a server in another. Each organization +wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its own +"realm". The name of the realm in which a client is +registered is part of the client's name, and can be used by +the end-service to decide whether to honor a request. + + By establishing "inter-realm" keys, the administrators +of two realms can allow a client authenticated in the local +realm to prove its identity to servers in other realms[3]. +The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key may be used +for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of +each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is +then able to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote +realm's ticket-granting service from its local realm. When +that ticket-granting ticket is used, the remote ticket- +granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +__________________________ +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client +could arrange registration of a separately-named prin- +cipal in a remote realm, and engage in normal exchanges +with that realm's services. However, for even small +numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more +automatic methods as described here are necessary. + + +Section 1.1. - 5 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket- +granting ticket, and is thus certain that it was issued by +the client's own TGS. Tickets issued by the remote ticket- +granting service will indicate to the end-service that the +client was authenticated from another realm. + + A realm is said to communicate with another realm if +the two realms share an inter-realm key, or if the local +realm shares an inter-realm key with an intermediate realm +that communicates with the remote realm. An authentication +path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are tran- +sited in communicating from one realm to another. + + Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each +realm shares a key with its parent and a different key with +each child. If an inter-realm key is not directly shared by +two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an authen- +tication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical +organization is not used, it may be necessary to consult a +database in order to construct an authentication path +between realms. + + Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermedi- +ate realms may be bypassed to achieve cross-realm authenti- +cation through alternate authentication paths (these might +be established to make communication between two realms more +efficient). It is important for the end-service to know +which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to +place in the authentication process. To facilitate this +decision, a field in each ticket contains the names of the +realms that were involved in authenticating the client. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of +verifying the identity of principals on a network. Authen- +tication is usually useful primarily as a first step in the +process of authorization, determining whether a client may +use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos +does not, by itself, provide authorization. Possession of a +client ticket for a service provides only for authentication +of the client to that service, and in the absence of a +separate authorization procedure, it should not be con- +sidered by an application as authorizing the use of that +service. + + Such separate authorization methods may be implemented +as application specific access control functions and may be +based on files such as the application server, or on +separately issued authorization credentials such as those +based on proxies [7] , or on other authorization services. + + Applications should not be modified to accept the +issuance of a service ticket by the Kerberos server (even by + +Section 1.2. - 6 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +an modified Kerberos server) as granting authority to use +the service, since such applications may become vulnerable +to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment +where they interoperate with other KDCs or where other +options for application authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP pro- +posal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in +which it can properly function: + ++ "Denial of service" attacks are not solved with Ker- + beros. There are places in these protocols where an + intruder can prevent an application from participating + in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to + be not-uncommon "normal" failure modes for the system) + is usually best left to the human administrators and + users. + ++ Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an + intruder somehow steals a principal's key, it will be + able to masquerade as that principal or impersonate any + server to the legitimate principal. + ++ "Password guessing" attacks are not solved by Kerberos. + If a user chooses a poor password, it is possible for + an attacker to successfully mount an offline dictionary + attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt, with suc- + cessive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained + which are encrypted under a key derived from the user's + password. + ++ Each host on the network must have a clock which is + "loosely synchronized" to the time of the other hosts; + this synchronization is used to reduce the bookkeeping + needs of application servers when they do replay detec- + tion. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 + minutes. If the clocks are synchronized over the net- + work, the clock synchronization protocol must itself be + secured from network attackers. + ++ Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term + basis. A typical mode of access control will use + access control lists (ACLs) to grant permissions to + particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains + for a deleted principal and the principal identifier is + reused, the new principal will inherit rights specified + in the stale ACL entry. By not re-using principal + identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + + + +Section 1.3. - 7 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + + +Authentication Verifying the claimed identity of a + principal. + + +Authentication headerA record containing a Ticket and an + Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication + process. + + +Authentication path A sequence of intermediate realms tran- + sited in the authentication process when + communicating from one realm to another. + + +Authenticator A record containing information that can + be shown to have been recently generated + using the session key known only by the + client and server. + + +Authorization The process of determining whether a + client may use a service, which objects + the client is allowed to access, and the + type of access allowed for each. + + +Capability A token that grants the bearer permis- + sion to access an object or service. In + Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose + use is restricted by the contents of the + authorization data field, but which + lists no network addresses, together + with the session key necessary to use + the ticket. + + +Ciphertext The output of an encryption function. + Encryption transforms plaintext into + ciphertext. + + +Client A process that makes use of a network + service on behalf of a user. Note that + in some cases a Server may itself be a + client of some other server (e.g. a + print server may be a client of a file + server). + + + +Section 1.4. - 8 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +Credentials A ticket plus the secret session key + necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. + + +KDC Key Distribution Center, a network ser- + vice that supplies tickets and temporary + session keys; or an instance of that + service or the host on which it runs. + The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The + initial ticket portion is sometimes + referred to as the Authentication Server + (or service). The ticket-granting + ticket portion is sometimes referred to + as the ticket-granting server (or ser- + vice). + + +Kerberos Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding + Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the + protocol used by that service, or the + code used to implement the authentica- + tion service. + + +Plaintext The input to an encryption function or + the output of a decryption function. + Decryption transforms ciphertext into + plaintext. + + +Principal A uniquely named client or server + instance that participates in a network + communication. + + +Principal identifierThe name used to uniquely identify each + different principal. + + +Seal To encipher a record containing several + fields in such a way that the fields + cannot be individually replaced without + either knowledge of the encryption key + or leaving evidence of tampering. + + +Secret key An encryption key shared by a principal + and the KDC, distributed outside the + bounds of the system, with a long life- + time. In the case of a human user's + principal, the secret key is derived + + +Section 1.4. - 9 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + from a password. + + +Server A particular Principal which provides a + resource to network clients. The server + is sometimes refered to as the Applica- + tion Server. + + +Service A resource provided to network clients; + often provided by more than one server + (for example, remote file service). + + +Session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, with a lifetime limited + to the duration of a single login "ses- + sion". + + +Sub-session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, selected and exchanged + by the principals using the session key, + and with a lifetime limited to the dura- + tion of a single association. + + +Ticket A record that helps a client authenti- + cate itself to a server; it contains the + client's identity, a session key, a + timestamp, and other information, all + sealed using the server's secret key. + It only serves to authenticate a client + when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used +to indicate various attributes of that ticket. Most flags +may be requested by a client when the ticket is obtained; +some are automatically turned on and off by a Kerberos +server as required. The following sections explain what the +various flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use +such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + + The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued +using the AS protocol and not issued based on a ticket- +granting ticket. Application servers that want to require +the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set +in any tickets they accept, and thus be assured that the + + +Section 2.1. - 10 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +client's key was recently presented to the application +client. + + The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition +information about the initial authentication, regardless of +whether the current ticket was issued directly (in which +case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of a +ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is +clear, but the PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried +forward from the ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + + The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. +Application servers must reject tickets which have this flag +set. A postdated ticket will usually be issued in this +form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC before +use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the +VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only validate tick- +ets after their starttime has passed. The validation is +required so that postdated tickets which have been stolen +before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid +(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + + Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be +valid for long periods of time. However, this can expose +their credentials to potential theft for equally long +periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until +the expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short- +lived tickets and obtaining new ones periodically would +require the client to have long-term access to its secret +key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be used to +mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have +two "expiration times": the first is when the current +instance of the ticket expires, and the second is the latest +permissible value for an individual expiration time. An +application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the +RENEW option set in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a +new ticket with a new session key and a later expiration +time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified by +the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration +time arrives, the ticket expires permanently. At each +renewal, the KDC may consult a hot-list to determine if the +ticket had been reported stolen since its last renewal; it +will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the +usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only inter- +preted by the ticket-granting service (discussed below in +section 3.3). It can usually be ignored by application +servers. However, some particularly careful application + + +Section 2.3. - 11 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + + If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration +time, the KDC will not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag +is reset by default, but a client may request it be set by +setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. If +it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains +the time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + + Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets +for use much later, e.g. a batch submission system would +need tickets to be valid at the time the batch job is ser- +viced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in a +batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more +prone to theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain +these tickets from the KDC at job submission time, but to +leave them "dormant" until they are activated and validated +by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were +reported in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate +the ticket, and the thief would be foiled. + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only +interpreted by the ticket-granting service. It can be +ignored by application servers. This flag must be set in a +ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket +based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it +may be requested by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE +option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow +a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting ticket; post- +dated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by +requesting the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The +life (endtime-starttime) of a postdated ticket will be the +remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at the time of +the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in +which case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of +the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how far in +the future a ticket may be postdated. + + The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been +postdated. The application server can check the authtime +field in the ticket to see when the original authentication +occurred. Some services may choose to reject postdated +tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain +period after the original authentication. When the KDC +issues a POSTDATED ticket, it will also be marked as +INVALID, so that the application client must present the +ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + + At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a +service to perform an operation on its behalf. The service + + +Section 2.5. - 12 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +must be able to take on the identity of the client, but only +for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a service +to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose +by granting it a proxy. + + The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and +proxiable flags is used to provide credentials for use with +specific services. Though conceptually also a proxy, user's +wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must use +the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next sec- +tion to forward a ticket granting ticket. + + The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only inter- +preted by the ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by +application servers. When set, this flag tells the ticket- +granting server that it is OK to issue a new ticket (but not +a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address +based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the +client on initial authentication. By default, the client +will request that it be set when requesting a ticket grant- +ing ticket, and reset when requesting any other ticket. + + This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server +to perform a remote request on its behalf, e.g. a print ser- +vice client can give the print server a proxy to access the +client's files on a particular file server in order to +satisfy a print request. + + In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, +Kerberos tickets are usually valid from only those network +addresses specifically included in the ticket[4]. When +granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network +address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that +the proxy is to be issued for use from any address. + + The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it +issues a proxy ticket. Application servers may check this +flag and at their option they may require additional authen- +tication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to +provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + + Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy +where the service is granted complete use of the client's +identity. An example where it might be used is when a user +logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to work +from that system as if the login were local. + + The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only +__________________________ +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- +ets with no network addresses specified. + + +Section 2.6. - 13 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +interpreted by the ticket-granting service. It can be +ignored by application servers. The FORWARDABLE flag has an +interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE flag, except +ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users +may request that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option +in the AS request when they request their initial ticket- +granting ticket. + + This flag allows for authentication forwarding without +requiring the user to enter a password again. If the flag +is not set, then authentication forwarding is not permitted, +but the same result can still be achieved if the user +engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + + The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client +presents a ticket with the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests +a forwarded ticket by specifying the FORWARDED KDC option +and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It is +also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the +FORWARDED flag set. Application servers may choose to pro- +cess FORWARDED tickets differently than non-FORWARDED tick- +ets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + + There are two additional options which may be set in a +client's request of the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indi- +cates that the client will accept a renewable ticket if a +ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be provided. +If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then +the KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal +to the the requested endtime. The value of the renew-till +field may still be adjusted by site-determined limits or +limits imposed by the individual principal or server. + + The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the +ticket-granting service. It indicates that the ticket to be +issued for the end server is to be encrypted in the session +key from the a additional second ticket-granting ticket pro- +vided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific +details. + +__________________________ +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored +unless the requester can provide the old password (the +user's current secret key). Otherwise, it would be +possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- +sion and change another user's password. +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local sys- +tem, the credentials obtained in the AS exchange may +first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain credentials + + +Section 3.1. - 14 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between +network clients and servers and the messages involved in +those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + + The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the +client and the Kerberos Authentication Server is initiated +by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication creden- +tials for a given server but currently holds no credentials. +In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for en- +cryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at +the initiation of a login session to obtain credentials for +a Ticket-Granting Server which will subsequently be used to +obtain credentials for other servers (see section 3.3) +without requiring further use of the client's secret key. +This exchange is also used to request credentials for ser- +vices which must not be mediated through the Ticket-Granting +Service, but rather require a principal's secret key, such +as the password-changing service[5]. This exchange does not +by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the +user[6]. + + The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from +the client to Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in +reply. The formats for these messages are described in sec- +tions 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + + In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own +identity and the identity of the server for which it is +requesting credentials. The response, KRB_AS_REP, contains +a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a ses- +sion key that will be shared by the client and the server. +The session key and additional information are encrypted in +the client's secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message contains +information which can be used to detect replays, and to +associate it with the message to which it replies. Various +errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response +(KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error +__________________________ +for a local server. Those credentials must then be +verified by a local server through successful comple- +tion of the Client/Server exchange. + + + +Section 3.1. - 15 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +message is not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains +information which can be used to associate it with the mes- +sage to which it replies. The lack of encryption in the +KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays, +fabrications, or modifications of such messages. + + Without preautentication, the authentication server +does not know whether the client is actually the principal +named in the request. It simply sends a reply without know- +ing or caring whether they are the same. This is acceptable +because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in +the request will be able to use the reply. Its critical +information is encrypted in that principal's key. The ini- +tial request supports an optional field that can be used to +pass additional information that might be needed for the +initial exchange. This field may be used for pre- +authentication as described in section <>. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + + The client may specify a number of options in the ini- +tial request. Among these options are whether pre- +authentication is to be performed; whether the requested +ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; +whether it should be postdated or allow postdating of +derivative tickets; and whether a renewable ticket will be +accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the requested +ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non- +renewable ticket (due to configuration constraints; see sec- +tion 4). See section A.1 for pseudocode. + + The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it +to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + + If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message +will result in the creation of a ticket for the client to +present to the server. The format for the ticket is +described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are +determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + + The authentication server looks up the client and +server principals named in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, +extracting their respective keys. If required, the server +pre-authenticates the request, and if the pre-authentication +check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot +accommodate the requested encryption type, an error message +with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP is returned. Otherwise it +generates a "random" session key[7]. +__________________________ + + +Section 3.1.3. - 16 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a +client in the Kerberos database (or if the key registered +supports multiple encryption types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and +DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS request is +used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used +for encrypting the response to the client. If there is more +than one supported, strong encryption type in the etype +list, the first valid etype for which an encryption key is +available is used. The encryption method used to respond to +a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key +found in the ticket granting ticket. + + When the etype field is present in a KDC request, +whether an AS or TGS request, the KDC will attempt to assign +the type of the random session key from the list of methods +in the etype field. The KDC will select the appropriate +type using the list of methods provided together with infor- +mation from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable +encryption methods for the application server. The KDC will +not issue tickets with a weak session key encryption type. + + If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time +in the past, or is within the window of acceptable clock +skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE option has not been speci- +fied, then the start time of the ticket is set to the +authentication server's current time. If it indicates a +time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the +POSTDATED option has not been specified then the error +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise the +requested start time is checked against the policy of the +local realm (the administrator might decide to prohibit cer- +tain types or ranges of postdated tickets), and if accept- +able, the ticket's start time is set as requested and the +INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated ticket +must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC +after the start time has been reached. + + + + + + + + + +__________________________ +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should +be impossible to guess the next session key based on +knowledge of past session keys. This can only be +achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is +based on cryptographic principles. It is more desir- +able to use a truly random number generator, such as +one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + + + +Section 3.1.3. - 17 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum +of the following: + ++The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ + message. + ++The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the client principal (the authentication + server's database includes a maximum ticket lifetime field + in each principal's record; see section 4). + ++The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the server principal. + ++The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + + If the requested expiration time minus the start time +(as determined above) is less than a site-determined minimum +lifetime, an error message with code KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is +returned. If the requested expiration time for the ticket +exceeds what was determined as above, and if the +"RENEWABLE-OK" option was requested, then the "RENEWABLE" +flag is set in the new ticket, and the renew-till value is +set as if the "RENEWABLE" option were requested (the field +and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the +RENEWABLE-OK option has been set and a renewable ticket is +to be issued, then the renew-till field is set to the +minimum of: + ++Its requested value. + ++The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two + maximum renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' + database entries. + ++The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable + lifetime set by the policy of the local realm. + + The flags field of the new ticket will have the follow- +ing options set if they have been requested and if the pol- +icy of the local realm allows: FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, +POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new ticket is post- +dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + + If all of the above succeed, the server formats a +KRB_AS_REP message (see section 5.4.2), copying the +addresses in the request into the caddr of the response, +placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata +of the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the +client's key using the requested encryption method, and + + +Section 3.1.3. - 18 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +sends it to the client. See section A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + + Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server +responds by returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the +client, with the error-code and e-text fields set to +appropriate values. The error message contents and details +are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + + If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the +client verifies that the cname and crealm fields in the +cleartext portion of the reply match what it requested. If +any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive +the proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client +decrypts the encrypted part of the response using its secret +key, verifies that the nonce in the encrypted part matches +the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect replays). +It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response +match those in the request (or are otherwise expected +values), and that the host address field is also correct. +It then stores the ticket, session key, start and expiration +times, and other information for later use. The key- +expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may +be checked to notify the user of impending key expiration +(the client program could then suggest remedial action, such +as a password change). See section A.3 for pseudocode. + + Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not suf- +ficient to verify the identity of the user; the user and an +attacker could cooperate to generate a KRB_AS_REP format +message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper +KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, +it must require the user to present application credentials +which can be verified using a securely-stored secret key for +the host. If those credentials can be verified, then the +identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + + If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client +interprets it as an error and performs whatever +application-specific tasks are necessary to recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + + +Section 3.2. - 19 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used +by network applications to authenticate the client to the +server and vice versa. The client must have already +acquired credentials for the server using the AS or TGS +exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + + The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information +which should be part of the first message in an authenti- +cated transaction. It contains a ticket, an authenticator, +and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insuf- +ficient to authenticate a client, since tickets are passed +across the network in cleartext[8], so the authenticator is +used to prevent invalid replay of tickets by proving to the +server that the client knows the session key of the ticket +and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ mes- +sage is referred to elsewhere as the "authentication +header." + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + + When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a +server, it obtains (either through a credentials cache, the +AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a ticket and session key +for the desired service. The client may re-use any tickets +it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client con- +structs a new Authenticator from the the system time, its +name, and optionally an application specific checksum, an +initial sequence number to be used in KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV +messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in negotiations +for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if +replayed to a server[9]. If a sequence number is to be +included, it should be randomly chosen so that even after +many messages have been exchanged it is not likely to col- +lide with other sequence numbers in use. + + The client may indicate a requirement of mutual +__________________________ +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted +portion, so cleartext here refers to the entire unit, +which can be copied from one message and replayed in +another without any cryptographic skill. +[9] Note that this can make applications based on un- +reliable transports difficult to code correctly. If the +transport might deliver duplicated messages, either a +new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies +and replay the first reply in response to a detected +duplicate. + + + +Section 3.2.2. - 20 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authentication or the use of a session-key based ticket by +setting the appropriate flag(s) in the ap-options field of +the message. + + The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and +combined with the ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message +which is then sent to the end server along with any addi- +tional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + + Authentication is based on the server's current time of +day (clocks must be loosely synchronized), the authentica- +tor, and the ticket. Several errors are possible. If an +error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client +with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated +in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not accept- +able to the protocol. The format of error messages is +described in section 5.9.1. + + The algorithm for verifying authentication information +is as follows. If the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the +server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key +version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not one +the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the +server no longer possesses a copy of the old key), the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE- +SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it indi- +cates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the ses- +sion key from the server's ticket-granting ticket rather +than its secret key[10]. Since it is possible for the +server to be registered in multiple realms, with different +keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of +the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret +key the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server +doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + + The ticket is decrypted using the version of the +server's key specified by the ticket. If the decryption +routines detect a modification of the ticket (each encryp- +tion system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY +error is returned (chances are good that different keys were +used to encrypt and decrypt). + + The authenticator is decrypted using the session key +extracted from the decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it +to have been modified, the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is +__________________________ +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as +described in [8]. + + +Section 3.2.3. - 21 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +returned. The name and realm of the client from the ticket +are compared against the same fields in the authenticator. +If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is +returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong +session key was used to encrypt the authenticator). The +addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for an +address matching the operating-system reported address of +the client. If no match is found or the server insists on +ticket addresses but none are present in the ticket, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + + If the local (server) time and the client time in the +authenticator differ by more than the allowable clock skew +(e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. +If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is +returned[11]. The server must remember any authenticator +presented within the allowable clock skew, so that a replay +attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses track of +any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, +it must reject all requests until the clock skew interval +has passed. This assures that any lost or re-played authen- +ticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew and can +no longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an +attacker could conceivably record the ticket and authentica- +tor sent over the network to a server, then disable the +client's host, pose as the disabled host, and replay the +ticket and authenticator to subvert the authentication.). +If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the +server saves it for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or +KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is present, the server +either saves it for later use or uses it to help generate +its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP +message. + + The server computes the age of the ticket: local +(server) time minus the start time inside the Ticket. If +the start time is later than the current time by more than +the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Oth- +erwise, if the current time is later than end time by more +than the allowable clock skew, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED +error is returned. + + If all these checks succeed without an error, the +__________________________ +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to au- +thenticators from the same principal to the same +server. Other client principals communicating with the +same server principal should not be have their authen- +ticators rejected if the time and microsecond fields +happen to match some other client's authenticator. + + +Section 3.2.3. - 22 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +server is assured that the client possesses the credentials +of the principal named in the ticket and thus, the client +has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for +pseudocode. + + Passing these checks provides only authentication of +the named principal; it does not imply authorization to use +the named service. Applications must make a separate +authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of +the user, the requested operation, local acces control +information such as that contained in a .k5login or .k5users +file, and possibly a separate distributed authorization ser- +vice. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + + Typically, a client's request will include both the +authentication information and its initial request in the +same message, and the server need not explicitly reply to +the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication (not only +authenticating the client to the server, but also the server +to the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message +will have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a +KRB_AP_REP message is required in response. As with the +error message, this message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable to +the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond +field used in the reply must be the client's timestamp and +microsecond field (as provided in the authenticator)[12]. +If a sequence number is to be included, it should be ran- +domly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A +subkey may be included if the server desires to negotiate a +different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in +the session key extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + + + If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses +the session key from the credentials obtained for the +server[13] to decrypt the message, and verifies that the +__________________________ +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp +in the reply was the client's timestamp plus one. This +is not necessary in version 5 because version 5 mes- +sages are formatted in such a way that it is not possi- +ble to create the reply by judicious message surgery +(even in encrypted form) without knowledge of the ap- +propriate encryption keys. +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, +the sub-session key is not used, even if present in the +Authenticator. + + +Section 3.2.5. - 23 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the Authen- +ticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the +client is assured that the server is genuine. The sequence +number and subkey (if present) are retained for later use. +See section A.12 for pseudocode. + + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + + After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, +the client and server share an encryption key which can be +used by the application. The "true session key" to be used +for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other application-specific uses +may be chosen by the application based on the subkeys in the +KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some +cases, the use of this session key will be implicit in the +protocol; in others the method of use must be chosen from +several alternatives. We leave the protocol negotiations of +how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or check- +sum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos proto- +col does not constrain the implementation options, but an +example of how this might be done follows. + + One way that an application may choose to negotiate a +key to be used for subequent integrity and privacy protec- +tion is for the client to propose a key in the subkey field +of the authenticator. The server can then choose a key +using the proposed key from the client as input, returning +the new subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. +This key could then be used for subsequent communication. +To make this example more concrete, if the encryption method +in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever reason, one +of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than +40 unknown bits, this method would allow the the party which +is prevented from using more than 40 bits to either propose +(if the client) an initial key with a known quantity for 16 +of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if the server) +with the known quantity. The application implementor is +warned, however, that this is only an example, and that an +analysis of the particular crytosystem to be used, and the +reasons for limiting the key length, must be made before +deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits of the key. + + With both the one-way and mutual authentication +exchanges, the peers should take care not to send sensitive +information to each other without proper assurances. In +particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client +__________________________ +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to pro- +vide routines to choose subkeys based on session keys +and random numbers and to generate a negotiated key to +be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + + +Section 3.2.6. - 24 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +to assure both client and server of their peer's identity. +If an application protocol requires privacy of its messages, +it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section 3.5). The KRB_SAFE +message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + + The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos +Ticket-Granting Server is initiated by a client when it +wishes to obtain authentication credentials for a given +server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when +it wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when +it wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the first case, the +client must already have acquired a ticket for the Ticket- +Granting Service using the AS exchange (the ticket-granting +ticket is usually obtained when a client initially authenti- +cates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The mes- +sage format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that +for the AS exchange. The primary difference is that encryp- +tion and decryption in the TGS exchange does not take place +under the client's key. Instead, the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session +key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for all +application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the +TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, +the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid +tickets. + + The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request +(KRB_TGS_REQ) from the client to the Kerberos Ticket- +Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or KRB_ERROR). +The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating +the client plus a request for credentials. The authentica- +tion information consists of the authentication header +(KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the client's previously obtained +ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. In the +ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may +include one or more of: a list of network addresses, a col- +lection of typed authorization data to be sealed in the +ticket for authorization use by the application server, or +additional tickets (the use of which are described later). +The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested creden- +tials, encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket, or if present, in the sub- +session key from the Authenticator (part of the authentica- +tion header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code + + +Section 3.3. - 25 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +and text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message +is not encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message contains informa- +tion which can be used to detect replays, and to associate +it with the message to which it replies. The KRB_ERROR mes- +sage also contains information which can be used to associ- +ate it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of +encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to +detect replays or fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + Before sending a request to the ticket-granting ser- +vice, the client must determine in which realm the applica- +tion server is registered[15]. If the client does not +already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted +by requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the destination +realm from a Kerberos server for which the client does +posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ mes- +sage recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for +the desired realm in which case one can proceed. Alterna- +tively, the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm +which is "closer" to the desired realm (further along the +standard hierarchical path), in which case this step must be +repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in +the returned TGT. If neither are returned, then the request +must be retried with a Kerberos server for a realm higher in +the hierarchy. This request will itself require a ticket- +granting ticket for the higher realm which must be obtained +by recursively applying these directions. + + + Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for +the appropriate realm, it determines which Kerberos servers +serve that realm, and contacts one. The list might be +obtained through a configuration file or network service or +it may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as +the secret keys exchanged by realms are kept secret, only +denial of service results from using a false Kerberos +server. +__________________________ +[15] This can be accomplished in several ways. It +might be known beforehand (since the realm is part of +the principal identifier), it might be stored in a +nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- +tion file. If the realm to be used is obtained from a +nameserver, there is a danger of being spoofed if the +nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- +cated. This might result in the use of a realm which +has been compromised, and would result in an attacker's +ability to compromise the authentication of the appli- +cation server to the client. + + + +Section 3.3.1. - 26 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number +of options in the KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares +the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing an authentication header +as an element of the padata field, and including the same +fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for appli- +cation server use and additional tickets required by some +options. + + In preparing the authentication header, the client can +select a sub-session key under which the response from the +Kerberos server will be encrypted[16]. If the sub-session +key is not specified, the session key from the ticket- +granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data +is present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if +present, from the authenticator portion of the authentica- +tion header, or if not present, using the session key from +the ticket-granting ticket. + + Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server +for the destination realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner simi- +lar to the KRB_AS_REQ message, but there are many additional +checks to be performed. First, the Kerberos server must +determine which server the accompanying ticket is for and it +must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting ser- +vice, and the TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued +by another realm, then the appropriate inter-realm key must +be used. If the accompanying ticket is not a ticket grant- +ing ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY +options are specified in the request, and the server for +which a ticket is requested is the server named in the +accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the ticket in +the authentication header using the key of the server for +which it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the +padata field, the KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. + + Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the +user-supplied checksum in the Authenticator must be verified +against the contents of the request, and the message +rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +__________________________ +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must +be taken to ensure the randomness of the selected sub- +session key. One approach would be to generate a ran- +dom number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + + +Section 3.3.2. - 27 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or +not collision-proof (with an error code of +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the checksum type is not sup- +ported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. If +the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + + If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity +checks, the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + + The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the +KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to +KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in section +5.4.2. + + The response will include a ticket for the requested +server. The Kerberos database is queried to retrieve the +record for the requested server (including the key with +which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request is for +a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key +is shared with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server +will select the realm "closest" to the requested realm with +which it does share a key, and use that realm instead. This +is the only case where the response from the KDC will be for +a different server than that requested by the client. + + By default, the address field, the client's name and +realm, the list of transited realms, the time of initial +authentication, the expiration time, and the authorization +data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from the +ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the +transited field needs to be updated, but the transited type +is not supported, the KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. + + If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime +of the new ticket is set to the minimum of (a) that request, +(b) the endtime from the TGT, and (c) the starttime of the +TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the application +server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when +the TGT was issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, +then the endtime above is replaced by the minimum of (a) the +value of the renew_till field of the ticket and (b) the +starttime for the new ticket plus the life (endtime- +starttime) of the old ticket. + + If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the +resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. This option will only be honored if the FORWARDABLE +flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is similar; the +resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the + + +Section 3.3.3. - 28 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in +the TGT is set. The PROXY option will not be honored on +requests for additional ticket-granting tickets. + + If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time +in the past, or is within the window of acceptable clock +skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE option has not been speci- +fied, then the start time of the ticket is set to the +authentication server's current time. If it indicates a +time in the future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the +POSTDATED option has not been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE +flag is not set in the TGT, then the error +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the +ticket-granting ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then +the resulting ticket will be postdated and the requested +starttime is checked against the policy of the local realm. +If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, +and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be +validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the +starttime has been reached. However, in no case may the +starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued +postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the +ticket-granting ticket. + + If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an +additional ticket has been included in the request, the KDC +will decrypt the additional ticket using the key for the +server to which the additional ticket was issued and verify +that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the +requested server is missing from the request, the name of +the client in the additional ticket will be used. Otherwise +the name of the requested server will be compared to the +name of the client in the additional ticket and if dif- +ferent, the request will be rejected. If the request +succeeds, the session key from the additional ticket will be +used to encrypt the new ticket that is issued instead of +using the key of the server for which the new ticket will be +used[17]. + + If the name of the server in the ticket that is +presented to the KDC as part of the authentication header is +not that of the ticket-granting server itself, the server is +registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW option is +requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag +is set in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in +the ticket, and that the renew_till time is still in the +future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, the KDC will +__________________________ +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user +authentication [8], which uses ticket-granting ticket +session keys in lieu of secret server keys in situa- +tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- +ised. + + +Section 3.3.3. - 29 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is +set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will +check that the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the +tests succeed, and the ticket passes the hotlist check +described in the next paragraph, the KDC will issue the +appropriate new ticket. + + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + + Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting +server, the presented ticket(s) is(are) checked against a +hot-list of tickets which have been canceled. This hot-list +might be implemented by storing a range of issue timestamps +for "suspect tickets"; if a presented ticket had an authtime +in that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen +ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to +gain additional tickets (renewals or otherwise) once the +theft has been reported. Any normal ticket obtained before +it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their +normal expiration time. + + The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP +message is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authen- +ticator, if present, or the session key key from the +ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's +expiration date and the key version number fields are left +out since these values are stored along with the client's +database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy a +request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 +for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + + If the identity of the server in the TGT that is +presented to the KDC as part of the authentication header is +that of the ticket-granting service, but the TGT was issued +from another realm, the KDC will look up the inter-realm key +shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the +request, subject to the constraints outlined above in the +section describing the AS exchange. The realm part of the +client's identity will be taken from the ticket-granting +ticket. The name of the realm that issued the ticket- +granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the +ticket to be issued. This is accomplished by reading the +transited field from the ticket-granting ticket (which is +treated as an unordered set of realm names), adding the new +realm to the set, then constructing and writing out its +encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement +of the existing encoding). + + + +Section 3.3.3.2. - 30 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the +name of its own realm. Instead, its responsibility is to +add the name of the previous realm. This prevents a mali- +cious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its own +name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + + The names of neither the local realm nor the +principal's realm are to be included in the transited field. +They appear elsewhere in the ticket and both are known to +have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the +endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop +inter-realm authentication result in a transited field that +is empty. + + Because the name of each realm transited is added to +this field, it might potentially be very long. To decrease +the length of this field, its contents are encoded. The +initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal +case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrange- +ment of realms using either domain or X.500 style realm +names. This encoding (called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now +described. + + Realm names in the transited field are separated by a +",". The ",", "\", trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") +are special characters, and if they are part of a realm +name, they must be quoted in the transited field by preced- +ing them with a "\". + + A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being +prepended to the previous realm. For example, we can encode +traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, +and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end- +points, that they would not be included in this field, and +we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being +appended to the previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by +itself, then it should be preceded by a space (" "). For +example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, /COM/HP, +/COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". +__________________________ +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding +the first listed realm is considered to be the null +realm (""). + + +Section 3.3.3.2. - 31 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are +endpoints, they they would not be included in this field, +and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + + + A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates +that all realms between the previous realm and the next +realm have been traversed[19]. Thus, "," means that all +realms along the path between the client and the server have +been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms +from the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierar- +chy) have been traversed, and that everything from /COM down +to the server's realm in an X.500 style has also been +traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierar- +chy shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm +in another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is pro- +cessed in the same manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing +described above. The primary difference is that the cipher- +text part of the response must be decrypted using the ses- +sion key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the +client's secret key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + + The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring +the ability to detect modifications of messages they +exchange. It achieves this by including a keyed collision- +proof checksum of the user data and some control informa- +tion. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually +the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if +no negotiation has occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it +collects its data and the appropriate control information +and computes a checksum over them. The checksum algorithm +should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the RSA- +MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or +the DES MAC), generated using the sub-session key if +present, or the session key. Different algorithms may be +__________________________ +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, +the client's realm is considered to precede those in +the transited field, and the server's realm is con- +sidered to follow them. + + +Section 3.4.1. - 32 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +selected by changing the checksum type in the message. +Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable +for this use. + + The control information for the KRB_SAFE message +includes both a timestamp and a sequence number. The +designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE message must +choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice +should be based on the needs of the application protocol. + + Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will +be received by one's peer. Connection state is presently +required to maintain the session key, so maintaining the +next sequence number should not present an additional prob- +lem. + + If the application protocol is expected to tolerate +lost messages without them being resent, the use of the +timestamp is the appropriate replay detection mechanism. +Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common +sub-session key, but some messages will be sent to a subset +of one's peers. + + After computing the checksum, the client then transmits +the information and checksum to the recipient in the message +format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies +it as follows. If any error occurs, an error code is +reported for use by the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the pro- +tocol version and type fields match the current version and +KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application verifies that the checksum used is a collision- +proof keyed checksum, and if it is not, a +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The recipient +verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's +address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if +a recipient address is specified or the recipient requires +an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears as +the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for +either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the +timestamp and usec and/or the sequence number fields are +checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and not +present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, +along with the client name, time and microsecond fields from +the Authenticator match any recently-seen (sent or +received[20] ) such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is +__________________________ +[20] This means that a client and server running on the + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or +a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time- +stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. Finally, the check- +sum is computed over the data and control information, and +if it doesn't match the received checksum, a +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application is assured +that the message was generated by its peer and was not modi- +fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + + The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring +confidentiality and the ability to detect modifications of +exchanged messages. It achieves this by encrypting the mes- +sages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it +collects its data and the appropriate control information +(specified in section 5.7.1) and encrypts them under an +encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, +or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part +of the control information, the client must choose to use +either a timestamp or a sequence number (or both); see the +discussion in section 3.4.1 for guidelines on which to use. +After the user data and control information are encrypted, +the client transmits the ciphertext and some "envelope" +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies +it as follows. If any error occurs, an error code is +reported for use by the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the pro- +tocol version and type fields match the current version and +KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the +resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have +been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is gen- +erated. The recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address +__________________________ +same host and communicating with one another using the +KRB_SAFE messages should not share a common replay +cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + + + +Section 3.5.2. - 34 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or +the recipient requires an address) that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in +the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec +and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp +and usec are expected and not present, or they are present +but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If +the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is +generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or +a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time- +stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application can assume +the message was generated by its peer, and was securely +transmitted (without intruders able to see the unencrypted +contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + + The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring +the ability to send Kerberos credentials from one host to +another. It achieves this by sending the tickets together +with encrypted data containing the session keys and other +information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it +first (using the KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be +sent to the remote host. It then constructs a KRB_CRED mes- +sage using the ticket or tickets so obtained, placing the +session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of +the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part +of the the KRB_CRED message. + + Other information associated with each ticket and +obtained during the KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in the encrypted part of +the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if specifically +required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r- +address fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the +KRB_CRED message which is then encrypted under an encryption +key previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP exchange (usually the +last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no +negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies + + +Section 3.6.2. - 35 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +it. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use +by the application. The message is verified by checking +that the protocol version and type fields match the current +version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the +resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have +been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is gen- +erated. + + If present or required, the recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches +the sender's address in the message, and that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in +the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields +(and the nonce field if required) are checked next. If the +timestamp and usec are not present, or they are present but +not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application stores each +of the new tickets in its ticket cache together with the +session key and other information in the corresponding +KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED +message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- +ing the principal identifiers and secret keys of principals +to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following +fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identif- +ier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +__________________________ +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not +combine the database and the server on the same +machine; it is feasible to store the principal database +in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries +stored therein are protected from disclosure to and +modification by unauthorized parties. However, we +recommend against such strategies, as they can make +system management and threat analysis quite complex. + + +Section 4.1. - 36 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. +The key field contains an encryption key. This key is the +principal's secret key. (The key can be encrypted before +storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it in case +the database is compromised but the master key is not. In +that case, an extra field must be added to indicate the mas- +ter key version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is the +key version number of the principal's secret key. The +max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (end- +time - starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. +The max_renewable_life field contains the maximum allowable +total lifetime for any renewable Ticket issued for this +principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these +lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given +Ticket.) + + A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as +long as the database representation provides a mechanism to +distinguish between principal records with identifiers which +differ only in the realm name. + + When an application server's key changes, if the change +is routine (i.e. not the result of disclosure of the old +key), the old key should be retained by the server until all +tickets that had been issued using that key have expired. +Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be +active for a single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a +principal's key is always tagged with the version of the key +that was used for encryption, to help the recipient find the +proper key for decryption. + + When more than one key is active for a particular prin- +cipal, the principal will have more than one record in the +Kerberos database. The keys and key version numbers will +differ between the records (the rest of the fields may or +may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or +responds to a request for initial authentication, the most +recent key (known by the Kerberos server) will be used for +encryption. This is the key with the highest key version +number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields +in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification + + +Section 4.2. - 37 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos +master key under which the principal's secret key is +encrypted. + + After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC +will return an error to any client attempting to gain tick- +ets as or for the principal. (A database may want to main- +tain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one +for the principal's current key. This allows password aging +to work independently of the principal's expiration date. +However, due to the limited space in the responses, the KDC +must combine the key expiration and principal expiration +date into a single value called "key_exp", which is used as +a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + + The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the +operations involving the principal. This field might be +useful in conjunction with user registration procedures, for +site-specific policy implementations (Project Athena +currently uses it for their user registration process con- +trolled by the system-wide database service, Moira [9]), to +identify whether a principal can play the role of a client +or server or both, to note whether a server is appropriate +trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a client, or to +identify the "string to key" conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that +certain ticket options should not be allowed in tickets +encrypted under a principal's key (one bit each): Disallow +issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing forwardable +tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentica- +tion, disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing +proxiable tickets, and disallow issuing tickets for which +the principal is the server. + + The mod_date field contains the time of last modifica- +tion of the entry, and the mod_name field contains the name +of the principal which last modified the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + + Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last +time that a request was made by a particular principal. +Information that might be maintained includes the time of +the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a +ticket-granting ticket, or other times. This information +can then be returned to the user in the last-req field (see +__________________________ +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section +5.4.2 for details on why this can be useful. + + +Section 4.3. - 38 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +section 5.2). + + Other frequently changing information that can be main- +tained is the latest expiration time for any tickets that +have been issued using each key. This field would be used +to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow the +continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + + The KDC implementation should have the following confi- +gurable constants or options, to allow an administrator to +make and enforce policy decisions: + ++ The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether + the KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This + constant should reflect reasonable expectations of + round-trip time to the KDC, encryption/decryption time, + and processing time by the client and target server, and + it should allow for a minimum "useful" lifetime. + ++ The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a + ticket (renew_till - starttime). + ++ The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - + starttime). + ++ Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address + fields (including the ability to specify that such tick- + ets may only be issued if the request specifies some + authorization_data). + ++ Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable + tickets are to be issued. + + +5. Message Specifications + + The following sections describe the exact contents and +encoding of protocol messages and objects. The ASN.1 base +definitions are presented in the first subsection. The +remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryp- +tion and checksum techniques, and the fields related to +them, appear in section 6. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + + All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Dis- +tinguished Encoding Representation of the data elements as +described in the X.509 specification, section 8.7 [10]. + + + + + +Section 5.1. - 39 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + + The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the +rest of this section. Note that since the underscore char- +acter (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 names, the hyphen (-) is +used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall +not contain a character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). +Most realms will usually consist of several components +separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet Domain +Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 +names. Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in +section 7. A PrincipalName is a typed sequence of com- +ponents consisting of the following sub-fields: + +name-type This field specifies the type of name that fol- + lows. Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two + names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the + components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. + +name-stringThis field encodes a sequence of components that + form a name, each component encoded as a General- + String. Taken together, a PrincipalName and a + Realm form a principal identifier. Most Princi- + palNames will have only a few components (typi- + cally one or two). + + + + KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + + + The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as General- +izedTimes. An encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) +and shall not include any fractional portions of the +seconds. It further shall not include any separators. +Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 +seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + + HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + + +Section 5.2. - 40 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + } + + HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + } + + + The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type This field specifies the type of address that + follows. Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 8.1. + + +address This field encodes a single address of type addr- + type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly +one address; HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly +many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + +ad-data This field contains authorization data to be + interpreted according to the value of the + corresponding ad-type field. + +ad-type This field specifies the format for the ad-data + subfield. All negative values are reserved for + local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + } + + + TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + + +Section 5.2. - 41 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11), + transited-policy-checked(12), + ok-as-delegate(13) + } + + + KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + unused12(12), + unused13(13), + disable-transited-check(26), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) + } + + ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When + used in Kerberos for the APOptions, TicketFlags, + and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on + generated values should be the smallest multiple + of 32 bits needed to include the highest order bit + that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. + Implementations should accept values of bit + strings of any length and treat the value of flags + cooresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit + string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparisonof + bit strings of different length should treat the + smaller string as if it were padded with zeros + beyond the high order bits to the length of the + longer string[23]. + +__________________________ +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack +data structures during the generation and verification +of embedded checksums: Because any checksums applied to +data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within +a data structure between the time that a checksum is +generated through transmission to the time that the +checksum is verified. + + + +Section 5.2. - 42 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime + } + + +lr-type This field indicates how the following lr-value + field is to be interpreted. Negative values indi- + cate that the information pertains only to the + responding server. Non-negative values pertain to + all servers for the realm. + + If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no informa- + tion is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the + absolute value of the lr-type field is one (1), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of last + initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of last initial + request. If it is three (3), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of the last + renewal. If it is five (5), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last request (of any + type). + + +lr-value This field contains the time of the last request. + The time must be interpreted according to the con- + tents of the accompanying lr-type subfield. + + See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, Check- +sumType, EncryptedData, EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and +KeyType. + + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + + This section describes the format and encryption param- +eters for tickets and authenticators. When a ticket or +authenticator is included in a protocol message it is +treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + + A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate +to a service. A Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + + +Section 5.3.1. - 43 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared +by Kerberos and the end server (the server's secret key). +See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno This field specifies the version number for the + ticket format. This document describes version + number 5. + + +realm This field specifies the realm that issued a + ticket. It also serves to identify the realm part + of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers + within its realm, the two will always be identi- + cal. + + +sname This field specifies the name part of the server's + identity. + + +enc-part This field holds the encrypted encoding of the + EncTicketPart sequence. + + +flags This field indicates which of various options were + used or requested when the ticket was issued. It + is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + unselected options and reserved fields being reset + (0). Bit 0 is the most significant bit. The + encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the flags are: + + +Section 5.3.1. - 44 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + + + + + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 45 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 46 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + +Section 5.3.1. - 47 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 48 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + + +key This field exists in the ticket and the KDC + response and is used to pass the session key from + Kerberos to the application server and the client. + The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +crealm This field contains the name of the realm in which + the client is registered and in which initial + authentication took place. + + +cname This field contains the name part of the client's + principal identifier. + + +transited This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms + that took part in authenticating the user to whom + this ticket was issued. It does not specify the + order in which the realms were transited. See + section 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field + encodes the traversed realms. + + +authtime This field indicates the time of initial authenti- + cation for the named principal. It is the time of + issue for the original ticket on which this ticket + is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to + provide the necessary information for implementa- + tion of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An end + service that is particularly paranoid could refuse + to accept tickets for which the initial authenti- + cation occurred "too far" in the past. + + This field is also returned as part of the + response from the KDC. When returned as part of + the response to initial authentication + + +Section 5.3.1. - 49 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- + beros server[24]. + + +starttime This field in the ticket specifies the time after + which the ticket is valid. Together with endtime, + this field specifies the life of the ticket. If + it is absent from the ticket, its value should be + treated as that of the authtime field. + + +endtime This field contains the time after which the + ticket will not be honored (its expiration time). + Note that individual services may place their own + limits on the life of a ticket and may reject + tickets which have not yet expired. As such, this + is really an upper bound on the expiration time + for the ticket. + + +renew-tillThis field is only present in tickets that have + the RENEWABLE flag set in the flags field. It + indicates the maximum endtime that may be included + in a renewal. It can be thought of as the abso- + lute expiration time for the ticket, including all + renewals. + + +caddr This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) + or more (if present) host addresses. These are + the addresses from which the ticket can be used. + If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used + from any location. The decision by the KDC to + issue or by the end server to accept zero-address + tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may + refuse to issue or accept such tickets. The sug- + gested and default policy, however, is that such + tickets will only be issued or accepted when addi- + tional information that can be used to restrict + the use of the ticket is included in the + authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to + make it harder for an attacker to use stolen + credentials. Because the session key is not sent + over the network in cleartext, credentials can't +__________________________ +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used +to adjust the workstation's clock since the workstation +cannot reliably determine that such a KRB_AS_REP actu- +ally came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + + +Section 5.3.1. - 50 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + be stolen simply by listening to the network; an + attacker has to gain access to the session key + (perhaps through operating system security + breaches or a careless user's unattended session) + to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address + from which a connection is received cannot be + reliably determined. Even if it could be, an + attacker who has compromised the client's worksta- + tion could use the credentials from there. + Including the network addresses only makes it more + difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk + off with stolen credentials and then use them from + a "safe" location. + + +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass + authorization data from the principal on whose + behalf a ticket was issued to the application ser- + vice. If no authorization data is included, this + field will be left out. Experience has shown that + the name of this field is confusing, and that a + better name for this field would be restrictions. + Unfortunately, it is not possible to change the + name of this field at this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority + obtained on the bases of authentication using the + ticket. It is possible for any principal in + posession of credentials to add entries to the + authorization data field since these entries + further restrict what can be done with the ticket. + Such additions can be made by specifying the addi- + tional entries when a new ticket is obtained dur- + ing the TGS exchange, or they may be added during + chained delegation using the authorization data + field of the authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the + holder of credentials, it is not allowable for the + presence of an entry in the authorization data + field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end + service; the field will contain the names of ser- + vice specific objects, and the rights to those + objects. The format for this field is described + in section 5.2. Although Kerberos is not con- + cerned with the format of the contents of the sub- + fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + + +Section 5.3.1. - 51 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal + is able to issue a proxy that is valid for a + specific purpose. For example, a client wishing + to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to + be passed to the print server. By specifying the + name of the file in the authorization_data field, + the file server knows that the print server can + only use the client's rights when accessing the + particular file to be printed. + + A separate service providing providing authoriza- + tion or certifying group membership may be built + using the authorization-data field. In this case, + the entity granting authorization (not the author- + ized entity), obtains a ticket in its own name + (e.g. the ticket is issued in the name of a + privelege server), and this entity adds restric- + tions on its own authority and delegates the res- + tricted authority through a proxy to the client. + The client would then present this authorization + credential to the application server separately + from the authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data + field of a proxy and leaves the host addresses + blank, the resulting ticket and session key can be + treated as a capability. See [7] for some sug- + gested uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does + not have to be included in a ticket. + + +5.3.2. Authenticators + + An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a +server to certify the client's knowledge of the encryption +key in the ticket, to help the server detect replays, and to +help choose a "true session key" to use with the particular +session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session +key shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + + +Section 5.3.2. - 52 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the + format of the authenticator. This document speci- + fies version 5. + + +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for + the ticket in section 5.3.1. + + +cksum This field contains a checksum of the the applica- + tion data that accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. + + +cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the + client's timestamp. Its value (before encryption) + ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears along + with ctime. The two fields are used together to + specify a reasonably accurate timestamp. + + +ctime This field contains the current time on the + client's host. + + +subkey This field contains the client's choice for an + encryption key which is to be used to protect this + specific application session. Unless an applica- + tion specifies otherwise, if this field is left + out the session key from the ticket will be used. + +seq-numberThis optional field includes the initial sequence + number to be used by the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE mes- + sages when sequence numbers are used to detect + replays (It may also be used by application + specific messages). When included in the authen- + ticator this field specifies the initial sequence + number for messages from the client to the server. + When included in the AP-REP message, the initial + sequence number is that for messages from the + server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after + each message is sent. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the + detection of replays they should be non-repeating, + even across connection boundaries. The initial + sequence number should be random and uniformly + distributed across the full space of possible + sequence numbers, so that it cannot be guessed by + an attacker and so that it and the successive + sequence numbers do not repeat other sequences. + + + +Section 5.3.2. - 53 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket + in section 5.3.1. It is optional and will only + appear when additional restrictions are to be + placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those car- + ried in the ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + + This section specifies the format of the messages used +in the exchange between the client and the Kerberos server. +The format of possible error messages appears in section +5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + + The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. +Instead, its type is one of KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ +depending on whether the request is for an initial ticket or +an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent +from the client to the Authentication Server to request +credentials for a service. + + The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + + +Section 5.4.1. - 54 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +The fields in this message are: + + +pvno This field is included in each message, and speci- + fies the protocol version number. This document + specifies protocol version 5. + + +msg-type This field indicates the type of a protocol mes- + sage. It will almost always be the same as the + application identifier associated with a message. + It is included to make the identifier more readily + accessible to the application. For the KDC-REQ + message, this type will be KRB_AS_REQ or + KRB_TGS_REQ. + + +padata The padata (pre-authentication data) field con- + tains a sequence of authentication information + which may be needed before credentials can be + issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for + additional tickets (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will + include an element with padata-type of PA-TGS-REQ + and data of an authentication header (ticket- + granting ticket and authenticator). The checksum + in the authenticator (which must be collision- + proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY + encoding. In most requests for initial authenti- + cation (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies (KDC-REP), + the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by + certain extensions to the Kerberos protocol. For + example, it might be used to initially verify the + identity of a client before any response is + returned. This is accomplished with a padata + field with padata-type equal to PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + and padata-value defined as follows: + +padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP +padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + +PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and + + +Section 5.4.1. - 55 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + pausec containing the microseconds which may be + omitted if a client will not generate more than + one request per second. The ciphertext (padata- + value) consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, + encrypted using the client's secret key. + + The padata field can also contain information + needed to help the KDC or the client select the + key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for + supporting the use of certain token cards with + Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [11] for + additional uses of this field. + +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indi- + cates the way that the padata-value element is to + be interpreted. Negative values of padata-type + are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative + values are used for a registered interpretation of + the element type. + + +req-body This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent + of the remaining fields. If a checksum is to be + calculated over the request, it is calculated over + an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. + + +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and + KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the KDC and indicates the + flags that the client wants set on the tickets as + well as other information that is to modify the + behavior of the KDC. Where appropriate, the name + of an option may be the same as the flag that is + set by that option. Although in most case, the + bit in the options field will be the same as that + in the flags field, this is not guaranteed, so it + is not acceptable to simply copy the options field + to the flags field. There are various checks that + must be made before honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the + selected options are indicated by the bit being + set (1), and the unselected options and reserved + fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits + is specified in section 5.2. The options are + described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the options are: + + + + +Section 5.4.1. - 56 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a request + for forwarding. The address(es) of the + host from which the resulting ticket is + to be valid are included in the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set on + the initial request, or in a subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this is + a request for a proxy. This option will + only be honored if the ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the host + from which the resulting ticket is to be + valid are included in the addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + + + + + + +Section 5.4.1. - 57 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that this + is a request for a postdated ticket. + This option will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket on which it is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may be + reset by a subsequent request to the KDC + after the starttime in the ticket has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or when the + ticket-granting ticket on which the + request is based is also renewable. If + this option is requested, then the rtime + field in the request contains the + desired absolute expiration time for the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not to + identify the user to which it was + issued. Instead, the principal identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified by + the policy of the realm (e.g. usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of the + ticket is only to securely distribute a + session key, and not to identify the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the ticket + to be returned should be set. If the + local realms policy does not permit + anonymous credentials, the request is to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited field + is disabled. Tickets issued without the + performance of this check will be noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + + +Section 5.4.1. - 58 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if a + ticket with the requested life cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket with + the requested life cannot be provided, + then a renewable ticket may be issued + with a renew-till equal to the the + requested endtime. The value of the + renew-till field may still be limited by + local limits, or limits selected by the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for the + end server is to be encrypted in the + session key from the additional ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The RENEW option + indicates that the present request is + for a renewal. The ticket provided is + encrypted in the secret key for the + server on which it is valid. This + option will only be honored if the + ticket to be renewed has its RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its renew- + till field has not passed. The ticket + to be renewed is passed in the padata + field as part of the authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE option + indicates that the request is to vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will only + be honored if the ticket presented is + postdated, presently has its INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be vali- + dated before its starttime. The ticket + presented for validation is encrypted in + the key of the server for which it is + valid and is passed in the padata field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for + the ticket in section 5.3.1. sname may only be + + +Section 5.4.1. - 59 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is speci- + fied. If absent, the name of the server is taken + from the name of the client in the ticket passed + as additional-tickets. + + +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can + only be present in the TGS_REQ form), is an encod- + ing of the desired authorization-data encrypted + under the sub-session key if present in the + Authenticator, or alternatively from the session + key in the ticket-granting ticket, both from the + padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. + + +realm This field specifies the realm part of the + server's principal identifier. In the AS + exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. + + +from This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and + KRB_TGS_REQ ticket requests when the requested + ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the + desired start time for the requested ticket. + + + +till This field contains the expiration date requested + by the client in a ticket request. It is option + and if omitted the requested ticket is to have the + maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy + for the parties to the authentication exchange as + limited by expiration date of the ticket granting + ticket or other preauthentication credentials. + + +rtime This field is the requested renew-till time sent + from a client to the KDC in a ticket request. It + is optional. + + +nonce This field is part of the KDC request and + response. It it intended to hold a random number + generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, + it provides evidence that the response is fresh + and has not been replayed by an attacker. Nonces + must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be gen- + erated randomly, but if the correct time is known, + it may suffice[25]. +__________________________ +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the + +Section 5.4.1. - 60 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +etype This field specifies the desired encryption algo- + rithm to be used in the response. + + +addresses This field is included in the initial request for + tickets, and optionally included in requests for + additional tickets from the ticket-granting + server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it + includes the addresses for the client's host. If + a proxy is requested, this field will contain + other addresses. The contents of this field are + usually copied by the KDC into the caddr field of + the resulting ticket. + + +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a + request to the ticket-granting server. If the + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified, then + the session key from the additional ticket will be + used in place of the server's key to encrypt the + new ticket. If more than one option which + requires additional tickets has been specified, + then the additional tickets are used in the order + specified by the ordering of the options bits (see + kdc-options, above). + + + The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve +(12) depending on whether the request is for an initial +ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional ticket (TGS-REQ). + + The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and +additional-tickets) are only included if necessary to per- +form the operation specified in the kdc-options field. + + It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol +version number appears twice and two different message types +appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message contains these fields as +does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is passed +in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + + The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply +from the KDC for either an initial (AS) request or a subse- +quent (TGS) request. There is no message type for +__________________________ +nonce, one must make sure that the workstation time is +monotonically increasing. If the time is ever reset +backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability +that a nonce will be reused. + + + +Section 5.4.2. - 61 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or +KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of +the reply depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the client's secret key, and the +client's key version number is included in the key version +number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the cipher- +text is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenti- +cator, or if absent, the session key from the ticket- +granting ticket used in the request. In that case, no ver- +sion number will be present in the EncryptedData sequence. + + The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + + + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is either KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +__________________________ +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a +message provides an additional check that the message +was decrypted properly. + + +Section 5.4.2. - 62 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +padata This field is described in detail in section + 5.4.1. One possible use for this field is to + encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is + described in section 6.3.2). This ability is use- + ful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to + change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such + a case all existing password-derived entries in + the KDC database would be flagged as needing a + special mix-in string until the next password + change. + + +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for + the ticket in section 5.3.1. + + +ticket The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. + + +enc-part This field is a place holder for the ciphertext + and related information that forms the encrypted + part of a message. The description of the + encrypted part of the message follows each appear- + ance of this field. The encrypted part is encoded + as described in section 6.1. + + +key This field is the same as described for the ticket + in section 5.3.1. + + +last-req This field is returned by the KDC and specifies + the time(s) of the last request by a principal. + Depending on what information is available, this + might be the last time that a request for a + ticket-granting ticket was made, or the last time + that a request based on a ticket-granting ticket + was successful. It also might cover all servers + for a realm, or just the particular server. Some + implementations may display this information to + the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of + one's identity. It is similar in spirit to the + last login time displayed when logging into + timesharing systems. + + +nonce This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response + from the KDC and specifies the time that the + + +Section 5.4.2. - 63 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + client's secret key is due to expire. The expira- + tion might be the result of password aging or an + account expiration. This field will usually be + left out of the TGS reply since the response to + the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and + no client information need be retrieved from the + KDC database. It is up to the application client + (usually the login program) to take appropriate + action (such as notifying the user) if the expira- + tion time is imminent. + + +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the + encrypted portion of the attached ticket (see sec- + tion 5.3.1), provided so the client may verify + they match the intended request and to assist in + proper ticket caching. If the message is of type + KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will only be filled + in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded + ticket, or if the user is substituting a subset of + the addresses from the ticket granting ticket. If + the client-requested addresses are not present or + not used, then the addresses contained in the + ticket will be the same as those included in the + ticket-granting ticket. + + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + + This section specifies the format of the messages used +for the authentication of the client to the application +server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + + The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol +version number, the message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options +field to indicate any options in use, and the ticket and +authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often +referred to as the "authentication header". + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + + +Section 5.5.1. - 64 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +} + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REQ. + + +ap-optionsThis field appears in the application request + (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects the way the request is + processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), + and the unselected options and reserved fields + being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is + specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the + options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + + +ticket This field is a ticket authenticating the client + to the server. + + +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes + the client's choice of a subkey. Its encoding is + described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + + The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol +version number, the message type, and an encrypted time- +stamp. The message is sent in in response to an application +request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual authentication option + + +Section 5.5.2. - 65 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session +key of the ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in +an application-arranged negotiation to choose a per associa- +tion session key. + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REP. + + +enc-part This field is described above in section 5.4.2. + + +ctime This field contains the current time on the + client's host. + + +cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the + client's timestamp. + + +subkey This field contains an encryption key which is to + be used to protect this specific application ses- + sion. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on how this + field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is + left out, the sub-session key from the authentica- + tor, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + + + +__________________________ +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a +message provides an additional check that the message +was decrypted properly. + + + +Section 5.5.2. - 66 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +5.5.3. Error message reply + + If an error occurs while processing the application +request, the KRB_ERROR message will be sent in response. +See section 5.9.1 for the format of the error message. The +cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server cannot +determine their appropriate values from the corresponding +KRB_AP_REQ message. If the authenticator was decipherable, +the ctime and cusec fields will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can +be used by either side (client or server) of an application +to send a tamper-proof message to its peer. It presumes +that a session key has previously been exchanged (for exam- +ple, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + + The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a +collision-proof checksum keyed with the last encryption key +negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation +has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_SAFE. + + +safe-body This field is a placeholder for the body of the + KRB-SAFE message. It is to be encoded separately + and then have the checksum computed over it, for + use in the cksum field. + + + +Section 5.6.1. - 67 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +cksum This field contains the checksum of the applica- + tion data. Checksum details are described in sec- + tion 6.4. The checksum is computed over the + encoding of the KRB-SAFE-BODY sequence. + + +user-data This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV + messages and contain the application specific data + that is being passed from the sender to the reci- + pient. + + +timestamp This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV + messages. Its contents are the current time as + known by the sender of the message. By checking + the timestamp, the recipient of the message is + able to make sure that it was recently generated, + and is not a replay. + + +usec This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV + headers. It contains the microsecond part of the + timestamp. + + +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + + +s-address This field specifies the address in use by the + sender of the message. + + +r-address This field specifies the address in use by the + recipient of the message. It may be omitted for + some uses (such as broadcast protocols), but the + recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. + This field along with s-address can be used to + help detect messages which have been incorrectly + or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can +be used by either side (client or server) of an application +to securely and privately send a message to its peer. It +presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged +(for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + + The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in +the Session Key. The message fields are: + +__________________________ +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_PRIV. + + +enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart + sequence encrypted under the session key[32]. + This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part + field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for + the format of the ciphertext. + + +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. + + +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can +be used to send Kerberos credentials from one principal to +__________________________ +message provides an additional check that the message +was decrypted properly. +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an +initialization vector may be passed to the encryption +procedure, in order to achieve proper cipher chaining. +The initialization vector might come from the last +block of the ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV mes- +sage, but it is the application's choice whether or not +to use such an initialization vector. If left out, the +default initialization vector for the encryption algo- +rithm will be used. + + +Section 5.8. - 69 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +another. It is presented here to encourage a common mechan- +ism to be used by applications when forwarding tickets or +providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that +a session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using +the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + + The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to +be sent and information needed to use the tickets, including +the session key from each. The information needed to use +the tickets is encrypted under an encryption key previously +exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. +The message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + + + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_CRED. + + + + +Section 5.8.1. - 70 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC + specifically for use by the intended recipient. + Successive tickets are paired with the correspond- + ing KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the + KRB-CRED message. + + +enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart + sequence encrypted under the session key shared + between the sender and the intended recipient. + This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part + field of the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for + the format of the ciphertext. + + +nonce If practical, an application may require the + inclusion of a nonce generated by the recipient of + the message. If the same value is included as the + nonce in the message, it provides evidence that + the message is fresh and has not been replayed by + an attacker. A nonce must never be re-used; it + should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the mes- + sage in an application specific manner. + + +timestamp and usec + + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED + message was generated. The time is used to pro- + vide assurance that the message is fresh. + + +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. + They are used optionally to provide additional + assurance of the integrity of the KRB-CRED mes- + sage. + + +key This field exists in the corresponding ticket + passed by the KRB-CRED message and is used to pass + the session key from the sender to the intended + recipient. The field's encoding is described in + section 6.2. + + The following fields are optional. If present, they +can be associated with the credentials in the remote ticket +file. If left out, then it is assumed that the recipient of +the credentials already knows their value. + + +prealm and pname + + +Section 5.8.1. - 71 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + The name and realm of the delegated principal + identity. + + +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, + sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- + ing fields from the ticket found in the ticket + field. Descriptions of the fields are identical + to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + + This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR +message. The fields included in the message are intended to +return as much information as possible about an error. It +is not expected that all the information required by the +fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is +composed, the corresponding field will be left out of the +message. + + Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected +by any encryption, it is quite possible for an intruder to +synthesize or modify such a message. In particular, this +means that the client should not use any fields in this mes- +sage for security-critical purposes, such as setting a sys- +tem clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The message +can be useful, however, for advising a user on the reason +for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + + The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL +} + + + + + +Section 5.9.1. - 72 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_ERROR. + + +ctime This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + + +cusec This field is described above in section 5.5.2. + + +stime This field contains the current time on the + server. It is of type KerberosTime. + + +susec This field contains the microsecond part of the + server's timestamp. Its value ranges from 0 to + 999999. It appears along with stime. The two + fields are used in conjunction to specify a rea- + sonably accurate timestamp. + + +error-codeThis field contains the error code returned by + Kerberos or the server when a request fails. To + interpret the value of this field see the list of + error codes in section 8. Implementations are + encouraged to provide for national language sup- + port in the display of error messages. + + +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. + + +e-text This field contains additional text to help + explain the error code associated with the failed + request (for example, it might include a principal + name which was unknown). + + +e-data This field contains additional data about the + error for use by the application to help it + recover from or handle the error. If the error- + code is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data + field will contain an encoding of a sequence of + padata fields, each corresponding to an acceptable + pre-authentication method and optionally contain- + ing data for the method: + + +e-cksum This field contains an optional checksum for the + KRB-ERROR message. The checksum is calculated + over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the KRB-ERROR + + +Section 5.9.1. - 73 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + message with the checksum absent. The checksum is + then added to the KRB-ERROR structure and the mes- + sage is re-encoded. The Checksum should be calcu- + lated using the session key from the ticket grant- + ing ticket or service ticket, where available. If + the error is in response to a TGS or AP request, + the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the + error is in response to an AS request, then the + checksum should be calulated using the client's + secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preau- + thentication to prove knowledge of the secret key + by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be com- + puted because the key to be used is not available, + no checksum will be included. + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the + e-data field will contain an encoding of the fol- + lowing sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate + method; method-data will contain any required + additional information. + + + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are +designed to use stream encryption ciphers, which can be +simulated using commonly available block encryption ciphers, +such as the Data Encryption Standard, [12] in conjunction +with block chaining and checksum methods [13]. Encryption +is used to prove the identities of the network entities par- +ticipating in message exchanges. The Key Distribution +Center for each realm is trusted by all principals +registered in that realm to store a secret key in confi- +dence. Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to +verify the authenticity of a principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS +__________________________ +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an in- +correct AS request from obtaining verifiable plaintext +for use in an off-line password guessing attack. + + +Section 6. - 74 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +exchange) or a shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to +encrypt responses to ticket requests; the ability to obtain +the secret key or session key implies the knowledge of the +appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability +of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and present a +Ticket and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with +the session key from the KDC response) to a service verifies +the identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the +service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove +its knowledge thereof in a response verifies the identity of +the service. + + The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the +encryption used is secure from cryptanalysis; however, in +some cases, the order of fields in the encrypted portions of +messages are arranged to minimize the effects of poorly +chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If +keys are derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords +need to be well chosen to make brute force attacks more dif- +ficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy targets for +intruders. + + The following sections specify the encryption and +checksum mechanisms currently defined for Kerberos. The +encodings, chaining, and padding requirements for each are +described. For encryption methods, it is often desirable to +place random information (often referred to as a confounder) +at the start of the message. The requirements for a con- +founder are specified with each encryption mechanism. + + Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to +improve the the security characteristics of the ciphertext. +However, these chaining methods often don't provide an +integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such as DES +in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain- +text which can be verified at decryption and used to detect +any tampering or damage. Such checksums should be good at +detecting burst errors in the input. If any damage is +detected, the decryption routine is expected to return an +error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an +appropriate checksum. The specification of each encryption +method sets out its checksum requirements. + + Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's +password, an algorithm for converting the password to a key +of the appropriate type is included. It is desirable for +the string to key function to be one-way, and for the map- +ping to be different in different realms. This is important +because users who are registered in more than one realm will +often use the same password in each, and it is desirable +that an attacker compromising the Kerberos server in one +realm not obtain or derive the user's key in another. + + + +Section 6. - 75 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of +the candidate encryption and checksum methods considered for +Kerberos, the the reader is referred to [14]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + + The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted +messages. The enc-part field which appears in the unen- +crypted part of messages in section 5 is a sequence consist- +ing of an encryption type, an optional key version number, +and the ciphertext. + + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + + +etype This field identifies which encryption algorithm + was used to encipher the cipher. Detailed specif- + ications for selected encryption types appear + later in this section. + + +kvno This field contains the version number of the key + under which data is encrypted. It is only present + in messages encrypted under long lasting keys, + such as principals' secret keys. + + +cipher This field contains the enciphered text, encoded + as an OCTET STRING. + + + The cipher field is generated by applying the specified +encryption algorithm to data composed of the message and +algorithm-specific inputs. Encryption mechanisms defined +for use with Kerberos must take sufficient measures to +guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend +they also take measures to protect against precomputed dic- +tionary attacks. If the encryption algorithm is not itself +capable of doing so, the protections can often be enhanced +by adding a checksum and a confounder. + + The suggested format for the data to be encrypted +includes a confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, +and any necessary padding. The msg-seq field contains the +part of the protocol message described in section 5 which is +to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are +all untagged and untyped, and their length is exactly suffi- +cient to hold the appropriate item. The type and length is +implicit and specified by the particular encryption type + + +Section 6.1. - 76 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted +is described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + + + One generates a random confounder of the appropriate +length, placing it in confounder; zeroes out check; calcu- +lates the appropriate checksum over confounder, check, and +msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the necessary +padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type +and the appropriate key. + + Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryp- +tion algorithm that specifies a checksum, a length for the +confounder field, or an octet boundary for padding uses this +ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which are not specified +will be omitted. + + In the interest of allowing all implementations using a +__________________________ +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET +STRING(length) is the notation for an octet string with +its tag and length removed. It is not a valid ASN.1 +type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so +that the message starts with random data, but the tag +and its length are fixed. For other fields, the length +and tag would be redundant if they were included be- +cause they are specified by the encryption type. +[36] The ordering of the fields in the CipherText is +important. Additionally, messages encoded in this for- +mat must include a length as part of the msg-seq field. +This allows the recipient to verify that the message +has not been truncated. Without a length, an attacker +could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a mes- +sage which could be truncated, while leaving the check- +sum intact. Note that if the msg-seq is an encoding of +an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length is +part of that encoding. + + + +Section 6.1. - 77 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +particular encryption type to communicate with all others +using that type, the specification of an encryption type +defines any checksum that is needed as part of the encryp- +tion process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + + Some cryptosystems require additional information +beyond the key and the data to be encrypted. For example, +DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining mode, requires an +initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such addi- +tional information. + +6.2. Encryption Keys + + The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption +key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + + +keytype This field specifies the type of encryption key + that follows in the keyvalue field. It will + almost always correspond to the encryption algo- + rithm used to generate the EncryptedData, though + more than one algorithm may use the same type of + key (the mapping is many to one). This might hap- + pen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses + an alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity + check, or a different chaining mechanism. + + +keyvalue This field contains the key itself, encoded as an + octet string. + + All negative values for the encryption key type are +reserved for local use. All non-negative values are +reserved for officially assigned type fields and interpreta- +tions. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + + If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is +said to be the NULL encryption system. In the NULL encryp- +tion system there is no checksum, confounder or padding. +The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key is +used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in +length, with keytype zero (0). + + + +Section 6.3.1. - 78 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + + The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information +under the Data Encryption Standard [12] using the cipher +block chaining mode [13]. A CRC-32 checksum (described in +ISO 3309 [15]) is applied to the confounder and message +sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES +blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted +(the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) +must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The +details of the encryption of this data are identical to +those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision- +proof, an attacker could use a probabilistic chosen- +plaintext attack to generate a valid message even if a con- +founder is used [14]. The use of collision-proof checksums +is recommended for environments where such attacks represent +a significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum +for ticket or authenticator is no longer mandated as an +interoperability requirement for Kerberos Version 5 Specifi- +cation 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information +under the Data Encryption Standard [12] using the cipher +block chaining mode [13]. An MD4 checksum (described in +[16]) is applied to the confounder and message sequence +(msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concate- +nation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded +to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the +encryption of this data are identical to those for the des- +cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information +under the Data Encryption Standard [12] using the cipher +block chaining mode [13]. An MD5 checksum (described in +[17].) is applied to the confounder and message sequence +(msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concate- +nation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded +to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. + + Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as 8-octet +blocks which are concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for +the DES algorithms. The first octet supplies the 8 most +significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as the DES +input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 + + +Section 6.3.4. - 79 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least signi- +ficant bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining +requires an additional input in the form of an initializa- +tion vector. Unless otherwise specified, zero should be +used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8-octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semi- +weak" keys; those keys shall not be used for encrypting mes- +sages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way +that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, keys +shall not be used that yield "weak" or "semi-weak" keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). +This consists of 56 bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per +octet). The key is encoded as a series of 8 octets written +in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are also +encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) +where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and +P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity bits, the first octet of the key +would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the +FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), +the text string normally must have the realm and each com- +ponent of the principal's name appended[37], then padded +with ASCII nulls to an 8 byte boundary. This string is then +fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte +DES key. The parity is corrected on the key, and it is used +to generate a DES CBC checksum on the initial string (with +the realm and name appended). Next, parity is corrected on +the CBC checksum. If the result matches a "weak" or "semi- +weak" key as described in the DES specification, it is +eXclusive-ORed with the constant 00000000000000F0. Finally, +the result is returned as the key. Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + odd = 1; + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { +__________________________ +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a dif- +ferent "mix-in" string for compatibility reasons; see +the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + + +Section 6.3.4. - 80 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + fixparity(tempkey); + key = DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES EDE in outer CBC mode with an SHA1 check- +sum (des3-cbc-sha1) + + The des3-cbc-sha1 encryption encodes information using +three Data Encryption Standard transformations with three +DES keys. The first key is used to perform a DES ECB +encryption on an eight-octet data block using the first DES +key, followed by a DES ECB decryption of the result using +the second DES key, and a DES ECB encryption of the result +using the third DES key. Because DES blocks are 8 bytes, +the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, +checksum, and message) must first be padded to an 8 byte +boundary before encryption. To support the outer CBC mode, +the input is padded an eight-octet boundary. The first 8 +octets of the data to be encrypted (the confounder) is +exclusive-ored with an initialization vector of zero and +then ECB encrypted using triple DES as described above. +Subsequent blocks of 8 octets are exclusive-ored with the +ciphertext produced by the encryption on the previous block +before ECB encryption. + + An HMAC-SHA1 checksum (described in [18].) is applied +to the confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed +in the cksum field. + + Plaintext are encoded as 8-octet blocks which are con- +catenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. +The first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with +the octet's MSbit used as the DES input block's MSbit, +etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth +octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + + Encryption under Triple DES using cipher block chaining +requires an additional input in the form of an initializa- +tion vector. Unless otherwise specified, zero should be +used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8-octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semi- + + +Section 6.3.5. - 81 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +weak" keys; those keys shall not be used for encrypting mes- +sages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way +that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, keys +shall not be used that yield "weak" or "semi-weak" keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + A Triple DES key is 24 octets of data, with keytype +seven (7). This consists of 168 bits of key, and 24 parity +bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a series of 24 +octets written in MSB-first order, with the first 8 octets +treated as the first DES key, the second 8 octets as the +second key, and the third 8 octets the third DES key. The +bits within each key are also encoded in MSB order. For +example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) +where B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and +P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity bits, the first octet of the key +would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the +FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), +the text string normally must have the realm and each com- +ponent of the principal's name appended[38], + + The input string (with any salt data appended to it) is +n-folded into a 24 octet (192 bit) string. To n-fold a +number X, replicate the input value to a length that is the +least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before each +repetition, the input X is rotated to the right by 13 bit +positions. The successive n-bit chunks are added together +using 1's-complement addition (addition with end-around +carry) to yield a n-bit result. (This transformation was +proposed by Richard Basch) + + Each successive set of 8 octets is taken as a DES key, +and its parity is adjusted in the same manner as previously +described. If any of the three sets of 8 octets match a +"weak" or "semi-weak" key as described in the DES specifica- +tion, that chunk is eXclusive-ORed with the constant +00000000000000F0. The resulting DES keys are then used in +sequence to perform a Triple-DES CBC encryption of the n- +folded input string (appended with any salt data), using a +zero initial vector. Parity, weak, and semi-weak keys are +once again corrected and the result is returned as the 24 +octet key. + + Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { +__________________________ +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a dif- +ferent "mix-in" string for compatibility reasons; see +the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + + +Section 6.3.5. - 82 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tkey[24] = fold(s); + fixparity(tkey); + if(isweak(tkey[0-7])) tkey[0-7] = tkey[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(isweak(tkey[8-15])) tkey[8-15] = tkey[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(tkey[16-23])) tkey[16-23] = tkey[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + key[24] = 3DES-CBC(data=fold(s),key=tkey,iv=0); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak(key[0-7])) key[0-7] = key[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[8-15])) key[8-15] = key[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[16-23])) key[16-23] = key[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.4. Checksums + + The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a check- +sum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + + +cksumtype This field indicates the algorithm used to gen- + erate the accompanying checksum. + +checksum This field contains the checksum itself, encoded + as an octet string. + + Detailed specification of selected checksum types +appear later in this section. Negative values for the +checksum type are reserved for local use. All non-negative +values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + + Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two +properties: whether they are collision-proof, and whether +they are keyed. It is infeasible to find two plaintexts +which generate the same checksum value for a collision-proof +checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the +algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream +modification by an active attacker, unkeyed checksums should +only be used when the checksum and message will be subse- +quently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as part of the +encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + + Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if +the checksum value is encrypted before inclusion in a mes- +sage. In such cases, the composition of the checksum and + + +Section 6.4. - 83 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a +new checksum algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed +checksums, as well as for the encrypted forms of unkeyed +collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a confounder +before the checksum is calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a +cyclic redundancy check as described in ISO 3309 [15]. The +resulting checksum is four (4) octets in length. The CRC-32 +is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The use of this +checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a proba- +bilistic chosen-plaintext attack as described in [14] might +be able to generate an alternative message that satisfies +the checksum. The use of collision-proof checksums is +recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the +RSA MD4 algorithm [16]. The algorithm takes as input an +input message of arbitrary length and produces as output a +128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to be +collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4- +des) + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision- +proof checksum by prepending an 8 octet confounder before +the text, applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm, and +encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES in +cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, +where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key +with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization +vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets +long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum is +tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and +__________________________ +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a +key to a particular function, separating the functions +of generating a checksum from other encryption per- +formed using the session key. The constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was chosen because it maintains key +parity. The properties of DES precluded the use of the +complement. The same constant is used for similar pur- +pose in the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy +Enhanced Mail standard. + + +Section 6.4.3. - 84 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +"semi-weak keys"; those keys shall not be used for generat- +ing RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- +ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + + + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the +RSA MD5 algorithm. [17]. The algorithm takes as input an +input message of arbitrary length and produces as output a +128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to be +collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5- +des) + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision- +proof checksum by prepending an 8 octet confounder before +the text, applying the RSA MD5 checksum algorithm, and +encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES in +cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, +where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key +with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vec- +tor should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets +long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum is +tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and +"semi-weak keys"; those keys shall not be used for encrypt- +ing RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- +ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who + + +Section 6.4.5. - 85 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 +octet confounder to the plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode +encryption on the result using the key and an initialization +vector of zero, taking the last block of the ciphertext, +prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of +the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing +the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initializa- +tion vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 +bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + + The format for the checksum is described in the follow- +ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who +prefer an ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semi- +weak" keys; those keys shall not be used for generating +DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos, nor shall a key be +used whose variant is "weak" or "semi-weak". + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative +(rsa-md4-des-k) + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed +collision-proof checksum by applying the RSA MD4 checksum +algorithm and encrypting the results using DES in cipher- +block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets +long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be +collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old +method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no + + +Section 6.4.7. - 86 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des- +mac-k) + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES +CBC-mode encryption of the plaintext, and using the last +block of the ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed +with an encryption key and an initialization vector; any +uses which do not specify an additional initialization vec- +tor will use the key as both key and initialization vector. +The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that +this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DES- +MAC checksum and it is no longer recommended. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys" and +"semi-weak keys"; those keys shall not be used for generat- +ing DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + + +7.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and +although a realm can technically select any name it chooses, +interoperability across realm boundaries requires agreement +on how realm names are to be assigned, and what information +they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform +to the conventions itself, and it must require that any +realms with which inter-realm keys are shared also conform +to the conventions and require the same from its neighbors. + + Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names +that differ only in the case of the characters are not +equivalent. There are presently four styles of realm names: +domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each style +follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of +components separated by periods (.) and they contain neither +colons (:) nor slashes (/). Domain names must be converted +to upper case when used as realm names. + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a + + +Section 7.1. - 87 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +colon (:) before the equal. The realm names for X.500 names +will be string representations of the names with components +separated by slashes. Leading and trailing slashes will not +be included. + + Names that fall into the other category must begin with +a prefix that contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the +prefix must be followed by a colon (:) and the rest of the +name. All prefixes must be assigned before they may be +used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not +fall into the first three categories. All names in this +category are reserved. It is unlikely that names will be +assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the "other" category. + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts +between the various name styles. The following additional +constraints apply to the assignment of realm names in the +domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for the +domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organiza- +tion owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet domain +name or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are +registered, authority to use a realm name may be derived +from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if +there is no domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the adminis- +trator of the MIT.EDU realm can authorize the creation of a +realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which +the parent is assigned is presumably the organization +authorized to assign names to its children in the X.500 and +domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 +hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make sure +that there will not in the future exists a name identical to +the realm name of the child unless it is assigned to the +same entity as the realm name. + + +7.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed +to ensure that all agree on what information is implied by a +principal name. The name-type field that is part of the +principal name indicates the kind of information implied by +the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. +Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. +at least one of the components, or the realm, must be dif- +ferent). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +The following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + + +Section 7.2. - 88 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness +at a particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. +The principal name type should be used for users, and it +might also be used for a unique server. If the name is a +unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed never to be +reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note +that it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any +type since stale entries might remain in access control +lists). + + If the first component of a name identifies a service +and the remaining components identify an instance of the +service in a server specified manner, then the name type of +SRV-INST should be used. An example of this name type is +the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first +component of krbtgt and a second component identifying the +realm for which the ticket is valid. + + If instance is a single component following the service +name and the instance identifies the host on which the +server is running, then the name type SRV-HST should be +used. This type is typically used for Internet services +such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components +following the name of the service, then the name type SRV- +XHST should be used. This type might be used to identify +servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash (/) might +otherwise be ambiguous. + + A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of +the name is not known. When comparing names, a name of type +UNKNOWN will match principals authenticated with names of +any type. A principal authenticated with a name of type +UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNK- +NOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of "krbtgt" +are reserved for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See +section 8.2.3 for the form of such names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will +generally be composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC +with which the server is registered, and (2) a two-component + + +Section 7.2.1. - 89 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an Internet +domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if +the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows +slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or +multi-component name will identify the service and the +latter components will identify the host. Where the name of +the host is not case sensitive (for example, with Internet +domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If +specified by the application protocol for services such as +telnet and the Berkeley R commands which run with system +privileges, the first component may be the string "host" +instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has +an official name and one or more aliases, the official name +of the host must be used when constructing the name of the +server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + + +8.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are +reserved for local use. All non-negative values are +reserved for officially assigned type fields and interpreta- +tions. + + The values of the types for the following addresses are +chosen to match the defined address family constants in the +Berkeley Standard Distributions of Unix. They can be found +in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is +an abbreviation of the address family name). + + +Internet addresses + + Internet addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, +encoded in MSB order. The type of internet addresses is two +(2). + +CHAOSnet addresses + + CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, +encoded in MSB order. The type of CHAOSnet addresses is +five (5). + +ISO addresses + + ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO +addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + + XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded +in MSB order. The type of XNS addresses is six (6). + + +Section 8.1. - 90 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + + AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number +and a 16-bit network number. The first octet of the address +is the node number; the remaining two octets encode the net- +work number in MSB order. The type of AppleTalk DDP +addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded +in LSB order. The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is +twelve (12). + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. IP transport + + When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a +KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP IP transport, the client shall +send a UDP datagram containing only an encoding of the +request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an +encoding of the reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a +KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at the sender's IP address. + + Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must accept +UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). Servers may also accept +TCP requests on port 88 (decimal). When the KRB_KDC_REQ +message is sent to the KDC by TCP, a new connection will be +established for each authentication exchange and the +KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the +client on the TCP stream that was established for the +request. The connection will be broken after the reply has +been received (or upon time-out). Care must be taken in +managing TCP/IP connections with the KDC to prevent denial +of service attacks based on the number of TCP/IP connections +with the KDC that remain open. + +8.2.2. OSI transport + + During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI +server, the mutual authentication of an OSI server to an OSI +client, the transfer of credentials from an OSI client to an +OSI server, or during exchange of private or integrity +checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be treated +as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechan- +ism will be: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), security(5), + kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an +authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply +(KRB_AP_REP), a safe message (KRB_SAFE), a private message + + +Section 8.2.2. - 91 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +(KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message (KRB_CRED). The opaque +data contains an application code as specified in the ASN.1 +description for each message. The application code may be +used by Kerberos to determine the message type. + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service +shall be composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC +issuing the TGS ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRV- +INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the second part the +name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting +ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the +ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the +ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") +(name). A ticket-granting ticket issued by the +ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the +MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" +(realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-priv 9 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-pub 10 (pkinit) +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 10 20 (I had this as 10, is it 12) + + +Section 8.3. - 92 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (pkinit) + +authorization data type ad-type value +reserved values 0-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + + + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + + +Section 8.3. - 93 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired- +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message + + + +Section 8.3. - 94 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) + + +9. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of +options. Among these are multiple encryption and checksum +types, alternative encoding schemes for the transited field, +optional mechanisms for pre-authentication, the handling of +tickets with no addresses, options for mutual authentica- +tion, user to user authentication, support for proxies, for- +warding, postdating, and renewing tickets, the format of +realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it +is necessary to define a minimal configuration which must be +supported by all implementations. This minimal configura- +tion is subject to change as technology does. For example, +if at some later date it is discovered that one of the +required encryption or checksum algorithms is not secure, it +will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 1 + + This section defines the first specification of these +options. Implementations which are configured in this way +can be said to support Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 +(5.1). + +Encryption and checksum methods + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be +supported. Implementations may support other mechanisms as +well, but the additional mechanisms may only be used when +communicating with principals known to also support them: +This list is to be determined. +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + + +__________________________ +- This error carries additional information in the e- +data field. The contents of the e-data field for this +message is described in section 5.9.1. + + + +Section 9.1. - 95 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in +both the Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket +granting ticket for an unknown realm is requested, the KDC +must be able to determine the names of the intermediate +realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be +supported. Alternative encodings may be supported, but they +may be used only when that encoding is supported by ALL +intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is +not used on the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP +method must be supported by clients but whether it is +enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC- +TIMESTAMP as an acceptable method, the client should retry +the initial request using the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre- +authentication method. Servers need not support the PA- +ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should +ignore the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication +in a request. + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be +supported. + + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. +if a TGT contains no addresses, the KDC will return deriva- +tive tickets), but each realm may set its own policy for +issuing such tickets, and each application server will set +its own policy with respect to accepting them. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Indi- +vidual realms and application servers can set their own pol- +icy on when such tickets will be accepted. + + All implementations must recognize renewable and post- +dated tickets, but need not actually implement them. If +these options are not supported, the starttime and endtime +in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful life. +When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all imple- +mentations shall make the presence of the postdated flag + + +Section 9.1. - 96 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +visible to the calling server. + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT- +IN-SKEY KDC option) must be provided by implementations, but +individual realms may decide as a matter of policy to reject +such requests on a per-principal or realm-wide basis. + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields +from ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets +unless directed to suppress a subfield as part of the defin- +ition of that registered subfield type (it is never +incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered subfield +types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + + Implementations must make the contents of any authori- +zation data subfields available to the server when a ticket +is used. Implementations are not required to allow clients +to specify the contents of the authorization data fields. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC imple- +mentation, based on the list of suggested configuration con- +stants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes + +maximum renewable lifetime1 week + +maximum ticket lifetime1 day + +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data + +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Section 9.2. - 97 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +10. REFERENCES + + + +1. B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +2. S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +3. J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +4. Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +5. Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +6. John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +7. B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +8. Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +9. P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +10. CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +11. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + + + +Section 10. - 98 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +12. National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + +13. National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +14. Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +15. International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +16. R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +17. R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +18. H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Section 10. - 99 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + + This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the +messages are to be constructed and interpreted by clients +and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + +Section A.2. - 100 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + +Section A.2. - 101 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + + +Section A.2. - 102 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + + + +Section A.2. - 103 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that */ + /* should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + + +Section A.4. - 104 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly */ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + + +Section A.5. - 105 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + +Section A.6. - 106 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(server)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(server); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + + +Section A.6. - 107 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + +Section A.6. - 108 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would */ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so */ + /* there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till >= kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + + +Section A.6. - 109 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + + + +Section A.6. - 110 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + + + +Section A.7. - 111 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +A.8. Authenticator generation + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + + +Section A.10. - 112 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + +Section A.11. - 113 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + +Section A.13. - 114 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + +Section A.15. - 115 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + + +Section A.17. - 116 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + + +Section A.18. - 117 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + using negotiated encryption key; + + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + + +Section A.20. - 118 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - 119 - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - cxx - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + + + + Table of Contents + + + + +Overview .............................................. 2 + +Background ............................................ 2 + +1. Introduction ....................................... 3 + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation ............................ 5 + +1.2. Authorization .................................... 6 + +1.3. Environmental assumptions ........................ 7 + +1.4. Glossary of terms ................................ 8 + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests ...................... 10 + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets ............ 10 + +2.2. Invalid tickets .................................. 11 + +2.3. Renewable tickets ................................ 11 + +2.4. Postdated tickets ................................ 12 + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets ...................... 12 + +2.6. Forwardable tickets .............................. 13 + +2.7. Other KDC options ................................ 14 + +3. Message Exchanges .................................. 14 + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange .............. 14 + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message ............... 16 + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message .................. 16 + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message ............... 16 + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message ................ 19 + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message .................. 19 + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message ................... 19 + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange ........ 19 + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message ......................... 20 + + + - i - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message ............. 20 + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message .................. 21 + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message ............. 23 + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message .................. 23 + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key ....................... 24 + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange ....... 25 + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message .............. 26 + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message ................. 27 + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message .............. 28 + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets ................. 30 + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field ................. 30 + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message ................. 32 + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange ............................ 32 + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message ............... 32 + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message .................... 33 + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange ............................ 34 + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message ............... 34 + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message .................... 34 + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange ............................ 35 + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message ............... 35 + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message .................... 35 + +4. The Kerberos Database .............................. 36 + +4.1. Database contents ................................ 36 + +4.2. Additional fields ................................ 37 + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields ....................... 38 + +4.4. Site Constants ................................... 39 + +5. Message Specifications ............................. 39 + + + + - ii - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation ...... 39 + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions ........................... 40 + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators ....................... 43 + +5.3.1. Tickets ........................................ 43 + +5.3.2. Authenticators ................................. 52 + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges ...... 54 + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition ......................... 54 + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition ......................... 61 + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications ........ 64 + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition .......................... 64 + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition .......................... 65 + +5.5.3. Error message reply ............................ 67 + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification ................... 67 + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition ............................ 67 + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification ................... 68 + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition ............................ 68 + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification ................... 69 + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition ............................ 70 + +5.9. Error message specification ...................... 72 + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition ........................... 72 + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications ............. 74 + +6.1. Encryption Specifications ........................ 76 + +6.2. Encryption Keys .................................. 78 + +6.3. Encryption Systems ............................... 78 + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) .............. 78 + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des- +cbc-crc) .............................................. 79 + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des- + + + - iii - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +cbc-md4) .............................................. 79 + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des- +cbc-md5) .............................................. 79 + +6.3.5. Triple DES EDE in outer CBC mode with an SHA1 +checksum (des3-cbc-sha1) .............................. 81 + +6.4. Checksums ........................................ 83 + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) .................... 84 + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) ................. 84 + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES +(rsa-md4-des) ......................................... 84 + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) ................. 85 + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES +(rsa-md5-des) ......................................... 85 + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES +alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) ........................... 86 + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative +(des-mac-k) ........................................... 87 + +7. Naming Constraints ................................. 87 + +7.1. Realm Names ...................................... 87 + +7.2. Principal Names .................................. 88 + +7.2.1. Name of server principals ...................... 89 + +8. Constants and other defined values ................. 90 + +8.1. Host address types ............................... 90 + +8.2. KDC messages ..................................... 91 + +8.2.1. IP transport ................................... 91 + +8.2.2. OSI transport .................................. 91 + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS ................................ 92 + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values ......... 92 + +9. Interoperability requirements ...................... 95 + + + + - iv - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + + + + + Version 5 - Specification Revision 6 + + +9.1. Specification 1 .................................. 95 + +9.2. Recommended KDC values ........................... 97 + +10. REFERENCES ........................................ 98 + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing ................ 100 + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation ............................ 100 + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP genera- +tion .................................................. 100 + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification .......................... 104 + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks ......... 104 + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation ........................... 105 + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP gen- +eration ............................................... 106 + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification ......................... 111 + +A.8. Authenticator generation ......................... 112 + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation ............................ 112 + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification ......................... 112 + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation ........................... 113 + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification ......................... 114 + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation ............................. 114 + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification ........................... 115 + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks ............. 115 + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation ............................. 116 + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification ........................... 116 + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation ............................. 117 + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification ........................... 118 + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation ............................ 118 + + + + + + + + - v - Expires 11 January 1998 + + + + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78db9d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-01.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6214 @@ + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + 21 November 1997 + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of +the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is +inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them +other than as 'work in progress.' + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +'1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow +Directories on ds.internic.net (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01.txt, and expires 21 May 1998. Please send +comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos +network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol. + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard through +the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the presentation, but +only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit +within current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested by +Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of Kerberos +Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff +members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman +(now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern +California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project +Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members +of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was +led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the community. The +development of the MIT reference implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl +and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from many others. +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. + +Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and 5 can be found in +[KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. a +workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. This +is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system, +without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical security +of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that packets +traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. +Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted +third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared secret key +[2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and implemented +that provide for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of +the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for authentication of +users registered with public key certification authorities, and allow the +system to provide certain benefits of public key cryptography in situations +where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the +client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server and 2) +a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The client +transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of the +session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session +key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the +client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also +be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to +exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further +communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret +keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos protocol. +In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical network +application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly or +through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for +a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted in +the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client uses +the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it were +contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry points +within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent "in +the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart +replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, additional +information is sent to prove that the message originated with the principal +to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the authenticator) +is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp +proves that the message was recently generated and is not a replay. +Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated +by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting +principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over the +network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to the +Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must be +modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's key. +This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos server, +the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol for +maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server in +another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its +own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is part +of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide whether +to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key +may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of +each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share an +inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is not +directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical organization +is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in order to construct +an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in authenticating +the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93] , or on other authorization services. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the issuance of a service +ticket by the Kerberos server (even by an modified Kerberos server) as +granting authority to use the service, since such applications may become +vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment if +they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for application +authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to successfully + mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt, + with successive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained which are + encrypted under a key derived from the user's password. + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A typical + mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to grant + permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains for + a deleted principal and the principal identifier is reused, the new + principal will inherit rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not + re-using principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been recently + generated using the session key known only by the client and server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access allowed + for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted by + the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. Note + that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other server + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and ticket-granting + ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is sometimes referred to as + the Authentication Server (or service). The ticket-granting ticket + portion is sometimes referred to as the ticket-granting server (or + service). +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than one + server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the various +flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC +before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the VALIDATE +option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their starttime +has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets which have +been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid +(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set in +the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key and +a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified +by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration time arrives, +the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a +hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last +renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the usable +lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in +a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to theft. +Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC at job +submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are activated and +validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported +in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief +would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This flag +must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket +based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be requested +by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. +This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting +ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting +the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) of a +postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at +the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in which +case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting +ticket. The KDC may limit how far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the identity +of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a +service to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose by +granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must +use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to forward +a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When set, +this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a new +ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address +based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client on initial +authentication. By default, the client will request that it be set when +requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any other +ticket. + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print server +a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in order to +satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in the +ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network +address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the proxy is to +be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may require +additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to +provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request that +it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when they +request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user to +enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It +is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED flag + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets differently +than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients and +servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the Kerberos +Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain +authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the initiation +of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting Server which +will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other servers (see +section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's secret key. This +exchange is also used to request credentials for services which must not be +mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a +principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. This +exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the +user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The response, +KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a +session key that will be shared by the client and the server. The session + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +key and additional information are encrypted in the client's secret key. The +KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect replays, +and to associate it with the message to which it replies. Various errors can +occur; these are indicated by an error response (KRB_ERROR) instead of the +KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR +message contains information which can be used to associate it with the +message to which it replies. The lack of encryption in the KRB_ERROR message +precludes the ability to detect replays, fabrications, or modifications of +such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends a +reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is encrypted +in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional field that +can be used to pass additional information that might be needed for the +initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as described +in section [hl<>]. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether the +requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether it +should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; and whether a +renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the +requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable +ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 +for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format for +the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are +determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named in +the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS +request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used for + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one supported, +strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype for which an +encryption key is available is used. The encryption method used to respond +to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key found in the +ticket granting ticket. + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise +the requested start time is checked against the policy of the local realm +(the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of +postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as +requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated +ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the +start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has +been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field +is set to the minimum of: + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using the +requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section A.2 for +pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, start +and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate a +KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper +KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must require +the user to present application credentials which can be verified using a +securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can be +verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS or +TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a +ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use of +a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors are + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client +with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If the +message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE +error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not +one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the server no +longer possesses a copy of the old key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is +returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it +indicates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from +the server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key[10]. Since it +is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms, with +different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of the +ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key the server +should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is +returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the client +from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the authenticator. +If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is returned (they might +not match, for example, if the wrong session key was used to encrypt the +authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for +an address matching the operating-system reported address of the client. If +no match is found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are +present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW +error is returned. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The server must +remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, so +that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses track of any +authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it must reject all +requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This assures that any +lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew +and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an attacker +could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator sent over the network +to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as the disabled host, and +replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the authentication.). If a +sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the server saves it for +later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is +present, the server either saves it for later use or uses it to help +generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that the +client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket and +thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for +pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; it +does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of +the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such as +that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server need +not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication +(not only authenticating the client to the server, but also the server to +the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will have +MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is +required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable +to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in +the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided +in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should +be randomly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A subkey may be +included if the server desires to negotiate a different subkey. The +KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key extracted from the +ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and server +share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The 'true +session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or +checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not +constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might be +done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever reason, +one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 unknown +bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from using +more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key with a +known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if the +server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server is +initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication credentials +for a given server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when it +wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain +a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already have acquired a +ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the +ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client initially +authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The message +format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. +The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS exchange +does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the session key from +the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session key from an +Authenticator is used. As is the case for all application servers, expired +tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +ticket expires, the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid +tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization +data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application +server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). The +TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, encrypted in the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or if +present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part of the +authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code and +text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The +KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect +replays, and to associate it with the message to which it replies. The +KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used to associate +it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of encryption in the +KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays or fabrications of +such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15]. If the +client does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by requesting a +ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a Kerberos server for +which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ +message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for the desired +realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, the Kerberos server may +return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further +along the standard hierarchical path), in which case this step must be +repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. +If neither are returned, then the request must be retried with a Kerberos +server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request will itself require +a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm which must be obtained by +recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. The +list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service or it +may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret keys +exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results from +using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server use +and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be encrypted[16]. +If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data is +present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from the +authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, using +the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which it +was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP), +but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in +section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. This is the only case where the response from the KDC +will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited field +needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. The +PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional ticket-granting +tickets. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting +ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be +postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the +local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, and +the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated before use +by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been reached. However, +in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued +postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the ticket-granting +ticket. + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket +using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and +verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the requested +server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the additional +ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be +compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as part +of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is set +in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that the +renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, +the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is +set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that the +PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the ticket +passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC will issue +the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration +time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and the +key version number fields are left out since these values are stored along +with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy +a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, subject +to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS exchange. +The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket to +be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous realm. +This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its +own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the +endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its contents +are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal +case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of realms +using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding (called +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that they +would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. Thus, +"," means that all realms along the path between the client and the server +have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from the +client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been traversed, +and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an X.500 style +has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierarchy +shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in another hierarchy. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC), +generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by one's +peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session key, so +maintaining the next sequence number should not present an additional +problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The +recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's +address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient +address is specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A +failed match for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the +timestamp and usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If +timestamp and usec are expected and not present, or they are present but not +current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along +with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator +match any recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, the +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number is +included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. +Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and control information, and +if it doesn't match the received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is +generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. The recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears +as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either case +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the +sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and +not present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error +is generated. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence +number is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It then +constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED +message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in +the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r-address +fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message which is +then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP +exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if +no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption +shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is +generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address +in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce field +if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not present, or +they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets in +its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED +message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- ing the +principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The key +can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it +in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. In that case, +an extra field must be added to indicate the master key version used, see +below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the principal's secret +key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime - +starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life +field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable Ticket +issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these +lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal records +with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. not +the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be retained by +the server until all tickets that had been issued using that key have +expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be active for a +single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged +with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to help the +recipient find the proper key for decryption. + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to a +request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error to +any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A database +may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one +for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether a +server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a client, +or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user in +the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow +the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 specification, +section 8.7 [X509-88]. + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A PrincipalName +is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same + (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An encoding +shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any fractional +portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any separators. +Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm +on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the interpretation +of the encapsulating element determines which of the embedded elements must +be interpreted, and which may be ignored. Definitions for these common +elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11), + transited-policy-checked(12), + ok-as-delegate(13) +} + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + unused12(12), + unused13(13), + disable-transited-check(26), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) +} + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest multiple of 32 bits needed to +include the highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 +bits. Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length and +treat the value of flags cooresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit +string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparisonof bit strings of different +length should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with zeros +beyond the high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute value + of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is the time + of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three (3), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A Ticket +contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos and +the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format of +the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies the name part of the server's identity. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + This optional field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used + to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support + several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext + authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other + information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the + application server. See Appendix C for definitions of some common + extensions. + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of the + appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The meanings + of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the necessary + information for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An + end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to accept + tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" in the + past. This field is also returned as part of the response from the KDC. + When returned as part of the response to initial authentication + (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- beros server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated as + that of the authtime field. +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be honored + (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place their + own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which have + not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is that + such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not sent + over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply by + listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the session + key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a careless + user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's worksta- tion could + use the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only + makes it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off + with stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, and + that a better name for this field would be restrictions. Unfortunately, + it is not possible to change the name of this field at this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the basis + of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any principal in + posession of credentials to add entries to the authorization data field + since these entries further restrict what can be done with the ticket. + Such additions can be made by specifying the additional entries when a + new ticket is obtained during the TGS exchange, or they may be added + during chained delegation using the authorization data field of the + authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, it is not allowable for the presence of an entry in the + authorization data field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + obtains a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the name + of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its own + authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy to the + client. The client would then present this authorization credential to + the application server separately from the authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy and + leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key + can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested uses of + this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. Its + value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears + along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify a + reasonably accurate timestamp. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that for + messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is sent. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. It + is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are to be + placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket + itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an initial +ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent from the +client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +The fields in this message are: + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket + and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which must be + collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies + (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions to + the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. This + is accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing the + microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate more + than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of + the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC or + the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets as + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the KDC. + Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the flag + that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field to + the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a request + for forwarding. The address(es) of the + host from which the resulting ticket is + to be valid are included in the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set on + the initial request, or in a subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this is + a request for a proxy. This option will + only be honored if the ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the host + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + from which the resulting ticket is to be + valid are included in the addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a sub- + sequent request if the ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that this + is a request for a postdated ticket. + This option will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket on which it is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may be + reset by a subsequent request to the KDC + after the starttime in the ticket has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that the + ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or when the + ticket-granting ticket on which the + request is based is also renewable. If + this option is requested, then the rtime + field in the request contains the + desired absolute expiration time for the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not to + identify the user to which it was + issued. Instead, the principal identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified by + the policy of the realm (e.g. usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of the + ticket is only to securely distribute a + session key, and not to identify the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the ticket + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + to be returned should be set. If the + local realms policy does not permit + anonymous credentials, the request is to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited field + is disabled. Tickets issued without the + performance of this check will be noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if a + ticket with the requested life cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket with + the requested life cannot be provided, + then a renewable ticket may be issued + with a renew-till equal to the the + requested endtime. The value of the + renew-till field may still be limited by + local limits, or limits selected by the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for the + end server is to be encrypted in the + session key from the additional ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The RENEW option + indicates that the present request is + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + for a renewal. The ticket provided is + encrypted in the secret key for the + server on which it is valid. This + option will only be honored if the + ticket to be renewed has its RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its renew- + till field has not passed. The ticket + to be renewed is passed in the padata + field as part of the authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE option + indicates that the request is to vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will only + be honored if the ticket presented is + postdated, presently has its INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be vali- + dated before its starttime. The ticket + presented for validation is encrypted in + the key of the server for which it is + valid and is passed in the padata field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, or + alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, both + from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the + desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is omitted + then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date of + the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated randomly, + but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in the + response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses for + the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will contain + other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied by the + KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be used + in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. If more than + one option which requires additional tickets has been specified, then + the additional tickets are used in the order specified by the ordering + of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is +passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for either +an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no message +type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or +KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if +absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. +In that case, no version number will be present in the EncryptedData +sequence. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section 6.3.2). + This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to + change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all existing + password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged as + needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related information + that forms the encrypted part of a message. The description of the + encrypted part of the message follows each appearance of this field. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + The encrypted part is encoded as described in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the last + request by a principal. Depending on what information is available, + this might be the last time that a request for a ticket-granting ticket + was made, or the last time that a request based on a ticket-granting + ticket was successful. It also might cover all servers for a realm, or + just the particular server. Some implementations may display this + information to the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of one's + identity. It is similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when + logging into timesharing systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up to + the application client (usually the login program) to take appropriate + action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will be + the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often +referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits + is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. It is + to be encoded separately and then have the checksum computed over it, + for use in the cksum field. +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over the + encoding of the KRB-SAFE-BODY sequence. +user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By checking + the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make sure that + it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast protocols), + but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. This field + along with s-address can be used to help detect messages which have + been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format of + the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by the + intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must + never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the message in an application + specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected by any encryption, it +is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such a message. In +particular, this means that the client should not use any fields in this +message for security-critical purposes, such as setting a system clock or +generating a fresh authenticator. The message can be useful, however, for +advising a user on the reason for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, + e-typed-data[14] SEQUENCE of ETypedData OPTIONAL +} + +ETypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + e-data-type [1] INTEGER, + e-data-value [2] OCTET STRING, +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. Its + value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The two + fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the list + of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to provide + for national language support in the display of error messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If the + errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields, each corresponding + to an acceptable pre-authentication method and optionally containing + data for the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate method; method-data + will contain any required additional information. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. The + checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to an + AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the client's + secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication to prove + knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be + computed because the key to be used is not available, no checksum will + be included. +e-typed-data + [This field for discussion, may be deleted from final spec] This field + contains optional data that may be used to help the client recover from + the indicated error. [This could contain the METHOD-DATA specified + since I don't think anyone actually uses it yet. It could also contain + the PA-DATA sequence for the preauth required error if we had a clear + way to transition to the use of this field from the use of the untype + e-data field.] For example, this field may specify the key version of + the key used to verify preauthentication: + + e-data-type := 20 -- Key version number + e-data-value := Integer -- Key version number used to verify + preauthentication + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use stream +encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly available block +encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption Standard, [DES77] in +conjunction with block chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption is +used to prove the identities of the network entities participating in +message exchanges. The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by +all principals registered in that realm to store a secret key in confidence. +Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the authenticity of +a principal. + +The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a shared +session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to ticket requests; +the ability to obtain the secret key or session key implies the knowledge of +the appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability of a principal +to decrypt the KDC response and present a Ticket and a properly formed +Authenticator (generated with the session key from the KDC response) to a +service verifies the identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the +service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge +thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is secure +from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields in the +encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the effects of +poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If keys are +derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords need to be well chosen to +make brute force attacks more difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy +targets for intruders. + +The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms +currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding +requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is often +desirable to place random information (often referred to as a confounder) at +the start of the message. The requirements for a confounder are specified +with each encryption mechanism. + +Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the +security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining methods +often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such +as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain-text +which can be verified at decryption and used to detect any tampering or +damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting burst errors in the +input. If any damage is detected, the decryption routine is expected to +return an error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. +The specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum +requirements. + +Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an algorithm +for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type is included. It +is desirable for the string to key function to be one-way, and for the +mapping to be different in different realms. This is important because users +who are registered in more than one realm will often use the same password +in each, and it is desirable that an attacker compromising the Kerberos +server in one realm not obtain or derive the user's key in another. + +For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate +encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the the reader is +referred to [SG92]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + +The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The +enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in section +5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional key version +number, and the ciphertext. + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + + + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to encipher + the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected encryption types + appear later in this section. +kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data is + encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long lasting + keys, such as principals' secret keys. +cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET STRING. + +The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption algorithm +to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific inputs. Encryption +mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take sufficient measures to +guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend they also take +measures to protect against precomputed dictionary attacks. If the +encryption algorithm is not itself capable of doing so, the protections can +often be enhanced by adding a checksum and a confounder. + +The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a confounder, a +checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary padding. The msg-seq +field contains the part of the protocol message described in section 5 which +is to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are all untagged +and untyped, and their length is exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate +item. The type and length is implicit and specified by the particular +encryption type being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted +is described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + +One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing it in +confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate checksum over +confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the +necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type and the +appropriate key. + +Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm that +specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an octet +boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which are +not specified will be omitted. + +In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the +specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is needed as +part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + +Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and the +data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining +mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such additional information. +6.2. Encryption Keys + +The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + +keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption key that follows in the + keyvalue field. It will almost always correspond to the encryption + algorithm used to generate the EncryptedData, though more than one + algorithm may use the same type of key (the mapping is many to one). + This might happen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a different + chaining mechanism. +keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + +All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpreta- tions. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + +If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the NULL +encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no checksum, +confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key +is used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in length, with +keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + +The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. A +CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is applied to the +confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES +blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation +of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an attacker +could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid +message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum for ticket or +authenticator is no longer mandated as an interoperability requirement for +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + +The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + +The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. + +Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are +concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first +octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as +the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., +and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + +Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an additional +input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise specified, +zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, +because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, +keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of 56 +bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a +series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are +also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity +bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the +MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), the text string +normally must have the realm and each component of the principal's name +appended[37], then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 byte boundary. This +string is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte +DES key. The parity is corrected on the key, and it is used to generate a +DES CBC checksum on the initial string (with the realm and name appended). +Next, parity is corrected on the CBC checksum. If the result matches a +'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES specification, it is +eXclusive-ORed with the constant 00000000000000F0. Finally, the result is +returned as the key. Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + odd = 1; + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + fixparity(tempkey); + key = DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES EDE in outer CBC mode with an SHA1 check-sum +(des3-cbc-sha1) + +The des3-cbc-sha1 encryption encodes information using three Data Encryption +Standard transformations with three DES keys. The first key is used to +perform a DES ECB encryption on an eight-octet data block using the first +DES key, followed by a DES ECB decryption of the result using the second DES +key, and a DES ECB encryption of the result using the third DES key. Because +DES blocks are 8 bytes, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must first be padded to an 8 byte +boundary before encryption. To support the outer CBC mode, the input is +padded to an eight-octet boundary. The first 8 octets of the data to be +encrypted (the confounder) is exclusive-ored with an initialization vector +of zero and then ECB encrypted using triple DES as described above. +Subsequent blocks of 8 octets are exclusive-ored with the ciphertext +produced by the encryption on the previous block before ECB encryption. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +An HMAC-SHA1 checksum (described in [KBC96].) is applied to the confounder +and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. + +Plaintext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are concatenated to make +the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first octet supplies the 8 +most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as the DES input block's +MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet +supplies the 8 least significant bits. + +Encryption under Triple DES using cipher block chaining requires an +additional input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise +specified, zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use +of DES requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, +because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, +keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A Triple DES key is 24 octets of data, with keytype seven (7). This consists +of 168 bits of key, and 24 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded +as a series of 24 octets written in MSB-first order, with the first 8 octets +treated as the first DES key, the second 8 octets as the second key, and the +third 8 octets the third DES key. The bits within each key are also encoded +in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity +bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the +MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + +Key derivation for specified operations (Horowitz) + +[Discussion is needed for this section, especially since it does not simply +derive key generation, but also specifies encryption using triple DES in a +manner that is different than the basic template that was specified for +single DES and similar systems] + +In the Kerberos protocol cryptographic keys are used in a number of places. +In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is desirable to +use a different key in each of these places. Key derivation [Horowitz96] can +be used to construct different keys for each operation from the keys +transported on the network or derived from the password specified by the +user. + +For each place where a key is used in Kerberos, a ``key usage'' is specified +for that purpose. The key, key usage, and encryption/checksum type together +describe the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext. For backwards +compatibility, this key derivation is only specified here for encryption +methods based on triple DES. Encryption methods specified for use by +Kerberos in the future should specify the key derivation function to be +used. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be +tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and +integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, for +each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption (Ke), and one +for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + +where the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network byte +order. The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | length | plaintext | padding) + +The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + +When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or +padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be generated +from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + MAC = H(Kc, length | plaintext) + + +Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a keyed +hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed hash +algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is recommended for use as H. + +The key usage value will be taken from the following list of places where +keys are used in the Kerberos protocol, with key usage values and Kerberos +specification section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + 10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) + 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) + 12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) + + 13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) + 14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) + 15. KRB-SAFE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) + + 16. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be encrypted using Kerberos encryption type. + 17. Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be checksummed using Kerberos checksum type. + + 18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) + 19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) + 20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) + 21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), the text string +normally must have the realm and each component of the principal's name +appended[38]. + +The input string (with any salt data appended to it) is n-folded into a 24 +octet (192 bit) string. To n-fold a number X, replicate the input value to a +length that is the least common multiple of n and the length of X. Before +each repetition, the input X is rotated to the right by 13 bit positions. +The successive n-bit chunks are added together using 1's-complement addition +(addition with end-around carry) to yield a n-bit result. (This +transformation was proposed by Richard Basch) + +Each successive set of 8 octets is taken as a DES key, and its parity is +adjusted in the same manner as previously described. If any of the three +sets of 8 octets match a 'weak' or 'semi-weak key as described in the DES +specification, that chunk is eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant +00000000000000F0. The resulting DES keys are then used in sequence to +perform a Triple-DES CBC encryption of the n-folded input string (appended +with any salt data), using a zero initial vector. Parity, weak, and +semi-weak keys are once again corrected and the result is returned as the 24 +octet key. + +Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + s = string + realm; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tkey[24] = fold(s); + fixparity(tkey); + if(isweak(tkey[0-7])) tkey[0-7] = tkey[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(isweak(tkey[8-15])) tkey[8-15] = tkey[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(tkey[16-23])) tkey[16-23] = tkey[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + key[24] = 3DES-CBC(data=fold(s),key=tkey,iv=0); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak(key[0-7])) key[0-7] = key[0-7] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[8-15])) key[8-15] = key[8-15] XOR 0xF0; + if(is_weak(key[16-23])) key[16-23] = key[16-23] XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + +6.4. Checksums + +The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + +cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the accompanying + checksum. +checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet string. + +Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this +section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + +Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: whether they +are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is infeasible to find +two plaintexts which generate the same checksum value for a collision-proof +checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the algorithm in a +keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream modification by an active +attacker, unkeyed checksums should only be used when the checksum and +message will be subsequently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as part +of the encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + +Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum value is +encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the composition of +the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a new checksum +algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed checksums, as well as for the +encrypted forms of unkeyed collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a +confounder before the checksum is calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy check +as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is four (4) +octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The use +of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a probabilistic +chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be able to generate an +alternative message that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + +The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm +[MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to +be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + +The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD4 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + +The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 algorithm. +[MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to +be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD5 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The resulting +checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum +is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder to the +plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result using the key +and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last block of the +ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The resulting +checksum is 128 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos, nor + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or 'semi-weak'. + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) + +The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. Note that this +checksum type is the old method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it +is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + +The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode encryption +of the plaintext, and using the last block of the ciphertext as the checksum +value. It is keyed with an encryption key and an initialization vector; any +uses which do not specify an additional initialization vector will use the +key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits +(8 octets) long. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note +that this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DES-MAC checksum +and it is no longer recommended. The DES specifications identify some 'weak +keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys shall not be used for generating +DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + +Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm can +technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across realm +boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be assigned, and +what information they imply. + +To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the conventions +itself, and it must require that any realms with which inter-realm keys are +shared also conform to the conventions and require the same from its +neighbors. + +Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only in the +case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently four styles +of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each style +follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components +separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor slashes +(/). Domain names must be converted to upper case when used as realm names. + +X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before the + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string representations of the +names with components separated by slashes. Leading and trailing slashes +will not be included. + +Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that +contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by a +colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned before +they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + +The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first +three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is unlikely +that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the 'other' category. + +These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the various +name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the assignment of +realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for the +domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organization owning (to +whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name or X.500 name, or in the case +that no such names are registered, authority to use a realm name may be +derived from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no +domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can +authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + +This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is assigned +is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to its children in +the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 hierarchy, it +is the parent's responsibility to make sure that there will not in the +future exists a name identical to the realm name of the child unless it is +assigned to the same entity as the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + +As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that all +agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The name-type +field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind of information +implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. Ignoring the +name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the +components, or the realm, must be different). The following name types are +defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a particular +time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal name type should + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +be used for users, and it might also be used for a unique server. If the +name is a unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed never to be +reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note that it is +generally a bad idea to reassign names of any type since stale entries might +remain in access control lists). + +If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining +components identify an instance of the service in a server specified manner, +then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of this name type +is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first component of +krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm for which the ticket is +valid. + +If instance is a single component following the service name and the +instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the name +type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for Internet +services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components following the +name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should be used. This type +might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash +(/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + +A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an X.509 +certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of the X.509 +name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding rules specified +in RFC 1779. + +A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not +known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match principals +authenticated with names of any type. A principal authenticated with a name +of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNKNOWN. + +Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved for the +Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the form of such +names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + +The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be composed +of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server is registered, +and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an +Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if the +name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows slash (/) +separators. The first component of the two- or multi-component name will +identify the service and the latter components will identify the host. Where +the name of the host is not case sensitive (for example, with Internet +domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If specified by the +application protocol for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands +which run with system privileges, the first component may be the string +'host' instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official +name and one or more aliases, the official name of the host must be used +when constructing the name of the server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +8.1. Host address types + +All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + +The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match the +defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard Distributions of +Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an +abbreviation of the address family name). + +Internet (IPv4) Addresses + +Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + +Internet (IPv6) Addresses + +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. The +following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos packet: + + * the Unspecified Address + * the Loopback Address + * Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +CHAOSnet addresses + +CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. +The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + +ISO addresses + +ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + +XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of XNS addresses is six (6). + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + +AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit network +number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the remaining two +octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type of AppleTalk DDP +addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + +DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. The +type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + +When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP +IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an +encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an encoding of the +reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at +the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must +accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made +through UDP/IP transport must also use UDP/IP transport. + +8.2.2. TCP/IP transport + +Kerberos servers (KDC's) must accept TCP requests on port 88 (decimal). When +the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP stream, a new +connection will be established for each authentication exchange (request and +response). The KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the +client on the same TCP stream that was established for the request. The +connection will be broken after the reply has been received (or upon +time-out). Care must be taken in managing TCP/IP connections with the KDC to +prevent denial of service attacks based on the number of TCP/IP connections +with the KDC that remain open. If multiple exchanges with the KDC are needed +for certain forms of preauthentication, multiple TCP connections will be +required. The response to a request made through TCP/IP transport must also +use TCP/IP transport. + +The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request request +will encode in network byte order the length of the request (KRB_KDC_REQ), +and the length will be followed by the request itself. The response will +similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in network byte order of the +length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR message and will be followed by +the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR response. + +8.2.3. OSI transport + +During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual +authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of +credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of +private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be +treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechanism will +be: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication +header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message +(KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message +(KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as specified in the +ASN.1 description for each message. The application code may be used by +Kerberos to determine the message type. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + +The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be composed of +three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS ticket (2) a two-part +name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the second part +the name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting ticket. For +example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be +used to get tickets from the ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier +of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A +ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get +tickets from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-priv 9 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-pub 10 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-md5 11 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-sha1 12 (pkinit) +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 10 20 (I had this as 10, is it 12) + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (pkinit) +PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + +authorization data type ad-type value +AD-KDC-ISSUED 1 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 +AD-IF-RELEVANT 4 +AD-OR 5 +AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 +AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 +reserved values 8-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +Ticket Extension Types + +TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension +TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data + 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations) +TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket +TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations) + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID +KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not + supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password + to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired [40] +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message +KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) + +9. Interoperability requirements + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among these +are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding schemes for +the transited field, optional mechanisms for pre-authentication, the +handling of tickets with no addresses, options for mutual authentication, +user to user authentication, support for proxies, forwarding, postdating, +and renewing tickets, the format of realm names, and the handling of +authorization data. + +In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to define +a minimal configuration which must be supported by all implementations. This +minimal configuration is subject to change as technology does. For example, +if at some later date it is discovered that one of the required encryption +or checksum algorithms is not secure, it will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 2 + +This section defines the second specification of these options. +Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (depricated) may +be found in RFC1510. + +Transport + +TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming conformance +to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance to specification 2 +must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the KDC and may support +TCP/IP transport. + +Encryption and checksum methods + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. +Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the additional +mechanisms may only be used when communicating with principals known to also +support them: This list is to be determined. + +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the Internet +Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for an unknown +realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the names of the +intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. +Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when that +encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on the +initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by clients +but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an +acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should ignore the +presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request. + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT +contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but each +realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each application +server will set its own policy with respect to accepting them. + +Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and +application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will be +accepted. + +All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but need +not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, the +starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful +life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all implementations +shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible to the calling server. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC option) +must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may decide as a +matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal or realm-wide +basis. + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from +ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to +suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered subfield +type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered +subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + +Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data subfields +available to the server when a ticket is used. Implementations are not +required to allow clients to specify the contents of the authorization data +fields. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, based on +the list of suggested configuration constants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes +maximum renewable lifetime 1 week +maximum ticket lifetime 1 day +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +10. REFERENCES + +[NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +[MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +[SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +[KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +[Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +[DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +[LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +[X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +[Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + +[DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + +[DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +[SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +[IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +[MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +[MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + +This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to be +constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that */ + /* should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly */ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would */ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so */ + /* there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) then + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == OK) + set new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not present) + then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + endif + +B. Definition of common authorization data elements + +This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data +elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly defined, +meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of +authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the encapsulating +element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating element, the +encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted as issued +directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate plaintext part of +the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements are specified as part of +the Kerberos specification ebcause the behavior based on these values should +be understood across implementations whereas other elements need only be +understood by the applications which they affect. + +In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the element +will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of the ad-data +will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection heading. + +B.1. KDC Issued + +AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. +} + +ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the ticket + itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same encryption + algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key derived from the + same key used to protect the ticket. +i-realm, i-sname + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC itself. + This field would be used when the KDC can verify the authenticity of + elements signed by the issuing principal and it allows this KDC to + notify the application server of the validity of those elements. +elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + +The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for Kerberos +principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege attributes and +other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying the priveleges of +the principal beyond what can be done using a credentials without such an +a-data element. + +This can not be provided without this element because the definition of the +authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the bearer +of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and elements may also +be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the authenticator. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are signed by +the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's key (the same +key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from that key). Elements +encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be ignored by the +application server if this "signature" is not present. Further, elements +encapsulated within this element from a ticket granting ticket may be +interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis according to policy for +including new signed elements within derivative tickets, but they will not +be copied to a derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a +derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the signature +will not be correct for the application ticket elements, and the field will +be ignored by the application server. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.2. Intended for server + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be +ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names of +intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application server +can remove this element if the application server is not in the list of +intended servers. + +Application servers should check for their principal name in the +intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not found, +this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated elements +should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present in the top +level authorization data field. Applications and application servers that do +not implement this element should reject tickets that contain authorization +data elements of this type. + +B.3. Intended for application class + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { intended-application-class[0] +SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] AuthorizationData } AD elements +encapsulated within the intended-for-application-class element may be +ignored if the application server is not in one of the named classes of +application servers. Examples of application server classes include +"FILESYSTEM", and other kinds of servers. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.4. If relevant + +AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended for +interpretation only by application servers that understand the particular +ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do not understand +the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant element may ignore +the uninterpretable element. This element promotes interoperability across +implementations which may have local extensions for authorization. + +B.5. And-Or + +AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are +encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the +encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. This +element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the +condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by setting +the condition count to the number of embedded elements. Application servers +that do not implement this element must reject tickets that contain +authorization data elements of this type. + +B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + +AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions specifies +a collision-proof checksum using the same has angorithm used to protect the +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be calculated over the +entire extensions field. If there are more than one extension, all will be +covered by the checksum. This restriction indicates that the ticket should +not be accepted if the checksum does not match that calculated over the +ticket extensions. Application servers that do not implement this element +must reject tickets that contain authorization data elements of this type. + +B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + +AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a +collision-proof checksum using the same has angorithm used to protect the +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a separate +external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket extensions. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. Application servers +that do implement this element will search the ticket extensions for +authorization data fields, calculate the specified checksum over each +authorization data field and look for one matching the checksum in this +in-ticket-extensions element. If not found, then the ticket must be +rejected. If found, the corresponding authorization data elements will be +interpreted in the same manner as if they were contained in the top level +authorization data field. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in a +ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type in-ticket-extensions +in the top level authorization data field, and the external entries will be +linked to the corresponding element by their checksums. + +C. Definition of common ticket extensions + +This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. Support +for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions have +associated authorization data elements that may require rejection of a +ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not implement +the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined beyond those +described in this specification. Such extensions are described elswhere and +for some of those extensions the reserved number may be found in the list of +constants. + +It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, and +that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they parse and +then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application servers. The +presence of the extension will not break such clients, but any functionaly +dependent on the extensions will not work when such tickets are handled by +old clients. In such situations, some implementation may use alternate +methods to transmit the information in the extensions field. + +C.1. Null ticket extension + +TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + +The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of lenght +zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket so that the +KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting ticket whether the +client software will strip the extensions field. + +C.2. External Authorization Data + +TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + +The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension is +field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization data +elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element will be +present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and that element +will contain a checksum of the external authorization data ticket extension. +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +[TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the +Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these +trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon +the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an application +subsequently provides integrity protection for the data stream, the identity +verification applies only to the initiation of the connection, and does not +guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate from the same +principal. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the literature. In +our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key +is a secret key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows +it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private key. + +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange +registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and engage +in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for even small +numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more automatic methods as +described here are necessary. + +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no network +addresses specified. + +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the requester +can provide the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it +would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- sion and +change another user's password. + +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials +obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain +credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be verified by a +local server through successful completion of the Client/Server exchange. + +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to +guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. This can +only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is based on +cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly random number +generator, such as one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext +here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one message and +replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + +[9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports +difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated +messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies and replay the first +reply in response to a detected duplicate. + +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from the +same principal to the same server. Other client principals communicating +with the same server principal should not be have their authenticators +rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to match some other +client's authenticator. + +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was the +client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 because +version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not possible to +create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) +without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + + +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key is +not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to choose +subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a +negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + +[15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known beforehand +(since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it might be stored in +a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- tion file. If the +realm to be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of being +spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- cated. +This might result in the use of a realm which has been compromised, and +would result in an attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of +the application server to the client. + +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to ensure +the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach would be to +generate a random number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication [8], +which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server keys +in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- ised. + +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first listed +realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's realm is +considered to precede those in the transited field, and the server's realm +is considered to follow them. + +[20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and +communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not share +a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the database +and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store the principal +database in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries stored +therein are protected from disclosure to and modification by unauthorized +parties. However, we recommend against such strategies, as they can make +system management and threat analysis quite complex. + +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for details on +why this can be useful. + +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data structures +during the generation and verification of embedded checksums: Because any +checksums applied to data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within a data structure +between the time that a checksum is generated through transmission to the +time that the checksum is verified. + + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the +workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine that +such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must make +sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If the time is +ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability that a nonce +will be reused. + +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization vector +may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve proper cipher +chaining. The initialization vector might come from the last block of the +ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the application's +choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. If left out, the +default initialization vector for the encryption algorithm will be used. + +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request from +obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password guessing +attack. + +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the +notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is not a +valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the message starts +with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. For other fields, +the length and tag would be redundant if they were included because they are +specified by the encryption type. [36] The ordering of the fields in the +CipherText is important. Additionally, messages encoded in this format must +include a length as part of the msg-seq field. This allows the recipient to +verify that the message has not been truncated. Without a length, an +attacker could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a message which +could be truncated, while leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the +msg-seq is an encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length +is part of that encoding. + +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a particular +function, separating the functions of generating a checksum from other +encryption performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 +was chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded + + +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-01 Expires 21 May 1998 + +the use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar purpose in +the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + +[40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. The +contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section 5.9.1. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06d997d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6766 @@ + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + November 18th, 1998 + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents +of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It +is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite +them other than as 'work in progress.' + +To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the +'1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow +Directories on ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), nic.nordu.net (Europe), +ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim). + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-03.txt, and expires May 18th, 1999. +Please send comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the +Kerberos network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version +5 of the Kerberos protocol. + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard +through the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the +presentation, but only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or +extensions that fit within current protocol framework will be considered at + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested +by Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of +Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena +staff members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford +Neuman (now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of +Southern California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of +Project Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many +other members of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on +Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol +was led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the +community. The development of the MIT reference implementation was led at +MIT by John Kohl and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from +many others. Since RFC1510 was issued, extensions and revisions to the +protocol have been proposed by many individuals. Some of these proposals +are reflected in this document. Where such changes involved significant +effort, the document cites the contribution of the proposer. + +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and +5 can be found in [KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. +a workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. +This is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating +system, without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical +security of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that +packets traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at +will[1]. Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a +trusted third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared +secret key [2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and +implemented that provide for the use of public key cryptography during +certain phases of the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for +authentication of users registered with public key certification +authorities, and allow the system to provide certain benefits of public key +cryptography in situations where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in +the client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server +and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +client transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a +copy of the session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. +The session key (now shared by the client and server) is used to +authenticate the client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the +server. It may also be used to encrypt further communication between the +two parties or to exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt +further communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their +secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos +protocol. In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical +network application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly +or through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request +for a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted +in the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client +uses the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it +were contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry +points within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent +"in the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't +thwart replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, +additional information is sent to prove that the message originated with +the principal to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the +authenticator) is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. +The timestamp proves that the message was recently generated and is not a +replay. Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was +generated by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the +requesting principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent +over the network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to +the Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must +be modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's +key. This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos +server, the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol +for maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server +in another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes +its own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is +part of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide +whether to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate +key may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service +of each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share +an inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is +not directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical +organization is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in +order to construct an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in +authenticating the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93] , or on other authorization services. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the issuance of a service +ticket by the Kerberos server (even by an modified Kerberos server) as +granting authority to use the service, since such applications may become +vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment if +they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for application +authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a dictionary, + messages obtained which are encrypted under a key derived from the + user's password. + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to + grant permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + remains for a deleted principal and the principal identifier is + reused, the new principal will inherit rights specified in the stale + ACL entry. By not re-using principal identifiers, the danger of + inadvertent access is removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been + recently generated using the session key known only by the client and + server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access + allowed for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted + by the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. + Note that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other + server (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use + that ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is + sometimes referred to as the Authentication Server (or service). The + ticket-granting ticket portion is sometimes referred to as the + ticket-granting server (or service). +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than + one server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a + lifetime limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the +various flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the +VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their +starttime has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets +which have been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently +invalid (through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set +in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key +and a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left +unmodified by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration +time arrives, the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may +consult a hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen +since its last renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and +thus the usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets +in a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to +theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC +at job submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are +activated and validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft +were reported in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, +and the thief would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This +flag must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated +ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be +requested by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the +KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated +ticket-granting ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by +obtained by requesting the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life +(endtime-starttime) of a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +ticket-granting ticket at the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE +option is also set, in which case it can be the full life +(endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how +far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the +identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can +allow a service to take on the principal's identity for a particular +purpose by granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose +must use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to +forward a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When +set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a +new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network +address based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client +on initial authentication. By default, the client will request that it be +set when requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any +other ticket. + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print +server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in +order to satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in +the ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new +network address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the +proxy is to be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may +require additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in +order to provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request +that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when +they request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user +to enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. +It is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED +flag set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets +differently than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients +and servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the +Kerberos Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to +obtain authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the +initiation of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting +Server which will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other +servers (see section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's +secret key. This exchange is also used to request credentials for services + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +which must not be mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather +require a principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. +This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity +of the user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The +response, KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the +server, and a session key that will be shared by the client and the server. +The session key and additional information are encrypted in the client's +secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used +to detect replays, and to associate it with the message to which it +replies. Various errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response +(KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not +encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains information which can be used to +associate it with the message to which it replies. The lack of encryption +in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays, +fabrications, or modifications of such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends +a reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is +encrypted in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional +field that can be used to pass additional information that might be needed +for the initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as +described in section [hl<>]. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether +the requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether +it should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; and +whether a renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable +ticket if the requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a +non-renewable ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See +section A.1 for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format +for the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket +are determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named +in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS +request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used for +encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one supported, +strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype for which +an encryption key is available is used. The encryption method used to +respond to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key found +in the ticket granting ticket. + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. +Otherwise the requested start time is checked against the policy of the +local realm (the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or +ranges of postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is +set as requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The +postdated ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC +after the start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option +has been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till +field is set to the minimum of: + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set + by the policy of the local realm. + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using +the requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section +A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, +start and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate +a KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the +proper KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must +require the user to present application credentials which can be verified +using a securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can +be verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS +or TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message +is referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) +a ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use +of a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors +are possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the +client with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If +the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in +the KRB_AP_REQ is not one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old +key, and the server no longer possesses a copy of the old key), the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set +in the ap-options field, it indicates to the server that the ticket is +encrypted in the session key from the server's ticket-granting ticket +rather than its secret key[10]. Since it is possible for the server to be +registered in multiple realms, with different keys in each, the srealm +field in the unencrypted portion of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to +specify which secret key the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is returned if the server doesn't have the +proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the +client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the +authenticator. If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is +returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong session key was +used to encrypt the authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) +are then searched for an address matching the operating-system reported +address of the client. If no match is found or the server insists on ticket +addresses but none are present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error +is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The +server must remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock +skew, so that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses +track of any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it +must reject all requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This +assures that any lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the +allowable clock skew and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is +not done, an attacker could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator +sent over the network to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as +the disabled host, and replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the +authentication.). If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, +the server saves it for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV +messages. If a subkey is present, the server either saves it for later use +or uses it to help generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a +KRB_AP_REP message. + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +the client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket +and thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 +for pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; +it does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name +of the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such +as that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server +need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual +authentication (not only authenticating the client to the server, but also +the server to the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will +have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message +is required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not +acceptable to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond +field used in the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond +field (as provided in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be +included, it should be randomly chosen as described above for the +authenticator. A subkey may be included if the server desires to negotiate +a different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key +extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and +server share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The +'true session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption +or checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does +not constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might +be done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +reason, one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 +unknown bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from +using more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key +with a known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if +the server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server +is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication +credentials for a given server (which might be registered in a remote +realm), when it wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it +wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already +have acquired a ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS +exchange (the ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client +initially authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The +message format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS +exchange. The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the +TGS exchange does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or +sub-session key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for all +application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a +renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, the client must use a separate +exchange to obtain valid tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed +authorization data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the +application server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described +later). The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, +encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable +ticket, or if present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part +of the authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code +and text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not +encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +to detect replays, and to associate it with the message to which it +replies. The KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used +to associate it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of +encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays +or fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15]. If the +client does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the +appropriate realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by +requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a +Kerberos server for which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket +(using the KRB_TGS_REQ message recursively). The Kerberos server may return +a TGT for the desired realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, +the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the +desired realm (further along the standard hierarchical path), in which case +this step must be repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in +the returned TGT. If neither are returned, then the request must be retried +with a Kerberos server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request +will itself require a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm which +must be obtained by recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. +The list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service +or it may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret +keys exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results +from using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server +use and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be +encrypted[16]. If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key +from the ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data +is present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from +the authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, +using the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which +it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP +(KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed +specification is in section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. This is the only case where the response from the KDC +will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited +field needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. +The PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional +ticket-granting tickets. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the +ticket-granting ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting +ticket will be postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the +policy of the local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as +requested, and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be +validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has +been reached. However, in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till +time of a newly-issued postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time +of the ticket-granting ticket. + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional +ticket using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was +issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the +requested server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the +additional ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server +will be compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is +set in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that +the renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is +rqeuested, the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID +flag is set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that +the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the +ticket passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC +will issue the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal +expiration time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and +the key version number fields are left out since these values are stored +along with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +satisfy a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for +pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, +subject to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS +exchange. The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket +to be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous +realm. This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving +out its own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since +the endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its +contents are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the +normal case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of +realms using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding +(called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. +Thus, "," means that all realms along the path between the client and the +server have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from +the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been +traversed, and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an +X.500 style has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in +one hierarchy shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in +another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES +MAC), generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by +one's peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session +key, so maintaining the next sequence number should not present an +additional problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and +type fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A +mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. +The application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. +The recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's +address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient +address is specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the +recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A +failed match for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the +timestamp and usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If +timestamp and usec are expected and not present, or they are present but +not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, +along with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the +Authenticator match any recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, +the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number +is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. +Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and control information, +and if it doesn't match the received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error +is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and +type fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A +mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. +The application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. The recipient verifies that +the operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses +appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for +either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and +usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec +are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an +incorrect sequence number is included, or a sequence number is expected but +not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a +time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED +error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It +then constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the +KRB_CRED message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence +in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and +r-address fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message +which is then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the +KRB_AP exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates +a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If +decryption shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +error is generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's +address in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce +field if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not +present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is +generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets +in its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in +the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the +KRB_CRED message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- ing the +principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be +authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The +key can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to +protect it in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. +In that case, an extra field must be added to indicate the master key +version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the +principal's secret key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable +lifetime (endtime - starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. +The max_renewable_life field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime +for any renewable Ticket issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a +description of how these lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of +a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal +records with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. +not the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be +retained by the server until all tickets that had been issued using that +key have expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be +active for a single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is +always tagged with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to +help the recipient find the proper key for decryption. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to +a request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error +to any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A +database may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, +and one for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether +a server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a +client, or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user +in the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to +allow the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +Optional field in ASN.1 sequences + +For optional integer value and date fields in ASN.1 sequences where a +default value has been specified, certain default values will not be +allowed in the encoding because these values will always be represented +through defaulting by the absence of the optional field. For example, one +will not send a microsecond zero value because one must make sure that +there is only one way to encode this value. + +Additional fields in ASN.1 sequences + +Implementations receiving Kerberos messages with additional fields present +in ASN.1 sequences should carry the those fields through unmodified when +the message is forwarded. Implementation should drop such fields if the +sequence is reencoded. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 +specification, section 8.7 [X509-88]. + +5.3. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A +PrincipalName is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following +sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the + same (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be + different). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An +encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any +fractional portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any +separators. Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 +seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved + for registered use. + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the +interpretation of the encapsulating element determines which of the +embedded elements must be interpreted, and which may be ignored. +Definitions for these common elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + + + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved + for registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + -- unused10(10), + -- unused11(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest number of bits needed to include +the highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. +The ASN.1 representation of the bit strings uses unnamed bits, with the +meaning of the individual bits defined by the comments in the specification +above. Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length +and treat the value of flags corresponding to bits beyond the end of the +bit string as if the bit were reset (0). Comparison of bit strings of +different length should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with +zeros beyond the high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute + value of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is + the time of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three + (3), then the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). If it is + (6), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the password will + expire. +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A +Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be +registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos +and the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format +of the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies the name part of the server's identity. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + This optional field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used + to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support + several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext + authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other + information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + application server. See Appendix C for definitions of some common + extensions. + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of + the appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal + identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. + When the names of CA's are to be embedded inthe transited field (as + specified for some extentions to the protocol), the X.500 names of the + CA's should be mapped into items in the transited field using the + mapping defined by RFC2253. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the + necessary information for implementation of a `hot list' service at + the KDC. An end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to + accept tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" + in the past. This field is also returned as part of the response from + the KDC. When returned as part of the response to initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- + beros server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated + as that of the authtime field. +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be + honored (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place + their own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which + have not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is + that such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not + sent over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply + by listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the + session key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a + careless user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's worksta- tion could + use the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + makes it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off + with stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, + and that a better name for this field would be restrictions. + Unfortunately, it is not possible to change the name of this field at + this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the + basis of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any + principal in posession of credentials to add entries to the + authorization data field since these entries further restrict what can + be done with the ticket. Such additions can be made by specifying the + additional entries when a new ticket is obtained during the TGS + exchange, or they may be added during chained delegation using the + authorization data field of the authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, it is not allowable for the presence of an entry in the + authorization data field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + obtains a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the + name of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its + own authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy + to the client. The client would then present this authorization + credential to the application server separately from the + authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy + and leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session + key can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested + uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. + Its value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often + appears along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify + a reasonably accurate timestamp. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that + for messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is + sent. Sequence numbers fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and + wrap to zero following the value 2^32 - 1. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. + It is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are + to be placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the + ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an +initial ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent +from the client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a +service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The fields in this message are: + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting + ticket and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which + must be collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY + encoding. In most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and + most replies (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions + to the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. This + is accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing + the microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate + more than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) + consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's + secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC + or the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets + as well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the + KDC. Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the + flag that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field + to the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of +this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + forwardable flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also +for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only +specified + in a request to the +ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket in the +request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. +This + option indicates that this is a +request + for forwarding. The address(es) of +the + host from which the resulting ticket +is + to be valid are included in +the + addresses field of the request. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have its +prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set +on + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + the initial request, or in a +subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket +on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this +is + a request for a proxy. This option +will + only be honored if the +ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its +PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the +host + from which the resulting ticket is to +be + valid are included in the +addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that +this + is a request for a postdated +ticket. + This option will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket on which + it is based has its MAY-POSTDATE + flag set. + The resulting ticket will also have +its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may +be + reset by a subsequent request to the +KDC + after the starttime in the ticket +has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have +its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be +set + on the initial request, or when +the + ticket-granting ticket on which +the + request is based is also renewable. +If + this option is requested, then the +rtime + field in the request contains +the + desired absolute expiration time for +the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option +indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not +to + identify the user to which it +was + issued. Instead, the principal +identif- + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + ier is to be generic, as specified +by + the policy of the realm (e.g. +usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of +the + ticket is only to securely distribute +a + session key, and not to identify +the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the +ticket + to be returned should be set. If +the + local realms policy does not +permit + anonymous credentials, the request is +to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited +field + is disabled. Tickets issued without +the + performance of this check will be +noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be +checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that +a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if +a + ticket with the requested life +cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket +with + the requested life cannot be +provided, + then a renewable ticket may be +issued + with a renew-till equal to the +the + requested endtime. The value of +the + renew-till field may still be limited +by + local limits, or limits selected by +the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The +ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for +the + end server is to be encrypted in +the + session key from the additional +ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The RENEW +option + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + indicates that the present request +is + for a renewal. The ticket provided +is + encrypted in the secret key for +the + server on which it is valid. +This + option will only be honored if +the + ticket to be renewed has its +RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its +renew- + till field has not passed. The +ticket + to be renewed is passed in the +padata + field as part of the +authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE +option + indicates that the request is to +vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will +only + be honored if the ticket presented +is + postdated, presently has its +INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise +usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be +vali- + dated before its starttime. The +ticket + presented for validation is encrypted +in + the key of the server for which it +is + valid and is passed in the padata +field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, + or alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, + both from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies + the desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is + omitted then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date + of the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated + randomly, but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in + the response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses + for the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will + contain other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied + by the KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be + used in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. If more + than one option which requires additional tickets has been specified, + then the additional tickets are used in the order specified by the + ordering of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that +is passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for +either an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no +message type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP +or KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or +if absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the +request. In that case, no version number will be present in the +EncryptedData sequence. + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section + 6.3.2). This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name + needs to change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all + existing password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged + as needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related + information that forms the encrypted part of a message. The + description of the encrypted part of the message follows each + appearance of this field. The encrypted part is encoded as described + in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the + last request by a principal. Depending on what information is + available, this might be the last time that a request for a + ticket-granting ticket was made, or the last time that a request based + on a ticket-granting ticket was successful. It also might cover all + servers for a realm, or just the particular server. Some + implementations may display this information to the user to aid in + discovering unauthorized use of one's identity. It is similar in + spirit to the last login time displayed when logging into timesharing + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up + to the application client (usually the login program) to take + appropriate action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time + is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will + be the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +often referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the + selected options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + unselected options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding + of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options + are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of +this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option +indicates + that the ticket the client is +presenting + to a server is encrypted in the +session + key from the server's +ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not +speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in +the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells +the + server that the client requires +mutual + authentication, and that it must +respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over + the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence. First, the cksum is zeroed and + the checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence, + then the checksum is set to the result of that computation, and + finally the KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again. +user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By + checking the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make + sure that it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast + protocols), but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. + This field along with s-address can be used to help detect messages + which have been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong + recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's +addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's +addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format + of the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by + the intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce + must never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the + recipient of the message and provided to the sender of the message in + an application specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected by any encryption, +it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such a +message. In particular, this means that the client should not use any +fields in this message for security-critical purposes, such as setting a +system clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The message can be +useful, however, for advising a user on the reason for some failure. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, + e-typed-data[14] SEQUENCE of ETypedData +OPTIONAL +} + +ETypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + e-data-type [1] INTEGER, + e-data-value [2] OCTET STRING, +} + + + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. + Its value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The + two fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the + list of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to + provide for national language support in the display of error + messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If the + errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of a sequence of padata fields, each corresponding + to an acceptable pre-authentication method and optionally containing + data for the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate method; method-data + will contain any required additional information. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. + The checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to + an AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the + client's secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication + to prove knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum + can not be computed because the key to be used is not available, no + checksum will be included. +e-typed-data + [This field for discussion, may be deleted from final spec] This field + contains optional data that may be used to help the client recover + from the indicated error. [This could contain the METHOD-DATA + specified since I don't think anyone actually uses it yet. It could + also contain the PA-DATA sequence for the preauth required error if we + had a clear way to transition to the use of this field from the use of + the untype e-data field.] For example, this field may specify the key + version of the key used to verify preauthentication: + + e-data-type := 20 -- Key version number + e-data-value := Integer -- Key version number used to verify +preauthentication + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use +stream encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly available +block encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption Standard, [DES77] in +conjunction with block chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption +is used to prove the identities of the network entities participating in +message exchanges. The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by +all principals registered in that realm to store a secret key in +confidence. Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the +authenticity of a principal. + +The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a shared +session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to ticket requests; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +the ability to obtain the secret key or session key implies the knowledge +of the appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability of a +principal to decrypt the KDC response and present a Ticket and a properly +formed Authenticator (generated with the session key from the KDC response) +to a service verifies the identity of the principal; likewise the ability +of the service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its +knowledge thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + +The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is secure +from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields in the +encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the effects of +poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If keys are +derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords need to be well chosen +to make brute force attacks more difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make +easy targets for intruders. + +The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms +currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding +requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is often +desirable to place random information (often referred to as a confounder) +at the start of the message. The requirements for a confounder are +specified with each encryption mechanism. + +Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the +security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining methods +often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such +as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain-text +which can be verified at decryption and used to detect any tampering or +damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting burst errors in the +input. If any damage is detected, the decryption routine is expected to +return an error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. +The specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum +requirements. + +Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an algorithm +for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type is included. +It is desirable for the string to key function to be one-way, and for the +mapping to be different in different realms. This is important because +users who are registered in more than one realm will often use the same +password in each, and it is desirable that an attacker compromising the +Kerberos server in one realm not obtain or derive the user's key in +another. + +For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate +encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the the reader is +referred to [SG92]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + +The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The +enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in section +5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional key version +number, and the ciphertext. + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +} + + + +etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to encipher + the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected encryption types + appear later in this section. +kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data is + encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long lasting + keys, such as principals' secret keys. +cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET STRING. + +The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption +algorithm to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific inputs. +Encryption mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take sufficient +measures to guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend they +also take measures to protect against precomputed dictionary attacks. If +the encryption algorithm is not itself capable of doing so, the protections +can often be enhanced by adding a checksum and a confounder. + +The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a confounder, a +checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary padding. The msg-seq +field contains the part of the protocol message described in section 5 +which is to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are all +untagged and untyped, and their length is exactly sufficient to hold the +appropriate item. The type and length is implicit and specified by the +particular encryption type being used (etype). The format for the data to +be encrypted is described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + +One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing it in +confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate checksum over +confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the +necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type and +the appropriate key. + +Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm that +specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an octet +boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which +are not specified will be omitted. + +In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular +encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is needed as +part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + +Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and the +data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining +mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such additional +information. 6.2. Encryption Keys + +The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + +keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption key that follows in the + keyvalue field. It will almost always correspond to the encryption + algorithm used to generate the EncryptedData, though more than one + algorithm may use the same type of key (the mapping is many to one). + This might happen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a different + chaining mechanism. +keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + +All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields +and interpreta- tions. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + +If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the NULL +encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no checksum, +confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key +is used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in length, with +keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + +The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +A CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is applied to the +confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. +DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the +concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 +byte boundary before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data +are identical to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an attacker +could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid +message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum for ticket or +authenticator is no longer mandated as an interoperability requirement for + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + +The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + +The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. + +Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are +concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first +octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as +the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., +and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + +Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an additional +input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise specified, +zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those +keys shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. +Additionally, because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption +of checksums, keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys +when eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of 56 +bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a +series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are +also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the +parity bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 +as the MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), a "salt" is +concatenated to the text string, and then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 +byte boundary. This "salt" is normally the realm and each component of the +principal's name appended. However, sometimes different salts are used --- +for example, when a realm is renamed, or if a user changes her username, or +for compatibility with Kerberos V4 (whose string-to-key algorithm uses a +null string for the salt). This string is then fan-folded and +eXclusive-ORed with itself to form an 8 byte DES key. Before + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +eXclusive-ORing a block, every byte is shifted one bit to the left to leave +the lowest bit zero. The key is the "corrected" by correcting the parity on +the key, and if the key matches a 'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in +the DES specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with the constant +00000000000000F0. This key is then used to generate a DES CBC checksum on +the initial string (with the salt appended). The result of the CBC checksum +is the "corrected" as described above to form the result which is return as +the key. Pseudocode follows: + + name_to_default_salt(realm, name) { + s = realm + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + return s; + } + + key_correction(key) { + fixparity(key); + if (is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + string_to_key(string,salt) { + + odd = 1; + s = string + salt; + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + left shift every byte in 8byteblock one bit; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + tempkey = key_correction(tempkey); + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type with Key +Derivation [Horowitz] + +NOTE: This description currently refers to documents, the contents of which +might be bettered included by value in this spec. The description below was +provided by Marc Horowitz, and the form in which it will finally appear is +yet to be determined. This description is included in this version of the +draft because it does describe the implemenation ready for use with the MIT +implementation. Note also that the encryption identifier has been left +unspecified here because the value from Marc Horowitz's spec conflicted +with some other impmenentations implemented based on perevious versions of +the specification. + +This encryption type is based on the Triple DES cryptosystem, the HMAC-SHA1 +[Krawczyk96] message authentication algorithm, and key derivation for + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Kerberos V5 [HorowitzB96]. + +The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value ??. The +hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 12. + +Encryption Type des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 + +EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in +[Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC mode. The +keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. Unless otherwise specified, a zero IV +must be used. If the length of the input data is not a multiple of the +block size, zero octets must be used to pad the plaintext to the next +eight-octet boundary. The counfounder must be eight random octets (one +block). + +Checksum Type hmac-sha1-des3 + +Checksums using this type must be generated as described in [Horowitz96]. +The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. + +Common Requirements + +The EncryptionKey value is 24 octets long. The 7 most significant bits of +each octet contain key bits, and the least significant bit is the inverse +of the xor of the key bits. + +For the purposes of key derivation, the block size is 64 bits, and the key +size is 168 bits. The 168 bits output by key derivation are converted to an +EncryptionKey value as follows. First, the 168 bits are divided into three +groups of 56 bits, which are expanded individually into 64 bits as follows: + + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p + 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p +25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p +33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p +41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p +49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p +56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p + +The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output of the +three expansions are concatenated to form the EncryptionKey value. + +When the HMAC-SHA1 of a string is computed, the key is used in the +EncryptedKey form. + +Key Derivation + +In the Kerberos protocol, cryptographic keys are used in a number of +places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is +desirable to use a different key for each of these places. Key derivation +[Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys for each operation +from the keys transported on the network. For this to be possible, a small +change to the specification is necessary. + +This section specifies a profile for the use of key derivation [Horowitz96] +with Kerberos. For each place where a key is used, a ``key usage'' must is +specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, and encryption/checksum +type together describe the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext, or + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +plaintext to checksum. + +Key Usage Values + +This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos protocol, +with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) +10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) +11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) +12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) +13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) +14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) +15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) +18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) +19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) +20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) +21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + +Key usage values between 1024 and 2047 (inclusive) are reserved for +application use. Applications should use even values for encryption and odd +values for checksums within this range. + +A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service which +receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket was part of an +AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always be used for +generating a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- REQ or TGS-REQ. + +There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of the +RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would not know +about key usages. In order that these documents continue to be meaningful +until they are updated, key usages 1024 and 1025 must be used to derive +keys for encryption and checksums, respectively. New protocols defined in + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +terms of the Kerberos encryption and checksum types should use their own +key usages. Key usages may be registered with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key +usages must be unsigned 32 bit integers. Zero is not permitted. + +Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + +Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be +tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and +integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, for +each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption (Ke), and +one for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + +where the protocol key is from the EncryptionKey from the wire protocol, +and the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network byte order. +The ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | plaintext | padding) + +The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + +When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or +padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be generated +from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + + MAC = H(Kc, plaintext) + +Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a +keyed hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed hash +algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is recommended for use as H. + +Key Derivation from Passwords + +The well-known constant for password key derivation must be the byte string +{0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values correspond to the +ASCII encoding for the string "kerberos". + +6.4. Checksums + +The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + +cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the accompanying + checksum. +checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet string. + +Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this +section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local use. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields +and interpretations. + +Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: whether +they are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is infeasible to +find two plaintexts which generate the same checksum value for a +collision-proof checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the +algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream modification by an +active attacker, unkeyed checksums should only be used when the checksum +and message will be subsequently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as +part of the encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + +Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum value is +encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the composition of +the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a new checksum +algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed checksums, as well as for +the encrypted forms of unkeyed collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends +a confounder before the checksum is calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + +The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy +check as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is four +(4) octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The +use of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a probabilistic +chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be able to generate an +alternative message that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + +The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm +[MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed +to be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + +The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD4 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where +the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). +This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in +Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + +The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 algorithm. +[MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed +to be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + +The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD5 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where +the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal +constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). +This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; +those keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in +Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder to the +plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result using the key +and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last block of the +ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of the key, where +the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal +constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 128 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are +redundant. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those +keys shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in +Kerberos, nor shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or 'semi-weak'. + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) + +The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results using +DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. Note that this +checksum type is the old method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and +it is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + +The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode encryption +of the plaintext, and using the last block of the ciphertext as the +checksum value. It is keyed with an encryption key and an initialization +vector; any uses which do not specify an additional initialization vector +will use the key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting +checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) long. This checksum is tamper-proof and +collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for +encoding the DES-MAC checksum and it is no longer recommended. The DES +specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys +shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + +Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm can +technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across realm +boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be assigned, and +what information they imply. + +To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the conventions +itself, and it must require that any realms with which inter-realm keys are +shared also conform to the conventions and require the same from its +neighbors. + +Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only in +the case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently four +styles of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each +style follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components +separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor slashes +(/). Domain names must be converted to upper case when used as realm names. + +X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before the +equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string representations of +the names with components separated by slashes. Leading and trailing +slashes will not be included. + +Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that +contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by a +colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned before +they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + +The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first +three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is unlikely +that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the 'other' category. + +These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the various +name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the assignment +of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for +the domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organization owning +(to whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name or X.500 name, or in the +case that no such names are registered, authority to use a realm name may +be derived from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is +no domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm +can authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + +This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is assigned +is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to its children +in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 hierarchy, it +is the parent's responsibility to make sure that there will not in the +future exists a name identical to the realm name of the child unless it is +assigned to the same entity as the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + +As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that all +agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The name-type +field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind of information +implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. Ignoring +the name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the +components, or the realm, must be different). The following name types are +defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE +principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a +particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal name +type should be used for users, and it might also be used for a unique +server. If the name is a unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed +never to be reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note that +it is generally a bad idea to reassign names of any type since stale +entries might remain in access control lists). + +If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining +components identify an instance of the service in a server specified +manner, then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of this +name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first +component of krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm for which +the ticket is valid. + +If instance is a single component following the service name and the +instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the name +type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for Internet +services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components following the +name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should be used. This type +might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash +(/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + +A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an X.509 +certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of the X.509 +name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding rules specified +in RFC 2253. + +A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not +known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match principals +authenticated with names of any type. A principal authenticated with a name +of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNKNOWN. + +Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved for +the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the form of +such names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + +The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be composed +of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server is registered, +and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an +Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if the +name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows slash (/) +separators. The first component of the two- or multi-component name will +identify the service and the latter components will identify the host. +Where the name of the host is not case sensitive (for example, with +Internet domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If +specified by the application protocol for services such as telnet and the +Berkeley R commands which run with system privileges, the first component +may be the string 'host' instead of a service specific identifier. When a +host has an official name and one or more aliases, the official name of the +host must be used when constructing the name of the server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + +8.1. Host address types + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields +and interpretations. + +The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match the +defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard Distributions of +Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an +abbreviation of the address family name). + +Internet (IPv4) Addresses + +Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + +Internet (IPv6) Addresses [Westerlund] + +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. The +following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos packet: + + * the Unspecified Address + * the Loopback Address + * Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +CHAOSnet addresses + +CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. +The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + +ISO addresses + +ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + +XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of XNS addresses is six (6). + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + +AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit +network number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the +remaining two octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type of +AppleTalk DDP addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + +DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. The +type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + +Netbios addresses + +Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to 15 +characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16th octet of +0x0. The type of Netbios addresses is 20 (0x14). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + +When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP +IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an +encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an encoding of the +reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at +the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must +accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made +through UDP/IP transport must also use UDP/IP transport. + +8.2.2. TCP/IP transport [Westerlund,Danielsson] + +Kerberos servers (KDC's) should accept TCP requests on port 88 (decimal) +and clients should support the sending of TCP requests on port 88 +(decimal). When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP +stream, a new connection will be established for each authentication +exchange (request and response). The KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will +be returned to the client on the same TCP stream that was established for +the request. The response to a request made through TCP/IP transport must +also use TCP/IP transport. Implementors should note that some extentions to +the Kerberos protocol will not work if any implementation not supporting +the TCP transport is involved (client or KDC). Implementors are strongly +urged to support the TCP transport on both the client and server and are +advised that the current notation of "should" support will likely change in +the future to must support. The KDC may close the TCP stream after sending +a response, but may leave the stream open if it expects a followup - in +which case it may close the stream at any time if resource constratints or +other factors make it desirable to do so. Care must be taken in managing +TCP/IP connections with the KDC to prevent denial of service attacks based +on the number of TCP/IP connections with the KDC that remain open. If +multiple exchanges with the KDC are needed for certain forms of +preauthentication, multiple TCP connections may be required. A client may +close the stream after receiving response, and should close the stream if +it does not expect to send followup messages. The client must be prepared +to have the stream closed by the KDC at anytime, in which case it must +simply connect again when it is ready to send subsequent messages. + +The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request +request will encode in network byte order the length of the request +(KRB_KDC_REQ), and the length will be followed by the request itself. The +response will similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in network byte +order of the length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR message and will be +followed by the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR response. If the sign bit is +set on integer represented by the first 4 octets, then the next 4 octets +will be read, extending the length of the field by another 4 octets (less 1 +bit). + +8.2.3. OSI transport + +During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual +authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of +credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of +private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be +treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechanism will +be: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), +security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication +header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message +(KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message +(KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as specified in +the ASN.1 description for each message. The application code may be used by +Kerberos to determine the message type. + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + +The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be composed +of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS ticket (2) a +two-part name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the +second part the name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting +ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU +realm to be used to get tickets from the ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal +identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") +(name). A ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be +used to get tickets from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section that limit +the values of constants for which values are defined here. This allows +implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that will be +received for these constants. Implementation receiving values outside the +range specified in the "specification" section may reject the request, but +they must recover cleanly. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder +size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-priv 9 (pkinit) +encrypt-rsa-pub 10 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-md5 11 (pkinit) +rsa-pub-sha1 12 (pkinit) +des3kd-cbc-sha1 ?? 8 0 8 +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 12 20 (I had this as 10, is it +12) + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (pkinit) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (pkinit) +PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 + +authorization data type ad-type value +AD-KDC-ISSUED 1 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 +AD-IF-RELEVANT 4 +AD-OR 5 +AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 +AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 +reserved values 8-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +Ticket Extension Types + +TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension +TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data + 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations) +TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket +TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations) + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward +credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for +users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID +KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not +supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end +time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password +to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was +invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired +[40] +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user +only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field +failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not +available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method +required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in +message +KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path +KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this +implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) + +9. Interoperability requirements + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among +these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding +schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for +pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, options for +mutual authentication, user to user authentication, support for proxies, +forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, the format of realm names, +and the handling of authorization data. + +In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to +define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all +implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as +technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered that +one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not secure, it +will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 2 + +This section defines the second specification of these options. +Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (depricated) may +be found in RFC1510. + +Transport + +TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming conformance +to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance to specification +2 must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the KDC and should +support TCP/IP transport. + +Encryption and checksum methods + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. +Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the additional +mechanisms may only be used when communicating with principals known to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +also support them: This list is to be determined. + +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the +Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for an +unknown realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the names of +the intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. +Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when that +encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on the +initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by clients +but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an +acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should ignore the +presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request. + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT +contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but each +realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each application +server will set its own policy with respect to accepting them. + +Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and +application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will be +accepted. + +All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but +need not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, the +starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful +life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all implementations +shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible to the calling +server. + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC +option) must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may +decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal or +realm-wide basis. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from +ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to +suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered subfield +type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered +subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + +Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data subfields +available to the server when a ticket is used. Implementations are not +required to allow clients to specify the contents of the authorization data +fields. + +Constant ranges + +All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values unless +further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit is provided to +allow implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that +will be received for these constants. Implementation receiving values +outside this range may reject the request, but they must recover cleanly. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, based +on the list of suggested configuration constants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes +maximum renewable lifetime 1 week +maximum ticket lifetime 1 day +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +10. REFERENCES + +[NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +[MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +[SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +[KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +[Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +[DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +[LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +[X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +[Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + +[DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + +[DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +[SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +[IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +[MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + +[Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, + August 1998. + +[HorowitzB96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-01.txt, September 1998. + +[Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + +This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to be +constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) +then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that +*/ + /* should be are set +*/ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly +*/ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket +*/ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing +the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The +realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and +keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would +*/ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so +*/ + /* there is no need to check again here +*/ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing +*/ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + +new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field +out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into +decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data ++ + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + +tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) then + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == OK) + set new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), +second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, +server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of +resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session +key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and keyed) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not present) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + +B. Definition of common authorization data elements + +This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data +elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly defined, +meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of +authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the encapsulating +element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating element, the +encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted as issued +directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate plaintext part +of the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements are specified as +part of the Kerberos specification because the behavior based on these +values should be understood across implementations whereas other elements +need only be understood by the applications which they affect. + +In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the element +will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of the ad-data +will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection +heading. + +B.1. KDC Issued + +AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. +} + +ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the ticket + itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same encryption + algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key derived from the + same key used to protect the ticket. +i-realm, i-sname + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC itself. + This field would be used when the KDC can verify the authenticity of + elements signed by the issuing principal and it allows this KDC to + notify the application server of the validity of those elements. +elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + +The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for Kerberos +principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege attributes and +other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying the priveleges of +the principal beyond what can be done using a credentials without such an +a-data element. + +This can not be provided without this element because the definition of the +authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the bearer +of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and elements may +also be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the authenticator. + +For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are signed +by the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's key (the +same key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from that key). +Elements encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be ignored by the +application server if this "signature" is not present. Further, elements +encapsulated within this element from a ticket granting ticket may be +interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis according to policy for +including new signed elements within derivative tickets, but they will not +be copied to a derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a +derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the signature +will not be correct for the application ticket elements, and the field will +be ignored by the application server. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.2. Intended for server + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be +ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names of +intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application server +can remove this element if the application server is not in the list of +intended servers. + +Application servers should check for their principal name in the +intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not +found, this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated +elements should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present in +the top level authorization data field. Applications and application +servers that do not implement this element should reject tickets that +contain authorization data elements of this type. + +B.3. Intended for application class + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { intended-application-class[0] + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] AuthorizationData } AD elements +encapsulated within the intended-for-application-class element may be +ignored if the application server is not in one of the named classes of +application servers. Examples of application server classes include +"FILESYSTEM", and other kinds of servers. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.4. If relevant + +AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + +AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended for +interpretation only by application servers that understand the particular +ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do not understand +the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant element may ignore +the uninterpretable element. This element promotes interoperability across +implementations which may have local extensions for authorization. + +B.5. And-Or + +AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are +encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the +encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. This +element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the +condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by +setting the condition count to the number of embedded elements. Application +servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets that contain +authorization data elements of this type. + +B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + +AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions specifies +a collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect +the integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be calculated over +an individual extension field. If there are more than one extension, +multiple Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions authorization data elements may be +present, each with a checksum for a different extension field. This +restriction indicates that the ticket should not be accepted if a ticket +extension is not present in the ticket for which the checksum does not +match that checksum specified in the authorization data element. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. + +B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + +AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a +collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a separate +external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket extensions. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. Application servers +that do implement this element will search the ticket extensions for +authorization data fields, calculate the specified checksum over each +authorization data field and look for one matching the checksum in this +in-ticket-extensions element. If not found, then the ticket must be +rejected. If found, the corresponding authorization data elements will be +interpreted in the same manner as if they were contained in the top level +authorization data field. + +Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in a +ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type in-ticket-extensions +in the top level authorization data field, and the external entries will be +linked to the corresponding element by their checksums. + +C. Definition of common ticket extensions + +This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. Support +for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions have +associated authorization data elements that may require rejection of a +ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not implement +the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined beyond those +described in this specification. Such extensions are described elswhere and +for some of those extensions the reserved number may be found in the list +of constants. + +It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, and +that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they parse and +then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application servers. The +presence of the extension will not break such clients, but any functionaly +dependent on the extensions will not work when such tickets are handled by +old clients. In such situations, some implementation may use alternate +methods to transmit the information in the extensions field. + +C.1. Null ticket extension + +TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + +The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of lenght +zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket so that +the KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting ticket whether +the client software will strip the extensions field. + +C.2. External Authorization Data + +TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + +The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension is +field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization data +elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element will be +present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and that element +will contain a checksum of the external authorization data ticket +extension. + ------------------------------------------------------------------------ +[TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the +Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these +trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon +the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an application +subsequently provides integrity protection for the data stream, the +identity verification applies only to the initiation of the connection, and +does not guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate +from the same principal. + +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the literature. In +our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key +is a secret key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows +it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private key. + +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange +registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and +engage in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for even +small numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more automatic +methods as described here are necessary. + +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no network +addresses specified. + +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the requester +can provide the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it +would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- sion and +change another user's password. + +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials +obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain +credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be verified by +a local server through successful completion of the Client/Server exchange. + +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to +guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. This +can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is based on +cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly random number +generator, such as one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext +here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one message and +replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + +[9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports +difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated +messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies and replay the first +reply in response to a detected duplicate. + +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from the +same principal to the same server. Other client principals communicating +with the same server principal should not be have their authenticators +rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to match some other +client's authenticator. + +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was the +client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 because +version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not possible to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + +create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) +without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key +is not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to choose +subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a +negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + +[15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known beforehand +(since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it might be stored +in a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- tion file. If +the realm to be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of +being spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- +cated. This might result in the use of a realm which has been compromised, +and would result in an attacker's ability to compromise the authentication +of the application server to the client. + +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to ensure +the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach would be to +generate a random number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication [8], +which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server +keys in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- ised. + +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first listed +realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's realm is +considered to precede those in the transited field, and the server's realm +is considered to follow them. + +[20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and +communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not share +a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the +database and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store the +principal database in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries +stored therein are protected from disclosure to and modification by +unauthorized parties. However, we recommend against such strategies, as +they can make system management and threat analysis quite complex. + +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for details on +why this can be useful. + +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data structures +during the generation and verification of embedded checksums: Because any +checksums applied to data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within a data structure +between the time that a checksum is generated through transmission to the +time that the checksum is verified. + +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the +workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine that +such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-r-03 November 18 1998 + + + +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must make +sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If the time is +ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability that a +nonce will be reused. + +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization vector +may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve proper +cipher chaining. The initialization vector might come from the last block +of the ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the +application's choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. +If left out, the default initialization vector for the encryption algorithm +will be used. + +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request from +obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password guessing +attack. + +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the +notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is not a +valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the message +starts with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. For other +fields, the length and tag would be redundant if they were included because +they are specified by the encryption type. [36] The ordering of the fields +in the CipherText is important. Additionally, messages encoded in this +format must include a length as part of the msg-seq field. This allows the +recipient to verify that the message has not been truncated. Without a +length, an attacker could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a +message which could be truncated, while leaving the checksum intact. Note +that if the msg-seq is an encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, +then the length is part of that encoding. + +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a particular +function, separating the functions of generating a checksum from other +encryption performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 +was chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded +the use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar purpose in +the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + +[40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. The +contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section +5.9.1. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 18 May 1999 + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16af15d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6780 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman + John Kohl + Theodore Ts'o + June 25, 1999 + Expires December 25, 1999 +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04.txt + +The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + +This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all +provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents +of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working +groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as +Internet-Drafts. + +Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and +may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is +inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them +other than as "work in progress." + +The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + +The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at +http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. To learn the current status of any +Internet-Draft, please check the '1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in +the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories. + +The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as +draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04.txt, and expires December 25th, 1999. +Please send comments to: krb-protocol@MIT.EDU + +ABSTRACT + +This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol +and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than +was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed +description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with +descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within +those messages. + +This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system +administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing +Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88], +are available elsewhere. + +OVERVIEW + +This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos +network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 of the +Kerberos protocol. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design +decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper +available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion +of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed +standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard through +the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the presentation, but +only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit +within current protocol framework will be considered at this time. + +Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of +Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. +This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group +comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including +documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + +BACKGROUND + +The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted +third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested by +Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of Kerberos +Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff +members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman +(now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern +California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project +Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members +of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos. + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved +from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not +available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was +led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the community. The +development of the MIT reference implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl +and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from many others. Since +RFC1510 was issued, extensions and revisions to the protocol have been +proposed by many individuals. Some of these proposals are reflected in this +document. Where such changes involved significant effort, the document cites +the contribution of the proposer. + +Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are +publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and +are widely used. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and +5 can be found in [KNT92]. + +1. Introduction + +Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. a +workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. This +is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system, +without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical security +of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that packets +traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will[1]. +Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted +third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared secret key +[2] cryptography. Kerberos extensions have been proposed and implemented +that provide for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of +the authentication protocol. These extensions provide for authentication of + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +users registered with public key certification authorities, and allow the +system to provide certain benefits of public key cryptography in situations +where they are needed. + +The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client +sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials' +for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the +client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server and 2) +a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The client +transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of the +session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session +key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the +client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also +be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to +exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further +communication. + +Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication +servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers +maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret +keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos protocol. +In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical network +application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly or +through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface, +GSSAPI, described in separate document. These calls result in the +transmission of the necessary messages to achieve authentication. + +The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges). +There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for +credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for +a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted in +the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting +ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). +In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client uses +the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it were +contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos +authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT. +Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate +servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry points +within a single Kerberos server. + +Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the +principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged +between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is +free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + +To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client +transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent "in +the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart +replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, additional +information is sent to prove that the message originated with the principal +to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the authenticator) +is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp +proves that the message was recently generated and is not a replay. +Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated +by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting +principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over the +network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be +guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the +credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and +message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and +transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest +function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and +integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by +encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the +ticket or the subsession key found in the authenticator. + +The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to the +Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must be +modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's key. +This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos server, +the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol for +maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these +protocols are described in this document. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + +The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational +boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server in +another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its +own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is part +of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide whether +to honor a request. + +By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can +allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to +servers in other realms[3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key +may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of +each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to +obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting +service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the +remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually +differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, +and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets +issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the +end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm. + +A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share an +inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an +intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An +authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are +transited in communicating from one realm to another. + +Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with +its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is not +directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an +authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical organization +is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in order to construct +an authentication path between realms. + +Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be +bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate +authentication paths (these might be established to make communication +between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in +the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each +ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in authenticating +the client. + +The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting +authentication and should check the transited field. The application server +may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check +the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the +TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate +realms may also check the transited field as they issue +ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do +so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by +setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not +required to honor this flag. + +1.2. Authorization + +As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the +identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful +primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining +whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to +access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by +itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service +provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the +absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered +by an application as authorizing the use of that service. + +Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application +specific access control functions and may be based on files such as the +application server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such +as those based on proxies [Neu93] , or on other authorization services. + +Applications should not be modified to accept the issuance of a service +ticket by the Kerberos server (even by an modified Kerberos server) as +granting authority to use the service, since such applications may become +vulnerable to the bypass of this authorization check in an environment if +they interoperate with other KDCs or where other options for application +authentication (e.g. the PKTAPP proposal) are provided. + +1.3. Environmental assumptions + +Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can +properly function: + + * 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are + places in these protocols where an intruder can prevent an application + from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and + solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be nnot-uncommon + 'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the + human administrators and users. + * Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow + steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that + principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal. + * 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user + chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to successfully + mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt, + with successive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained which are + encrypted under a key derived from the user's password. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + * Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely + synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is + used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they + do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a + per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization + protocol must itself be secured from network attackers. + * Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A typical + mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to grant + permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains for + a deleted principal and the principal identifier is reused, the new + principal will inherit rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not + re-using principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + +1.4. Glossary of terms + +Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + +Authentication + Verifying the claimed identity of a principal. +Authentication header + A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication process. +Authentication path + A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication + process when communicating from one realm to another. +Authenticator + A record containing information that can be shown to have been recently + generated using the session key known only by the client and server. +Authorization + The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which + objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access allowed + for each. +Capability + A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or + service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted by + the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no + network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the + ticket. +Ciphertext + The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext + into ciphertext. +Client + A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. Note + that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other server + (e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server). +Credentials + A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. +KDC + Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and + temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on + which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and ticket-granting + ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is sometimes referred to as + the Authentication Server (or service). The ticket-granting ticket + portion is sometimes referred to as the ticket-granting server (or + service). + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Kerberos + Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or + the code used to implement the authentication service. +Plaintext + The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption + function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext. +Principal + A uniquely named client or server instance that participates in a + network communication. +Principal identifier + The name used to uniquely identify each different principal. +Seal + To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the + fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the + encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering. +Secret key + An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed + outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of + a human user's principal, the secret key is derived from a password. +Server + A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients. + The server is sometimes refered to as the Application Server. +Service + A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than one + server (for example, remote file service). +Session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single login "session". +Sub-session key + A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and + exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime + limited to the duration of a single association. +Ticket + A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it + contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other + information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves + to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + +Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate +various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client +when the ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a +Kerberos server as required. The following sections explain what the various +flags mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + +The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol +and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that +want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a +password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets +they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently +presented to the application client. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information about the +initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was issued +directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the basis of +a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear, but the +PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the +ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + +The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers +must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will +usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC +before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the VALIDATE +option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their starttime +has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets which have +been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid +(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + +Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods +of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for +equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the +expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and +obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term +access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be +used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two +"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket +expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual +expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it +expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set in +the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key and +a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified +by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration time arrives, +the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a +hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last +renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the usable +lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + +The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be +ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful +application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets. + +If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will +not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client +may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ +message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the +time after which the ticket may not be renewed. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +2.4. Postdated tickets + +Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later, +e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time +the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in +a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to theft. +Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC at job +submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are activated and +validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported +in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief +would be foiled. + +The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This flag +must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket +based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be requested +by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. +This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting +ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting +the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) of a +postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at +the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in which +case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting +ticket. The KDC may limit how far in the future a ticket may be postdated. + +The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The +application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when +the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject +postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period +after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket, +it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must +present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + +At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform +an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the identity +of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a +service to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose by +granting it a proxy. + +The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used +to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually +also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must +use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to forward +a ticket granting ticket. + +The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When set, +this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a new +ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address +based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client on initial +authentication. By default, the client will request that it be set when +requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any other +ticket. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote +request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print server +a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in order to +satisfy a print request. + +In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are +usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in the +ticket[4]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network +address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the proxy is to +be issued for use from any address. + +The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket. +Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may require +additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to +provide an audit trail. + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + +Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service is +granted complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might be +used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication to +work from that system as if the login were local. + +The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the +ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The +FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE +flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different +network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request that +it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when they +request their initial ticket- granting ticket. + +This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user to +enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication +forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if +the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network +addresses and supplies a password. + +The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with +the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the +FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It +is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED flag +set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets differently +than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + +There are two additional options which may be set in a client's request of +the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a +renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be +provided. If a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the +KDC may issue a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the +requested endtime. The value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted +by site-determined limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or +server. + +The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting service. +It indicates that the ticket to be issued for the end server is to be +encrypted in the session key from the a additional second ticket-granting +ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 for specific details. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3. Message Exchanges + +The following sections describe the interactions between network clients and +servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the Kerberos +Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain +authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no +credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for +encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the initiation +of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting Server which +will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other servers (see +section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's secret key. This +exchange is also used to request credentials for services which must not be +mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a +principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[5]. This +exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the +user[6]. + +The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to +Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these +messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + +In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the +identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The response, +KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a +session key that will be shared by the client and the server. The session +key and additional information are encrypted in the client's secret key. The +KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect replays, +and to associate it with the message to which it replies. Various errors can +occur; these are indicated by an error response (KRB_ERROR) instead of the +KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not encrypted. The KRB_ERROR +message contains information which can be used to associate it with the +message to which it replies. The lack of encryption in the KRB_ERROR message +precludes the ability to detect replays, fabrications, or modifications of +such messages. + +Without preautentication, the authentication server does not know whether +the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends a +reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is +acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the +request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is encrypted +in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional field that +can be used to pass additional information that might be needed for the +initial exchange. This field may be used for preauthentication as described +in section [hl<>]. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + +The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among +these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether the +requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether it +should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; and whether a +renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the +requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable +ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 +for pseudocode. + +The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + +If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the +creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format for +the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are +determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + +The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named in +the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If +required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the +pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate the +requested encryption type, an error message with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP +is returned. Otherwise it generates a 'random' session key[7]. + +If there are multiple encryption keys registered for a client in the +Kerberos database (or if the key registered supports multiple encryption +types; e.g. DES-CBC-CRC and DES-CBC-MD5), then the etype field from the AS +request is used by the KDC to select the encryption method to be used for +encrypting the response to the client. If there is more than one supported, +strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid etype for which an +encryption key is available is used. The encryption method used to respond +to a TGS request is taken from the keytype of the session key found in the +ticket granting ticket. [***I will change the example keytypes to be 3DES +based examples 7/14***] + +When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS +request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key +from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the +appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with +information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption +methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a +weak session key encryption type. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise +the requested start time is checked against the policy of the local realm +(the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of +postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated +ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the +start time has been reached. + +The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the +following: + + * The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the client principal (the authentication server's database + includes a maximum ticket lifetime field in each principal's record; + see section 4). + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated + with the server principal. + * The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of + the local realm. + +If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above) +is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the +ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK' +option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket, +and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested +(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1). + +If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has +been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field +is set to the minimum of: + + * Its requested value. + * The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum + renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries. + * The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + +The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if +they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows: +FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. If the new +ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID flag +will also be set. + +If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see +section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the +response, placing any required pre-authentication data into the padata of +the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using the +requested encryption method, and sends it to the client. See section A.2 for +pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + +Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by +returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code +and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error message contents and +details are described in Section 5.9.1. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + +If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the +cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it +requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the +proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted +part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the +encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect +replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match +those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host +address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, start +and expiration times, and other information for later use. The +key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked +to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could +then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 +for pseudocode. + +Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to verify the +identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate to generate a +KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not from the proper +KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user, it must require +the user to present application credentials which can be verified using a +securely-stored secret key for the host. If those credentials can be +verified, then the identity of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + +If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an +error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to +recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary +Message direction Message type Section +Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 +[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network +applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The +client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS or +TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + +The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of +the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an +authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section +5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to +authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in +cleartext[DS90], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of +tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of +the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message is +referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.' + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + +When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains +(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a +ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any +tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a +new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an +application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in +KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in +negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session. +Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a +server[LGDSR87]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be +randomly chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is +not likely to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + +The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use of +a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the +ap-options field of the message. + +The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the +ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server +along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9 +for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + +Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be +loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors are +possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client +with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the +application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol. +The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1. + +The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If the +message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE +error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not +one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the server no +longer possesses a copy of the old key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is +returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it +indicates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from +the server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key[10]. Since it +is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms, with +different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of the +ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key the server +should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is +returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket. + +The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by +the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket +(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified +ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned +(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + +The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the +decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the client +from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the authenticator. +If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is returned (they might + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +not match, for example, if the wrong session key was used to encrypt the +authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for +an address matching the operating-system reported address of the client. If +no match is found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are +present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + +If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ +by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW +error is returned. If the server name, along with the client name, time and +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is returned[11]. The server must +remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, so +that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a server loses track of any +authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew, it must reject all +requests until the clock skew interval has passed. This assures that any +lost or re-played authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew +and can no longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an attacker +could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator sent over the network +to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as the disabled host, and +replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the authentication.). If a +sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the server saves it for +later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is +present, the server either saves it for later use or uses it to help +generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + +The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the +start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current +time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in +the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the +current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew, +the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned. + +If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that the +client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket and +thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for +pseudocode. + +Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; it +does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must +make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of +the user, the requested operation, local acces control information such as +that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate +distributed authorization service. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + +Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication +information and its initial request in the same message, and the server need +not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication +(not only authenticating the client to the server, but also the server to +the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will have +MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is +required in response. As with the error message, this message may be +encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable +to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in +the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided +in the authenticator)[12]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should +be randomly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A subkey may be + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +included if the server desires to negotiate a different subkey. The +KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key extracted from the +ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + +If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from +the credentials obtained for the server[13] to decrypt the message, and +verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the +Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is +assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if +present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + +After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and server +share an encryption key which can be used by the application. The 'true +session key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other +application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on the +subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[14]. In some cases, +the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the +method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. We leave the +protocol negotiations of how to use the key (e.g. selecting an encryption or +checksum type) to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not +constrain the implementation options, but an example of how this might be +done follows. + +One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for +subequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a +key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a +key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new +subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be +used for subsequent communication. To make this example more concrete, if +the encryption method in use required a 56 bit key, and for whatever reason, +one of the parties was prevented from using a key with more than 40 unknown +bits, this method would allow the the party which is prevented from using +more than 40 bits to either propose (if the client) an initial key with a +known quantity for 16 of those bits, or to mask 16 of the bits (if the +server) with the known quantity. The application implementor is warned, +however, that this is only an example, and that an analysis of the +particular crytosystem to be used, and the reasons for limiting the key +length, must be made before deciding whether it is acceptable to mask bits +of the key. + +With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should +take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper +assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity +should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both +client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol +requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section +3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + +The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server is +initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication credentials +for a given server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when it +wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain +a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already have acquired a +ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the +ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client initially +authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The message +format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. +The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS exchange +does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the session key from +the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session key from an +Authenticator is used. As is the case for all application servers, expired +tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting +ticket expires, the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid +tickets. + +The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the +client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or +KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the +client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information +consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the +client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. +In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one +or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization +data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application +server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). The +TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, encrypted in the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or if +present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part of the +authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code and +text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The +KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect +replays, and to associate it with the message to which it replies. The +KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used to associate +it with the message to which it replies, but the lack of encryption in the +KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays or fabrications of +such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must +determine in which realm the application server is registered[15]. If the +client does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate +realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by requesting a +ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a Kerberos server for +which the client does posess a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ +message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for the desired +realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, the Kerberos server may +return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +along the standard hierarchical path), in which case this step must be +repeated with a Kerberos server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. +If neither are returned, then the request must be retried with a Kerberos +server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request will itself require +a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm which must be obtained by +recursively applying these directions. + +Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm, +it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. The +list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service or it +may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret keys +exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results from +using a false Kerberos server. + +As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the +KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing +an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including +the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several +optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server use +and additional tickets required by some options. + +In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session +key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be encrypted[16]. +If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data is +present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from the +authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present, using +the session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + +Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination +realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + +The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ +message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the +Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for +and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal +KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the +TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the +appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not +a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application +server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are +specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is +the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the +ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which it +was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum +in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request, +and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code +of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not +collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the +checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is +returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using +the sub-session key from the Authenticator. + +If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + +The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP), +but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in +section 5.4.2. + +The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The Kerberos +database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested server +(including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). If the request +is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, and if no key is shared +with the requested realm, then the Kerberos server will select the realm +"closest" to the requested realm with which it does share a key, and use +that realm instead. This is the only case where the response from the KDC +will be for a different server than that requested by the client. + +By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of +transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time, +and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from +the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited field +needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + +If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is +set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and +(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the +application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum +life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was +issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is +replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the +ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life +(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket. + +If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will +contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be +honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is +similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the +client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. The +PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional ticket-granting +tickets. + +If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is +within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE +option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to +the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the +future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not +been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the +error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting +ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be +postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the +local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, and +the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated before use +by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been reached. However, +in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued +postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the ticket-granting +ticket. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket +has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket +using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and +verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the requested +server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the additional +ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be +compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if +different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the +session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new +ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the +new ticket will be used[17]. + +If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as part +of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server +itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW +option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is set +in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that the +renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, +the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is +set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that the +PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the ticket +passes the hotlist check described in the next paragraph, the KDC will issue +the appropriate new ticket. + +3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets + +Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented +ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been +canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue +timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in +that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting +ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets +(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported. Any normal ticket +obtained before it was reported stolen will still be valid (because they +require no interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration +time. + +The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted +in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session +key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the +client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and the +key version number fields are left out since these values are stored along +with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy +a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field + +If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as +part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service, +but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the +inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the +ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, subject +to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS exchange. +The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the +ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the +ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket to +be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the +ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out +its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the +existing encoding). + +Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own +realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous realm. +This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its +own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names). + +The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be +included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and +both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the +endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm +authentication result in a transited field that is empty. + +Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might +potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its contents +are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal +case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of realms +using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding (called +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described. + +Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\", +trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they +are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by +preced- ing them with a "\". + +A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the +previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU, +ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + +Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that they +would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + +A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the +previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded +by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, +/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + +Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they +they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + +A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms +between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. Thus, +"," means that all realms along the path between the client and the server +have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from the +client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been traversed, +and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an X.500 style +has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierarchy +shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in another hierarchy. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + +When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same +manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference +is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the +session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret +key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + +The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect +modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a +keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control +information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last +key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has +occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them. +The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the +RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC), +generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. +Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the +message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this +use. + +The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp +and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE +message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should +be based on the needs of the application protocol. + +Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by one's +peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session key, so +maintaining the next sequence number should not present an additional +problem. + +If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without +them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay +detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for +multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session +key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers. + +After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and +checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + +When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed +checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. If +the sender's address was included in the control information, the recipient + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches +the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is +specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's +addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match +for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and +usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec +are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the +client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any +recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT +error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a +sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error +is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is +present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. Finally, the checksum is +computed over the data and control information, and if it doesn't match the +received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was +generated by its peer and was not modi- fied in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + +The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and +the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this +by encrypting the messages and adding control information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data +and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and +encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via +subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occured). As part of the +control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a +sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for +guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are +encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope' +information to the recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + +When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows. +If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. + +The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type +fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The +application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant +plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. If the sender's address was +included in the control information, the recipient verifies that the +operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's +address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the +recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears +as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either case +generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the +sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and +not present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error +is generated. If the server name, along with the client name, time and + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such +tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence +number is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or +a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was +generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able +to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + +The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send +Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending +the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and +other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + +When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the +KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It then +constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained, +placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED +message. + +Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the +KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in +the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if +specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r-address +fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message which is +then encrypted under an encryption key previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP +exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if +no negotiation has occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + +When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any +error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The +message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields +match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then +decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption +shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is +generated. + +If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's +report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message, +and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address +in the message. A failed match for either case generates a +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce field +if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not present, or +they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + +If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets in +its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in the +corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED +message. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +4. The Kerberos Database + +The Kerberos server must have access to a database contain- ing the +principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be authenticated[21]. + +4.1. Database contents + +A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + +Field Value + +name Principal's identifier +key Principal's secret key +p_kvno Principal's key version +max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets +max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets + +The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field +contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The key +can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it +in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. In that case, +an extra field must be added to indicate the master key version used, see +below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the principal's secret +key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime - +starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life +field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable Ticket +issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these +lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given Ticket.) + +A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database +representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal records +with identifiers which differ only in the realm name. + +When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. not +the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be retained by +the server until all tickets that had been issued using that key have +expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be active for a +single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged +with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to help the +recipient find the proper key for decryption. + +When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal +will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key +version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may +or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to a +request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the +Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the +highest key version number. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +4.2. Additional fields + +Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database: + +Field Value + +K_kvno Kerberos' key version +expiration Expiration date for entry +attributes Bit field of attributes +mod_date Timestamp of last modification +mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + +The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under +which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + +After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error to +any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A database +may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one +for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work +independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the +limited space in the responses, the KDC must combine the key expiration and +principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is +used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.) + +The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving +the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user +registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project +Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by +the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a +principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether a +server is appropriate trusted to recieve credentials delegated by a client, +or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a +principal's key[22]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket +options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key +(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing +forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, +disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and +disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server. + +The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and +the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified +the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + +Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request +was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained +includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a +ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting +ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user in +the last-req field (see section 5.2). + +Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest +expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This +field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow +the continued use of outstanding tickets. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +4.4. Site Constants + +The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or +options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions: + + * The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should + reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC, + encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and + target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime. + * The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + * The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + * Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued + if the request specifies some authorization_data). + * Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are + to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + +The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol +messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first +subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets +and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum +techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6. + +Optional field in ASN.1 sequences + +For optional integer value and date fields in ASN.1 sequences where a +default value has been specified, certain default values will not be allowed +in the encoding because these values will always be represented through +defaulting by the absence of the optional field. For example, one will not +send a microsecond zero value because one must make sure that there is only +one way to encode this value. + +Additional fields in ASN.1 sequences + +Implementations receiving Kerberos messages with additional fields present +in ASN.1 sequences should carry the those fields through, unmodified, when +the message is forwarded. Implementations should not drop such fields if the +sequence is reencoded. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + +All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding +Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 specification, +section 8.7 [X509-88]. + +5.3. ASN.1 Base Definitions + +The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section. +Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1 +names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names. + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a +character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist +of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet +Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names. +Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A PrincipalName +is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following sub-fields: + +name-type + This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values + for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same + (i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. +name-string + This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each + component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName + and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have + only a few components (typically one or two). + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An encoding +shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any fractional +portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any separators. +Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm +on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + +The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + +addr-type + This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined + values for this field are specified in section 8.1. +address + This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + +The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address; +HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses. + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +ad-data + This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to + the value of the corresponding ad-type field. +ad-type + This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Each sequence of type and data is refered to as an authorization element. +Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of +recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These +elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the interpretation +of the encapsulating element determines which of the embedded elements must +be interpreted, and which may be ignored. Definitions for these common +elements may be found in Appendix B. + +TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + te-type[0] INTEGER, + te-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +te-data + This field contains opaque data that must be caried with the ticket to + support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited + to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization + data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field. +te-type + This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative + values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- use-session-key(1), + -- mutual-required(2) + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- may-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- invalid(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- initial(9), + -- pre-authent(10), + -- hw-authent(11), + -- transited-policy-checked(12), + -- ok-as-delegate(13) + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING + -- reserved(0), + -- forwardable(1), + -- forwarded(2), + -- proxiable(3), + -- proxy(4), + -- allow-postdate(5), + -- postdated(6), + -- unused7(7), + -- renewable(8), + -- unused9(9), + -- unused10(10), + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + -- unused11(11), + -- unused12(12), + -- unused13(13), + -- disable-transited-check(26), + -- renewable-ok(27), + -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + -- renew(30), + -- validate(31) + +ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the +APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on +generated values should be the smallest number of bits needed to include the +highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. The +ASN.1 representation of the bit strings uses unnamed bits, with the meaning +of the individual bits defined by the comments in the specification above. +Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length and treat +the value of flags corresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit string as +if the bit were reset (0). Comparison of bit strings of different length +should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with zeros beyond the +high order bits to the length of the longer string[23]. + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +lr-type + This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be + interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains + only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all + servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no + information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute value + of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is the time + of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three (3), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the + lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). If it is + (6), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the password will + expire. +lr-value + This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be + interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type + subfield. + +See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData, +EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + +This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and +authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol +message it is treated as an opaque object. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +5.3.1. Tickets + +A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A Ticket +contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData, + extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL +} + +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be +registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos and +the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format of +the ciphertext. + +tkt-vno + This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This + document describes version number 5. +realm + This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to + identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a + Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm, + the two will always be identical. +sname + This field specifies all components of the name part of the server's + identity, including those parts that identify a specific instance of a + service. +enc-part + This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence. +extensions + [*** This change is still subject to discussion. Several alternatives + for this - including none at all - will be distributed to the cat and + krb-protocol mailing lists before the Oslo IETF, and an alternative + will be selected and the spec modified by 7/14/99 ***] This optional + field contains a sequence of extentions that may be used to carry + information that must be carried with the ticket to support several + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + extensions, including but not limited to plaintext authorization data, + tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other information that must + be associated with a ticket for use by the application server. See + Appendix C for definitions of some common extensions. + + Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field. + Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but + older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it + to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket + field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and + reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients. + + If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket, + as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the + enc-part of the ticket and append a traler indicating the lenght of the + appended extensions field. (this paragraph is open for discussion, + including the form of the traler). +flags + This field indicates which of various options were used or requested + when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most + significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. + The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The meanings + of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, this + flag tells the ticket-granting server + that it is OK to issue a new ticket- + granting ticket with a different network + address based on the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED + When set, this flag indicates that the + ticket has either been forwarded or was + issued based on authentication involving + a forwarded ticket-granting ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical to + that of the FORWARDABLE flag, except + that the PROXIABLE flag tells the + ticket-granting server that only non- + ticket-granting tickets may be issued + with different network addresses. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + 4 PROXY + When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE + The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. This flag tells + the ticket-granting server that a post- + dated ticket may be issued based on this + ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED + This flag indicates that this ticket has + been postdated. The end-service can + check the authtime field to see when the + original authentication occurred. + + 7 INVALID + This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by the + KDC before use. Application servers + must reject tickets which have this flag + set. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can usually + be ignored by end servers (some particu- + larly careful servers may wish to disal- + low renewable tickets). A renewable + ticket can be used to obtain a replace- + ment ticket that expires at a later + date. + + 9 INITIAL + This flag indicates that this ticket was + issued using the AS protocol, and not + issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that during initial + authentication, the client was authenti- + cated by the KDC before a ticket was + issued. The strength of the pre- + authentication method is not indicated, + but is acceptable to the KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT + This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected to + be possessed solely by the named client. + The hardware authentication method is + selected by the KDC and the strength of + the method is not indicated. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + 12 TRANSITED This flag indicates that the KDC for the + POLICY-CHECKED realm has checked the transited field + against a realm defined policy for + trusted certifiers. If this flag is + reset (0), then the application server + must check the transited field itself, + and if unable to do so it must reject + the authentication. If the flag is set + (1) then the application server may skip + its own validation of the transited + field, relying on the validation + performed by the KDC. At its option the + application server may still apply its + own validation based on a separate + policy for acceptance. + + 13 OK-AS-DELEGATE This flag indicates that the server (not + the client) specified in the ticket has + been determined by policy of the realm + to be a suitable recipient of + delegation. A client can use the + presence of this flag to help it make a + decision whether to delegate credentials + (either grant a proxy or a forwarded + ticket granting ticket) to this server. + The client is free to ignore the value + of this flag. When setting this flag, + an administrator should consider the + Security and placement of the server on + which the service will run, as well as + whether the service requires the use of + delegated credentials. + + 14 ANONYMOUS + This flag indicates that the principal + named in the ticket is a generic princi- + pal for the realm and does not identify + the individual using the ticket. The + purpose of the ticket is only to + securely distribute a session key, and + not to identify the user. Subsequent + requests using the same ticket and ses- + sion may be considered as originating + from the same user, but requests with + the same username but a different ticket + are likely to originate from different + users. + + 15-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +key + This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to + pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the + client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. +crealm + This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is + registered and in which initial authentication took place. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +cname + This field contains the name part of the client's principal identifier. +transited + This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in + authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not + specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section + 3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms. + When the names of CA's are to be embedded inthe transited field (as + specified for some extentions to the protocol), the X.500 names of the + CA's should be mapped into items in the transited field using the + mapping defined by RFC2253. +authtime + This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named + principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which + this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide + additional information to the end service, and to provide the necessary + information for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An + end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to accept + tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" in the + past. This field is also returned as part of the response from the KDC. + When returned as part of the response to initial authentication + (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Ker- beros server[24]. +starttime + This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is + valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the + ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated as + that of the authtime field. +endtime + This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be honored + (its expiration time). Note that individual services may place their + own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which have + not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the + expiration time for the ticket. +renew-till + This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set + in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be + included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration + time for the ticket, including all renewals. +caddr + This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present) + host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be + used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any + location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to + accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or + accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is that + such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional + information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is + included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a + capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an + attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not sent + over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply by + listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the session + key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a careless + user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + It is important to note that the network address from which a + connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could + be, an attacker who has compromised the client's workstation could use + the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only makes + it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off with + stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location. +authorization-data + The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from + the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application + service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, and + that a better name for this field would be restrictions. Unfortunately, + it is not possible to change the name of this field at this time. + + This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the basis + of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any principal in + posession of credentials to add entries to the authorization data field + since these entries further restrict what can be done with the ticket. + Such additions can be made by specifying the additional entries when a + new ticket is obtained during the TGS exchange, or they may be added + during chained delegation using the authorization data field of the + authenticator. + + Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of + credentials, it is not allowable for the presence of an entry in the + authorization data field of a ticket to amplify the priveleges one + would obtain from using a ticket. + + The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field + will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to + those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2. + Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of + the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a + proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client + wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to + the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the + authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server + can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to + be printed. + + A separate service providing authorization or certifying group + membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this + case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity), + obtains a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the name + of a privelege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its own + authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy to the + client. The client would then present this authorization credential to + the application server separately from the authentication exchange. + + Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy and + leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key + can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested uses of + this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be + included in a ticket. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +5.3.2. Authenticators + +An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the +client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server +detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the +particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key +shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + +authenticator-vno + This field specifies the version number for the format of the + authenticator. This document specifies version 5. +crealm and cname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +cksum + This field contains a checksum of the the applica- tion data that + accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. Its + value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears + along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify a + reasonably accurate timestamp. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +subkey + This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is + to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an + application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session + key from the ticket will be used. +seq-number + This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by + the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to + detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages). + When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial + sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that for + messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or + KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is sent. + Sequence numbers fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and wrap to + zero following the value 2^32 - 1. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays + they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The + initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot + be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. +authorization-data + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. It + is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are to be + placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket + itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + +This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange +between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error +messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + +The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of +KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an initial +ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent from the +client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, + -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData + -- encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The fields in this message are: + +pvno + This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol + version number. This document specifies protocol version 5. +msg-type + This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost + always be the same as the application identifier associated with a + message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible + to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. +padata + The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of + authentication information which may be needed before credentials can + be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets + (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of + PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket + and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which must be + collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In + most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies + (KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions to + the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially + verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. This + is accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to + PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing the + microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate more + than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of + the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key. + + [use-specified-kvno item is here for discussion and may be removed] It + may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that is + being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should be + used to encrypt the reply from the KDC. + + PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO ::= Integer + + The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the + use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key + is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation + is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated + key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC or + the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the + response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of + certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are + specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of + this field. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +padata-type + The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the + padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of + padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are + used for a registered interpretation of the element type. +req-body + This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining + fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is + calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is + enclosed within the req-body field. +kdc-options + This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the + KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets as + well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the KDC. + Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the flag + that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not + guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field to + the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before + honoring an option anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are + indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and + reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified + in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in + section 2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of +this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE + The FORWARDABLE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + forwardable flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based is also +for- + wardable. + + 2 FORWARDED + The FORWARDED option is only +specified + in a request to the +ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket in the +request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. +This + option indicates that this is a +request + for forwarding. The address(es) of +the + host from which the resulting ticket +is + to be valid are included in +the + addresses field of the request. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + 3 PROXIABLE + The PROXIABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have its +prox- + iable flag set. It may only be set +on + the initial request, or in a +subsequent + request if the ticket-granting ticket +on + which it is based is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY + The PROXY option indicates that this +is + a request for a proxy. This option +will + only be honored if the +ticket-granting + ticket in the request has its +PROXIABLE + bit set. The address(es) of the +host + from which the resulting ticket is to +be + valid are included in the +addresses + field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE + The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates +that + the ticket to be issued is to have +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It may only +be + set on the initial request, or in a +sub- + sequent request if the +ticket-granting + ticket on which it is based also has +its + MAY-POSTDATE flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED + The POSTDATED option indicates that +this + is a request for a postdated +ticket. + This option will only be honored if +the + ticket-granting ticket on which it +is + based has its MAY-POSTDATE flag +set. + The resulting ticket will also have +its + INVALID flag set, and that flag may +be + reset by a subsequent request to the +KDC + after the starttime in the ticket +has + been reached. + + 7 UNUSED + This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE + The RENEWABLE option indicates that +the + ticket to be issued is to have +its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be +set + on the initial request, or when +the + ticket-granting ticket on which +the + request is based is also renewable. +If + this option is requested, then the +rtime + field in the request contains +the + desired absolute expiration time for +the + ticket. + + 9-13 UNUSED + These options are presently unused. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + 14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS + The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option +indicates + that the ticket to be issued is not +to + identify the user to which it +was + issued. Instead, the principal +identif- + ier is to be generic, as specified +by + the policy of the realm (e.g. +usually + anonymous@realm). The purpose of +the + ticket is only to securely distribute +a + session key, and not to identify +the + user. The ANONYMOUS flag on the +ticket + to be returned should be set. If +the + local realms policy does not +permit + anonymous credentials, the request is +to + be rejected. + + 15-25 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK + By default the KDC will check the + transited field of a ticket-granting- + ticket against the policy of the local + realm before it will issue derivative + tickets based on the ticket granting + ticket. If this flag is set in the + request, checking of the transited +field + is disabled. Tickets issued without +the + performance of this check will be +noted + by the reset (0) value of the + TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag, + indicating to the application server + that the tranisted field must be +checked + locally. KDC's are encouraged but not + required to honor the + DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK + The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that +a + renewable ticket will be acceptable if +a + ticket with the requested life +cannot + otherwise be provided. If a ticket +with + the requested life cannot be +provided, + then a renewable ticket may be +issued + with a renew-till equal to the +the + requested endtime. The value of +the + renew-till field may still be limited +by + local limits, or limits selected by +the + individual principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The +ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY + option indicates that the ticket for +the + end server is to be encrypted in +the + session key from the additional +ticket- + granting ticket provided. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + 29 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The RENEW +option + indicates that the present request +is + for a renewal. The ticket provided +is + encrypted in the secret key for +the + server on which it is valid. +This + option will only be honored if +the + ticket to be renewed has its +RENEWABLE + flag set and if the time in its +renew- + till field has not passed. The +ticket + to be renewed is passed in the +padata + field as part of the +authentication + header. + + 31 VALIDATE + This option is used only by the +ticket- + granting service. The VALIDATE +option + indicates that the request is to +vali- + date a postdated ticket. It will +only + be honored if the ticket presented +is + postdated, presently has its +INVALID + flag set, and would be otherwise +usable + at this time. A ticket cannot be +vali- + dated before its starttime. The +ticket + presented for validation is encrypted +in + the key of the server for which it +is + valid and is passed in the padata +field + as part of the authentication header. + +cname and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is + specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of + the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets. +enc-authorization-data + The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in + the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data + encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, or + alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, both + from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. +realm + This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal + identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the + client's principal identifier. +from + This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket + requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the + desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is omitted + then the KDC should use the current time instead. +till + This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a + ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is + to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the + parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date of + the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +rtime + This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the + KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. +nonce + This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to + hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is + included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence + that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. + Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated randomly, + but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25]. +etype + This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in the + response. +addresses + This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and + optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the + ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the + requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses for + the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will contain + other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied by the + KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. +additional-tickets + Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the + ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been + specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be used + in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. If more than + one option which requires additional tickets has been specified, then + the additional tickets are used in the order specified by the ordering + of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + +The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on +whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional +ticket (TGS-REQ). + +The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets) +are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the +kdc-options field. + +It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears +twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message +contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is +passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + +The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for either +an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no message +type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or +KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply +depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in +the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in +the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the +ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if +absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. +In that case, no version number will be present in the EncryptedData +sequence. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. +padata + This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use + for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used + with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section 6.3.2). + This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to + change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all existing + password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged as + needing a special mix-in string until the next password change. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section + 5.3.1. +ticket + The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. +enc-part + This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related information + that forms the encrypted part of a message. The description of the + encrypted part of the message follows each appearance of this field. + The encrypted part is encoded as described in section 6.1. +key + This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +last-req + This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the last + request by a principal. Depending on what information is available, + this might be the last time that a request for a ticket-granting ticket + was made, or the last time that a request based on a ticket-granting + ticket was successful. It also might cover all servers for a realm, or + just the particular server. Some implementations may display this + information to the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of one's + identity. It is similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when + logging into timesharing systems. +nonce + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +key-expiration + The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and + specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The + expiration might be the result of password aging or an account + expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since + the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no + client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up to + the application client (usually the login program) to take appropriate + action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time is imminent. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr + These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of + the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may + verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket + caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will + only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket, + or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the + ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not + present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will be + the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + +This section specifies the format of the messages used for the +authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + +The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use, +and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often +referred to as the 'authentication header'. + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REQ. +ap-options + This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects + the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected + options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits + is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED + Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEY + The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is presenting + to a server is encrypted in the session + key from the server's ticket-granting + ticket. When this option is not speci- + fied, the ticket is encrypted in the + server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED + The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must respond + with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED + Reserved for future use. + +ticket + This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server. +authenticator + This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of + a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2. + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + +The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the +message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in +response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual +authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the +ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged +negotiation to choose a per association session key. + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_AP_REP. +enc-part + This field is described above in section 5.4.2. +ctime + This field contains the current time on the client's host. +cusec + This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. +subkey + This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect + this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on + how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application + specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key + from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the + ticket will be used. + +5.5.3. Error message reply + +If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR +message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the +error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server +cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ +message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields +will contain the values from it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to +its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for +example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + +The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof +checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the +session key if no negotiation has occured. The message fields are: + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_SAFE. +safe-body + This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message. +cksum + This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum + details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over the + encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence. First, the cksum is zeroed and the + checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence, then + the checksum is set to the result of that computation, and finally the + KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again. +user-data + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain + the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to + the recipient. +timestamp + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents + are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By checking + the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make sure that + it was recently generated, and is not a replay. +usec + This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains + the microsecond part of the timestamp. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. +s-address + This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message. + It may be omitted if not required by the application protocol. The + application designer considering omission of this field is warned, that + the inclusion of this address prevents some kinds of replay attacks + (e.g., reflection attacks) and that it is only acceptable to omit this + address if there is sufficient information in the integrity protected + part of the application message for the recipient to unambiguously + determine if it was the intended recipient. +r-address + This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the + message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast protocols), + but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. This field + along with s-address can be used to help detect messages which have + been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either +side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a +message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been +exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + +The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The +message fields are: + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's +addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's +addr +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_PRIV. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted + under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the + enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format of + the ciphertext. +user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. +seq-number + This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + +This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send +Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to +encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding +tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a +session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the +KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + +The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and +information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each. +The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption +key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The +message fields are: + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_CRED. +tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by the + intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the + corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED + message. +enc-part + This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted + under the session key shared between the sender and the intended + recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of + the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. +nonce + If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce + generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is + included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the + message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must + never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the message in an application + specific manner. +timestamp and usec + These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated. + The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh. +s-address and r-address + These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used + optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the + KRB-CRED message. +key + This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED + message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the + intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2. + +The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with +the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed +that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value. + +prealm and pname + The name and realm of the delegated principal identity. +flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr + These fields contain the values of the correspond- ing fields from the + ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are + identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +5.9. Error message specification + +This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields +included in the message are intended to return as much information as +possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information +required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the +appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the +corresponding field will be left out of the message. + +Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is only optionally integrity +protected, it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such +a message. In particular, this means that unless appropriate integrity +protection mechanisms have been applied to the KRB_ERROR message, the client +should not use any fields in this message for security-critical purposes, +such as setting a system clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The +message can be useful, however, for advising a user on the reason for some +failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + +The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL, +(*REMOVE7/14*) e-typed-data[14] SEQUENCE of ETypedData +OPTIONAL +} + +pvno and msg-type + These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is + KRB_ERROR. +ctime + This field is described above in section 5.4.1. +cusec + This field is described above in section 5.5.2. +stime + This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type + KerberosTime. +susec + This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. Its + value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The two + fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +error-code + This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server + when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the list + of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to provide + for national language support in the display of error messages. +crealm, cname, srealm and sname + These fields are described above in section 5.3.1. +e-text + This field contains additional text to help explain the error code + associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a + principal name which was unknown). +e-data + This field contains additional data about the error for use by the + application to help it recover from or handle the error. If present, + this field will contain the encoding of a sequence of TypedData + (TYPED-DATA below), unless the errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, + in which case it will contain the encoding of a sequence of of padata + fields (METHOD-DATA below), each corresponding to an acceptable + pre-authentication method and optionally containing data for the + method: + + TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of TypeData + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + TypedData ::= SEQUENCE { + data-type[0] INTEGER, + data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + Note that e-data-types have been reserved for all PA data types defined + prior to July 1999. For the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message, when + using new PA data types defined in July 1999 or later, the METHOD-DATA + sequence must itself be encapsulated in an TypedData element of type + TD-PADATA. All new implementations interpreting the METHOD-DATA field + for the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message must accept a type of + TD-PADATA, extract the typed data field and interpret the use any + elements encapsulated in the TD-PADATA elements as if they were present + in the METHOD-DATA sequence. +e-cksum + This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. The + checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the + KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added + to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum + should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting + ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response + to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated uing the the + session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to an + AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the client's + secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication to prove + knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be + computed because the key to be used is not available, no checksum will + be included. +e-typed-data + [***Will be deleted 7/14***] This field contains optional data that may + be used to help the client recover from the indicated error. [This + could contain the METHOD-DATA specified since I don't think anyone + actually uses it yet. It could also contain the PA-DATA sequence for + the preauth required error if we had a clear way to transition to the + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + use of this field from the use of the untyped e-data field.] For + example, this field may specify the key version of the key used to + verify preauthentication: + + e-data-type := 20 -- Key version number + e-data-value := Integer -- Key version number used to + verify preauthentication + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + +The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use stream +encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly available block +encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption Standard, [DES77] in +conjunction with block chaining and checksum methods [DESM80]. Encryption is +used to prove the identities of the network entities participating in +message exchanges. The Key Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by +all principals registered in that realm to store a secret key in confidence. +Proof of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the authenticity of +a principal. [*** Discussion above will change to use 3DES as example +7/14/99 ***] + +The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a shared +session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to ticket requests; +the ability to obtain the secret key or session key implies the knowledge of +the appropriate keys and the identity of the KDC. The ability of a principal +to decrypt the KDC response and present a Ticket and a properly formed +Authenticator (generated with the session key from the KDC response) to a +service verifies the identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the +service to extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge +thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + +The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is secure +from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of fields in the +encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize the effects of +poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose good keys. If keys are +derived from user-typed passwords, those passwords need to be well chosen to +make brute force attacks more difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy +targets for intruders. + +The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms +currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding +requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is often +desirable to place random information (often referred to as a confounder) at +the start of the message. The requirements for a confounder are specified +with each encryption mechanism. + +Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the the +security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these chaining methods +often don't provide an integrity check upon decryption. Such systems (such +as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented with a checksum of the plain-text +which can be verified at decryption and used to detect any tampering or +damage. Such checksums should be good at detecting burst errors in the +input. If any damage is detected, the decryption routine is expected to +return an error indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each +encryption type is expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. +The specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum +requirements. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an algorithm +for converting the password to a key of the appropriate type is included. It +is desirable for the string to key function to be one-way, and for the +mapping to be different in different realms. This is important because users +who are registered in more than one realm will often use the same password +in each, and it is desirable that an attacker compromising the Kerberos +server in one realm not obtain or derive the user's key in another. + +For an discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate +encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the reader is +referred to [SG92]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + +The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The +enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in section +5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional key version +number, and the ciphertext. + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + +etype + This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used to encipher + the cipher. Detailed specifications for selected encryption types + appear later in this section. +kvno + This field contains the version number of the key under which data is + encrypted. It is only present in messages encrypted under long lasting + keys, such as principals' secret keys. +cipher + This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an OCTET STRING. + +The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption algorithm +to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific inputs. Encryption +mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must take sufficient measures to +guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, and we recommend they also take +measures to protect against precomputed dictionary attacks. If the +encryption algorithm is not itself capable of doing so, the protections can +often be enhanced by adding a checksum and a confounder. + +The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a confounder, a +checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary padding. The msg-seq +field contains the part of the protocol message described in section 5 which +is to be encrypted. The confounder, checksum, and padding are all untagged +and untyped, and their length is exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate +item. The type and length is implicit and specified by the particular +encryption type being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted +is described in the following diagram: + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED[35] OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + +One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing it in +confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate checksum over +confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in check; adds the +necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified encryption type and the +appropriate key. + +Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm that +specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an octet +boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format[36]. Those fields which are +not specified will be omitted. + +In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular +encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the +specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is needed as +part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum is to be used, a +new encryption type must be defined. + +Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and the +data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher-block-chaining +mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, the description for +each encryption type must specify the source of such additional information. +6.2. Encryption Keys + +The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + +keytype + This field specifies the type of encryption that is to be performed + using the key that follows in the keyvalue field. It will always + correspond to the etype to be used to generate or decode the + EncryptedData. In cases when multiple algorithms use a common kind of + key (e.g., if the encryption algorithm uses an alternate checksum + algorithm for an integrity check, or a different chaining mechanism), + the keytype provides information needed to determine which algorithm is + to be used. +keyvalue + This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet string. + +All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpreta- tions. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + +If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the NULL +encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no checksum, +confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the plaintext. The NULL Key +is used by the null encryption system and is zero octets in length, with +keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + +The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. A +CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]) is applied to the +confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES +blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation +of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collision-proof, an attacker +could use a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack to generate a valid +message even if a confounder is used [SG92]. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the checksum for ticket or +authenticator is no longer mandated as an interoperability requirement for +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + +The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD4 checksum (described in [MD492]) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. The details of the encryption of this data are identical +to those for the des-cbc-md5 encryption mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + +The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data +Encryption Standard [DES77] using the cipher block chaining mode [DESM80]. +An MD5 checksum (described in [MD5-92].) is applied to the confounder and +message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks are 8 +bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the concatenation of +confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to an 8 byte boundary +before encryption. + +Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as blocks of 8 octets which are +concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The first +octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's MSbit used as +the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet the next 8 bits, ..., +and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least significant bits. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an additional +input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless otherwise specified, +zero should be used as the initialization vector. Kerberos' use of DES +requires an 8 octet confounder. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in Kerberos. Additionally, +because of the way that keys are derived for the encryption of checksums, +keys shall not be used that yield 'weak' or 'semi-weak' keys when +eXclusive-ORed with the hexadecimal constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + +A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists of 56 +bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is encoded as a +series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits within the key are +also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the encryption key is +(B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where +B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the parity +bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 (with B1 as the +MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for reference.] + +String to key transformation + +To generate a DES key from a text string (password), a "salt" is +concatenated to the text string, and then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 +byte boundary. This "salt" is normally the realm and each component of the +principal's name appended. However, sometimes different salts are used --- +for example, when a realm is renamed, or if a user changes her username, or +for compatibility with Kerberos V4 (whose string-to-key algorithm uses a +null string for the salt). This string is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed +with itself to form an 8 byte DES key. Before eXclusive-ORing a block, every +byte is shifted one bit to the left to leave the lowest bit zero. The key is +the "corrected" by correcting the parity on the key, and if the key matches +a 'weak' or 'semi-weak' key as described in the DES specification, it is +eXclusive-ORed with the constant 00000000000000F0. This key is then used to +generate a DES CBC checksum on the initial string (with the salt appended). +The result of the CBC checksum is the "corrected" as described above to form +the result which is return as the key. Pseudocode follows: + + name_to_default_salt(realm, name) { + s = realm + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + return s; + } + + key_correction(key) { + fixparity(key); + if (is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + string_to_key(string,salt) { + + odd = 1; + s = string + salt; + tempkey = NULL; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + left shift every byte in 8byteblock one bit; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + tempkey = key_correction(tempkey); + key = key_correction(DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey)); + return(key); + } + +6.3.5. Triple DES with HMAC-SHA1 Kerberos Encryption Type with Key +Derivation [Horowitz] + +[*** Note that there are several 3DES varients in use in different Kerberos +implemenations, updates to this section will be sent to the cat list and +krb-protocol list prior to the Oslo IETF, including the key derivation and +non-key derivation varients ***] NOTE: This description currently refers to +documents, the contents of which might be bettered included by value in this +spec. The description below was provided by Marc Horowitz, and the form in +which it will finally appear is yet to be determined. This description is +included in this version of the draft because it does describe the +implemenation ready for use with the MIT implementation. Note also that the +encryption identifier has been left unspecified here because the value from +Marc Horowitz's spec conflicted with some other impmenentations implemented +based on perevious versions of the specification. + +This encryption type is based on the Triple DES cryptosystem, the HMAC-SHA1 +[Krawczyk96] message authentication algorithm, and key derivation for +Kerberos V5 [HorowitzB96]. + +The des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 encryption type has been assigned the value ??. The +hmac-sha1-des3 checksum type has been assigned the value 12. + +Encryption Type des3-cbc-hmac-sha1 + +EncryptedData using this type must be generated as described in +[Horowitz96]. The encryption algorithm is Triple DES in Outer-CBC mode. The +keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. Unless otherwise specified, a zero IV +must be used. If the length of the input data is not a multiple of the block +size, zero octets must be used to pad the plaintext to the next eight-octet +boundary. The counfounder must be eight random octets (one block). + +Checksum Type hmac-sha1-des3 + +Checksums using this type must be generated as described in [Horowitz96]. +The keyed hash algorithm is HMAC-SHA1. + +Common Requirements + +The EncryptionKey value is 24 octets long. The 7 most significant bits of +each octet contain key bits, and the least significant bit is the inverse of +the xor of the key bits. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +For the purposes of key derivation, the block size is 64 bits, and the key +size is 168 bits. The 168 bits output by key derivation are converted to an +EncryptionKey value as follows. First, the 168 bits are divided into three +groups of 56 bits, which are expanded individually into 64 bits as follows: + + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 p + 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 p +17 18 19 20 21 22 23 p +25 26 27 28 29 30 31 p +33 34 35 36 37 38 39 p +41 42 43 44 45 46 47 p +49 50 51 52 53 54 55 p +56 48 40 32 24 16 8 p + +The "p" bits are parity bits computed over the data bits. The output of the +three expansions are concatenated to form the EncryptionKey value. + +When the HMAC-SHA1 of a string is computed, the key is used in the +EncryptedKey form. + +Key Derivation + +In the Kerberos protocol, cryptographic keys are used in a number of places. +In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is desirable to +use a different key for each of these places. Key derivation [Horowitz96] +can be used to construct different keys for each operation from the keys +transported on the network. For this to be possible, a small change to the +specification is necessary. + +This section specifies a profile for the use of key derivation [Horowitz96] +with Kerberos. For each place where a key is used, a ``key usage'' must is +specified for that purpose. The key, key usage, and encryption/checksum type +together describe the transformation from plaintext to ciphertext, or +plaintext to checksum. + +Key Usage Values + +This is a complete list of places keys are used in the kerberos protocol, +with key usage values and RFC 1510 section numbers: + + 1. AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) + 2. AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) + 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) + 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) + 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) + 6. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) + 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) + 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) +10. AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) +11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) +12. AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) +13. KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) +14. KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.6.1) +15. KRB-SAVE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.8.1) +18. KRB-ERROR checksum (e-cksum in section 5.9.1) +19. AD-KDCIssued checksum (ad-checksum in appendix B.1) +20. Checksum for Mandatory Ticket Extensions (appendix B.6) +21. Checksum in Authorization Data in Ticket Extensions (appendix B.7) + +Key usage values between 1024 and 2047 (inclusive) are reserved for +application use. Applications should use even values for encryption and odd +values for checksums within this range. + +A few of these key usages need a little clarification. A service which +receives an AP-REQ has no way to know if the enclosed Ticket was part of an +AS-REP or TGS-REP. Therefore, key usage 2 must always be used for generating +a Ticket, whether it is in response to an AS- REQ or TGS-REQ. + +There might exist other documents which define protocols in terms of the +RFC1510 encryption types or checksum types. Such documents would not know +about key usages. In order that these documents continue to be meaningful +until they are updated, key usages 1024 and 1025 must be used to derive keys +for encryption and checksums, respectively. New protocols defined in terms +of the Kerberos encryption and checksum types should use their own key +usages. Key usages may be registered with IANA to avoid conflicts. Key +usages must be unsigned 32 bit integers. Zero is not permitted. + +Defining Cryptosystems Using Key Derivation + +Kerberos requires that the ciphertext component of EncryptedData be +tamper-resistant as well as confidential. This implies encryption and +integrity functions, which must each use their own separate keys. So, for +each key usage, two keys must be generated, one for encryption (Ke), and one +for integrity (Ki): + + Ke = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0xAA) + Ki = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x55) + +where the protocol key is from the EncryptionKey from the wire protocol, and +the key usage is represented as a 32 bit integer in network byte order. The +ciphertest must be generated from the plaintext as follows: + + ciphertext = E(Ke, confounder | plaintext | padding) | + H(Ki, confounder | plaintext | padding) + +The confounder and padding are specific to the encryption algorithm E. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +When generating a checksum only, there is no need for a confounder or +padding. Again, a new key (Kc) must be used. Checksums must be generated +from the plaintext as follows: + + Kc = DK(protocol key, key usage | 0x99) + + MAC = H(Kc, plaintext) + +Note that each enctype is described by an encryption algorithm E and a keyed +hash algorithm H, and each checksum type is described by a keyed hash +algorithm H. HMAC, with an appropriate hash, is recommended for use as H. + +Key Derivation from Passwords + +The well-known constant for password key derivation must be the byte string +{0x6b 0x65 0x72 0x62 0x65 0x72 0x6f 0x73}. These values correspond to the +ASCII encoding for the string "kerberos". + +6.4. Checksums + +The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + +cksumtype + This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the accompanying + checksum. +checksum + This field contains the checksum itself, encoded as an octet string. + +Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in this +section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + +Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: whether they +are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is infeasible to find +two plaintexts which generate the same checksum value for a collision-proof +checksum. A key is required to perturb or initialize the algorithm in a +keyed checksum. To prevent message-stream modification by an active +attacker, unkeyed checksums should only be used when the checksum and +message will be subsequently encrypted (e.g. the checksums defined as part +of the encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). + +Collision-proof checksums can be made tamper-proof if the checksum value is +encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the composition of +the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be considered a separate +checksum algorithm (e.g. RSA-MD5 encrypted using DES is a new checksum +algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most keyed checksums, as well as for the +encrypted forms of unkeyed collision-proof checksums, Kerberos prepends a +confounder before the checksum is calculated. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + +The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic redundancy check +as described in ISO 3309 [ISO3309]. The resulting checksum is four (4) +octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed nor collision-proof. The use +of this checksum is not recommended. An attacker using a probabilistic +chosen-plaintext attack as described in [SG92] might be able to generate an +alternative message that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof +checksums is recommended for environments where such attacks represent a +significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + +The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 algorithm +[MD4-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to +be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4-des) + +The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD4 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0[39]. The initialization vector should be zero. The +resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the follow- ing diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + +The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 algorithm. +[MD5-92]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of arbitrary length +and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to +be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5-des) + +The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA MD5 +checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the checksum using DES + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The resulting +checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are redundant). This checksum +is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those +keys shall not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ +| des-cbc(confounder + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) +} + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + +The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder to the +plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result using the key +and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last block of the +ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and encrypting the pair using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a a variant of the key, where the +variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing the key with the hexadecimal constant +F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization vector should be zero. The resulting +checksum is 128 bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This +checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + +The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ +| des-cbc(confounder + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | ++--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + +The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an +ASN.1-like notation: + +des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) +} + +The DES specifications identify some 'weak' and 'semi-weak' keys; those keys +shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos, nor +shall a key be used whose variant is 'weak' or 'semi-weak'. + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) + +The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof checksum by +applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting the results using DES +in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES key as both key and + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 16 octets long. This +checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be collision-proof. Note that this +checksum type is the old method for encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it +is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (des-mac-k) + +The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode encryption +of the plaintext, and using the last block of the ciphertext as the checksum +value. It is keyed with an encryption key and an initialization vector; any +uses which do not specify an additional initialization vector will use the +key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits +(8 octets) long. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note +that this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DES-MAC checksum +and it is no longer recommended. The DES specifications identify some 'weak +keys' and 'semi-weak keys'; those keys shall not be used for generating +DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + +Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm can +technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across realm +boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be assigned, and +what information they imply. + +To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the conventions +itself, and it must require that any realms with which inter-realm keys are +shared also conform to the conventions and require the same from its +neighbors. + +Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only in the +case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently four styles +of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each style +follow: + + domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + +Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components +separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor slashes +(/). Domain names must be converted to upper case when used as realm names. + +X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before the +equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string representations of the +names with components separated by slashes. Leading and trailing slashes +will not be included. + +Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that +contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by a +colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned before +they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first +three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is unlikely +that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a very strong +argument for not using the 'other' category. + +These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the various +name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the assignment of +realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for the +domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organization owning (to +whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name or X.500 name, or in the case +that no such names are registered, authority to use a realm name may be +derived from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no +domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can +authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + +This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is assigned +is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to its children in +the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm +name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 hierarchy, it +is the parent's responsibility to make sure that there will not in the +future exists a name identical to the realm name of the child unless it is +assigned to the same entity as the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + +As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that all +agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The name-type +field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind of information +implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. Ignoring the +name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the +components, or the realm, must be different). The following name types are +defined: + + name-type value meaning + + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE +principal) + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779] + +When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a particular +time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal name type should +be used for users, and it might also be used for a unique server. If the +name is a unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed never to be +reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note that it is +generally a bad idea to reassign names of any type since stale entries might +remain in access control lists). + +If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining +components identify an instance of the service in a server specified manner, +then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of this name type +is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first component of +krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm for which the ticket is +valid. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +If instance is a single component following the service name and the +instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the name +type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for Internet +services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate +components of the host name appear as successive components following the +name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should be used. This type +might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash +(/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + +A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an X.509 +certificiate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of the X.509 +name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding rules specified +in RFC 2253. + +A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not +known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match principals +authenticated with names of any type. A principal authenticated with a name +of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNKNOWN. + +Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved for the +Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the form of such +names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + +The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be composed +of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server is registered, +and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an +Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if the +name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows slash (/) +separators. The first component of the two- or multi-component name will +identify the service and the latter components will identify the host. Where +the name of the host is not case sensitive (for example, with Internet +domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If specified by the +application protocol for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands +which run with system privileges, the first component may be the string +'host' instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official +name and one or more aliases, the official name of the host must be used +when constructing the name of the server principal. + +8. Constants and other defined values + +8.1. Host address types + +All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local use. +All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and +interpretations. + +The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match the +defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard Distributions of +Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an +abbreviation of the address family name). + +Internet (IPv4) Addresses + +Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB +order. The type of IPv4 addresses is two (2). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Internet (IPv6) Addresses [Westerlund] + +IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. The +following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos packet: + + * the Unspecified Address + * the Loopback Address + * Link-Local addresses + +IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2. + +CHAOSnet addresses + +CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. +The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + +ISO addresses + +ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven (7). + +Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + +XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The +type of XNS addresses is six (6). + +AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + +AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit network +number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the remaining two +octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type of AppleTalk DDP +addresses is sixteen (16). + +DECnet Phase IV addresses + +DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. The +type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + +Netbios addresses + +Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to 15 +characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16th octet of 0x0. +The type of Netbios addresses is 20 (0x14). + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. UDP/IP transport + +When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP +IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an +encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the +KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an encoding of the +reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at +the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must +accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made +through UDP/IP transport must also use UDP/IP transport. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +8.2.2. TCP/IP transport [Westerlund,Danielsson] + +Kerberos servers (KDC's) should accept TCP requests on port 88 (decimal) and +clients should support the sending of TCP requests on port 88 (decimal). +When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP stream, a new +connection will be established for each authentication exchange (request and +response). The KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the +client on the same TCP stream that was established for the request. The +response to a request made through TCP/IP transport must also use TCP/IP +transport. Implementors should note that some extentions to the Kerberos +protocol will not work if any implementation not supporting the TCP +transport is involved (client or KDC). Implementors are strongly urged to +support the TCP transport on both the client and server and are advised that +the current notation of "should" support will likely change in the future to +must support. The KDC may close the TCP stream after sending a response, but +may leave the stream open if it expects a followup - in which case it may +close the stream at any time if resource constratints or other factors make +it desirable to do so. Care must be taken in managing TCP/IP connections +with the KDC to prevent denial of service attacks based on the number of +TCP/IP connections with the KDC that remain open. If multiple exchanges with +the KDC are needed for certain forms of preauthentication, multiple TCP +connections may be required. A client may close the stream after receiving +response, and should close the stream if it does not expect to send followup +messages. The client must be prepared to have the stream closed by the KDC +at anytime, in which case it must simply connect again when it is ready to +send subsequent messages. + +The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request request +will encode in network byte order the length of the request (KRB_KDC_REQ), +and the length will be followed by the request itself. The response will +similarly be preceeded by a 4 octet encoding in network byte order of the +length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR message and will be followed by +the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR response. If the sign bit is set on the +integer represented by the first 4 octets, then the next 4 octets will be +read, extending the length of the field by another 4 octets (less the sign +bit which is reserved for future expansion). + +8.2.3. OSI transport + +During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual +authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of +credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of +private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be +treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechanism will +be: + +OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), + security(5),kerberosv5(2)} + +Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication +header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message +(KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message +(KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as specified in the +ASN.1 description for each message. The application code may be used by +Kerberos to determine the message type. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + +The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be composed of +three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS ticket (2) a two-part +name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the second part +the name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting ticket. For +example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be +used to get tickets from the ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier +of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A +ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get +tickets from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of +"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + +The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines their +meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section that limit the +values of constants for which values are defined here. This allows +implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that will be +received for these constants. Implementation receiving values outside the +range specified in the "specification" section may reject the request, but +they must recover cleanly. + +Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder +size +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + 4 +des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8 + 6 +des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8 +sign-dsa-generate 8 +(old-pkinit-will-remove) +dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 (pkinit) +md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 (pkinit) +sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 (pkinit) +rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 (pkinit) +rsaEncryption-EnvOID 13 (pkinit from PKCS#1 +v1.5) +rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID 14 (pkinit from PKCS#1 +v2.0) +des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 (pkinit) +des3kd-cbc-sha1 ?? 8 0 8 +ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS 48 (reserved for pkcross) + 0x8003 + +Checksum type sumtype value checksum size +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 +rsa-md5-des3 9 24 +hmac-sha1-des3 12 20 (I had this as 10, is it +12) + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +padata type padata-type value + +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + 4 +PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 +PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6 +PA-SESAME 7 +PA-OSF-DCE 8 +PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9 +PA-AFS3-SALT 10 +PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 +SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp) +SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp) +PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit) +PA-PK-AS-SIGN 16 (***remove on 7/14***) +PA-PK-KEY-REQ 17 (***remove on 7/14***) +PA-PK-KEY-REP 18 (***remove on 7/14***) +PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20 +SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp) +PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 + +data-type value form of typed-data + + 1-21 +TD-PADATA 22 +TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS +TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 +TD-KRB-REALM 103 +TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 +TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 + +authorization data type ad-type value +AD-IF-RELEVANT 1 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2 +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3 +AD-KDC-ISSUED 4 +AD-OR 5 +AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6 +AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7 +reserved values 8-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +Ticket Extension Types + +TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension +TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data + 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations) +TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket +TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp + 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations) + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +alternate authentication type method-type value +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +transited encoding type tr-type value +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + +Label Value Meaning or MIT code + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward +credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for +users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, +rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID +KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253] + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version # not +supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end +time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was +invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired +[40] +KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match +KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user +only +KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path +KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE 29 A service is not available +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field +failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not +available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method +required +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in +message +KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path +KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this +implementation +KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit) +KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit) +KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT 67 (user-to-user) +KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM 68 (user-to-user) +KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED 69 (user-to-user) +KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 (pkinit) +KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 (pkinit) + +9. Interoperability requirements + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among these +are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding schemes for +the transited field, optional mechanisms for pre-authentication, the +handling of tickets with no addresses, options for mutual authentication, +user to user authentication, support for proxies, forwarding, postdating, +and renewing tickets, the format of realm names, and the handling of +authorization data. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to define +a minimal configuration which must be supported by all implementations. This +minimal configuration is subject to change as technology does. For example, +if at some later date it is discovered that one of the required encryption +or checksum algorithms is not secure, it will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 2 + +This section defines the second specification of these options. +Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support +Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (depricated) may +be found in RFC1510. + +Transport + +TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming conformance +to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance to specification 2 +must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the KDC and should support +TCP/IP transport. + +Encryption and checksum methods + +The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. +Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the additional +mechanisms may only be used when communicating with principals known to also +support them: This list is to be determined. [***This section will change, +and alternatives will be sent to the cat and krb-protocol list prior to the +Oslo IETF - change will be made 7/14/99 ***] + +Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 +Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + +Realm Names + +All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the Internet +Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for an unknown +realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the names of the +intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm. + +Transited field encoding + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported. +Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when that +encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + +Pre-authentication methods + +The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on the +initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by clients +but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm +basis. If not used in the initial request and the error +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an +acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support the +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should ignore the +presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +Mutual authentication + +Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + +Ticket addresses and flags + +All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT +contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but each +realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each application +server will set its own policy with respect to accepting them. + +Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and +application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will be +accepted. + +All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but need +not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, the +starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful +life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all implementations +shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible to the calling server. + +User-to-user authentication + +Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC option) +must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may decide as a +matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal or realm-wide +basis. + +Authorization data + +Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from +ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to +suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered subfield +type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered +subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + +Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data subfields +available to the server when a ticket is used. Implementations are not +required to allow clients to specify the contents of the authorization data +fields. + +Constant ranges + +All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values unless +further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit is provided to +allow implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that will +be received for these constants. Implementation receiving values outside +this range may reject the request, but they must recover cleanly. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + +Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, based on +the list of suggested configuration constants (see section 4.4). + +minimum lifetime 5 minutes +maximum renewable lifetime 1 week +maximum ticket lifetime 1 day +empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data +proxiable, etc. Allowed. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +10. REFERENCES + +[NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti- + cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica- + tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994). + +[MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H. + Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and + Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, + Massachusetts (December 21, 1987). + +[SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker- + beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys- + tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings, + Dallas, Texas (February, 1988). + +[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using + Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com- + puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12), + pp. 993-999 (December, 1978). + +[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time- + stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981). + +[KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o, + "The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service," + in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published + (June 1992). + +[Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and + Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of + the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com- + puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993). + +[DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and + Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical + Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science + (February 1990). + +[LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som- + merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage- + ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas- + sachusetts (1987). + +[X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica- + tion Framework, December 1988. + +[Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password + Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request + for Comments 26 (December 1992). + +[DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC + (1977). + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +[DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com- + merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information + Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA + (December 1980). + +[SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message + Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings + of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and + Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992). + +[IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO + Information Processing Systems - Data Communication - + High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc- + ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition. + +[MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC + 1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April + 1992). + +[KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- + Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft + draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996). + +[Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication, + Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt, + August 1998. + +[HorowitzB96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft- + horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-01.txt, September 1998. + +[Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC: + Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac- + md5-01.txt, August, 1996. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + +This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to be +constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) +then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) then + set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all that +*/ + /* should be are set +*/ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + + /* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly +*/ + /* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting ticket +*/ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and choosing +the + correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in the + plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating is + determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The +realm + in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the ticket + granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos + server to support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) +then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and + keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket would +*/ + /* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so +*/ + /* there is no need to check again here +*/ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing +*/ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; /* leave the renew-till field out +*/ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into +decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data ++ + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited := compress_transited(tgt.transited + +tgt.realm) + /* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm, + * or requested not to check */ + if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server) + && req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) then + /* Check it, so end-server does not have to + * but don't fail, end-server may still accept it */ + if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) == OK) + set new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED; + endif + endif + endif + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of +resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + if (decr_ticket.transited) then + /* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do + * check anyway */ + if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then + if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then + error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED); + endif + endif + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number + not present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +B. Definition of common authorization data elements + +This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data +elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly defined, +meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of +authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the encapsulating +element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating element, the +encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted as issued +directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate plaintext part of +the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements are specified as part of +the Kerberos specification because the behavior based on these values should +be understood across implementations whereas other elements need only be +understood by the applications which they affect. + +In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the element +will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of the ad-data +will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection heading. + +B.1. If relevant + +AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData + +AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended for +interpretation only by application servers that understand the particular +ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do not understand +the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant element may ignore +the uninterpretable element. This element promotes interoperability across +implementations which may have local extensions for authorization. + +B.2. Intended for server + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE { + intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be +ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names of +intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application server +can remove this element if the application server is not in the list of +intended servers. + +Application servers should check for their principal name in the +intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not found, +this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated elements +should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present in the top +level authorization data field. Applications and application servers that do +not implement this element should reject tickets that contain authorization +data elements of this type. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +B.3. Intended for application class + +AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { intended-application-class[0] +SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] AuthorizationData } AD elements +encapsulated within the intended-for-application-class element may be +ignored if the application server is not in one of the named classes of +application servers. Examples of application server classes include +"FILESYSTEM", and other kinds of servers. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + +B.4. KDC Issued + +AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE { + ad-checksum[0] Checksum, + i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + elements[3] AuthorizationData. +} + +ad-checksum + A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum + method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the ticket + itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same encryption + algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key derived from the + same key used to protect the ticket. +i-realm, i-sname + The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC itself. + This field would be used when the KDC can verify the authenticity of + elements signed by the issuing principal and it allows this KDC to + notify the application server of the validity of those elements. +elements + A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC. + +The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for Kerberos +principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege attributes and +other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying the priveleges of +the principal beyond what can be done using a credentials without such an +a-data element. + +This can not be provided without this element because the definition of the +authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the bearer +of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and elements may also +be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the authenticator. + +For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are signed by +the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's key (the same +key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from that key). Elements +encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be ignored by the +application server if this "signature" is not present. Further, elements +encapsulated within this element from a ticket granting ticket may be +interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis according to policy for +including new signed elements within derivative tickets, but they will not +be copied to a derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a +derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the signature +will not be correct for the application ticket elements, and the field will +be ignored by the application server. + +This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by +applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this +element. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +B.5. And-Or + +AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE { + condition-count[0] INTEGER, + elements[1] AuthorizationData +} + +When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are +encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the +encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. This +element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the +condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by setting +the condition count to the number of embedded elements. Application servers +that do not implement this element must reject tickets that contain +authorization data elements of this type. + +B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions + +AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions specifies +a collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect the +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be calculated over an +individual extension field. If there are more than one extension, multiple +Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions authorization data elements may be present, each +with a checksum for a different extension field. This restriction indicates +that the ticket should not be accepted if a ticket extension is not present +in the ticket for which the checksum does not match that checksum specified +in the authorization data element. Application servers that do not implement +this element must reject tickets that contain authorization data elements of +this type. + +B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions + +AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum + +An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a +collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect the +integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a separate +external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket extensions. +Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets +that contain authorization data elements of this type. Application servers +that do implement this element will search the ticket extensions for +authorization data fields, calculate the specified checksum over each +authorization data field and look for one matching the checksum in this +in-ticket-extensions element. If not found, then the ticket must be +rejected. If found, the corresponding authorization data elements will be +interpreted in the same manner as if they were contained in the top level +authorization data field. + +Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in a +ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type in-ticket-extensions +in the top level authorization data field, and the external entries will be +linked to the corresponding element by their checksums. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +C. Definition of common ticket extensions + +This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. Support +for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions have +associated authorization data elements that may require rejection of a +ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not implement +the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined beyond those +described in this specification. Such extensions are described elswhere and +for some of those extensions the reserved number may be found in the list of +constants. + +It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, and +that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they parse and +then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application servers. The +presence of the extension will not break such clients, but any functionaly +dependent on the extensions will not work when such tickets are handled by +old clients. In such situations, some implementation may use alternate +methods to transmit the information in the extensions field. + +C.1. Null ticket extension + +TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String + +The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of lenght +zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket so that the +KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting ticket whether the +client software will strip the extensions field. + +C.2. External Authorization Data + +TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData + +The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension is +field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization data +elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element will be +present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and that element +will contain a checksum of the external authorization data ticket extension. + ------------------------------------------------------------------------ +[TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the +Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these +trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT. + +[1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon +the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an application +subsequently provides integrity protection for the data stream, the identity +verification applies only to the initiation of the connection, and does not +guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate from the same +principal. + +[2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the literature. In +our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key +is a secret key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows +it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private key. + +[3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange +registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and engage +in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for even small +numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more automatic methods as +described here are necessary. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +[4] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no network +addresses specified. + +[5] The password-changing request must not be honored unless the requester +can provide the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it +would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended ses- sion and +change another user's password. + +[6] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials +obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain +credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be verified by a +local server through successful completion of the Client/Server exchange. + +[7] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to +guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. This can +only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is based on +cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly random number +generator, such as one based on measurements of random physical phenomena. + +[8] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext +here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one message and +replayed in another without any cryptographic skill. + +[9] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports +difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated +messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or +the application server must match requests and replies and replay the first +reply in response to a detected duplicate. + +[10] This is used for user-to-user authentication as described in [8]. + +[11] Note that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from the +same principal to the same server. Other client principals communicating +with the same server principal should not be have their authenticators +rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to match some other +client's authenticator. + +[12] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was the +client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 because +version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not possible to +create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) +without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys. + +[13] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key is +not used, even if present in the Authenticator. + +[14] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to choose +subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a +negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message. + +[15]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known beforehand +(since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it might be stored in +a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configura- tion file. If the +realm to be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of being +spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not authenti- cated. +This might result in the use of a realm which has been compromised, and +would result in an attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of +the application server to the client. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +[16] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to ensure +the randomness of the selected sub- session key. One approach would be to +generate a random number and XOR it with the session key from the +ticket-granting ticket. + +[17] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication [8], +which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server keys +in situa- tions where such secret keys could be easily comprom- ised. + +[18] For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding the first listed +realm is considered to be the null realm (""). + +[19] For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the client's realm is +considered to precede those in the transited field, and the server's realm +is considered to follow them. + +[20] This means that a client and server running on the same host and +communicating with one another using the KRB_SAFE messages should not share +a common replay cache to detect KRB_SAFE replays. + +[21] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the database +and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store the principal +database in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries stored +therein are protected from disclosure to and modification by unauthorized +parties. However, we recommend against such strategies, as they can make +system management and threat analysis quite complex. + +[22] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for details on +why this can be useful. + +[23] Warning for implementations that unpack and repack data structures +during the generation and verification of embedded checksums: Because any +checksums applied to data structures must be checked against the original +data the length of bit strings must be preserved within a data structure +between the time that a checksum is generated through transmission to the +time that the checksum is verified. + +[24] It is NOT recommended that this time value be used to adjust the +workstation's clock since the workstation cannot reliably determine that +such a KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely manner. + +[25] Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one must make +sure that the workstation time is monotonically increasing. If the time is +ever reset backwards, there is a small, but finite, probability that a nonce +will be reused. + +[27] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[29] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + +[31] An application code in the encrypted part of a message provides an +additional check that the message was decrypted properly. + + +Neuman, Ts'o, Kohl Expires: 25 December, +1999 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-04 June 25, +1999 + +[32] If supported by the encryption method in use, an initialization vector +may be passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve proper cipher +chaining. The initialization vector might come from the last block of the +ciphertext from the previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the application's +choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. If left out, the +default initialization vector for the encryption algorithm will be used. + +[33] This prevents an attacker who generates an incorrect AS request from +obtaining verifiable plaintext for use in an off-line password guessing +attack. + +[35] In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the +notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is not a +valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from the +confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the message starts +with random data, but the tag and its length are fixed. For other fields, +the length and tag would be redundant if they were included because they are +specified by the encryption type. [36] The ordering of the fields in the +CipherText is important. Additionally, messages encoded in this format must +include a length as part of the msg-seq field. This allows the recipient to +verify that the message has not been truncated. Without a length, an +attacker could use a chosen plaintext attack to generate a message which +could be truncated, while leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the +msg-seq is an encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length +is part of that encoding. + +[37] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[38] In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different "mix-in" string +for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of padata in section 5.4.2. + +[39] A variant of the key is used to limit the use of a key to a particular +function, separating the functions of generating a checksum from other +encryption performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 +was chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES precluded +the use of the complement. The same constant is used for similar purpose in +the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. + +[40] This error carries additional information in the e- data field. The +contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section 5.9.1. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e76a0e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-00.txt @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +INTERNET-DRAFT Ken Hornstein + NRL +June 21, 1999 Jeffrey Altman +Expires: December 21, 1999 Columbia University + + Distributing Kerberos KDC and Realm Information with DNS + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with + all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as , and expires on December 21, 1999. Please + send comments to the authors. + +Abstract + + Neither the Kerberos V5 protocol [RFC1510] nor the Kerberos V4 proto- + col [RFC????] describe any mechanism for clients to learn critical + configuration information necessary for proper operation of the pro- + tocol. Such information includes the location of Kerberos key dis- + tribution centers or a mapping between DNS domains and Kerberos + realms. + + Current Kerberos implementations generally store such configuration + information in a file on each client machine. Experience has shown + this method of storing configuration information presents problems + with out-of-date information and scaling problems, especially when + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 1] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + using cross-realm authentication. + + This memo describes a method for using the Domain Name System + [RFC1035] for storing such configuration information. Specifically, + methods for storing KDC location and hostname/domain name to realm + mapping information are discussed. + +Overview - KDC location information + + KDC location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kerberos is always "_kerberos". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_udp" record MUST be included. If the Kerberos implementa- + tion supports TCP transport, a "_tcp" record SHOULD be included. + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + +Example - KDC location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has two Ker- + beros servers, kdc1.asdf.com and kdc2.asdf.com. Queries should be + directed to kdc1.asdf.com first as per the specified priority. + Weights are not used in these records. + + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + _kerberos._udp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.asdf.com. + +Overview - KAdmin location information + + Kadmin location information is to be stored using the DNS SRV RR [RFC + 2052]. The format of this RR is as follows: + + Service.Proto.Realm TTL Class SRV Priority Weight Port Target + + The Service name for Kadmin is always "_kadmin". + + The Proto can be either "_udp" or "_tcp". If these records are to be + used, a "_tcp" record MUST be included. If the Kadmin implementation + supports UDP transport, a "_udp" record SHOULD be included. + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 2] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + The Realm is the Kerberos realm that this record corresponds to. + + TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port, and Target have the standard + meaning as defined in RFC 2052. + +Example - Kadmin location information + + These are DNS records for a Kerberos realm ASDF.COM. It has one Kad- + min server, kdc1.asdf.com. + + _kadmin._tcp.ASDF.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.asdf.com. + +Overview - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + Information on the mapping of DNS hostnames and domain names to Ker- + beros realms is stored using DNS TXT records [RFC 1035]. These + records have the following format. + + Service.Name TTL Class TXT Realm + + The Service field is always "_kerberos", and prefixes all entries of + this type. + + The Name is a DNS hostname or domain name. This is explained in + greater detail below. + + TTL, Class, and TXT have the standard DNS meaning as defined in RFC + 1035. + + The Realm is the data for the TXT RR, and consists simply of the Ker- + beros realm that corresponds to the Name specified. + + When a Kerberos client wishes to utilize a host-specific service, it + will perform a DNS TXT query, using the hostname in the Name field of + the DNS query. If the record is not found, the first label of the + name is stripped and the query is retried. + + Compliant implementations MUST query the full hostname and the most + specific domain name (the hostname with the first label removed). + Compliant implementations SHOULD try stripping all subsequent labels + until a match is found or the Name field is empty. + +Example - Hostname/domain name to Kerberos realm mapping + + For the previously mentioned ASDF.COM realm and domain, some sample + records might be as follows: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT "ASDF.COM" + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 3] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + _kerberos.mrkserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "MARKETING.ASDF.COM" + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com. IN TXT "SALES.ASDF.COM" + + Let us suppose that in this case, a Kerberos client wishes to use a + Kerberized service on the host foo.asdf.com. It would first query: + + _kerberos.foo.asdf.com. IN TXT + + Finding no match, it would then query: + + _kerberos.asdf.com. IN TXT + + And find an answer of ASDF.COM. This would be the realm that + foo.asdf.com resides in. + + If another Kerberos client wishes to use a Kerberized service on the + host salesserver.asdf.com, it would query: + + _kerberos.salesserver.asdf.com IN TXT + + And find an answer of SALES.ASDF.COM. + +Security considerations + + As DNS is deployed today, it is an unsecure service. Thus the infor- + mation returned by it cannot be trusted. However, the use of DNS to + store this configuration information does not introduce any new secu- + rity risks to the Kerberos protocol. + + Current practice is to use hostnames to indicate KDC hosts (stored in + some implementation-dependent location, but generally a local config + file). These hostnames are vulnerable to the standard set of DNS + attacks (denial of service, spoofed entries, etc). The design of the + Kerberos protocol limits attacks of this sort to denial of service. + However, the use of SRV records does not change this attack in any + way. They have the same vulnerabilities that already exist in the + common practice of using hostnames for KDC locations. + + The same holds true for the TXT records used to indicate the domain + name to realm mapping. Current practice is to configure these map- + pings locally. But this again is vulnerable to spoofing via CNAME + records that point to hosts in other domains. This has the same + effect as a spoofed TXT record. + + While the described protocol does not introduce any new security + risks to the best of our knowledge, implementations SHOULD provide a + way of specifying this information locally without the use of DNS. + However, to make this feature worthwhile a lack of any configuration + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 4] + +RFC DRAFT June 21, 1999 + + information on a client should be interpretted as permission to use + DNS. + +Expiration + + This Internet-Draft expires on December 21, 1999. + +References + + [RFC1510] + The Kerberos Network Authentication System; Kohl, Newman; Sep- + tember 1993. + + [RFC1035] + Domain Names - Implementation and Specification; Mockapetris; + November 1987 + + [RFC2052] + A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV); Gul- + brandsen, Vixie; October 1996 + +Authors' Addresses + + Ken Hornstein + US Naval Research Laboratory + Bldg A-49, Room 2 + 4555 Overlook Avenue + Washington DC 20375 USA + + Phone: +1 (202) 404-4765 + EMail: kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil + + Jeffrey Altman + The Kermit Project + Columbia University + 612 West 115th Street #716 + New York NY 10025-7799 USA + + Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344 + EMail: jaltman@columbia.edu + +Hornstein, Altman [Page 5] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..885cf49 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3415 @@ +FTPEXT Working Group R. Elz +Internet Draft University of Melbourne +Expiration Date: April 2000 + P. Hethmon + Hethmon Brothers + + October 1999 + + + Extensions to FTP + + + draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is NOT offered in accordance + with Section 10 of RFC2026, and the author does not provide the IETF + with any rights other than to publish as an Internet-Draft. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. + + To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This entire section has been prepended to this document automatically + during formatting without any direct involvement by the author(s) of + this draft. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 1] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +Abstract + + In order to overcome the problems caused by the undefined format of + the current FTP LIST command output, a new command is needed to + transfer standardized listing information from Server-FTP to User- + FTP. Commands to enable this are defined in this document. + + In order to allow consenting clients and servers to interact more + freely, a quite basic, and optional, virtual file store structure is + defined. + + This proposal also extends the FTP protocol to allow character sets + other than US-ASCII[1] by allowing the transmission of 8-bit + characters and the recommended use of UTF-8[2] encoding. + + Much implemented, but long undocumented, mechanisms to permit + restarts of interrupted data transfers in STREAM mode, are also + included here. + + Lastly, the HOST command has been added to allow a style of "virtual + site" to be constructed. + + Changed in this version of this document: Minor corrections as + discussed on the mailing list, including fixing many typographical + errors; Additional examples. This paragraph will be deleted from the + final version of this document. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 2] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + + +Table of Contents + + Abstract ................................................ 2 + 1 Introduction ............................................ 4 + 2 Document Conventions .................................... 4 + 2.1 Basic Tokens ............................................ 5 + 2.2 Pathnames ............................................... 5 + 2.3 Times ................................................... 7 + 2.4 Server Replies .......................................... 8 + 3 File Modification Time (MDTM) ........................... 8 + 3.1 Syntax .................................................. 9 + 3.2 Error responses ......................................... 9 + 3.3 FEAT response for MDTM .................................. 9 + 3.4 MDTM Examples ........................................... 10 + 4 File SIZE ............................................... 11 + 4.1 Syntax .................................................. 11 + 4.2 Error responses ......................................... 11 + 4.3 FEAT response for SIZE .................................. 12 + 4.4 Size Examples ........................................... 12 + 5 Restart of Interrupted Transfer (REST) .................. 13 + 5.1 Restarting in STREAM Mode ............................... 13 + 5.2 Error Recovery and Restart .............................. 14 + 5.3 Syntax .................................................. 14 + 5.4 FEAT response for REST .................................. 16 + 5.5 REST Example ............................................ 16 + 6 Virtual FTP servers ..................................... 16 + 6.1 The HOST command ........................................ 18 + 6.2 Syntax of the HOST command .............................. 18 + 6.3 HOST command semantics .................................. 19 + 6.4 HOST command errors ..................................... 21 + 6.5 FEAT response for HOST command .......................... 22 + 7 A Trivial Virtual File Store (TVFS) ..................... 23 + 7.1 TVFS File Names ......................................... 23 + 7.2 TVFS Path Names ......................................... 24 + 7.3 FEAT Response for TVFS .................................. 25 + 7.4 OPTS for TVFS ........................................... 26 + 7.5 TVFS Examples ........................................... 26 + 8 Listings for Machine Processing (MLST and MLSD) ......... 28 + 8.1 Format of MLSx Requests ................................. 29 + 8.2 Format of MLSx Response ................................. 29 + 8.3 Filename encoding ....................................... 32 + 8.4 Format of Facts ......................................... 33 + 8.5 Standard Facts .......................................... 33 + 8.6 System Dependent and Local Facts ........................ 41 + 8.7 MLSx Examples ........................................... 42 + 8.8 FEAT response for MLSx .................................. 50 + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 3] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + 8.9 OPTS parameters for MLST ................................ 51 + 9 Impact On Other FTP Commands ............................ 55 + 10 Character sets and Internationalization ................. 56 + 11 IANA Considerations ..................................... 56 + 11.1 The OS specific fact registry ........................... 56 + 11.2 The OS specific filetype registry ....................... 57 + 12 Security Considerations ................................. 57 + 13 References .............................................. 58 + Acknowledgments ......................................... 59 + Copyright ............................................... 60 + Editors' Addresses ...................................... 60 + + + + +1. Introduction + + This document amends the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [3]. Five new + commands are added: "SIZE", "HOST", "MDTM", "MLST", and "MLSD". The + existing command "REST" is modified. Of those, the "SIZE" and "MDTM" + commands, and the modifications to "REST" have been in wide use for + many years. The others are new. + + These commands allow a client to restart an interrupted transfer in + transfer modes not previously supported in any documented way, to + support the notion of virtual hosts, and to obtain a directory + listing in a machine friendly, predictable, format. + + An optional structure for the server's file store (NVFS) is also + defined, allowing servers that support such a structure to convey + that information to clients in a standard way, thus allowing clients + more certainty in constructing and interpreting path names. + +2. Document Conventions + + This document makes use of the document conventions defined in BCP14 + [4]. That provides the interpretation of capitalized imperative + words like MUST, SHOULD, etc. + + This document also uses notation defined in STD 9 [3]. In + particular, the terms "reply", "user", "NVFS", "file", "pathname", + "FTP commands", "DTP", "user-FTP process", "user-PI", "user-DTP", + "server-FTP process", "server-PI", "server-DTP", "mode", "type", + "NVT", "control connection", "data connection", and "ASCII", are all + used here as defined there. + + Syntax required is defined using the Augmented BNF defined in [5]. + Some general ABNF definitions are required throughout the document, + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 4] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + those will be defined later in this section. At first reading, it + may be wise to simply recall that these definitions exist here, and + skip to the next section. + +2.1. Basic Tokens + + This document imports the core definitions given in Appendix A of + [5]. There definitions will be found for basic ABNF elements like + ALPHA, DIGIT, SP, etc. To that, the following terms are added for + use in this document. + + TCHAR = VCHAR / SP / HTAB ; visible plus white space + RCHAR = ALPHA / DIGIT / "," / "." / ":" / "!" / + "@" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "^" / + "&" / "(" / ")" / "-" / "_" / + "+" / "?" / "/" / "\" / "'" / + DQUOTE ; <"> -- double quote character (%x22) + + The VCHAR (from [5]), TCHAR, and RCHAR types give basic character + types from varying sub-sets of the ASCII character set for use in + various commands and responses. + + token = 1*RCHAR + + A "token" is a string whose precise meaning depends upon the context + in which it is used. In some cases it will be a value from a set of + possible values maintained elsewhere. In others it might be a string + invented by one party to an FTP conversation from whatever sources it + finds relevant. + + Note that in ABNF, string literals are case insensitive. That + convention is preserved in this document, and implies that FTP + commands added by this specification have names that can be + represented in any case. That is, "MDTM" is the same as "mdtm", + "Mdtm" and "MdTm" etc. However note that ALPHA, in particular, is + case sensitive. That implies that a "token" is a case sensitive + value. That implication is correct. + +2.2. Pathnames + + Various FTP commands take pathnames as arguments, or return pathnames + in responses. When the MLST command is supported, as indicated in + the response to the FEAT command [6], pathnames are to be transferred + in one of the following two formats. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 5] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + pathname = utf-8-name / raw + utf-8-name = + raw = + + Which format is used is at the option of the user-PI or server-PI + sending the pathname. UTF-8 encodings [2] contain enough internal + structure that it is always, in practice, possible to determine + whether a UTF-8 or raw encoding has been used, in those cases where + it matters. While it is useful for the user-PI to be able to + correctly display a pathname received from the server-PI to the user, + it is far more important for the user-PI to be able to retain and + retransmit the identical pathname when required. Implementations are + advised against converting a UTF-8 pathname to a local encoding, and + then attempting to invert the encoding later. Note that ASCII is a + subset of UTF-8. + + Unless otherwise specified, the pathname is terminated by the CRLF + that terminates the FTP command, or by the CRLF that ends a reply. + Any trailing spaces preceding that CRLF form part of the name. + Exactly one space will precede the pathname and serve as a separator + from the preceding syntax element. Any additional spaces form part + of the pathname. See [7] for a fuller explanation of the character + encoding issues. All implementations supporting MLST MUST support + [7]. + + Implementations should also beware that the control connection uses + Telnet NVT conventions [8], and that the Telnet IAC character, if + part of a pathname sent over the control connection, MUST be + correctly escaped as defined by the Telnet protocol. + + Implementors should also be aware that although Telnet NVT + conventions are used over the control connections, Telnet option + negotiation MUST NOT be attempted. See section 4.1.2.12 of [9]. + +2.2.1. Pathname Syntax + + Except where TVFS is supported (see section 7) this specification + imposes no syntax upon pathnames. Nor does it restrict the character + set from which pathnames are created. This does not imply that the + NVFS is required to make sense of all possible pathnames. Server-PIs + may restrict the syntax of valid pathnames in their NVFS in any + manner appropriate to their implementation or underlying file system. + Similarly, a server-PI may parse the pathname, and assign meaning to + the components detected. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 6] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +2.2.2. Wildcarding + + For the commands defined in this specification, all pathnames are to + be treated literally. That is, for a pathname given as a parameter + to a command, the file whose name is identical to the pathname given + is implied. No characters from the pathname may be treated as + special or "magic", thus no pattern matching (other than for exact + equality) between the pathname given and the files present in the + NVFS of the Server-FTP is permitted. + + Clients that desire some form of pattern matching functionality must + obtain a listing of the relevant directory, or directories, and + implement their own filename selection procedures. + +2.3. Times + + The syntax of a time value is: + + time-val = 14DIGIT [ "." 1*DIGIT ] + + The leading, mandatory, fourteen digits are to be interpreted as, in + order from the leftmost, four digits giving the year, with a range of + 1000-9999, two digits giving the month of the year, with a range of + 01-12, two digits giving the day of the month, with a range of 01-31, + two digits giving the hour of the day, with a range of 00-23, two + digits giving minutes past the hour, with a range of 00-59, and + finally, two digits giving seconds past the minute, with a range of + 00-60 (with 60 being used only at a leap second). Years in the tenth + century, and earlier, cannot be expressed. This is not considered a + serious defect of the protocol. + + The optional digits, which are preceded by a period, give decimal + fractions of a second. These may be given to whatever precision is + appropriate to the circumstance, however implementations MUST NOT add + precision to time-vals where that precision does not exist in the + underlying value being transmitted. + + Symbolically, a time-val may be viewed as + + YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.sss + + The "." and subsequent digits ("sss") are optional. However the "." + MUST NOT appear unless at least one following digit also appears. + + Time values are always represented in UTC (GMT), and in the Gregorian + calendar regardless of what calendar may have been in use at the date + and time indicated at the location of the server-PI. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 7] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The technical differences between GMT, TAI, UTC, UT1, UT2, etc, are + not considered here. A server-FTP process should always use the same + time reference, so the times it returns will be consistent. Clients + are not expected to be time synchronized with the server, so the + possible difference in times that might be reported by the different + time standards is not considered important. + +2.4. Server Replies + + Section 4.2 of [3] defines the format and meaning of replies by the + server-PI to FTP commands from the user-PI. Those reply conventions + are used here without change. + + error-response = error-code SP *TCHAR CRLF + error-code = ("4" / "5") 2DIGIT + + Implementors should note that the ABNF syntax (which was not used in + [3]) used in this document, and other FTP related documents, + sometimes shows replies using the one line format. Unless otherwise + explicitly stated, that is not intended to imply that multi-line + responses are not permitted. Implementors should assume that, unless + stated to the contrary, any reply to any FTP command (including QUIT) + may be of the multi-line format described in [3]. + + Throughout this document, replies will be identified by the three + digit code that is their first element. Thus the term "500 reply" + means a reply from the server-PI using the three digit code "500". + +3. File Modification Time (MDTM) + + The FTP command, MODIFICATION TIME (MDTM), can be used to determine + when a file in the server NVFS was last modified. This command has + existed in many FTP servers for many years, as an adjunct to the REST + command for STREAM mode, thus is widely available. However, where + supported, the "modify" fact which can be provided in the result from + the new MLST command is recommended as a superior alternative. + + When attempting to restart a RETRieve, if the User-FTP makes use of + the MDTM command, or "modify" fact, it can check and see if the + modification time of the source file is more recent than the + modification time of the partially transferred file. If it is, then + most likely the source file has changed and it would be unsafe to + restart the previously incomplete file transfer. + + When attempting to restart a STORe, the User FTP can use the MDTM + command to discover the modification time of the partially + transferred file. If it is older than the modification time of the + file that is about to be STORed, then most likely the source file has + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 8] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + changed and it would be unsafe to restart the file transfer. + + Note that using MLST (described below) where available, can provide + this information, and much more, thus giving an even better + indication that a file has changed, and that restarting a transfer + would not give valid results. + + Note that this is applicable to any RESTart attempt, regardless of + the mode of the file transfer. + +3.1. Syntax + + The syntax for the MDTM command is: + + mdtm = "MdTm" SP pathname CRLF + + As with all FTP commands, the "MDTM" command label is interpreted in + a case insensitive manner. + + The "pathname" specifies an object in the NVFS which may be the + object of a RETR command. Attempts to query the modification time of + files that are unable to be retrieved generate undefined responses. + + The server-PI will respond to the MDTM command with a 213 reply + giving the last modification time of the file whose pathname was + supplied, or a 550 reply if the file does not exist, the modification + time is unavailable, or some other error has occurred. + + mdtm-response = "213" SP time-val CRLF / + error-response + +3.2. Error responses + + Where the command is correctly parsed, but the modification time is + not available, either because the pathname identifies no existing + entity, or because the information is not available for the entity + named, then a 550 reply should be sent. Where the command cannot be + correctly parsed, a 500 or 501 reply should be sent, as specified in + [3]. + +3.3. FEAT response for MDTM + + When replying to the FEAT command [6], an FTP server process that + supports the MDTM command MUST include a line containing the single + word "MDTM". This MAY be sent in upper or lower case, or a mixture + of both (it is case insensitive) but SHOULD be transmitted in upper + case only. That is, the response SHOULD be + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 9] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + C> Feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> MDTM + S> ... + S> 211 End + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + +3.4. MDTM Examples + + If we assume the existence of three files, A B and C, and a directory + D, and no other files at all, then the MTDM command may behave as + indicated. The "C>" lines are commands from user-PI to server-PI, + the "S>" lines are server-PI replies. + + C> MDTM A + S> 213 19980615100045.014 + C> MDTM B + S> 213 19980615100045.014 + C> MDTM C + S> 213 19980705132316 + C> MDTM D + S> 550 D is not retrievable + C> MDTM E + S> 550 No file named "E" + C> mdtm file6 + S> 213 19990929003355 + C> MdTm 19990929043300 File6 + S> 213 19991005213102 + C> MdTm 19990929043300 file6 + S> 550 19990929043300 file6: No such file or directory. + + From that we can conclude that both A and B were last modified at the + same time (to the nearest millisecond), and that C was modified 21 + days and several hours later. + + The times are in GMT, so file A was modified on the 15th of June, + 1998, at approximately 11am in London (summer time was then in + effect), or perhaps at 8pm in Melbourne, Australia, or at 6am in New + York. All of those represent the same absolute time of course. The + location where the file was modified, and consequently the local wall + clock time at that location, is not available. + + There is no file named "E" in the current directory, but there are + files named both "file6" and "19990929043300 File6". The + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 10] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + modification times of those files were obtained. There is no file + named "19990929043300 file6". + +4. File SIZE + + The FTP command, SIZE OF FILE (SIZE), is used to obtain the transfer + size of a file from the server-FTP process. That is, the exact + number of octets (8 bit bytes) which would be transmitted over the + data connection should that file be transmitted. This value will + change depending on the current STRUcture, MODE and TYPE of the data + connection, or a data connection which would be created were one + created now. Thus, the result of the SIZE command is dependent on + the currently established STRU, MODE and TYPE parameters. + + The SIZE command returns how many octets would be transferred if the + file were to be transferred using the current transfer structure, + mode and type. This command is normally used in conjunction with the + RESTART (REST) command. The server-PI might need to read the + partially transferred file, do any appropriate conversion, and count + the number of octets that would be generated when sending the file in + order to correctly respond to this command. Estimates of the file + transfer size MUST NOT be returned, only precise information is + acceptable. + +4.1. Syntax + + The syntax of the SIZE command is: + + size = "Size" SP pathname CRLF + + The server-PI will respond to the SIZE command with a 213 reply + giving the transfer size of the file whose pathname was supplied, or + an error response if the file does not exist, the size is + unavailable, or some other error has occurred. The value returned is + in a format suitable for use with the RESTART (REST) command for mode + STREAM, provided the transfer mode and type are not altered. + + size-response = "213" SP 1*DIGIT CRLF / + error-response + +4.2. Error responses + + Where the command is correctly parsed, but the size is not available, + either because the pathname identifies no existing entity, or because + the entity named cannot be transferred in the current MODE and TYPE + (or at all), then a 550 reply should be sent. Where the command + cannot be correctly parsed, a 500 or 501 reply should be sent, as + specified in [3]. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 11] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +4.3. FEAT response for SIZE + + When replying to the FEAT command [6], an FTP server process that + supports the SIZE command MUST include a line containing the single + word "SIZE". This word is case insensitive, and MAY be sent in any + mixture of upper or lower case, however it SHOULD be sent in upper + case. That is, the response SHOULD be + + C> FEAT + S> 211- + S> ... + S> SIZE + S> ... + S> 211 END + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + +4.4. Size Examples + + Consider a text file "Example" stored on a Unix(TM) server where each + end of line is represented by a single octet. Assume the file + contains 112 lines, and 1830 octets total. Then the SIZE command + would produce: + + C> TYPE I + S> 200 Type set to I. + C> size Example + S> 213 1830 + C> TYPE A + S> 200 Type set to A. + C> Size Example + S> 213 1942 + + Notice that with TYPE=A the SIZE command reports an extra 112 octets. + Those are the extra octets that need to be inserted, one at the end + of each line, to provide correct end of line semantics for a transfer + using TYPE=A. Other systems might need to make other changes to the + transfer format of files when converting between TYPEs and MODEs. + The SIZE command takes all of that into account. + + Since calculating the size of a file with this degree of precision + may take considerable effort on the part of the server-PI, user-PIs + should not used this command unless this precision is essential (such + as when about to restart an interrupted transfer). For other uses, + the "Size" fact of the MLST command (see section 8.5.7) ought be + requested. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 12] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +5. Restart of Interrupted Transfer (REST) + + To avoid having to resend the entire file if the file is only + partially transferred, both sides need some way to be able to agree + on where in the data stream to restart the data transfer. + + The FTP specification [3] includes three modes of data transfer, + Stream, Block and Compressed. In Block and Compressed modes, the + data stream that is transferred over the data connection is + formatted, allowing the embedding of restart markers into the stream. + The sending DTP can include a restart marker with whatever + information it needs to be able to restart a file transfer at that + point. The receiving DTP can keep a list of these restart markers, + and correlate them with how the file is being saved. To restart the + file transfer, the receiver just sends back that last restart marker, + and both sides know how to resume the data transfer. Note that there + are some flaws in the description of the restart mechanism in RFC 959 + [3]. See section 4.1.3.4 of RFC 1123 [9] for the corrections. + +5.1. Restarting in STREAM Mode + + In Stream mode, the data connection contains just a stream of + unformatted octets of data. Explicit restart markers thus cannot be + inserted into the data stream, they would be indistinguishable from + data. For this reason, the FTP specification [3] did not provide the + ability to do restarts in stream mode. However, there is not really + a need to have explicit restart markers in this case, as restart + markers can be implied by the octet offset into the data stream. + + Because the data stream defines the file in STREAM mode, a different + data stream would represent a different file. Thus, an offset will + always represent the same position within a file. On the other hand, + in other modes than STREAM, the same file can be transferred using + quite different octet sequences, and yet be reconstructed into the + one identical file. Thus an offset into the data stream in transfer + modes other than STREAM would not give an unambiguous restart point. + + If the data representation TYPE is IMAGE, and the STRUcture is File, + for many systems the file will be stored exactly in the same format + as it is sent across the data connection. It is then usually very + easy for the receiver to determine how much data was previously + received, and notify the sender of the offset where the transfer + should be restarted. In other representation types and structures + more effort will be required, but it remains always possible to + determine the offset with finite, but perhaps non-negligible, effort. + In the worst case an FTP process may need to open a data connection + to itself, set the appropriate transfer type and structure, and + actually transmit the file, counting the transmitted octets. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 13] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + If the user-FTP process is intending to restart a retrieve, it will + directly calculate the restart marker, and send that information in + the RESTart command. However, if the user-FTP process is intending + to restart sending the file, it needs to be able to determine how + much data was previously sent, and correctly received and saved. A + new FTP command is needed to get this information. This is the + purpose of the SIZE command, as documented in section 4. + +5.2. Error Recovery and Restart + + STREAM MODE transfers with FILE STRUcture may be restarted even + though no restart marker has been transferred in addition to the data + itself. This is done by using the SIZE command, if needed, in + combination with the RESTART (REST) command, and one of the standard + file transfer commands. + + When using TYPE ASCII or IMAGE, the SIZE command will return the + number of octets that would actually be transferred if the file were + to be sent between the two systems. I.e. with type IMAGE, the SIZE + normally would be the number of octets in the file. With type ASCII, + the SIZE would be the number of octets in the file including any + modifications required to satisfy the TYPE ASCII CR-LF end of line + convention. + +5.3. Syntax + + The syntax for the REST command when the current transfer mode is + STREAM is: + + rest = "Rest" SP 1*DIGIT CRLF + + The numeric value gives the number of octets of the immediately + following transfer to not actually send, effectively causing the + transmission to be restarted at a later point. A value of zero + effectively disables restart, causing the entire file to be + transmitted. The server-PI will respond to the REST command with a + 350 reply, indicating that the REST parameter has been saved, and + that another command, which should be either RETR or STOR, should + then follow to complete the restart. + + rest-response = "350" SP *TCHAR CRLF / + error-response + + Server-FTP processes may permit transfer commands other than RETR and + STOR, such as APPE and STOU, to complete a restart, however, this is + not recommended. STOU (store unique) is undefined in this usage, as + storing the remainder of a file into a unique filename is rarely + going to be useful. If APPE (append) is permitted, it MUST act + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 14] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + identically to STOR when a restart marker has been set. That is, in + both cases, octets from the data connection are placed into the file + at the location indicated by the restart marker value. + + The REST command is intended to complete a failed transfer. Use with + RETR is comparatively well defined in all cases, as the client bears + the responsibility of merging the retrieved data with the partially + retrieved file. If it chooses to use the data obtained other than to + complete an earlier transfer, or if it chooses to re-retrieve data + that had been retrieved before, that is its choice. With STOR, + however, the server must insert the data into the file named. The + results are undefined if a client uses REST to do other than restart + to complete a transfer of a file which had previously failed to + completely transfer. In particular, if the restart marker set with a + REST command is not at the end of the data currently stored at the + server, as reported by the server, or if insufficient data are + provided in a STOR that follows a REST to extend the destination file + to at least its previous size, then the effects are undefined. + + The REST command must be the last command issued before the data + transfer command which is to cause a restarted rather than complete + file transfer. The effect of issuing a REST command at any other + time is undefined. The server-PI may react to a badly positioned + REST command by issuing an error response to the following command, + not being a restartable data transfer command, or it may save the + restart value and apply it to the next data transfer command, or it + may silently ignore the inappropriate restart attempt. Because of + this, a user-PI that has issued a REST command, but which has not + successfully transmitted the following data transfer command for any + reason, should send another REST command before the next data + transfer command. If that transfer is not to be restarted, then + "REST 0" should be issued. + + An error-response will follow a REST command only when the server + does not implement the command, or the restart marker value is + syntactically invalid for the current transfer mode. That is, in + STREAM mode, if something other than one or more digits appears in + the parameter to the REST command. Any other errors, including such + problems as restart marker out of range, should be reported when the + following transfer command is issued. Such errors will cause that + transfer request to be rejected with an error indicating the invalid + restart attempt. + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 15] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +5.4. FEAT response for REST + + Where a server-FTP process supports RESTart in STREAM mode, as + specified here, it MUST include in the response to the FEAT command + [6], a line containing exactly the string "REST STREAM". This string + is not case sensitive, but SHOULD be transmitted in upper case. + Where REST is not supported at all, or supported only in block or + compressed modes, the REST line MUST NOT be included in the FEAT + response. Where required, the response SHOULD be + + C> feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> REST STREAM + S> ... + S> 211 end + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + +5.5. REST Example + + Assume that the transfer of a largish file has previously been + interrupted after 802816 octets had been received, that the previous + transfer was with TYPE=I, and that it has been verified that the file + on the server has not since changed. + + C> TYPE I + S> 200 Type set to I. + C> PORT 127,0,0,1,15,107 + S> 200 PORT command successful. + C> REST 802816 + S> 350 Restarting at 802816. Send STORE or RETRIEVE + C> RETR cap60.pl198.tar + S> 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection + [...] + S> 226 Transfer complete. + +6. Virtual FTP servers + + It has become common in the Internet for many domain names to be + allocated to a single IP address. This has introduced the concept of + a "virtual host", where a host appears to exist as an independent + entity, but in reality shares all of its resources with one, or more, + other such hosts. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 16] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + Such an arrangement presents some problems for FTP Servers, as all + the FTP Server can detect is an incoming FTP connection to a + particular IP address. That is, all domain names which share the IP + address also share the FTP server, and more importantly, its NVFS. + This means that the various virtual hosts cannot offer different + virtual file systems to clients, nor can they offer different + authentication systems. + + No scheme can overcome this without modifications of some kind to the + user-PI and the user-FTP process. That process is the only entity + that knows which virtual host is required. It has performed the + domain name to IP address translation, and thus has the original + domain name available. + + One method which could be used to allow a style of virtual host would + be for the client to simply send a "CWD" command after connecting, + using the virtual host name as the argument to the CWD command. This + would allow the server-FTP process to implement the file stores of + the virtual hosts as sub-directories in its NVFS. This is simple, + and supported by essentially all server-FTP implementations without + requiring any code changes. + + While that method is simple to describe, and to implement, it suffers + from several drawbacks. First, the "CWD" command is available only + after the user-PI has authenticated itself to the server-FTP process. + Thus, all virtual hosts would be required to share a common + authentication scheme. Second, either the server-FTP process needs + to be modified to understand the special nature of this first CWD + command, negating most of the advantage of this scheme, or all users + must see the same identical NVFS view upon connecting (they must + connect in the same initial directory) or the NVFS must implement the + full set of virtual host directories at each possible initial + directory for any possible user, or the virtual host will not be + truly transparent. Third, and again unless the server is specially + modified, a user connecting this way to a virtual host would be able + to trivially move to any other virtual host supported at the same + server-FTP process, exposing the nature of the virtual host. + + Other schemes overloading other existing FTP commands have also been + proposed. None of those have sufficient merit to be worth + discussion. + + The conclusion from the examination of the possibilities seems to be + that to obtain an adequate emulation of "real" FTP servers, server + modifications to support virtual hosts are required. A new command + seems most likely to provide the support required. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 17] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +6.1. The HOST command + + A new command "HOST" is added to the FTP command set to allow + server-FTP process to determine to which of possibly many virtual + hosts the client wishes to connect. This command is intended to be + issued before the user is authenticated, allowing the authentication + scheme, and set of legal users, to be dependent upon the virtual host + chosen. Server-FTP processes may, if they desire, permit the HOST + command to be issued after the user has been authenticated, or may + treat that as an erroneous sequence of commands. The behavior of the + server-FTP process which does allow late HOST commands is undefined. + One reasonable interpretation would be for the user-PI to be returned + to the state that existed after the TCP connection was first + established, before user authentication. + + Servers should note that the response to the HOST command is a + sensible time to send their "welcome" message. This allows the + message to be personalized for any virtual hosts that are supported, + and also allows the client to have determined supported languages, or + representations, for the message, and other messages, via the FEAT + response, and selected an appropriate one via the LANG command. See + [7] for more information. + +6.2. Syntax of the HOST command + + The HOST command is defined as follows. + + host-command = "Host" SP hostname CRLF + hostname = 1*DNCHAR 1*( "." 1*DNCHAR ) [ "." ] + DNCHAR = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / "$" / + "!" / "%" / "[" / "]" / ":" + host-response = host-ok / error-response + host-ok = "220" [ SP *TCHAR ] CRLF + + As with all FTP commands, the "host" command word is case + independent, and may be specified in any character case desired. + + The "hostname" given as a parameter specifies the virtual host to + which access is desired. It should normally be the same name that + was used to obtain the IP address to which the FTP control connection + was made, after any client conversions to convert an abbreviated or + local alias to a complete (fully qualified) domain name, but before + resolving a DNS alias (owner of a CNAME resource record) to its + canonical name. + + If the client was given a network literal address, and consequently + was not required to derive it from a hostname, it should send the + HOST command with the network address, as specified to it, enclosed + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 18] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + in brackets (after eliminating any syntax, which might also be + brackets, but is not required to be, from which the server deduced + that a literal address had been specified.) That is, for example + + HOST [10.1.2.3] + + should be sent if the client had been instructed to connect to + "10.1.2.3", or "[10.1.2.3]", or perhaps even IPv4:10.1.2.3. The + method of indicating to a client that a literal address is to be used + is beyond the scope of this specification. + + The parameter is otherwise to be treated as a "complete domain name", + as that term is defined in section 3.1 of RFC 1034 [10]. That + implies that the name is to be treated as a case independent string, + in that upper case ASCII characters are to be treated as equivalent + to the corresponding lower case ASCII characters, but otherwise + preserved as given. It also implies some limits on the length of the + parameter and of the components that create its internal structure. + Those limits are not altered in any way here. + + RFC 1034 imposes no other restrictions upon what kinds of names can + be stored in the DNS. Nor does RFC 1035. This specification, + however, allows only a restricted set of names for the purposes of + the HOST command. Those restrictions can be inferred from the ABNF + grammar given for the "hostname". + +6.3. HOST command semantics + + Upon receiving the HOST command, before authenticating the user-PI, a + server-FTP process should validate that the hostname given represents + a valid virtual host for that server, and if so, establish the + appropriate environment for that virtual host. The meaning of that + is not specified here, and may range from doing nothing at all, or + performing a simple change of working directory, to much more + elaborate state changes, as required. + + If the hostname specified is unknown at the server, or if the server + is otherwise unwilling to treat the particular connection as a + connection to the hostname specified, the server will respond with a + 504 reply. + + Note: servers may require that the name specified is in some sense + equivalent to the particular network address that was used to reach + the server. + + If the hostname specified would normally be acceptable, but for any + reason is temporarily unavailable, the server SHOULD reply to the + HOST command with a 434 reply. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 19] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The "220" reply code for the HOST command is the same as the code + used on the initial connection established "welcome" message. This + is done deliberately so as to allow the implementation to implement + the front end FTP server as a wrapper which simply waits for the HOST + command, and then invokes an older, RFC959 compliant, server in the + appropriate environment for the particular hostname received. + +6.3.1. The REIN command + + As specified in [3], the REIN command returns the state of the + connection to that it was immediately after the transport connection + was opened. That is not changed here. The effect of a HOST command + will be lost if a REIN command is performed, a new HOST command must + be issued. + + Implementors of user-FTP should be aware that server-FTP + implementations which implement the HOST command as a wrapper around + older implementations will be unable to correctly implement the REIN + command. In such an implementation, REIN will typically return the + server-FTP to the state that existed immediately after the HOST + command was issued, instead of to the state immediately after the + connection was opened. + +6.3.2. User-PI usage of HOST + + A user-PI that conforms to this specification, MUST send the HOST + command after opening the transport connection, or after any REIN + command, before attempting to authenticate the user with the USER + command. + + The following state diagram shows a typical sequence of flow of + control, where the "B" (begin) state is assumed to occur after the + transport connection has opened, or a REIN command has succeeded. + Other commands (such as FEAT [6]) which require no authentication may + have intervened. This diagram is modeled upon (and largely borrowed + from) the similar diagram in section 6 of [3]. + + In this diagram, a three digit reply indicates that precise server + reply code, a single digit on a reply path indicates any server reply + beginning with that digit, other than any three digit replies that + might take another path. + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 20] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + + +---+ HOST +---+ 1,3,5 + | B |---------->| W |----------------- + +---+ +---+ | + | | | + 2,500,502 | | 4,501,503,504 | + -------------- ------------- | + | | | + V 1 | V + +---+ USER +---+-------------->+---+ + | |---------->| W | 2 ----->| E | + +---+ +---+------ | --->+---+ + | | | | | | + 3 | | 4,5 | | | | + -------------- ----- | | | | + | | | | | | + | | | | | | + | --------- | | + | 1| | | | | + V | | | | | + +---+ PASS +---+ 2 | ------->+---+ + | |---------->| W |-------------->| S | + +---+ +---+ ----------->+---+ + | | | | | | + 3 | |4,5| | | | + -------------- -------- | | + | | | | | ---- + | | | | | | + | ----------- | + | 1,3| | | | | + V | 2| | | V + +---+ ACCT +---+-- | ------>+---+ + | |---------->| W | 4,5 --------->| F | + +---+ +---+-------------->+---+ + +6.4. HOST command errors + + The server-PI shall reply with a 500 or 502 reply if the HOST command + is unrecognized or unimplemented. A 503 reply may be sent if the + HOST command is given after a previous HOST command, or after a user + has been authenticated. Alternately, the server may accept the + command at such a time, with server defined behavior. A 501 reply + should be sent if the hostname given is syntactically invalid, and a + 504 reply if a syntactically valid hostname is not a valid virtual + host name for the server. + + In all such cases the server-FTP process should act as if no HOST + command had been given. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 21] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + A user-PI receiving a 500 or 502 reply should assume that the + server-PI does not implement the HOST command style virtual server. + It may then proceed to login as if the HOST command had succeeded, + and perhaps, attempt a CWD command to the hostname after + authenticating the user. + + A user-PI receiving some other error reply should assume that the + virtual HOST is unavailable, and terminate communications. + + A server-PI that receives a USER command, beginning the + authentication sequence, without having received a HOST command + SHOULD NOT reject the USER command. Clients conforming to earlier + FTP specifications do not send HOST commands. In this case the + server may act as if some default virtual host had been explicitly + selected, or may enter an environment different from that of all + supported virtual hosts, perhaps one in which a union of all + available accounts exists, and which presents a NVFS which appears to + contain sub-directories containing the NVFS for all virtual hosts + supported. + +6.5. FEAT response for HOST command + + A server-FTP process that supports the host command, and virtual FTP + servers, MUST include in the response to the FEAT command [6], a + feature line indicating that the HOST command is supported. This + line should contain the single word "HOST". This MAY be sent in + upper or lower case, or a mixture of both (it is case insensitive) + but SHOULD be transmitted in upper case only. That is, the response + SHOULD be + + C> Feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> HOST + S> ... + S> 211 End + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6]. + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 22] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +7. A Trivial Virtual File Store (TVFS) + + Traditionally, FTP has placed almost no constraints upon the file + store (NVFS) provided by a server. This specification does not alter + that. However, it has become common for servers to attempt to + provide at least file system naming conventions modeled loosely upon + those of the UNIX(TM) file system. That is, a tree structured file + system, built of directories, each of which can contain other + directories, or other kinds of files, or both. Each file and + directory has a file name relative to the directory that contains it, + except for the directory at the root of the tree, which is contained + in no other directory, and hence has no name of its own. + + That which has so far been described is perfectly consistent with the + standard FTP NVFS and access mechanisms. The "CWD" command is used + to move from one directory to an embedded directory. "CDUP" may be + provided to return to the parent directory, and the various file + manipulation commands ("RETR", "STOR", the rename commands, etc) are + used to manipulate files within the current directory. + + However, it is often useful to be able to reference files other than + by changing directories, especially as FTP provides no guaranteed + mechanism to return to a previous directory. The Trivial Virtual + File Store (TVFS), if implemented, provides that mechanism. + +7.1. TVFS File Names + + Where a server implements the TVFS, no elementary filename shall + contain the character "/". Where the underlying natural file store + permits files, or directories, to contain the "/" character in their + names, a server-PI implementing TVFS must encode that character in + some manner whenever file or directory names are being returned to + the user-PI, and reverse that encoding whenever such names are being + accepted from the user-PI. + + The encoding method to be used is not specified here. Where some + other character is illegal in file and directory names in the + underlying file store, a simple transliteration may be sufficient. + Where there is no suitable substitute character a more complex + encoding scheme, possibly using an escape character, is likely to be + required. + + With the one exception of the unnamed root directory, a TVFS file + name may not be empty. That is, all other file names contain at + least one character. + + With the sole exception of the "/" character, any valid IS10646 + character [11] may be used in a TVFS filename. When transmitted, + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 23] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + file name characters are encoded using the UTF-8 encoding [2]. + +7.2. TVFS Path Names + + A TVFS "Path Name" combines the file or directory name of a target + file or directory, with the directory names of zero or more enclosing + directories, so as to allow the target file or directory to be + referenced other than when the server's "current working directory" + is the directory directly containing the target file or directory. + + By definition, every TVFS file or directory name is also a TVFS path + name. Such a path name is valid to reference the file from the + directory containing the name, that is, when that directory is the + server-FTP's current working directory. + + Other TVFS path names are constructed by prefixing a path name by a + name of a directory from which the path is valid, and separating the + two with the "/" character. Such a path name is valid to reference + the file or directory from the directory containing the newly added + directory name. + + Where a path name has been extended to the point where the directory + added is the unnamed root directory, the path name will begin with + the "/" character. Such a path is known as a fully qualified path + name. Fully qualified paths may, obviously, not be further extended, + as, by definition, no directory contains the root directory. Being + unnamed, it cannot be represented in any other directory. A fully + qualified path name is valid to reference the named file or directory + from any location (that is, regardless of what the current working + directory may be) in the virtual file store. + + Any path name which is not a fully qualified path name may be + referred to as a "relative path name" and will only correctly + reference the intended file when the current working directory of the + server-FTP is a directory from which the relative path name is valid. + + As a special case, the path name "/" is defined to be a fully + qualified path name referring to the root directory. That is, the + root directory does not have a directory (or file) name, but does + have a path name. This special path name may be used only as is as a + reference to the root directory. It may not be combined with other + path names using the rules above, as doing so would lead to a path + name containing two consecutive "/" characters, which is an undefined + sequence. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 24] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +7.2.1. Notes + + + It is not required, or expected, that there be only one fully + qualified path name that will reference any particular file or + directory. + + As a caveat, though the TVFS file store is basically tree + structured, there is no requirement that any file or directory + have only one parent directory. + + As defined, no TVFS path name will ever contain two consecutive + "/" characters. Such a name is not illegal however, and may be + defined by the server for any purpose that suits it. Clients + implementing this specification should not assume any semantics + at all for such names. + + Similarly, other than the special case path that refers to the + root directory, no TVFS path name constructed as defined here + will ever end with the "/" character. Such names are also not + illegal, but are undefined. + + While any legal IS10646 character is permitted to occur in a TVFS + file or directory name, other than "/", server FTP + implementations are not required to support all possible IS10646 + characters. The subset supported is entirely at the discretion + of the server. The case (where it exists) of the characters that + make up file, directory, and path names may be significant. + Unless determined otherwise by means unspecified here, clients + should assume that all such names are comprised of characters + whose case is significant. Servers are free to treat case (or + any other attribute) of a name as irrelevant, and hence map two + names which appear to be distinct onto the same underlying file. + + There are no defined "magic" names, like ".", ".." or "C:". + Servers may implement such names, with any semantics they choose, + but are not required to do so. + + TVFS imposes no particular semantics or properties upon files, + guarantees no access control schemes, or any of the other common + properties of a file store. Only the naming scheme is defined. + +7.3. FEAT Response for TVFS + + In response to the FEAT command [6] a server that wishes to indicate + support for the TVFS as defined here will include a line that begins + with the four characters "TVFS" (in any case, or mixture of cases, + upper case is not required). Servers SHOULD send upper case. + + Such a response to the FEAT command MUST NOT be returned unless the + server implements TVFS as defined here. + + Later specifications may add to the TVFS definition. Such additions + should be notified by means of additional text appended to the TVFS + feature line. Such specifications, if any, will define the extra + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 25] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + text. + + Until such a specification is defined, servers should not include + anything after "TVFS" in the TVFS feature line. Clients, however, + should be prepared to deal with arbitrary text following the four + defined characters, and simply ignore it if unrecognized. + + A typical response to the FEAT command issued by a server + implementing only this specification would be: + + C> feat + S> 211- + S> ... + S> TVFS + S> ... + S> 211 end + + The ellipses indicate place holders where other features may be + included, and are not required. The one space indentation of the + feature lines is mandatory [6], and is not counted as one of the + first four characters for the purposes of this feature listing. + + The TVFS feature adds no new commands to the FTP command repertoire. + +7.4. OPTS for TVFS + + There are no options in this TVFS specification, and hence there is + no OPTS command defined. + +7.5. TVFS Examples + + Assume a TVFS file store is comprised of a root directory, which + contains two directories (A and B) and two non-directory files (X and + Y). The A directory contains two directories (C and D) and one other + file (Z). The B directory contains just two non-directory files (P + and Q) and the C directory also two non-directory files (also named P + and Q, by chance). The D directory is empty, that is, contains no + files or directories. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 26] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + This structure may depicted graphically as... + + (unnamed root) + / | \ \ + / | \ \ + A X B Y + /|\ / \ + / | \ / \ + C D Z P Q + / \ + / \ + P Q + + Given this structure, the following fully qualified path names exist. + + / + /A + /B + /X + /Y + /A/C + /A/D + /A/Z + /A/C/P + /A/C/Q + /B/P + /B/Q + + It is clear that none of the paths / /A /B or /A/D refer to the same + directory, as the contents of each is different. Nor do any of / /A + /A/C or /A/D. However /A/C and /B might be the same directory, there + is insufficient information given to tell. Any of the other path + names (/X /Y /A/Z /A/C/P /A/C/Q /B/P and /B/Q) may refer to the same + underlying files, in almost any combination. + + If the current working directory of the server-FTP is /A then the + following path names, in addition to all the fully qualified path + names, are valid + + C + D + Z + C/P + C/Q + + These all refer to the same files or directories as the corresponding + fully qualified path with "/A/" prepended. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 27] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + That those path names all exist does not imply that the TVFS sever + will necessarily grant any kind of access rights to the named paths, + or that access to the same file via different path names will + necessarily be granted equal rights. + + None of the following relative paths are valid when the current + directory is /A + + A + B + X + Y + B/P + B/Q + P + Q + + Any of those could be made valid by changing the server-FTP's current + working directory to the appropriate directory. Note that the paths + "P" and "Q" might refer to different files depending upon which + directory is selected to cause those to become valid TVFS relative + paths. + +8. Listings for Machine Processing (MLST and MLSD) + + The MLST and MLSD commands are intended to standardize the file and + directory information returned by the Server-FTP process. These + commands differ from the LIST command in that the format of the + replies is strictly defined although extensible. + + Two commands are defined, MLST which provides data about exactly the + object named on its command line, and no others. MLSD on the other + hand will list the contents of a directory if a directory is named, + otherwise a 501 reply will be returned. In either case, if no object + is named, the current directory is assumed. That will cause MLST to + send a one line response, describing the current directory itself, + and MLSD to list the contents of the current directory. + + In the following, the term MLSx will be used wherever either MLST or + MLSD may be inserted. + + The MLST and MLSD commands also extend the FTP protocol as presented + in RFC 959 [3] and RFC 1123 [9] to allow that transmission of 8-bit + data over the control connection. Note this is not specifying + character sets which are 8-bit, but specifying that FTP + implementations are to specifically allow the transmission and + reception of 8-bit bytes, with all bits significant, over the control + connection. That is, all 256 possible octet values are permitted. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 28] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The MLSx command allows both UTF-8/Unicode and "raw" forms as + arguments, and in responses both to the MLST and MLSD commands, and + all other FTP commands which take pathnames as arguments. + +8.1. Format of MLSx Requests + + The MLST and MLSD commands each allow a single optional argument. + This argument may be either a directory name or, for MLST only, a + filename. For these purposes, a "filename" is the name of any entity + in the server NVFS which is not a directory. Where TVFS is + supported, any TVFS relative path name valid in the current working + directory, or any TVFS fully qualified path name, may be given. If a + directory name is given then MLSD must return a listing of the + contents of the named directory, otherwise it issues a 501 reply, and + does not open a data connection. In all cases for MLST, a single set + of fact lines (usually a single fact line) containing the information + about the named file or directory shall be returned over the control + connection, without opening a data connection. + + If no argument is given then MLSD must return a listing of the + contents of the current working directory, and MLST must return a + listing giving information about the current working directory + itself. For these purposes, the contents of a directory are whatever + filenames (not pathnames) the server-PI will allow to be referenced + when the current working directory is the directory named, and which + the server-PI desires to reveal to the user-PI. + + No title, header, or summary, lines, or any other formatting, other + than as is specified below, is ever returned in the output of an MLST + or MLSD command. + + If the Client-FTP sends an invalid argument, the Server-FTP MUST + reply with an error code of 501. + + The syntax for the MLSx command is: + + mlst = "MLst" [ SP pathname ] CRLF + mlsd = "MLsD" [ SP pathname ] CRLF + +8.2. Format of MLSx Response + + The format of a response to an MLSx command is as follows: + + mlst-response = control-response / error-response + mlsd-response = ( initial-response final-response ) / + error-response + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 29] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + control-response = "250-" [ response-message ] CRLF + 1*( SP entry CRLF ) + "250" [ SP response-message ] CRLF + + initial-response = "150" [ SP response-message ] CRLF + final-response = "226" SP response-message CRLF + + response-message = *TCHAR + + data-response = *( entry CRLF ) + + entry = [ facts ] SP pathname + facts = 1*( fact ";" ) + fact = factname "=" value + factname = "Size" / "Modify" / "Create" / + "Type" / "Unique" / "Perm" / + "Lang" / "Media-Type" / "CharSet" / + os-depend-fact / local-fact + os-depend-fact = "." token + local-fact = "X." token + value = *RCHAR + + Upon receipt of a MLSx command, the server will verify the parameter, + and if invalid return an error-response. For this purpose, the + parameter should be considered to be invalid if the client issuing + the command does not have permission to perform the request + operation. + + If valid, then for an MLST command, the server-PI will send the first + (leading) line of the control response, the entry for the pathname + given, or the current directory if no pathname was provided, and the + terminating line. Normally exactly one entry would be returned, more + entries are permitted only when required to represent a file that is + to have multiple "Type" facts returned. + + Note that for MLST the fact set is preceded by a space. That is + provided to guarantee that the fact set cannot be accidentally + interpreted as the terminating line of the control response, but is + required even when that would not be possible. Exactly one space + exists between the set of facts and the pathname. Where no facts are + present, there will be exactly two leading spaces before the + pathname. No spaces are permitted in the facts, any other spaces in + the response are to be treated as being a part of the pathname. + + If the command was an MLSD command, the server will open a data + connection as indicated in section 3.2 of RFC959 [3]. If that fails, + the server will return an error-response. If all is OK, the server + will return the initial-response, send the appropriate data-response + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 30] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + over the new data connection, close that connection, and then send + the final-response over the control connection. The grammar above + defines the format for the data-response, which defines the format of + the data returned over the data connection established. + + The data connection opened for a MLSD response shall be a connection + as if the "TYPE L 8", "MODE S", and "STRU F" commands had been given, + whatever FTP transfer type, mode and structure had actually been set, + and without causing those settings to be altered for future commands. + That is, this transfer type shall be set for the duration of the data + connection established for this command only. While the content of + the data sent can be viewed as a series of lines, implementations + should note that there is no maximum line length defined. + Implementations should be prepared to deal with arbitrarily long + lines. + + The facts part of the specification would contain a series of "file + facts" about the file or directory named on the same line. Typical + information to be presented would include file size, last + modification time, creation time, a unique identifier, and a + file/directory flag. + + The complete format for a successful reply to the MLSD command would + be: + + facts SP pathname CRLF + facts SP pathname CRLF + facts SP pathname CRLF + ... + + Note that the format is intended for machine processing, not human + viewing, and as such the format is very rigid. Implementations MUST + NOT vary the format by, for example, inserting extra spaces for + readability, replacing spaces by tabs, including header or title + lines, or inserting blank lines, or in any other way alter this + format. Exactly one space is always required after the set of facts + (which may be empty). More spaces may be present on a line if, and + only if, the file name presented contains significant spaces. The + set of facts must not contain any spaces anywhere inside it. Facts + should be provided in each output line only if they both provide + relevant information about the file named on the same line, and they + are in the set requested by the user-PI. There is no requirement + that the same set of facts be provided for each file, or that the + facts presented occur in the same order for each file. + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 31] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.3. Filename encoding + + An FTP implementation supporting the MLSx commands must be 8-bit + clean. This is necessary in order to transmit UTF-8 encoded + filenames. This specification recommends the use of UTF-8 encoded + filenames. FTP implementations SHOULD use UTF-8 whenever possible to + encourage the maximum interoperability. + + Filenames are not restricted to UTF-8, however treatment of arbitrary + character encodings is not specified by this standard. Applications + are encouraged to treat non-UTF-8 encodings of filenames as octet + sequences. + + Note that this encoding is unrelated to that of the contents of the + file, even if the file contains character data. + + Further information about filename encoding for FTP may be found in + "Internationalization of the File Transfer Protocol" [7]. + +8.3.1. Notes about the Filename + + The filename returned in the MLST response should be the same name as + was specified in the MLST command, or, where TVFS is supported, a + fully qualified TVFS path naming the same file. Where no argument + was given to the MLST command, the server-PI may either include an + empty filename in the response, or it may supply a name that refers + to the current directory, if such a name is available. Where TVFS is + supported, a fully qualified path name of the current directory + SHOULD be returned. + + Filenames returned in the output from an MLSD command SHOULD be + unqualified names within the directory named, or the current + directory if no argument was given. That is, the directory named in + the MLSD command SHOULD NOT appear as a component of the filenames + returned. + + If the server-FTP process is able, and the "type" fact is being + returned, it MAY return in the MLSD response, an entry whose type is + "cdir", which names the directory from which the contents of the + listing were obtained. Where TVFS is supported, the name MAY be the + fully qualified path name of the directory, or MAY be any other path + name which is valid to refer to that directory from the current + working directory of the server-FTP. Where more than one name + exists, multiple of these entries may be returned. In a sense, the + "cdir" entry can be viewed as a heading for the MLSD output. + However, it is not required to be the first entry returned, and may + occur anywhere within the listing. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 32] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + When TVFS is supported, a user-PI can refer to any file or directory + in the listing by combining a type "cdir" name, with the appropriate + name from the directory listing using the procedure defined in + section 7.2. + + Alternatively, whether TVFS is supported or not, the user-PI can + issue a CWD command ([3]) giving a name of type "cdir" from the + listing returned, and from that point reference the files returned in + the MLSD response from which the cdir was obtained by using the + filename components of the listing. + +8.4. Format of Facts + + The "facts" for a file in a reply to a MLSx command consist of + information about that file. The facts are a series of keyword=value + pairs each followed by semi-colon (";") characters. An individual + fact may not contain a semi-colon in its name or value. The complete + series of facts may not contain the space character. See the + definition or "RCHAR" in section 2.1 for a list of the characters + that can occur in a fact value. Not all are applicable to all facts. + + A sample of a typical series of facts would be: (spread over two + lines for presentation here only) + + size=4161;lang=en-US;modify=19970214165800;create=19961001124534; + type=file;x.myfact=foo,bar; + +8.5. Standard Facts + + This document defines a standard set of facts as follows: + + size -- Size in octets + modify -- Last modification time + create -- Creation time + type -- Entry type + unique -- Unique id of file/directory + perm -- File permissions, whether read, write, execute is + allowed for the login id. + lang -- Language of the filename per IANA[12] registry. + media-type -- MIME media-type of file contents per IANA registry. + charset -- Character set per IANA registry (if not UTF-8) + + Fact names are case-insensitive. Size, size, SIZE, and SiZe are the + same fact. + + Further operating system specific keywords could be specified by + using the IANA operating system name as a prefix (examples only): + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 33] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + OS/2.ea -- OS/2 extended attributes + MACOS.rf -- MacIntosh resource forks + UNIX.mode -- Unix file modes (permissions) + + Implementations may define keywords for experimental, or private use. + All such keywords MUST begin with the two character sequence "x.". + As type names are case independent, "x." and "X." are equivalent. + For example: + + x.ver -- Version information + x.desc -- File description + x.type -- File type + +8.5.1. The type Fact + + The type fact needs a special description. Part of the problem with + current practices is deciding when a file is a directory. If it is a + directory, is it the current directory, a regular directory, or a + parent directory? The MLST specification makes this unambiguous + using the type fact. The type fact given specifies information about + the object listed on the same line of the MLST response. + + Five values are possible for the type fact: + + file -- a file entry + cdir -- the listed directory + pdir -- a parent directory + dir -- a directory or sub-directory + OS.name=type -- an OS or file system dependent file type + + The syntax is defined to be: + + type-fact = type-label "=" type-val + type-label = "Type" + type-val = "File" / "cdir" / "pdir" / "dir" / + os-type + +8.5.1.1. type=file + + The presence of the type=file fact indicates the listed entry is a + file containing non-system data. That is, it may be transferred from + one system to another of quite different characteristics, and perhaps + still be meaningful. + +8.5.1.2. type=cdir + + The type=cdir fact indicates the listed entry contains a pathname of + the directory whose contents are listed. An entry of this type will + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 34] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + only be returned as a part of the result of an MLSD command when the + type fact is included, and provides a name for the listed directory, + and facts about that directory. In a sense, it can be viewed as + representing the title of the listing, in a machine friendly format. + It may appear at any point of the listing, it is not restricted to + appearing at the start, though frequently may do so, and may occur + multiple times. It MUST NOT be included if the type fact is not + included, or there would be no way for the user-PI to distinguish the + name of the directory from an entry in the directory. + + Where TVFS is supported by the server-FTP, this name may be used to + construct path names with which to refer to the files and directories + returned in the same MLSD output (see section 7.2). These path names + are only expected to work when the server-PI's position in the NVFS + file tree is the same as its position when the MLSD command was + issued, unless a fully qualified path name results. + + Where TVFS is not supported, the only defined semantics associated + with a "type=cdir" entry are that, provided the current working + directory of the server-PI has not been changed, a pathname of type + "cdir" may be used as an argument to a CWD command, which will cause + the current directory of the server-PI to change so that the + directory which was listed in its current working directory. + +8.5.1.3. type=dir + + If present, the type=dir entry gives the name of a directory. Such + an entry typically cannot be transferred from one system to another + using RETR, etc, but should (permissions permitting) be able to be + the object of an MLSD command. + +8.5.1.4. type=pdir + + If present, which will occur only in the response to a MLSD command + when the type fact is included, the type=pdir entry represents a + pathname of the parent directory of the listed directory. As well as + having the properties of a type=dir, a CWD command that uses the + pathname from this entry should change the user to a parent directory + of the listed directory. If the listed directory is the current + directory, a CDUP command may also have the effect of changing to the + named directory. User-FTP processes should note not all responses + will include this information, and that some systems may provide + multiple type=pdir responses. + + Where TVFS is supported, a "type=pdir" name may be a relative path + name, or a fully qualified path name. A relative path name will be + relative to the directory being listed, not to the current directory + of the server-PI at the time. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 35] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + For the purposes of this type value, a "parent directory" is any + directory in which there is an entry of type=dir which refers to the + directory in which the type=pdir entity was found. Thus it is not + required that all entities with type=pdir refer to the same + directory. The "unique" fact (if supported) can be used to determine + whether there is a relationship between the type=pdir entries or not. + +8.5.1.5. System defined types + + Files types that are specific to a specific operating system, or file + system, can be encoded using the "OS." type names. The format is: + + os-type = "OS." os-name "=" os-type + os-name = + os-type = token + + The "os-name" indicates the specific system type which supports the + particular localtype. OS specific types are registered by the IANA + using the procedures specified in section 11. The "os-type" provides + the system dependent information as to the type of the file listed. + The os-name and os-type strings in an os-type are case independent. + "OS.unix=block" and "OS.Unix=BLOCK" represent the same type (or + would, if such a type were registered.) + + Note: Where the underlying system supports a file type which is + essentially an indirect pointer to another file, the NVFS + representation of that type should normally be to represent the file + which the reference indicates. That is, the underlying basic file + will appear more than once in the NVFS, each time with the "unique" + fact (see immediately following section) containing the same value, + indicating that the same file is represented by all such names. + User-PIs transferring the file need then transfer it only once, and + then insert their own form of indirect reference to construct + alternate names where desired, or perhaps even copy the local file if + that is the only way to provide two names with the same content. A + file which would be a reference to another file, if only the other + file actually existed, may be represented in any OS dependent manner + appropriate, or not represented at all. + +8.5.1.6. Multiple types + + Where a file is such that it may validly, and sensibly, treated by + the server-PI as being of more than one of the above types, then + multiple entries should be returned, each with its own "Type" fact of + the appropriate type, and each containing the same pathname. This + may occur, for example, with a structured file, which may contain + sub-files, and where the server-PI permits the structured file to be + treated as a unit, or treated as a directory allowing the sub-files + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 36] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + within it to be referenced. + +8.5.2. The unique Fact + + The unique fact is used to present a unique identifier for a file or + directory in the NVFS accessed via a server-FTP process. The value + of this fact should be the same for any number of pathnames that + refer to the same underlying file. The fact should have different + values for names which reference distinct files. The mapping between + files, and unique fact tokens should be maintained, and remain + consistent, for at least the lifetime of the control connection from + user-PI to server-PI. + + unique-fact = "Unique" "=" token + + This fact would be expected to be used by Server-FTPs whose host + system allows things such as symbolic links so that the same file may + be represented in more than one directory on the server. The only + conclusion that should be drawn is that if two different names each + have the same value for the unique fact, they refer to the same + underlying object. The value of the unique fact (the token) should + be considered an opaque string for comparison purposes, and is a case + dependent value. The tokens "A" and "a" do not represent the same + underlying object. + +8.5.3. The modify Fact + + The modify fact is used to determine the last time the content of the + file (or directory) indicated was modified. Any change of substance + to the file should cause this value to alter. That is, if a change + is made to a file such that the results of a RETR command would + differ, then the value of the modify fact should alter. User-PIs + should not assume that a different modify fact value indicates that + the file contents are necessarily different than when last retrieved. + Some systems may alter the value of the modify fact for other + reasons, though this is discouraged wherever possible. Also a file + may alter, and then be returned to its previous content, which would + often be indicated as two incremental alterations to the value of the + modify fact. + + For directories, this value should alter whenever a change occurs to + the directory such that different filenames would (or might) be + included in MLSD output of that directory. + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 37] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + modify-fact = "Modify" "=" time-val + +8.5.4. The create Fact + + The create fact indicates when a file, or directory, was first + created. Exactly what "creation" is for this purpose is not + specified here, and may vary from server to server. About all that + can be said about the value returned is that it can never indicate a + later time than the modify fact. + + create-fact = "Create" "=" time-val + + Implementation Note: Implementors of this fact on UNIX(TM) systems + should note that the unix "stat" "st_ctime" field does not give + creation time, and that unix file systems do not record creation + time at all. Unix (and POSIX) implementations will normally not + include this fact. + +8.5.5. The perm Fact + + The perm fact is used to indicate access rights the current FTP user + has over the object listed. Its value is always an unordered + sequence of alphabetic characters. + + perm-fact = "Perm" "=" *pvals + pvals = "a" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f" / + "l" / "m" / "p" / "r" / "w" + + There are ten permission indicators currently defined. Many are + meaningful only when used with a particular type of object. The + indicators are case independent, "d" and "D" are the same indicator. + + The "a" permission applies to objects of type=file, and indicates + that the APPE (append) command may be applied to the file named. + + The "c" permission applies to objects of type=dir (and type=pdir, + type=cdir). It indicates that files may be created in the directory + named. That is, that a STOU command is likely to succeed, and that + STOR and APPE commands might succeed if the file named did not + previously exist, but is to be created in the directory object that + has the "c" permission. It also indicates that the RNTO command is + likely to succeed for names in the directory. + + The "d" permission applies to all types. It indicates that the + object named may be deleted, that is, that the RMD command may be + applied to it if it is a directory, and otherwise that the DELE + command may be applied to it. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 38] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The "e" permission applies to the directory types. When set on an + object of type=dir, type=cdir, or type=pdir it indicates that a CWD + command naming the object should succeed, and the user should be able + to enter the directory named. For type=pdir it also indicates that + the CDUP command may succeed (if this particular pathname is the one + to which a CDUP would apply.) + + The "f" permission for objects indicates that the object named may be + renamed - that is, may be the object of an RNFR command. + + The "l" permission applies to the directory file types, and indicates + that the listing commands, LIST, NLST, and MLSD may be applied to the + directory in question. + + The "m" permission applies to directory types, and indicates that the + MKD command may be used to create a new directory within the + directory under consideration. + + The "p" permission applies to directory types, and indicates that + objects in the directory may be deleted, or (stretching naming a + little) that the directory may be purged. Note: it does not indicate + that the RMD command may be used to remove the directory named + itself, the "d" permission indicator indicates that. + + The "r" permission applies to type=file objects, and for some + systems, perhaps to other types of objects, and indicates that the + RETR command may be applied to that object. + + The "w" permission applies to type=file objects, and for some + systems, perhaps to other types of objects, and indicates that the + STOR command may be applied to the object named. + + Note: That a permission indicator is set can never imply that the + appropriate command is guaranteed to work - just that it might. + Other system specific limitations, such as limitations on + available space for storing files, may cause an operation to + fail, where the permission flags may have indicated that it was + likely to succeed. The permissions are a guide only. + + Implementation note: The permissions are described here as they apply + to FTP commands. They may not map easily into particular + permissions available on the server's operating system. Servers + are expected to synthesize these permission bits from the + permission information available from operating system. For + example, to correctly determine whether the "D" permission bit + should be set on a directory for a server running on the + UNIX(TM) operating system, the server should check that the + directory named is empty, and that the user has write permission + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 39] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + on both the directory under consideration, and its parent + directory. + + Some systems may have more specific permissions than those + listed here, such systems should map those to the flags defined + as best they are able. Other systems may have only more broad + access controls. They will generally have just a few possible + permutations of permission flags, however they should attempt to + correctly represent what is permitted. + +8.5.6. The lang Fact + + The lang fact describes the natural language of the filename for use + in display purposes. Values used here should be taken from the + language registry of the IANA. See [13] for the syntax, and + procedures, related to language tags. + + lang-fact = "Lang" "=" token + + Server-FTP implementations MUST NOT guess language values. Language + values must be determined in an unambiguous way such as file system + tagging of language or by user configuration. Note that the lang + fact provides no information at all about the content of a file, only + about the encoding of its name. + +8.5.7. The size Fact + + The size fact applies to non-directory file types and should always + reflect the approximate size of the file. This should be as accurate + as the server can make it, without going to extraordinary lengths, + such as reading the entire file. The size is expressed in units of + octets of data in the file. + + Given limitations in some systems, Client-FTP implementations must + understand this size may not be precise and may change between the + time of a MLST and RETR operation. + + Clients that need highly accurate size information for some + particular reason should use the SIZE command as defined in section + 4. The most common need for this accuracy is likely to be in + conjunction with the REST command described in section 5. The size + fact, on the other hand, should be used for purposes such as + indicating to a human user the approximate size of the file to be + transferred, and perhaps to give an idea of expected transfer + completion time. + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 40] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + size-fact = "Size" "=" 1*DIGIT + +8.5.8. The media-type Fact + + The media-type fact represents the IANA media type of the file named, + and applies only to non-directory types. The list of values used + must follow the guidelines set by the IANA registry. + + media-type = "Media-Type" "=" + + Server-FTP implementations MUST NOT guess media type values. Media + type values must be determined in an unambiguous way such as file + system tagging of media-type or by user configuration. This fact + gives information about the content of the file named. Both the + primary media type, and any appropriate subtype should be given, + separated by a slash "/" as is traditional. + +8.5.9. The charset Fact + + The charset fact provides the IANA character set name, or alias, for + the encoded pathnames in a MLSx response. The default character set + is UTF-8 unless specified otherwise. FTP implementations SHOULD use + UTF-8 if possible to encourage maximum interoperability. The value + of this fact applies to the pathname only, and provides no + information about the contents of the file. + + charset-type = "Charset" "=" token + +8.5.10. Required facts + + Servers are not required to support any particular set of the + available facts. However, servers SHOULD, if conceivably possible, + support at least the type, perm, size, unique, and modify facts. + +8.6. System Dependent and Local Facts + + By using an system dependent fact, or a local fact, a server-PI may + communicate to the user-PI information about the file named which is + peculiar to the underlying file system. + +8.6.1. System Dependent Facts + + System dependent fact names are labeled by prefixing a label + identifying the specific information returned by the name of the + appropriate operating system from the IANA maintained list of + operating system names. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 41] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The value of an OS dependent fact may be whatever is appropriate to + convey the information available. It must be encoded as a "token" as + defined in section 2.1 however. + + In order to allow reliable interoperation between users of system + dependent facts, the IANA will maintain a registry of system + dependent fact names, their syntax, and the interpretation to be + given to their values. Registrations of system dependent facts are + to be accomplished according to the procedures of section 11. + +8.6.2. Local Facts + + Implementations may also make available other facts of their own + choosing. As the method of interpretation of such information will + generally not be widely understood, server-PIs should be aware that + clients will typically ignore any local facts provided. As there is + no registration of locally defined facts, it is entirely possible + that different servers will use the same local fact name to provide + vastly different information. Hence user-PIs should be hesitant + about making any use of any information in a locally defined fact + without some other specific assurance that the particular fact is one + that they do comprehend. + + Local fact names all begin with the sequence "X.". The rest of the + name is a "token" (see section 2.1). The value of a local fact can + be anything at all, provided it can be encoded as a "token". + +8.7. MLSx Examples + + The following examples are all taken from dialogues between existing + FTP clients and servers. Because of this, not all possible + variations of possible response formats are shown in the examples. + This should not be taken as limiting the options of other server + implementors. Where the examples show OS dependent information, that + is to be treated as being purely for the purposes of demonstration of + some possible OS specific information that could be defined. As at + the time of the writing of this document, no OS specific facts or + file types have been defined, the examples shown here should not be + treated as in any way to be preferred over other possible similar + definitions. Consult the IANA registries to determine what types and + facts have been defined. + + In the examples shown, only relevant commands and responses have been + included. This is not to imply that other commands (including + authentication, directory modification, PORT or PASV commands, or + similar) would not be present in an actual connection, or were not, + in fact, actually used in the examples before editing. Note also + that the formats shown are those that are transmitted between client + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 42] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + and server, not formats which would normally ever be reported to the + user of the client. + + In the examples, lines that begin "C> " were sent over the control + connection from the client to the server, lines that begin "S> " were + sent over the control connection from the server to the client, and + lines that begin "D> " were sent from the server to the client over a + data connection created just to send those lines and closed + immediately after. No examples here show data transferred over a + data connection from the client to the server. In all cases, the + prefixes shown above, including the one space, have been added for + the purposes of this document, and are not a part of the data + exchanged between client and server. + +8.7.1. Simple MLST + + C> PWD + S> 257 "/tmp" is current directory. + C> MLst cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> 250- Listing cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> Type=file;Size=1024990;Perm=r; /tmp/cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> 250 End + + The client first asked to be told the current directory of the + server. This was purely for the purposes of clarity of this example. + The client then requested facts about a specific file. The server + returned the "250-" first control-response line, followed by a single + line of facts about the file, followed by the terminating "250 " + line. The text on the control-response line and the terminating line + can be anything the server decides to send. Notice that the fact + line is indented by a single space. Notice also that there are no + spaces in the set of facts returned, until the single space before + the filename. The filename returned on the fact line is a fully + qualified pathname of the file listed. The facts returned show that + the line refers to a file, that file contains approximately 1024990 + bytes, though more or less than that may be transferred if the file + is retrieved, and a different number may be required to store the + file at the client's file store, and the connected user has + permission to retrieve the file but not to do anything else + particularly interesting. + +8.7.2. MLST of a directory + + C> PWD + S> 257 "/" is current directory. + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Type=dir;Modify=19981107085215;Perm=el; /tmp + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 43] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + S> 250 End + + Again the PWD is just for the purposes of demonstration for the + example. The MLST fact line this time shows that the file listed is + a directory, that it was last modified at 08:52:15 on the 7th of + November, 1998 UTC, and that the user has permission to enter the + directory, and to list its contents, but not to modify it in any way. + Again, the fully qualified path name of the directory listed is + given. + +8.7.3. MLSD of a directory + + C> MLSD tmp + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD tmp + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19981107085215;Perm=el; tmp + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19981107085215;Perm=el; /tmp + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990112030508;Perm=el; .. + D> Type=file;Size=25730;Modify=19940728095854;Perm=; capmux.tar.z + D> Type=file;Size=1830;Modify=19940916055648;Perm=r; hatch.c + D> Type=file;Size=25624;Modify=19951003165342;Perm=r; MacIP-02.txt + D> Type=file;Size=2154;Modify=19950501105033;Perm=r; uar.netbsd.patch + D> Type=file;Size=54757;Modify=19951105101754;Perm=r; iptnnladev.1.0.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=226546;Modify=19970515023901;Perm=r; melbcs.tif + D> Type=file;Size=12927;Modify=19961025135602;Perm=r; tardis.1.6.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=17867;Modify=19961025135602;Perm=r; timelord.1.4.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=224907;Modify=19980615100045;Perm=r; uar.1.2.3.sit.hqx + D> Type=file;Size=1024990;Modify=19980130010322;Perm=r; cap60.pl198.tar.gz + S> 226 MLSD completed + + In this example notice that there is no leading space on the fact + lines returned over the data connection. Also notice that two lines + of "type=cdir" have been given. These show two alternate names for + the directory listed, one a fully qualified pathname, and the other a + local name relative to the servers current directory when the MLSD + was performed. Note that all other filenames in the output are + relative to the directory listed, though the server could, if it + chose, give a fully qualified path name for the "type=pdir" line. + This server has chosen not to. The other files listed present a + fairly boring set of files that are present in the listed directory. + Note that there is no particular order in which they are listed. + They are not sorted by filename, by size, or by modify time. Note + also that the "perm" fact has an empty value for the file + "capmux.tar.z" indicating that the connected user has no permissions + at all for that file. This server has chosen to present the "cdir" + and "pdir" lines before the lines showing the content of the + directory, it is not required to do so. The "size" fact does not + provide any meaningful information for a directory, so is not + included in the fact lines for the directory types shown. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 44] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.7.4. A more complex example + + C> MLst test + S> 250- Listing test + S> Type=dir;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4 test + S> 250 End + C> MLSD test + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD test + D> Type=cdir;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4; test + D> Type=pdir;Perm=e;Unique=keVO1+d?3; .. + D> Type=OS.unix=slink:/foobar;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+4G4; foobar + D> Type=OS.unix=chr-13/29;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+5G4; device + D> Type=OS.unix=blk-11/108;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+6G4; block + D> Type=file;Perm=awr;Unique=keVO1+8G4; writable + D> Type=dir;Perm=cpmel;Unique=keVO1+7G4; promiscuous + D> Type=dir;Perm=;Unique=keVO1+1t2; no-exec + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+EG4; two words + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+IH4; leading space + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file1 + D> Type=dir;Perm=cpmel;Unique=keVO1+7G4; incoming + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file2 + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file3 + D> Type=file;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file4 + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD test/incoming + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD test/incoming + D> Type=cdir;Perm=cpmel;Unique=keVO1+7G4; test/incoming + D> Type=pdir;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4; .. + D> Type=file;Perm=awdrf;Unique=keVO1+EH4; bar + D> Type=file;Perm=awdrf;Unique=keVO1+LH4; + D> Type=file;Perm=rf;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file5 + D> Type=file;Perm=rf;Unique=keVO1+1G4; file6 + D> Type=dir;Perm=cpmdelf;Unique=keVO1+!s2; empty + S> 226 MLSD completed + + For the purposes of this example the fact set requested has been + modified to delete the "size" and "modify" facts, and add the + "unique" fact. First, facts about a filename have been obtained via + MLST. Note that no fully qualified path name was given this time. + That was because the server was unable to determine that information. + Then having determined that the filename represents a directory, that + directory has been listed. That listing also shows no fully + qualified path name, for the same reason, thus has but a single + "type=cdir" line. This directory (which was created especially for + the purpose) contains several interesting files. There are some with + OS dependent file types, several sub-directories, and several + ordinary files. + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 45] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + Not much can be said here about the OS dependent file types, as none + of the information shown there should be treated as any more than + possibilities. It can be seen that the OS type of the server is + "unix" though, which is one of the OS types in the IANA registry of + Operating System names. + + Of the three directories listed, "no-exec" has no permission granted + to this user to access at all. From the "Unique" fact values, it can + be determined that "promiscuous" and "incoming" in fact represent the + same directory. Its permissions show that the connected user has + permission to do essentially anything other than to delete the + directory. That directory was later listed. It happens that the + directory can not be deleted because it is not empty. + + Of the normal files listed, two contain spaces in their names. The + file called " leading space" actually contains two spaces in its + name, one before the "l" and one between the "g" and the "s". The + two spaces that separate the facts from the visible part of the path + name make that clear. The file "writable" has the "a" and "w" + permission bits set, and consequently the connected user should be + able to STOR or APPE to that file. + + The other four file names, "file1", "file2", "file3", and "file4" all + represent the same underlying file, as can be seen from the values of + the "unique" facts of each. It happens that "file1" and "file2" are + Unix "hard" links, and that "file3" and "file4" are "soft" or + "symbolic" links to the first two. None of that information is + available via standard MLST facts, it is sufficient for the purposes + of FTP to note that all represent the same file, and that the same + data would be fetched no matter which of them was retrieved, and that + all would be simultaneously modified were data stored in any. + + Finally, the sub-directory "incoming" is listed. Since "promiscuous" + is the same directory there would be no point listing it as well. In + that directory, the files "file5" and "file6" represent still more + names for the "file1" file we have seen before. Notice the entry + between that for "bar" and "file5". Though it is not possible to + easily represent it in this document, that shows a file with a name + comprising exactly three spaces (" "). A client will have no + difficulty determining that name from the output presented to it + however. The directory "empty" is, as its name implies, empty, + though that is not shown here. It can, however, be deleted, as can + file "bar" and the file whose name is three spaces. All the files + that reside in this directory can be renamed. This is a consequence + of the UNIX semantics of the directory that contains them being + modifiable. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 46] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.7.5. More accurate time information + + C> MLst file1 + S> 250- Listing file1 + S> Type=file;Modify=19990929003355.237; file1 + S> 250 End + + In this example, the server-FTP is indicating that "file1" was last + modified 237 milliseconds after 00:33:55 UTC on the 29th of + September, 1999. + +8.7.6. A different server + + C> MLST + S> 250-Begin + S> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABCAAA; / + S> 250 End. + C> MLSD . + S> 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for MLS. + D> type=cdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABCAAA; / + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABEAAA; bin + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABGAAA; etc + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAAB8AwA; halflife + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABoAAA; incoming + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABIAAA; lib + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABWAEA; linux + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABKAEA; ncftpd + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABGAEA; outbox + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABuAAA; quake2 + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABQAEA; winstuff + S> 226 Listing completed. + C> MLSD linux + S> 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for MLS. + D> type=cdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABWAEA; /linux + D> type=pdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABCAAA; / + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABeAEA; firewall + D> type=file;size=12;unique=AQkAAAAAAAACWAEA; helo_world + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABYAEA; kernel + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABmAEA; scripts + D> type=dir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABkAEA; security + S> 226 Listing completed. + C> MLSD linux/kernel + S> 150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for MLS. + D> type=cdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABYAEA; /linux/kernel + D> type=pdir;unique=AQkAAAAAAAABWAEA; /linux + D> type=file;size=6704;unique=AQkAAAAAAAADYAEA; k.config + D> type=file;size=7269221;unique=AQkAAAAAAAACYAEA; linux-2.0.36.tar.gz + D> type=file;size=12514594;unique=AQkAAAAAAAAEYAEA; linux-2.1.130.tar.gz + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 47] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + S> 226 Listing completed. + + Note that this server returns its "unique" fact value in quite a + different format. It also returns fully qualified path names for the + "pdir" entry. + +8.7.7. Some IANA files + + C> MLSD . + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD . + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990219183438; /iana/assignments + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990112030453; .. + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990219073522; media-types + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033515; character-set-info + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033529; languages + D> Type=file;Size=44242;Modify=19990217230400; character-sets + D> Type=file;Size=1947;Modify=19990209215600; operating-system-names + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD media-types + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD media-types + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990219073522; media-types + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990219073522; /iana/assignments/media-types + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990219183438; .. + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033045; text + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990219183442; image + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033216; multipart + D> Type=dir;Modify=19990112033254; video + D> Type=file;Size=30249;Modify=19990218032700; media-types + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD character-set-info + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD character-set-info + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033515; character-set-info + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033515; /iana/assignments/character-set-info + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990219183438; .. + D> Type=file;Size=1234;Modify=19980903020400; windows-1251 + D> Type=file;Size=4557;Modify=19980922001400; tis-620 + D> Type=file;Size=801;Modify=19970324130000; ibm775 + D> Type=file;Size=552;Modify=19970320130000; ibm866 + D> Type=file;Size=922;Modify=19960505140000; windows-1258 + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> MLSD languages + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD languages + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033529; languages + D> Type=cdir;Modify=19990112033529; /iana/assignments/languages + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990219183438; .. + D> Type=file;Size=2391;Modify=19980309130000; default + D> Type=file;Size=943;Modify=19980309130000; tags + D> Type=file;Size=870;Modify=19971026130000; navajo + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 48] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + D> Type=file;Size=699;Modify=19950911140000; no-bok + S> 226 MLSD completed + C> PWD + S> 257 "/iana/assignments" is current directory. + + This example shows some of the IANA maintained files that are + relevant for this specification in MLSD format. Note that these + listings have been edited by deleting many entries, the actual + listings are much longer. + +8.7.8. A stress test of case (in)dependence + + The following example is intended to make clear some cases where case + dependent strings are permitted in the MLSx commands, and where case + independent strings are required. + + C> MlsD . + S> 150 BINARY connection open for MLSD . + D> Type=pdir;Modify=19990929011228;Perm=el;Unique=keVO1+ZF4; .. + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+Bd8; FILE2 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+aG8; file3 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+ag8; FILE3 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bD8; file1 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bD8; file2 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+Ag8; File3 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bD8; File1 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+Bd8; File2 + D> Type=file;Size=4096;Modify=19990929011440;Perm=r;Unique=keVO1+bd8; FILE1 + S> 226 MLSD completed + + Note first that the "MLSD" command, shown here as "MlsD" is case + independent. Clients may issue this command in any case, or + combination of cases, they desire. This is the case for all FTP + commands. + + Next, notice the labels of the facts. These are also case + independent strings, Server-FTP is permitted to return them in any + case they desire. User-FTP must be prepared to deal with any case, + though it may do this by mapping the labels to a common case if + desired. + + Then, notice that there are nine objects of "type" file returned. In + a case independent NVFS these would represent three different file + names, "file1", "file2", and "file3". With a case dependent NVFS all + nine represent different file names. Either is possible, server-FTPs + may implement a case dependent or a case independent NVFS. User-FTPs + must allow for case dependent selection of files to manipulate on the + server. + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 49] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + Lastly, notice that the value of the "unique" fact is case dependent. + In the example shown, "file1", "File1", and "file2" all have the same + "unique" fact value "keVO1+bD8", and thus all represent the same + underlying file. On the other hand, "FILE1" has a different "unique" + fact value ("keVO1+bd8") and hence represents a different file. + Similarly, "FILE2" and "File2" are two names for the same underlying + file, whereas "file3", "File3" and "FILE3" all represent different + underlying files. + + That the approximate sizes ("size" fact) and last modification times + ("modify" fact) are the same in all cases might be no more than a + coincidence. + + It is not suggested that the operators of server-FTPs create NVFS + which stress the protocols to this extent, however both user and + server implementations must be prepared to deal with such extreme + examples. + +8.8. FEAT response for MLSx + + When responding to the FEAT command, a server-FTP process that + supports MLST, and MLSD, plus internationalization of pathnames, MUST + indicate that this support exists. It does this by including a MLST + feature line. As well as indicating the basic support, the MLST + feature line indicates which MLST facts are available from the + server, and which of those will be returned if no subsequent "OPTS + MLST" command is sent. + + mlst-feat = SP "MLST" [SP factlist] CRLF + factlist = 1*( factname ["*"] ";" ) + + The initial space shown in the mlst-feat response is that required by + the FEAT command, two spaces are not permitted. If no factlist is + given, then the server-FTP process is indicating that it supports + MLST, but implements no facts. Only pathnames can be returned. This + would be a minimal MLST implementation, and useless for most + practical purposes. Where the factlist is present, the factnames + included indicate the facts supported by the server. Where the + optional asterisk appears after a factname, that fact will be + included in MLST format responses, until an "OPTS MLST" is given to + alter the list of facts returned. After that, subsequent FEAT + commands will return the asterisk to show the facts selected by the + most recent "OPTS MLST". + + Note that there is no distinct FEAT output for MLSD. The presence of + the MLST feature indicates that both MLST and MLSD are supported. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 50] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +8.8.1. Examples + + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> REST STREAM + S> MDTM + S> SIZE + S> TVFS + S> UTF8 + S> MLST Type*;Size*;Modify*;Perm*;Unique*;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + + Aside from some features irrelevant here, this server indicates that + it supports MLST including several, but not all, standard facts, all + of which it will send by default. It also supports two OS dependent + facts, and one locally defined fact. The latter three must be + requested expressly by the client for this server to supply them. + + C> Feat + S> 211-Extensions supported: + S> CLNT + S> MDTM + S> MLST type*;size*;modify*;UNIX.mode*;UNIX.owner;UNIX.group;unique; + S> PASV + S> REST STREAM + S> SIZE + S> TVFS + S> Compliance Level: 19981201 (IETF mlst-05) + S> 211 End. + + Again, in addition to some irrelevant features here, this server + indicates that it supports MLST, four of the standard facts, one of + which ("unique") is not enabled by default, and several OS dependent + facts, one of which is provided by the server by default. This + server actually supported more OS dependent facts. Others were + deleted for the purposes of this document to comply with document + formatting restrictions. + +8.9. OPTS parameters for MLST + + For the MLSx commands, the Client-FTP may specify a list of facts it + wishes to be returned in all subsequent MLSx commands until another + OPTS MLST command is sent. The format is specified by: + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 51] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + mlst-opts = "OPTS" SP "MLST" + [ SP 1*( factname ";" ) ] + + By sending the "OPTS MLST" command, the client requests the server to + include only the facts listed as arguments to the command in + subsequent output from MLSx commands. Facts not included in the + "OPTS MLST" command MUST NOT be returned by the server. Facts that + are included should be returned for each entry returned from the MLSx + command where they meaningfully apply. Facts requested that are not + supported, or which are inappropriate to the file or directory being + listed should simply be omitted from the MLSx output. This is not an + error. Note that where no factname arguments are present, the client + is requesting that only the file names be returned. In this case, + and in any other case where no facts are included in the result, the + space that separates the fact names and their values from the file + name is still required. That is, the first character of the output + line will be a space, (or two characters will be spaces when the line + is returned over the control connection,) and the file name will + start immediately thereafter. + + Clients should note that generating values for some facts can be + possible, but very expensive, for some servers. It is generally + acceptable to retrieve any of the facts that the server offers as its + default set before any "OPTS MLST" command has been given, however + clients should use particular caution before requesting any facts not + in that set. That is, while other facts may be available from the + server, clients should refrain from requesting such facts unless + there is a particular operational requirement for that particular + information, which ought be more significant than perhaps simply + improving the information displayed to an end user. + + Note, there is no "OPTS MLSD" command, the fact names set with the + "OPTS MLST" command apply to both MLST and MLSD commands. + + Servers are not required to accept "OPTS MLST" commands before + authentication of the user-PI, but may choose to permit them. + +8.9.1. OPTS MLST Response + + The "response-message" from [6] to a successful OPTS MLST command has + the following syntax. + + mlst-opt-resp = "MLST OPTS" [ SP 1*( factname ";" ) ] + + This defines the "response-message" as used in the "opts-good" + message in RFC2389 [6]. + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 52] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + The facts named in the response are those which the server will now + include in MLST (and MLSD) response, after the processing of the + "OPTS MLST" command. Any facts from the request not supported by the + server will be omitted from this response message. If no facts will + be included, the list of facts will be empty. Note that the list of + facts returned will be the same as those marked by a trailing + asterisk ("*") in a subsequent FEAT command response. There is no + requirement that the order of the facts returned be the same as that + in which they were requested, or that in which they will be listed in + a FEAT command response, or that in which facts are returned in MLST + responses. The fixed string "MLST OPTS" in the response may be + returned in any case, or mixture of cases. + +8.9.2. Examples + + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size;Modify*;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> OptS Mlst Type;UNIX.mode;Perm; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Type;Perm;UNIX.mode; + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size;Modify;Perm*;Unique;UNIX.mode*;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> opts MLst lang;type;charset;create; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Type; + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> OPTS mlst size;frogs; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Size; + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type;Size*;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> opts MLst unique type; + S> 501 Invalid MLST options + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type;Size*;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + + For the purposes of this example, features other than MLST have been + deleted from the output to avoid clutter. The example shows the + initial default feature output for MLST. The facts requested are + then changed by the client. The first change shows facts that are + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 53] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + available from the server being selected. Subsequent FEAT output + shows the altered features as being returned. The client then + attempts to select some standard features which the server does not + support. This is not an error, however the server simply ignores the + requests for unsupported features, as the FEAT output that follows + shows. Then, the client attempts to request a non-standard, and + unsupported, feature. The server ignores that, and selects only the + supported features requested. Lastly, the client sends a request + containing a syntax error (spaces cannot appear in the factlist.) The + server-FTP sends an error response and completely ignores the + request, leaving the fact set selected as it had been previously. + + Note that in all cases, except the error response, the response lists + the facts that have been selected. + + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type*;Size*;Modify*;Perm*;Unique*;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> Opts MLST + S> 201 MLST OPTS + C> Feat + S> 211- Features supported + S> MLST Type;Size;Modify;Perm;Unique;UNIX.mode;UNIX.chgd;X.hidden; + S> 211 End + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OPTS mlst unique;size; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Size;Unique; + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OPTS mlst unique;type;modify; + S> 201 MLST OPTS Type;Modify;Unique; + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Type=dir;Modify=19990930152225;Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OPTS mlst fish;cakes; + S> 201 MLST OPTS + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> /tmp + S> 250 End + C> OptS Mlst Modify;Unique; + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 54] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + S> 201 MLST OPTS Modify;Unique; + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Modify=19990930152225;Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + C> opts MLst fish cakes; + S> 501 Invalid MLST options + C> MLst tmp + S> 250- Listing tmp + S> Modify=19990930152225;Unique=keVO1+YZ5; /tmp + S> 250 End + + This example shows the effect of changing the facts requested upon + subsequent MLST commands. Notice that a syntax error leaves the set + of selected facts unchanged. Also notice exactly two spaces + preceding the pathname when no facts were selected, either + deliberately, or because none of the facts requested were available. + +9. Impact On Other FTP Commands + + Along with the introduction of MLST, traditional FTP commands must be + extended to allow for the use of more than US-ASCII or EBCDIC + character sets. In general, the support of MLST requires support for + arbitrary character sets wherever filenames and directory names are + allowed. This applies equally to both arguments given to the + following commands and to the replies from them, as appropriate. + + CWD + RETR + STOR + STOU + APPE + RNFR + RNTO + DELE + RMD + MKD + PWD + STAT + + The arguments to all of these commands should be processed the same + way that MLST commands and responses are processed with respect to + handling embedded spaces, CRs and NULs. See section 2.2. + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 55] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +10. Character sets and Internationalization + + FTP commands are protocol elements, and are always expressed in + ASCII. FTP responses are composed of the numeric code, which is a + protocol element, and a message, which is often expected to convey + information to the user. It is not expected that users normally + interact directly with the protocol elements, rather the user FTP- + process constructs the commands, and interprets the results, in the + manner best suited for the particular user. Explanatory text in + responses generally has no particular meaning to the protocol. The + numeric codes provide all necessary information. Server-PIs are free + to provide the text in any language that can be adequately + represented in ASCII, or where an alternative language and + representation has been negotiated (see [7]) in that language and + representation. + + Pathnames are expected to be encoded in UTF-8 allowing essentially + any character to be represented in a pathname. Meaningful pathnames + are defined by the server NVFS. + + No restrictions at all are placed upon the contents of files + transferred using the FTP protocols. Unless the "media-type" fact is + provided in a MLSx response nor is any advice given here which would + allow determining the content type. That information is assumed to + be obtained via other means. + +11. IANA Considerations + + This specification makes use of some lists of values currently + maintained by the IANA, and creates two new lists for the IANA to + maintain. It does not add any values to any existing registries. + + The existing IANA registries used by this specification are modified + using mechanisms specified elsewhere. + +11.1. The OS specific fact registry + + A registry of OS specific fact names shall be maintained by the IANA. + The OS names for the OS portion of the fact name must be taken from + the IANA's list of registered OS names. To add a fact name to this + OS specific registry of OS specific facts, an applicant must send to + the IANA a request, in which is specified the OS name, the OS + specific fact name, a definition of the syntax of the fact value, + which must conform to the syntax of a token as given in this + document, and a specification of the semantics to be associated with + the particular fact and its values. Upon receipt of such an + application, and if the combination of OS name and OS specific fact + name has not been previously defined, the IANA will add the + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 56] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + specification to the registry. + + Any examples of OS specific facts found in this document are to be + treated as examples of possible OS specific facts, and do not form a + part of the IANA's registry merely because of being included in this + document. + +11.2. The OS specific filetype registry + + A registry of OS specific file types shall be maintained by the IANA. + The OS names for the OS portion of the fact name must be taken from + the IANA's list of registered OS names. To add a file type to this + OS specific registry of OS specific file types, an applicant must + send to the IANA a request, in which is specified the OS name, the OS + specific file type, a definition of the syntax of the fact value, + which must conform to the syntax of a token as given in this + document, and a specification of the semantics to be associated with + the particular fact and its values. Upon receipt of such an + application, and if the combination of OS name and OS specific file + type has not been previously defined, the IANA will add the + specification to the registry. + + Any examples of OS specific file types found in this document are to + be treated as potential OS specific file types only, and do not form + a part of the IANA's registry merely because of being included in + this document. + +12. Security Considerations + + This memo does not directly concern security. It is not believed + that any of the mechanisms documented here impact in any particular + way upon the security of FTP. + + Implementing the SIZE command, and perhaps some of the facts of the + MDLx commands, may impose a considerable load on the server, which + could lead to denial of service attacks. Servers have, however, + implemented this for many years, without significant reported + difficulties. + + With the introduction of virtual hosts to FTP, and the possible + accompanying multiple authentication environments, server + implementors will need to take some care to ensure that integrity is + maintained. + + The FEAT and OPTS commands may be issued before the FTP + authentication has occurred [6]. This allows unauthenticated clients + to determine which of the features defined here are supported, and to + negotiate the fact list for MLSx output. No actual MLSx commands may + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 57] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + be issued however, and no problems with permitting the selection of + the format prior to authentication are foreseen. + + A general discussion of issues related to the security of FTP can be + found in [14]. + +13. References + + [1] Coded Character Set--7-bit American Standard Code for Information + Interchange, ANSI X3.4-1986. + + [2] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode and ISO + 10646", RFC 2044, October 1996. + + [3] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "File Transfer Protocol (FTP)", + STD 9, RFC 959, October 1985 + + [4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 + + [5] Crocker, D., Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997 + + [6] Hethmon, P., Elz, R., "Feature negotiation mechanism for the + File Transfer Protocol", RFC 2389, August 1998 + + [7] Curtin, W., "Internationalization of the File Transfer Protocol", + RFC 2640, July 1999 + + [8] Postel, J., Reynolds, J., "Telnet protocol Specification" + STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983 + + [9] Braden, R,. "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application + and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989 + + [10] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities" + STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987 + + [11] ISO/IEC 10646-1:1993 "Universal multiple-octet coded character set + (UCS) -- Part 1: Architecture and basic multilingual plane", + International Standard -- Information Technology, 1993 + + [12] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. http://www.iana.org + Email: iana@iana.org. + + [13] Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of Languages" + RFC 1766, March 1995 + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 58] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + + [14] Allman, M., Ostermann, S., "FTP Security Considerations" + RFC 2577, May 1999 + +Acknowledgments + + This document is a product of the FTPEXT working group of the IETF. + + The following people are among those who have contributed to this + document: + + Alex Belits + D. J. Bernstein + Dave Cridland + Martin J. Duerst + Mike Gleason + Mark Harris + Alun Jones + James Matthews + Luke Mewburn + Jan Mikkelsen + Keith Moore + Buz Owen + Mark Symons + Stephen Tihor + and the entire FTPEXT working group of the IETF. + + Apologies are offered to any inadvertently omitted. + + Bernhard Rosenkraenzer suggested the HOST command, and initially + described it. + + The description of the modifications to the REST command and the MDTM + and SIZE commands comes from a set of modifications suggested for + RFC959 by Rick Adams in 1989. A draft containing just those + commands, edited by David Borman, has been merged with this document. + + Mike Gleason provided access to the FTP server used in some of the + examples. + + All of the examples in this document are taken from actual + client/server exchanges, though some have been edited for brevity, or + to meet document formatting requirements. + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 59] + + +Internet Draft draft-ietf-ftpext-mlst-08.txt October 1999 + + +Copyright + + This document is in the public domain. Any and all copyright + protection that might apply in any jurisdiction is expressly + disclaimed. + +Editors' Addresses + + Robert Elz + University of Melbourne + Department of Computer Science + Parkville, Vic 3052 + Australia + + Email: kre@munnari.OZ.AU + + + Paul Hethmon + Hethmon Brothers + 2305 Chukar Road + Knoxville, TN 37923 USA + + Phone: +1 423 690 8990 + Email: phethmon@hethmon.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Elz & Hethmon [Expires April 2000] [Page 60] diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..132b855 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1508.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2747 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 1508 Geer Zolot Associates + September 1993 + + + Generic Security Service Application Program Interface + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status + of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) + definition provides security services to callers in a generic + fashion, supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms and + technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of + applications to different environments. This specification defines + GSS-API services and primitives at a level independent of underlying + mechanism and programming language environment, and is to be + complemented by other, related specifications: + + documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular + language environments + + documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to + be implemented in order to realize GSS-API services atop + particular security mechanisms + +Table of Contents + + 1. GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts ....................... 2 + 1.1. GSS-API Constructs ....................................... 5 + 1.1.1. Credentials ........................................... 5 + 1.1.2. Tokens ................................................ 6 + 1.1.3. Security Contexts ..................................... 7 + 1.1.4. Mechanism Types ....................................... 8 + 1.1.5. Naming ................................................ 9 + 1.1.6. Channel Bindings ...................................... 10 + 1.2. GSS-API Features and Issues ............................. 11 + 1.2.1. Status Reporting ...................................... 11 + 1.2.2. Per-Message Security Service Availability ............. 12 + 1.2.3. Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing ........... 13 + 1.2.4. Quality of Protection ................................. 15 + + + +Linn [Page 1] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + 2. Interface Descriptions ..................................... 15 + 2.1. Credential management calls ............................. 17 + 2.1.1. GSS_Acquire_cred call ................................. 17 + 2.1.2. GSS_Release_cred call ................................. 19 + 2.1.3. GSS_Inquire_cred call ................................. 20 + 2.2. Context-level calls ..................................... 21 + 2.2.1. GSS_Init_sec_context call ............................. 21 + 2.2.2. GSS_Accept_sec_context call ........................... 26 + 2.2.3. GSS_Delete_sec_context call ........................... 29 + 2.2.4. GSS_Process_context_token call ........................ 30 + 2.2.5. GSS_Context_time call ................................. 31 + 2.3. Per-message calls ....................................... 32 + 2.3.1. GSS_Sign call ......................................... 32 + 2.3.2. GSS_Verify call ....................................... 33 + 2.3.3. GSS_Seal call ......................................... 35 + 2.3.4. GSS_Unseal call ....................................... 36 + 2.4. Support calls ........................................... 37 + 2.4.1. GSS_Display_status call ............................... 37 + 2.4.2. GSS_Indicate_mechs call ............................... 38 + 2.4.3. GSS_Compare_name call ................................. 38 + 2.4.4. GSS_Display_name call ................................. 39 + 2.4.5. GSS_Import_name call .................................. 40 + 2.4.6. GSS_Release_name call ................................. 41 + 2.4.7. GSS_Release_buffer call ............................... 41 + 2.4.8. GSS_Release_oid_set call .............................. 42 + 3. Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios ....................... 42 + 3.1. Kerberos V5, single-TGT ................................. 43 + 3.2. Kerberos V5, double-TGT ................................. 43 + 3.3. X.509 Authentication Framework .......................... 44 + 4. Related Activities ......................................... 45 + 5. Acknowledgments ............................................ 46 + 6. Security Considerations .................................... 46 + 7. Author's Address ........................................... 46 + Appendix A .................................................... 47 + Appendix B .................................................... 48 + Appendix C .................................................... 49 + +1. GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts + + The operational paradigm in which GSS-API operates is as follows. A + typical GSS-API caller is itself a communications protocol, calling + on GSS-API in order to protect its communications with + authentication, integrity, and/or confidentiality security services. + A GSS-API caller accepts tokens provided to it by its local GSS-API + implementation and transfers the tokens to a peer on a remote system; + that peer passes the received tokens to its local GSS-API + implementation for processing. The security services available + through GSS-API in this fashion are implementable (and have been + + + +Linn [Page 2] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + implemented) over a range of underlying mechanisms based on secret- + key and public-key cryptographic technologies. + + The GSS-API separates the operations of initializing a security + context between peers, achieving peer entity authentication (This + security service definition, and other definitions used in this + document, corresponds to that provided in International Standard ISO + 7498-2-1988(E), Security Architecture.) (GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls), from the operations of providing + per-message data origin authentication and data integrity protection + (GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify() calls) for messages subsequently + transferred in conjunction with that context. Per-message GSS_Seal() + and GSS_Unseal() calls provide the data origin authentication and + data integrity services which GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify() offer, and + also support selection of confidentiality services as a caller + option. Additional calls provide supportive functions to the GSS- + API's users. + + The following paragraphs provide an example illustrating the + dataflows involved in use of the GSS-API by a client and server in a + mechanism-independent fashion, establishing a security context and + transferring a protected message. The example assumes that credential + acquisition has already been completed. The example assumes that the + underlying authentication technology is capable of authenticating a + client to a server using elements carried within a single token, and + of authenticating the server to the client (mutual authentication) + with a single returned token; this assumption holds for presently- + documented CAT mechanisms but is not necessarily true for other + cryptographic technologies and associated protocols. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context() to establish a security + context to the server identified by targ_name, and elects to set the + mutual_req_flag so that mutual authentication is performed in the + course of context establishment. GSS_Init_sec_context() returns an + output_token to be passed to the server, and indicates + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status pending completion of the mutual + authentication sequence. Had mutual_req_flag not been set, the + initial call to GSS_Init_sec_context() would have returned + GSS_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_token to the server. + + The server passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context indicates + GSS_COMPLETE status, provides the client's authenticated identity in + the src_name result, and provides an output_token to be passed to the + client. The server sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + a successor call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), which processes data + + + +Linn [Page 3] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + included in the token in order to achieve mutual authentication from + the client's viewpoint. This call to GSS_Init_sec_context() returns + GSS_COMPLETE status, indicating successful mutual authentication and + the completion of context establishment for this example. + + The client generates a data message and passes it to GSS_Seal(). + GSS_Seal() performs data origin authentication, data integrity, and + (optionally) confidentiality processing on the message and + encapsulates the result into output_message, indicating GSS_COMPLETE + status. The client sends the output_message to the server. + + The server passes the received message to GSS_Unseal(). GSS_Unseal + inverts the encapsulation performed by GSS_Seal(), deciphers the + message if the optional confidentiality feature was applied, and + validates the data origin authentication and data integrity checking + quantities. GSS_Unseal() indicates successful validation by + returning GSS_COMPLETE status along with the resultant + output_message. + + For purposes of this example, we assume that the server knows by + out-of-band means that this context will have no further use after + one protected message is transferred from client to server. Given + this premise, the server now calls GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush + context-level information. GSS_Delete_sec_context() returns a + context_token for the server to pass to the client. + + The client passes the returned context_token to + GSS_Process_context_token(), which returns GSS_COMPLETE status after + deleting context-level information at the client system. + + The GSS-API design assumes and addresses several basic goals, + including: + + Mechanism independence: The GSS-API defines an interface to + cryptographically implemented strong authentication and other + security services at a generic level which is independent of + particular underlying mechanisms. For example, GSS-API-provided + services can be implemented by secret-key technologies (e.g., + Kerberos) or public-key approaches (e.g., X.509). + + Protocol environment independence: The GSS-API is independent of + the communications protocol suites with which it is employed, + permitting use in a broad range of protocol environments. In + appropriate environments, an intermediate implementation "veneer" + which is oriented to a particular communication protocol (e.g., + Remote Procedure Call (RPC)) may be interposed between + applications which call that protocol and the GSS-API, thereby + invoking GSS-API facilities in conjunction with that protocol's + + + +Linn [Page 4] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + communications invocations. + + Protocol association independence: The GSS-API's security context + construct is independent of communications protocol association + constructs. This characteristic allows a single GSS-API + implementation to be utilized by a variety of invoking protocol + modules on behalf of those modules' calling applications. GSS-API + services can also be invoked directly by applications, wholly + independent of protocol associations. + + Suitability to a range of implementation placements: GSS-API + clients are not constrained to reside within any Trusted Computing + Base (TCB) perimeter defined on a system where the GSS-API is + implemented; security services are specified in a manner suitable + to both intra-TCB and extra-TCB callers. + +1.1. GSS-API Constructs + + This section describes the basic elements comprising the GSS-API. + +1.1.1. Credentials + + Credentials structures provide the prerequisites enabling peers to + establish security contexts with each other. A caller may designate + that its default credential be used for context establishment calls + without presenting an explicit handle to that credential. + Alternately, those GSS-API callers which need to make explicit + selection of particular credentials structures may make references to + those credentials through GSS-API-provided credential handles + ("cred_handles"). + + A single credential structure may be used for initiation of outbound + contexts and acceptance of inbound contexts. Callers needing to + operate in only one of these modes may designate this fact when + credentials are acquired for use, allowing underlying mechanisms to + optimize their processing and storage requirements. The credential + elements defined by a particular mechanism may contain multiple + cryptographic keys, e.g., to enable authentication and message + encryption to be performed with different algorithms. + + A single credential structure may accommodate credential information + associated with multiple underlying mechanisms (mech_types); a + credential structure's contents will vary depending on the set of + mech_types supported by a particular GSS-API implementation. + Commonly, a single mech_type will be used for all security contexts + established by a particular initiator to a particular target; the + primary motivation for supporting credential sets representing + multiple mech_types is to allow initiators on systems which are + + + +Linn [Page 5] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + equipped to handle multiple types to initiate contexts to targets on + other systems which can accommodate only a subset of the set + supported at the initiator's system. + + It is the responsibility of underlying system-specific mechanisms and + OS functions below the GSS-API to ensure that the ability to acquire + and use credentials associated with a given identity is constrained + to appropriate processes within a system. This responsibility should + be taken seriously by implementors, as the ability for an entity to + utilize a principal's credentials is equivalent to the entity's + ability to successfully assert that principal's identity. + + Once a set of GSS-API credentials is established, the transferability + of that credentials set to other processes or analogous constructs + within a system is a local matter, not defined by the GSS-API. An + example local policy would be one in which any credentials received + as a result of login to a given user account, or of delegation of + rights to that account, are accessible by, or transferable to, + processes running under that account. + + The credential establishment process (particularly when performed on + behalf of users rather than server processes) is likely to require + access to passwords or other quantities which should be protected + locally and exposed for the shortest time possible. As a result, it + will often be appropriate for preliminary credential establishment to + be performed through local means at user login time, with the + result(s) cached for subsequent reference. These preliminary + credentials would be set aside (in a system-specific fashion) for + subsequent use, either: + + to be accessed by an invocation of the GSS-API GSS_Acquire_cred() + call, returning an explicit handle to reference that credential + + as the default credentials installed on behalf of a process + +1.1.2. Tokens + + Tokens are data elements transferred between GSS-API callers, and are + divided into two classes. Context-level tokens are exchanged in order + to establish and manage a security context between peers. Per-message + tokens are exchanged in conjunction with an established context to + provide protective security services for corresponding data messages. + The internal contents of both classes of tokens are specific to the + particular underlying mechanism used to support the GSS-API; Appendix + B of this document provides a uniform recommendation for designers of + GSS-API support mechanisms, encapsulating mechanism-specific + information along with a globally-interpretable mechanism identifier. + + + + +Linn [Page 6] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Tokens are opaque from the viewpoint of GSS-API callers. They are + generated within the GSS-API implementation at an end system, + provided to a GSS-API caller to be transferred to the peer GSS-API + caller at a remote end system, and processed by the GSS-API + implementation at that remote end system. Tokens may be output by + GSS-API primitives (and are to be transferred to GSS-API peers) + independent of the status indications which those primitives + indicate. Token transfer may take place in an in-band manner, + integrated into the same protocol stream used by the GSS-API callers + for other data transfers, or in an out-of-band manner across a + logically separate channel. + + Development of GSS-API support primitives based on a particular + underlying cryptographic technique and protocol does not necessarily + imply that GSS-API callers invoking that GSS-API mechanism type will + be able to interoperate with peers invoking the same technique and + protocol outside the GSS-API paradigm. For example, the format of + GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a particular mechanism, + and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into callers' + protocols, may not be the same as those used by non-GSS-API callers + of the same underlying technique. + +1.1.3. Security Contexts + + Security contexts are established between peers, using credentials + established locally in conjunction with each peer or received by + peers via delegation. Multiple contexts may exist simultaneously + between a pair of peers, using the same or different sets of + credentials. Coexistence of multiple contexts using different + credentials allows graceful rollover when credentials expire. + Distinction among multiple contexts based on the same credentials + serves applications by distinguishing different message streams in a + security sense. + + The GSS-API is independent of underlying protocols and addressing + structure, and depends on its callers to transport GSS-API-provided + data elements. As a result of these factors, it is a caller + responsibility to parse communicated messages, separating GSS-API- + related data elements from caller-provided data. The GSS-API is + independent of connection vs. connectionless orientation of the + underlying communications service. + + No correlation between security context and communications protocol + association is dictated. (The optional channel binding facility, + discussed in Section 1.1.6 of this document, represents an + intentional exception to this rule, supporting additional protection + features within GSS-API supporting mechanisms.) This separation + allows the GSS-API to be used in a wide range of communications + + + +Linn [Page 7] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + environments, and also simplifies the calling sequences of the + individual calls. In many cases (depending on underlying security + protocol, associated mechanism, and availability of cached + information), the state information required for context setup can be + sent concurrently with initial signed user data, without interposing + additional message exchanges. + +1.1.4. Mechanism Types + + In order to successfully establish a security context with a target + peer, it is necessary to identify an appropriate underlying mechanism + type (mech_type) which both initiator and target peers support. The + definition of a mechanism embodies not only the use of a particular + cryptographic technology (or a hybrid or choice among alternative + cryptographic technologies), but also definition of the syntax and + semantics of data element exchanges which that mechanism will employ + in order to support security services. + + It is recommended that callers initiating contexts specify the + "default" mech_type value, allowing system-specific functions within + or invoked by the GSS-API implementation to select the appropriate + mech_type, but callers may direct that a particular mech_type be + employed when necessary. + + The means for identifying a shared mech_type to establish a security + context with a peer will vary in different environments and + circumstances; examples include (but are not limited to): + + use of a fixed mech_type, defined by configuration, within an + environment + + syntactic convention on a target-specific basis, through + examination of a target's name + + lookup of a target's name in a naming service or other database in + order to identify mech_types supported by that target + + explicit negotiation between GSS-API callers in advance of + security context setup + + When transferred between GSS-API peers, mech_type specifiers (per + Appendix B, represented as Object Identifiers (OIDs)) serve to + qualify the interpretation of associated tokens. (The structure and + encoding of Object Identifiers is defined in ISO/IEC 8824, + "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)" and in + ISO/IEC 8825, "Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract + Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)".) Use of hierarchically structured OIDs + serves to preclude ambiguous interpretation of mech_type specifiers. + + + +Linn [Page 8] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + The OID representing the DASS MechType, for example, is + 1.3.12.2.1011.7.5. + +1.1.5. Naming + + The GSS-API avoids prescription of naming structures, treating the + names transferred across the interface in order to initiate and + accept security contexts as opaque octet string quantities. This + approach supports the GSS-API's goal of implementability atop a range + of underlying security mechanisms, recognizing the fact that + different mechanisms process and authenticate names which are + presented in different forms. Generalized services offering + translation functions among arbitrary sets of naming environments are + outside the scope of the GSS-API; availability and use of local + conversion functions to translate among the naming formats supported + within a given end system is anticipated. + + Two distinct classes of name representations are used in conjunction + with different GSS-API parameters: + + a printable form (denoted by OCTET STRING), for acceptance from + and presentation to users; printable name forms are accompanied by + OID tags identifying the namespace to which they correspond + + an internal form (denoted by INTERNAL NAME), opaque to callers and + defined by individual GSS-API implementations; GSS-API + implementations supporting multiple namespace types are + responsible for maintaining internal tags to disambiguate the + interpretation of particular names + + Tagging of printable names allows GSS-API callers and underlying + GSS-API mechanisms to disambiguate name types and to determine + whether an associated name's type is one which they are capable of + processing, avoiding aliasing problems which could result from + misinterpreting a name of one type as a name of another type. + + In addition to providing means for names to be tagged with types, + this specification defines primitives to support a level of naming + environment independence for certain calling applications. To provide + basic services oriented towards the requirements of callers which + need not themselves interpret the internal syntax and semantics of + names, GSS-API calls for name comparison (GSS_Compare_name()), + human-readable display (GSS_Display_name()), input conversion + (GSS_Import_name()), and internal name deallocation + (GSS_Release_name()) functions are defined. (It is anticipated that + these proposed GSS-API calls will be implemented in many end systems + based on system-specific name manipulation primitives already extant + within those end systems; inclusion within the GSS-API is intended to + + + +Linn [Page 9] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + offer GSS-API callers a portable means to perform specific + operations, supportive of authorization and audit requirements, on + authenticated names.) + + GSS_Import_name() implementations can, where appropriate, support + more than one printable syntax corresponding to a given namespace + (e.g., alternative printable representations for X.500 Distinguished + Names), allowing flexibility for their callers to select among + alternative representations. GSS_Display_name() implementations + output a printable syntax selected as appropriate to their + operational environments; this selection is a local matter. Callers + desiring portability across alternative printable syntaxes should + refrain from implementing comparisons based on printable name forms + and should instead use the GSS_Compare_name() call to determine + whether or not one internal-format name matches another. + +1.1.6. Channel Bindings + + The GSS-API accommodates the concept of caller-provided channel + binding ("chan_binding") information, used by GSS-API callers to bind + the establishment of a security context to relevant characteristics + (e.g., addresses, transformed representations of encryption keys) of + the underlying communications channel and of protection mechanisms + applied to that communications channel. Verification by one peer of + chan_binding information provided by the other peer to a context + serves to protect against various active attacks. The caller + initiating a security context must determine the chan_binding values + before making the GSS_Init_sec_context() call, and consistent values + must be provided by both peers to a context. Callers should not + assume that underlying mechanisms provide confidentiality protection + for channel binding information. + + Use or non-use of the GSS-API channel binding facility is a caller + option, and GSS-API supporting mechanisms can support operation in an + environment where NULL channel bindings are presented. When non-NULL + channel bindings are used, certain mechanisms will offer enhanced + security value by interpreting the bindings' content (rather than + simply representing those bindings, or signatures computed on them, + within tokens) and will therefore depend on presentation of specific + data in a defined format. To this end, agreements among mechanism + implementors are defining conventional interpretations for the + contents of channel binding arguments, including address specifiers + (with content dependent on communications protocol environment) for + context initiators and acceptors. (These conventions are being + incorporated into related documents.) In order for GSS-API callers to + be portable across multiple mechanisms and achieve the full security + functionality available from each mechanism, it is strongly + recommended that GSS-API callers provide channel bindings consistent + + + +Linn [Page 10] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + with these conventions and those of the networking environment in + which they operate. + +1.2. GSS-API Features and Issues + + This section describes aspects of GSS-API operations, of the security + services which the GSS-API provides, and provides commentary on + design issues. + +1.2.1. Status Reporting + + Each GSS-API call provides two status return values. Major_status + values provide a mechanism-independent indication of call status + (e.g., GSS_COMPLETE, GSS_FAILURE, GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED), sufficient to + drive normal control flow within the caller in a generic fashion. + Table 1 summarizes the defined major_status return codes in tabular + fashion. + + Table 1: GSS-API Major Status Codes + + FATAL ERROR CODES + + GSS_BAD_BINDINGS channel binding mismatch + GSS_BAD_MECH unsupported mechanism requested + GSS_BAD_NAME invalid name provided + GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE name of unsupported type provided + GSS_BAD_STATUS invalid input status selector + GSS_BAD_SIG token had invalid signature + GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED specified security context expired + GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED expired credentials detected + GSS_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL defective credential detected + GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN defective token detected + GSS_FAILURE failure, unspecified at GSS-API + level + GSS_NO_CONTEXT no valid security context specified + GSS_NO_CRED no valid credentials provided + + INFORMATORY STATUS CODES + + GSS_COMPLETE normal completion + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED continuation call to routine + required + GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN duplicate per-message token + detected + GSS_OLD_TOKEN timed-out per-message token + detected + GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN out-of-order per-message token + detected + + + +Linn [Page 11] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Minor_status provides more detailed status information which may + include status codes specific to the underlying security mechanism. + Minor_status values are not specified in this document. + + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status returns, and optional message + outputs, are provided in GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls so that different mechanisms' + employment of different numbers of messages within their + authentication sequences need not be reflected in separate code paths + within calling applications. Instead, such cases are accomodated with + sequences of continuation calls to GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The same mechanism is used to encapsulate + mutual authentication within the GSS-API's context initiation calls. + + For mech_types which require interactions with third-party servers in + order to establish a security context, GSS-API context establishment + calls may block pending completion of such third-party interactions. + On the other hand, no GSS-API calls pend on serialized interactions + with GSS-API peer entities. As a result, local GSS-API status + returns cannot reflect unpredictable or asynchronous exceptions + occurring at remote peers, and reflection of such status information + is a caller responsibility outside the GSS-API. + +1.2.2. Per-Message Security Service Availability + + When a context is established, two flags are returned to indicate the + set of per-message protection security services which will be + available on the context: + + the integ_avail flag indicates whether per-message integrity and + data origin authentication services are available + + the conf_avail flag indicates whether per-message confidentiality + services are available, and will never be returned TRUE unless the + integ_avail flag is also returned TRUE + + GSS-API callers desiring per-message security services should + check the values of these flags at context establishment time, and + must be aware that a returned FALSE value for integ_avail means + that invocation of GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal() primitives on the + associated context will apply no cryptographic protection to user + data messages. + + The GSS-API per-message protection service primitives, as the + category name implies, are oriented to operation at the granularity + of protocol data units. They perform cryptographic operations on the + data units, transfer cryptographic control information in tokens, + and, in the case of GSS_Seal(), encapsulate the protected data unit. + + + +Linn [Page 12] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + As such, these primitives are not oriented to efficient data + protection for stream-paradigm protocols (e.g., Telnet) if + cryptography must be applied on an octet-by-octet basis. + +1.2.3. Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing + + Certain underlying mech_types are expected to offer support for + replay detection and/or sequencing of messages transferred on the + contexts they support. These optionally-selectable protection + features are distinct from replay detection and sequencing features + applied to the context establishment operation itself; the presence + or absence of context-level replay or sequencing features is wholly a + function of the underlying mech_type's capabilities, and is not + selected or omitted as a caller option. + + The caller initiating a context provides flags (replay_det_req_flag + and sequence_req_flag) to specify whether the use of per-message + replay detection and sequencing features is desired on the context + being established. The GSS-API implementation at the initiator system + can determine whether these features are supported (and whether they + are optionally selectable) as a function of mech_type, without need + for bilateral negotiation with the target. When enabled, these + features provide recipients with indicators as a result of GSS-API + processing of incoming messages, identifying whether those messages + were detected as duplicates or out-of-sequence. Detection of such + events does not prevent a suspect message from being provided to a + recipient; the appropriate course of action on a suspect message is a + matter of caller policy. + + The semantics of the replay detection and sequencing services applied + to received messages, as visible across the interface which the GSS- + API provides to its clients, are as follows: + + When replay_det_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window. + + 2. GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the + received message was correct, but that the message was recognized + as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. + + 3. GSS_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + message was correct, but that the message is too old to be checked + for duplication. + + + +Linn [Page 13] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + When sequence_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window. + + 2. GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the + received message was correct, but that the message was recognized + as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. + + 3. GSS_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + message was correct, but that the token is too old to be checked + for duplication. + + 4. GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + message was correct, but that it is earlier in a sequenced stream + than a message already processed on the context. [Note: + Mechanisms can be architected to provide a stricter form of + sequencing service, delivering particular messages to recipients + only after all predecessor messages in an ordered stream have been + delivered. This type of support is incompatible with the GSS-API + paradigm in which recipients receive all messages, whether in + order or not, and provide them (one at a time, without intra-GSS- + API message buffering) to GSS-API routines for validation. GSS- + API facilities provide supportive functions, aiding clients to + achieve strict message stream integrity in an efficient manner in + conjunction with sequencing provisions in communications + protocols, but the GSS-API does not offer this level of message + stream integrity service by itself.] + + As the message stream integrity features (especially sequencing) may + interfere with certain applications' intended communications + paradigms, and since support for such features is likely to be + resource intensive, it is highly recommended that mech_types + supporting these features allow them to be activated selectively on + initiator request when a context is established. A context initiator + and target are provided with corresponding indicators + (replay_det_state and sequence_state), signifying whether these + features are active on a given context. + + An example mech_type supporting per-message replay detection could + (when replay_det_state is TRUE) implement the feature as follows: The + underlying mechanism would insert timestamps in data elements output + by GSS_Sign() and GSS_Seal(), and would maintain (within a time- + limited window) a cache (qualified by originator-recipient pair) + identifying received data elements processed by GSS_Verify() and + + + +Linn [Page 14] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + GSS_Unseal(). When this feature is active, exception status returns + (GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_ OLD_TOKEN) will be provided when + GSS_Verify() or GSS_Unseal() is presented with a message which is + either a detected duplicate of a prior message or which is too old to + validate against a cache of recently received messages. + +1.2.4. Quality of Protection + + Some mech_types will provide their users with fine granularity + control over the means used to provide per-message protection, + allowing callers to trade off security processing overhead + dynamically against the protection requirements of particular + messages. A per-message quality-of-protection parameter (analogous to + quality-of-service, or QOS) selects among different QOP options + supported by that mechanism. On context establishment for a multi-QOP + mech_type, context-level data provides the prerequisite data for a + range of protection qualities. + + It is expected that the majority of callers will not wish to exert + explicit mechanism-specific QOP control and will therefore request + selection of a default QOP. Definitions of, and choices among, non- + default QOP values are mechanism-specific, and no ordered sequences + of QOP values can be assumed equivalent across different mechanisms. + Meaningful use of non-default QOP values demands that callers be + familiar with the QOP definitions of an underlying mechanism or + mechanisms, and is therefore a non-portable construct. + +2. Interface Descriptions + + This section describes the GSS-API's service interface, dividing the + set of calls offered into four groups. Credential management calls + are related to the acquisition and release of credentials by + principals. Context-level calls are related to the management of + security contexts between principals. Per-message calls are related + to the protection of individual messages on established security + contexts. Support calls provide ancillary functions useful to GSS-API + callers. Table 2 groups and summarizes the calls in tabular fashion. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 15] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Table 2: GSS-API Calls + + CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT + + GSS_Acquire_cred acquire credentials for use + GSS_Release_cred release credentials after use + GSS_Inquire_cred display information about + credentials + + CONTEXT-LEVEL CALLS + + GSS_Init_sec_context initiate outbound security context + GSS_Accept_sec_context accept inbound security context + GSS_Delete_sec_context flush context when no longer needed + GSS_Process_context_token process received control token on + context + GSS_Context_time indicate validity time remaining on + context + + PER-MESSAGE CALLS + + GSS_Sign apply signature, receive as token + separate from message + GSS_Verify validate signature token along with + message + GSS_Seal sign, optionally encrypt, + encapsulate + GSS_Unseal decapsulate, decrypt if needed, + validate signature + + SUPPORT CALLS + + GSS_Display_status translate status codes to printable + form + GSS_Indicate_mechs indicate mech_types supported on + local system + GSS_Compare_name compare two names for equality + GSS_Display_name translate name to printable form + GSS_Import_name convert printable name to + normalized form + GSS_Release_name free storage of normalized-form + name + GSS_Release_buffer free storage of printable name + GSS_Release_oid_set free storage of OID set object + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 16] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +2.1. Credential management calls + + These GSS-API calls provide functions related to the management of + credentials. Their characterization with regard to whether or not + they may block pending exchanges with other network entities (e.g., + directories or authentication servers) depends in part on OS-specific + (extra-GSS-API) issues, so is not specified in this document. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call is defined within the GSS-API in support + of application portability, with a particular orientation towards + support of portable server applications. It is recognized that (for + certain systems and mechanisms) credentials for interactive users may + be managed differently from credentials for server processes; in such + environments, it is the GSS-API implementation's responsibility to + distinguish these cases and the procedures for making this + distinction are a local matter. The GSS_Release_cred() call provides + a means for callers to indicate to the GSS-API that use of a + credentials structure is no longer required. The GSS_Inquire_cred() + call allows callers to determine information about a credentials + structure. + +2.1.1. GSS_Acquire_cred call + + Inputs: + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME, -NULL requests locally-determined + default + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,-empty set requests + system-selected default + + o cred_usage INTEGER-0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle OCTET STRING, + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + + +Linn [Page 17] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that requested credentials were + successfully established, for the duration indicated in + lifetime_rec, suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, for + the set of mech_types indicated in actual_mechs, and that those + credentials can be referenced for subsequent use with the handle + returned in output_cred_handle. + + o GSS_BAD_MECH indicates that a mech_type unsupported by the GSS-API + implementation type was requested, causing the credential + establishment operation to fail. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name is + uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the supporting GSS-API + implementation, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that credential establishment failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack of + authorization to establish and use credentials associated with the + identity named in the input desired_name argument. + + GSS_Acquire_cred() is used to acquire credentials so that a + principal can (as a function of the input cred_usage parameter) + initiate and/or accept security contexts under the identity + represented by the desired_name input argument. On successful + completion, the returned output_cred_handle result provides a handle + for subsequent references to the acquired credentials. Typically, + single-user client processes using only default credentials for + context establishment purposes will have no need to invoke this call. + + A caller may provide the value NULL for desired_name, signifying a + request for credentials corresponding to a default principal + identity. The procedures used by GSS-API implementations to select + the appropriate principal identity in response to this form of + request are local matters. It is possible that multiple pre- + established credentials may exist for the same principal identity + (for example, as a result of multiple user login sessions) when + GSS_Acquire_cred() is called; the means used in such cases to select + a specific credential are local matters. The input lifetime_req + argument to GSS_Acquire_cred() may provide useful information for + local GSS-API implementations to employ in making this disambiguation + + + +Linn [Page 18] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + in a manner which will best satisfy a caller's intent. + + The lifetime_rec result indicates the length of time for which the + acquired credentials will be valid, as an offset from the present. A + mechanism may return a reserved value indicating INDEFINITE if no + constraints on credential lifetime are imposed. A caller of + GSS_Acquire_cred() can request a length of time for which acquired + credentials are to be valid (lifetime_req argument), beginning at the + present, or can request credentials with a default validity interval. + (Requests for postdated credentials are not supported within the + GSS-API.) Certain mechanisms and implementations may bind in + credential validity period specifiers at a point preliminary to + invocation of the GSS_Acquire_cred() call (e.g., in conjunction with + user login procedures). As a result, callers requesting non-default + values for lifetime_req must recognize that such requests cannot + always be honored and must be prepared to accommodate the use of + returned credentials with different lifetimes as indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + The caller of GSS_Acquire_cred() can explicitly specify a set of + mech_types which are to be accommodated in the returned credentials + (desired_mechs argument), or can request credentials for a system- + defined default set of mech_types. Selection of the system-specified + default set is recommended in the interests of application + portability. The actual_mechs return value may be interrogated by the + caller to determine the set of mechanisms with which the returned + credentials may be used. + +2.1.2. GSS_Release_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle OCTET STRING-NULL specifies default credentials + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle were released for purposes of subsequent access + by the caller. The effect on other processes which may be + authorized shared access to such credentials is a local matter. + + + + + +Linn [Page 19] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no release operation was performed, + either because the input cred_handle was invalid or because the + caller lacks authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for a caller to explicitly request that credentials + be released when their use is no longer required. Note that system- + specific credential management functions are also likely to exist, + for example to assure that credentials shared among processes are + properly deleted when all affected processes terminate, even if no + explicit release requests are issued by those processes. Given the + fact that multiple callers are not precluded from gaining authorized + access to the same credentials, invocation of GSS_Release_cred() + cannot be assumed to delete a particular set of credentials on a + system-wide basis. + +2.1.3. GSS_Inquire_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle OCTET STRING -NULL specifies default credentials + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, and that the output + cred_name, lifetime_rec, and cred_usage values represent, + respectively, the credentials' associated principal name, + remaining lifetime, suitable usage modes, and supported + mechanism types. + + + +Linn [Page 20] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks + authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred() call is defined primarily for the use of + those callers which make use of default credentials rather than + acquiring credentials explicitly with GSS_Acquire_cred(). It enables + callers to determine a credential structure's associated principal + name, remaining validity period, usability for security context + initiation and/or acceptance, and supported mechanisms. + +2.2. Context-level calls + + This group of calls is devoted to the establishment and management of + security contexts between peers. A context's initiator calls + GSS_Init_sec_context(), resulting in generation of a token which the + caller passes to the target. At the target, that token is passed to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Depending on the underlying mech_type and + specified options, additional token exchanges may be performed in the + course of context establishment; such exchanges are accommodated by + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns from GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Either party to an established context may + invoke GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush context information when a + context is no longer required. GSS_Process_context_token() is used + to process received tokens carrying context-level control + information. GSS_Context_time() allows a caller to determine the + length of time for which an established context will remain valid. + +2.2.1. GSS_Init_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o claimant_cred_handle OCTET STRING, -NULL specifies "use + default" + + o input_context_handle INTEGER, -0 specifies "none assigned + yet" + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -NULL parameter specifies "use + default" + + o deleg_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + + +Linn [Page 21] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o mutual_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default lifetime + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING-NULL or token received from target + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_handle INTEGER, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -actual mechanism always + indicated, never NULL + + o output_token OCTET STRING, -NULL or token to pass to context + target + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which an authentication server or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context initiator in order to generate an + output_token suitable for presentation to a specified target. + + Return major_status codes: + + + + +Linn [Page 22] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that context-level information was + successfully initialized, and that the returned output_token will + provide sufficient information for the target to perform per- + message processing on the newly-established context. + + o GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the target, and that a reply + must be received and passed as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), before per-message + processing can be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed, preventing further processing from being + performed based on that token. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + claimant_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token contains an + incorrect signature, so context setup cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the referenced + credentials are valid for context acceptor use only, or because + the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced + credentials. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input claimant_cred_handle argument are no longer + valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller- + provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the input_token + was detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing + context establishment. (This result will be returned by + GSS_Init_sec_context only for contexts where mutual_state is + TRUE.) + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided; this major status will be + returned only for successor calls following GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status returns. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided targ_name is of a + type uninterpretable or unsupported by the supporting GSS-API + implementation, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + + +Linn [Page 23] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided targ_name is inconsistent + in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier information, so + context establishment cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be accomplished + for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that no + interface-defined recovery action is available. + + This routine is used by a context initiator, and ordinarily emits one + (or, for the case of a multi-step exchange, more than one) + output_token suitable for use by the target within the selected + mech_type's protocol. Using information in the credentials structure + referenced by claimant_cred_handle, GSS_Init_sec_context() + initializes the data structures required to establish a security + context with target targ_name. The claimant_cred_handle must + correspond to the same valid credentials structure on the initial + call to GSS_Init_sec_context() and on any successor calls resulting + from GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; different protocol sequences + modeled by the GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED mechanism will require access to + credentials at different points in the context establishment + sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Init_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. That call returns an output_context_handle for future + references to this context. When continuation attempts to + GSS_Init_sec_context() are needed to perform context establishment, + the previously-returned non-zero handle value is entered into the + input_context_handle argument and will be echoed in the returned + output_context_handle argument. On such continuation attempts (and + only on continuation attempts) the input_token value is used, to + provide the token returned from the context's target. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The input_token argument contains a message received from the target, + and is significant only on a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() which + follows a previous return indicating GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + It is the caller's responsibility to establish a communications path + to the target, and to transmit any returned output_token (independent + of the accompanying returned major_status value) to the target over + that path. The output_token can, however, be transmitted along with + + + +Linn [Page 24] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + the first application-provided input message to be processed by + GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal() in conjunction with a successfully- + established context. + + The initiator may request various context-level functions through + input flags: the deleg_req_flag requests delegation of access rights, + the mutual_req_flag requests mutual authentication, the + replay_det_req_flag requests that replay detection features be + applied to messages transferred on the established context, and the + sequence_req_flag requests that sequencing be enforced. (See Section + 1.2.3 for more information on replay detection and sequencing + features.) + + Not all of the optionally-requestable features will be available in + all underlying mech_types; the corresponding return state values + (deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, sequence_state) + indicate, as a function of mech_type processing capabilities and + initiator-provided input flags, the set of features which will be + active on the context. These state indicators' values are undefined + unless the routine's major_status indicates COMPLETE. Failure to + provide the precise set of features requested by the caller does not + cause context establishment to fail; it is the caller's prerogative + to delete the context if the feature set provided is unsuitable for + the caller's use. The returned mech_type value indicates the + specific mechanism employed on the context, and will never indicate + the value for "default". + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Seal() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal()) on + the established context. + + The lifetime_req input specifies a desired upper bound for the + lifetime of the context to be established, with a value of 0 used to + request a default lifetime. The lifetime_rec return value indicates + the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as + an offset from the present; depending on mechanism capabilities, + credential lifetimes, and local policy, it may not correspond to the + value requested in lifetime_req. If no constraints on context + lifetime are imposed, this may be indicated by returning a reserved + value representing INDEFINITE lifetime_req. The values of conf_avail, + integ_avail, and lifetime_rec are undefined unless the routine's + major_status indicates COMPLETE. + + If the mutual_state is TRUE, this fact will be reflected within the + + + +Linn [Page 25] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + output_token. A call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() at the target in + conjunction with such a context will return a token, to be processed + by a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), in order to achieve + mutual authentication. + +2.2.2. GSS_Accept_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o acceptor_cred_handle OCTET STRING,-NULL specifies "use + default" + + o input_context_handle INTEGER, -0 specifies "not yet assigned" + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o output_context_handle INTEGER, + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER, - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o delegated_cred_handle OCTET STRING, + + o output_token OCTET STRING -NULL or token to pass to context + + + +Linn [Page 26] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + initiator + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which a directory service or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context acceptor in order to validate a + received input_token. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that context-level data structures were + successfully initialized, and that per-message processing can now + be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the initiator, and that a + response must be received and passed as the input_token argument + to a continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), before per- + message processing can be performed in conjunction with this + context. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed, preventing further processing from being + performed based on that token. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + acceptor_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token contains an + incorrect signature, so context setup cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token was recognized + as a duplicate of an input_token already processed. No new context + is established. + + o GSS_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the signature on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token is too old to be + checked for duplication against previously-processed input_tokens. + No new context is established. + + o GSS_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the referenced + credentials are valid for context initiator use only, or because + the caller lacks authorization to access the referenced + credentials. + + + + +Linn [Page 27] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input acceptor_cred_handle argument are no longer + valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the caller- + provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the input_token + was detected, signifying a security-relevant event and preventing + context establishment. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided; this major status will be + returned only for successor calls following GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status returns. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be accomplished + for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and that no + interface-defined recovery action is available. + + The GSS_Accept_sec_context() routine is used by a context target. + Using information in the credentials structure referenced by the + input acceptor_cred_handle, it verifies the incoming input_token and + (following the successful completion of a context establishment + sequence) returns the authenticated src_name and the mech_type used. + The acceptor_cred_handle must correspond to the same valid + credentials structure on the initial call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() + and on any successor calls resulting from GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED status + returns; different protocol sequences modeled by the + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED mechanism will require access to credentials at + different points in the context establishment sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Accept_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. That call returns an output_context_handle for future + references to this context; when continuation attempts to + GSS_Accept_sec_context() are needed to perform context + establishment, that handle value will be entered into the + input_context_handle argument. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The returned state results (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, and sequence_state) reflect the same context state + values as returned to GSS_Init_sec_context()'s caller at the + initiator system. + + + +Linn [Page 28] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Seal() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal()) on + the established context. + + The lifetime_rec return value indicates the length of time for which + the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the present. + The values of deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, + sequence_state, conf_avail, integ_avail, and lifetime_rec are + undefined unless the accompanying major_status indicates COMPLETE. + + The delegated_cred_handle result is significant only when deleg_state + is TRUE, and provides a means for the target to reference the + delegated credentials. The output_token result, when non-NULL, + provides a context-level token to be returned to the context + initiator to continue a multi-step context establishment sequence. As + noted with GSS_Init_sec_context(), any returned token should be + transferred to the context's peer (in this case, the context + initiator), independent of the value of the accompanying returned + major_status. + + Note: A target must be able to distinguish a context-level + input_token, which is passed to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), from the + per-message data elements passed to GSS_Verify() or GSS_Unseal(). + These data elements may arrive in a single application message, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() must be performed before per-message + processing can be performed successfully. + +2.2.3. GSS_Delete_sec_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle INTEGER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + + + + +Linn [Page 29] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the context was recognized, that + relevant context-specific information was flushed, and that the + returned output_context_token is ready for transfer to the + context's peer. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provide, so no deletion was performed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Delete_sec_context() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call may block pending network interactions for mech_types in + which active notification must be made to a central server when a + security context is to be deleted. + + This call can be made by either peer in a security context, to flush + context-specific information and to return an output_context_token + which can be passed to the context's peer informing it that the + peer's corresponding context information can also be flushed. (Once a + context is established, the peers involved are expected to retain + cached credential and context-related information until the + information's expiration time is reached or until a + GSS_Delete_sec_context() call is made.) Attempts to perform per- + message processing on a deleted context will result in error returns. + +2.2.4. GSS_Process_context_token call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o input_context_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the input_context_token was + successfully processed in conjunction with the context referenced + by context_handle. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the received context_token failed, preventing further processing + + + +Linn [Page 30] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Process_context_token() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to process context_tokens received from a peer once + a context has been established, with corresponding impact on + context-level state information. One use for this facility is + processing of the context_tokens generated by + GSS_Delete_sec_context(); GSS_Process_context_token() will not block + pending network interactions for that purpose. Another use is to + process tokens indicating remote-peer context establishment failures + after the point where the local GSS-API implementation has already + indicated GSS_COMPLETE status. + +2.2.5. GSS_Context_time call + + Input: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid, and + will remain valid for the amount of time indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that data items related to the + referenced context have expired. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + + +Linn [Page 31] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to determine the amount of time for which a + currently established context will remain valid. + +2.3. Per-message calls + + This group of calls is used to perform per-message protection + processing on an established security context. None of these calls + block pending network interactions. These calls may be invoked by a + context's initiator or by the context's target. The four members of + this group should be considered as two pairs; the output from + GSS_Sign() is properly input to GSS_Verify(), and the output from + GSS_Seal() is properly input to GSS_Unseal(). + + GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify() support data origin authentication and + data integrity services. When GSS_Sign() is invoked on an input + message, it yields a per-message token containing data items which + allow underlying mechanisms to provide the specified security + services. The original message, along with the generated per-message + token, is passed to the remote peer; these two data elements are + processed by GSS_Verify(), which validates the message in + conjunction with the separate token. + + GSS_Seal() and GSS_Unseal() support caller-requested confidentiality + in addition to the data origin authentication and data integrity + services offered by GSS_Sign() and GSS_Verify(). GSS_Seal() outputs + a single data element, encapsulating optionally enciphered user data + as well as associated token data items. The data element output from + GSS_Seal() is passed to the remote peer and processed by + GSS_Unseal() at that system. GSS_Unseal() combines decipherment (as + required) with validation of data items related to authentication and + integrity. + +2.3.1. GSS_Sign call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn [Page 32] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a signature, suitable for an + established security context, was successfully applied and that + the message and corresponding per_msg_token are ready for + transmission. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + requested operation could not be performed for reasons unspecified + at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, apply a + signature to the input message (along with timestamps and/or other + data included in support of mech_type-specific mechanisms) and return + the result in per_msg_token. The qop_req parameter allows quality- + of-protection control. The caller passes the message and the + per_msg_token to the target. + + The GSS_Sign() function completes before the message and + per_msg_token is sent to the peer; successful application of + GSS_Sign() does not guarantee that a corresponding GSS_Verify() has + been (or can necessarily be) performed successfully when the message + arrives at the destination. + +2.3.2. GSS_Verify call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o message OCTET STRING, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + + + +Linn [Page 33] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + Outputs: + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the message was successfully verified. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the received per_msg_token failed, preventing further processing + from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that the received per_msg_token contains an + incorrect signature for the message. + + o GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_OLD_TOKEN, and GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN values + appear in conjunction with the optional per-message replay + detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are + described in that section. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Verify() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, verify that + the input per_msg_token contains an appropriate signature for the + input message, and apply any active replay detection or sequencing + features. Return an indication of the quality-of-protection applied + to the processed message in the qop_state result. + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 34] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +2.3.3. GSS_Seal call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the output_message is ready for transmission. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Seal() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Performs the data origin authentication and data integrity functions + of GSS_Sign(). If the input conf_req_flag is TRUE, requests that + confidentiality be applied to the input_message. Confidentiality may + not be supported in all mech_types or by all implementations; the + returned conf_state flag indicates whether confidentiality was + provided for the input_message. The qop_req parameter allows + quality-of-protection control. + + + +Linn [Page 35] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + In all cases, the GSS_Seal() call yields a single output_message + data element containing (optionally enciphered) user data as well as + control information. + +2.3.4. GSS_Unseal call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle INTEGER, + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the resulting output_message is available. + + o GSS_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed on + the per_msg_token extracted from the input_message failed, + preventing further processing from being performed. + + o GSS_BAD_SIG indicates that an incorrect signature was detected for + the message. + + o GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_OLD_TOKEN, and GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN values + appear in conjunction with the optional per-message replay + detection features described in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are + described in that section. + + o GSS_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data items have + expired, so that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so that the + requested operation cannot be performed. + + + + +Linn [Page 36] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized for + the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but that the + GSS_Unseal() operation could not be performed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Processes a data element generated (and optionally enciphered) by + GSS_Seal(), provided as input_message. The returned conf_state value + indicates whether confidentiality was applied to the input_message. + If conf_state is TRUE, GSS_Unseal() deciphers the input_message. + Returns an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the + processed message in the qop_state result. GSS_Seal() performs the + data integrity and data origin authentication checking functions of + GSS_Verify() on the plaintext data. Plaintext data is returned in + output_message. + +2.4. Support calls + + This group of calls provides support functions useful to GSS-API + callers, independent of the state of established contexts. Their + characterization with regard to blocking or non-blocking status in + terms of network interactions is unspecified. + +2.4.1. GSS_Display_status call + + Inputs: + + o status_value INTEGER,-GSS-API major_status or minor_status + return value + + o status_type INTEGER,-1 if major_status, 2 if minor_status + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER-mech_type to be used for minor_ + status translation + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o status_string_set SET OF OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable status + representation (possibly representing more than one status event + + + +Linn [Page 37] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + encoded within the status_value) is available in the returned + status_string_set. + + o GSS_BAD_MECH indicates that translation in accordance with an + unsupported mech_type was requested, so translation could not be + performed. + + o GSS_BAD_STATUS indicates that the input status_value was invalid, + or that the input status_type carried a value other than 1 or 2, + so translation could not be performed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for callers to translate GSS-API-returned major and + minor status codes into printable string representations. + +2.4.2. GSS_Indicate_mechs call + + Input: + + o (none) + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a set of available mechanisms has + been returned in mech_set. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of mechanism types available on + the local system. This call is intended for support of specialized + callers who need to request non-default mech_type sets from + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and should not be needed by other callers. + +2.4.3. GSS_Compare_name call + + Inputs: + + + + +Linn [Page 38] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o name1 INTERNAL NAME, + + o name2 INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_equal BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that name1 and name2 were comparable, and + that the name_equal result indicates whether name1 and name2 were + equal or unequal. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that one or both of name1 and name2 + contained internal type specifiers uninterpretable by the + supporting GSS-API implementation, or that the two names' types + are different and incomparable, so the equality comparison could + not be completed. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that one or both of the input names was + ill-formed in terms of its internal type specifier, so the + equality comparison could not be completed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to compare two internal name representations for + equality. + +2.4.4. GSS_Display_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_string OCTET STRING, + + + + +Linn [Page 39] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable name representation + is available in the returned name_string. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided name was of a type + uninterpretable by the supporting GSS-API implementation, so no + printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the contents of the provided name were + inconsistent with the internally-indicated name type, so no + printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to translate an internal name representation into a + printable form with associated namespace type descriptor. The syntax + of the printable form is a local matter. + +2.4.5. GSS_Import_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name_string OCTET STRING, + + o input_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that a valid name representation is output + in output_name and described by the type value in + output_name_type. + + o GSS_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input_name_type is unsupported + by the GSS-API implementation, so the import operation could not + be completed. + + + + +Linn [Page 40] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided input_name_string is + ill-formed in terms of the input_name_type, so the import + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to provide a printable name representation, designate + the type of namespace in conjunction with which it should be parsed, + and convert that printable representation to an internal form + suitable for input to other GSS-API routines. The syntax of the + input_name is a local matter. + +2.4.6. GSS_Release_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the input + name was successfully released. + + o GSS_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name argument did not + contain a valid name. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an internal + name representation. + +2.4.7. GSS_Release_buffer call + + Inputs: + + o buffer OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + +Linn [Page 41] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the input + buffer was successfully released. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an OCTET STRING + buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. + +2.4.8. GSS_Release_oid_set call + + Inputs: + + o buffer SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the input + object identifier set was successfully released. + + o GSS_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an object + identifier set object allocated by another GSS-API call. + +3. Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios + + This section provides illustrative overviews of the use of various + candidate mechanism types to support the GSS-API. These discussions + are intended primarily for readers familiar with specific security + technologies, demonstrating how GSS-API functions can be used and + implemented by candidate underlying mechanisms. They should not be + regarded as constrictive to implementations or as defining the only + means through which GSS-API functions can be realized with a + particular underlying technology, and do not demonstrate all GSS-API + features with each technology. + + + + +Linn [Page 42] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +3.1. Kerberos V5, single-TGT + + OS-specific login functions yield a TGT to the local realm Kerberos + server; TGT is placed in a credentials structure for the client. + Client calls GSS_Acquire_cred() to acquire a cred_handle in order to + reference the credentials for use in establishing security contexts. + + Client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(). If the requested service is + located in a different realm, GSS_Init_sec_context() gets the + necessary TGT/key pairs needed to traverse the path from local to + target realm; these data are placed in the owner's TGT cache. After + any needed remote realm resolution, GSS_Init_sec_context() yields a + service ticket to the requested service with a corresponding session + key; these data are stored in conjunction with the context. GSS-API + code sends KRB_TGS_REQ request(s) and receives KRB_TGS_REP + response(s) (in the successful case) or KRB_ERROR. + + Assuming success, GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted + KRB_AP_REQ message, and returns it in output_token. The client sends + the output_token to the service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which verifies the authenticator, provides + the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns an + output_context_handle. + + Both parties now hold the session key associated with the service + ticket, and can use this key in subsequent GSS_Sign(), GSS_Verify(), + GSS_Seal(), and GSS_Unseal() operations. + +3.2. Kerberos V5, double-TGT + + TGT acquisition as above. + + Note: To avoid unnecessary frequent invocations of error paths when + implementing the GSS-API atop Kerberos V5, it seems appropriate to + represent "single-TGT K-V5" and "double-TGT K-V5" with separate + mech_types, and this discussion makes that assumption. + + Based on the (specified or defaulted) mech_type, + GSS_Init_sec_context() determines that the double-TGT protocol + should be employed for the specified target. GSS_Init_sec_context() + returns GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, and its returned + output_token contains a request to the service for the service's TGT. + (If a service TGT with suitably long remaining lifetime already + exists in a cache, it may be usable, obviating the need for this + step.) The client passes the output_token to the service. Note: this + scenario illustrates a different use for the GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED + + + +Linn [Page 43] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + status return facility than for support of mutual authentication; + note that both uses can coexist as successive operations within a + single context establishment operation. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which recognizes it as a request for TGT. + (Note that current Kerberos V5 defines no intra-protocol mechanism to + represent such a request.) GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns + GSS_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status and provides the service's TGT in + its output_token. The service sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation of GSS_Init_sec_context(). GSS_Init_sec_context() caches + the received service TGT and uses it as part of a service ticket + request to the Kerberos authentication server, storing the returned + service ticket and session key in conjunction with the context. + GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted authenticator, + and returns it in output_token along with GSS_COMPLETE return + major_status. The client sends the output_token to the service. + + Service passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + GSS_Accept_sec_context() verifies the authenticator, provides the + service with the client's authenticated name, and returns + major_status GSS_COMPLETE. + + GSS_Sign(), GSS_Verify(), GSS_Seal(), and GSS_Unseal() as above. + +3.3. X.509 Authentication Framework + + This example illustrates use of the GSS-API in conjunction with + public-key mechanisms, consistent with the X.509 Directory + Authentication Framework. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call establishes a credentials structure, + making the client's private key accessible for use on behalf of the + client. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(), which interrogates the + Directory to acquire (and validate) a chain of public-key + certificates, thereby collecting the public key of the service. The + certificate validation operation determines that suitable signatures + were applied by trusted authorities and that those certificates have + not expired. GSS_Init_sec_context() generates a secret key for use + in per-message protection operations on the context, and enciphers + that secret key under the service's public key. + + The enciphered secret key, along with an authenticator quantity + + + +Linn [Page 44] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + signed with the client's private key, is included in the output_token + from GSS_Init_sec_context(). The output_token also carries a + certification path, consisting of a certificate chain leading from + the service to the client; a variant approach would defer this path + resolution to be performed by the service instead of being asserted + by the client. The client application sends the output_token to the + service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context() validates the + certification path, and as a result determines a certified binding + between the client's distinguished name and the client's public key. + Given that public key, GSS_Accept_sec_context() can process the + input_token's authenticator quantity and verify that the client's + private key was used to sign the input_token. At this point, the + client is authenticated to the service. The service uses its private + key to decipher the enciphered secret key provided to it for per- + message protection operations on the context. + + The client calls GSS_Sign() or GSS_Seal() on a data message, which + causes per-message authentication, integrity, and (optional) + confidentiality facilities to be applied to that message. The service + uses the context's shared secret key to perform corresponding + GSS_Verify() and GSS_Unseal() calls. + +4. Related Activities + + In order to implement the GSS-API atop existing, emerging, and future + security mechanisms: + + object identifiers must be assigned to candidate GSS-API + mechanisms and the name types which they support + + concrete data element formats must be defined for candidate + mechanisms + + Calling applications must implement formatting conventions which will + enable them to distinguish GSS-API tokens from other data carried in + their application protocols. + + Concrete language bindings are required for the programming + environments in which the GSS-API is to be employed; such bindings + for the C language are available in an associated RFC. + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 45] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +5. Acknowledgments + + This proposal is the result of a collaborative effort. + Acknowledgments are due to the many members of the IETF Security Area + Advisory Group (SAAG) and the Common Authentication Technology (CAT) + Working Group for their contributions at meetings and by electronic + mail. Acknowledgments are also due to Kannan Alagappan, Doug Barlow, + Bill Brown, Cliff Kahn, Charlie Kaufman, Butler Lampson, Richard + Pitkin, Joe Tardo, and John Wray of Digital Equipment Corporation, + and John Carr, John Kohl, Jon Rochlis, Jeff Schiller, and Ted T'so of + MIT and Project Athena. Joe Pato and Bill Sommerfeld of HP/Apollo, + Walt Tuvell of OSF, and Bill Griffith and Mike Merritt of AT&T, + provided inputs which helped to focus and clarify directions. + Precursor work by Richard Pitkin, presented to meetings of the + Trusted Systems Interoperability Group (TSIG), helped to demonstrate + the value of a generic, mechanism-independent security service API. + +6. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +7. Author's Address + + John Linn + Geer Zolot Associates + One Main St. + Cambridge, MA 02142 USA + + Phone: +1 617.374.3700 + Email: Linn@gza.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 46] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + +APPENDIX A + +PACS AND AUTHORIZATION SERVICES + + Consideration has been given to modifying the GSS-API service + interface to recognize and manipulate Privilege Attribute + Certificates (PACs) as in ECMA 138, carrying authorization data as a + side effect of establishing a security context, but no such + modifications have been incorporated at this time. This appendix + provides rationale for this decision and discusses compatibility + alternatives between PACs and the GSS-API which do not require that + PACs be made visible to GSS-API callers. + + Existing candidate mechanism types such as Kerberos and X.509 do not + incorporate PAC manipulation features, and exclusion of such + mechanisms from the set of candidates equipped to fully support the + GSS-API seems inappropriate. Inclusion (and GSS-API visibility) of a + feature supported by only a limited number of mechanisms could + encourage the development of ostensibly portable applications which + would in fact have only limited portability. + + The status quo, in which PACs are not visible across the GSS-API + interface, does not preclude implementations in which PACs are + carried transparently, within the tokens defined and used for certain + mech_types, and stored within peers' credentials and context-level + data structures. While invisible to API callers, such PACs could be + used by operating system or other local functions as inputs in the + course of mediating access requests made by callers. This course of + action allows dynamic selection of PAC contents, if such selection is + administratively-directed rather than caller-directed. + + In a distributed computing environment, authentication must span + different systems; the need for such authentication provides + motivation for GSS-API definition and usage. Heterogeneous systems in + a network can intercommunicate, with globally authenticated names + comprising the common bond between locally defined access control + policies. Access control policies to which authentication provides + inputs are often local, or specific to particular operating systems + or environments. If the GSS-API made particular authorization models + visible across its service interface, its scope of application would + become less general. The current GSS-API paradigm is consistent with + the precedent set by Kerberos, neither defining the interpretation of + authorization-related data nor enforcing access controls based on + such data. + + The GSS-API is a general interface, whose callers may reside inside + or outside any defined TCB or NTCB boundaries. Given this + characteristic, it appears more realistic to provide facilities which + + + +Linn [Page 47] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + provide "value-added" security services to its callers than to offer + facilities which enforce restrictions on those callers. Authorization + decisions must often be mediated below the GSS-API level in a local + manner against (or in spite of) applications, and cannot be + selectively invoked or omitted at those applications' discretion. + Given that the GSS-API's placement prevents it from providing a + comprehensive solution to the authorization issue, the value of a + partial contribution specific to particular authorization models is + debatable. + +APPENDIX B + +MECHANISM-INDEPENDENT TOKEN FORMAT + + This appendix specifies a mechanism-independent level of + encapsulating representation for the initial token of a GSS-API + context establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the + mechanism type to be used on that context. Use of this format (with + ASN.1-encoded data elements represented in BER, constrained in the + interests of parsing simplicity to the Distinguished Encoding Rule + (DER) BER subset defined in X.509, clause 8.7) is recommended to the + designers of GSS-API implementations based on various mechanisms, so + that tokens can be interpreted unambiguously at GSS-API peers. There + is no requirement that the mechanism-specific innerContextToken, + innerMsgToken, and sealedUserData data elements be encoded in ASN.1 + BER. + + -- optional top-level token definitions to + -- frame different mechanisms + + GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::= + + BEGIN + + MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- data structure definitions + + -- callers must be able to distinguish among + -- InitialContextToken, SubsequentContextToken, + -- PerMsgToken, and SealedMessage data elements + -- based on the usage in which they occur + + InitialContextToken ::= + -- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within + -- mechanism-specific token + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType, + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + + + +Linn [Page 48] + +RFC 1508 Generic Security Interface September 1993 + + + -- contents mechanism-specific + } + + SubsequentContextToken ::= innerContextToken ANY + -- interpretation based on predecessor InitialContextToken + + PerMsgToken ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Sign and processed by GSS_Verify + innerMsgToken ANY + + SealedMessage ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Seal and processed by GSS_Unseal + -- includes internal, mechanism-defined indicator + -- of whether or not encrypted + sealedUserData ANY + + END + +APPENDIX C + +MECHANISM DESIGN CONSTRAINTS + + The following constraints on GSS-API mechanism designs are adopted in + response to observed caller protocol requirements, and adherence + thereto is anticipated in subsequent descriptions of GSS-API + mechanisms to be documented in standards-track Internet + specifications. + + Use of the approach defined in Appendix B of this specification, + applying a mechanism type tag to the InitialContextToken, is + required. + + It is strongly recommended that mechanisms offering per-message + protection services also offer at least one of the replay detection + and sequencing services, as mechanisms offering neither of the latter + will fail to satisfy recognized requirements of certain candidate + caller protocols. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn [Page 49] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f36cd80 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1509.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2691 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Wray +Request for Comments: 1509 Digital Equipment Corporation + September 1993 + + + Generic Security Service API : C-bindings + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status + of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This document specifies C language bindings for the Generic Security + Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), which is described + at a language-independent conceptual level in other documents. + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface (GSS- + API) provides security services to its callers, and is intended for + implementation atop alternative underlying cryptographic mechanisms. + Typically, GSS-API callers will be application protocols into which + security enhancements are integrated through invocation of services + provided by the GSS-API. The GSS-API allows a caller application to + authenticate a principal identity associated with a peer application, + to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security services such as + confidentiality and integrity on a per-message basis. + +1. INTRODUCTION + + The Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface [1] + provides security services to calling applications. It allows a + communicating application to authenticate the user associated with + another application, to delegate rights to another application, and + to apply security services such as confidentiality and integrity on a + per-message basis. + + There are four stages to using the GSSAPI: + + (a) The application acquires a set of credentials with which it may + prove its identity to other processes. The application's + credentials vouch for its global identity, which may or may not + be related to the local username under which it is running. + + + + + +Wray [Page 1] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + (b) A pair of communicating applications establish a joint security + context using their credentials. The security context is a + pair of GSSAPI data structures that contain shared state + information, which is required in order that per-message + security services may be provided. As part of the + establishment of a security context, the context initiator is + authenticated to the responder, and may require that the + responder is authenticated in turn. The initiator may + optionally give the responder the right to initiate further + security contexts. This transfer of rights is termed + delegation, and is achieved by creating a set of credentials, + similar to those used by the originating application, but which + may be used by the responder. To establish and maintain the + shared information that makes up the security context, certain + GSSAPI calls will return a token data structure, which is a + cryptographically protected opaque data type. The caller of + such a GSSAPI routine is responsible for transferring the token + to the peer application, which should then pass it to a + corresponding GSSAPI routine which will decode it and extract + the information. + + (c) Per-message services are invoked to apply either: + + (i) integrity and data origin authentication, or + + (ii) confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication + to application data, which are treated by GSSAPI as + arbitrary octet-strings. The application transmitting a + message that it wishes to protect will call the appropriate + GSSAPI routine (sign or seal) to apply protection, specifying + the appropriate security context, and send the result to the + receiving application. The receiver will pass the received + data to the corresponding decoding routine (verify or unseal) + to remove the protection and validate the data. + + (d) At the completion of a communications session (which may extend + across several connections), the peer applications call GSSAPI + routines to delete the security context. Multiple contexts may + also be used (either successively or simultaneously) within a + single communications association. + +2. GSSAPI Routines + + This section lists the functions performed by each of the GSSAPI + routines and discusses their major parameters, describing how they + are to be passed to the routines. The routines are listed in figure + 4-1. + + + + +Wray [Page 2] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Figure 4-1 GSSAPI Routines + + + Routine Function + + gss_acquire_cred Assume a global identity + + gss_release_cred Discard credentials + + gss_init_sec_context Initiate a security context + with a peer application + + gss_accept_sec_context Accept a security context + initiated by a peer + application + + gss_process_context_token Process a token on a security + context from a peer + application + + gss_delete_sec_context Discard a security context + + gss_context_time Determine for how long a + context will remain valid + + gss_sign Sign a message; integrity + service + + gss_verify Check signature on a message + + gss_seal Sign (optionally encrypt) a + message; confidentiality + service + + gss_unseal Verify (optionally decrypt) + message + + gss_display_status Convert an API status code + to text + + gss_indicate_mechs Determine underlying + authentication mechanism + + gss_compare_name Compare two internal-form + names + + gss_display_name Convert opaque name to text + + + + +Wray [Page 3] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + gss_import_name Convert a textual name to + internal-form + + gss_release_name Discard an internal-form + name + + gss_release_buffer Discard a buffer + + gss_release_oid_set Discard a set of object + identifiers + + gss_inquire_cred Determine information about + a credential + + Individual GSSAPI implementations may augment these routines by + providing additional mechanism-specific routines if required + functionality is not available from the generic forms. Applications + are encouraged to use the generic routines wherever possible on + portability grounds. + +2.1. Data Types and Calling Conventions + + The following conventions are used by the GSSAPI: + +2.1.1. Structured data types + + Wherever these GSSAPI C-bindings describe structured data, only + fields that must be provided by all GSSAPI implementation are + documented. Individual implementations may provide additional + fields, either for internal use within GSSAPI routines, or for use by + non-portable applications. + +2.1.2. Integer types + + GSSAPI defines the following integer data type: + + OM_uint32 32-bit unsigned integer + + Where guaranteed minimum bit-count is important, this portable data + type is used by the GSSAPI routine definitions. Individual GSSAPI + implementations will include appropriate typedef definitions to map + this type onto a built-in data type. + +2.1.3. String and similar data + + Many of the GSSAPI routines take arguments and return values that + describe contiguous multiple-byte data. All such data is passed + between the GSSAPI and the caller using the gss_buffer_t data type. + + + +Wray [Page 4] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + This data type is a pointer to a buffer descriptor, which consists of + a length field that contains the total number of bytes in the datum, + and a value field which contains a pointer to the actual datum: + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + Storage for data passed to the application by a GSSAPI routine using + the gss_buffer_t conventions is allocated by the GSSAPI routine. The + application may free this storage by invoking the gss_release_buffer + routine. Allocation of the gss_buffer_desc object is always the + responsibility of the application; Unused gss_buffer_desc objects + may be initialized to the value GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER. + +2.1.3.1. Opaque data types + + Certain multiple-word data items are considered opaque data types at + the GSSAPI, because their internal structure has no significance + either to the GSSAPI or to the caller. Examples of such opaque data + types are the input_token parameter to gss_init_sec_context (which is + opaque to the caller), and the input_message parameter to gss_seal + (which is opaque to the GSSAPI). Opaque data is passed between the + GSSAPI and the application using the gss_buffer_t datatype. + +2.1.3.2. Character strings + + Certain multiple-word data items may be regarded as simple ISO + Latin-1 character strings. An example of this is the + input_name_buffer parameter to gss_import_name. Some GSSAPI routines + also return character strings. Character strings are passed between + the application and the GSSAPI using the gss_buffer_t datatype, + defined earlier. + +2.1.4. Object Identifiers + + Certain GSSAPI procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID, or + Object identifier. This is a type containing ISO-defined tree- + structured values, and is used by the GSSAPI caller to select an + underlying security mechanism. A value of type gss_OID has the + following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + + + +Wray [Page 5] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + The elements field of this structure points to the first byte of an + octet string containing the ASN.1 BER encoding of the value of the + gss_OID. The length field contains the number of bytes in this + value. For example, the gss_OID value corresponding to {iso(1) + identified- oganization(3) icd-ecma(12) member-company(2) dec(1011) + cryptoAlgorithms(7) SPX(5)} meaning SPX (Digital's X.509 + authentication mechanism) has a length field of 7 and an elements + field pointing to seven octets containing the following octal values: + 53,14,2,207,163,7,5. GSSAPI implementations should provide constant + gss_OID values to allow callers to request any supported mechanism, + although applications are encouraged on portability grounds to accept + the default mechanism. gss_OID values should also be provided to + allow applications to specify particular name types (see section + 2.1.10). Applications should treat gss_OID_desc values returned by + GSSAPI routines as read-only. In particular, the application should + not attempt to deallocate them. The gss_OID_desc datatype is + equivalent to the X/Open OM_object_identifier datatype [2]. + +2.1.5. Object Identifier Sets + + Certain GSSAPI procedures take parameters of the type gss_OID_set. + This type represents one or more object identifiers (section 2.1.4). + A gss_OID_set object has the following structure: + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + int count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + The count field contains the number of OIDs within the set. The + elements field is a pointer to an array of gss_OID_desc objects, each + of which describes a single OID. gss_OID_set values are used to name + the available mechanisms supported by the GSSAPI, to request the use + of specific mechanisms, and to indicate which mechanisms a given + credential supports. Storage associated with gss_OID_set values + returned to the application by the GSSAPI may be deallocated by the + gss_release_oid_set routine. + +2.1.6. Credentials + + A credential handle is a caller-opaque atomic datum that identifies a + GSSAPI credential data structure. It is represented by the caller- + opaque type gss_cred_id_t, which may be implemented as either an + arithmetic or a pointer type. Credentials describe a principal, and + they give their holder the ability to act as that principal. The + GSSAPI does not make the actual credentials available to + applications; instead the credential handle is used to identify a + particular credential, held internally by GSSAPI or underlying + + + +Wray [Page 6] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + mechanism. Thus the credential handle contains no security-relavent + information, and requires no special protection by the application. + Depending on the implementation, a given credential handle may refer + to different credentials when presented to the GSSAPI by different + callers. Individual GSSAPI implementations should define both the + scope of a credential handle and the scope of a credential itself + (which must be at least as wide as that of a handle). Possibilities + for credential handle scope include the process that acquired the + handle, the acquiring process and its children, or all processes + sharing some local identification information (e.g., UID). If no + handles exist by which a given credential may be reached, the GSSAPI + may delete the credential. + + Certain routines allow credential handle parameters to be omitted to + indicate the use of a default credential. The mechanism by which a + default credential is established and its scope should be defined by + the individual GSSAPI implementation. + +2.1.7. Contexts + + The gss_ctx_id_t data type contains a caller-opaque atomic value that + identifies one end of a GSSAPI security context. It may be + implemented as either an arithmetic or a pointer type. Depending on + the implementation, a given gss_ctx_id_t value may refer to different + GSSAPI security contexts when presented to the GSSAPI by different + callers. The security context holds state information about each end + of a peer communication, including cryptographic state information. + Individual GSSAPI implementations should define the scope of a + context. Since no way is provided by which a new gss_ctx_id_t value + may be obtained for an existing context, the scope of a context + should be the same as the scope of a gss_ctx_id_t. + +2.1.8. Authentication tokens + + A token is a caller-opaque type that GSSAPI uses to maintain + synchronization between the context data structures at each end of a + GSSAPI security context. The token is a cryptographically protected + bit-string, generated by the underlying mechanism at one end of a + GSSAPI security context for use by the peer mechanism at the other + end. Encapsulation (if required) and transfer of the token are the + responsibility of the peer applications. A token is passed between + the GSSAPI and the application using the gss_buffer_t conventions. + +2.1.9. Status values + + One or more status codes are returned by each GSSAPI routine. Two + distinct sorts of status codes are returned. These are termed GSS + status codes and Mechanism status codes. + + + +Wray [Page 7] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +2.1.9.1. GSS status codes + + GSSAPI routines return GSS status codes as their OM_uint32 function + value. These codes indicate errors that are independent of the + underlying mechanism used to provide the security service. The + errors that can be indicated via a GSS status code are either generic + API routine errors (errors that are defined in the GSSAPI + specification) or calling errors (errors that are specific to these + bindings). + + A GSS status code can indicate a single fatal generic API error from + the routine and a single calling error. In addition, supplementary + status information may be indicated via the setting of bits in the + supplementary info field of a GSS status code. + + These errors are encoded into the 32-bit GSS status code as follows: + + MSB LSB + |------------------------------------------------------------| + | Calling Error | Routine Error | Supplementary Info | + |------------------------------------------------------------| + Bit 31 24 23 16 15 0 + + Hence if a GSSAPI routine returns a GSS status code whose upper 16 + bits contain a non-zero value, the call failed. If the calling error + field is non-zero, the invoking application's call of the routine was + erroneous. Calling errors are defined in table 5-1. If the routine + error field is non-zero, the routine failed for one of the routine- + specific reasons listed below in table 5-2. Whether or not the upper + 16 bits indicate a failure or a success, the routine may indicate + additional information by setting bits in the supplementary info + field of the status code. The meaning of individual bits is listed + below in table 5-3. + + Table 5-1 Calling Errors + + Name Value in Meaning + Field + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ 1 A required input + parameter could + not be read. + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE 2 A required output + parameter could + not be written. + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE 3 A parameter was + malformed + + + + + +Wray [Page 8] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Table 5-2 Routine Errors + + Name Value in Meaning + Field + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH 1 An unsupported mechanism was + requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME 2 An invalid name was supplied + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 3 A supplied name was of an + unsupported type + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS 4 Incorrect channel bindings + were supplied + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 5 An invalid status code was + supplied + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG 6 A token had an invalid + signature + GSS_S_NO_CRED 7 No credentials were supplied + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 8 No context has been + established + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 9 A token was invalid + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 10 A credential was invalid + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 11 The referenced credentials + have expired + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 12 The context has expired + GSS_S_FAILURE 13 Miscellaneous failure + (see text) + + Table 5-3 Supplementary Status Bits + + Name Bit Number Meaning + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED 0 (LSB) The routine must be called + again to complete its + function. + See routine documentation for + detailed description. + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN 1 The token was a duplicate of + an earlier token + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 2 The token's validity period + has expired + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 3 A later token has already been + processed + + The routine documentation also uses the name GSS_S_COMPLETE, which is + a zero value, to indicate an absence of any API errors or + supplementary information bits. + + + + + +Wray [Page 9] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + All GSS_S_xxx symbols equate to complete OM_uint32 status codes, + rather than to bitfield values. For example, the actual value of the + symbol GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (value 3 in the routine error field) is 3 + << 16. + + The macros GSS_CALLING_ERROR(), GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR() and + GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO() are provided, each of which takes a GSS + status code and removes all but the relevant field. For example, the + value obtained by applying GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR to a status code removes + the calling errors and supplementary info fields, leaving only the + routine errors field. The values delivered by these macros may be + directly compared with a GSS_S_xxx symbol of the appropriate type. + The macro GSS_ERROR() is also provided, which when applied to a GSS + status code returns a non-zero value if the status code indicated a + calling or routine error, and a zero value otherwise. + + A GSSAPI implementation may choose to signal calling errors in a + platform-specific manner instead of, or in addition to the routine + value; routine errors and supplementary info should be returned via + routine status values only. + +2.1.9.2. Mechanism-specific status codes + + GSSAPI routines return a minor_status parameter, which is used to + indicate specialized errors from the underlying security mechanism. + This parameter may contain a single mechanism-specific error, + indicated by a OM_uint32 value. + + The minor_status parameter will always be set by a GSSAPI routine, + even if it returns a calling error or one of the generic API errors + indicated above as fatal, although other output parameters may remain + unset in such cases. However, output parameters that are expected to + return pointers to storage allocated by a routine must always set set + by the routine, even in the event of an error, although in such cases + the GSSAPI routine may elect to set the returned parameter value to + NULL to indicate that no storage was actually allocated. Any length + field associated with such pointers (as in a gss_buffer_desc + structure) should also be set to zero in such cases. + + The GSS status code GSS_S_FAILURE is used to indicate that the + underlying mechanism detected an error for which no specific GSS + status code is defined. The mechanism status code will provide more + details about the error. + +2.1.10. Names + + A name is used to identify a person or entity. GSSAPI authenticates + the relationship between a name and the entity claiming the name. + + + +Wray [Page 10] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Two distinct representations are defined for names: + + (a) A printable form, for presentation to a user + + (b) An internal form, for presentation at the API + + The syntax of a printable name is defined by the GSSAPI + implementation, and may be dependent on local system configuration, + or on individual user preference. The internal form provides a + canonical representation of the name that is independent of + configuration. + + A given GSSAPI implementation may support names drawn from multiple + namespaces. In such an implementation, the internal form of the name + must include fields that identify the namespace from which the name + is drawn. The namespace from which a printable name is drawn is + specified by an accompanying object identifier. + + Routines (gss_import_name and gss_display_name) are provided to + convert names between their printable representations and the + gss_name_t type. gss_import_name may support multiple syntaxes for + each supported namespace, allowing users the freedom to choose a + preferred name representation. gss_display_name should use an + implementation-chosen preferred syntax for each supported name-type. + + Comparison of internal-form names is accomplished via the + gss_compare_names routine. This removes the need for the application + program to understand the syntaxes of the various printable names + that a given GSSAPI implementation may support. + + Storage is allocated by routines that return gss_name_t values. A + procedure, gss_release_name, is provided to free storage associated + with a name. + +2.1.11. Channel Bindings + + GSSAPI supports the use of user-specified tags to identify a given + context to the peer application. These tags are used to identify the + particular communications channel that carries the context. Channel + bindings are communicated to the GSSAPI using the following + structure: + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 11] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + The initiator_addrtype and acceptor_addrtype fields denote the type + of addresses contained in the initiator_address and acceptor_address + buffers. The address type should be one of the following: + + GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC Unspecified address type + GSS_C_AF_LOCAL Host-local address type + GSS_C_AF_INET DARPA Internet address type + GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK ARPAnet IMP address type (eg IP) + GSS_C_AF_PUP pup protocols (eg BSP) address type + GSS_C_AF_CHAOS MIT CHAOS protocol address type + GSS_C_AF_NS XEROX NS address type + GSS_C_AF_NBS nbs address type + GSS_C_AF_ECMA ECMA address type + GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT datakit protocols address type + GSS_C_AF_CCITT CCITT protocols (eg X.25) + GSS_C_AF_SNA IBM SNA address type + GSS_C_AF_DECnet DECnet address type + GSS_C_AF_DLI Direct data link interface address type + GSS_C_AF_LAT LAT address type + GSS_C_AF_HYLINK NSC Hyperchannel address type + GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK AppleTalk address type + GSS_C_AF_BSC BISYNC 2780/3780 address type + GSS_C_AF_DSS Distributed system services address type + GSS_C_AF_OSI OSI TP4 address type + GSS_C_AF_X25 X25 + GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR No address specified + + Note that these name address families rather than specific addressing + formats. For address families that contain several alternative + address forms, the initiator_address and acceptor_address fields must + contain sufficient information to determine which address form is + used. When not otherwise specified, addresses should be specified in + network byte-order. + + Conceptually, the GSSAPI concatenates the initiator_addrtype, + initiator_address, acceptor_addrtype, acceptor_address and + application_data to form an octet string. The mechanism signs this + octet string, and binds the signature to the context establishment + token emitted by gss_init_sec_context. The same bindings are + presented by the context acceptor to gss_accept_sec_context, and a + + + +Wray [Page 12] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + signature is calculated in the same way. The calculated signature is + compared with that found in the token, and if the signatures differ, + gss_accept_sec_context will return a GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS error, and + the context will not be established. Some mechanisms may include the + actual channel binding data in the token (rather than just a + signature); applications should therefore not use confidential data + as channel-binding components. Individual mechanisms may impose + additional constraints on addresses and address types that may appear + in channel bindings. For example, a mechanism may verify that the + initiator_address field of the channel bindings presented to + gss_init_sec_context contains the correct network address of the host + system. + +2.1.12. Optional parameters + + Various parameters are described as optional. This means that they + follow a convention whereby a default value may be requested. The + following conventions are used for omitted parameters. These + conventions apply only to those parameters that are explicitly + documented as optional. + +2.1.12.1. gss_buffer_t types + + Specify GSS_C_NO_BUFFER as a value. For an input parameter this + signifies that default behavior is requested, while for an output + parameter it indicates that the information that would be returned + via the parameter is not required by the application. + +2.1.12.2. Integer types (input) + + Individual parameter documentation lists values to be used to + indicate default actions. + +2.1.12.3. Integer types (output) + + Specify NULL as the value for the pointer. + +2.1.12.4. Pointer types + + Specify NULL as the value. + +2.1.12.5. Object IDs + + Specify GSS_C_NULL_OID as the value. + +2.1.12.6. Object ID Sets + + Specify GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET as the value. + + + +Wray [Page 13] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +2.1.12.7. Credentials + + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to use the default credential handle. + +2.1.12.8. Channel Bindings + + Specify GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS to indicate that channel bindings + are not to be used. + +3. GSSAPI routine descriptions + +2.1. gss_acquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + int cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_int32 * time_rec) + Purpose: + + Allows an application to acquire a handle for a pre-existing + credential by name. GSSAPI implementations must impose a local + access-control policy on callers of this routine to prevent + unauthorized callers from acquiring credentials to which they are not + entitled. This routine is not intended to provide a "login to the + network" function, as such a function would result in the creation of + new credentials rather than merely acquiring a handle to existing + credentials. Such functions, if required, should be defined in + implementation-specific extensions to the API. + + If credential acquisition is time-consuming for a mechanism, the + mechanism may chooses to delay the actual acquisition until the + credential is required (e.g., by gss_init_sec_context or + gss_accept_sec_context). Such mechanism-specific implementation + decisions should be invisible to the calling application; thus a call + of gss_inquire_cred immediately following the call of + gss_acquire_cred must return valid credential data, and may therefore + incur the overhead of a deferred credential acquisition. + + Parameters: + + desired_name gss_name_t, read + Name of principal whose credential + should be acquired + + + +Wray [Page 14] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + time_req integer, read + number of seconds that credentials + should remain valid + + desired_mechs Set of Object IDs, read + set of underlying security mechanisms that + may be used. GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET may be used + to obtain an implementation-specific default. + + cred_usage integer, read + GSS_C_BOTH - Credentials may be used + either to initiate or accept + security contexts. + GSS_C_INITIATE - Credentials will only be + used to initiate security + contexts. + GSS_C_ACCEPT - Credentials will only be used to + accept security contexts. + + output_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify + The returned credential handle. + + actual_mechs Set of Object IDs, modify, optional + The set of mechanisms for which the + credential is valid. Specify NULL + if not required. + + time_rec Integer, modify, optional + Actual number of seconds for which the + returned credentials will remain valid. If the + implementation does not support expiration of + credentials, the value GSS_C_INDEFINITE will + be returned. Specify NULL if not required + + minor_status Integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Unavailable mechanism requested + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE Type contained within desired_name parameter is + not supported + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME Value supplied for desired_name parameter is + + + +Wray [Page 15] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + ill-formed. + + GSS_S_FAILURE Unspecified failure. The minor_status parameter + contains more detailed information + +3.2. gss_release_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Informs GSSAPI that the specified credential handle is no longer + required by the process. When all processes have released a + credential, it will be deleted. + + Parameters: + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, modify, optional + buffer containing opaque credential + handle. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is supplied, + the default credential will be released + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED Credentials could not be accessed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 16] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +3.3. gss_init_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_name_t target_name, + gss_OID mech_type, + int req_flags, + int time_req, + gss_channel_bindings_t + input_chan_bindings, + gss_buffer_t input_token + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + int * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec ) + + Purpose: + + Initiates the establishment of a security context between the + application and a remote peer. Initially, the input_token parameter + should be specified as GSS_C_NO_BUFFER. The routine may return a + output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, + where the peer application will present it to gss_accept_sec_context. + If no token need be sent, gss_init_sec_context will indicate this by + setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To + complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + required from the peer application; if so, gss_init_sec_context will + return a status indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED in which case it + should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer + application, passing the token to gss_init_sec_context via the + input_token parameters. + + The values returned via the ret_flags and time_rec parameters are not + defined unless the routine returns GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + Parameters: + + claimant_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + handle for credentials claimed. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to use default + credentials. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned by first call in continuation calls. + + + +Wray [Page 17] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + target_name gss_name_t, read + Name of target + + mech_type OID, read, optional + Object ID of desired mechanism. Supply + GSS_C_NULL_OID to obtain an implementation + specific default + + req_flags bit-mask, read + Contains four independent flags, each of + which requests that the context support a + specific service option. Symbolic + names are provided for each flag, and the + symbolic names corresponding to the required + flags should be logically-ORed + together to form the bit-mask value. The + flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegate credentials to remote peer + False - Don't delegate + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Request that remote peer + authenticate itself + False - Authenticate self to remote peer + only + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - Enable replay detection for signed + or sealed messages + False - Don't attempt to detect + replayed messages + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - Enable detection of out-of-sequence + signed or sealed messages + False - Don't attempt to detect + out-of-sequence messages + + time_req integer, read + Desired number of seconds for which context + should remain valid. Supply 0 to request a + default validity period. + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. + + + + +Wray [Page 18] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + input_token buffer, opaque, read, optional (see text) + Token received from peer application. + Supply GSS_C_NO_BUFFER on initial call. + + actual_mech_type OID, modify + actual mechanism used. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be sent to peer application. If + the length field of the returned buffer is + zero, no token need be sent to the peer + application. + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify + Contains six independent flags, each of which + indicates that the context supports a specific + service option. Symbolic names are provided + for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags should be + logically-ANDed with the ret_flags value to test + whether a given option is supported by the + context. The flags are: + + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Credentials were delegated to + the remote peer + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer has been asked to + authenticated itself + False - Remote peer has not been asked to + authenticate itself + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of signed or sealed messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence signed or sealed + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling seal routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + seal) available. seal will provide + message encapsulation, data-origin + + + +Wray [Page 19] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + authentication and integrity + services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked by + calling either gss_sign or gss_seal + routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + + time_rec integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. If the implementation does + not support credential expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer + application is required to complete thecontext, and + that gss_init_sec_context must be called again with + that token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks performed on + the input_token failed + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for context + initiation, or the credential handle did not + reference any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel + bindings to those specified via the + input_chan_bindings parameter + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid signature, or a + signature that could not be verified + + + +Wray [Page 20] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal error + during context establishment + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a duplicate of + a token already processed. This is a fatal error + during context establishment. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did not + refer to a valid context + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The provided target_name parameter contained an + invalid or unsupported type of name + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The provided target_name parameter was ill-formed. + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information + +3.4. gss_accept_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_cred_id_t verifier_cred_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer + gss_channel_bindings_t + input_chan_bindings, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_OID * mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + int * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle) + + Purpose: + + Allows a remotely initiated security context between the application + and a remote peer to be established. The routine may return a + output_token which should be transferred to the peer application, + where the peer application will present it to gss_init_sec_context. + If no token need be sent, gss_accept_sec_context will indicate this + by setting the length field of the output_token argument to zero. To + complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + required from the peer application; if so, gss_accept_sec_context + will return a status flag of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, in which case it + should be called again when the reply token is received from the peer + application, passing the token to gss_accept_sec_context via the + input_token parameters. + + + + +Wray [Page 21] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + The values returned via the src_name, ret_flags, time_rec, and + delegated_cred_handle parameters are not defined unless the routine + returns GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + Parameters: + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read/modify + context handle for new context. Supply + GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT for first call; use value + returned in subsequent calls. + + verifier_cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read, optional + Credential handle claimed by context + acceptor. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to use default + credentials. If GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is + specified, but the caller has no default + credentials established, an + implementation-defined default credential + may be used. + + input_token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token obtained from remote application + + input_chan_bindings channel bindings, read + Application-specified bindings. Allows + application to securely bind channel + identification information to the security + context. + + src_name gss_name_t, modify, optional + Authenticated name of context initiator. + After use, this name should be deallocated by + passing it to gss_release_name. If not required, + specify NULL. + + mech_type Object ID, modify + Security mechanism used. The returned + OID value will be a pointer into static + storage, and should be treated as read-only + by the caller. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + Token to be passed to peer application. If the + length field of the returned token buffer is 0, + then no token need be passed to the peer + application. + + + + +Wray [Page 22] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + ret_flags bit-mask, modify + Contains six independent flags, each of + which indicates that the context supports a + specific service option. Symbolic names are + provided for each flag, and the symbolic names + corresponding to the required flags + should be logically-ANDed with the ret_flags + value to test whether a given option is + supported by the context. The flags are: + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG + True - Delegated credentials are available + via the delegated_cred_handle + parameter + False - No credentials were delegated + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG + True - Remote peer asked for mutual + authentication + False - Remote peer did not ask for mutual + authentication + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG + True - replay of signed or sealed messages + will be detected + False - replayed messages will not be + detected + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG + True - out-of-sequence signed or sealed + messages will be detected + False - out-of-sequence messages will not + be detected + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG + True - Confidentiality service may be + invoked by calling seal routine + False - No confidentiality service (via + seal) available. seal will + provide message encapsulation, + data-origin authentication and + integrity services only. + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG + True - Integrity service may be invoked + by calling either gss_sign or + gss_seal routines. + False - Per-message integrity service + unavailable. + + time_rec integer, modify, optional + number of seconds for which the context + will remain valid. Specify NULL if not required. + + + + +Wray [Page 23] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + delegated_cred_handle + gss_cred_id_t, modify + credential handle for credentials received from + context initiator. Only valid if deleg_flag in + ret_flags is true. + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED Indicates that a token from the peer + application is required to complete the context, + and that gss_accept_sec_context must be called + again with that token. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the input_token failed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential failed. + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The supplied credentials were not valid for + context acceptance, or the credential handle + did not reference any credentials. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have + expired. + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS The input_token contains different channel + bindings to those specified via the + input_chan_bindings parameter. + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT Indicates that the supplied context handle did + not refer to a valid context. + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The input_token contains an invalid signature. + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The input_token was too old. This is a fatal + error during context establishment. + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The input_token is valid, but is a + duplicate of a token already processed. This + is a fatal error during context establishment. + + + +Wray [Page 24] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.5. gss_process_context_token + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer) + + Purpose: + + Provides a way to pass a token to the security service. Usually, + tokens are associated either with context establishment (when they + would be passed to gss_init_sec_context or gss_accept_sec_context) or + with per-message security service (when they would be passed to + gss_verify or gss_unseal). Occasionally, tokens may be received at + other times, and gss_process_context_token allows such tokens to be + passed to the underlying security service for processing. At + present, such additional tokens may only be generated by + gss_delete_sec_context. GSSAPI implementation may use this service + to implement deletion of the security context. + + Parameters: + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + context handle of context on which token is to + be processed + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + pointer to first byte of token to process + + minor_status integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN Indicates that consistency checks + performed on the token failed + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle did not refer to a valid + context + + + + +Wray [Page 25] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +3.6. gss_delete_sec_context + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token) + + Purpose: + + Delete a security context. gss_delete_sec_context will delete the + local data structures associated with the specified security context, + and generate an output_token, which when passed to the peer + gss_process_context_token will instruct it to do likewise. No + further security services may be obtained using the context specified + by context_handle. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, modify + context handle identifying context to delete. + + output_token buffer, opaque, modify + token to be sent to remote application to + instruct it to also delete the context + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure, see minor_status for more information + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT No valid context was supplied + +3.7. gss_context_time + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 * time_rec) + Purpose: + + Determines the number of seconds for which the specified context will + remain valid. + + + +Wray [Page 26] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + Identifies the context to be interrogated. + + time_rec integer, modify + Number of seconds that the context will remain + valid. If the context has already expired, + zero will be returned. + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + +3.8. gss_sign + + OM_uint32 gss_sign ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t msg_token) + Purpose: + + Generates a cryptographic signature for the supplied message, and + places the signature in a token for transfer to the peer application. + The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several cryptographic + algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Implementation specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + + + +Wray [Page 27] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + will be sent + + qop_req integer, read, optional + Specifies requested quality of protection. + Callers are encouraged, on portability grounds, + to accept the default quality of protection + offered by the chosen mechanism, which may be + requested by specifying GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT for + this parameter. If an unsupported protection + strength is requested, gss_sign will return a + major_status of GSS_S_FAILURE. + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be signed + + msg_token buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive token + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.9. gss_verify + + OM_uint32 gss_verify ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + int * qop_state) + Purpose: + + Verifies that a cryptographic signature, contained in the token + parameter, fits the supplied message. The qop_state parameter allows + a message recipient to determine the strength of protection that was + applied to the message. + + + +Wray [Page 28] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be verified + + token_buffer buffer, opaque, read + token associated with message + + qop_state integer, modify + quality of protection gained from signature + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The signature was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but it had already + been processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but it is too old + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but has been + verified out of sequence; an earlier token has + been signed or sealed by the remote + application, but not yet been processed + locally. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + + + + +Wray [Page 29] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.10. gss_seal + + OM_uint32 gss_seal ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + int qop_req + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer) + + Purpose: + + Cryptographically signs and optionally encrypts the specified + input_message. The output_message contains both the signature and + the message. The qop_req parameter allows a choice between several + cryptographic algorithms, if supported by the chosen mechanism. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + will be sent + + conf_req_flag boolean, read + True - Both confidentiality and integrity + services are requested + False - Only integrity service is requested + + qop_req integer, read, optional + Specifies required quality of protection. A + mechanism-specific default may be requested by + setting qop_req to GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT. If an + unsupported protection strength is requested, + gss_seal will return a major_status of + GSS_S_FAILURE. + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + message to be sealed + + + + +Wray [Page 30] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + conf_state boolean, modify + True - Confidentiality, data origin + authentication and integrity services + have been applied + False - Integrity and data origin services only + has been applied. + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive sealed message + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.11. gss_unseal + + OM_uint32 gss_unseal ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + int * qop_state) + + Purpose: + + Converts a previously sealed message back to a usable form, verifying + the embedded signature. The conf_state parameter indicates whether + the message was encrypted; the qop_state parameter indicates the + strength of protection that was used to provide the confidentiality + and integrity services. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + + +Wray [Page 31] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + context_handle gss_ctx_id_t, read + identifies the context on which the message + arrived + + input_message_buffer buffer, opaque, read + sealed message + + output_message_buffer buffer, opaque, modify + buffer to receive unsealed message + + conf_state boolean, modify + True - Confidentiality and integrity protection + were used + False - Inteegrity service only was used + + qop_state integer, modify + quality of protection gained from signature + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN The token failed consistency checks + + GSS_S_BAD_SIG The signature was incorrect + + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a + correct signature for the message, but it had + already been processed + + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but it is too old + + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN The token was valid, and contained a correct + signature for the message, but has been + verified out of sequence; an earlier token has + been signed or sealed by the remote + application, but not yet been processed + locally. + + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED The context has already expired + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The context is recognized, but + associated credentials have expired + + + + + +Wray [Page 32] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT The context_handle parameter did not identify a + valid context + + GSS_S_FAILURE Failure. See minor_status for more information. + +3.12. gss_display_status + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + int status_value, + int status_type, + gss_OID mech_type, + int * message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of a GSSAPI + status code, for display to the user or for logging purposes. Since + some status values may indicate multiple errors, applications may + need to call gss_display_status multiple times, each call generating + a single text string. The message_context parameter is used to + indicate which error message should be extracted from a given + status_value; message_context should be initialized to 0, and + gss_display_status will return a non-zero value if there are further + messages to extract. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + status_value integer, read + Status value to be converted + + status_type integer, read + GSS_C_GSS_CODE - status_value is a GSS status + code + GSS_C_MECH_CODE - status_value is a mechanism + status code + + mech_type Object ID, read, optional + Underlying mechanism (used to interpret a + minor status value) Supply GSS_C_NULL_OID to + obtain the system default. + + message_context integer, read/modify + Should be initialized to zero by caller + + + +Wray [Page 33] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + on first call. If further messages are + contained in the status_value parameter, + message_context will be non-zero on return, + and this value should be passed back to + subsequent calls, along with the same + status_value, status_type and mech_type + parameters. + + status_string buffer, character string, modify + textual interpretation of the status_value + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_MECH Indicates that translation in accordance with + an unsupported mechanism type was requested + + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS The status value was not recognized, or the + status type was neither GSS_C_GSS_CODE nor + GSS_C_MECH_CODE. + + +3.13. gss_indicate_mechs + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * mech_set) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to determine which underlying security + mechanisms are available. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + mech_set set of Object IDs, modify + set of implementation-supported mechanisms. + The returned gss_OID_set value will be a + pointer into static storage, and should be + treated as read-only by the caller. + + + + + +Wray [Page 34] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +3.14. gss_compare_name + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t name1, + gss_name_t name2, + int * name_equal) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to compare two internal-form names to determine + whether they refer to the same entity. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + name1 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name2 gss_name_t, read + internal-form name + + name_equal boolean, modify + True - names refer to same entity + False - names refer to different entities + (strictly, the names are not known to + refer to the same identity). + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The type contained within either name1 or + name2 was unrecognized, or the names were of + incomparable types. + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME One or both of name1 or name2 was ill-formed + + + + + +Wray [Page 35] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + +3.15. gss_display_name + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID * output_name_type) + + Purpose: + + Allows an application to obtain a textual representation of an opaque + internal-form name for display purposes. The syntax of a printable + name is defined by the GSSAPI implementation. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code. + + input_name gss_name_t, read + name to be displayed + + output_name_buffer buffer, character-string, modify + buffer to receive textual name string + + output_name_type Object ID, modify + The type of the returned name. The returned + gss_OID will be a pointer into static storage, + and should be treated as read-only by the caller + + Function value: + + GSS status code: + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The type of input_name was not recognized + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME input_name was ill-formed + +3.16. gss_import_name + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t * output_name) + + + + +Wray [Page 36] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Purpose: + + Convert a printable name to internal form. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + input_name_buffer buffer, character-string, read + buffer containing printable name to convert + + input_name_type Object ID, read, optional + Object Id specifying type of printable + name. Applications may specify either + GSS_C_NULL_OID to use a local system-specific + printable syntax, or an OID registered by the + GSSAPI implementation to name a particular + namespace. + + output_name gss_name_t, modify + returned name in internal form + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE The input_name_type was unrecognized + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The input_name parameter could not be + interpreted as a name of the specified type + +3.17. gss_release_name + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t * name) + + Purpose: + + Free GSSAPI-allocated storage associated with an internal form name. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + + +Wray [Page 37] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + name gss_name_t, modify + The name to be deleted + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_BAD_NAME The name parameter did not contain a valid name + +3.18. gss_release_buffer + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer) + + Purpose: + + Free storage associated with a buffer format name. The storage must + have been allocated by a GSSAPI routine. In addition to freeing the + associated storage, the routine will zero the length field in the + buffer parameter. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + buffer buffer, modify + The storage associated with the buffer will be + deleted. The gss_buffer_desc object will not + be freed, but its length field will be zeroed. + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +3.19. gss_release_oid_set + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * set) + + Purpose: + + + + +Wray [Page 38] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + Free storage associated with a gss_OID_set object. The storage must + have been allocated by a GSSAPI routine. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + set Set of Object IDs, modify + The storage associated with the gss_OID_set + will be deleted. + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + +3.20. gss_inquire_cred + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime, + int * cred_usage, + gss_OID_set * mechanisms ) + + Purpose: + + Obtains information about a credential. The caller must already have + obtained a handle that refers to the credential. + + Parameters: + + minor_status integer, modify + Mechanism specific status code + + cred_handle gss_cred_id_t, read + A handle that refers to the target credential. + Specify GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to inquire about + the default credential. + + name gss_name_t, modify + The name whose identity the credential asserts. + Specify NULL if not required. + + lifetime Integer, modify + + + +Wray [Page 39] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + The number of seconds for which the credential + will remain valid. If the credential has + expired, this parameter will be set to zero. + If the implementation does not support + credential expiration, the value + GSS_C_INDEFINITE will be returned. Specify + NULL if not required. + + cred_usage Integer, modify + How the credential may be used. One of the + following: + GSS_C_INITIATE + GSS_C_ACCEPT + GSS_C_BOTH + Specify NULL if not required. + + mechanisms gss_OID_set, modify + Set of mechanisms supported by the credential. + Specify NULL if not required. + + Function value: + + GSS status code + + GSS_S_COMPLETE Successful completion + + GSS_S_NO_CRED The referenced credentials could not be + accessed. + + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL The referenced credentials were + invalid. + + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED The referenced credentials have expired. + If the lifetime parameter was not passed as + NULL, it will be set to 0. + + + #ifndef GSSAPI_H_ + #define GSSAPI_H_ + + /* + * First, define the platform-dependent types. + */ + typedef OM_uint32; + typedef gss_ctx_id_t; + typedef gss_cred_id_t; + typedef gss_name_t; + + + + +Wray [Page 40] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + /* + * Note that a platform supporting the xom.h X/Open header file + * may make use of that header for the definitions of OM_uint32 + * and the structure to which gss_OID_desc equates. + */ + + typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; + } gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + + typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + int count; + gss_OID elements; + } gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + + typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; + } gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + + typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; + } *gss_channel_bindings_t; + + + /* + * Six independent flags each of which indicates that a context + * supports a specific service option. + */ + #define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 1 + #define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 2 + #define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 4 + #define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 8 + #define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 16 + #define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 32 + + + /* + * Credential usage options + */ + #define GSS_C_BOTH 0 + #define GSS_C_INITIATE 1 + #define GSS_C_ACCEPT 2 + + + +Wray [Page 41] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + /* + * Status code types for gss_display_status + */ + #define GSS_C_GSS_CODE 1 + #define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2 + + /* + * The constant definitions for channel-bindings address families + */ + #define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC 0; + #define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL 1; + #define GSS_C_AF_INET 2; + #define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK 3; + #define GSS_C_AF_PUP 4; + #define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS 5; + #define GSS_C_AF_NS 6; + #define GSS_C_AF_NBS 7; + #define GSS_C_AF_ECMA 8; + #define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT 9; + #define GSS_C_AF_CCITT 10; + #define GSS_C_AF_SNA 11; + #define GSS_C_AF_DECnet 12; + #define GSS_C_AF_DLI 13; + #define GSS_C_AF_LAT 14; + #define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK 15; + #define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK 16; + #define GSS_C_AF_BSC 17; + #define GSS_C_AF_DSS 18; + #define GSS_C_AF_OSI 19; + #define GSS_C_AF_X25 21; + + #define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR 255; + + #define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID ((gss_OID) 0) + #define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0) + #define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL} + + /* + * Define the default Quality of Protection for per-message + * services. Note that an implementation that offers multiple + * levels of QOP may either reserve a value (for example zero, + * as assumed here) to mean "default protection", or alternatively + * may simply equate GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT to a specific explicit QOP + * value. + + + +Wray [Page 42] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + */ + #define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0 + + /* + * Expiration time of 2^32-1 seconds means infinite lifetime for a + * credential or security context + */ + #define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful + + + /* Major status codes */ + + #define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0 + + /* + * Some "helper" definitions to make the status code macros obvious. + */ + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24 + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16 + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0 + #define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul + #define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul + + /* + * The macros that test status codes for error conditions + */ + #define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK << GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET)) + #define GSS_ERROR(x) \ + ((GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) != 0) || (GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) != 0)) + + + /* + * Now the actual status code definitions + */ + + /* + * Calling errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ \ + (1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE \ + (2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + + + +Wray [Page 43] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + #define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE \ + (3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Routine errors: + */ + #define GSS_S_BAD_MECH (1ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAME (2ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (3ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS (4ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS (5ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_BAD_SIG (6ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NO_CRED (7ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT (8ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN (9ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED (11ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (12ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + #define GSS_S_FAILURE (13ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + + /* + * Supplementary info bits: + */ + #define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0)) + #define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1)) + #define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2)) + #define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3)) + + + /* + * Finally, function prototypes for the GSSAPI routines. + */ + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t, /* desired_name */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + gss_OID_set, /* desired_mechs */ + int, /* cred_usage */ + gss_cred_id_t*, /* output_cred_handle */ + gss_OID_set*, /* actual_mechs */ + OM_uint32* /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_cred, + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t* /* cred_handle */ + ); + + + +Wray [Page 44] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t, /* claimant_cred_handle */ + gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ + gss_name_t, /* target_name */ + gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + int, /* req_flags */ + OM_uint32, /* time_req */ + gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_token */ + gss_OID*, /* actual_mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + int*, /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32* /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ + gss_cred_id_t, /* verifier_cred_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_token_buffer */ + gss_channel_bindings_t, + /* input_chan_bindings */ + gss_name_t*, /* src_name */ + gss_OID*, /* mech_type */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_token */ + int*, /* ret_flags */ + OM_uint32*, /* time_rec */ + gss_cred_id_t* /* delegated_cred_handle */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* token_buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t*, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_token */ + ); + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 45] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + OM_uint32* /* time_rec */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t /* message_token */ + ); + + OM_uitn32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* token_buffer */ + int* /* qop_state */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + int, /* conf_req_flag */ + int, /* qop_req */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + int*, /* conf_state */ + gss_buffer_t /* output_message_buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_ctx_id_t, /* context_handle */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_message_buffer */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_message_buffer */ + int*, /* conf_state */ + int* /* qop_state */ + ); + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 46] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + OM_uint32, /* status_value */ + int, /* status_type */ + gss_OID, /* mech_type */ + int*, /* message_context */ + gss_buffer_t /* status_string */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set* /* mech_set */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t, /* name1 */ + gss_name_t, /* name2 */ + int* /* name_equal */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_display_name, + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t, /* input_name */ + gss_buffer_t, /* output_name_buffer */ + gss_OID* /* output_name_type */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_buffer_t, /* input_name_buffer */ + gss_OID, /* input_name_type */ + gss_name_t* /* output_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_name_t* /* input_name */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_buffer_t /* buffer */ + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32*, /* minor_status */ + gss_OID_set* /* set */ + + + +Wray [Page 47] + +RFC 1509 GSSAPI - Overview and C bindings September 1993 + + + ); + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 *, /* minor_status */ + gss_cred_id_t, /* cred_handle */ + gss_name_t *, /* name */ + OM_uint32 *, /* lifetime */ + int *, /* cred_usage */ + gss_OID_set * /* mechanisms */ + ); + + + + #endif /* GSSAPI_H_ */ + +References + + [1] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface", RFC 1508, Geer Zolot Associate, September 1993. + + [2] "OSI Object Management API Specification, Version 2.0 t", X.400 + API Association & X/Open Company Limited, August 24, 1990. + Specification of datatypes and routines for manipulating + information objects. + +Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +Author's Address + + John Wray + Digital Equipment Corporation + 550 King Street, LKG2-2/AA6 + Littleton, MA 01460 + USA + + Phone: +1-508-486-5210 + EMail: Wray@tuxedo.enet.dec.com + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wray [Page 48] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc810cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1510.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6275 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Kohl +Request for Comments: 1510 Digital Equipment Corporation + C. Neuman + ISI + September 1993 + + + The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) + +Status of this Memo + + This RFC specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" for the standardization state and status + of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This document gives an overview and specification of Version 5 of the + protocol for the Kerberos network authentication system. Version 4, + described elsewhere [1,2], is presently in production use at MIT's + Project Athena, and at other Internet sites. + +Overview + + Project Athena, Athena, Athena MUSE, Discuss, Hesiod, Kerberos, + Moira, and Zephyr are trademarks of the Massachusetts Institute of + Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these trademarks may be made + without prior written permission of MIT. + + This RFC describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos + network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 + of the Kerberos protocol. + + The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design + decisions are treated cursorily; for Version 4 they are fully + described in the Kerberos portion of the Athena Technical Plan [1]. + The protocols are under review, and are not being submitted for + consideration as an Internet standard at this time. Comments are + encouraged. Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for + discussion of Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to + kerberos-request@MIT.EDU. This mailing list is gatewayed onto the + Usenet as the group comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further + information, including documents and code availability, may be sent + to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 1] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +Background + + The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's + trusted third-party authentication protocol [3] and on modifications + suggested by Denning and Sacco [4]. The original design and + implementation of Kerberos Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two + former Project Athena staff members, Steve Miller of Digital + Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman (now at the Information + Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California), along + with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project Athena, and + Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members of + Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos. + Version 4 is publicly available, and has seen wide use across the + Internet. + + Version 5 (described in this document) has evolved from Version 4 + based on new requirements and desires for features not available in + Version 4. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 + and 5 can be found in [5]. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................... 5 + 1.1. Cross-Realm Operation ............................ 7 + 1.2. Environmental assumptions ........................ 8 + 1.3. Glossary of terms ................................ 9 + 2. Ticket flag uses and requests ...................... 12 + 2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets ............ 12 + 2.2. Invalid tickets .................................. 12 + 2.3. Renewable tickets ................................ 12 + 2.4. Postdated tickets ................................ 13 + 2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets ...................... 14 + 2.6. Forwardable tickets .............................. 15 + 2.7. Other KDC options ................................ 15 + 3. Message Exchanges .................................. 16 + 3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange .............. 16 + 3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message ............... 17 + 3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message .................. 17 + 3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message ............... 17 + 3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message ................ 19 + 3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message .................. 19 + 3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message ................... 20 + 3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange ........ 20 + 3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message ......................... 20 + 3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message ............. 20 + 3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message .................. 21 + 3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message ............. 23 + 3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message .................. 23 + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 2] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + 3.2.6. Using the encryption key ....................... 24 + 3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange ....... 24 + 3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message .............. 25 + 3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message ................. 26 + 3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message .............. 27 + 3.3.3.1. Encoding the transited field ................. 29 + 3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message ................. 31 + 3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange ............................ 31 + 3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message ............... 31 + 3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message .................... 32 + 3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange ............................ 33 + 3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message ............... 33 + 3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message .................... 33 + 3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange ............................ 34 + 3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message ............... 34 + 3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message .................... 34 + 4. The Kerberos Database .............................. 35 + 4.1. Database contents ................................ 35 + 4.2. Additional fields ................................ 36 + 4.3. Frequently Changing Fields ....................... 37 + 4.4. Site Constants ................................... 37 + 5. Message Specifications ............................. 38 + 5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation ...... 38 + 5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions ........................... 38 + 5.3. Tickets and Authenticators ....................... 42 + 5.3.1. Tickets ........................................ 42 + 5.3.2. Authenticators ................................. 47 + 5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges ...... 49 + 5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition ......................... 49 + 5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition ......................... 56 + 5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications ........ 58 + 5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition .......................... 58 + 5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition .......................... 60 + 5.5.3. Error message reply ............................ 61 + 5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification ................... 61 + 5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition ............................ 61 + 5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification ................... 62 + 5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition ............................ 62 + 5.8. KRB_CRED message specification ................... 63 + 5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition ............................ 63 + 5.9. Error message specification ...................... 65 + 5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition ........................... 66 + 6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications ............. 67 + 6.1. Encryption Specifications ........................ 68 + 6.2. Encryption Keys .................................. 71 + 6.3. Encryption Systems ............................... 71 + 6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) .............. 71 + 6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (descbc-crc)71 + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 3] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + 6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (descbc-md4) 72 + 6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (descbc-md5) 72 + 6.4. Checksums ........................................ 74 + 6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) .................... 74 + 6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) ................. 75 + 6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + (rsa-md4-des) ......................................... 75 + 6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) ................. 76 + 6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + (rsa-md5-des) ......................................... 76 + 6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + 6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES + alternative (rsa-md4-des-k) ........................... 77 + 6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative + (des-mac-k) ........................................... 77 + 7. Naming Constraints ................................. 78 + 7.1. Realm Names ...................................... 77 + 7.2. Principal Names .................................. 79 + 7.2.1. Name of server principals ...................... 80 + 8. Constants and other defined values ................. 80 + 8.1. Host address types ............................... 80 + 8.2. KDC messages ..................................... 81 + 8.2.1. IP transport ................................... 81 + 8.2.2. OSI transport .................................. 82 + 8.2.3. Name of the TGS ................................ 82 + 8.3. Protocol constants and associated values ......... 82 + 9. Interoperability requirements ...................... 86 + 9.1. Specification 1 .................................. 86 + 9.2. Recommended KDC values ........................... 88 + 10. Acknowledgments ................................... 88 + 11. References ........................................ 89 + 12. Security Considerations ........................... 90 + 13. Authors' Addresses ................................ 90 + A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing ................ 91 + A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation ............................ 91 + A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation 92 + A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification .......................... 95 + A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks ......... 96 + A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation ........................... 97 + A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation 98 + A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification ......................... 104 + A.8. Authenticator generation ......................... 104 + A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation ............................ 105 + A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification ......................... 105 + A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation ........................... 106 + A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification ......................... 107 + A.13. KRB_SAFE generation ............................. 107 + A.14. KRB_SAFE verification ........................... 108 + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 4] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks ............. 108 + A.16. KRB_PRIV generation ............................. 109 + A.17. KRB_PRIV verification ........................... 110 + A.18. KRB_CRED generation ............................. 110 + A.19. KRB_CRED verification ........................... 111 + A.20. KRB_ERROR generation ............................ 112 + +1. Introduction + + Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, + (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an open + (unprotected) network. This is accomplished without relying on + authentication by the host operating system, without basing trust on + host addresses, without requiring physical security of all the hosts + on the network, and under the assumption that packets traveling along + the network can be read, modified, and inserted at will. (Note, + however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only upon the + initiation of a stream-based network connection, and assume the + absence of any "hijackers" who might subvert such a connection. Such + use implicitly trusts the host addresses involved.) Kerberos + performs authentication under these conditions as a trusted third- + party authentication service by using conventional cryptography, + i.e., shared secret key. (shared secret key - Secret and private are + often used interchangeably in the literature. In our usage, it takes + two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES key is a secret + key. Something is only private when no one but its owner knows it. + Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private + key.) + + The authentication process proceeds as follows: A client sends a + request to the authentication server (AS) requesting "credentials" + for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, + encrypted in the client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a + "ticket" for the server and 2) a temporary encryption key (often + called a "session key"). The client transmits the ticket (which + contains the client's identity and a copy of the session key, all + encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session key (now + shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the client, + and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also + be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or + to exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further + communication. + + The implementation consists of one or more authentication servers + running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers + maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their + secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the + Kerberos protocol. In order to add authentication to its + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 5] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + transactions, a typical network application adds one or two calls to + the Kerberos library, which results in the transmission of the + necessary messages to achieve authentication. + + The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or + exchanges). There are two methods by which a client can ask a + Kerberos server for credentials. In the first approach, the client + sends a cleartext request for a ticket for the desired server to the + AS. The reply is sent encrypted in the client's secret key. Usually + this request is for a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) which can later be + used with the ticket-granting server (TGS). In the second method, + the client sends a request to the TGS. The client sends the TGT to + the TGS in the same manner as if it were contacting any other + application server which requires Kerberos credentials. The reply is + encrypted in the session key from the TGT. + + Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the + principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages + exchanged between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The + application is free to choose whatever protection may be necessary. + + To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the + client transmits the ticket to the server. Since the ticket is sent + "in the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption + doesn't thwart replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an + attacker, additional information is sent to prove that the message + was originated by the principal to whom the ticket was issued. This + information (called the authenticator) is encrypted in the session + key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp proves that the message + was recently generated and is not a replay. Encrypting the + authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated by a + party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting + principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over + the network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client. + + The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also + be guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and + contained in the credentials). This approach provides detection of + both replay attacks and message stream modification attacks. It is + accomplished by generating and transmitting a collision-proof + checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest function) of the client's + message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and integrity of the + messages exchanged between principals can be secured by encrypting + the data to be passed using the session key passed in the ticket, and + contained in the credentials. + + The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access + to the Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 6] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + database must be modified, such as when adding new principals or + changing a principal's key. This is done using a protocol between a + client and a third Kerberos server, the Kerberos Administration + Server (KADM). The administration protocol is not described in this + document. There is also a protocol for maintaining multiple copies of + the Kerberos database, but this can be considered an implementation + detail and may vary to support different database technologies. + +1.1. Cross-Realm Operation + + The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational + boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a + server in another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos + server establishes its own "realm". The name of the realm in which a + client is registered is part of the client's name, and can be used by + the end-service to decide whether to honor a request. + + By establishing "inter-realm" keys, the administrators of two realms + can allow a client authenticated in the local realm to use its + authentication remotely (Of course, with appropriate permission the + client could arrange registration of a separately-named principal in + a remote realm, and engage in normal exchanges with that realm's + services. However, for even small numbers of clients this becomes + cumbersome, and more automatic methods as described here are + necessary). The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate key may be + used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of + each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able + to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket- + granting service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting + ticket is used, the remote ticket-granting service uses the inter- + realm key (which usually differs from its own normal TGS key) to + decrypt the ticket-granting ticket, and is thus certain that it was + issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets issued by the remote ticket- + granting service will indicate to the end-service that the client was + authenticated from another realm. + + A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms + share an inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm + key with an intermediate realm that communicates with the remote + realm. An authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms + that are transited in communicating from one realm to another. + + Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a + key with its parent and a different key with each child. If an + inter-realm key is not directly shared by two realms, the + hierarchical organization allows an authentication path to be easily + constructed. If a hierarchical organization is not used, it may be + necessary to consult some database in order to construct an + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 7] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authentication path between realms. + + Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may + be bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate + authentication paths (these might be established to make + communication between two realms more efficient). It is important + for the end-service to know which realms were transited when deciding + how much faith to place in the authentication process. To facilitate + this decision, a field in each ticket contains the names of the + realms that were involved in authenticating the client. + +1.2. Environmental assumptions + + Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can + properly function: + + + "Denial of service" attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There + are places in these protocols where an intruder intruder can + prevent an application from participating in the proper + authentication steps. Detection and solution of such attacks + (some of which can appear to be not-uncommon "normal" failure + modes for the system) is usually best left to the human + administrators and users. + + + Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder + somehow steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade + as that principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate + principal. + + + "Password guessing" attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a + user chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to + successfully mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly + attempting to decrypt, with successive entries from a + dictionary, messages obtained which are encrypted under a key + derived from the user's password. + + + Each host on the network must have a clock which is "loosely + synchronized" to the time of the other hosts; this + synchronization is used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of + application servers when they do replay detection. The degree + of "looseness" can be configured on a per-server basis. If the + clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock + synchronization protocol must itself be secured from network + attackers. + + + Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A + typical mode of access control will use access control lists + (ACLs) to grant permissions to particular principals. If a + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 8] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + stale ACL entry remains for a deleted principal and the + principal identifier is reused, the new principal will inherit + rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not re-using + principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is + removed. + +1.3. Glossary of terms + + Below is a list of terms used throughout this document. + + + Authentication Verifying the claimed identity of a + principal. + + + Authentication header A record containing a Ticket and an + Authenticator to be presented to a + server as part of the authentication + process. + + + Authentication path A sequence of intermediate realms transited + in the authentication process when + communicating from one realm to another. + + Authenticator A record containing information that can + be shown to have been recently generated + using the session key known only by the + client and server. + + + Authorization The process of determining whether a + client may use a service, which objects + the client is allowed to access, and the + type of access allowed for each. + + + Capability A token that grants the bearer permission + to access an object or service. In + Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose + use is restricted by the contents of the + authorization data field, but which + lists no network addresses, together + with the session key necessary to use + the ticket. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 9] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Ciphertext The output of an encryption function. + Encryption transforms plaintext into + ciphertext. + + + Client A process that makes use of a network + service on behalf of a user. Note that + in some cases a Server may itself be a + client of some other server (e.g., a + print server may be a client of a file + server). + + + Credentials A ticket plus the secret session key + necessary to successfully use that + ticket in an authentication exchange. + + + KDC Key Distribution Center, a network service + that supplies tickets and temporary + session keys; or an instance of that + service or the host on which it runs. + The KDC services both initial ticket and + ticket-granting ticket requests. The + initial ticket portion is sometimes + referred to as the Authentication Server + (or service). The ticket-granting + ticket portion is sometimes referred to + as the ticket-granting server (or service). + + Kerberos Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding + Hades, the name given to Project + Athena's authentication service, the + protocol used by that service, or the + code used to implement the authentication + service. + + + Plaintext The input to an encryption function or + the output of a decryption function. + Decryption transforms ciphertext into + plaintext. + + + Principal A uniquely named client or server + instance that participates in a network + communication. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 10] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Principal identifier The name used to uniquely identify each + different principal. + + + Seal To encipher a record containing several + fields in such a way that the fields + cannot be individually replaced without + either knowledge of the encryption key + or leaving evidence of tampering. + + + Secret key An encryption key shared by a principal + and the KDC, distributed outside the + bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. + In the case of a human user's + principal, the secret key is derived + from a password. + + + Server A particular Principal which provides a + resource to network clients. + + + Service A resource provided to network clients; + often provided by more than one server + (for example, remote file service). + + + Session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, with a lifetime limited + to the duration of a single login "session". + + + Sub-session key A temporary encryption key used between + two principals, selected and exchanged + by the principals using the session key, + and with a lifetime limited to the duration + of a single association. + + + Ticket A record that helps a client authenticate + itself to a server; it contains the + client's identity, a session key, a + timestamp, and other information, all + sealed using the server's secret key. + It only serves to authenticate a client + when presented along with a fresh + Authenticator. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 11] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +2. Ticket flag uses and requests + + Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to + indicate various attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be + requested by a client when the ticket is obtained; some are + automatically turned on and off by a Kerberos server as required. + The following sections explain what the various flags mean, and gives + examples of reasons to use such a flag. + +2.1. Initial and pre-authenticated tickets + + The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS + protocol and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. + Application servers that want to require the knowledge of a client's + secret key (e.g., a passwordchanging program) can insist that this + flag be set in any tickets they accept, and thus be assured that the + client's key was recently presented to the application client. + + The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide addition information + about the initial authentication, regardless of whether the current + ticket was issued directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) + or issued on the basis of a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the + INITIAL flag is clear, but the PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are + carried forward from the ticket-granting ticket). + +2.2. Invalid tickets + + The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application + servers must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated + ticket will usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be + validated by the KDC before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a + TGS request with the VALIDATE option specified. The KDC will only + validate tickets after their starttime has passed. The validation is + required so that postdated tickets which have been stolen before + their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid (through a hot- + list mechanism). + +2.3. Renewable tickets + + Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long + periods of time. However, this can expose their credentials to + potential theft for equally long periods, and those stolen + credentials would be valid until the expiration time of the + ticket(s). Simply using shortlived tickets and obtaining new ones + periodically would require the client to have long-term access to its + secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be used to + mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two + "expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 12] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + ticket expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an + individual expiration time. An application client must periodically + (i.e., before it expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with + the RENEW option set in the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new + ticket with a new session key and a later expiration time. All other + fields of the ticket are left unmodified by the renewal process. + When the latest permissible expiration time arrives, the ticket + expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a hot-list + to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last + renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the + usable lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced. + + The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can + usually be ignored by application servers. However, some + particularly careful application servers may wish to disallow + renewable tickets. + + If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC + will not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, + but a client may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option + in the KRB_AS_REQ message. If it is set, then the renew-till field + in the ticket contains the time after which the ticket may not be + renewed. + +2.4. Postdated tickets + + Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much + later, e.g., a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid + at the time the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to + hold valid tickets in a batch queue, since they will be on-line + longer and more prone to theft. Postdated tickets provide a way to + obtain these tickets from the KDC at job submission time, but to + leave them "dormant" until they are activated and validated by a + further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported in the + interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief + would be foiled. + + The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + This flag must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a + postdated ticket based on the presented ticket. It is reset by + default; it may be requested by a client by setting the ALLOW- + POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message. This flag does not allow + a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting ticket; postdated + ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting the + postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) + of a postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket- + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 13] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + granting ticket at the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE + option is also set, in which case it can be the full life (endtime- + starttime) of the ticket-granting ticket. The KDC may limit how far + in the future a ticket may be postdated. + + The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The + application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see + when the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose + to reject postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a + certain period after the original authentication. When the KDC issues + a POSTDATED ticket, it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the + application client must present the ticket to the KDC to be validated + before use. + +2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets + + At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to + perform an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take + on the identity of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A + principal can allow a service to take on the principal's identity for + a particular purpose by granting it a proxy. + + The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + When set, this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to + issue a new ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a + different network address based on this ticket. This flag is set by + default. + + This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a + remote request on its behalf, e.g., a print service client can give + the print server a proxy to access the client's files on a particular + file server in order to satisfy a print request. + + In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos + tickets are usually valid from only those network addresses + specifically included in the ticket (It is permissible to request or + issue tickets with no network addresses specified, but we do not + recommend it). For this reason, a client wishing to grant a proxy + must request a new ticket valid for the network address of the + service to be granted the proxy. + + The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a + proxy ticket. Application servers may check this flag and require + additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in + order to provide an audit trail. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 14] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +2.6. Forwardable tickets + + Authentication forwarding is an instance of the proxy case where the + service is granted complete use of the client's identity. An example + where it might be used is when a user logs in to a remote system and + wants authentication to work from that system as if the login were + local. + + The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the + ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. + The FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the + PROXIABLE flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued + with different network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but + users may request that it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in + the AS request when they request their initial ticket-granting + ticket. + + This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the + user to enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then + authentication forwarding is not permitted, but the same end result + can still be achieved if the user engages in the AS exchange with the + requested network addresses and supplies a password. + + The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket + with the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests it be set by specifying + the FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new + ticket. It is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with + the FORWARDED flag set. Application servers may wish to process + FORWARDED tickets differently than non-FORWARDED tickets. + +2.7. Other KDC options + + There are two additional options which may be set in a client's + request of the KDC. The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the + client will accept a renewable ticket if a ticket with the requested + life cannot otherwise be provided. If a ticket with the requested + life cannot be provided, then the KDC may issue a renewable ticket + with a renew-till equal to the the requested endtime. The value of + the renew-till field may still be adjusted by site-determined limits + or limits imposed by the individual principal or server. + + The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is honored only by the ticket-granting + service. It indicates that the to-be-issued ticket for the end + server is to be encrypted in the session key from the additional + ticket-granting ticket provided with the request. See section 3.3.3 + for specific details. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 15] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +3. Message Exchanges + + The following sections describe the interactions between network + clients and servers and the messages involved in those exchanges. + +3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the + Kerberos Authentication Server is usually initiated by a client when + it wishes to obtain authentication credentials for a given server but + currently holds no credentials. The client's secret key is used for + encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the + initiation of a login session, to obtain credentials for a Ticket- + Granting Server, which will subsequently be used to obtain + credentials for other servers (see section 3.3) without requiring + further use of the client's secret key. This exchange is also used + to request credentials for services which must not be mediated + through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a principal's + secret key, such as the password-changing service. (The password- + changing request must not be honored unless the requester can provide + the old password (the user's current secret key). Otherwise, it + would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended session and + change another user's password.) This exchange does not by itself + provide any assurance of the the identity of the user. (To + authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials + obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to + obtain credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then + be verified by the local server through successful completion of the + Client/Server exchange.) + + The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to + Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these + messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1. + + In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and + the identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. + The response, KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present + to the server, and a session key that will be shared by the client + and the server. The session key and additional information are + encrypted in the client's secret key. The KRB_AS_REP message + contains information which can be used to detect replays, and to + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 16] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + associate it with the message to which it replies. Various errors + can occur; these are indicated by an error response (KRB_ERROR) + instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not + encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can + be used to associate it with the message to which it replies. The + lack of encryption in the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to + detect replays or fabrications of such messages. + + In the normal case the authentication server does not know whether + the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply + sends a reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. + This is acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity + was given in the request will be able to use the reply. Its critical + information is encrypted in that principal's key. The initial + request supports an optional field that can be used to pass + additional information that might be needed for the initial exchange. + This field may be used for preauthentication if desired, but the + mechanism is not currently specified. + +3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message + + The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. + Among these options are whether preauthentication is to be performed; + whether the requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or + forwardable; whether it should be postdated or allow postdating of + derivative tickets; and whether a renewable ticket will be accepted + in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the requested ticket expiration + date cannot be satisfied by a nonrenewable ticket (due to + configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1 for + pseudocode. + + The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC. + +3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message + + If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in + the creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. + The format for the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The + contents of the ticket are determined as follows. + +3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message + + The authentication server looks up the client and server principals + named in the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective + keys. If required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if + the pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code + KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If the server cannot accommodate + the requested encryption type, an error message with code + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 17] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP is returned. Otherwise it generates a "random" + session key ("Random" means that, among other things, it should be + impossible to guess the next session key based on knowledge of past + session keys. This can only be achieved in a pseudo-random number + generator if it is based on cryptographic principles. It would be + more desirable to use a truly random number generator, such as one + based on measurements of random physical phenomena.). + + If the requested start time is absent or indicates a time in the + past, then the start time of the ticket is set to the authentication + server's current time. If it indicates a time in the future, but the + POSTDATED option has not been specified, then the error + KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise the requested start + time is checked against the policy of the local realm (the + administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of + postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set + as requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The + postdated ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the + KDC after the start time has been reached. + + The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the minimum of the + following: + + +The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ + message. + + +The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the client principal (the authentication + server's database includes a maximum ticket lifetime field + in each principal's record; see section 4). + + +The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime + associated with the server principal. + + +The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by + the policy of the local realm. + + If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined + above) is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error + message with code KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested + expiration time for the ticket exceeds what was determined as above, + and if the "RENEWABLE-OK" option was requested, then the "RENEWABLE" + flag is set in the new ticket, and the renew-till value is set as if + the "RENEWABLE" option were requested (the field and option names are + described fully in section 5.4.1). If the RENEWABLE option has been + requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has been set and a renewable + ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field is set to the + minimum of: + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 18] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + +Its requested value. + + +The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two + maximum renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' + database entries. + + +The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable + lifetime set by the policy of the local realm. + + The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set + if they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm + allows: FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE. + If the new ticket is postdated (the start time is in the future), its + INVALID flag will also be set. + + If all of the above succeed, the server formats a KRB_AS_REP message + (see section 5.4.2), copying the addresses in the request into the + caddr of the response, placing any required pre-authentication data + into the padata of the response, and encrypts the ciphertext part in + the client's key using the requested encryption method, and sends it + to the client. See section A.2 for pseudocode. + +3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message + + Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by + returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the + error-code and e-text fields set to appropriate values. The error + message contents and details are described in Section 5.9.1. + +3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message + + If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies + that the cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the + reply match what it requested. If any padata fields are present, + they may be used to derive the proper secret key to decrypt the + message. The client decrypts the encrypted part of the response + using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the encrypted part + matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect replays). It + also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match those + in the request, and that the host address field is also correct. It + then stores the ticket, session key, start and expiration times, and + other information for later use. The key-expiration field from the + encrypted part of the response may be checked to notify the user of + impending key expiration (the client program could then suggest + remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3 for + pseudocode. + + Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient to + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 19] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + verify the identity of the user; the user and an attacker could + cooperate to generate a KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts + properly but is not from the proper KDC. If the host wishes to + verify the identity of the user, it must require the user to present + application credentials which can be verified using a securely-stored + secret key. If those credentials can be verified, then the identity + of the user can be assured. + +3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message + + If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it + as an error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are + necessary to recover. + +3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1 + [optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network + applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. + The client must have already acquired credentials for the server + using the AS or TGS exchange. + +3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message + + The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be + part of the first message in an authenticated transaction. It + contains a ticket, an authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping + information (see section 5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by + itself is insufficient to authenticate a client, since tickets are + passed across the network in cleartext(Tickets contain both an + encrypted and unencrypted portion, so cleartext here refers to the + entire unit, which can be copied from one message and replayed in + another without any cryptographic skill.), so the authenticator is + used to prevent invalid replay of tickets by proving to the server + that the client knows the session key of the ticket and thus is + entitled to use it. The KRB_AP_REQ message is referred to elsewhere + as the "authentication header." + +3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message + + When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it + obtains (either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 20] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + TGS exchange) a ticket and session key for the desired service. The + client may re-use any tickets it holds until they expire. The client + then constructs a new Authenticator from the the system time, its + name, and optionally an application specific checksum, an initial + sequence number to be used in KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a + session subkey to be used in negotiations for a session key unique to + this particular session. Authenticators may not be re-used and will + be rejected if replayed to a server (Note that this can make + applications based on unreliable transports difficult to code + correctly, if the transport might deliver duplicated messages. In + such cases, a new authenticator must be generated for each retry.). + If a sequence number is to be included, it should be randomly chosen + so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is not likely + to collide with other sequence numbers in use. + + The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the + use of a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) + in the ap-options field of the message. + + The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with + the ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the + end server along with any additional application-specific + information. See section A.9 for pseudocode. + +3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message + + Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks + must be loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. + Several errors are possible. If an error occurs, the server is + expected to reply to the client with a KRB_ERROR message. This + message may be encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" + form is not acceptable to the protocol. The format of error messages + is described in section 5.9.1. + + The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. + If the message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket + in the KRB_AP_REQ is not one the server can use (e.g., it indicates + an old key, and the server no longer possesses a copy of the old + key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is returned. If the USE- + SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it indicates to the + server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from the + server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key (This is + used for user-to-user authentication as described in [6]). Since it + is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms, with + different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion + of the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key + the server should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 21] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + error code is returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to + decipher the ticket. + + The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key + specified by the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a + modification of the ticket (each encryption system must provide + safeguards to detect modified ciphertext; see section 6), the + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned (chances are good that + different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt). + + The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from + the decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, + the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm + of the client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in + the authenticator. If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH + error is returned (they might not match, for example, if the wrong + session key was used to encrypt the authenticator). The addresses in + the ticket (if any) are then searched for an address matching the + operating-system reported address of the client. If no match is + found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are present + in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. + + If the local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator + differ by more than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is returned. If the server name, along with + the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator + match any recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is + returned (Note that the rejection here is restricted to + authenticators from the same principal to the same server. Other + client principals communicating with the same server principal should + not be have their authenticators rejected if the time and microsecond + fields happen to match some other client's authenticator.). The + server must remember any authenticator presented within the allowable + clock skew, so that a replay attempt is guaranteed to fail. If a + server loses track of any authenticator presented within the + allowable clock skew, it must reject all requests until the clock + skew interval has passed. This assures that any lost or re-played + authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew and can no + longer be successfully replayed (If this is not done, an attacker + could conceivably record the ticket and authenticator sent over the + network to a server, then disable the client's host, pose as the + disabled host, and replay the ticket and authenticator to subvert the + authentication.). If a sequence number is provided in the + authenticator, the server saves it for later use in processing + KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey is present, the + server either saves it for later use or uses it to help generate its + own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 22] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus + the start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than + the current time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the + INVALID flag is set in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is + returned. Otherwise, if the current time is later than end time by + more than the allowable clock skew, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error + is returned. + + If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured + that the client possesses the credentials of the principal named in + the ticket and thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. + See section A.10 for pseudocode. + +3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message + + Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication + information and its initial request in the same message, and the + server need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if + mutual authentication (not only authenticating the client to the + server, but also the server to the client) is being performed, the + KRB_AP_REQ message will have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options + field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is required in response. As with the + error message, this message may be encapsulated in the application + protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable to the application's + protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in the reply must + be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided in the + authenticator). [Note: In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the + timestamp in the reply was the client's timestamp plus one. This is + not necessary in version 5 because version 5 messages are formatted + in such a way that it is not possible to create the reply by + judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form) without knowledge + of the appropriate encryption keys.] If a sequence number is to be + included, it should be randomly chosen as described above for the + authenticator. A subkey may be included if the server desires to + negotiate a different subkey. The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in + the session key extracted from the ticket. See section A.11 for + pseudocode. + +3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message + + If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key + from the credentials obtained for the server (Note that for + encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key is not used, + even if present in the Authenticator.) to decrypt the message, and + verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the + Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client + is assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey + (if present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 23] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + pseudocode. + +3.2.6. Using the encryption key + + After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and + server share an encryption key which can be used by the application. + The "true session key" to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other + application-specific uses may be chosen by the application based on + the subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator + (Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to + choose subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to + orchestrate a negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP + message.). In some cases, the use of this session key will be + implicit in the protocol; in others the method of use must be chosen + from a several alternatives. We leave the protocol negotiations of + how to use the key (e.g., selecting an encryption or checksum type) + to the application programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not + constrain the implementation options. + + With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers + should take care not to send sensitive information to each other + without proper assurances. In particular, applications that require + privacy or integrity should use the KRB_AP_REP or KRB_ERROR responses + from the server to client to assure both client and server of their + peer's identity. If an application protocol requires privacy of its + messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section 3.5). The KRB_SAFE + message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity. + +3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange + + Summary + + Message direction Message type Section + 1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1 + 2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2 + KRB_ERROR 5.9.1 + + The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting + Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain + authentication credentials for a given server (which might be + registered in a remote realm), when it wishes to renew or validate an + existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain a proxy ticket. In the + first case, the client must already have acquired a ticket for the + Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the ticket-granting + ticket is usually obtained when a client initially authenticates to + the system, such as when a user logs in). The message format for the + TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange. The + primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 24] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + exchange does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or + sub-session key from an Authenticator is used. As is the case for + all application servers, expired tickets are not accepted by the TGS, + so once a renewable or ticket-granting ticket expires, the client + must use a separate exchange to obtain valid tickets. + + The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) + from the client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply + (KRB_TGS_REP or KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes + information authenticating the client plus a request for credentials. + The authentication information consists of the authentication header + (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the client's previously obtained ticket- + granting, renewable, or invalid ticket. In the ticket-granting + ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one or more of: a + list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization data + to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application + server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). + The TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, + encrypted in the session key from the ticket-granting ticket or + renewable ticket, or if present, in the subsession key from the + Authenticator (part of the authentication header). The KRB_ERROR + message contains an error code and text explaining what went wrong. + The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The KRB_TGS_REP message + contains information which can be used to detect replays, and to + associate it with the message to which it replies. The KRB_ERROR + message also contains information which can be used to associate it + with the message to which it replies, but the lack of encryption in + the KRB_ERROR message precludes the ability to detect replays or + fabrications of such messages. + +3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client + must determine in which realm the application server is registered + [Note: This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known + beforehand (since the realm is part of the principal identifier), or + it might be stored in a nameserver. Presently, however, this + information is obtained from a configuration file. If the realm to + be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of being + spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not + authenticated. This might result in the use of a realm which has + been compromised, and would result in an attacker's ability to + compromise the authentication of the application server to the + client.]. If the client does not already possess a ticket-granting + ticket for the appropriate realm, then one must be obtained. This is + first attempted by requesting a ticket-granting ticket for the + destination realm from the local Kerberos server (using the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 25] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + KRB_TGS_REQ message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a + TGT for the desired realm in which case one can proceed. + Alternatively, the Kerberos server may return a TGT for a realm which + is "closer" to the desired realm (further along the standard + hierarchical path), in which case this step must be repeated with a + Kerberos server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. If + neither are returned, then the request must be retried with a + Kerberos server for a realm higher in the hierarchy. This request + will itself require a ticket-granting ticket for the higher realm + which must be obtained by recursively applying these directions. + + Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate + realm, it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and + contacts one. The list might be obtained through a configuration file + or network service; as long as the secret keys exchanged by realms + are kept secret, only denial of service results from a false Kerberos + server. + + As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in + the KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ + message, providing an authentication header as an element of the + padata field, and including the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ + message along with several optional fields: the enc-authorization- + data field for application server use and additional tickets required + by some options. + + In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub- + session key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be + encrypted (If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be + taken to ensure the randomness of the selected subsession key. One + approach would be to generate a random number and XOR it with the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket.). If the sub-session key + is not specified, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket + will be used. If the enc-authorization-data is present, it must be + encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from the authenticator + portion of the authentication header, or if not present in the + session key from the ticket-granting ticket. + + Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the + destination realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode. + +3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message + + The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the + KRB_AS_REQ message, but there are many additional checks to be + performed. First, the Kerberos server must determine which server + the accompanying ticket is for and it must select the appropriate key + to decrypt it. For a normal KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 26] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + ticket granting service, and the TGS's key will be used. If the TGT + was issued by another realm, then the appropriate inter-realm key + must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not a ticket granting + ticket for the current realm, but is for an application server in the + current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are specified in + the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is the + server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt + the ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server + for which it was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata + field, the KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. + + Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied + checksum in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents + of the request, and the message rejected if the checksums do not + match (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum + is not keyed or not collision-proof (with an error code of + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the checksum type is not supported, the + KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned. If the authorization-data + are present, they are decrypted using the sub-session key from the + Authenticator. + + If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the + KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. + +3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message + + The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP + (KRB_KDC_REP), but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The + detailed specification is in section 5.4.2. + + The response will include a ticket for the requested server. The + Kerberos database is queried to retrieve the record for the requested + server (including the key with which the ticket will be encrypted). + If the request is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote realm, + and if no key is shared with the requested realm, then the Kerberos + server will select the realm "closest" to the requested realm with + which it does share a key, and use that realm instead. This is the + only case where the response from the KDC will be for a different + server than that requested by the client. + + By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list + of transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the + expiration time, and the authorization data of the newly-issued + ticket will be copied from the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or + renewable ticket. If the transited field needs to be updated, but + the transited type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error + is returned. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 27] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new + ticket is set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime + from the TGT, and (c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of + the maximum life for the application server and the maximum life for + the local realm (the maximum life for the requesting principal was + already applied when the TGT was issued). If the new ticket is to be + a renewal, then the endtime above is replaced by the minimum of (a) + the value of the renew_till field of the ticket and (b) the starttime + for the new ticket plus the life (endtimestarttime) of the old + ticket. + + If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket + will contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will + only be honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY + option is similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses + specified by the client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE + flag in the TGT is set. The PROXY option will not be honored on + requests for additional ticket-granting tickets. + + If the requested start time is absent or indicates a time in the + past, then the start time of the ticket is set to the authentication + server's current time. If it indicates a time in the future, but the + POSTDATED option has not been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is + not set in the TGT, then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is + returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting ticket has the + MAYPOSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be postdated and + the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the local + realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, + and the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated + before use by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been + reached. However, in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew- + till time of a newly-issued postdated ticket extend beyond the + renew-till time of the ticket-granting ticket. + + If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional + ticket has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the + additional ticket using the key for the server to which the + additional ticket was issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting + ticket. If the name of the requested server is missing from the + request, the name of the client in the additional ticket will be + used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be compared to + the name of the client in the additional ticket and if different, the + request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the session key + from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new ticket + that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the + new ticket will be used (This allows easy implementation of user-to- + user authentication [6], which uses ticket-granting ticket session + keys in lieu of secret server keys in situations where such secret + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 28] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + keys could be easily compromised.). + + If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC + as part of the authentication header is not that of the ticket- + granting server itself, and the server is registered in the realm of + the KDC, If the RENEW option is requested, then the KDC will verify + that the RENEWABLE flag is set in the ticket and that the renew_till + time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is rqeuested, + the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag + is set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check + that the PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, + the KDC will issue the appropriate new ticket. + + Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the + presented ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets + which have been canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by + storing a range of issue dates for "suspect tickets"; if a presented + ticket had an authtime in that range, it would be rejected. In this + way, a stolen ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket cannot be + used to gain additional tickets (renewals or otherwise) once the + theft has been reported. Any normal ticket obtained before it was + reported stolen will still be valid (because they require no + interaction with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration + time. + + The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is + encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, + or the session key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not + encrypted using the client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's + key's expiration date and the key version number fields are left out + since these values are stored along with the client's database + record, and that record is not needed to satisfy a request based on a + ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode. + +3.3.3.1. Encoding the transited field + + If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC + as part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting + service, but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look + up the inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to + decrypt the ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor + the request, subject to the constraints outlined above in the section + describing the AS exchange. The realm part of the client's identity + will be taken from the ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm + that issued the ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited + field of the ticket to be issued. This is accomplished by reading + the transited field from the ticket-granting ticket (which is treated + as an unordered set of realm names), adding the new realm to the set, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 29] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + then constructing and writing out its encoded (shorthand) form (this + may involve a rearrangement of the existing encoding). + + Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its + own realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the + previous realm. This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from + intentionally leaving out its own name (it could, however, omit other + realms' names). + + The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to + be included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the + ticket and both are known to have taken part in authenticating the + principal. Since the endpoints are not included, both local and + single-hop inter-realm authentication result in a transited field + that is empty. + + Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, + it might potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this + field, its contents are encoded. The initially supported encoding is + optimized for the normal case of inter-realm communication: a + hierarchical arrangement of realms using either domain or X.500 style + realm names. This encoding (called DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now + described. + + Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", + "\", trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, + and if they are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the + transited field by preceding them with a "\". + + A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to + the previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, + MIT.EDU, ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as: + + "EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.". + + Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were endpoints, + that they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU" + + A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to + the previous realm (For the purpose of appending, the realm preceding + the first listed realm is considered to be the null realm ("")). If + it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded by a space (" + "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO, /COM/HP, + /COM, and /COM/DEC as: + + "/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC". + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 30] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, + they they would not be included in this field, and we would have: + + "/COM,/HP" + + A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all + realms between the previous realm and the next realm have been + traversed (For the purpose of interpreting null subfields, the + client's realm is considered to precede those in the transited field, + and the server's realm is considered to follow them.). Thus, "," + means that all realms along the path between the client and the + server have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms + from the client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have + been traversed, and that everything from /COM down to the server's + realm in an X.500 style has also been traversed. This could occur if + the EDU realm in one hierarchy shares an inter-realm key directly + with the /COM realm in another hierarchy. + +3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message + + When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in + the same manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The + primary difference is that the ciphertext part of the response must + be decrypted using the session key from the ticket-granting ticket + rather than the client's secret key. See section A.7 for pseudocode. + +3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange + + The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to + detect modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by + including a keyed collisionproof checksum of the user data and some + control information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key + (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if + no negotiation has occured). + +3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects + its data and the appropriate control information and computes a + checksum over them. The checksum algorithm should be some sort of + keyed one-way hash function (such as the RSA-MD5-DES checksum + algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC), generated + using the sub-session key if present, or the session key. Different + algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the + message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable + for this use. + + The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 31] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + timestamp and a sequence number. The designer of an application + using the KRB_SAFE message must choose at least one of the two + mechanisms. This choice should be based on the needs of the + application protocol. + + Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received + by one's peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain + the session key, so maintaining the next sequence number should not + present an additional problem. + + If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages + without them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the + appropriate replay detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the + appropriate mechanism for multi-cast protocols where all of one's + peers share a common sub-session key, but some messages will be sent + to a subset of one's peers. + + After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the + information and checksum to the recipient in the message format + specified in section 5.6.1. + +3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message + + When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as + follows. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by + the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version + and type fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. + A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE + error. The application verifies that the checksum used is a + collisionproof keyed checksum, and if it is not, a + KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. The recipient verifies + that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches + the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is + specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the + recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address in the + message. A failed match for either case generates a + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the + sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are + expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with + the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator + match any recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is + generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a + sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER + error is generated. If neither a timestamp and usec or a sequence + number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 32] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Finally, the checksum is computed over the data and control + information, and if it doesn't match the received checksum, a + KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the + message was generated by its peer and was not modified in transit. + +3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange + + The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality + and the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It + achieves this by encrypting the messages and adding control + information. + +3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects + its data and the appropriate control information (specified in + section 5.7.1) and encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the + last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation + has occured). As part of the control information, the client must + choose to use either a timestamp or a sequence number (or both); see + the discussion in section 3.4.1 for guidelines on which to use. + After the user data and control information are encrypted, the client + transmits the ciphertext and some "envelope" information to the + recipient. + +3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message + + When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as + follows. If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by + the application. + + The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version + and type fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. + A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE + error. The application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes + the resultant plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been + modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. The + recipient verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's + address matches the sender's address in the message, and (if a + recipient address is specified or the recipient requires an address) + that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's + address in the message. A failed match for either case generates a + KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the + sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are + expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the + KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 33] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + the client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator + match any recently-seen such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is + generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a + sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER + error is generated. If neither a timestamp and usec or a sequence + number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was + generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without + intruders able to see the unencrypted contents). + +3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange + + The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to + send Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this + by sending the tickets together with encrypted data containing the + session keys and other information associated with the tickets. + +3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message + + When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using + the KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote + host. It then constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or + tickets so obtained, placing the session key needed to use each + ticket in the key field of the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of + the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED message. + + Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the + KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo + sequence in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current + time and, if specifically required by the application the nonce, s- + address, and raddress fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the + KRB_CRED message which is then encrypted under an encryption key + previosuly exchanged in the KRB_AP exchange (usually the last key + negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has + occured). + +3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message + + When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If + any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the + application. The message is verified by checking that the protocol + version and type fields match the current version and KRB_CRED, + respectively. A mismatch generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or + KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then decrypts the + ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption shows + the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is + generated. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 34] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating + system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's address + in the message, and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as + the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either + case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec + fields (and the nonce field if required) are checked next. If the + timestamp and usec are not present, or they are present but not + current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. + + If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new + tickets in its ticket cache together with the session key and other + information in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the + encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. + +4. The Kerberos Database + + The Kerberos server must have access to a database containing the + principal identifiers and secret keys of principals to be + authenticated (The implementation of the Kerberos server need not + combine the database and the server on the same machine; it is + feasible to store the principal database in, say, a network name + service, as long as the entries stored therein are protected from + disclosure to and modification by unauthorized parties. However, we + recommend against such strategies, as they can make system management + and threat analysis quite complex.). + +4.1. Database contents + + A database entry should contain at least the following fields: + + Field Value + + name Principal's identifier + key Principal's secret key + p_kvno Principal's key version + max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets + max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable + Tickets + + The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key + field contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret + key. (The key can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos + "master key" to protect it in case the database is compromised but + the master key is not. In that case, an extra field must be added to + indicate the master key version used, see below.) The p_kvno field is + the key version number of the principal's secret key. The max_life + field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime - starttime) + for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 35] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable + Ticket issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description + of how these lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a + given Ticket.) + + A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the + database representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between + principal records with identifiers which differ only in the realm + name. + + When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine + (i.e., not the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key + should be retained by the server until all tickets that had been + issued using that key have expired. Because of this, it is possible + for several keys to be active for a single principal. Ciphertext + encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged with the version of + the key that was used for encryption, to help the recipient find the + proper key for decryption. + + When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the + principal will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. + The keys and key version numbers will differ between the records (the + rest of the fields may or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos + issues a ticket, or responds to a request for initial authentication, + the most recent key (known by the Kerberos server) will be used for + encryption. This is the key with the highest key version number. + +4.2. Additional fields + + Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its + database: + + Field Value + + K_kvno Kerberos' key version + expiration Expiration date for entry + attributes Bit field of attributes + mod_date Timestamp of last modification + mod_name Modifying principal's identifier + + The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key + under which the principal's secret key is encrypted. + + After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an + error to any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the + principal. (A database may want to maintain two expiration dates: + one for the principal, and one for the principal's current key. This + allows password aging to work independently of the principal's + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 36] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + expiration date. However, due to the limited space in the responses, + the KDC must combine the key expiration and principal expiration date + into a single value called "key_exp", which is used as a hint to the + user to take administrative action.) + + The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations + involving the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction + with user registration procedures, for site-specific policy + implementations (Project Athena currently uses it for their user + registration process controlled by the system-wide database service, + Moira [7]), or to identify the "string to key" conversion algorithm + used for a principal's key. (See the discussion of the padata field + in section 5.4.2 for details on why this can be useful.) Other bits + are used to indicate that certain ticket options should not be + allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key (one bit each): + Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing forwardable + tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication, + disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable + tickets, and disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the + server. + + The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the + entry, and the mod_name field contains the name of the principal + which last modified the entry. + +4.3. Frequently Changing Fields + + Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a + request was made by a particular principal. Information that might + be maintained includes the time of the last request, the time of the + last request for a ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use + of a ticket-granting ticket, or other times. This information can + then be returned to the user in the last-req field (see section 5.2). + + Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the + latest expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using + each key. This field would be used to indicate how long old keys + must remain valid to allow the continued use of outstanding tickets. + +4.4. Site Constants + + The KDC implementation should have the following configurable + constants or options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce + policy decisions: + + + The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the + KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant + should reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 37] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + KDC, encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client + and target server, and it should allow for a minimum "useful" + lifetime. + + + The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket + (renew_till - starttime). + + + The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime). + + + Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields + (including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be + issued if the request specifies some authorization_data). + + + Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets + are to be issued. + +5. Message Specifications + + The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of + protocol messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are + presented in the first subsection. The remaining subsections specify + the protocol objects (tickets and authenticators) and messages. + Specification of encryption and checksum techniques, and the fields + related to them, appear in section 6. + +5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation + + All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding + Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 + specification, section 8.7 [8]. + +5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions + + The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this + section. Note that since the underscore character (_) is not + permitted in ASN.1 names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the + purposes of ASN.1 names. + + Realm ::= GeneralString + PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString + } + + Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not + contain a character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms + will usually consist of several components separated by periods (.), + in the style of Internet Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 38] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + the style of X.500 names. Acceptable forms for realm names are + specified in section 7. A PrincipalName is a typed sequence of + components consisting of the following sub-fields: + + name-type This field specifies the type of name that follows. + Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two + names can be the same (i.e., at least one of the + components, or the realm, must be different). + This constraint may be eliminated in the future. + + name-string This field encodes a sequence of components that + form a name, each component encoded as a General + String. Taken together, a PrincipalName and a Realm + form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames + will have only a few components (typically one or two). + + KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime + -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + + The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An + encoding shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include + any fractional portions of the seconds. It further shall not include + any separators. Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 + minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z. + + HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + } + + HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING + } + + + The host adddress encodings consists of two fields: + + addr-type This field specifies the type of address that + follows. Pre-defined values for this field are + specified in section 8.1. + + + address This field encodes a single address of type addr-type. + + The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 39] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + address; HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many + addresses. + + AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING + } + + + ad-data This field contains authorization data to be + interpreted according to the value of the + corresponding ad-type field. + + ad-type This field specifies the format for the ad-data + subfield. All negative values are reserved for + local use. Non-negative values are reserved for + registered use. + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + } + + + TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11) + } + + KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 40] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) + } + + + LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime + } + + lr-type This field indicates how the following lr-value + field is to be interpreted. Negative values indicate + that the information pertains only to the + responding server. Non-negative values pertain to + all servers for the realm. + + If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no information + is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the + absolute value of the lr-type field is one (1), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of last + initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then + the lr-value subfield is the time of last initial + request. If it is three (3), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of issue for the newest + ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), + then the lr-value subfield is the time of the last + renewal. If it is five (5), then the lr-value + subfield is the time of last request (of any + type). + + lr-value This field contains the time of the last request. + The time must be interpreted according to the contents + of the accompanying lr-type subfield. + + See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, + EncryptedData, EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType. + + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 41] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +5.3. Tickets and Authenticators + + This section describes the format and encryption parameters for + tickets and authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is + included in a protocol message it is treated as an opaque object. + +5.3.1. Tickets + + A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. + A Ticket contains the following information: + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + + The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by + Kerberos and the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 + for the format of the ciphertext. + + tkt-vno This field specifies the version number for the ticket + format. This document describes version number 5. + + realm This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It + also serves to identify the realm part of the server's + principal identifier. Since a Kerberos server can only + issue tickets for servers within its realm, the two will + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 42] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + always be identical. + + sname This field specifies the name part of the server's + identity. + + enc-part This field holds the encrypted encoding of the + EncTicketPart sequence. + + flags This field indicates which of various options were used or + requested when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, + where the selected options are indicated by the bit being + set (1), and the unselected options and reserved fields + being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most significant bit. The + encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The + flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The + meanings of the flags are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. When set, + this flag tells the ticket-granting + server that it is OK to issue a new + ticket- granting ticket with a + different network address based on + the presented ticket. + + 2 FORWARDED When set, this flag indicates that + the ticket has either been forwarded + or was issued based on authentication + involving a forwarded ticket-granting + ticket. + + 3 PROXIABLE The PROXIABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can be + ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE + flag has an interpretation identical + to that of the FORWARDABLE flag, + except that the PROXIABLE flag tells + the ticket-granting server that only + non- ticket-granting tickets may be + issued with different network + addresses. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 43] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + 4 PROXY When set, this flag indicates that a + ticket is a proxy. + + 5 MAY-POSTDATE The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally + only interpreted by the TGS, and can + be ignored by end servers. This flag + tells the ticket-granting server that + a post- dated ticket may be issued + based on this ticket-granting ticket. + + 6 POSTDATED This flag indicates that this ticket + has been postdated. The end-service + can check the authtime field to see + when the original authentication + occurred. + + 7 INVALID This flag indicates that a ticket is + invalid, and it must be validated by + the KDC before use. Application + servers must reject tickets which + have this flag set. + + 8 RENEWABLE The RENEWABLE flag is normally only + interpreted by the TGS, and can + usually be ignored by end servers + (some particularly careful servers + may wish to disallow renewable + tickets). A renewable ticket can be + used to obtain a replacement ticket + that expires at a later date. + + 9 INITIAL This flag indicates that this ticket + was issued using the AS protocol, and + not issued based on a ticket-granting + ticket. + + 10 PRE-AUTHENT This flag indicates that during + initial authentication, the client + was authenticated by the KDC before a + ticket was issued. The strength of + the preauthentication method is not + indicated, but is acceptable to the + KDC. + + 11 HW-AUTHENT This flag indicates that the protocol + employed for initial authentication + required the use of hardware expected + to be possessed solely by the named + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 44] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + client. The hardware authentication + method is selected by the KDC and the + strength of the method is not + indicated. + + 12-31 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + key This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is + used to pass the session key from Kerberos to the + application server and the client. The field's encoding is + described in section 6.2. + + crealm This field contains the name of the realm in which the + client is registered and in which initial authentication + took place. + + cname This field contains the name part of the client's principal + identifier. + + transited This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took + part in authenticating the user to whom this ticket was + issued. It does not specify the order in which the realms + were transited. See section 3.3.3.1 for details on how + this field encodes the traversed realms. + + authtime This field indicates the time of initial authentication for + the named principal. It is the time of issue for the + original ticket on which this ticket is based. It is + included in the ticket to provide additional information to + the end service, and to provide the necessary information + for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An + end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to + accept tickets for which the initial authentication + occurred "too far" in the past. + + This field is also returned as part of the response from + the KDC. When returned as part of the response to initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on + the Kerberos server (It is NOT recommended that this time + value be used to adjust the workstation's clock since the + workstation cannot reliably determine that such a + KRB_AS_REP actually came from the proper KDC in a timely + manner.). + + starttime This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the + ticket is valid. Together with endtime, this field + specifies the life of the ticket. If it is absent from + the ticket, its value should be treated as that of the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 45] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authtime field. + + endtime This field contains the time after which the ticket will + not be honored (its expiration time). Note that individual + services may place their own limits on the life of a ticket + and may reject tickets which have not yet expired. As + such, this is really an upper bound on the expiration time + for the ticket. + + renew-till This field is only present in tickets that have the + RENEWABLE flag set in the flags field. It indicates the + maximum endtime that may be included in a renewal. It can + be thought of as the absolute expiration time for the + ticket, including all renewals. + + caddr This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more + (if present) host addresses. These are the addresses from + which the ticket can be used. If there are no addresses, + the ticket can be used from any location. The decision + by the KDC to issue or by the end server to accept zero- + address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the + Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to + issue or accept such tickets. The suggested and default + policy, however, is that such tickets will only be issued + or accepted when additional information that can be used to + restrict the use of the ticket is included in the + authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a capability. + + Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it + harder for an attacker to use stolen credentials. Because + the session key is not sent over the network in cleartext, + credentials can't be stolen simply by listening to the + network; an attacker has to gain access to the session key + (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a + careless user's unattended session) to make use of stolen + tickets. + + It is important to note that the network address from which + a connection is received cannot be reliably determined. + Even if it could be, an attacker who has compromised the + client's workstation could use the credentials from there. + Including the network addresses only makes it more + difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off with + stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" + location. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 46] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authorization-data The authorization-data field is used to pass + authorization data from the principal on whose behalf a + ticket was issued to the application service. If no + authorization data is included, this field will be left + out. The data in this field are specific to the end + service. It is expected that the field will contain the + names of service specific objects, and the rights to those + objects. The format for this field is described in section + 5.2. Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of + the contents of the subfields, it does carry type + information (ad-type). + + By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able + to issue a proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For + example, a client wishing to print a file can obtain a file + server proxy to be passed to the print server. By + specifying the name of the file in the authorization_data + field, the file server knows that the print server can only + use the client's rights when accessing the particular file + to be printed. + + It is interesting to note that if one specifies the + authorization-data field of a proxy and leaves the host + addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key can + be treated as a capability. See [9] for some suggested + uses of this field. + + The authorization-data field is optional and does not have + to be included in a ticket. + +5.3.2. Authenticators + + An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to + certify the client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, + to help the server detect replays, and to help choose a "true session + key" to use with the particular session. The encoding is encrypted + in the ticket's session key shared by the client and the server: + +-- Unencrypted authenticator +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 47] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + authenticator-vno This field specifies the version number for the + format of the authenticator. This document specifies + version 5. + + crealm and cname These fields are the same as those described for the + ticket in section 5.3.1. + + cksum This field contains a checksum of the the application data + that accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ. + + cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the client's + timestamp. Its value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to + 999999. It often appears along with ctime. The two fields + are used together to specify a reasonably accurate + timestamp. + + ctime This field contains the current time on the client's host. + + subkey This field contains the client's choice for an encryption + key which is to be used to protect this specific + application session. Unless an application specifies + otherwise, if this field is left out the session key from + the ticket will be used. + + seq-number This optional field includes the initial sequence number + to be used by the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when + sequence numbers are used to detect replays (It may also be + used by application specific messages). When included in + the authenticator this field specifies the initial sequence + number for messages from the client to the server. When + included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number + is that for messages from the server to the client. When + used in KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by + one after each message is sent. + + For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of + replays they should be non-repeating, even across + connection boundaries. The initial sequence number should + be random and uniformly distributed across the full space + of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot be guessed + by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence + numbers do not repeat other sequences. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 48] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + authorization-data This field is the same as described for the ticket + in section 5.3.1. It is optional and will only appear when + additional restrictions are to be placed on the use of a + ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket itself. + +5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges + + This section specifies the format of the messages used in exchange + between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible + error messages appears in section 5.9.1. + +5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition + + The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is + one of KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is + for an initial ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the + message is sent from the client to the Authentication Server to + request credentials for a service. + +The message fields are: + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING, + -- might be encoded AP-REQ +} + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 49] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + + The fields in this message are: + + pvno This field is included in each message, and specifies the + protocol version number. This document specifies protocol + version 5. + + msg-type This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It + will almost always be the same as the application + identifier associated with a message. It is included to + make the identifier more readily accessible to the + application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be + KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ. + + padata The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a of + authentication information which may be needed before + credentials can be issued or decrypted. In the case of + requests for additional tickets (KRB_TGS_REQ), this field + will include an element with padata-type of PA-TGS-REQ and + data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket + and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator + (which must be collisionproof) is to be computed over the + KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In most requests for initial + authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies (KDC-REP), the + padata field will be left out. + + This field may also contain information needed by certain + extensions to the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might + be used to initially verify the identity of a client before + any response is returned. This is accomplished with a + padata field with padata-type equal to PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and + padata-value defined as follows: + + padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP + padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC + + PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 50] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec + containing the microseconds which may be omitted if a + client will not generate more than one request per second. + The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of the PA-ENC-TS-ENC + sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key. + + The padata field can also contain information needed to + help the KDC or the client select the key needed for + generating or decrypting the response. This form of the + padata is useful for supporting the use of certain + "smartcards" with Kerberos. The details of such extensions + are beyond the scope of this specification. See [10] for + additional uses of this field. + + padata-type The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the + way that the padata-value element is to be interpreted. + Negative values of padata-type are reserved for + unregistered use; non-negative values are used for a + registered interpretation of the element type. + + req-body This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the + remaining fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over + the request, it is calculated over an encoding of the KDC- + REQ-BODY sequence which is enclosed within the req-body + field. + + kdc-options This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ + requests to the KDC and indicates the flags that the client + wants set on the tickets as well as other information that + is to modify the behavior of the KDC. Where appropriate, + the name of an option may be the same as the flag that is + set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the + options field will be the same as that in the flags field, + this is not guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply + copy the options field to the flags field. There are + various checks that must be made before honoring an option + anyway. + + The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected + options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the + unselected options and reserved fields being reset (0). + The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2. The + options are described in more detail above in section 2. + The meanings of the options are: + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 51] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this + field. + + 1 FORWARDABLE The FORWARDABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + forwardable flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or in a + subsequent request if the ticket- + granting ticket on which it is based + is also forwardable. + + 2 FORWARDED The FORWARDED option is only specified + in a request to the ticket-granting + server and will only be honored if the + ticket-granting ticket in the request + has its FORWARDABLE bit set. This + option indicates that this is a + request for forwarding. The + address(es) of the host from which the + resulting ticket is to be valid are + included in the addresses field of the + request. + + + 3 PROXIABLE The PROXIABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + proxiable flag set. It may only be set + on the initial request, or in a + subsequent request if the ticket- + granting ticket on which it is based + is also proxiable. + + 4 PROXY The PROXY option indicates that this + is a request for a proxy. This option + will only be honored if the ticket- + granting ticket in the request has its + PROXIABLE bit set. The address(es) of + the host from which the resulting + ticket is to be valid are included in + the addresses field of the request. + + 5 ALLOW-POSTDATE The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates + that the ticket to be issued is to + have its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It + may only be set on the initial + request, or in a subsequent request if + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 52] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + the ticket-granting ticket on which it + is based also has its MAY-POSTDATE + flag set. + + 6 POSTDATED The POSTDATED option indicates that + this is a request for a postdated + ticket. This option will only be + honored if the ticket-granting ticket + on which it is based has its MAY- + POSTDATE flag set. The resulting + ticket will also have its INVALID flag + set, and that flag may be reset by a + subsequent request to the KDC after + the starttime in the ticket has been + reached. + + 7 UNUSED This option is presently unused. + + 8 RENEWABLE The RENEWABLE option indicates that + the ticket to be issued is to have its + RENEWABLE flag set. It may only be + set on the initial request, or when + the ticket-granting ticket on which + the request is based is also + renewable. If this option is + requested, then the rtime field in the + request contains the desired absolute + expiration time for the ticket. + + 9-26 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + 27 RENEWABLE-OK The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that + a renewable ticket will be acceptable + if a ticket with the requested life + cannot otherwise be provided. If a + ticket with the requested life cannot + be provided, then a renewable ticket + may be issued with a renew-till equal + to the the requested endtime. The + value of the renew-till field may + still be limited by local limits, or + limits selected by the individual + principal or server. + + 28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The ENC- + TKT-IN-SKEY option indicates that the + ticket for the end server is to be + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 53] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + encrypted in the session key from the + additional ticket-granting ticket + provided. + + 29 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + 30 RENEW This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The RENEW + option indicates that the present + request is for a renewal. The ticket + provided is encrypted in the secret + key for the server on which it is + valid. This option will only be + honored if the ticket to be renewed + has its RENEWABLE flag set and if the + time in its renew till field has not + passed. The ticket to be renewed is + passed in the padata field as part of + the authentication header. + + 31 VALIDATE This option is used only by the + ticket-granting service. The VALIDATE + option indicates that the request is + to validate a postdated ticket. It + will only be honored if the ticket + presented is postdated, presently has + its INVALID flag set, and would be + otherwise usable at this time. A + ticket cannot be validated before its + starttime. The ticket presented for + validation is encrypted in the key of + the server for which it is valid and + is passed in the padata field as part + of the authentication header. + + cname and sname These fields are the same as those described for the + ticket in section 5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is specified. If absent, the name + of the server is taken from the name of the client in the + ticket passed as additional-tickets. + + enc-authorization-data The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it + can only be present in the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of + the desired authorization-data encrypted under the sub- + session key if present in the Authenticator, or + alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting + ticket, both from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 54] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + realm This field specifies the realm part of the server's + principal identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the + realm part of the client's principal identifier. + + from This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ + ticket requests when the requested ticket is to be + postdated. It specifies the desired start time for the + requested ticket. + + till This field contains the expiration date requested by the + client in a ticket request. + + rtime This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a + client to the KDC in a ticket request. It is optional. + + nonce This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it + intended to hold a random number generated by the client. + If the same number is included in the encrypted response + from the KDC, it provides evidence that the response is + fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. Nonces + must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be gen erated + randomly, but if the correct time is known, it may suffice + (Note, however, that if the time is used as the nonce, one + must make sure that the workstation time is monotonically + increasing. If the time is ever reset backwards, there is + a small, but finite, probability that a nonce will be + reused.). + + etype This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be + used in the response. + + addresses This field is included in the initial request for tickets, + and optionally included in requests for additional tickets + from the ticket-granting server. It specifies the + addresses from which the requested ticket is to be valid. + Normally it includes the addresses for the client's host. + If a proxy is requested, this field will contain other + addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied + by the KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket. + + additional-tickets Additional tickets may be optionally included in a + request to the ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN- + SKEY option has been specified, then the session key from + the additional ticket will be used in place of the server's + key to encrypt the new ticket. If more than one option + which requires additional tickets has been specified, then + the additional tickets are used in the order specified by + the ordering of the options bits (see kdc-options, above). + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 55] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending + on whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an + additional ticket (TGS-REQ). + + The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional- + tickets) are only included if necessary to perform the operation + specified in the kdc-options field. + + It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number + appears twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ + message contains these fields as does the authentication header + (KRB_AP_REQ) that is passed in the padata field. + +5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition + + The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for + either an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There + is no message type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either + KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext + part of the reply depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the + ciphertext is encrypted in the client's secret key, and the client's + key version number is included in the key version number for the + encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in the + sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if absent, the session key + from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request. In that case, + no version number will be present in the EncryptedData sequence. + + The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields: + + AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP + TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + + KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData + } + + EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[25]] EncKDCRepPart + EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + + EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 56] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + NOTE: In EncASRepPart, the application code in the encrypted + part of a message provides an additional check that + the message was decrypted properly. + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is either KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP. + + padata This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One + possible use for this field is to encode an alternate + "mix-in" string to be used with a string-to-key algorithm + (such as is described in section 6.3.2). This ability is + useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to change + (e.g., when a company is acquired); in such a case all + existing password-derived entries in the KDC database would + be flagged as needing a special mix-in string until the + next password change. + + crealm, cname, srealm and sname These fields are the same as those + described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. + + ticket The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1. + + enc-part This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related + information that forms the encrypted part of a message. + The description of the encrypted part of the message + follows each appearance of this field. The encrypted part + is encoded as described in section 6.1. + + key This field is the same as described for the ticket in + section 5.3.1. + + last-req This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) + of the last request by a principal. Depending on what + information is available, this might be the last time that + a request for a ticket-granting ticket was made, or the + last time that a request based on a ticket-granting ticket + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 57] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + was successful. It also might cover all servers for a + realm, or just the particular server. Some implementations + may display this information to the user to aid in + discovering unauthorized use of one's identity. It is + similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when + logging into timesharing systems. + + nonce This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + key-expiration The key-expiration field is part of the response from + the KDC and specifies the time that the client's secret key + is due to expire. The expiration might be the result of + password aging or an account expiration. This field will + usually be left out of the TGS reply since the response to + the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no client + information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is + up to the application client (usually the login program) to + take appropriate action (such as notifying the user) if the + expira tion time is imminent. + + flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr These + fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted + portion of the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), + provided so the client may verify they match the intended + request and to assist in proper ticket caching. If the + message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will only + be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded + ticket, or if the user is substituting a subset of the + addresses from the ticket granting ticket. If the client- + requested addresses are not present or not used, then the + addresses contained in the ticket will be the same as those + included in the ticket-granting ticket. + +5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications + + This section specifies the format of the messages used for the + authentication of the client to the application server. + +5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition + + The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, + the message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options + in use, and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ + message is often referred to as the "authentication header". + + AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 58] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData + } + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) + } + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REQ. + + ap-options This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) + and affects the way the request is processed. It is a + bit-field, where the selected options are indicated by the + bit being set (1), and the unselected options and reserved + fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is + specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are: + + Bit(s) Name Description + + 0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of + this field. + + 1 USE-SESSION-KEYThe USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates + that the ticket the client is + presenting to a server is encrypted in + the session key from the server's + ticket-granting ticket. When this + option is not specified, the ticket is + encrypted in the server's secret key. + + 2 MUTUAL-REQUIREDThe MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the + server that the client requires mutual + authentication, and that it must + respond with a KRB_AP_REP message. + + 3-31 RESERVED Reserved for future use. + + ticket This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the + server. + + authenticator This contains the authenticator, which includes the + client's choice of a subkey. Its encoding is described in + section 5.3.2. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 59] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition + + The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, + the message type, and an encrypted timestamp. The message is sent in + in response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual + authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field. + + AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData + } + + EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + NOTE: in EncAPRepPart, the application code in the encrypted part of + a message provides an additional check that the message was decrypted + properly. + + The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of + the ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an + application-arranged negotiation to choose a per association session + key. + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_AP_REP. + + enc-part This field is described above in section 5.4.2. + + ctime This field contains the current time on the client's host. + + cusec This field contains the microsecond part of the client's + timestamp. + + subkey This field contains an encryption key which is to be used + to protect this specific application session. See section + 3.2.6 for specifics on how this field is used to negotiate + a key. Unless an application specifies otherwise, if this + field is left out, the sub-session key from the + authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from + the ticket will be used. + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 60] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +5.5.3. Error message reply + + If an error occurs while processing the application request, the + KRB_ERROR message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for + the format of the error message. The cname and crealm fields may be + left out if the server cannot determine their appropriate values from + the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ message. If the authenticator was + decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields will contain the values from + it. + +5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by + either side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper- + proof message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has + previously been exchanged (for example, by using the + KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition + + The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof + checksum keyed with the session key. The message fields are: + + KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum + } + + KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_SAFE. + + safe-body This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE + message. It is to be encoded separately and then have the + checksum computed over it, for use in the cksum field. + + cksum This field contains the checksum of the application data. + Checksum details are described in section 6.4. The + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 61] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE-BODY + sequence. + + user-data This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages + and contain the application specific data that is being + passed from the sender to the recipient. + + timestamp This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. + Its contents are the current time as known by the sender of + the message. By checking the timestamp, the recipient of + the message is able to make sure that it was recently + generated, and is not a replay. + + usec This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. + It contains the microsecond part of the timestamp. + + seq-number This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + + s-address This field specifies the address in use by the sender of + the message. + + r-address This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of + the message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as + broadcast protocols), but the recipient may arbitrarily + reject such messages. This field along with s-address can + be used to help detect messages which have been incorrectly + or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient. + +5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by + either side (client or server) of an application to securely and + privately send a message to its peer. It presumes that a session key + has previously been exchanged (for example, by using the + KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages). + +5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition + + The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. + The message fields are: + + KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData + } + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 62] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + -- recip's addr + } + + NOTE: In EncKrbPrivPart, the application code in the encrypted part + of a message provides an additional check that the message was + decrypted properly. + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_PRIV. + + enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence + encrypted under the session key (If supported by the + encryption method in use, an initialization vector may be + passed to the encryption procedure, in order to achieve + proper cipher chaining. The initialization vector might + come from the last block of the ciphertext from the + previous KRB_PRIV message, but it is the application's + choice whether or not to use such an initialization vector. + If left out, the default initialization vector for the + encryption algorithm will be used.). This encrypted + encoding is used for the enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV + message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. + + user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address These fields are + described above in section 5.6.1. + + seq-number This field is described above in section 5.3.2. + +5.8. KRB_CRED message specification + + This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to + send Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is + presented here to encourage a common mechanism to be used by + applications when forwarding tickets or providing proxies to + subordinate servers. It presumes that a session key has already been + exchanged perhaps by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages. + +5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition + + The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and + information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 63] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + each. The information needed to use the tickets is encryped under an + encryption key previously exchanged. The message fields are: + + KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData + } + + EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL + } + + KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL + } + + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_CRED. + + tickets + These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically + for use by the intended recipient. Successive tickets are + paired with the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the + enc-part of the KRB-CRED message. + + enc-part This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence + encrypted under the session key shared between the sender + and the intended recipient. This encrypted encoding is + used for the enc-part field of the KRB-CRED message. See + section 6 for the format of the ciphertext. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 64] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + nonce If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a + nonce generated by the recipient of the message. If the + same value is included as the nonce in the message, it + provides evidence that the message is fresh and has not + been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must never be re- + used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of + the message and provided to the sender of the mes sage in + an application specific manner. + + timestamp and usec These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED + message was generated. The time is used to provide + assurance that the message is fresh. + + s-address and r-address These fields are described above in section + 5.6.1. They are used optionally to provide additional + assurance of the integrity of the KRB-CRED message. + + key This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the + KRB-CRED message and is used to pass the session key from + the sender to the intended recipient. The field's encoding + is described in section 6.2. + + The following fields are optional. If present, they can be + associated with the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left + out, then it is assumed that the recipient of the credentials already + knows their value. + + prealm and pname The name and realm of the delegated principal + identity. + + flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, + and caddr These fields contain the values of the + corresponding fields from the ticket found in the ticket + field. Descriptions of the fields are identical to the + descriptions in the KDC-REP message. + +5.9. Error message specification + + This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The + fields included in the message are intended to return as much + information as possible about an error. It is not expected that all + the information required by the fields will be available for all + types of errors. If the appropriate information is not available + when the message is composed, the corresponding field will be left + out of the message. + + Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is not protected by any + encryption, it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 65] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + modify such a message. In particular, this means that the client + should not use any fields in this message for security-critical + purposes, such as setting a system clock or generating a fresh + authenticator. The message can be useful, however, for advising a + user on the reason for some failure. + +5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition + + The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields: + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + pvno and msg-type These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. + msg-type is KRB_ERROR. + + ctime This field is described above in section 5.4.1. + + cusec This field is described above in section 5.5.2. + + stime This field contains the current time on the server. It is + of type KerberosTime. + + susec This field contains the microsecond part of the server's + timestamp. Its value ranges from 0 to 999. It appears + along with stime. The two fields are used in conjunction to + specify a reasonably accurate timestamp. + + error-code This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or + the server when a request fails. To interpret the value of + this field see the list of error codes in section 8. + Implementations are encouraged to provide for national + language support in the display of error messages. + + crealm, cname, srealm and sname These fields are described above in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 66] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + section 5.3.1. + + e-text This field contains additional text to help explain the + error code associated with the failed request (for example, + it might include a principal name which was unknown). + + e-data This field contains additional data about the error for use + by the application to help it recover from or handle the + error. If the errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, then + the e-data field will contain an encoding of a sequence of + padata fields, each corresponding to an acceptable pre- + authentication method and optionally containing data for + the method: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA + + If the error-code is KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, then the e-data field will + contain an encoding of the following sequence: + + METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + method-type[0] INTEGER, + method-data[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + method-type will indicate the required alternate method; method-data + will contain any required additional information. + +6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications + + The Kerberos protocols described in this document are designed to use + stream encryption ciphers, which can be simulated using commonly + available block encryption ciphers, such as the Data Encryption + Standard [11], in conjunction with block chaining and checksum + methods [12]. Encryption is used to prove the identities of the + network entities participating in message exchanges. The Key + Distribution Center for each realm is trusted by all principals + registered in that realm to store a secret key in confidence. Proof + of knowledge of this secret key is used to verify the authenticity of + a principal. + + The KDC uses the principal's secret key (in the AS exchange) or a + shared session key (in the TGS exchange) to encrypt responses to + ticket requests; the ability to obtain the secret key or session key + implies the knowledge of the appropriate keys and the identity of the + KDC. The ability of a principal to decrypt the KDC response and + present a Ticket and a properly formed Authenticator (generated with + the session key from the KDC response) to a service verifies the + identity of the principal; likewise the ability of the service to + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 67] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + extract the session key from the Ticket and prove its knowledge + thereof in a response verifies the identity of the service. + + The Kerberos protocols generally assume that the encryption used is + secure from cryptanalysis; however, in some cases, the order of + fields in the encrypted portions of messages are arranged to minimize + the effects of poorly chosen keys. It is still important to choose + good keys. If keys are derived from user-typed passwords, those + passwords need to be well chosen to make brute force attacks more + difficult. Poorly chosen keys still make easy targets for intruders. + + The following sections specify the encryption and checksum mechanisms + currently defined for Kerberos. The encodings, chaining, and padding + requirements for each are described. For encryption methods, it is + often desirable to place random information (often referred to as a + confounder) at the start of the message. The requirements for a + confounder are specified with each encryption mechanism. + + Some encryption systems use a block-chaining method to improve the + the security characteristics of the ciphertext. However, these + chaining methods often don't provide an integrity check upon + decryption. Such systems (such as DES in CBC mode) must be augmented + with a checksum of the plaintext which can be verified at decryption + and used to detect any tampering or damage. Such checksums should be + good at detecting burst errors in the input. If any damage is + detected, the decryption routine is expected to return an error + indicating the failure of an integrity check. Each encryption type is + expected to provide and verify an appropriate checksum. The + specification of each encryption method sets out its checksum + requirements. + + Finally, where a key is to be derived from a user's password, an + algorithm for converting the password to a key of the appropriate + type is included. It is desirable for the string to key function to + be one-way, and for the mapping to be different in different realms. + This is important because users who are registered in more than one + realm will often use the same password in each, and it is desirable + that an attacker compromising the Kerberos server in one realm not + obtain or derive the user's key in another. + + For a discussion of the integrity characteristics of the candidate + encryption and checksum methods considered for Kerberos, the the + reader is referred to [13]. + +6.1. Encryption Specifications + + The following ASN.1 definition describes all encrypted messages. The + enc-part field which appears in the unencrypted part of messages in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 68] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + section 5 is a sequence consisting of an encryption type, an optional + key version number, and the ciphertext. + + EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + } + + etype This field identifies which encryption algorithm was used + to encipher the cipher. Detailed specifications for + selected encryption types appear later in this section. + + kvno This field contains the version number of the key under + which data is encrypted. It is only present in messages + encrypted under long lasting keys, such as principals' + secret keys. + + cipher This field contains the enciphered text, encoded as an + OCTET STRING. + + The cipher field is generated by applying the specified encryption + algorithm to data composed of the message and algorithm-specific + inputs. Encryption mechanisms defined for use with Kerberos must + take sufficient measures to guarantee the integrity of the plaintext, + and we recommend they also take measures to protect against + precomputed dictionary attacks. If the encryption algorithm is not + itself capable of doing so, the protections can often be enhanced by + adding a checksum and a confounder. + + The suggested format for the data to be encrypted includes a + confounder, a checksum, the encoded plaintext, and any necessary + padding. The msg-seq field contains the part of the protocol message + described in section 5 which is to be encrypted. The confounder, + checksum, and padding are all untagged and untyped, and their length + is exactly sufficient to hold the appropriate item. The type and + length is implicit and specified by the particular encryption type + being used (etype). The format for the data to be encrypted is + described in the following diagram: + + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + |confounder | check | msg-seq | pad | + +-----------+----------+-------------+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 69] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +CipherText ::= ENCRYPTED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(conf_length) OPTIONAL, + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(checksum_length) OPTIONAL, + msg-seq[2] MsgSequence, + pad UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(pad_length) OPTIONAL +} + + In the above specification, UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(length) is the + notation for an octet string with its tag and length removed. It is + not a valid ASN.1 type. The tag bits and length must be removed from + the confounder since the purpose of the confounder is so that the + message starts with random data, but the tag and its length are + fixed. For other fields, the length and tag would be redundant if + they were included because they are specified by the encryption type. + + One generates a random confounder of the appropriate length, placing + it in confounder; zeroes out check; calculates the appropriate + checksum over confounder, check, and msg-seq, placing the result in + check; adds the necessary padding; then encrypts using the specified + encryption type and the appropriate key. + + Unless otherwise specified, a definition of an encryption algorithm + that specifies a checksum, a length for the confounder field, or an + octet boundary for padding uses this ciphertext format (The ordering + of the fields in the CipherText is important. Additionally, messages + encoded in this format must include a length as part of the msg-seq + field. This allows the recipient to verify that the message has not + been truncated. Without a length, an attacker could use a chosen + plaintext attack to generate a message which could be truncated, + while leaving the checksum intact. Note that if the msg-seq is an + encoding of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE or OCTET STRING, then the length is + part of that encoding.). Those fields which are not specified will be + omitted. + + In the interest of allowing all implementations using a particular + encryption type to communicate with all others using that type, the + specification of an encryption type defines any checksum that is + needed as part of the encryption process. If an alternative checksum + is to be used, a new encryption type must be defined. + + Some cryptosystems require additional information beyond the key and + the data to be encrypted. For example, DES, when used in cipher- + block-chaining mode, requires an initialization vector. If required, + the description for each encryption type must specify the source of + such additional information. + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 70] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +6.2. Encryption Keys + + The sequence below shows the encoding of an encryption key: + + EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + } + + keytype This field specifies the type of encryption key that + follows in the keyvalue field. It will almost always + correspond to the encryption algorithm used to generate the + EncryptedData, though more than one algorithm may use the + same type of key (the mapping is many to one). This might + happen, for example, if the encryption algorithm uses an + alternate checksum algorithm for an integrity check, or a + different chaining mechanism. + + keyvalue This field contains the key itself, encoded as an octet + string. + + All negative values for the encryption key type are reserved for + local use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially + assigned type fields and interpretations. + +6.3. Encryption Systems + +6.3.1. The NULL Encryption System (null) + + If no encryption is in use, the encryption system is said to be the + NULL encryption system. In the NULL encryption system there is no + checksum, confounder or padding. The ciphertext is simply the + plaintext. The NULL Key is used by the null encryption system and is + zero octets in length, with keytype zero (0). + +6.3.2. DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 checksum (des-cbc-crc) + + The des-cbc-crc encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [11] using the cipher block chaining mode [12]. + A CRC-32 checksum (described in ISO 3309 [14]) is applied to the + confounder and message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum + field. DES blocks are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be + encrypted (the concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) + must be padded to an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details + of the encryption of this data are identical to those for the des- + cbc-md5 encryption mode. + + Note that, since the CRC-32 checksum is not collisionproof, an + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 71] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + attacker could use a probabilistic chosenplaintext attack to generate + a valid message even if a confounder is used [13]. The use of + collision-proof checksums is recommended for environments where such + attacks represent a significant threat. The use of the CRC-32 as the + checksum for ticket or authenticator is no longer mandated as an + interoperability requirement for Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 + (See section 9.1 for specific details). + +6.3.3. DES in CBC mode with an MD4 checksum (des-cbc-md4) + + The des-cbc-md4 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [11] using the cipher block chaining mode [12]. + An MD4 checksum (described in [15]) is applied to the confounder and + message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks + are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the + concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to + an 8 byte boundary before encryption. The details of the encryption + of this data are identical to those for the descbc-md5 encryption + mode. + +6.3.4. DES in CBC mode with an MD5 checksum (des-cbc-md5) + + The des-cbc-md5 encryption mode encrypts information under the Data + Encryption Standard [11] using the cipher block chaining mode [12]. + An MD5 checksum (described in [16]) is applied to the confounder and + message sequence (msg-seq) and placed in the cksum field. DES blocks + are 8 bytes. As a result, the data to be encrypted (the + concatenation of confounder, checksum, and message) must be padded to + an 8 byte boundary before encryption. + + Plaintext and DES ciphtertext are encoded as 8-octet blocks which are + concatenated to make the 64-bit inputs for the DES algorithms. The + first octet supplies the 8 most significant bits (with the octet's + MSbit used as the DES input block's MSbit, etc.), the second octet + the next 8 bits, ..., and the eighth octet supplies the 8 least + significant bits. + + Encryption under DES using cipher block chaining requires an + additional input in the form of an initialization vector. Unless + otherwise specified, zero should be used as the initialization + vector. Kerberos' use of DES requires an 8-octet confounder. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semiweak" keys; + those keys shall not be used for encrypting messages for use in + Kerberos. Additionally, because of the way that keys are derived for + the encryption of checksums, keys shall not be used that yield "weak" + or "semi-weak" keys when eXclusive-ORed with the constant + F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 72] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + A DES key is 8 octets of data, with keytype one (1). This consists + of 56 bits of key, and 8 parity bits (one per octet). The key is + encoded as a series of 8 octets written in MSB-first order. The bits + within the key are also encoded in MSB order. For example, if the + encryption key is: + (B1,B2,...,B7,P1,B8,...,B14,P2,B15,...,B49,P7,B50,...,B56,P8) where + B1,B2,...,B56 are the key bits in MSB order, and P1,P2,...,P8 are the + parity bits, the first octet of the key would be B1,B2,...,B7,P1 + (with B1 as the MSbit). [See the FIPS 81 introduction for + reference.] + + To generate a DES key from a text string (password), the text string + normally must have the realm and each component of the principal's + name appended(In some cases, it may be necessary to use a different + "mix-in" string for compatibility reasons; see the discussion of + padata in section 5.4.2.), then padded with ASCII nulls to an 8 byte + boundary. This string is then fan-folded and eXclusive-ORed with + itself to form an 8 byte DES key. The parity is corrected on the + key, and it is used to generate a DES CBC checksum on the initial + string (with the realm and name appended). Next, parity is corrected + on the CBC checksum. If the result matches a "weak" or "semiweak" + key as described in the DES specification, it is eXclusive-ORed with + the constant 00000000000000F0. Finally, the result is returned as + the key. Pseudocode follows: + + string_to_key(string,realm,name) { + odd = 1; + s = string + realm; + for(each component in name) { + s = s + component; + } + tempkey = NULL; + pad(s); /* with nulls to 8 byte boundary */ + for(8byteblock in s) { + if(odd == 0) { + odd = 1; + reverse(8byteblock) + } + else odd = 0; + tempkey = tempkey XOR 8byteblock; + } + fixparity(tempkey); + key = DES-CBC-check(s,tempkey); + fixparity(key); + if(is_weak_key_key(key)) + key = key XOR 0xF0; + return(key); + } + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 73] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +6.4. Checksums + + The following is the ASN.1 definition used for a checksum: + + Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING + } + + cksumtype This field indicates the algorithm used to generate the + accompanying checksum. + + checksum This field contains the checksum itself, encoded + as an octet string. + + Detailed specification of selected checksum types appear later in + this section. Negative values for the checksum type are reserved for + local use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially + assigned type fields and interpretations. + + Checksums used by Kerberos can be classified by two properties: + whether they are collision-proof, and whether they are keyed. It is + infeasible to find two plaintexts which generate the same checksum + value for a collision-proof checksum. A key is required to perturb + or initialize the algorithm in a keyed checksum. To prevent + message-stream modification by an active attacker, unkeyed checksums + should only be used when the checksum and message will be + subsequently encrypted (e.g., the checksums defined as part of the + encryption algorithms covered earlier in this section). Collision- + proof checksums can be made tamper-proof as well if the checksum + value is encrypted before inclusion in a message. In such cases, the + composition of the checksum and the encryption algorithm must be + considered a separate checksum algorithm (e.g., RSA-MD5 encrypted + using DES is a new checksum algorithm of type RSA-MD5-DES). For most + keyed checksums, as well as for the encrypted forms of collisionproof + checksums, Kerberos prepends a confounder before the checksum is + calculated. + +6.4.1. The CRC-32 Checksum (crc32) + + The CRC-32 checksum calculates a checksum based on a cyclic + redundancy check as described in ISO 3309 [14]. The resulting + checksum is four (4) octets in length. The CRC-32 is neither keyed + nor collision-proof. The use of this checksum is not recommended. + An attacker using a probabilistic chosen-plaintext attack as + described in [13] might be able to generate an alternative message + that satisfies the checksum. The use of collision-proof checksums is + recommended for environments where such attacks represent a + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 74] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + significant threat. + +6.4.2. The RSA MD4 Checksum (rsa-md4) + + The RSA-MD4 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD4 + algorithm [15]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) + checksum. RSA-MD4 is believed to be collision-proof. + +6.4.3. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md4des) + + The RSA-MD4-DES checksum calculates a keyed collisionproof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD4 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the + checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 (A variant of the key is + used to limit the use of a key to a particular function, separating + the functions of generating a checksum from other encryption + performed using the session key. The constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0 was + chosen because it maintains key parity. The properties of DES + precluded the use of the complement. The same constant is used for + similar purpose in the Message Integrity Check in the Privacy + Enhanced Mail standard.). The initialization vector should be zero. + The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 octets of which are + redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys"; those keys shall + not be used for generating RSA-MD4 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + | des-cbc(confounder + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + rsa-md4(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md4-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 75] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +6.4.4. The RSA MD5 Checksum (rsa-md5) + + The RSA-MD5 checksum calculates a checksum using the RSA MD5 + algorithm [16]. The algorithm takes as input an input message of + arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit (16 octet) + checksum. RSA-MD5 is believed to be collision-proof. + +6.4.5. RSA MD5 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES (rsa-md5des) + + The RSA-MD5-DES checksum calculates a keyed collisionproof checksum + by prepending an 8 octet confounder before the text, applying the RSA + MD5 checksum algorithm, and encrypting the confounder and the + checksum using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode using a + variant of the key, where the variant is computed by eXclusive-ORing + the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The initialization + vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 24 octets long (8 + octets of which are redundant). This checksum is tamper-proof and + believed to be collision-proof. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys"; those keys shall + not be used for encrypting RSA-MD5 checksums for use in Kerberos. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + | des-cbc(confounder + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + rsa-md5(confounder+msg),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + rsa-md5-des-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(16) + } + +6.4.6. DES cipher-block chained checksum (des-mac) + + The DES-MAC checksum is computed by prepending an 8 octet confounder + to the plaintext, performing a DES CBC-mode encryption on the result + using the key and an initialization vector of zero, taking the last + block of the ciphertext, prepending the same confounder and + encrypting the pair using DES in cipher-block-chaining (CBC) mode + using a a variant of the key, where the variant is computed by + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 76] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + eXclusive-ORing the key with the constant F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0. The + initialization vector should be zero. The resulting checksum is 128 + bits (16 octets) long, 64 bits of which are redundant. This checksum + is tamper-proof and collision-proof. + + The format for the checksum is described in the following diagram: + + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + | des-cbc(confounder + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-- + + +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + des-mac(conf+msg,iv=0,key),key=var(key),iv=0) | + +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ + + The format cannot be described in ASN.1, but for those who prefer an + ASN.1-like notation: + + des-mac-checksum ::= ENCRYPTED UNTAGGED SEQUENCE { + confounder[0] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8), + check[1] UNTAGGED OCTET STRING(8) + } + + The DES specifications identify some "weak" and "semiweak" keys; + those keys shall not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use + in Kerberos, nor shall a key be used whose veriant is "weak" or + "semi-weak". + +6.4.7. RSA MD4 Cryptographic Checksum Using DES alternative + (rsa-md4-des-k) + + The RSA-MD4-DES-K checksum calculates a keyed collision-proof + checksum by applying the RSA MD4 checksum algorithm and encrypting + the results using DES in cipherblock-chaining (CBC) mode using a DES + key as both key and initialization vector. The resulting checksum is + 16 octets long. This checksum is tamper-proof and believed to be + collision-proof. Note that this checksum type is the old method for + encoding the RSA-MD4-DES checksum and it is no longer recommended. + +6.4.8. DES cipher-block chained checksum alternative (desmac-k) + + The DES-MAC-K checksum is computed by performing a DES CBC-mode + encryption of the plaintext, and using the last block of the + ciphertext as the checksum value. It is keyed with an encryption key + and an initialization vector; any uses which do not specify an + additional initialization vector will use the key as both key and + initialization vector. The resulting checksum is 64 bits (8 octets) + long. This checksum is tamper-proof and collision-proof. Note that + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 77] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + this checksum type is the old method for encoding the DESMAC checksum + and it is no longer recommended. + + The DES specifications identify some "weak keys"; those keys shall + not be used for generating DES-MAC checksums for use in Kerberos. + +7. Naming Constraints + +7.1. Realm Names + + Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a + realm can technically select any name it chooses, interoperability + across realm boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to + be assigned, and what information they imply. + + To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the + conventions itself, and it must require that any realms with which + inter-realm keys are shared also conform to the conventions and + require the same from its neighbors. + + There are presently four styles of realm names: domain, X500, other, + and reserved. Examples of each style follow: + + domain: host.subdomain.domain (example) + X500: C=US/O=OSF (example) + other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example) + reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above + + Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components + separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor + slashes (/). + + X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) + before the equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string + representations of the names with components separated by slashes. + Leading and trailing slashes will not be included. + + Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that + contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed + by a colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be + assigned before they may be used. Presently none are assigned. + + The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the + first three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It + is unlikely that names will be assigned to this category unless there + is a very strong argument for not using the "other" category. + + These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 78] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + various name styles. The following additional constraints apply to + the assignment of realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the + name of a realm for the domain or X.500 formats must either be used + by the organization owning (to whom it was assigned) an Internet + domain name or X.500 name, or in the case that no such names are + registered, authority to use a realm name may be derived from the + authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no domain + name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can + authorize the creation of a realm with that name. + + This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is + assigned is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to + its children in the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the + parent assigns a realm name without also registering it in the domain + name or X.500 hierarchy, it is the parent's responsibility to make + sure that there will not in the future exists a name identical to the + realm name of the child unless it is assigned to the same entity as + the realm name. + +7.2. Principal Names + + As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure + that all agree on what information is implied by a principal name. + The name-type field that is part of the principal name indicates the + kind of information implied by the name. The name-type should be + treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the + same (i.e., at least one of the components, or the realm, must be + different). This constraint may be eliminated in the future. The + following name types are defined: + + name-type value meaning + NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known + NT-PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in + DCE, or for users + NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) + NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance + (telnet, rcommands) + NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components + NT-UID 5 Unique ID + + When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a + particular time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The + principal name type should be used for users, and it might also be + used for a unique server. If the name is a unique machine generated + ID that is guaranteed never to be reassigned then the name type of + UID should be used (note that it is generally a bad idea to reassign + names of any type since stale entries might remain in access control + lists). + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 79] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + If the first component of a name identifies a service and the + remaining components identify an instance of the service in a server + specified manner, then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An + example of this name type is the Kerberos ticket-granting ticket + which has a first component of krbtgt and a second component + identifying the realm for which the ticket is valid. + + If instance is a single component following the service name and the + instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the + name type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for + Internet services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the + separate components of the host name appear as successive components + following the name of the service, then the name type SRVXHST should + be used. This type might be used to identify servers on hosts with + X.500 names where the slash (/) might otherwise be ambiguous. + + A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is + not known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match + principals authenticated with names of any type. A principal + authenticated with a name of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match + other names of type UNKNOWN. + + Names of any type with an initial component of "krbtgt" are reserved + for the Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the + form of such names. + +7.2.1. Name of server principals + + The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be + composed of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server + is registered, and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the + host name is an Internet domain name or a multi-component name of + type NT-SRV-XHST if the name of the host is of a form such as X.500 + that allows slash (/) separators. The first component of the two- or + multi-component name will identify the service and the latter + components will identify the host. Where the name of the host is not + case sensitive (for example, with Internet domain names) the name of + the host must be lower case. For services such as telnet and the + Berkeley R commands which run with system privileges, the first + component will be the string "host" instead of a service specific + identifier. + +8. Constants and other defined values + +8.1. Host address types + + All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local + use. All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 80] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + type fields and interpretations. + + The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to + match the defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard + Distributions of Unix. They can be found in with + symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an abbreviation of the address + family name). + + + Internet addresses + + Internet addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of internet addresses is two (2). + + CHAOSnet addresses + + CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5). + + ISO addresses + + ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is + seven (7). + + Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses + + XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB + order. The type of XNS addresses is six (6). + + AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses + + AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16- + bit network number. The first octet of the address is the node + number; the remaining two octets encode the network number in MSB + order. The type of AppleTalk DDP addresses is sixteen (16). + + DECnet Phase IV addresses + + DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB + order. The type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12). + +8.2. KDC messages + +8.2.1. IP transport + + When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request + using IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing + only an encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 81] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + address; the KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only + an encoding of the reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a + KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at the sender's IP address. + +8.2.2. OSI transport + + During authentication of an OSI client to and OSI server, the mutual + authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of + credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange + of private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages + may be treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication + mechanism will be: + + OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(5),internet(1), + security(5), kerberosv5(2)} + + Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an + authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply + (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message (KRB_SAFE), a private message + (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message (KRB_CRED). The opaque data + contains an application code as specified in the ASN.1 description + for each message. The application code may be used by Kerberos to + determine the message type. + +8.2.3. Name of the TGS + + The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be + composed of three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS + ticket (2) a two-part name of type NT-SRVINST, with the first part + "krbtgt" and the second part the name of the realm which will accept + the ticket-granting ticket. For example, a ticket-granting ticket + issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets from the + ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A ticket-granting + ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get tickets + from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" + (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name). + +8.3. Protocol constants and associated values + + The following tables list constants used in the protocol and defines + their meanings. + + + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 82] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +---------------+-----------+----------+----------------+--------------- +Encryption type|etype value|block size|minimum pad size|confounder size +---------------+-----------+----------+----------------+--------------- +NULL 0 1 0 0 +des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8 +des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8 +des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8 + +-------------------------------+-------------------+------------- +Checksum type |sumtype value |checksum size +-------------------------------+-------------------+------------- +CRC32 1 4 +rsa-md4 2 16 +rsa-md4-des 3 24 +des-mac 4 16 +des-mac-k 5 8 +rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 +rsa-md5 7 16 +rsa-md5-des 8 24 + +-------------------------------+----------------- +padata type |padata-type value +-------------------------------+----------------- +PA-TGS-REQ 1 +PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 +PA-PW-SALT 3 + +-------------------------------+------------- +authorization data type |ad-type value +-------------------------------+------------- +reserved values 0-63 +OSF-DCE 64 +SESAME 65 + +-------------------------------+----------------- +alternate authentication type |method-type value +-------------------------------+----------------- +reserved values 0-63 +ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64 + +-------------------------------+------------- +transited encoding type |tr-type value +-------------------------------+------------- +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1 +reserved values all others + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 83] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +--------------+-------+----------------------------------------- +Label |Value |Meaning or MIT code +--------------+-------+----------------------------------------- + +pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number + +message types + +KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication +KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT +KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server +KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message +KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message +KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward + credentials +KRB_ERROR 30 Error response + +name types + +KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known +KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or + for users +KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, + rcommands) +KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components +KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID + +error codes + +KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error +KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has + expired +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has + expired +KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number + not supported +KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old + master key +KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old + master key +KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database +KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in + database + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 84] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key +KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating +KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than + end time +KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request +KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested + option +KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption + type +KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type +KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type +KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been + revoked +KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked +KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again + later +KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again + later +KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change + password to reset +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information + was invalid +KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authentication + required* +KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field + failed +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired +KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid +KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay +KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us +KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match +KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great +KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address +KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch +KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type +KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified +KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order +KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not + available +KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available +KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed +KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction +KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method + required* +KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message +KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 85] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + message +KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text) +KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this + implementation + + *This error carries additional information in the e-data field. The + contents of the e-data field for this message is described in section + 5.9.1. + +9. Interoperability requirements + + Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. + Among these are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative + encoding schemes for the transited field, optional mechanisms for + pre-authentication, the handling of tickets with no addresses, + options for mutual authentication, user to user authentication, + support for proxies, forwarding, postdating, and renewing tickets, + the format of realm names, and the handling of authorization data. + + In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to + define a minimal configuration which must be supported by all + implementations. This minimal configuration is subject to change as + technology does. For example, if at some later date it is discovered + that one of the required encryption or checksum algorithms is not + secure, it will be replaced. + +9.1. Specification 1 + + This section defines the first specification of these options. + Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to + support Kerberos Version 5 Specification 1 (5.1). + + Encryption and checksum methods + + The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported. + Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the + additional mechanisms may only be used when communicating with + principals known to also support them: Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5 + Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, and DES-MD5 + + Realm Names + + All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the + Internet Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket + for an unknown realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine + the names of the intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the + requested realm. + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 86] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Transited field encoding + + DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.1) must be + supported. Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be + used only when that encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms. + + Pre-authentication methods + + The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used + on the initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported + by clients but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on + a realm by realm basis. If not used in the initial request and the + error KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENCTIMESTAMP + as an acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request + using the PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not + support the PAENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server + should ignore the presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in + a request. + + Mutual authentication + + Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported. + + Ticket addresses and flags + + All KDC's must pass on tickets that carry no addresses (i.e., if a + TGT contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), + but each realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and + each application server will set its own policy with respect to + accepting them. By default, servers should not accept them. + + Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms + and application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets + will be accepted. + + All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, + but need not actually implement them. If these options are not + supported, the starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a + ticket's entire useful life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a + server, all implementations shall make the presence of the postdated + flag visible to the calling server. + + User-to-user authentication + + Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKTIN-SKEY KDC + option) must be provided by implementations, but individual realms + may decide as a matter of policy to reject such requests on a per- + principal or realm-wide basis. + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 87] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + Authorization data + + Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from + ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to + suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered + subfield type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no + registered subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC). + + Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data + subfields available to the server when a ticket is used. + Implementations are not required to allow clients to specify the + contents of the authorization data fields. + +9.2. Recommended KDC values + + Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, + based on the list of suggested configuration constants (see section + 4.4). + + minimum lifetime 5 minutes + + maximum renewable lifetime 1 week + + maximum ticket lifetime 1 day + + empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear + in authorization data + + proxiable, etc. Allowed. + +10. Acknowledgments + + Early versions of this document, describing version 4 of the + protocol, were written by Jennifer Steiner (formerly at Project + Athena); these drafts provided an excellent starting point for this + current version 5 specification. Many people in the Internet + community have contributed ideas and suggested protocol changes for + version 5. Notable contributions came from Ted Anderson, Steve + Bellovin and Michael Merritt [17], Daniel Bernstein, Mike Burrows, + Donald Davis, Ravi Ganesan, Morrie Gasser, Virgil Gligor, Bill + Griffeth, Mark Lillibridge, Mark Lomas, Steve Lunt, Piers McMahon, + Joe Pato, William Sommerfeld, Stuart Stubblebine, Ralph Swick, Ted + T'so, and Stanley Zanarotti. Many others commented and helped shape + this specification into its current form. + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 88] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +11. References + + [1] Miller, S., Neuman, C., Schiller, J., and J. Saltzer, "Section + E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and Authorization System", + M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 21, + 1987. + + [2] Steiner, J., Neuman, C., and J. Schiller, "Kerberos: An + Authentication Service for Open Network Systems", pp. 191-202 in + Usenix Conference Proceedings, Dallas, Texas, February, 1988. + + [3] Needham, R., and M. Schroeder, "Using Encryption for + Authentication in Large Networks of Computers", Communications + of the ACM, Vol. 21 (12), pp. 993-999, December 1978. + + [4] Denning, D., and G. Sacco, "Time stamps in Key Distribution + Protocols", Communications of the ACM, Vol. 24 (8), pp. 533-536, + August 1981. + + [5] Kohl, J., Neuman, C., and T. Ts'o, "The Evolution of the + Kerberos Authentication Service", in an IEEE Computer Society + Text soon to be published, June 1992. + + [6] Davis, D., and R. Swick, "Workstation Services and Kerberos + Authentication at Project Athena", Technical Memorandum TM-424, + MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, February 1990. + + [7] Levine, P., Gretzinger, M, Diaz, J., Sommerfeld, W., and K. + Raeburn, "Section E.1: Service Management System, M.I.T. + Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas sachusetts (1987). + + [8] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentication + Framework, December 1988. + + [9] Neuman, C., "Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for + Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of the 13th International + Conference on Distributed Computing Systems", Pittsburgh, PA, + May 1993. + + [10] Pato, J., "Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password Guessing + Attacks", Open Software Foundation DCE Request for Comments 26, + December 1992. + + [11] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Data + Encryption Standard", Federal Information Processing Standards + Publication 46, Washington, DC (1977). + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 89] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + [12] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, "DES + Modes of Operation", Federal Information Processing Standards + Publication 81, Springfield, VA, December 1980. + + [13] Stubblebine S., and V. Gligor, "On Message Integrity in + Cryptographic Protocols", in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium + on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May + 1992. + + [14] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO Information + Processing Systems - Data Communication High-Level Data Link + Control Procedure - Frame Structure", IS 3309, October 1984, 3rd + Edition. + + [15] Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320, MIT + Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992. + + [16] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321, MIT + Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992. + + [17] Bellovin S., and M. Merritt, "Limitations of the Kerberos + Authentication System", Computer Communications Review, Vol. + 20(5), pp. 119-132, October 1990. + +12. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +13. Authors' Addresses + + John Kohl + Digital Equipment Corporation + 110 Spit Brook Road, M/S ZKO3-3/U14 + Nashua, NH 03062 + + Phone: 603-881-2481 + EMail: jtkohl@zk3.dec.com + + + B. Clifford Neuman + USC/Information Sciences Institute + 4676 Admiralty Way #1001 + Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695 + + Phone: 310-822-1511 + EMail: bcn@isi.edu + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 90] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing + + This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to + be constructed and interpreted by clients and servers. + +A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_AS_REQ */ + + if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then + request.padata.padata-type = PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP; + get system_time; + padata-body.patimestamp,pausec = system_time; + encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value + using client.key; /* derived from password */ + endif + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + body.cname := user's name; + body.realm := user's realm; + body.sname := service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", + "localrealm" */ + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + omit body.enc-authorization-data; + request.req-body := body; + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberos server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 91] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation + decode message into req; + + client := lookup(req.cname,req.realm); + server := lookup(req.sname,req.realm); + get system_time; + kdc_time := system_time.seconds; + + if (!client) then + /* no client in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + if (!server) then + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + + if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and + pa_enc_timestamp not present) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)); + endif + + if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then + decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp + using client.key; + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable + skew) then error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay) + error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED); + endif + add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache; + endif + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := req.srealm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 92] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.ALLOW-POSTDATE; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or + (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or + (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or + (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or + (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.session := random_session_key(); + new_tkt.cname := req.cname; + new_tkt.crealm := req.crealm; + new_tkt.transited := empty_transited_field(); + + new_tkt.authtime := kdc_time; + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + else + omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when + omitted */ + endif + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm); + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 93] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := req.till; + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm); + else + omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */ + endif + + if (req.addresses) then + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + else + omit new_tkt.caddr; + endif + + new_tkt.authorization_data := empty_authorization_data(); + + encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING; + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, server.p_kvno; + + + /* Start processing the response */ + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_AS_REP; + resp.cname := req.cname; + resp.crealm := req.realm; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := new_tkt.session; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.key-expiration := client.expiration; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 94] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + + resp.caddr := new_tkt.caddr; + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno; + send(resp); + +A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + if(error = KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) + then set pa_enc_timestamp_required; + goto KRB_AS_REQ; + endif + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */ + /* from the response immediately */ + + key = get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, resp.enc-part.etype, + resp.padata); + unencrypted part of resp := decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and key; + zero(key); + + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + if near(resp.princ_exp) then + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 95] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + print(warning message); + endif + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks + if (decryption_error() or + (req.cname != resp.cname) or + (req.realm != resp.crealm) or + (req.sname != resp.sname) or + (req.realm != resp.realm) or + (req.nonce != resp.nonce) or + (req.addresses != resp.caddr)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + /* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that */ + /* all that should be are set */ + if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) + then destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.from = 0) and + (resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + endif + if ((req.from != 0) and (req.from != resp.starttime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.till != 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (req.rtime != 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + endif + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and + (req.till != 0) and + (resp.renew-till > req.till)) then + destroy resp.key; + return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 96] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + +A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation + /* Note that make_application_request might have to */ + /* recursivly call this routine to get the appropriate */ + /* ticket-granting ticket */ + + request.pvno := protocol version; /* pvno = 5 */ + request.msg-type := message type; /* type = KRB_TGS_REQ */ + + body.kdc-options := users's preferences; + /* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */ + /* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */ + /* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */ + /* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */ + /* sending applies */ + body.sname := service's name; + body.realm := service's realm; + + if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + body.from := requested starting time; + else + omit body.from; + endif + body.till := requested end time; + if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then + body.rtime := requested final renewal time; + endif + body.nonce := random_nonce(); + body.etype := requested etypes; + if (user supplied addresses) then + body.addresses := user's addresses; + else + omit body.addresses; + endif + + body.enc-authorization-data := user-supplied data; + if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then + body.additional-tickets_ticket := second TGT; + endif + + request.req-body := body; + check := generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype); + + request.padata[0].padata-type := PA-TGS-REQ; + request.padata[0].padata-value := create a KRB_AP_REQ using + the TGT and checksum + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 97] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + /* add in any other padata as required/supplied */ + + kerberos := lookup(name of local kerberose server (or servers)); + send(packet,kerberos); + + wait(for response); + if (timed_out) then + retry or use alternate server; + endif + +A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation + /* note that reading the application request requires first + determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and + choosing the correct key for decryption. The name of the + server appears in the plaintext part of the ticket. */ + + if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata; + + /* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is + operating is determined by the instance from the + ticket-granting ticket. The realm in the ticket-granting + ticket is the realm under which the ticket granting ticket was + issued. It is possible for a single Kerberos server to + support more than one realm. */ + + auth_hdr := KRB_AP_REQ; + tgt := auth_hdr.ticket; + + if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not + req.sname) then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US); + + realm := realm_tgt_is_for(tgt); + + decode remainder of request; + + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 98] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + set computed_checksum := checksum(req); + if (computed_checksum != auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + server := lookup(req.sname,realm); + + if (!server) then + if (is_foreign_tgt_name(server)) then + server := best_intermediate_tgs(server); + else + /* no server in Database */ + error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN); + endif + endif + + session := generate_random_session_key(); + + + use_etype := first supported etype in req.etypes; + + if (no support for req.etypes) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + + new_tkt.vno := ticket version; /* = 5 */ + new_tkt.sname := req.sname; + new_tkt.srealm := realm; + reset all flags in new_tkt.flags; + + /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ + /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ + /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ + + new_tkt.caddr := tgt.caddr; + resp.caddr := NULL; /* We only include this if they change */ + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 99] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then + set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then + if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.PROXY; + new_tkt.caddr := req.addresses; + resp.caddr := req.addresses; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.POSTDATE is reset) + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATE; + endif + if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then + if (tgt.flags.POSTDATE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED; + set new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + new_tkt.starttime := req.from; + endif + + + if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then + if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV); + endif + if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 100] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + tkt := tgt; + reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID; + endif + + if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW, + and those already processed) is set) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + + new_tkt.authtime := tgt.authtime; + + if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then + /* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket */ + /* would have been rejected in the initial authentication */ + /* stage, so there is no need to check again here */ + if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION); + endif + if (tgt.renew-till >= kdc_time) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + tkt := tgt; + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + old_life := tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime; + new_tkt.endtime := min(tgt.renew-till, + new_tkt.starttime + old_life); + else + new_tkt.starttime := kdc_time; + if (req.till = 0) then + till := infinity; + else + till := req.till; + endif + new_tkt.endtime := min(till, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life, + new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm, + tgt.endtime); + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and + (new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then + /* we set the RENEWABLE option for later */ + /* processing */ + set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE; + req.rtime := min(req.till, tgt.renew-till); + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 101] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + endif + + if (req.rtime = 0) then + rtime := infinity; + else + rtime := req.rtime; + endif + + if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and + (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then + set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE; + new_tkt.renew-till := min(rtime, + new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife, + new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm, + tgt.renew-till); + else + new_tkt.renew-till := OMIT; + /* leave the renew-till field out */ + endif + if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then + decrypt req.enc-authorization-data + into decrypted_authorization_data + using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey; + if (decrypt_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + endif + new_tkt.authorization_data := + req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data + + decrypted_authorization_data; + + new_tkt.key := session; + new_tkt.crealm := tgt.crealm; + new_tkt.cname := req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname; + + if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) := tgt.realm) then + /* tgt issued by local realm */ + new_tkt.transited := tgt.transited; + else + /* was issued for this realm by some other realm */ + if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP); + endif + new_tkt.transited + := compress_transited(tgt.transited + tgt.realm) + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 102] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING; + if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then + if (server not specified) then + server = req.second_ticket.client; + endif + if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or + (req.second_ticket.client != server)) then + error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY); + endif + + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using + using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), + second-ticket.key; + else + new_tkt.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, + server.p_kvno; + endif + + resp.pvno := 5; + resp.msg-type := KRB_TGS_REP; + resp.crealm := tgt.crealm; + resp.cname := tgt.cname; + resp.ticket := new_tkt; + + resp.key := session; + resp.nonce := req.nonce; + resp.last-req := fetch_last_request_info(client); + resp.flags := new_tkt.flags; + + resp.authtime := new_tkt.authtime; + resp.starttime := new_tkt.starttime; + resp.endtime := new_tkt.endtime; + + omit resp.key-expiration; + + resp.sname := new_tkt.sname; + resp.realm := new_tkt.realm; + + if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then + resp.renew-till := new_tkt.renew-till; + endif + + + encode body of reply into OCTET STRING; + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 103] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + req.padata.authenticator.subkey; + else resp.enc-part := encrypt OCTET STRING + using use_etype, tgt.key; + + send(resp); + +A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification + decode response into resp; + + if (resp.msg-type = KRB_ERROR) then + process_error(resp); + return; + endif + + /* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from + the response immediately */ + + if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey) + unencrypted part of resp := + decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey; + else unencrypted part of resp := + decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part + using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's session key; + if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then + destroy resp.key; + return error; + endif + + check authorization_data as necessary; + save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags); + +A.8. Authenticator generation + body.authenticator-vno := authenticator vno; /* = 5 */ + body.cname, body.crealm := client name; + if (supplying checksum) then + body.cksum := checksum; + endif + get system_time; + body.ctime, body.cusec := system_time; + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 104] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + +A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation + obtain ticket and session_key from cache; + + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */ + + if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then + set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + else + reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED; + endif + if (using session key for ticket) then + set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + else + reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY; + endif + packet.ticket := ticket; /* ticket */ + generate authenticator; + encode authenticator into OCTET STRING; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator + using session_key; + +A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REQ) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then + retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype}; + else + retrieve service key for + packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno}; + endif + if (no_key_available) then + if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER); + else + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY); + endif + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 105] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket + using retrieved key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator + using decr_ticket.key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} != + decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH); + endif + if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then + if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + elseif (application requires addresses) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime, + decr_authenticator.cusec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm}); + get system_time; + if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or + (decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then + /* it hasn't yet become valid */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV); + endif + if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED); + endif + /* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent */ + /* details */ + return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED); + +A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */ + body.ctime := packet.ctime; + body.cusec := packet.cusec; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 106] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + if (selecting sub-session key) then + select sub-session key; + body.subkey := sub-session key; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + select initial sequence number; + body.seq-number := initial sequence; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part; + +A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_AP_REP) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) + using ticket's session key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if (cleartext.ctime != authenticator.ctime) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.cusec != authenticator.cusec) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL); + endif + if (cleartext.subkey is present) then + save cleartext.subkey for future use; + endif + if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then + save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications; + endif + return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED); + +A.13. KRB_SAFE generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_SAFE */ + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 107] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + body.user-data := buffer; /* DATA */ + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + checksum.cksumtype := checksum type; + compute checksum over body; + checksum.checksum := checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */ + packet.cksum := checksum; + packet.safe-body := body; + +A.14. KRB_SAFE verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_SAFE) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof + and keyed) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM); + endif + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then + set computed_checksum := checksum(packet.body); + if (computed_checksum != packet.checksum) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks + if (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 108] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if (((packet.timestamp is present) and + (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or + (packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (((packet.seq-number is present) and + ((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or + (packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER); + endif + if (packet.timestamp not present and + packet.seq-number not present) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address}, + sender_principal(packet)); + + return PACKET_IS_OK; + +A.16. KRB_PRIV generation + collect user data in buffer; + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_PRIV */ + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + body.user-data := buffer; + if (using timestamp) then + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + endif + if (using sequence numbers) then + body.seq-number := sequence number; + endif + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + if (only one recipient) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 109] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher; + +A.17. KRB_PRIV verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_PRIV) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + + if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then + return(cleartext.DATA, PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED); + else + return common_checks_error; + endif + +A.18. KRB_CRED generation + invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */ + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_CRED */ + + for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + packet.tickets[n] = tickets[n].ticket; + done + + packet.enc-part.etype := encryption type; + + for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do + body.ticket-info[n].key = tickets[n].session; + body.ticket-info[n].prealm = tickets[n].crealm; + body.ticket-info[n].pname = tickets[n].cname; + body.ticket-info[n].flags = tickets[n].flags; + body.ticket-info[n].authtime = tickets[n].authtime; + body.ticket-info[n].starttime = tickets[n].starttime; + body.ticket-info[n].endtime = tickets[n].endtime; + body.ticket-info[n].renew-till = tickets[n].renew-till; + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 110] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + body.ticket-info[n].srealm = tickets[n].srealm; + body.ticket-info[n].sname = tickets[n].sname; + body.ticket-info[n].caddr = tickets[n].caddr; + done + + get system_time; + body.timestamp, body.usec := system_time; + + if (using nonce) then + body.nonce := nonce; + endif + + if (using s-address) then + body.s-address := sender host addresses; + endif + if (limited recipients) then + body.r-address := recipient host address; + endif + + encode body into OCTET STRING; + + select encryption type; + encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher + using negotiated encryption key; + +A.19. KRB_CRED verification + receive packet; + if (packet.pvno != 5) then + either process using other protocol spec + or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION); + endif + if (packet.msg-type != KRB_CRED) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE); + endif + + cleartext := decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key; + if (decryption_error()) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and + (packet.s-address != O/S_sender(packet)) then + /* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + endif + if ((packet.r-address is present) and + (packet.r-address != local_host_address)) then + /* was not sent to proper place */ + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR); + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 111] + +RFC 1510 Kerberos September 1993 + + + endif + if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW); + endif + if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) + then error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT); + endif + if (packet.nonce is required or present) and + (packet.nonce != expected-nonce) then + error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); + endif + + for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do + save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n], + server[n],times[n],flags[n]); + return + +A.20. KRB_ERROR generation + + /* assemble packet: */ + packet.pvno := protocol version; /* 5 */ + packet.msg-type := message type; /* KRB_ERROR */ + + get system_time; + packet.stime, packet.susec := system_time; + packet.realm, packet.sname := server name; + + if (client time available) then + packet.ctime, packet.cusec := client_time; + endif + packet.error-code := error code; + if (client name available) then + packet.cname, packet.crealm := client name; + endif + if (error text available) then + packet.e-text := error text; + endif + if (error data available) then + packet.e-data := error data; + endif + + + + + + + + + + + +Kohl & Neuman [Page 112] + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56d478c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1750.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1683 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Eastlake, 3rd +Request for Comments: 1750 DEC +Category: Informational S. Crocker + Cybercash + J. Schiller + MIT + December 1994 + + + Randomness Recommendations for Security + +Status of this Memo + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo + does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of + this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + Security systems today are built on increasingly strong cryptographic + algorithms that foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security + of these systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for + passwords, cryptographic keys, and similar quantities. The use of + pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in + pseudo-security. The sophisticated attacker of these security + systems may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced + the secret quantities, searching the resulting small set of + possibilities, than to locate the quantities in the whole of the + number space. + + Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated + adversary is surprisingly difficult. This paper points out many + pitfalls in using traditional pseudo-random number generation + techniques for choosing such quantities. It recommends the use of + truly random hardware techniques and shows that the existing hardware + on many systems can be used for this purpose. It provides + suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hardware solution is not + available. And it gives examples of how large such quantities need + to be for some particular applications. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 1] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +Acknowledgements + + Comments on this document that have been incorporated were received + from (in alphabetic order) the following: + + David M. Balenson (TIS) + Don Coppersmith (IBM) + Don T. Davis (consultant) + Carl Ellison (Stratus) + Marc Horowitz (MIT) + Christian Huitema (INRIA) + Charlie Kaufman (IRIS) + Steve Kent (BBN) + Hal Murray (DEC) + Neil Haller (Bellcore) + Richard Pitkin (DEC) + Tim Redmond (TIS) + Doug Tygar (CMU) + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction........................................... 3 + 2. Requirements........................................... 4 + 3. Traditional Pseudo-Random Sequences.................... 5 + 4. Unpredictability....................................... 7 + 4.1 Problems with Clocks and Serial Numbers............... 7 + 4.2 Timing and Content of External Events................ 8 + 4.3 The Fallacy of Complex Manipulation.................. 8 + 4.4 The Fallacy of Selection from a Large Database....... 9 + 5. Hardware for Randomness............................... 10 + 5.1 Volume Required...................................... 10 + 5.2 Sensitivity to Skew.................................. 10 + 5.2.1 Using Stream Parity to De-Skew..................... 11 + 5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew............... 12 + 5.2.3 Using FFT to De-Skew............................... 13 + 5.2.4 Using Compression to De-Skew....................... 13 + 5.3 Existing Hardware Can Be Used For Randomness......... 14 + 5.3.1 Using Existing Sound/Video Input................... 14 + 5.3.2 Using Existing Disk Drives......................... 14 + 6. Recommended Non-Hardware Strategy..................... 14 + 6.1 Mixing Functions..................................... 15 + 6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function.......................... 15 + 6.1.2 Stronger Mixing Functions.......................... 16 + 6.1.3 Diff-Hellman as a Mixing Function.................. 17 + 6.1.4 Using a Mixing Function to Stretch Random Bits..... 17 + 6.1.5 Other Factors in Choosing a Mixing Function........ 18 + 6.2 Non-Hardware Sources of Randomness................... 19 + 6.3 Cryptographically Strong Sequences................... 19 + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 2] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + 6.3.1 Traditional Strong Sequences....................... 20 + 6.3.2 The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator.............. 21 + 7. Key Generation Standards.............................. 22 + 7.1 US DoD Recommendations for Password Generation....... 23 + 7.2 X9.17 Key Generation................................. 23 + 8. Examples of Randomness Required....................... 24 + 8.1 Password Generation................................. 24 + 8.2 A Very High Security Cryptographic Key............... 25 + 8.2.1 Effort per Key Trial............................... 25 + 8.2.2 Meet in the Middle Attacks......................... 26 + 8.2.3 Other Considerations............................... 26 + 9. Conclusion............................................ 27 + 10. Security Considerations.............................. 27 + References............................................... 28 + Authors' Addresses....................................... 30 + +1. Introduction + + Software cryptography is coming into wider use. Systems like + Kerberos, PEM, PGP, etc. are maturing and becoming a part of the + network landscape [PEM]. These systems provide substantial + protection against snooping and spoofing. However, there is a + potential flaw. At the heart of all cryptographic systems is the + generation of secret, unguessable (i.e., random) numbers. + + For the present, the lack of generally available facilities for + generating such unpredictable numbers is an open wound in the design + of cryptographic software. For the software developer who wants to + build a key or password generation procedure that runs on a wide + range of hardware, the only safe strategy so far has been to force + the local installation to supply a suitable routine to generate + random numbers. To say the least, this is an awkward, error-prone + and unpalatable solution. + + It is important to keep in mind that the requirement is for data that + an adversary has a very low probability of guessing or determining. + This will fail if pseudo-random data is used which only meets + traditional statistical tests for randomness or which is based on + limited range sources, such as clocks. Frequently such random + quantities are determinable by an adversary searching through an + embarrassingly small space of possibilities. + + This informational document suggests techniques for producing random + quantities that will be resistant to such attack. It recommends that + future systems include hardware random number generation or provide + access to existing hardware that can be used for this purpose. It + suggests methods for use if such hardware is not available. And it + gives some estimates of the number of random bits required for sample + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 3] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + applications. + +2. Requirements + + Probably the most commonly encountered randomness requirement today + is the user password. This is usually a simple character string. + Obviously, if a password can be guessed, it does not provide + security. (For re-usable passwords, it is desirable that users be + able to remember the password. This may make it advisable to use + pronounceable character strings or phrases composed on ordinary + words. But this only affects the format of the password information, + not the requirement that the password be very hard to guess.) + + Many other requirements come from the cryptographic arena. + Cryptographic techniques can be used to provide a variety of services + including confidentiality and authentication. Such services are + based on quantities, traditionally called "keys", that are unknown to + and unguessable by an adversary. + + In some cases, such as the use of symmetric encryption with the one + time pads [CRYPTO*] or the US Data Encryption Standard [DES], the + parties who wish to communicate confidentially and/or with + authentication must all know the same secret key. In other cases, + using what are called asymmetric or "public key" cryptographic + techniques, keys come in pairs. One key of the pair is private and + must be kept secret by one party, the other is public and can be + published to the world. It is computationally infeasible to + determine the private key from the public key [ASYMMETRIC, CRYPTO*]. + + The frequency and volume of the requirement for random quantities + differs greatly for different cryptographic systems. Using pure RSA + [CRYPTO*], random quantities are required when the key pair is + generated, but thereafter any number of messages can be signed + without any further need for randomness. The public key Digital + Signature Algorithm that has been proposed by the US National + Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) requires good random + numbers for each signature. And encrypting with a one time pad, in + principle the strongest possible encryption technique, requires a + volume of randomness equal to all the messages to be processed. + + In most of these cases, an adversary can try to determine the + "secret" key by trial and error. (This is possible as long as the + key is enough smaller than the message that the correct key can be + uniquely identified.) The probability of an adversary succeeding at + this must be made acceptably low, depending on the particular + application. The size of the space the adversary must search is + related to the amount of key "information" present in the information + theoretic sense [SHANNON]. This depends on the number of different + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 4] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + secret values possible and the probability of each value as follows: + + ----- + \ + Bits-of-info = \ - p * log ( p ) + / i 2 i + / + ----- + + where i varies from 1 to the number of possible secret values and p + sub i is the probability of the value numbered i. (Since p sub i is + less than one, the log will be negative so each term in the sum will + be non-negative.) + + If there are 2^n different values of equal probability, then n bits + of information are present and an adversary would, on the average, + have to try half of the values, or 2^(n-1) , before guessing the + secret quantity. If the probability of different values is unequal, + then there is less information present and fewer guesses will, on + average, be required by an adversary. In particular, any values that + the adversary can know are impossible, or are of low probability, can + be initially ignored by an adversary, who will search through the + more probable values first. + + For example, consider a cryptographic system that uses 56 bit keys. + If these 56 bit keys are derived by using a fixed pseudo-random + number generator that is seeded with an 8 bit seed, then an adversary + needs to search through only 256 keys (by running the pseudo-random + number generator with every possible seed), not the 2^56 keys that + may at first appear to be the case. Only 8 bits of "information" are + in these 56 bit keys. + +3. Traditional Pseudo-Random Sequences + + Most traditional sources of random numbers use deterministic sources + of "pseudo-random" numbers. These typically start with a "seed" + quantity and use numeric or logical operations to produce a sequence + of values. + + [KNUTH] has a classic exposition on pseudo-random numbers. + Applications he mentions are simulation of natural phenomena, + sampling, numerical analysis, testing computer programs, decision + making, and games. None of these have the same characteristics as + the sort of security uses we are talking about. Only in the last two + could there be an adversary trying to find the random quantity. + However, in these cases, the adversary normally has only a single + chance to use a guessed value. In guessing passwords or attempting + to break an encryption scheme, the adversary normally has many, + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 5] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + perhaps unlimited, chances at guessing the correct value and should + be assumed to be aided by a computer. + + For testing the "randomness" of numbers, Knuth suggests a variety of + measures including statistical and spectral. These tests check + things like autocorrelation between different parts of a "random" + sequence or distribution of its values. They could be met by a + constant stored random sequence, such as the "random" sequence + printed in the CRC Standard Mathematical Tables [CRC]. + + A typical pseudo-random number generation technique, known as a + linear congruence pseudo-random number generator, is modular + arithmetic where the N+1th value is calculated from the Nth value by + + V = ( V * a + b )(Mod c) + N+1 N + + The above technique has a strong relationship to linear shift + register pseudo-random number generators, which are well understood + cryptographically [SHIFT*]. In such generators bits are introduced + at one end of a shift register as the Exclusive Or (binary sum + without carry) of bits from selected fixed taps into the register. + + For example: + + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ + | B | <-- | B | <-- | B | <-- . . . . . . <-- | B | <-+ + | 0 | | 1 | | 2 | | n | | + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ | + | | | | + | | V +-----+ + | V +----------------> | | + V +-----------------------------> | XOR | + +---------------------------------------------------> | | + +-----+ + + + V = ( ( V * 2 ) + B .xor. B ... )(Mod 2^n) + N+1 N 0 2 + + The goodness of traditional pseudo-random number generator algorithms + is measured by statistical tests on such sequences. Carefully chosen + values of the initial V and a, b, and c or the placement of shift + register tap in the above simple processes can produce excellent + statistics. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 6] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + These sequences may be adequate in simulations (Monte Carlo + experiments) as long as the sequence is orthogonal to the structure + of the space being explored. Even there, subtle patterns may cause + problems. However, such sequences are clearly bad for use in + security applications. They are fully predictable if the initial + state is known. Depending on the form of the pseudo-random number + generator, the sequence may be determinable from observation of a + short portion of the sequence [CRYPTO*, STERN]. For example, with + the generators above, one can determine V(n+1) given knowledge of + V(n). In fact, it has been shown that with these techniques, even if + only one bit of the pseudo-random values is released, the seed can be + determined from short sequences. + + Not only have linear congruent generators been broken, but techniques + are now known for breaking all polynomial congruent generators + [KRAWCZYK]. + +4. Unpredictability + + Randomness in the traditional sense described in section 3 is NOT the + same as the unpredictability required for security use. + + For example, use of a widely available constant sequence, such as + that from the CRC tables, is very weak against an adversary. Once + they learn of or guess it, they can easily break all security, future + and past, based on the sequence [CRC]. Yet the statistical + properties of these tables are good. + + The following sections describe the limitations of some randomness + generation techniques and sources. + +4.1 Problems with Clocks and Serial Numbers + + Computer clocks, or similar operating system or hardware values, + provide significantly fewer real bits of unpredictability than might + appear from their specifications. + + Tests have been done on clocks on numerous systems and it was found + that their behavior can vary widely and in unexpected ways. One + version of an operating system running on one set of hardware may + actually provide, say, microsecond resolution in a clock while a + different configuration of the "same" system may always provide the + same lower bits and only count in the upper bits at much lower + resolution. This means that successive reads on the clock may + produce identical values even if enough time has passed that the + value "should" change based on the nominal clock resolution. There + are also cases where frequently reading a clock can produce + artificial sequential values because of extra code that checks for + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 7] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + the clock being unchanged between two reads and increases it by one! + Designing portable application code to generate unpredictable numbers + based on such system clocks is particularly challenging because the + system designer does not always know the properties of the system + clocks that the code will execute on. + + Use of a hardware serial number such as an Ethernet address may also + provide fewer bits of uniqueness than one would guess. Such + quantities are usually heavily structured and subfields may have only + a limited range of possible values or values easily guessable based + on approximate date of manufacture or other data. For example, it is + likely that most of the Ethernet cards installed on Digital Equipment + Corporation (DEC) hardware within DEC were manufactured by DEC + itself, which significantly limits the range of built in addresses. + + Problems such as those described above related to clocks and serial + numbers make code to produce unpredictable quantities difficult if + the code is to be ported across a variety of computer platforms and + systems. + +4.2 Timing and Content of External Events + + It is possible to measure the timing and content of mouse movement, + key strokes, and similar user events. This is a reasonable source of + unguessable data with some qualifications. On some machines, inputs + such as key strokes are buffered. Even though the user's inter- + keystroke timing may have sufficient variation and unpredictability, + there might not be an easy way to access that variation. Another + problem is that no standard method exists to sample timing details. + This makes it hard to build standard software intended for + distribution to a large range of machines based on this technique. + + The amount of mouse movement or the keys actually hit are usually + easier to access than timings but may yield less unpredictability as + the user may provide highly repetitive input. + + Other external events, such as network packet arrival times, can also + be used with care. In particular, the possibility of manipulation of + such times by an adversary must be considered. + +4.3 The Fallacy of Complex Manipulation + + One strategy which may give a misleading appearance of + unpredictability is to take a very complex algorithm (or an excellent + traditional pseudo-random number generator with good statistical + properties) and calculate a cryptographic key by starting with the + current value of a computer system clock as the seed. An adversary + who knew roughly when the generator was started would have a + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 8] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + relatively small number of seed values to test as they would know + likely values of the system clock. Large numbers of pseudo-random + bits could be generated but the search space an adversary would need + to check could be quite small. + + Thus very strong and/or complex manipulation of data will not help if + the adversary can learn what the manipulation is and there is not + enough unpredictability in the starting seed value. Even if they can + not learn what the manipulation is, they may be able to use the + limited number of results stemming from a limited number of seed + values to defeat security. + + Another serious strategy error is to assume that a very complex + pseudo-random number generation algorithm will produce strong random + numbers when there has been no theory behind or analysis of the + algorithm. There is a excellent example of this fallacy right near + the beginning of chapter 3 in [KNUTH] where the author describes a + complex algorithm. It was intended that the machine language program + corresponding to the algorithm would be so complicated that a person + trying to read the code without comments wouldn't know what the + program was doing. Unfortunately, actual use of this algorithm + showed that it almost immediately converged to a single repeated + value in one case and a small cycle of values in another case. + + Not only does complex manipulation not help you if you have a limited + range of seeds but blindly chosen complex manipulation can destroy + the randomness in a good seed! + +4.4 The Fallacy of Selection from a Large Database + + Another strategy that can give a misleading appearance of + unpredictability is selection of a quantity randomly from a database + and assume that its strength is related to the total number of bits + in the database. For example, typical USENET servers as of this date + process over 35 megabytes of information per day. Assume a random + quantity was selected by fetching 32 bytes of data from a random + starting point in this data. This does not yield 32*8 = 256 bits + worth of unguessability. Even after allowing that much of the data + is human language and probably has more like 2 or 3 bits of + information per byte, it doesn't yield 32*2.5 = 80 bits of + unguessability. For an adversary with access to the same 35 + megabytes the unguessability rests only on the starting point of the + selection. That is, at best, about 25 bits of unguessability in this + case. + + The same argument applies to selecting sequences from the data on a + CD ROM or Audio CD recording or any other large public database. If + the adversary has access to the same database, this "selection from a + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 9] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + large volume of data" step buys very little. However, if a selection + can be made from data to which the adversary has no access, such as + system buffers on an active multi-user system, it may be of some + help. + +5. Hardware for Randomness + + Is there any hope for strong portable randomness in the future? + There might be. All that's needed is a physical source of + unpredictable numbers. + + A thermal noise or radioactive decay source and a fast, free-running + oscillator would do the trick directly [GIFFORD]. This is a trivial + amount of hardware, and could easily be included as a standard part + of a computer system's architecture. Furthermore, any system with a + spinning disk or the like has an adequate source of randomness + [DAVIS]. All that's needed is the common perception among computer + vendors that this small additional hardware and the software to + access it is necessary and useful. + +5.1 Volume Required + + How much unpredictability is needed? Is it possible to quantify the + requirement in, say, number of random bits per second? + + The answer is not very much is needed. For DES, the key is 56 bits + and, as we show in an example in Section 8, even the highest security + system is unlikely to require a keying material of over 200 bits. If + a series of keys are needed, it can be generated from a strong random + seed using a cryptographically strong sequence as explained in + Section 6.3. A few hundred random bits generated once a day would be + enough using such techniques. Even if the random bits are generated + as slowly as one per second and it is not possible to overlap the + generation process, it should be tolerable in high security + applications to wait 200 seconds occasionally. + + These numbers are trivial to achieve. It could be done by a person + repeatedly tossing a coin. Almost any hardware process is likely to + be much faster. + +5.2 Sensitivity to Skew + + Is there any specific requirement on the shape of the distribution of + the random numbers? The good news is the distribution need not be + uniform. All that is needed is a conservative estimate of how non- + uniform it is to bound performance. Two simple techniques to de-skew + the bit stream are given below and stronger techniques are mentioned + in Section 6.1.2 below. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 10] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +5.2.1 Using Stream Parity to De-Skew + + Consider taking a sufficiently long string of bits and map the string + to "zero" or "one". The mapping will not yield a perfectly uniform + distribution, but it can be as close as desired. One mapping that + serves the purpose is to take the parity of the string. This has the + advantages that it is robust across all degrees of skew up to the + estimated maximum skew and is absolutely trivial to implement in + hardware. + + The following analysis gives the number of bits that must be sampled: + + Suppose the ratio of ones to zeros is 0.5 + e : 0.5 - e, where e is + between 0 and 0.5 and is a measure of the "eccentricity" of the + distribution. Consider the distribution of the parity function of N + bit samples. The probabilities that the parity will be one or zero + will be the sum of the odd or even terms in the binomial expansion of + (p + q)^N, where p = 0.5 + e, the probability of a one, and q = 0.5 - + e, the probability of a zero. + + These sums can be computed easily as + + N N + 1/2 * ( ( p + q ) + ( p - q ) ) + and + N N + 1/2 * ( ( p + q ) - ( p - q ) ). + + (Which one corresponds to the probability the parity will be 1 + depends on whether N is odd or even.) + + Since p + q = 1 and p - q = 2e, these expressions reduce to + + N + 1/2 * [1 + (2e) ] + and + N + 1/2 * [1 - (2e) ]. + + Neither of these will ever be exactly 0.5 unless e is zero, but we + can bring them arbitrarily close to 0.5. If we want the + probabilities to be within some delta d of 0.5, i.e. then + + N + ( 0.5 + ( 0.5 * (2e) ) ) < 0.5 + d. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 11] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Solving for N yields N > log(2d)/log(2e). (Note that 2e is less than + 1, so its log is negative. Division by a negative number reverses + the sense of an inequality.) + + The following table gives the length of the string which must be + sampled for various degrees of skew in order to come within 0.001 of + a 50/50 distribution. + + +---------+--------+-------+ + | Prob(1) | e | N | + +---------+--------+-------+ + | 0.5 | 0.00 | 1 | + | 0.6 | 0.10 | 4 | + | 0.7 | 0.20 | 7 | + | 0.8 | 0.30 | 13 | + | 0.9 | 0.40 | 28 | + | 0.95 | 0.45 | 59 | + | 0.99 | 0.49 | 308 | + +---------+--------+-------+ + + The last entry shows that even if the distribution is skewed 99% in + favor of ones, the parity of a string of 308 samples will be within + 0.001 of a 50/50 distribution. + +5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew + + Another technique, originally due to von Neumann [VON NEUMANN], is to + examine a bit stream as a sequence of non-overlapping pairs. You + could then discard any 00 or 11 pairs found, interpret 01 as a 0 and + 10 as a 1. Assume the probability of a 1 is 0.5+e and the + probability of a 0 is 0.5-e where e is the eccentricity of the source + and described in the previous section. Then the probability of each + pair is as follows: + + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + | pair | probability | + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + | 00 | (0.5 - e)^2 = 0.25 - e + e^2 | + | 01 | (0.5 - e)*(0.5 + e) = 0.25 - e^2 | + | 10 | (0.5 + e)*(0.5 - e) = 0.25 - e^2 | + | 11 | (0.5 + e)^2 = 0.25 + e + e^2 | + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + + This technique will completely eliminate any bias but at the expense + of taking an indeterminate number of input bits for any particular + desired number of output bits. The probability of any particular + pair being discarded is 0.5 + 2e^2 so the expected number of input + bits to produce X output bits is X/(0.25 - e^2). + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 12] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + This technique assumes that the bits are from a stream where each bit + has the same probability of being a 0 or 1 as any other bit in the + stream and that bits are not correlated, i.e., that the bits are + identical independent distributions. If alternate bits were from two + correlated sources, for example, the above analysis breaks down. + + The above technique also provides another illustration of how a + simple statistical analysis can mislead if one is not always on the + lookout for patterns that could be exploited by an adversary. If the + algorithm were mis-read slightly so that overlapping successive bits + pairs were used instead of non-overlapping pairs, the statistical + analysis given is the same; however, instead of provided an unbiased + uncorrelated series of random 1's and 0's, it instead produces a + totally predictable sequence of exactly alternating 1's and 0's. + +5.2.3 Using FFT to De-Skew + + When real world data consists of strongly biased or correlated bits, + it may still contain useful amounts of randomness. This randomness + can be extracted through use of the discrete Fourier transform or its + optimized variant, the FFT. + + Using the Fourier transform of the data, strong correlations can be + discarded. If adequate data is processed and remaining correlations + decay, spectral lines approaching statistical independence and + normally distributed randomness can be produced [BRILLINGER]. + +5.2.4 Using Compression to De-Skew + + Reversible compression techniques also provide a crude method of de- + skewing a skewed bit stream. This follows directly from the + definition of reversible compression and the formula in Section 2 + above for the amount of information in a sequence. Since the + compression is reversible, the same amount of information must be + present in the shorter output than was present in the longer input. + By the Shannon information equation, this is only possible if, on + average, the probabilities of the different shorter sequences are + more uniformly distributed than were the probabilities of the longer + sequences. Thus the shorter sequences are de-skewed relative to the + input. + + However, many compression techniques add a somewhat predicatable + preface to their output stream and may insert such a sequence again + periodically in their output or otherwise introduce subtle patterns + of their own. They should be considered only a rough technique + compared with those described above or in Section 6.1.2. At a + minimum, the beginning of the compressed sequence should be skipped + and only later bits used for applications requiring random bits. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 13] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +5.3 Existing Hardware Can Be Used For Randomness + + As described below, many computers come with hardware that can, with + care, be used to generate truly random quantities. + +5.3.1 Using Existing Sound/Video Input + + Increasingly computers are being built with inputs that digitize some + real world analog source, such as sound from a microphone or video + input from a camera. Under appropriate circumstances, such input can + provide reasonably high quality random bits. The "input" from a + sound digitizer with no source plugged in or a camera with the lens + cap on, if the system has enough gain to detect anything, is + essentially thermal noise. + + For example, on a SPARCstation, one can read from the /dev/audio + device with nothing plugged into the microphone jack. Such data is + essentially random noise although it should not be trusted without + some checking in case of hardware failure. It will, in any case, + need to be de-skewed as described elsewhere. + + Combining this with compression to de-skew one can, in UNIXese, + generate a huge amount of medium quality random data by doing + + cat /dev/audio | compress - >random-bits-file + +5.3.2 Using Existing Disk Drives + + Disk drives have small random fluctuations in their rotational speed + due to chaotic air turbulence [DAVIS]. By adding low level disk seek + time instrumentation to a system, a series of measurements can be + obtained that include this randomness. Such data is usually highly + correlated so that significant processing is needed, including FFT + (see section 5.2.3). Nevertheless experimentation has shown that, + with such processing, disk drives easily produce 100 bits a minute or + more of excellent random data. + + Partly offsetting this need for processing is the fact that disk + drive failure will normally be rapidly noticed. Thus, problems with + this method of random number generation due to hardware failure are + very unlikely. + +6. Recommended Non-Hardware Strategy + + What is the best overall strategy for meeting the requirement for + unguessable random numbers in the absence of a reliable hardware + source? It is to obtain random input from a large number of + uncorrelated sources and to mix them with a strong mixing function. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 14] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Such a function will preserve the randomness present in any of the + sources even if other quantities being combined are fixed or easily + guessable. This may be advisable even with a good hardware source as + hardware can also fail, though this should be weighed against any + increase in the chance of overall failure due to added software + complexity. + +6.1 Mixing Functions + + A strong mixing function is one which combines two or more inputs and + produces an output where each output bit is a different complex non- + linear function of all the input bits. On average, changing any + input bit will change about half the output bits. But because the + relationship is complex and non-linear, no particular output bit is + guaranteed to change when any particular input bit is changed. + + Consider the problem of converting a stream of bits that is skewed + towards 0 or 1 to a shorter stream which is more random, as discussed + in Section 5.2 above. This is simply another case where a strong + mixing function is desired, mixing the input bits to produce a + smaller number of output bits. The technique given in Section 5.2.1 + of using the parity of a number of bits is simply the result of + successively Exclusive Or'ing them which is examined as a trivial + mixing function immediately below. Use of stronger mixing functions + to extract more of the randomness in a stream of skewed bits is + examined in Section 6.1.2. + +6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function + + A trivial example for single bit inputs is the Exclusive Or function, + which is equivalent to addition without carry, as show in the table + below. This is a degenerate case in which the one output bit always + changes for a change in either input bit. But, despite its + simplicity, it will still provide a useful illustration. + + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + | input 1 | input 2 | output | + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 1 | 1 | + | 1 | 0 | 1 | + | 1 | 1 | 0 | + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + + If inputs 1 and 2 are uncorrelated and combined in this fashion then + the output will be an even better (less skewed) random bit than the + inputs. If we assume an "eccentricity" e as defined in Section 5.2 + above, then the output eccentricity relates to the input eccentricity + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 15] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + as follows: + + e = 2 * e * e + output input 1 input 2 + + Since e is never greater than 1/2, the eccentricity is always + improved except in the case where at least one input is a totally + skewed constant. This is illustrated in the following table where + the top and left side values are the two input eccentricities and the + entries are the output eccentricity: + + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | e | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | + | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.10 | + | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.20 | + | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.30 | + | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.40 | + | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + + However, keep in mind that the above calculations assume that the + inputs are not correlated. If the inputs were, say, the parity of + the number of minutes from midnight on two clocks accurate to a few + seconds, then each might appear random if sampled at random intervals + much longer than a minute. Yet if they were both sampled and + combined with xor, the result would be zero most of the time. + +6.1.2 Stronger Mixing Functions + + The US Government Data Encryption Standard [DES] is an example of a + strong mixing function for multiple bit quantities. It takes up to + 120 bits of input (64 bits of "data" and 56 bits of "key") and + produces 64 bits of output each of which is dependent on a complex + non-linear function of all input bits. Other strong encryption + functions with this characteristic can also be used by considering + them to mix all of their key and data input bits. + + Another good family of mixing functions are the "message digest" or + hashing functions such as The US Government Secure Hash Standard + [SHS] and the MD2, MD4, MD5 [MD2, MD4, MD5] series. These functions + all take an arbitrary amount of input and produce an output mixing + all the input bits. The MD* series produce 128 bits of output and SHS + produces 160 bits. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 16] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Although the message digest functions are designed for variable + amounts of input, DES and other encryption functions can also be used + to combine any number of inputs. If 64 bits of output is adequate, + the inputs can be packed into a 64 bit data quantity and successive + 56 bit keys, padding with zeros if needed, which are then used to + successively encrypt using DES in Electronic Codebook Mode [DES + MODES]. If more than 64 bits of output are needed, use more complex + mixing. For example, if inputs are packed into three quantities, A, + B, and C, use DES to encrypt A with B as a key and then with C as a + key to produce the 1st part of the output, then encrypt B with C and + then A for more output and, if necessary, encrypt C with A and then B + for yet more output. Still more output can be produced by reversing + the order of the keys given above to stretch things. The same can be + done with the hash functions by hashing various subsets of the input + data to produce multiple outputs. But keep in mind that it is + impossible to get more bits of "randomness" out than are put in. + + An example of using a strong mixing function would be to reconsider + the case of a string of 308 bits each of which is biased 99% towards + zero. The parity technique given in Section 5.2.1 above reduced this + to one bit with only a 1/1000 deviance from being equally likely a + zero or one. But, applying the equation for information given in + Section 2, this 308 bit sequence has 5 bits of information in it. + Thus hashing it with SHS or MD5 and taking the bottom 5 bits of the + result would yield 5 unbiased random bits as opposed to the single + bit given by calculating the parity of the string. + +6.1.3 Diffie-Hellman as a Mixing Function + + Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange is a technique that yields a + shared secret between two parties that can be made computationally + infeasible for a third party to determine even if they can observe + all the messages between the two communicating parties. This shared + secret is a mixture of initial quantities generated by each of them + [D-H]. If these initial quantities are random, then the shared + secret contains the combined randomness of them both, assuming they + are uncorrelated. + +6.1.4 Using a Mixing Function to Stretch Random Bits + + While it is not necessary for a mixing function to produce the same + or fewer bits than its inputs, mixing bits cannot "stretch" the + amount of random unpredictability present in the inputs. Thus four + inputs of 32 bits each where there is 12 bits worth of + unpredicatability (such as 4,096 equally probable values) in each + input cannot produce more than 48 bits worth of unpredictable output. + The output can be expanded to hundreds or thousands of bits by, for + example, mixing with successive integers, but the clever adversary's + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 17] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + search space is still 2^48 possibilities. Furthermore, mixing to + fewer bits than are input will tend to strengthen the randomness of + the output the way using Exclusive Or to produce one bit from two did + above. + + The last table in Section 6.1.1 shows that mixing a random bit with a + constant bit with Exclusive Or will produce a random bit. While this + is true, it does not provide a way to "stretch" one random bit into + more than one. If, for example, a random bit is mixed with a 0 and + then with a 1, this produces a two bit sequence but it will always be + either 01 or 10. Since there are only two possible values, there is + still only the one bit of original randomness. + +6.1.5 Other Factors in Choosing a Mixing Function + + For local use, DES has the advantages that it has been widely tested + for flaws, is widely documented, and is widely implemented with + hardware and software implementations available all over the world + including source code available by anonymous FTP. The SHS and MD* + family are younger algorithms which have been less tested but there + is no particular reason to believe they are flawed. Both MD5 and SHS + were derived from the earlier MD4 algorithm. They all have source + code available by anonymous FTP [SHS, MD2, MD4, MD5]. + + DES and SHS have been vouched for the the US National Security Agency + (NSA) on the basis of criteria that primarily remain secret. While + this is the cause of much speculation and doubt, investigation of DES + over the years has indicated that NSA involvement in modifications to + its design, which originated with IBM, was primarily to strengthen + it. No concealed or special weakness has been found in DES. It is + almost certain that the NSA modification to MD4 to produce the SHS + similarly strengthened the algorithm, possibly against threats not + yet known in the public cryptographic community. + + DES, SHS, MD4, and MD5 are royalty free for all purposes. MD2 has + been freely licensed only for non-profit use in connection with + Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM]. Between the MD* algorithms, some people + believe that, as with "Goldilocks and the Three Bears", MD2 is strong + but too slow, MD4 is fast but too weak, and MD5 is just right. + + Another advantage of the MD* or similar hashing algorithms over + encryption algorithms is that they are not subject to the same + regulations imposed by the US Government prohibiting the unlicensed + export or import of encryption/decryption software and hardware. The + same should be true of DES rigged to produce an irreversible hash + code but most DES packages are oriented to reversible encryption. + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 18] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +6.2 Non-Hardware Sources of Randomness + + The best source of input for mixing would be a hardware randomness + such as disk drive timing affected by air turbulence, audio input + with thermal noise, or radioactive decay. However, if that is not + available there are other possibilities. These include system + clocks, system or input/output buffers, user/system/hardware/network + serial numbers and/or addresses and timing, and user input. + Unfortunately, any of these sources can produce limited or + predicatable values under some circumstances. + + Some of the sources listed above would be quite strong on multi-user + systems where, in essence, each user of the system is a source of + randomness. However, on a small single user system, such as a + typical IBM PC or Apple Macintosh, it might be possible for an + adversary to assemble a similar configuration. This could give the + adversary inputs to the mixing process that were sufficiently + correlated to those used originally as to make exhaustive search + practical. + + The use of multiple random inputs with a strong mixing function is + recommended and can overcome weakness in any particular input. For + example, the timing and content of requested "random" user keystrokes + can yield hundreds of random bits but conservative assumptions need + to be made. For example, assuming a few bits of randomness if the + inter-keystroke interval is unique in the sequence up to that point + and a similar assumption if the key hit is unique but assuming that + no bits of randomness are present in the initial key value or if the + timing or key value duplicate previous values. The results of mixing + these timings and characters typed could be further combined with + clock values and other inputs. + + This strategy may make practical portable code to produce good random + numbers for security even if some of the inputs are very weak on some + of the target systems. However, it may still fail against a high + grade attack on small single user systems, especially if the + adversary has ever been able to observe the generation process in the + past. A hardware based random source is still preferable. + +6.3 Cryptographically Strong Sequences + + In cases where a series of random quantities must be generated, an + adversary may learn some values in the sequence. In general, they + should not be able to predict other values from the ones that they + know. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 19] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + The correct technique is to start with a strong random seed, take + cryptographically strong steps from that seed [CRYPTO2, CRYPTO3], and + do not reveal the complete state of the generator in the sequence + elements. If each value in the sequence can be calculated in a fixed + way from the previous value, then when any value is compromised, all + future values can be determined. This would be the case, for + example, if each value were a constant function of the previously + used values, even if the function were a very strong, non-invertible + message digest function. + + It should be noted that if your technique for generating a sequence + of key values is fast enough, it can trivially be used as the basis + for a confidentiality system. If two parties use the same sequence + generating technique and start with the same seed material, they will + generate identical sequences. These could, for example, be xor'ed at + one end with data being send, encrypting it, and xor'ed with this + data as received, decrypting it due to the reversible properties of + the xor operation. + +6.3.1 Traditional Strong Sequences + + A traditional way to achieve a strong sequence has been to have the + values be produced by hashing the quantities produced by + concatenating the seed with successive integers or the like and then + mask the values obtained so as to limit the amount of generator state + available to the adversary. + + It may also be possible to use an "encryption" algorithm with a + random key and seed value to encrypt and feedback some or all of the + output encrypted value into the value to be encrypted for the next + iteration. Appropriate feedback techniques will usually be + recommended with the encryption algorithm. An example is shown below + where shifting and masking are used to combine the cypher output + feedback. This type of feedback is recommended by the US Government + in connection with DES [DES MODES]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 20] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + +---------------+ + | V | + | | n | + +--+------------+ + | | +---------+ + | +---------> | | +-----+ + +--+ | Encrypt | <--- | Key | + | +-------- | | +-----+ + | | +---------+ + V V + +------------+--+ + | V | | + | n+1 | + +---------------+ + + Note that if a shift of one is used, this is the same as the shift + register technique described in Section 3 above but with the all + important difference that the feedback is determined by a complex + non-linear function of all bits rather than a simple linear or + polynomial combination of output from a few bit position taps. + + It has been shown by Donald W. Davies that this sort of shifted + partial output feedback significantly weakens an algorithm compared + will feeding all of the output bits back as input. In particular, + for DES, repeated encrypting a full 64 bit quantity will give an + expected repeat in about 2^63 iterations. Feeding back anything less + than 64 (and more than 0) bits will give an expected repeat in + between 2**31 and 2**32 iterations! + + To predict values of a sequence from others when the sequence was + generated by these techniques is equivalent to breaking the + cryptosystem or inverting the "non-invertible" hashing involved with + only partial information available. The less information revealed + each iteration, the harder it will be for an adversary to predict the + sequence. Thus it is best to use only one bit from each value. It + has been shown that in some cases this makes it impossible to break a + system even when the cryptographic system is invertible and can be + broken if all of each generated value was revealed. + +6.3.2 The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator + + Currently the generator which has the strongest public proof of + strength is called the Blum Blum Shub generator after its inventors + [BBS]. It is also very simple and is based on quadratic residues. + It's only disadvantage is that is is computationally intensive + compared with the traditional techniques give in 6.3.1 above. This + is not a serious draw back if it is used for moderately infrequent + purposes, such as generating session keys. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 21] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Simply choose two large prime numbers, say p and q, which both have + the property that you get a remainder of 3 if you divide them by 4. + Let n = p * q. Then you choose a random number x relatively prime to + n. The initial seed for the generator and the method for calculating + subsequent values are then + + 2 + s = ( x )(Mod n) + 0 + + 2 + s = ( s )(Mod n) + i+1 i + + You must be careful to use only a few bits from the bottom of each s. + It is always safe to use only the lowest order bit. If you use no + more than the + + log ( log ( s ) ) + 2 2 i + + low order bits, then predicting any additional bits from a sequence + generated in this manner is provable as hard as factoring n. As long + as the initial x is secret, you can even make n public if you want. + + An intersting characteristic of this generator is that you can + directly calculate any of the s values. In particular + + i + ( ( 2 )(Mod (( p - 1 ) * ( q - 1 )) ) ) + s = ( s )(Mod n) + i 0 + + This means that in applications where many keys are generated in this + fashion, it is not necessary to save them all. Each key can be + effectively indexed and recovered from that small index and the + initial s and n. + +7. Key Generation Standards + + Several public standards are now in place for the generation of keys. + Two of these are described below. Both use DES but any equally + strong or stronger mixing function could be substituted. + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 22] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +7.1 US DoD Recommendations for Password Generation + + The United States Department of Defense has specific recommendations + for password generation [DoD]. They suggest using the US Data + Encryption Standard [DES] in Output Feedback Mode [DES MODES] as + follows: + + use an initialization vector determined from + the system clock, + system ID, + user ID, and + date and time; + use a key determined from + system interrupt registers, + system status registers, and + system counters; and, + as plain text, use an external randomly generated 64 bit + quantity such as 8 characters typed in by a system + administrator. + + The password can then be calculated from the 64 bit "cipher text" + generated in 64-bit Output Feedback Mode. As many bits as are needed + can be taken from these 64 bits and expanded into a pronounceable + word, phrase, or other format if a human being needs to remember the + password. + +7.2 X9.17 Key Generation + + The American National Standards Institute has specified a method for + generating a sequence of keys as follows: + + s is the initial 64 bit seed + 0 + + g is the sequence of generated 64 bit key quantities + n + + k is a random key reserved for generating this key sequence + + t is the time at which a key is generated to as fine a resolution + as is available (up to 64 bits). + + DES ( K, Q ) is the DES encryption of quantity Q with key K + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 23] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + g = DES ( k, DES ( k, t ) .xor. s ) + n n + + s = DES ( k, DES ( k, t ) .xor. g ) + n+1 n + + If g sub n is to be used as a DES key, then every eighth bit should + be adjusted for parity for that use but the entire 64 bit unmodified + g should be used in calculating the next s. + +8. Examples of Randomness Required + + Below are two examples showing rough calculations of needed + randomness for security. The first is for moderate security + passwords while the second assumes a need for a very high security + cryptographic key. + +8.1 Password Generation + + Assume that user passwords change once a year and it is desired that + the probability that an adversary could guess the password for a + particular account be less than one in a thousand. Further assume + that sending a password to the system is the only way to try a + password. Then the crucial question is how often an adversary can + try possibilities. Assume that delays have been introduced into a + system so that, at most, an adversary can make one password try every + six seconds. That's 600 per hour or about 15,000 per day or about + 5,000,000 tries in a year. Assuming any sort of monitoring, it is + unlikely someone could actually try continuously for a year. In + fact, even if log files are only checked monthly, 500,000 tries is + more plausible before the attack is noticed and steps taken to change + passwords and make it harder to try more passwords. + + To have a one in a thousand chance of guessing the password in + 500,000 tries implies a universe of at least 500,000,000 passwords or + about 2^29. Thus 29 bits of randomness are needed. This can probably + be achieved using the US DoD recommended inputs for password + generation as it has 8 inputs which probably average over 5 bits of + randomness each (see section 7.1). Using a list of 1000 words, the + password could be expressed as a three word phrase (1,000,000,000 + possibilities) or, using case insensitive letters and digits, six + would suffice ((26+10)^6 = 2,176,782,336 possibilities). + + For a higher security password, the number of bits required goes up. + To decrease the probability by 1,000 requires increasing the universe + of passwords by the same factor which adds about 10 bits. Thus to + have only a one in a million chance of a password being guessed under + the above scenario would require 39 bits of randomness and a password + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 24] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + that was a four word phrase from a 1000 word list or eight + letters/digits. To go to a one in 10^9 chance, 49 bits of randomness + are needed implying a five word phrase or ten letter/digit password. + + In a real system, of course, there are also other factors. For + example, the larger and harder to remember passwords are, the more + likely users are to write them down resulting in an additional risk + of compromise. + +8.2 A Very High Security Cryptographic Key + + Assume that a very high security key is needed for symmetric + encryption / decryption between two parties. Assume an adversary can + observe communications and knows the algorithm being used. Within + the field of random possibilities, the adversary can try key values + in hopes of finding the one in use. Assume further that brute force + trial of keys is the best the adversary can do. + +8.2.1 Effort per Key Trial + + How much effort will it take to try each key? For very high security + applications it is best to assume a low value of effort. Even if it + would clearly take tens of thousands of computer cycles or more to + try a single key, there may be some pattern that enables huge blocks + of key values to be tested with much less effort per key. Thus it is + probably best to assume no more than a couple hundred cycles per key. + (There is no clear lower bound on this as computers operate in + parallel on a number of bits and a poor encryption algorithm could + allow many keys or even groups of keys to be tested in parallel. + However, we need to assume some value and can hope that a reasonably + strong algorithm has been chosen for our hypothetical high security + task.) + + If the adversary can command a highly parallel processor or a large + network of work stations, 2*10^10 cycles per second is probably a + minimum assumption for availability today. Looking forward just a + couple years, there should be at least an order of magnitude + improvement. Thus assuming 10^9 keys could be checked per second or + 3.6*10^11 per hour or 6*10^13 per week or 2.4*10^14 per month is + reasonable. This implies a need for a minimum of 51 bits of + randomness in keys to be sure they cannot be found in a month. Even + then it is possible that, a few years from now, a highly determined + and resourceful adversary could break the key in 2 weeks (on average + they need try only half the keys). + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 25] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +8.2.2 Meet in the Middle Attacks + + If chosen or known plain text and the resulting encrypted text are + available, a "meet in the middle" attack is possible if the structure + of the encryption algorithm allows it. (In a known plain text + attack, the adversary knows all or part of the messages being + encrypted, possibly some standard header or trailer fields. In a + chosen plain text attack, the adversary can force some chosen plain + text to be encrypted, possibly by "leaking" an exciting text that + would then be sent by the adversary over an encrypted channel.) + + An oversimplified explanation of the meet in the middle attack is as + follows: the adversary can half-encrypt the known or chosen plain + text with all possible first half-keys, sort the output, then half- + decrypt the encoded text with all the second half-keys. If a match + is found, the full key can be assembled from the halves and used to + decrypt other parts of the message or other messages. At its best, + this type of attack can halve the exponent of the work required by + the adversary while adding a large but roughly constant factor of + effort. To be assured of safety against this, a doubling of the + amount of randomness in the key to a minimum of 102 bits is required. + + The meet in the middle attack assumes that the cryptographic + algorithm can be decomposed in this way but we can not rule that out + without a deep knowledge of the algorithm. Even if a basic algorithm + is not subject to a meet in the middle attack, an attempt to produce + a stronger algorithm by applying the basic algorithm twice (or two + different algorithms sequentially) with different keys may gain less + added security than would be expected. Such a composite algorithm + would be subject to a meet in the middle attack. + + Enormous resources may be required to mount a meet in the middle + attack but they are probably within the range of the national + security services of a major nation. Essentially all nations spy on + other nations government traffic and several nations are believed to + spy on commercial traffic for economic advantage. + +8.2.3 Other Considerations + + Since we have not even considered the possibilities of special + purpose code breaking hardware or just how much of a safety margin we + want beyond our assumptions above, probably a good minimum for a very + high security cryptographic key is 128 bits of randomness which + implies a minimum key length of 128 bits. If the two parties agree + on a key by Diffie-Hellman exchange [D-H], then in principle only + half of this randomness would have to be supplied by each party. + However, there is probably some correlation between their random + inputs so it is probably best to assume that each party needs to + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 26] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + provide at least 96 bits worth of randomness for very high security + if Diffie-Hellman is used. + + This amount of randomness is beyond the limit of that in the inputs + recommended by the US DoD for password generation and could require + user typing timing, hardware random number generation, or other + sources. + + It should be noted that key length calculations such at those above + are controversial and depend on various assumptions about the + cryptographic algorithms in use. In some cases, a professional with + a deep knowledge of code breaking techniques and of the strength of + the algorithm in use could be satisfied with less than half of the + key size derived above. + +9. Conclusion + + Generation of unguessable "random" secret quantities for security use + is an essential but difficult task. + + We have shown that hardware techniques to produce such randomness + would be relatively simple. In particular, the volume and quality + would not need to be high and existing computer hardware, such as + disk drives, can be used. Computational techniques are available to + process low quality random quantities from multiple sources or a + larger quantity of such low quality input from one source and produce + a smaller quantity of higher quality, less predictable key material. + In the absence of hardware sources of randomness, a variety of user + and software sources can frequently be used instead with care; + however, most modern systems already have hardware, such as disk + drives or audio input, that could be used to produce high quality + randomness. + + Once a sufficient quantity of high quality seed key material (a few + hundred bits) is available, strong computational techniques are + available to produce cryptographically strong sequences of + unpredicatable quantities from this seed material. + +10. Security Considerations + + The entirety of this document concerns techniques and recommendations + for generating unguessable "random" quantities for use as passwords, + cryptographic keys, and similar security uses. + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 27] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +References + + [ASYMMETRIC] - Secure Communications and Asymmetric Cryptosystems, + edited by Gustavus J. Simmons, AAAS Selected Symposium 69, Westview + Press, Inc. + + [BBS] - A Simple Unpredictable Pseudo-Random Number Generator, SIAM + Journal on Computing, v. 15, n. 2, 1986, L. Blum, M. Blum, & M. Shub. + + [BRILLINGER] - Time Series: Data Analysis and Theory, Holden-Day, + 1981, David Brillinger. + + [CRC] - C.R.C. Standard Mathematical Tables, Chemical Rubber + Publishing Company. + + [CRYPTO1] - Cryptography: A Primer, A Wiley-Interscience Publication, + John Wiley & Sons, 1981, Alan G. Konheim. + + [CRYPTO2] - Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data Security, + A Wiley-Interscience Publication, John Wiley & Sons, 1982, Carl H. + Meyer & Stephen M. Matyas. + + [CRYPTO3] - Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source + Code in C, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, Bruce Schneier. + + [DAVIS] - Cryptographic Randomness from Air Turbulence in Disk + Drives, Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '94, Springer-Verlag Lecture + Notes in Computer Science #839, 1984, Don Davis, Ross Ihaka, and + Philip Fenstermacher. + + [DES] - Data Encryption Standard, United States of America, + Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and + Technology, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-1. + - Data Encryption Algorithm, American National Standards Institute, + ANSI X3.92-1981. + (See also FIPS 112, Password Usage, which includes FORTRAN code for + performing DES.) + + [DES MODES] - DES Modes of Operation, United States of America, + Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and + Technology, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 81. + - Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation, American National + Standards Institute, ANSI X3.106-1983. + + [D-H] - New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions on + Information Technology, November, 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin + E. Hellman. + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 28] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + [DoD] - Password Management Guideline, United States of America, + Department of Defense, Computer Security Center, CSC-STD-002-85. + (See also FIPS 112, Password Usage, which incorporates CSC-STD-002-85 + as one of its appendices.) + + [GIFFORD] - Natural Random Number, MIT/LCS/TM-371, September 1988, + David K. Gifford + + [KNUTH] - The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2: Seminumerical + Algorithms, Chapter 3: Random Numbers. Addison Wesley Publishing + Company, Second Edition 1982, Donald E. Knuth. + + [KRAWCZYK] - How to Predict Congruential Generators, Journal of + Algorithms, V. 13, N. 4, December 1992, H. Krawczyk + + [MD2] - The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1319, April 1992, B. + Kaliski + [MD4] - The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1320, April 1992, R. + Rivest + [MD5] - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1321, April 1992, R. + Rivest + + [PEM] - RFCs 1421 through 1424: + - RFC 1424, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + IV: Key Certification and Related Services, 02/10/1993, B. Kaliski + - RFC 1423, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers, 02/10/1993, D. Balenson + - RFC 1422, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + II: Certificate-Based Key Management, 02/10/1993, S. Kent + - RFC 1421, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: + Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, 02/10/1993, J. Linn + + [SHANNON] - The Mathematical Theory of Communication, University of + Illinois Press, 1963, Claude E. Shannon. (originally from: Bell + System Technical Journal, July and October 1948) + + [SHIFT1] - Shift Register Sequences, Aegean Park Press, Revised + Edition 1982, Solomon W. Golomb. + + [SHIFT2] - Cryptanalysis of Shift-Register Generated Stream Cypher + Systems, Aegean Park Press, 1984, Wayne G. Barker. + + [SHS] - Secure Hash Standard, United States of American, National + Institute of Science and Technology, Federal Information Processing + Standard (FIPS) 180, April 1993. + + [STERN] - Secret Linear Congruential Generators are not + Cryptograhically Secure, Proceedings of IEEE STOC, 1987, J. Stern. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 29] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + [VON NEUMANN] - Various techniques used in connection with random + digits, von Neumann's Collected Works, Vol. 5, Pergamon Press, 1963, + J. von Neumann. + +Authors' Addresses + + Donald E. Eastlake 3rd + Digital Equipment Corporation + 550 King Street, LKG2-1/BB3 + Littleton, MA 01460 + + Phone: +1 508 486 6577(w) +1 508 287 4877(h) + EMail: dee@lkg.dec.com + + + Stephen D. Crocker + CyberCash Inc. + 2086 Hunters Crest Way + Vienna, VA 22181 + + Phone: +1 703-620-1222(w) +1 703-391-2651 (fax) + EMail: crocker@cybercash.com + + + Jeffrey I. Schiller + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 253 0161(w) + EMail: jis@mit.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 30] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0556c9e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1831.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1011 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group R. Srinivasan +Request for Comments: 1831 Sun Microsystems +Category: Standards Track August 1995 + + + RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol Specification Version 2 + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +ABSTRACT + + This document describes the ONC Remote Procedure Call (ONC RPC + Version 2) protocol as it is currently deployed and accepted. "ONC" + stands for "Open Network Computing". + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + + 1. INTRODUCTION 2 + 2. TERMINOLOGY 2 + 3. THE RPC MODEL 2 + 4. TRANSPORTS AND SEMANTICS 4 + 5. BINDING AND RENDEZVOUS INDEPENDENCE 5 + 6. AUTHENTICATION 5 + 7. RPC PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS 5 + 7.1 RPC Programs and Procedures 6 + 7.2 Authentication 7 + 7.3 Program Number Assignment 8 + 7.4 Other Uses of the RPC Protocol 8 + 7.4.1 Batching 8 + 7.4.2 Broadcast Remote Procedure Calls 8 + 8. THE RPC MESSAGE PROTOCOL 9 + 9. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 12 + 9.1 Null Authentication 13 + 10. RECORD MARKING STANDARD 13 + 11. THE RPC LANGUAGE 13 + 11.1 An Example Service Described in the RPC Language 13 + 11.2 The RPC Language Specification 14 + 11.3 Syntax Notes 15 + APPENDIX A: SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION 16 + REFERENCES 17 + Security Considerations 18 + Author's Address 18 + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +1. INTRODUCTION + + This document specifies version two of the message protocol used in + ONC Remote Procedure Call (RPC). The message protocol is specified + with the eXternal Data Representation (XDR) language [9]. This + document assumes that the reader is familiar with XDR. It does not + attempt to justify remote procedure calls systems or describe their + use. The paper by Birrell and Nelson [1] is recommended as an + excellent background for the remote procedure call concept. + +2. TERMINOLOGY + + This document discusses clients, calls, servers, replies, services, + programs, procedures, and versions. Each remote procedure call has + two sides: an active client side that makes the call to a server, + which sends back a reply. A network service is a collection of one + or more remote programs. A remote program implements one or more + remote procedures; the procedures, their parameters, and results are + documented in the specific program's protocol specification. A + server may support more than one version of a remote program in order + to be compatible with changing protocols. + + For example, a network file service may be composed of two programs. + One program may deal with high-level applications such as file system + access control and locking. The other may deal with low-level file + input and output and have procedures like "read" and "write". A + client of the network file service would call the procedures + associated with the two programs of the service on behalf of the + client. + + The terms client and server only apply to a particular transaction; a + particular hardware entity (host) or software entity (process or + program) could operate in both roles at different times. For + example, a program that supplies remote execution service could also + be a client of a network file service. + +3. THE RPC MODEL + + The ONC RPC protocol is based on the remote procedure call model, + which is similar to the local procedure call model. In the local + case, the caller places arguments to a procedure in some well- + specified location (such as a register window). It then transfers + control to the procedure, and eventually regains control. At that + point, the results of the procedure are extracted from the well- + specified location, and the caller continues execution. + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + The remote procedure call model is similar. One thread of control + logically winds through two processes: the caller's process, and a + server's process. The caller process first sends a call message to + the server process and waits (blocks) for a reply message. The call + message includes the procedure's parameters, and the reply message + includes the procedure's results. Once the reply message is + received, the results of the procedure are extracted, and caller's + execution is resumed. + + On the server side, a process is dormant awaiting the arrival of a + call message. When one arrives, the server process extracts the + procedure's parameters, computes the results, sends a reply message, + and then awaits the next call message. + + In this model, only one of the two processes is active at any given + time. However, this model is only given as an example. The ONC RPC + protocol makes no restrictions on the concurrency model implemented, + and others are possible. For example, an implementation may choose + to have RPC calls be asynchronous, so that the client may do useful + work while waiting for the reply from the server. Another + possibility is to have the server create a separate task to process + an incoming call, so that the original server can be free to receive + other requests. + + There are a few important ways in which remote procedure calls differ + from local procedure calls: + + 1. Error handling: failures of the remote server or network must + be handled when using remote procedure calls. + + 2. Global variables and side-effects: since the server does not + have access to the client's address space, hidden arguments cannot + be passed as global variables or returned as side effects. + + 3. Performance: remote procedures usually operate one or more + orders of magnitude slower than local procedure calls. + + 4. Authentication: since remote procedure calls can be transported + over unsecured networks, authentication may be necessary. + Authentication prevents one entity from masquerading as some other + entity. + + The conclusion is that even though there are tools to automatically + generate client and server libraries for a given service, protocols + must still be designed carefully. + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +4. TRANSPORTS AND SEMANTICS + + The RPC protocol can be implemented on several different transport + protocols. The RPC protocol does not care how a message is passed + from one process to another, but only with specification and + interpretation of messages. However, the application may wish to + obtain information about (and perhaps control over) the transport + layer through an interface not specified in this document. For + example, the transport protocol may impose a restriction on the + maximum size of RPC messages, or it may be stream-oriented like TCP + with no size limit. The client and server must agree on their + transport protocol choices. + + It is important to point out that RPC does not try to implement any + kind of reliability and that the application may need to be aware of + the type of transport protocol underneath RPC. If it knows it is + running on top of a reliable transport such as TCP [6], then most of + the work is already done for it. On the other hand, if it is running + on top of an unreliable transport such as UDP [7], it must implement + its own time-out, retransmission, and duplicate detection policies as + the RPC protocol does not provide these services. + + Because of transport independence, the RPC protocol does not attach + specific semantics to the remote procedures or their execution + requirements. Semantics can be inferred from (but should be + explicitly specified by) the underlying transport protocol. For + example, consider RPC running on top of an unreliable transport such + as UDP. If an application retransmits RPC call messages after time- + outs, and does not receive a reply, it cannot infer anything about + the number of times the procedure was executed. If it does receive a + reply, then it can infer that the procedure was executed at least + once. + + A server may wish to remember previously granted requests from a + client and not regrant them in order to insure some degree of + execute-at-most-once semantics. A server can do this by taking + advantage of the transaction ID that is packaged with every RPC + message. The main use of this transaction ID is by the client RPC + entity in matching replies to calls. However, a client application + may choose to reuse its previous transaction ID when retransmitting a + call. The server may choose to remember this ID after executing a + call and not execute calls with the same ID in order to achieve some + degree of execute-at-most-once semantics. The server is not allowed + to examine this ID in any other way except as a test for equality. + + On the other hand, if using a "reliable" transport such as TCP, the + application can infer from a reply message that the procedure was + executed exactly once, but if it receives no reply message, it cannot + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + assume that the remote procedure was not executed. Note that even if + a connection-oriented protocol like TCP is used, an application still + needs time-outs and reconnection to handle server crashes. + + There are other possibilities for transports besides datagram- or + connection-oriented protocols. For example, a request-reply protocol + such as VMTP [2] is perhaps a natural transport for RPC. ONC RPC + uses both TCP and UDP transport protocols. Section 10 (RECORD + MARKING STANDARD) describes the mechanism employed by ONC RPC to + utilize a connection-oriented, stream-oriented transport such as TCP. + +5. BINDING AND RENDEZVOUS INDEPENDENCE + + The act of binding a particular client to a particular service and + transport parameters is NOT part of this RPC protocol specification. + This important and necessary function is left up to some higher-level + software. + + Implementors could think of the RPC protocol as the jump-subroutine + instruction ("JSR") of a network; the loader (binder) makes JSR + useful, and the loader itself uses JSR to accomplish its task. + Likewise, the binding software makes RPC useful, possibly using RPC + to accomplish this task. + +6. AUTHENTICATION + + The RPC protocol provides the fields necessary for a client to + identify itself to a service, and vice-versa, in each call and reply + message. Security and access control mechanisms can be built on top + of this message authentication. Several different authentication + protocols can be supported. A field in the RPC header indicates + which protocol is being used. More information on specific + authentication protocols is in section 9: "Authentication Protocols". + +7. RPC PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS + + The RPC protocol must provide for the following: + + (1) Unique specification of a procedure to be called. + (2) Provisions for matching response messages to request messages. + (3) Provisions for authenticating the caller to service and + vice-versa. + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + Besides these requirements, features that detect the following are + worth supporting because of protocol roll-over errors, implementation + bugs, user error, and network administration: + + (1) RPC protocol mismatches. + (2) Remote program protocol version mismatches. + (3) Protocol errors (such as misspecification of a procedure's + parameters). + (4) Reasons why remote authentication failed. + (5) Any other reasons why the desired procedure was not called. + +7.1 RPC Programs and Procedures + + The RPC call message has three unsigned integer fields -- remote + program number, remote program version number, and remote procedure + number -- which uniquely identify the procedure to be called. + Program numbers are administered by a central authority + (rpc@sun.com). Once implementors have a program number, they can + implement their remote program; the first implementation would most + likely have the version number 1. Because most new protocols evolve, + a version field of the call message identifies which version of the + protocol the caller is using. Version numbers enable support of both + old and new protocols through the same server process. + + The procedure number identifies the procedure to be called. These + numbers are documented in the specific program's protocol + specification. For example, a file service's protocol specification + may state that its procedure number 5 is "read" and procedure number + 12 is "write". + + Just as remote program protocols may change over several versions, + the actual RPC message protocol could also change. Therefore, the + call message also has in it the RPC version number, which is always + equal to two for the version of RPC described here. + + The reply message to a request message has enough information to + distinguish the following error conditions: + + (1) The remote implementation of RPC does not support protocol + version 2. The lowest and highest supported RPC version numbers + are returned. + + (2) The remote program is not available on the remote system. + + (3) The remote program does not support the requested version + number. The lowest and highest supported remote program version + numbers are returned. + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + (4) The requested procedure number does not exist. (This is + usually a client side protocol or programming error.) + + (5) The parameters to the remote procedure appear to be garbage + from the server's point of view. (Again, this is usually caused + by a disagreement about the protocol between client and service.) + +7.2 Authentication + + Provisions for authentication of caller to service and vice-versa are + provided as a part of the RPC protocol. The call message has two + authentication fields, the credential and verifier. The reply + message has one authentication field, the response verifier. The RPC + protocol specification defines all three fields to be the following + opaque type (in the eXternal Data Representation (XDR) language [9]): + + enum auth_flavor { + AUTH_NONE = 0, + AUTH_SYS = 1, + AUTH_SHORT = 2 + /* and more to be defined */ + }; + + struct opaque_auth { + auth_flavor flavor; + opaque body<400>; + }; + + In other words, any "opaque_auth" structure is an "auth_flavor" + enumeration followed by up to 400 bytes which are opaque to + (uninterpreted by) the RPC protocol implementation. + + The interpretation and semantics of the data contained within the + authentication fields is specified by individual, independent + authentication protocol specifications. (Section 9 defines the + various authentication protocols.) + + If authentication parameters were rejected, the reply message + contains information stating why they were rejected. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +7.3 Program Number Assignment + + Program numbers are given out in groups of hexadecimal 20000000 + (decimal 536870912) according to the following chart: + + 0 - 1fffffff defined by rpc@sun.com + 20000000 - 3fffffff defined by user + 40000000 - 5fffffff transient + 60000000 - 7fffffff reserved + 80000000 - 9fffffff reserved + a0000000 - bfffffff reserved + c0000000 - dfffffff reserved + e0000000 - ffffffff reserved + + The first group is a range of numbers administered by rpc@sun.com and + should be identical for all sites. The second range is for + applications peculiar to a particular site. This range is intended + primarily for debugging new programs. When a site develops an + application that might be of general interest, that application + should be given an assigned number in the first range. Application + developers may apply for blocks of RPC program numbers in the first + range by sending electronic mail to "rpc@sun.com". The third group + is for applications that generate program numbers dynamically. The + final groups are reserved for future use, and should not be used. + +7.4 Other Uses of the RPC Protocol + + The intended use of this protocol is for calling remote procedures. + Normally, each call message is matched with a reply message. + However, the protocol itself is a message-passing protocol with which + other (non-procedure call) protocols can be implemented. + +7.4.1 Batching + + Batching is useful when a client wishes to send an arbitrarily large + sequence of call messages to a server. Batching typically uses + reliable byte stream protocols (like TCP) for its transport. In the + case of batching, the client never waits for a reply from the server, + and the server does not send replies to batch calls. A sequence of + batch calls is usually terminated by a legitimate remote procedure + call operation in order to flush the pipeline and get positive + acknowledgement. + +7.4.2 Broadcast Remote Procedure Calls + + In broadcast protocols, the client sends a broadcast call to the + network and waits for numerous replies. This requires the use of + packet-based protocols (like UDP) as its transport protocol. Servers + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + that support broadcast protocols usually respond only when the call + is successfully processed and are silent in the face of errors, but + this varies with the application. + + The principles of broadcast RPC also apply to multicasting - an RPC + request can be sent to a multicast address. + +8. THE RPC MESSAGE PROTOCOL + + This section defines the RPC message protocol in the XDR data + description language [9]. + + enum msg_type { + CALL = 0, + REPLY = 1 + }; + + A reply to a call message can take on two forms: The message was + either accepted or rejected. + + enum reply_stat { + MSG_ACCEPTED = 0, + MSG_DENIED = 1 + }; + + Given that a call message was accepted, the following is the status + of an attempt to call a remote procedure. + + enum accept_stat { + SUCCESS = 0, /* RPC executed successfully */ + PROG_UNAVAIL = 1, /* remote hasn't exported program */ + PROG_MISMATCH = 2, /* remote can't support version # */ + PROC_UNAVAIL = 3, /* program can't support procedure */ + GARBAGE_ARGS = 4, /* procedure can't decode params */ + SYSTEM_ERR = 5 /* errors like memory allocation failure */ + }; + + Reasons why a call message was rejected: + + enum reject_stat { + RPC_MISMATCH = 0, /* RPC version number != 2 */ + AUTH_ERROR = 1 /* remote can't authenticate caller */ + }; + + Why authentication failed: + + enum auth_stat { + AUTH_OK = 0, /* success */ + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + /* + * failed at remote end + */ + AUTH_BADCRED = 1, /* bad credential (seal broken) */ + AUTH_REJECTEDCRED = 2, /* client must begin new session */ + AUTH_BADVERF = 3, /* bad verifier (seal broken) */ + AUTH_REJECTEDVERF = 4, /* verifier expired or replayed */ + AUTH_TOOWEAK = 5, /* rejected for security reasons */ + /* + * failed locally + */ + AUTH_INVALIDRESP = 6, /* bogus response verifier */ + AUTH_FAILED = 7 /* reason unknown */ + }; + + The RPC message: + + All messages start with a transaction identifier, xid, followed by a + two-armed discriminated union. The union's discriminant is a + msg_type which switches to one of the two types of the message. The + xid of a REPLY message always matches that of the initiating CALL + message. NB: The xid field is only used for clients matching reply + messages with call messages or for servers detecting retransmissions; + the service side cannot treat this id as any type of sequence number. + + struct rpc_msg { + unsigned int xid; + union switch (msg_type mtype) { + case CALL: + call_body cbody; + case REPLY: + reply_body rbody; + } body; + }; + + Body of an RPC call: + + In version 2 of the RPC protocol specification, rpcvers must be equal + to 2. The fields prog, vers, and proc specify the remote program, + its version number, and the procedure within the remote program to be + called. After these fields are two authentication parameters: cred + (authentication credential) and verf (authentication verifier). The + two authentication parameters are followed by the parameters to the + remote procedure, which are specified by the specific program + protocol. + + The purpose of the authentication verifier is to validate the + authentication credential. Note that these two items are + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + historically separate, but are always used together as one logical + entity. + + struct call_body { + unsigned int rpcvers; /* must be equal to two (2) */ + unsigned int prog; + unsigned int vers; + unsigned int proc; + opaque_auth cred; + opaque_auth verf; + /* procedure specific parameters start here */ + }; + + Body of a reply to an RPC call: + + union reply_body switch (reply_stat stat) { + case MSG_ACCEPTED: + accepted_reply areply; + case MSG_DENIED: + rejected_reply rreply; + } reply; + + Reply to an RPC call that was accepted by the server: + + There could be an error even though the call was accepted. The first + field is an authentication verifier that the server generates in + order to validate itself to the client. It is followed by a union + whose discriminant is an enum accept_stat. The SUCCESS arm of the + union is protocol specific. The PROG_UNAVAIL, PROC_UNAVAIL, + GARBAGE_ARGS, and SYSTEM_ERR arms of the union are void. The + PROG_MISMATCH arm specifies the lowest and highest version numbers of + the remote program supported by the server. + + struct accepted_reply { + opaque_auth verf; + union switch (accept_stat stat) { + case SUCCESS: + opaque results[0]; + /* + * procedure-specific results start here + */ + case PROG_MISMATCH: + struct { + unsigned int low; + unsigned int high; + } mismatch_info; + default: + /* + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + * Void. Cases include PROG_UNAVAIL, PROC_UNAVAIL, + * GARBAGE_ARGS, and SYSTEM_ERR. + */ + void; + } reply_data; + }; + + Reply to an RPC call that was rejected by the server: + + The call can be rejected for two reasons: either the server is not + running a compatible version of the RPC protocol (RPC_MISMATCH), or + the server rejects the identity of the caller (AUTH_ERROR). In case + of an RPC version mismatch, the server returns the lowest and highest + supported RPC version numbers. In case of invalid authentication, + failure status is returned. + + union rejected_reply switch (reject_stat stat) { + case RPC_MISMATCH: + struct { + unsigned int low; + unsigned int high; + } mismatch_info; + case AUTH_ERROR: + auth_stat stat; + }; + +9. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS + + As previously stated, authentication parameters are opaque, but + open-ended to the rest of the RPC protocol. This section defines two + standard "flavors" of authentication. Implementors are free to + invent new authentication types, with the same rules of flavor number + assignment as there is for program number assignment. The "flavor" + of a credential or verifier refers to the value of the "flavor" field + in the opaque_auth structure. Flavor numbers, like RPC program + numbers, are also administered centrally, and developers may assign + new flavor numbers by applying through electronic mail to + "rpc@sun.com". Credentials and verifiers are represented as variable + length opaque data (the "body" field in the opaque_auth structure). + + In this document, two flavors of authentication are described. Of + these, Null authentication (described in the next subsection) is + mandatory - it must be available in all implementations. System + authentication is described in Appendix A. It is strongly + recommended that implementors include System authentication in their + implementations. Many applications use this style of authentication, + and availability of this flavor in an implementation will enhance + interoperability. + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +9.1 Null Authentication + + Often calls must be made where the client does not care about its + identity or the server does not care who the client is. In this + case, the flavor of the RPC message's credential, verifier, and reply + verifier is "AUTH_NONE". Opaque data associated with "AUTH_NONE" is + undefined. It is recommended that the length of the opaque data be + zero. + +10. RECORD MARKING STANDARD + + When RPC messages are passed on top of a byte stream transport + protocol (like TCP), it is necessary to delimit one message from + another in order to detect and possibly recover from protocol errors. + This is called record marking (RM). One RPC message fits into one RM + record. + + A record is composed of one or more record fragments. A record + fragment is a four-byte header followed by 0 to (2**31) - 1 bytes of + fragment data. The bytes encode an unsigned binary number; as with + XDR integers, the byte order is from highest to lowest. The number + encodes two values -- a boolean which indicates whether the fragment + is the last fragment of the record (bit value 1 implies the fragment + is the last fragment) and a 31-bit unsigned binary value which is the + length in bytes of the fragment's data. The boolean value is the + highest-order bit of the header; the length is the 31 low-order bits. + (Note that this record specification is NOT in XDR standard form!) + +11. THE RPC LANGUAGE + + Just as there was a need to describe the XDR data-types in a formal + language, there is also need to describe the procedures that operate + on these XDR data-types in a formal language as well. The RPC + Language is an extension to the XDR language, with the addition of + "program", "procedure", and "version" declarations. The following + example is used to describe the essence of the language. + +11.1 An Example Service Described in the RPC Language + + Here is an example of the specification of a simple ping program. + + program PING_PROG { + /* + * Latest and greatest version + */ + version PING_VERS_PINGBACK { + void + PINGPROC_NULL(void) = 0; + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + /* + * Ping the client, return the round-trip time + * (in microseconds). Returns -1 if the operation + * timed out. + */ + int + PINGPROC_PINGBACK(void) = 1; + } = 2; + + /* + * Original version + */ + version PING_VERS_ORIG { + void + PINGPROC_NULL(void) = 0; + } = 1; + } = 1; + + const PING_VERS = 2; /* latest version */ + + The first version described is PING_VERS_PINGBACK with two + procedures, PINGPROC_NULL and PINGPROC_PINGBACK. PINGPROC_NULL takes + no arguments and returns no results, but it is useful for computing + round-trip times from the client to the server and back again. By + convention, procedure 0 of any RPC protocol should have the same + semantics, and never require any kind of authentication. The second + procedure is used for the client to have the server do a reverse ping + operation back to the client, and it returns the amount of time (in + microseconds) that the operation used. The next version, + PING_VERS_ORIG, is the original version of the protocol and it does + not contain PINGPROC_PINGBACK procedure. It is useful for + compatibility with old client programs, and as this program matures + it may be dropped from the protocol entirely. + +11.2 The RPC Language Specification + + The RPC language is identical to the XDR language defined in RFC + 1014, except for the added definition of a "program-def" described + below. + + program-def: + "program" identifier "{" + version-def + version-def * + "}" "=" constant ";" + + version-def: + "version" identifier "{" + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + + procedure-def + procedure-def * + "}" "=" constant ";" + + procedure-def: + type-specifier identifier "(" type-specifier + ("," type-specifier )* ")" "=" constant ";" + +11.3 Syntax Notes + + (1) The following keywords are added and cannot be used as + identifiers: "program" and "version"; + + (2) A version name cannot occur more than once within the scope of a + program definition. Nor can a version number occur more than once + within the scope of a program definition. + + (3) A procedure name cannot occur more than once within the scope of + a version definition. Nor can a procedure number occur more than once + within the scope of version definition. + + (4) Program identifiers are in the same name space as constant and + type identifiers. + + (5) Only unsigned constants can be assigned to programs, versions and + procedures. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +APPENDIX A: SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION + + The client may wish to identify itself, for example, as it is + identified on a UNIX(tm) system. The flavor of the client credential + is "AUTH_SYS". The opaque data constituting the credential encodes + the following structure: + + struct authsys_parms { + unsigned int stamp; + string machinename<255>; + unsigned int uid; + unsigned int gid; + unsigned int gids<16>; + }; + + The "stamp" is an arbitrary ID which the caller machine may generate. + The "machinename" is the name of the caller's machine (like + "krypton"). The "uid" is the caller's effective user ID. The "gid" + is the caller's effective group ID. The "gids" is a counted array of + groups which contain the caller as a member. The verifier + accompanying the credential should have "AUTH_NONE" flavor value + (defined above). Note this credential is only unique within a + particular domain of machine names, uids, and gids. + + The flavor value of the verifier received in the reply message from + the server may be "AUTH_NONE" or "AUTH_SHORT". In the case of + "AUTH_SHORT", the bytes of the reply verifier's string encode an + opaque structure. This new opaque structure may now be passed to the + server instead of the original "AUTH_SYS" flavor credential. The + server may keep a cache which maps shorthand opaque structures + (passed back by way of an "AUTH_SHORT" style reply verifier) to the + original credentials of the caller. The caller can save network + bandwidth and server cpu cycles by using the shorthand credential. + + The server may flush the shorthand opaque structure at any time. If + this happens, the remote procedure call message will be rejected due + to an authentication error. The reason for the failure will be + "AUTH_REJECTEDCRED". At this point, the client may wish to try the + original "AUTH_SYS" style of credential. + + It should be noted that use of this flavor of authentication does not + guarantee any security for the users or providers of a service, in + itself. The authentication provided by this scheme can be considered + legitimate only when applications using this scheme and the network + can be secured externally, and privileged transport addresses are + used for the communicating end-points (an example of this is the use + of privileged TCP/UDP ports in Unix systems - note that not all + systems enforce privileged transport address mechanisms). + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +REFERENCES + + [1] Birrell, A. D. & Nelson, B. J., "Implementing Remote Procedure + Calls", XEROX CSL-83-7, October 1983. + + [2] Cheriton, D., "VMTP: Versatile Message Transaction Protocol", + Preliminary Version 0.3, Stanford University, January 1987. + + [3] Diffie & Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography", IEEE + Transactions on Information Theory IT-22, November 1976. + + [4] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol", RFC 1305, UDEL, + March 1992. + + [5] National Bureau of Standards, "Data Encryption Standard", + Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46, January + 1977. + + [6] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol - DARPA Internet + Program Protocol Specification", STD 7, RFC 793, USC/Information + Sciences Institute, September 1981. + + [7] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, August 1980. + + [8] Reynolds, J., and Postel, J., "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, + RFC 1700, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994. + + [9] Srinivasan, R., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard", + RFC 1832, Sun Microsystems, Inc., August 1995. + + [10] Miller, S., Neuman, C., Schiller, J., and J. Saltzer, "Section + E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and Authorization System", + M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 21, + 1987. + + [11] Steiner, J., Neuman, C., and J. Schiller, "Kerberos: An + Authentication Service for Open Network Systems", pp. 191-202 in + Usenix Conference Proceedings, Dallas, Texas, February 1988. + + [12] Kohl, J. and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication + Service (V5)", RFC 1510, Digital Equipment Corporation, + USC/Information Sciences Institute, September 1993. + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 1831 Remote Procedure Call Protocol Version 2 August 1995 + + +Security Considerations + + Security issues are not discussed in this memo. + +Author's Address + + Raj Srinivasan + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + ONC Technologies + 2550 Garcia Avenue + M/S MTV-5-40 + Mountain View, CA 94043 + USA + + Phone: 415-336-2478 + Fax: 415-336-6015 + EMail: raj@eng.sun.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Srinivasan Standards Track [Page 18] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2960b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc1964.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1123 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 1964 OpenVision Technologies +Category: Standards Track June 1996 + + + The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +ABSTRACT + + This specification defines protocols, procedures, and conventions to + be employed by peers implementing the Generic Security Service + Application Program Interface (as specified in RFCs 1508 and 1509) + when using Kerberos Version 5 technology (as specified in RFC 1510). + +ACKNOWLEDGMENTS + + Much of the material in this memo is based on working documents + drafted by John Wray of Digital Equipment Corporation and on + discussions, implementation activities, and interoperability testing + involving Marc Horowitz, Ted Ts'o, and John Wray. Particular thanks + are due to each of these individuals for their contributions towards + development and availability of GSS-API support within the Kerberos + Version 5 code base. + +1. Token Formats + + This section discusses protocol-visible characteristics of the GSS- + API mechanism to be implemented atop Kerberos V5 security technology + per RFC-1508 and RFC-1510; it defines elements of protocol for + interoperability and is independent of language bindings per RFC- + 1509. + + Tokens transferred between GSS-API peers (for security context + management and per-message protection purposes) are defined. The + data elements exchanged between a GSS-API endpoint implementation and + the Kerberos KDC are not specific to GSS-API usage and are therefore + defined within RFC-1510 rather than within this specification. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + To support ongoing experimentation, testing, and evolution of the + specification, the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as defined in this + and any successor memos will be identified with the following Object + Identifier, as defined in RFC-1510, until the specification is + advanced to the level of Proposed Standard RFC: + + {iso(1), org(3), dod(5), internet(1), security(5), kerberosv5(2)} + + Upon advancement to the level of Proposed Standard RFC, the Kerberos + V5 GSS-API mechanism will be identified by an Object Identifier + having the value: + + {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) + gssapi(2) krb5(2)} + +1.1. Context Establishment Tokens + + Per RFC-1508, Appendix B, the initial context establishment token + will be enclosed within framing as follows: + + InitialContextToken ::= + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType + -- MechType is OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- representing "Kerberos V5" + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + -- contents mechanism-specific; + -- ASN.1 usage within innerContextToken + -- is not required + } + + The innerContextToken of the initial context token will consist of a + Kerberos V5 KRB_AP_REQ message, preceded by a two-byte token-id + (TOK_ID) field, which shall contain the value 01 00. + + The above GSS-API framing shall be applied to all tokens emitted by + the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, including KRB_AP_REP, KRB_ERROR, + context-deletion, and per-message tokens, not just to the initial + token in a context establishment sequence. While not required by + RFC-1508, this enables implementations to perform enhanced error- + checking. The innerContextToken field of context establishment tokens + for the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism will contain a Kerberos message + (KRB_AP_REQ, KRB_AP_REP or KRB_ERROR), preceded by a 2-byte TOK_ID + field containing 01 00 for KRB_AP_REQ messages, 02 00 for KRB_AP_REP + messages and 03 00 for KRB_ERROR messages. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +1.1.1. Initial Token + + Relevant KRB_AP_REQ syntax (from RFC-1510) is as follows: + + AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER, -- indicates Version 5 + msg-type [1] INTEGER, -- indicates KRB_AP_REQ + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData + } + + APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved (0), + use-session-key (1), + mutual-required (2) + } + + Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno [0] INTEGER, -- indicates Version 5 + realm [1] Realm, + sname [2] PrincipalName, + enc-part [3] EncryptedData + } + + -- Encrypted part of ticket + EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + -- Unencrypted authenticator + Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + + For purposes of this specification, the authenticator shall include + the optional sequence number, and the checksum field shall be used to + convey channel binding, service flags, and optional delegation + information. The checksum will have a type of 0x8003 (a value being + registered within the Kerberos protocol specification), and a value + field of at least 24 bytes in length. The length of the value field + is extended beyond 24 bytes if and only if an optional facility to + carry a Kerberos-defined KRB_CRED message for delegation purposes is + supported by an implementation and active on a context. When + delegation is active, a TGT with its FORWARDABLE flag set will be + transferred within the KRB_CRED message. + + The checksum value field's format is as follows: + + Byte Name Description + 0..3 Lgth Number of bytes in Bnd field; + Currently contains hex 10 00 00 00 + (16, represented in little-endian form) + 4..19 Bnd MD5 hash of channel bindings, taken over all non-null + components of bindings, in order of declaration. + Integer fields within channel bindings are represented + in little-endian order for the purposes of the MD5 + calculation. + 20..23 Flags Bit vector of context-establishment flags, + with values consistent with RFC-1509, p. 41: + GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG: 1 + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG: 2 + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG: 4 + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG: 8 + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG: 16 + GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG: 32 + The resulting bit vector is encoded into bytes 20..23 + in little-endian form. + 24..25 DlgOpt The Delegation Option identifier (=1) [optional] + 26..27 Dlgth The length of the Deleg field. [optional] + 28..n Deleg A KRB_CRED message (n = Dlgth + 29) [optional] + + In computing the contents of the "Bnd" field, the following detailed + points apply: + + (1) Each integer field shall be formatted into four bytes, using + little-endian byte ordering, for purposes of MD5 hash + computation. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + (2) All input length fields within gss_buffer_desc elements of a + gss_channel_bindings_struct, even those which are zero-valued, + shall be included in the hash calculation; the value elements of + gss_buffer_desc elements shall be dereferenced, and the + resulting data shall be included within the hash computation, + only for the case of gss_buffer_desc elements having non-zero + length specifiers. + + (3) If the caller passes the value GSS_C_NO_BINDINGS instead of + a valid channel bindings structure, the Bnd field shall be set + to 16 zero-valued bytes. + + In the initial Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism token (KRB_AP_REQ token) + from initiator to target, the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, + GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, and GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG values shall each be set + as the logical AND of the initiator's corresponding request flag to + GSS_Init_sec_context() and a Boolean indicator of whether that + optional service is available to GSS_Init_sec_context()'s caller. + GSS_C_CONF_FLAG and GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG, for which no corresponding + context-level input indicator flags to GSS_Init_sec_context() exist, + shall each be set to indicate whether their respective per-message + protection services are available for use on the context being + established. + + When input source address channel binding values are provided by a + caller (i.e., unless the input argument is GSS_C_NO_BINDINGS or the + source address specifier value within the input structure is + GSS_C_NULL_ADDRTYPE), and the corresponding token received from the + context's peer bears address restrictions, it is recommended that an + implementation of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism should check that + the source address as provided by the caller matches that in the + received token, and should return the GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS major_status + value if a mismatch is detected. Note: discussion is ongoing about + the strength of recommendation to be made in this area, and on the + circumstances under which such a recommendation should be applicable; + implementors are therefore advised that changes on this matter may be + included in subsequent versions of this specification. + +1.1.2. Response Tokens + + A context establishment sequence based on the Kerberos V5 mechanism + will perform one-way authentication (without confirmation or any + return token from target to initiator in response to the initiator's + KRB_AP_REQ) if the mutual_req bit is not set in the application's + call to GSS_Init_sec_context(). Applications requiring confirmation + that their authentication was successful should request mutual + authentication, resulting in a "mutual-required" indication within + KRB_AP_REQ APoptions and the setting of the mutual_req bit in the + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + flags field of the authenticator checksum. In response to such a + request, the context target will reply to the initiator with a token + containing either a KRB_AP_REP or KRB_ERROR, completing the mutual + context establishment exchange. + + Relevant KRB_AP_REP syntax is as follows: + + AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno [0] INTEGER, -- represents Kerberos V5 + msg-type [1] INTEGER, -- represents KRB_AP_REP + enc-part [2] EncryptedData + } + + EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime [0] KerberosTime, + cusec [1] INTEGER, + subkey [2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL + } + + The optional seq-number element within the AP-REP's EncAPRepPart + shall be included. + + The syntax of KRB_ERROR is as follows: + + KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + } + + Values to be transferred in the error-code field of a KRB-ERROR + message are defined in [RFC-1510], not in this specification. + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +1.2. Per-Message and Context Deletion Tokens + + Three classes of tokens are defined in this section: "MIC" tokens, + emitted by calls to GSS_GetMIC() (formerly GSS_Sign()) and consumed + by calls to GSS_VerifyMIC() (formerly GSS_Verify()), "Wrap" tokens, + emitted by calls to GSS_Wrap() (formerly GSS_Seal()) and consumed by + calls to GSS_Unwrap() (formerly GSS_Unseal()), and context deletion + tokens, emitted by calls to GSS_Delete_sec_context() and consumed by + calls to GSS_Process_context_token(). Note: References to GSS-API + per-message routines in the remainder of this specification will be + based on those routines' newer recommended names rather than those + names' predecessors. + + Several variants of cryptographic keys are used in generation and + processing of per-message tokens: + + (1) context key: uses Kerberos session key (or subkey, if + present in authenticator emitted by context initiator) directly + + (2) confidentiality key: forms variant of context key by + exclusive-OR with the hexadecimal constant f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0. + + (3) MD2.5 seed key: forms variant of context key by reversing + the bytes of the context key (i.e. if the original key is the + 8-byte sequence {aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, ff, gg, hh}, the seed key + will be {hh, gg, ff, ee, dd, cc, bb, aa}). + +1.2.1. Per-message Tokens - MIC + +Use of the GSS_GetMIC() call yields a token, separate from the user +data being protected, which can be used to verify the integrity of +that data as received. The token has the following format: + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by GSS_GetMIC() contain + the hex value 01 01 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Integrity algorithm indicator. + 00 00 - DES MAC MD5 + 01 00 - MD2.5 + 02 00 - DES MAC + 4..7 Filler Contains ff ff ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Sequence number field. + 16..23 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of "to-be-signed data", + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + GSS-API tokens must be encapsulated within the higher-level protocol + by the application; no embedded length field is necessary. + +1.2.1.1. Checksum + + Checksum calculation procedure (common to all algorithms): Checksums + are calculated over the data field, logically prepended by the first + 8 bytes of the plaintext packet header. The resulting value binds + the data to the packet type and signature algorithm identifier + fields. + + DES MAC MD5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by computing an MD5 + [RFC-1321] hash over the plaintext data, and then computing a DES-CBC + MAC on the 16-byte MD5 result. A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is + computed per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key and a zero IV. + The 8-byte result is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. + + MD2.5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by first DES-CBC encrypting a + 16-byte zero-block, using a zero IV and a key formed by reversing the + bytes of the context key (i.e. if the original key is the 8-byte + sequence {aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, ff, gg, hh}, the checksum key will be + {hh, gg, ff, ee, dd, cc, bb, aa}). The resulting 16-byte value is + logically prepended to the to-be-signed data. A standard MD5 + checksum is calculated over the combined data, and the first 8 bytes + of the result are stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. Note 1: we refer to + this algorithm informally as "MD2.5" to connote the fact that it uses + half of the 128 bits generated by MD5; use of only a subset of the + MD5 bits is intended to protect against the prospect that data could + be postfixed to an existing message with corresponding modifications + being made to the checksum. Note 2: This algorithm is fairly novel + and has received more limited evaluation than that to which other + integrity algorithms have been subjected. An initial, limited + evaluation indicates that it may be significantly weaker than DES MAC + MD5. + + DES-MAC algorithm: A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is computed on the + plaintext data per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key and a + zero IV. Padding procedures to accomodate plaintext data lengths + which may not be integral multiples of 8 bytes are defined in [FIPS- + PUB-113]. The result is an 8-byte value, which is stored in the + SGN_CKSUM field. Support for this algorithm may not be present in + all implementations. + +1.2.1.2. Sequence Number + + Sequence number field: The 8 byte plaintext sequence number field is + formed from the sender's four-byte sequence number as follows. If + the four bytes of the sender's sequence number are named s0, s1, s2 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + and s3 (from least to most significant), the plaintext sequence + number field is the 8 byte sequence: (s0, s1, s2, s3, di, di, di, + di), where 'di' is the direction-indicator (Hex 0 - sender is the + context initiator, Hex FF - sender is the context acceptor). The + field is then DES-CBC encrypted using the context key and an IV + formed from the first 8 bytes of the previously calculated SGN_CKSUM + field. After sending a GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() token, the sender's + sequence number is incremented by one. + + The receiver of the token will first verify the SGN_CKSUM field. If + valid, the sequence number field may be decrypted and compared to the + expected sequence number. The repetition of the (effectively 1-bit) + direction indicator within the sequence number field provides + redundancy so that the receiver may verify that the decryption + succeeded. + + Since the checksum computation is used as an IV to the sequence + number decryption, attempts to splice a checksum and sequence number + from different messages will be detected. The direction indicator + will detect packets that have been maliciously reflected. + + The sequence number provides a basis for detection of replayed + tokens. Replay detection can be performed using state information + retained on received sequence numbers, interpreted in conjunction + with the security context on which they arrive. + + Provision of per-message replay and out-of-sequence detection + services is optional for implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism. Further, it is recommended that implementations of the + Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism which offer these services should honor + a caller's request that the services be disabled on a context. + Specifically, if replay_det_req_flag is input FALSE, replay_det_state + should be returned FALSE and the GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN and + GSS_OLD_TOKEN stati should not be indicated as a result of duplicate + detection when tokens are processed; if sequence_req_flag is input + FALSE, sequence_state should be returned FALSE and + GSS_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_OLD_TOKEN, and GSS_UNSEQ_TOKEN stati should + not be indicated as a result of out-of-sequence detection when tokens + are processed. + +1.2.2. Per-message Tokens - Wrap + + Use of the GSS_Wrap() call yields a token which encapsulates the + input user data (optionally encrypted) along with associated + integrity check quantities. The token emitted by GSS_Wrap() consists + of an integrity header whose format is identical to that emitted by + GSS_GetMIC() (except that the TOK_ID field contains the value 02 01), + followed by a body portion that contains either the plaintext data + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + (if SEAL_ALG = ff ff) or encrypted data for any other supported value + of SEAL_ALG. Currently, only SEAL_ALG = 00 00 is supported, and + means that DES-CBC encryption is being used to protect the data. + + The GSS_Wrap() token has the following format: + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by GSS_Wrap() contain + the hex value 02 01 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Checksum algorithm indicator. + 00 00 - DES MAC MD5 + 01 00 - MD2.5 + 02 00 - DES MAC + 4..5 SEAL_ALG ff ff - none + 00 00 - DES + 6..7 Filler Contains ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Encrypted sequence number field. + 16..23 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of plaintext padded data, + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + 24..last Data encrypted or plaintext padded data + + GSS-API tokens must be encapsulated within the higher-level protocol + by the application; no embedded length field is necessary. + +1.2.2.1. Checksum + + Checksum calculation procedure (common to all algorithms): Checksums + are calculated over the plaintext padded data field, logically + prepended by the first 8 bytes of the plaintext packet header. The + resulting signature binds the data to the packet type, protocol + version, and signature algorithm identifier fields. + + DES MAC MD5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by computing an MD5 + hash over the plaintext padded data, and then computing a DES-CBC MAC + on the 16-byte MD5 result. A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is computed + per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key and a zero IV. The 8- + byte result is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. + + MD2.5 algorithm: The checksum is formed by first DES-CBC encrypting a + 16-byte zero-block, using a zero IV and a key formed by reversing the + bytes of the context key (i.e., if the original key is the 8-byte + sequence {aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, ff, gg, hh}, the checksum key will be + {hh, gg, ff, ee, dd, cc, bb, aa}). The resulting 16-byte value is + logically pre-pended to the "to-be-signed data". A standard MD5 + checksum is calculated over the combined data, and the first 8 bytes + of the result are stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + DES-MAC algorithm: A standard 64-bit DES-CBC MAC is computed on the + plaintext padded data per [FIPS-PUB-113], employing the context key + and a zero IV. The plaintext padded data is already assured to be an + integral multiple of 8 bytes; no additional padding is required or + applied in order to accomplish MAC calculation. The result is an 8- + byte value, which is stored in the SGN_CKSUM field. Support for this + lgorithm may not be present in all implementations. + +1.2.2.2. Sequence Number + + Sequence number field: The 8 byte plaintext sequence number field is + formed from the sender's four-byte sequence number as follows. If + the four bytes of the sender's sequence number are named s0, s1, s2 + and s3 (from least to most significant), the plaintext sequence + number field is the 8 byte sequence: (s0, s1, s2, s3, di, di, di, + di), where 'di' is the direction-indicator (Hex 0 - sender is the + context initiator, Hex FF - sender is the context acceptor). + + The field is then DES-CBC encrypted using the context key and an IV + formed from the first 8 bytes of the SEAL_CKSUM field. + + After sending a GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() token, the sender's + sequence numbers are incremented by one. + +1.2.2.3. Padding + + Data padding: Before encryption and/or signature calculation, + plaintext data is padded to the next highest multiple of 8 bytes, by + appending between 1 and 8 bytes, the value of each such byte being + the total number of pad bytes. For example, given data of length 20 + bytes, four pad bytes will be appended, and each byte will contain + the hex value 04. An 8-byte random confounder is prepended to the + data, and signatures are calculated over the resulting padded + plaintext. + + After padding, the data is encrypted according to the algorithm + specified in the SEAL_ALG field. For SEAL_ALG=DES (the only non-null + algorithm currently supported), the data is encrypted using DES-CBC, + with an IV of zero. The key used is derived from the established + context key by XOR-ing the context key with the hexadecimal constant + f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0. + +1.2.3. Context deletion token + + The token emitted by GSS_Delete_sec_context() is based on the packet + format for tokens emitted by GSS_GetMIC(). The context-deletion + token has the following format: + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + Byte no Name Description + 0..1 TOK_ID Identification field. + Tokens emitted by + GSS_Delete_sec_context() contain + the hex value 01 02 in this field. + 2..3 SGN_ALG Integrity algorithm indicator. + 00 00 - DES MAC MD5 + 01 00 - MD2.5 + 02 00 - DES MAC + 4..7 Filler Contains ff ff ff ff + 8..15 SND_SEQ Sequence number field. + 16..23 SGN_CKSUM Checksum of "to-be-signed data", + calculated according to algorithm + specified in SGN_ALG field. + + SGN_ALG and SND_SEQ will be calculated as for tokens emitted by + GSS_GetMIC(). The SGN_CKSUM will be calculated as for tokens emitted + by GSS_GetMIC(), except that the user-data component of the "to-be- + signed" data will be a zero-length string. + +2. Name Types and Object Identifiers + + This section discusses the name types which may be passed as input to + the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism's GSS_Import_name() call, and their + associated identifier values. It defines interface elements in + support of portability, and assumes use of C language bindings per + RFC-1509. In addition to specifying OID values for name type + identifiers, symbolic names are included and recommended to GSS-API + implementors in the interests of convenience to callers. It is + understood that not all implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism need support all name types in this list, and that + additional name forms will likely be added to this list over time. + Further, the definitions of some or all name types may later migrate + to other, mechanism-independent, specifications. The occurrence of a + name type in this specification is specifically not intended to + suggest that the type may be supported only by an implementation of + the Kerberos V5 mechanism. In particular, the occurrence of the + string "_KRB5_" in the symbolic name strings constitutes a means to + unambiguously register the name strings, avoiding collision with + other documents; it is not meant to limit the name types' usage or + applicability. + + For purposes of clarification to GSS-API implementors, this section's + discussion of some name forms describes means through which those + forms can be supported with existing Kerberos technology. These + discussions are not intended to preclude alternative implementation + strategies for support of the name forms within Kerberos mechanisms + or mechanisms based on other technologies. To enhance application + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + portability, implementors of mechanisms are encouraged to support + name forms as defined in this section, even if their mechanisms are + independent of Kerberos V5. + +2.1. Mandatory Name Forms + + This section discusses name forms which are to be supported by all + conformant implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism. + +2.1.1. Kerberos Principal Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + krb5(2) krb5_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this type + is "GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME". + + This name type corresponds to the single-string representation of a + Kerberos name. (Within the MIT Kerberos V5 implementation, such + names are parseable with the krb5_parse_name() function.) The + elements included within this name representation are as follows, + proceeding from the beginning of the string: + + (1) One or more principal name components; if more than one + principal name component is included, the components are + separated by `/`. Arbitrary octets may be included within + principal name components, with the following constraints and + special considerations: + + (1a) Any occurrence of the characters `@` or `/` within a + name component must be immediately preceded by the `\` + quoting character, to prevent interpretation as a component + or realm separator. + + (1b) The ASCII newline, tab, backspace, and null characters + may occur directly within the component or may be + represented, respectively, by `\n`, `\t`, `\b`, or `\0`. + + (1c) If the `\` quoting character occurs outside the contexts + described in (1a) and (1b) above, the following character is + interpreted literally. As a special case, this allows the + doubled representation `\\` to represent a single occurrence + of the quoting character. + + (1d) An occurrence of the `\` quoting character as the last + character of a component is illegal. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + (2) Optionally, a `@` character, signifying that a realm name + immediately follows. If no realm name element is included, the + local realm name is assumed. The `/` , `:`, and null characters + may not occur within a realm name; the `@`, newline, tab, and + backspace characters may be included using the quoting + conventions described in (1a), (1b), and (1c) above. + +2.1.2. Host-Based Service Name Form + + This name form has been incorporated at the mechanism-independent + GSS-API level as of GSS-API, Version 2. This subsection retains the + Object Identifier and symbolic name assignments previously made at + the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism level, and adopts the definition as + promoted to the mechanism-independent level. + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) service_name(4)}. The previously recommended symbolic + name for this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE_NAME". The + currently preferred symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE". + + This name type is used to represent services associated with host + computers. This name form is constructed using two elements, + "service" and "hostname", as follows: + + service@hostname + + When a reference to a name of this type is resolved, the "hostname" + is canonicalized by attempting a DNS lookup and using the fully- + qualified domain name which is returned, or by using the "hostname" + as provided if the DNS lookup fails. The canonicalization operation + also maps the host's name into lower-case characters. + + The "hostname" element may be omitted. If no "@" separator is + included, the entire name is interpreted as the service specifier, + with the "hostname" defaulted to the canonicalized name of the local + host. + + Values for the "service" element will be registered with the IANA. + +2.1.3. Exported Name Object Form for Kerberos V5 Mechanism + + Support for this name form is not required for GSS-V1 + implementations, but will be required for use in conjunction with the + GSS_Export_name() call planned for GSS-API Version 2. Use of this + name form will be signified by a "GSS-API Exported Name Object" OID + value which will be defined at the mechanism-independent level for + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + GSS-API Version 2. + + This name type represents a self-describing object, whose framing + structure will be defined at the mechanism-independent level for + GSS-API Version 2. When generated by the Kerberos V5 mechanism, the + Mechanism OID within the exportable name shall be that of the + Kerberos V5 mechanism. The name component within the exportable name + shall be a contiguous string with structure as defined for the + Kerberos Principal Name Form. + + In order to achieve a distinguished encoding for comparison purposes, + the following additional constraints are imposed on the export + operation: + + (1) all occurrences of the characters `@`, `/`, and `\` within + principal components or realm names shall be quoted with an + immediately-preceding `\`. + + (2) all occurrences of the null, backspace, tab, or newline + characters within principal components or realm names will be + represented, respectively, with `\0`, `\b`, `\t`, or `\n`. + + (3) the `\` quoting character shall not be emitted within an + exported name except to accomodate cases (1) and (2). + +2.2. Optional Name Forms + + This section discusses additional name forms which may optionally be + supported by implementations of the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism. + It is recognized that some of the name forms cited here are derived + from UNIX(tm) operating system platforms; some listed forms may be + irrelevant to non-UNIX platforms, and definition of additional forms + corresponding to such platforms may also be appropriate. It is also + recognized that OS-specific functions outside GSS-API are likely to + exist in order to perform translations among these forms, and that + GSS-API implementations supporting these forms may themselves be + layered atop such OS-specific functions. Inclusion of this support + within GSS-API implementations is intended as a convenience to + applications. + +2.2.1. User Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this + type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME". + + This name type is used to indicate a named user on a local system. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + Its interpretation is OS-specific. This name form is constructed as: + + username + + Assuming that users' principal names are the same as their local + operating system names, an implementation of GSS_Import_name() based + on Kerberos V5 technology can process names of this form by + postfixing an "@" sign and the name of the local realm. + +2.2.2. Machine UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". + + This name type is used to indicate a numeric user identifier + corresponding to a user on a local system. Its interpretation is + OS-specific. The gss_buffer_desc representing a name of this type + should contain a locally-significant uid_t, represented in host byte + order. The GSS_Import_name() operation resolves this uid into a + username, which is then treated as the User Name Form. + +2.2.3. String UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". + + This name type is used to indicate a string of digits representing + the numeric user identifier of a user on a local system. Its + interpretation is OS-specific. This name type is similar to the + Machine UID Form, except that the buffer contains a string + representing the uid_t. + +3. Credentials Management + + The Kerberos V5 protocol uses different credentials (in the GSSAPI + sense) for initiating and accepting security contexts. Normal + clients receive a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) and an associated + session key at "login" time; the pair of a TGT and its corresponding + session key forms a credential which is suitable for initiating + security contexts. A ticket-granting ticket, its session key, and + any other (ticket, key) pairs obtained through use of the ticket- + granting-ticket, are typically stored in a Kerberos V5 credentials + cache, sometimes known as a ticket file. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + The encryption key used by the Kerberos server to seal tickets for a + particular application service forms the credentials suitable for + accepting security contexts. These service keys are typically stored + in a Kerberos V5 key table, or srvtab file. In addition to their use + as accepting credentials, these service keys may also be used to + obtain initiating credentials for their service principal. + + The Kerberos V5 mechanism's credential handle may contain references + to either or both types of credentials. It is a local matter how the + Kerberos V5 mechanism implementation finds the appropriate Kerberos + V5 credentials cache or key table. + + However, when the Kerberos V5 mechanism attempts to obtain initiating + credentials for a service principal which are not available in a + credentials cache, and the key for that service principal is + available in a Kerberos V5 key table, the mechanism should use the + service key to obtain initiating credentials for that service. This + should be accomplished by requesting a ticket-granting-ticket from + the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC), and decrypting the KDC's + reply using the service key. + +4. Parameter Definitions + + This section defines parameter values used by the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism. It defines interface elements in support of portability, + and assumes use of C language bindings per RFC-1509. + +4.1. Minor Status Codes + + This section recommends common symbolic names for minor_status values + to be returned by the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism. Use of these + definitions will enable independent implementors to enhance + application portability across different implementations of the + mechanism defined in this specification. (In all cases, + implementations of GSS_Display_status() will enable callers to + convert minor_status indicators to text representations.) Each + implementation should make available, through include files or other + means, a facility to translate these symbolic names into the concrete + values which a particular GSS-API implementation uses to represent + the minor_status values specified in this section. + + It is recognized that this list may grow over time, and that the need + for additional minor_status codes specific to particular + implementations may arise. It is recommended, however, that + implementations should return a minor_status value as defined on a + mechanism-wide basis within this section when that code is accurately + representative of reportable status rather than using a separate, + implementation-defined code. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +4.1.1. Non-Kerberos-specific codes + + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_SERVICE_NAME + /* "No @ in SERVICE-NAME name string" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_STRING_UID + /* "STRING-UID-NAME contains nondigits" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_NOUSER + /* "UID does not resolve to username" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_VALIDATE_FAILED + /* "Validation error" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BUFFER_ALLOC + /* "Couldn't allocate gss_buffer_t data" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_MSG_CTX + /* "Message context invalid" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_WRONG_SIZE + /* "Buffer is the wrong size" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE + /* "Credential usage type is unknown" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_G_UNKNOWN_QOP + /* "Unknown quality of protection specified" */ + +4.1.2. Kerberos-specific-codes + + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH + /* "Principal in credential cache does not match desired name" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_KEYTAB_NOMATCH + /* "No principal in keytab matches desired name" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_TGT_MISSING + /* "Credential cache has no TGT" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_NO_SUBKEY + /* "Authenticator has no subkey" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED + /* "Context is already fully established" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_SIGN_TYPE + /* "Unknown signature type in token" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_LENGTH + /* "Invalid field length in token" */ + GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE + /* "Attempt to use incomplete security context" */ + +4.2. Quality of Protection Values + + This section defines Quality of Protection (QOP) values to be used + with the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as input to GSS_Wrap() and + GSS_GetMIC() routines in order to select among alternate integrity + and confidentiality algorithms. Additional QOP values may be added in + future versions of this specification. Non-overlapping bit positions + are and will be employed in order that both integrity and + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + + confidentiality QOP may be selected within a single parameter, via + inclusive-OR of the specified integrity and confidentiality values. + +4.2.1. Integrity Algorithms + + The following Quality of Protection (QOP) values are currently + defined for the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, and are used to select + among alternate integrity checking algorithms. + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_MD5 (numeric value: 1) + /* Integrity using partial MD5 ("MD2.5") of plaintext */ + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DES_MD5 (numeric value: 2) + /* Integrity using DES MAC of MD5 of plaintext */ + + GSS_KRB5_INTEG_C_QOP_DES_MAC (numeric value: 3) + /* Integrity using DES MAC of plaintext */ + +4.2.2. Confidentiality Algorithms + + Only one confidentiality QOP value is currently defined for the + Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism: + + GSS_KRB5_CONF_C_QOP_DES (numeric value: 0) + /* Confidentiality with DES */ + + Note: confidentiality QOP should be indicated only by GSS-API calls + capable of providing confidentiality services. If non-zero + confidentiality QOP values are defined in future to represent + different algorithms, therefore, the bit positions containing those + values should be cleared before being returned by implementations of + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC(). + +4.3. Buffer Sizes + + All implementations of this specification shall be capable of + accepting buffers of at least 16 Kbytes as input to GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), and GSS_Wrap(), and shall be capable of accepting + the output_token generated by GSS_Wrap() for a 16 Kbyte input buffer + as input to GSS_Unwrap(). Support for larger buffer sizes is optional + but recommended. + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 1964 Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API June 1996 + + +5. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +6. References + + + [RFC-1321]: Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC + 1321, April 1992. + + [RFC-1508]: Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface", RFC 1508, September 1993. + + [RFC-1509]: Wray, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program + Interface: C-bindings", RFC 1509, September 1993. + + [RFC-1510]: Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network + Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 1510, September 1993. + + [FIPS-PUB-113]: National Bureau of Standards, Federal Information + Processing Standard 113, "Computer Data Authentication", May 1985. + +AUTHOR'S ADDRESS + + John Linn + OpenVision Technologies + One Main St. + Cambridge, MA 02142 USA + + Phone: +1 617.374.2245 + EMail: John.Linn@ov.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 20] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1dd1e4a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2078.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4763 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group J. Linn +Request for Comments: 2078 OpenVision Technologies +Category: Standards Track January 1997 +Obsoletes: 1508 + + + Generic Security Service Application Program Interface, Version 2 + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), + as defined in RFC-1508, provides security services to callers in a + generic fashion, supportable with a range of underlying mechanisms + and technologies and hence allowing source-level portability of + applications to different environments. This specification defines + GSS-API services and primitives at a level independent of underlying + mechanism and programming language environment, and is to be + complemented by other, related specifications: + + documents defining specific parameter bindings for particular + language environments + + documents defining token formats, protocols, and procedures to be + implemented in order to realize GSS-API services atop particular + security mechanisms + + This memo revises RFC-1508, making specific, incremental changes in + response to implementation experience and liaison requests. It is + intended, therefore, that this memo or a successor version thereto + will become the basis for subsequent progression of the GSS-API + specification on the standards track. + +Table of Contents + + 1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts.......................... 3 + 1.1: GSS-API Constructs.......................................... 6 + 1.1.1: Credentials.............................................. 6 + 1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts...................... 6 + 1.1.1.2: Credential Management................................... 7 + 1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution........................... 8 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 1.1.2: Tokens.................................................... 9 + 1.1.3: Security Contexts........................................ 10 + 1.1.4: Mechanism Types.......................................... 11 + 1.1.5: Naming................................................... 12 + 1.1.6: Channel Bindings......................................... 14 + 1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues................................ 15 + 1.2.1: Status Reporting......................................... 15 + 1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability................. 17 + 1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing............... 18 + 1.2.4: Quality of Protection.................................... 20 + 1.2.5: Anonymity Support......................................... 21 + 1.2.6: Initialization............................................ 22 + 1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment....... 22 + 1.2.8: Implementation Robustness................................. 23 + 2: Interface Descriptions....................................... 23 + 2.1: Credential management calls................................ 25 + 2.1.1: GSS_Acquire_cred call.................................... 26 + 2.1.2: GSS_Release_cred call.................................... 28 + 2.1.3: GSS_Inquire_cred call.................................... 29 + 2.1.4: GSS_Add_cred call........................................ 31 + 2.1.5: GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech call............................ 33 + 2.2: Context-level calls........................................ 34 + 2.2.1: GSS_Init_sec_context call................................ 34 + 2.2.2: GSS_Accept_sec_context call.............................. 40 + 2.2.3: GSS_Delete_sec_context call.............................. 44 + 2.2.4: GSS_Process_context_token call........................... 46 + 2.2.5: GSS_Context_time call.................................... 47 + 2.2.6: GSS_Inquire_context call................................. 47 + 2.2.7: GSS_Wrap_size_limit call................................. 49 + 2.2.8: GSS_Export_sec_context call.............................. 50 + 2.2.9: GSS_Import_sec_context call.............................. 52 + 2.3: Per-message calls.......................................... 53 + 2.3.1: GSS_GetMIC call.......................................... 54 + 2.3.2: GSS_VerifyMIC call....................................... 55 + 2.3.3: GSS_Wrap call............................................ 56 + 2.3.4: GSS_Unwrap call.......................................... 58 + 2.4: Support calls.............................................. 59 + 2.4.1: GSS_Display_status call.................................. 60 + 2.4.2: GSS_Indicate_mechs call.................................. 60 + 2.4.3: GSS_Compare_name call.................................... 61 + 2.4.4: GSS_Display_name call.................................... 62 + 2.4.5: GSS_Import_name call..................................... 63 + 2.4.6: GSS_Release_name call.................................... 64 + 2.4.7: GSS_Release_buffer call.................................. 65 + 2.4.8: GSS_Release_OID_set call................................. 65 + 2.4.9: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set call............................ 66 + 2.4.10: GSS_Add_OID_set_member call.............................. 67 + 2.4.11: GSS_Test_OID_set_member call............................. 67 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 2.4.12: GSS_Release_OID call..................................... 68 + 2.4.13: GSS_OID_to_str call...................................... 68 + 2.4.14: GSS_Str_to_OID call...................................... 69 + 2.4.15: GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech call.......................... 69 + 2.4.16: GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name call.......................... 70 + 2.4.17: GSS_Canonicalize_name call............................... 71 + 2.4.18: GSS_Export_name call..................................... 72 + 2.4.19: GSS_Duplicate_name call.................................. 73 + 3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage................... 73 + 3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format.......................... 74 + 3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format........... 77 + 4: Name Type Definitions......................................... 77 + 4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form................................ 77 + 4.2: User Name Form.............................................. 78 + 4.3: Machine UID Form............................................ 78 + 4.4: String UID Form............................................. 79 + 5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios......................... 79 + 5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT..................................... 79 + 5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT..................................... 80 + 5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework............................. 81 + 6: Security Considerations...................................... 82 + 7: Related Activities........................................... 82 + Appendix A: Mechanism Design Constraints......................... 83 + Appendix B: Compatibility with GSS-V1............................ 83 + +1: GSS-API Characteristics and Concepts + + GSS-API operates in the following paradigm. A typical GSS-API caller + is itself a communications protocol, calling on GSS-API in order to + protect its communications with authentication, integrity, and/or + confidentiality security services. A GSS-API caller accepts tokens + provided to it by its local GSS-API implementation and transfers the + tokens to a peer on a remote system; that peer passes the received + tokens to its local GSS-API implementation for processing. The + security services available through GSS-API in this fashion are + implementable (and have been implemented) over a range of underlying + mechanisms based on secret-key and public-key cryptographic + technologies. + + The GSS-API separates the operations of initializing a security + context between peers, achieving peer entity authentication (This + security service definition, and other definitions used in this + document, corresponds to that provided in International Standard ISO + 7498-2-1988(E), Security Architecture.) (GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls), from the operations of providing + per-message data origin authentication and data integrity protection + (GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() calls) for messages subsequently + transferred in conjunction with that context. When establishing a + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + security context, the GSS-API enables a context initiator to + optionally permit its credentials to be delegated, meaning that the + context acceptor may initiate further security contexts on behalf of + the initiating caller. Per-message GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap() calls + provide the data origin authentication and data integrity services + which GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() offer, and also support + selection of confidentiality services as a caller option. Additional + calls provide supportive functions to the GSS-API's users. + + The following paragraphs provide an example illustrating the + dataflows involved in use of the GSS-API by a client and server in a + mechanism-independent fashion, establishing a security context and + transferring a protected message. The example assumes that credential + acquisition has already been completed. The example assumes that the + underlying authentication technology is capable of authenticating a + client to a server using elements carried within a single token, and + of authenticating the server to the client (mutual authentication) + with a single returned token; this assumption holds for presently- + documented CAT mechanisms but is not necessarily true for other + cryptographic technologies and associated protocols. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context() to establish a security + context to the server identified by targ_name, and elects to set the + mutual_req_flag so that mutual authentication is performed in the + course of context establishment. GSS_Init_sec_context() returns an + output_token to be passed to the server, and indicates + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status pending completion of the mutual + authentication sequence. Had mutual_req_flag not been set, the + initial call to GSS_Init_sec_context() would have returned + GSS_S_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_token to the + server. + + The server passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE status, provides the client's authenticated identity + in the src_name result, and provides an output_token to be passed to + the client. The server sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token parameter to + a successor call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), which processes data + included in the token in order to achieve mutual authentication from + the client's viewpoint. This call to GSS_Init_sec_context() returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE status, indicating successful mutual authentication + and the completion of context establishment for this example. + + The client generates a data message and passes it to GSS_Wrap(). + GSS_Wrap() performs data origin authentication, data integrity, and + (optionally) confidentiality processing on the message and + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + encapsulates the result into output_message, indicating + GSS_S_COMPLETE status. The client sends the output_message to the + server. + + The server passes the received message to GSS_Unwrap(). GSS_Unwrap() + inverts the encapsulation performed by GSS_Wrap(), deciphers the + message if the optional confidentiality feature was applied, and + validates the data origin authentication and data integrity checking + quantities. GSS_Unwrap() indicates successful validation by + returning GSS_S_COMPLETE status along with the resultant + output_message. + + For purposes of this example, we assume that the server knows by + out-of-band means that this context will have no further use after + one protected message is transferred from client to server. Given + this premise, the server now calls GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush + context-level information. Optionally, the server-side application + may provide a token buffer to GSS_Delete_sec_context(), to receive a + context_token to be transferred to the client in order to request + that client-side context-level information be deleted. + + If a context_token is transferred, the client passes the + context_token to GSS_Process_context_token(), which returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE status after deleting context-level information at the + client system. + + The GSS-API design assumes and addresses several basic goals, + including: + + Mechanism independence: The GSS-API defines an interface to + cryptographically implemented strong authentication and other + security services at a generic level which is independent of + particular underlying mechanisms. For example, GSS-API-provided + services can be implemented by secret-key technologies (e.g., + Kerberos) or public-key approaches (e.g., X.509). + + Protocol environment independence: The GSS-API is independent of + the communications protocol suites with which it is employed, + permitting use in a broad range of protocol environments. In + appropriate environments, an intermediate implementation "veneer" + which is oriented to a particular communication protocol (e.g., + Remote Procedure Call (RPC)) may be interposed between + applications which call that protocol and the GSS-API, thereby + invoking GSS-API facilities in conjunction with that protocol's + communications invocations. + + Protocol association independence: The GSS-API's security context + construct is independent of communications protocol association + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + constructs. This characteristic allows a single GSS-API + implementation to be utilized by a variety of invoking protocol + modules on behalf of those modules' calling applications. GSS-API + services can also be invoked directly by applications, wholly + independent of protocol associations. + + Suitability to a range of implementation placements: GSS-API + clients are not constrained to reside within any Trusted Computing + Base (TCB) perimeter defined on a system where the GSS-API is + implemented; security services are specified in a manner suitable + to both intra-TCB and extra-TCB callers. + +1.1: GSS-API Constructs + + This section describes the basic elements comprising the GSS-API. + +1.1.1: Credentials + +1.1.1.1: Credential Constructs and Concepts + + Credentials provide the prerequisites which permit GSS-API peers to + establish security contexts with each other. A caller may designate + that the credential elements which are to be applied for context + initiation or acceptance be selected by default. Alternately, those + GSS-API callers which need to make explicit selection of particular + credentials structures may make references to those credentials + through GSS-API-provided credential handles ("cred_handles"). In all + cases, callers' credential references are indirect, mediated by GSS- + API implementations and not requiring callers to access the selected + credential elements. + + A single credential structure may be used to initiate outbound + contexts and to accept inbound contexts. Callers needing to operate + in only one of these modes may designate this fact when credentials + are acquired for use, allowing underlying mechanisms to optimize + their processing and storage requirements. The credential elements + defined by a particular mechanism may contain multiple cryptographic + keys, e.g., to enable authentication and message encryption to be + performed with different algorithms. + + A GSS-API credential structure may contain multiple credential + elements, each containing mechanism-specific information for a + particular underlying mechanism (mech_type), but the set of elements + within a given credential structure represent a common entity. A + credential structure's contents will vary depending on the set of + mech_types supported by a particular GSS-API implementation. Each + credential element identifies the data needed by its mechanism in + order to establish contexts on behalf of a particular principal, and + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + may contain separate credential references for use in context + initiation and context acceptance. Multiple credential elements + within a given credential having overlapping combinations of + mechanism, usage mode, and validity period are not permitted. + + Commonly, a single mech_type will be used for all security contexts + established by a particular initiator to a particular target. A major + motivation for supporting credential sets representing multiple + mech_types is to allow initiators on systems which are equipped to + handle multiple types to initiate contexts to targets on other + systems which can accommodate only a subset of the set supported at + the initiator's system. + +1.1.1.2: Credential Management + + It is the responsibility of underlying system-specific mechanisms and + OS functions below the GSS-API to ensure that the ability to acquire + and use credentials associated with a given identity is constrained + to appropriate processes within a system. This responsibility should + be taken seriously by implementors, as the ability for an entity to + utilize a principal's credentials is equivalent to the entity's + ability to successfully assert that principal's identity. + + Once a set of GSS-API credentials is established, the transferability + of that credentials set to other processes or analogous constructs + within a system is a local matter, not defined by the GSS-API. An + example local policy would be one in which any credentials received + as a result of login to a given user account, or of delegation of + rights to that account, are accessible by, or transferable to, + processes running under that account. + + The credential establishment process (particularly when performed on + behalf of users rather than server processes) is likely to require + access to passwords or other quantities which should be protected + locally and exposed for the shortest time possible. As a result, it + will often be appropriate for preliminary credential establishment to + be performed through local means at user login time, with the + result(s) cached for subsequent reference. These preliminary + credentials would be set aside (in a system-specific fashion) for + subsequent use, either: + + to be accessed by an invocation of the GSS-API GSS_Acquire_cred() + call, returning an explicit handle to reference that credential + + to comprise default credential elements to be installed, and to be + used when default credential behavior is requested on behalf of a + process + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +1.1.1.3: Default Credential Resolution + + The gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context routines allow + the value GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL to be specified as their credential + handle parameter. This special credential-handle indicates a desire + by the application to act as a default principal. While individual + GSS-API implementations are free to determine such default behavior + as appropriate to the mechanism, the following default behavior by + these routines is recommended for portability: + + GSS_Init_sec_context: + + (i) If there is only a single principal capable of initiating + security contexts that the application is authorized to act on + behalf of, then that principal shall be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default network- + identity, and if the application is authorized to act on behalf of + that identity for the purpose of initiating security contexts, + then the principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, + otherwise + + (iii) If the platform maintains a concept of a default local + identity, and provides a means to map local identities into + network-identities, and if the application is authorized to act on + behalf of the network-identity image of the default local identity + for the purpose of initiating security contexts, then the + principal corresponding to that identity shall be used, otherwise + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity should be used. + + GSS_Accept_sec_context: + + (i) If there is only a single authorized principal identity + capable of accepting security contexts, then that principal shall + be used, otherwise + + (ii) If the mechanism can determine the identity of the target + principal by examining the context-establishment token, and if the + accepting application is authorized to act as that principal for + the purpose of accepting security contexts, then that principal + identity shall be used, otherwise + + (iii) If the mechanism supports context acceptance by any + principal, and mutual authentication was not requested, any + principal that the application is authorized to accept security + contexts under may be used, otherwise + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + (iv) A user-configurable default identity shall be used. + + The purpose of the above rules is to allow security contexts to be + established by both initiator and acceptor using the default behavior + wherever possible. Applications requesting default behavior are + likely to be more portable across mechanisms and platforms than ones + that use GSS_Acquire_cred to request a specific identity. + +1.1.2: Tokens + + Tokens are data elements transferred between GSS-API callers, and are + divided into two classes. Context-level tokens are exchanged in order + to establish and manage a security context between peers. Per-message + tokens relate to an established context and are exchanged to provide + protective security services (i.e., data origin authentication, + integrity, and optional confidentiality) for corresponding data + messages. + + The first context-level token obtained from GSS_Init_sec_context() is + required to indicate at its very beginning a globally-interpretable + mechanism identifier, i.e., an Object Identifier (OID) of the + security mechanism. The remaining part of this token as well as the + whole content of all other tokens are specific to the particular + underlying mechanism used to support the GSS-API. Section 3 of this + document provides, for designers of GSS-API support mechanisms, the + description of the header of the first context-level token which is + then followed by mechanism-specific information. + + Tokens' contents are opaque from the viewpoint of GSS-API callers. + They are generated within the GSS-API implementation at an end + system, provided to a GSS-API caller to be transferred to the peer + GSS-API caller at a remote end system, and processed by the GSS-API + implementation at that remote end system. Tokens may be output by + GSS-API calls (and should be transferred to GSS-API peers) whether or + not the calls' status indicators indicate successful completion. + Token transfer may take place in an in-band manner, integrated into + the same protocol stream used by the GSS-API callers for other data + transfers, or in an out-of-band manner across a logically separate + channel. + + Different GSS-API tokens are used for different purposes (e.g., + context initiation, context acceptance, protected message data on an + established context), and it is the responsibility of a GSS-API + caller receiving tokens to distinguish their types, associate them + with corresponding security contexts, and pass them to appropriate + GSS-API processing routines. Depending on the caller protocol + environment, this distinction may be accomplished in several ways. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The following examples illustrate means through which tokens' types + may be distinguished: + + - implicit tagging based on state information (e.g., all tokens on + a new association are considered to be context establishment + tokens until context establishment is completed, at which point + all tokens are considered to be wrapped data objects for that + context), + + - explicit tagging at the caller protocol level, + + - a hybrid of these approaches. + + Commonly, the encapsulated data within a token includes internal + mechanism-specific tagging information, enabling mechanism-level + processing modules to distinguish tokens used within the mechanism + for different purposes. Such internal mechanism-level tagging is + recommended to mechanism designers, and enables mechanisms to + determine whether a caller has passed a particular token for + processing by an inappropriate GSS-API routine. + + Development of GSS-API support primitives based on a particular + underlying cryptographic technique and protocol (i.e., conformant to + a specific GSS-API mechanism definition) does not necessarily imply + that GSS-API callers using that GSS-API mechanism will be able to + interoperate with peers invoking the same technique and protocol + outside the GSS-API paradigm, or with peers implementing a different + GSS-API mechanism based on the same underlying technology. The + format of GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a particular + mechanism, and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into + callers' protocols, may not be interoperable with the tokens used by + non-GSS-API callers of the same underlying technique. + +1.1.3: Security Contexts + + Security contexts are established between peers, using credentials + established locally in conjunction with each peer or received by + peers via delegation. Multiple contexts may exist simultaneously + between a pair of peers, using the same or different sets of + credentials. Coexistence of multiple contexts using different + credentials allows graceful rollover when credentials expire. + Distinction among multiple contexts based on the same credentials + serves applications by distinguishing different message streams in a + security sense. + + The GSS-API is independent of underlying protocols and addressing + structure, and depends on its callers to transport GSS-API-provided + data elements. As a result of these factors, it is a caller + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + responsibility to parse communicated messages, separating GSS-API- + related data elements from caller-provided data. The GSS-API is + independent of connection vs. connectionless orientation of the + underlying communications service. + + No correlation between security context and communications protocol + association is dictated. (The optional channel binding facility, + discussed in Section 1.1.6 of this document, represents an + intentional exception to this rule, supporting additional protection + features within GSS-API supporting mechanisms.) This separation + allows the GSS-API to be used in a wide range of communications + environments, and also simplifies the calling sequences of the + individual calls. In many cases (depending on underlying security + protocol, associated mechanism, and availability of cached + information), the state information required for context setup can be + sent concurrently with initial signed user data, without interposing + additional message exchanges. + +1.1.4: Mechanism Types + + In order to successfully establish a security context with a target + peer, it is necessary to identify an appropriate underlying mechanism + type (mech_type) which both initiator and target peers support. The + definition of a mechanism embodies not only the use of a particular + cryptographic technology (or a hybrid or choice among alternative + cryptographic technologies), but also definition of the syntax and + semantics of data element exchanges which that mechanism will employ + in order to support security services. + + It is recommended that callers initiating contexts specify the + "default" mech_type value, allowing system-specific functions within + or invoked by the GSS-API implementation to select the appropriate + mech_type, but callers may direct that a particular mech_type be + employed when necessary. + + The means for identifying a shared mech_type to establish a security + context with a peer will vary in different environments and + circumstances; examples include (but are not limited to): + + use of a fixed mech_type, defined by configuration, within an + environment + + syntactic convention on a target-specific basis, through + examination of a target's name + + lookup of a target's name in a naming service or other database in + order to identify mech_types supported by that target + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + explicit negotiation between GSS-API callers in advance of + security context setup + + When transferred between GSS-API peers, mech_type specifiers (per + Section 3, represented as Object Identifiers (OIDs)) serve to qualify + the interpretation of associated tokens. (The structure and encoding + of Object Identifiers is defined in ISO/IEC 8824, "Specification of + Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)" and in ISO/IEC 8825, + "Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation + One (ASN.1)".) Use of hierarchically structured OIDs serves to + preclude ambiguous interpretation of mech_type specifiers. The OID + representing the DASS MechType, for example, is 1.3.12.2.1011.7.5, + and that of the Kerberos V5 mechanism, once advanced to the level of + Proposed Standard, will be 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2. + +1.1.5: Naming + + The GSS-API avoids prescribing naming structures, treating the names + which are transferred across the interface in order to initiate and + accept security contexts as opaque objects. This approach supports + the GSS-API's goal of implementability atop a range of underlying + security mechanisms, recognizing the fact that different mechanisms + process and authenticate names which are presented in different + forms. Generalized services offering translation functions among + arbitrary sets of naming environments are outside the scope of the + GSS-API; availability and use of local conversion functions to + translate among the naming formats supported within a given end + system is anticipated. + + Different classes of name representations are used in conjunction + with different GSS-API parameters: + + - Internal form (denoted in this document by INTERNAL NAME), + opaque to callers and defined by individual GSS-API + implementations. GSS-API implementations supporting multiple + namespace types must maintain internal tags to disambiguate the + interpretation of particular names. A Mechanism Name (MN) is a + special case of INTERNAL NAME, guaranteed to contain elements + corresponding to one and only one mechanism; calls which are + guaranteed to emit MNs or which require MNs as input are so + identified within this specification. + + - Contiguous string ("flat") form (denoted in this document by + OCTET STRING); accompanied by OID tags identifying the namespace + to which they correspond. Depending on tag value, flat names may + or may not be printable strings for direct acceptance from and + presentation to users. Tagging of flat names allows GSS-API + callers and underlying GSS-API mechanisms to disambiguate name + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + types and to determine whether an associated name's type is one + which they are capable of processing, avoiding aliasing problems + which could result from misinterpreting a name of one type as a + name of another type. + + - The GSS-API Exported Name Object, a special case of flat name + designated by a reserved OID value, carries a canonicalized form + of a name suitable for binary comparisons. + + In addition to providing means for names to be tagged with types, + this specification defines primitives to support a level of naming + environment independence for certain calling applications. To provide + basic services oriented towards the requirements of callers which + need not themselves interpret the internal syntax and semantics of + names, GSS-API calls for name comparison (GSS_Compare_name()), + human-readable display (GSS_Display_name()), input conversion + (GSS_Import_name()), internal name deallocation (GSS_Release_name()), + and internal name duplication (GSS_Duplicate_name()) functions are + defined. (It is anticipated that these proposed GSS-API calls will be + implemented in many end systems based on system-specific name + manipulation primitives already extant within those end systems; + inclusion within the GSS-API is intended to offer GSS-API callers a + portable means to perform specific operations, supportive of + authorization and audit requirements, on authenticated names.) + + GSS_Import_name() implementations can, where appropriate, support + more than one printable syntax corresponding to a given namespace + (e.g., alternative printable representations for X.500 Distinguished + Names), allowing flexibility for their callers to select among + alternative representations. GSS_Display_name() implementations + output a printable syntax selected as appropriate to their + operational environments; this selection is a local matter. Callers + desiring portability across alternative printable syntaxes should + refrain from implementing comparisons based on printable name forms + and should instead use the GSS_Compare_name() call to determine + whether or not one internal-format name matches another. + + The GSS_Canonicalize_name() and GSS_Export_name() calls enable + callers to acquire and process Exported Name Objects, canonicalized + and translated in accordance with the procedures of a particular + GSS-API mechanism. Exported Name Objects can, in turn, be input to + GSS_Import_name(), yielding equivalent MNs. These facilities are + designed specifically to enable efficient storage and comparison of + names (e.g., for use in access control lists). + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The following diagram illustrates the intended dataflow among name- + related GSS-API processing routines. + + GSS-API library defaults + | + | + V text, for + text --------------> internal_name (IN) -----------> display only + import_name() / display_name() + / + / + / + accept_sec_context() / + | / + | / + | / canonicalize_name() + | / + | / + | / + | / + | / + | | + V V <--------------------- + single mechanism import_name() exported name: flat + internal_name (MN) binary "blob" usable + ----------------------> for access control + export_name() + +1.1.6: Channel Bindings + + The GSS-API accommodates the concept of caller-provided channel + binding ("chan_binding") information. Channel bindings are used to + strengthen the quality with which peer entity authentication is + provided during context establishment, by limiting the scope within + which an intercepted context establishment token can be reused by an + attacker. Specifically, they enable GSS-API callers to bind the + establishment of a security context to relevant characteristics + (e.g., addresses, transformed representations of encryption keys) of + the underlying communications channel, of protection mechanisms + applied to that communications channel, and to application-specific + data. + + The caller initiating a security context must determine the + appropriate channel binding values to provide as input to the + GSS_Init_sec_context() call, and consistent values must be provided + to GSS_Accept_sec_context() by the context's target, in order for + both peers' GSS-API mechanisms to validate that received tokens + possess correct channel-related characteristics. Use or non-use of + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + the GSS-API channel binding facility is a caller option. GSS-API + mechanisms can operate in an environment where NULL channel bindings + are presented; mechanism implementors are encouraged, but not + required, to make use of caller-provided channel binding data within + their mechanisms. Callers should not assume that underlying + mechanisms provide confidentiality protection for channel binding + information. + + When non-NULL channel bindings are provided by callers, certain + mechanisms can offer enhanced security value by interpreting the + bindings' content (rather than simply representing those bindings, or + integrity check values computed on them, within tokens) and will + therefore depend on presentation of specific data in a defined + format. To this end, agreements among mechanism implementors are + defining conventional interpretations for the contents of channel + binding arguments, including address specifiers (with content + dependent on communications protocol environment) for context + initiators and acceptors. (These conventions are being incorporated + in GSS-API mechanism specifications and into the GSS-API C language + bindings specification.) In order for GSS-API callers to be portable + across multiple mechanisms and achieve the full security + functionality which each mechanism can provide, it is strongly + recommended that GSS-API callers provide channel bindings consistent + with these conventions and those of the networking environment in + which they operate. + +1.2: GSS-API Features and Issues + + This section describes aspects of GSS-API operations, of the security + services which the GSS-API provides, and provides commentary on + design issues. + +1.2.1: Status Reporting + + Each GSS-API call provides two status return values. Major_status + values provide a mechanism-independent indication of call status + (e.g., GSS_S_COMPLETE, GSS_S_FAILURE, GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), + sufficient to drive normal control flow within the caller in a + generic fashion. Table 1 summarizes the defined major_status return + codes in tabular fashion. + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +Table 1: GSS-API Major Status Codes + + FATAL ERROR CODES + + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS channel binding mismatch + GSS_S_BAD_MECH unsupported mechanism requested + GSS_S_BAD_NAME invalid name provided + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE name of unsupported type provided + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS invalid input status selector + GSS_S_BAD_SIG token had invalid integrity check + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED specified security context expired + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED expired credentials detected + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL defective credential detected + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN defective token detected + GSS_S_FAILURE failure, unspecified at GSS-API + level + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT no valid security context specified + GSS_S_NO_CRED no valid credentials provided + GSS_S_BAD_QOP unsupported QOP value + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED operation unauthorized + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE operation unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT duplicate credential element requested + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN name contains multi-mechanism elements + + INFORMATORY STATUS CODES + + GSS_S_COMPLETE normal completion + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED continuation call to routine + required + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN duplicate per-message token + detected + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN timed-out per-message token + detected + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN reordered (early) per-message token + detected + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN skipped predecessor token(s) + detected + + Minor_status provides more detailed status information which may + include status codes specific to the underlying security mechanism. + Minor_status values are not specified in this document. + + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status returns, and optional message + outputs, are provided in GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() calls so that different mechanisms' + employment of different numbers of messages within their + authentication sequences need not be reflected in separate code paths + within calling applications. Instead, such cases are accommodated + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + with sequences of continuation calls to GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The same mechanism is used to encapsulate + mutual authentication within the GSS-API's context initiation calls. + + For mech_types which require interactions with third-party servers in + order to establish a security context, GSS-API context establishment + calls may block pending completion of such third-party interactions. + + On the other hand, no GSS-API calls pend on serialized interactions + with GSS-API peer entities. As a result, local GSS-API status + returns cannot reflect unpredictable or asynchronous exceptions + occurring at remote peers, and reflection of such status information + is a caller responsibility outside the GSS-API. + +1.2.2: Per-Message Security Service Availability + + When a context is established, two flags are returned to indicate the + set of per-message protection security services which will be + available on the context: + + the integ_avail flag indicates whether per-message integrity and + data origin authentication services are available + + the conf_avail flag indicates whether per-message confidentiality + services are available, and will never be returned TRUE unless the + integ_avail flag is also returned TRUE + + GSS-API callers desiring per-message security services should + check the values of these flags at context establishment time, and + must be aware that a returned FALSE value for integ_avail means + that invocation of GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() primitives on the + associated context will apply no cryptographic protection to user + data messages. + + The GSS-API per-message integrity and data origin authentication + services provide assurance to a receiving caller that protection was + applied to a message by the caller's peer on the security context, + corresponding to the entity named at context initiation. The GSS-API + per-message confidentiality service provides assurance to a sending + caller that the message's content is protected from access by + entities other than the context's named peer. + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The GSS-API per-message protection service primitives, as the + category name implies, are oriented to operation at the granularity + of protocol data units. They perform cryptographic operations on the + data units, transfer cryptographic control information in tokens, + and, in the case of GSS_Wrap(), encapsulate the protected data unit. + As such, these primitives are not oriented to efficient data + protection for stream-paradigm protocols (e.g., Telnet) if + cryptography must be applied on an octet-by-octet basis. + +1.2.3: Per-Message Replay Detection and Sequencing + + Certain underlying mech_types offer support for replay detection + and/or sequencing of messages transferred on the contexts they + support. These optionally-selectable protection features are distinct + from replay detection and sequencing features applied to the context + establishment operation itself; the presence or absence of context- + level replay or sequencing features is wholly a function of the + underlying mech_type's capabilities, and is not selected or omitted + as a caller option. + + The caller initiating a context provides flags (replay_det_req_flag + and sequence_req_flag) to specify whether the use of per-message + replay detection and sequencing features is desired on the context + being established. The GSS-API implementation at the initiator system + can determine whether these features are supported (and whether they + are optionally selectable) as a function of mech_type, without need + for bilateral negotiation with the target. When enabled, these + features provide recipients with indicators as a result of GSS-API + processing of incoming messages, identifying whether those messages + were detected as duplicates or out-of-sequence. Detection of such + events does not prevent a suspect message from being provided to a + recipient; the appropriate course of action on a suspect message is a + matter of caller policy. + + The semantics of the replay detection and sequencing services applied + to received messages, as visible across the interface which the GSS- + API provides to its clients, are as follows: + + When replay_det_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + and that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 2. GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic + checkvalue on the received message was correct, but that the + message was recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed + message. + + 3. GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on + the received message was correct, but that the message is too old + to be checked for duplication. + + When sequence_state is TRUE, the possible major_status returns for + well-formed and correctly signed messages are as follows: + + 1. GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was within the window + (of time or sequence space) allowing replay events to be detected, + that the message was not a replay of a previously-processed + message within that window, and that no predecessor sequenced + messages are missing relative to the last received message (if + any) processed on the context with a correct cryptographic + checkvalue. + + 2. GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value + on the received message was correct, but that the message was + recognized as a duplicate of a previously-processed message. + + 3. GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check value on the + received message was correct, but that the token is too old to be + checked for duplication. + + 4. GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue + on the received message was correct, but that it is earlier in a + sequenced stream than a message already processed on the context. + [Note: Mechanisms can be architected to provide a stricter form of + sequencing service, delivering particular messages to recipients + only after all predecessor messages in an ordered stream have been + delivered. This type of support is incompatible with the GSS-API + paradigm in which recipients receive all messages, whether in + order or not, and provide them (one at a time, without intra-GSS- + API message buffering) to GSS-API routines for validation. GSS- + API facilities provide supportive functions, aiding clients to + achieve strict message stream integrity in an efficient manner in + conjunction with sequencing provisions in communications + protocols, but the GSS-API does not offer this level of message + stream integrity service by itself.] + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 5. GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN indicates that the cryptographic checkvalue on + the received message was correct, but that one or more predecessor + sequenced messages have not been successfully processed relative + to the last received message (if any) processed on the context + with a correct cryptographic checkvalue. + + As the message stream integrity features (especially sequencing) may + interfere with certain applications' intended communications + paradigms, and since support for such features is likely to be + resource intensive, it is highly recommended that mech_types + supporting these features allow them to be activated selectively on + initiator request when a context is established. A context initiator + and target are provided with corresponding indicators + (replay_det_state and sequence_state), signifying whether these + features are active on a given context. + + An example mech_type supporting per-message replay detection could + (when replay_det_state is TRUE) implement the feature as follows: The + underlying mechanism would insert timestamps in data elements output + by GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap(), and would maintain (within a time- + limited window) a cache (qualified by originator-recipient pair) + identifying received data elements processed by GSS_VerifyMIC() and + GSS_Unwrap(). When this feature is active, exception status returns + (GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN) will be provided when + GSS_VerifyMIC() or GSS_Unwrap() is presented with a message which is + either a detected duplicate of a prior message or which is too old to + validate against a cache of recently received messages. + +1.2.4: Quality of Protection + + Some mech_types provide their users with fine granularity control + over the means used to provide per-message protection, allowing + callers to trade off security processing overhead dynamically against + the protection requirements of particular messages. A per-message + quality-of-protection parameter (analogous to quality-of-service, or + QOS) selects among different QOP options supported by that mechanism. + On context establishment for a multi-QOP mech_type, context-level + data provides the prerequisite data for a range of protection + qualities. + + It is expected that the majority of callers will not wish to exert + explicit mechanism-specific QOP control and will therefore request + selection of a default QOP. Definitions of, and choices among, non- + default QOP values are mechanism-specific, and no ordered sequences + of QOP values can be assumed equivalent across different mechanisms. + Meaningful use of non-default QOP values demands that callers be + familiar with the QOP definitions of an underlying mechanism or + mechanisms, and is therefore a non-portable construct. The + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP major_status value is defined in order to indicate that + a provided QOP value is unsupported for a security context, most + likely because that value is unrecognized by the underlying + mechanism. + +1.2.5: Anonymity Support + + In certain situations or environments, an application may wish to + authenticate a peer and/or protect communications using GSS-API per- + message services without revealing its own identity. For example, + consider an application which provides read access to a research + database, and which permits queries by arbitrary requestors. A + client of such a service might wish to authenticate the service, to + establish trust in the information received from it, but might not + wish to disclose its identity to the service for privacy reasons. + + In ordinary GSS-API usage, a context initiator's identity is made + available to the context acceptor as part of the context + establishment process. To provide for anonymity support, a facility + (input anon_req_flag to GSS_Init_sec_context()) is provided through + which context initiators may request that their identity not be + provided to the context acceptor. Mechanisms are not required to + honor this request, but a caller will be informed (via returned + anon_state indicator from GSS_Init_sec_context()) whether or not the + request is honored. Note that authentication as the anonymous + principal does not necessarily imply that credentials are not + required in order to establish a context. + + The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to + identify anonymous names, and can be compared against in order to + determine, in a mechanism-independent fashion, whether a name refers + to an anonymous principal: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 3(gss-anonymous-name)} + + The recommended symbolic name corresponding to this definition is + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS. + + Four possible combinations of anon_state and mutual_state are + possible, with the following results: + + anon_state == FALSE, mutual_state == FALSE: initiator + authenticated to target. + + anon_state == FALSE, mutual_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated + to target, target authenticated to initiator. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == FALSE: initiator authenticated + as anonymous principal to target. + + anon_state == TRUE, mutual_state == TRUE: initiator authenticated + as anonymous principal to target, target authenticated to + initiator. + +1.2.6: Initialization + + No initialization calls (i.e., calls which must be invoked prior to + invocation of other facilities in the interface) are defined in GSS- + API. As an implication of this fact, GSS-API implementations must + themselves be self-initializing. + +1.2.7: Per-Message Protection During Context Establishment + + A facility is defined in GSS-V2 to enable protection and buffering of + data messages for later transfer while a security context's + establishment is in GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status, to be used in cases + where the caller side already possesses the necessary session key to + enable this processing. Specifically, a new state Boolean, called + prot_ready_state, is added to the set of information returned by + GSS_Init_sec_context(), GSS_Accept_sec_context(), and + GSS_Inquire_context(). + + For context establishment calls, this state Boolean is valid and + interpretable when the associated major_status is either + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, or GSS_S_COMPLETE. Callers of GSS-API (both + initiators and acceptors) can assume that per-message protection (via + GSS_Wrap(), GSS_Unwrap(), GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC()) is + available and ready for use if either: prot_ready_state == TRUE, or + major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE, though mutual authentication (if + requested) cannot be guaranteed until GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + + This achieves full, transparent backward compatibility for GSS-API V1 + callers, who need not even know of the existence of prot_ready_state, + and who will get the expected behavior from GSS_S_COMPLETE, but who + will not be able to use per-message protection before GSS_S_COMPLETE + is returned. + + It is not a requirement that GSS-V2 mechanisms ever return TRUE + prot_ready_state before completion of context establishment (indeed, + some mechanisms will not evolve usable message protection keys, + especially at the context acceptor, before context establishment is + complete). It is expected but not required that GSS-V2 mechanisms + will return TRUE prot_ready_state upon completion of context + establishment if they support per-message protection at all (however + GSS-V2 applications should not assume that TRUE prot_ready_state will + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + always be returned together with the GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status, + since GSS-V2 implementations may continue to support GSS-V1 mechanism + code, which will never return TRUE prot_ready_state). + + When prot_ready_state is returned TRUE, mechanisms shall also set + those context service indicator flags (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, trans_state, + conf_avail, integ_avail) which represent facilities confirmed, at + that time, to be available on the context being established. In + situations where prot_ready_state is returned before GSS_S_COMPLETE, + it is possible that additional facilities may be confirmed and + subsequently indicated when GSS_S_COMPLETE is returned. + +1.2.8: Implementation Robustness + + This section recommends aspects of GSS-API implementation behavior in + the interests of overall robustness. + + If a token is presented for processing on a GSS-API security context + and that token is determined to be invalid for that context, the + context's state should not be disrupted for purposes of processing + subsequent valid tokens. + + Certain local conditions at a GSS-API implementation (e.g., + unavailability of memory) may preclude, temporarily or permanently, + the successful processing of tokens on a GSS-API security context, + typically generating GSS_S_FAILURE major_status returns along with + locally-significant minor_status. For robust operation under such + conditions, the following recommendations are made: + + Failing calls should free any memory they allocate, so that + callers may retry without causing further loss of resources. + + Failure of an individual call on an established context should not + preclude subsequent calls from succeeding on the same context. + + Whenever possible, it should be possible for + GSS_Delete_sec_context() calls to be successfully processed even + if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + resources to be released. + +2: Interface Descriptions + + This section describes the GSS-API's service interface, dividing the + set of calls offered into four groups. Credential management calls + are related to the acquisition and release of credentials by + principals. Context-level calls are related to the management of + security contexts between principals. Per-message calls are related + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + to the protection of individual messages on established security + contexts. Support calls provide ancillary functions useful to GSS-API + callers. Table 2 groups and summarizes the calls in tabular fashion. + +Table 2: GSS-API Calls + + CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT + + GSS_Acquire_cred acquire credentials for use + GSS_Release_cred release credentials after use + GSS_Inquire_cred display information about + credentials + GSS_Add_cred construct credentials incrementally + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech display per-mechanism credential + information + + CONTEXT-LEVEL CALLS + + GSS_Init_sec_context initiate outbound security context + GSS_Accept_sec_context accept inbound security context + GSS_Delete_sec_context flush context when no longer needed + GSS_Process_context_token process received control token on + context + GSS_Context_time indicate validity time remaining on + context + GSS_Inquire_context display information about context + GSS_Wrap_size_limit determine GSS_Wrap token size limit + GSS_Export_sec_context transfer context to other process + GSS_Import_sec_context import transferred context + + PER-MESSAGE CALLS + + GSS_GetMIC apply integrity check, receive as + token separate from message + GSS_VerifyMIC validate integrity check token + along with message + GSS_Wrap sign, optionally encrypt, + encapsulate + GSS_Unwrap decapsulate, decrypt if needed, + validate integrity check + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + SUPPORT CALLS + + GSS_Display_status translate status codes to printable + form + GSS_Indicate_mechs indicate mech_types supported on + local system + GSS_Compare_name compare two names for equality + GSS_Display_name translate name to printable form + GSS_Import_name convert printable name to + normalized form + GSS_Release_name free storage of normalized-form + name + GSS_Release_buffer free storage of printable name + GSS_Release_OID free storage of OID object + GSS_Release_OID_set free storage of OID set object + GSS_Create_empty_OID_set create empty OID set + GSS_Add_OID_set_member add member to OID set + GSS_Test_OID_set_member test if OID is member of OID set + GSS_OID_to_str display OID as string + GSS_Str_to_OID construct OID from string + GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech indicate name types supported by + mechanism + GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name indicates mechanisms supporting name + type + GSS_Canonicalize_name translate name to per-mechanism form + GSS_Export_name externalize per-mechanism name + GSS_Duplicate_name duplicate name object + +2.1: Credential management calls + + These GSS-API calls provide functions related to the management of + credentials. Their characterization with regard to whether or not + they may block pending exchanges with other network entities (e.g., + directories or authentication servers) depends in part on OS-specific + (extra-GSS-API) issues, so is not specified in this document. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call is defined within the GSS-API in support + of application portability, with a particular orientation towards + support of portable server applications. It is recognized that (for + certain systems and mechanisms) credentials for interactive users may + be managed differently from credentials for server processes; in such + environments, it is the GSS-API implementation's responsibility to + distinguish these cases and the procedures for making this + distinction are a local matter. The GSS_Release_cred() call provides + a means for callers to indicate to the GSS-API that use of a + credentials structure is no longer required. The GSS_Inquire_cred() + call allows callers to determine information about a credentials + structure. The GSS_Add_cred() call enables callers to append + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + elements to an existing credential structure, allowing iterative + construction of a multi-mechanism credential. The + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() call enables callers to extract per- + mechanism information describing a credentials structure. + +2.1.1: GSS_Acquire_cred call + + Inputs: + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME, -NULL requests locally-determined + default + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,-empty set requests + system-selected default + + o cred_usage INTEGER -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that requested credentials were + successfully established, for the duration indicated in + lifetime_rec, suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, + for the set of mech_types indicated in actual_mechs, and that + those credentials can be referenced for subsequent use with + the handle returned in output_cred_handle. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that a mech_type unsupported by the + GSS-API implementation type was requested, causing the + credential establishment operation to fail. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name is + uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable + underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so no credentials could be + established for the accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so no credentials could be established for the + accompanying desired_name. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that credential establishment failed + for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack + of authorization to establish and use credentials associated + with the identity named in the input desired_name argument. + + GSS_Acquire_cred() is used to acquire credentials so that a + principal can (as a function of the input cred_usage parameter) + initiate and/or accept security contexts under the identity + represented by the desired_name input argument. On successful + completion, the returned output_cred_handle result provides a handle + for subsequent references to the acquired credentials. Typically, + single-user client processes requesting that default credential + behavior be applied for context establishment purposes will have no + need to invoke this call. + + A caller may provide the value NULL for desired_name, signifying a + request for credentials corresponding to a principal identity + selected by default for the caller. The procedures used by GSS-API + implementations to select the appropriate principal identity in + response to such a request are local matters. It is possible that + multiple pre-established credentials may exist for the same principal + identity (for example, as a result of multiple user login sessions) + when GSS_Acquire_cred() is called; the means used in such cases to + select a specific credential are local matters. The input + lifetime_req argument to GSS_Acquire_cred() may provide useful + information for local GSS-API implementations to employ in making + this disambiguation in a manner which will best satisfy a caller's + intent. + + The lifetime_rec result indicates the length of time for which the + acquired credentials will be valid, as an offset from the present. A + mechanism may return a reserved value indicating INDEFINITE if no + constraints on credential lifetime are imposed. A caller of + GSS_Acquire_cred() can request a length of time for which acquired + credentials are to be valid (lifetime_req argument), beginning at the + present, or can request credentials with a default validity interval. + (Requests for postdated credentials are not supported within the + GSS-API.) Certain mechanisms and implementations may bind in + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + credential validity period specifiers at a point preliminary to + invocation of the GSS_Acquire_cred() call (e.g., in conjunction with + user login procedures). As a result, callers requesting non-default + values for lifetime_req must recognize that such requests cannot + always be honored and must be prepared to accommodate the use of + returned credentials with different lifetimes as indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + The caller of GSS_Acquire_cred() can explicitly specify a set of + mech_types which are to be accommodated in the returned credentials + (desired_mechs argument), or can request credentials for a system- + defined default set of mech_types. Selection of the system-specified + default set is recommended in the interests of application + portability. The actual_mechs return value may be interrogated by the + caller to determine the set of mechanisms with which the returned + credentials may be used. + +2.1.2: GSS_Release_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE - NULL specifies that + the credential elements used when default credential behavior + is requested be released. + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle were released for purposes of subsequent + access by the caller. The effect on other processes which may + be authorized shared access to such credentials is a local + matter. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no release operation was + performed, either because the input cred_handle was invalid or + because the caller lacks authorization to access the + referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the release operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Provides a means for a caller to explicitly request that credentials + be released when their use is no longer required. Note that system- + specific credential management functions are also likely to exist, + for example to assure that credentials shared among processes are + properly deleted when all affected processes terminate, even if no + explicit release requests are issued by those processes. Given the + fact that multiple callers are not precluded from gaining authorized + access to the same credentials, invocation of GSS_Release_cred() + cannot be assumed to delete a particular set of credentials on a + system-wide basis. + +2.1.3: GSS_Inquire_cred call + + Input: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -NULL specifies that the + credential elements used when default credential behavior is + requested are to be queried + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, and that the output + cred_name, lifetime_rec, and cred_usage values represent, + respectively, the credentials' associated principal name, + remaining lifetime, suitable usage modes, and supported + mechanism types. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks + authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced + credentials are invalid. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced + credentials have expired. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred() call is defined primarily for the use of those + callers which request use of default credential behavior rather than + acquiring credentials explicitly with GSS_Acquire_cred(). It enables + callers to determine a credential structure's associated principal + name, remaining validity period, usability for security context + initiation and/or acceptance, and supported mechanisms. + + For a multi-mechanism credential, the returned "lifetime" specifier + indicates the shortest lifetime of any of the mechanisms' elements in + the credential (for either context initiation or acceptance + purposes). + + GSS_Inquire_cred() should indicate INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT for + "cred_usage" if both of the following conditions hold: + + (1) there exists in the credential an element which allows context + initiation using some mechanism + + (2) there exists in the credential an element which allows context + acceptance using some mechanism (allowably, but not necessarily, + one of the same mechanism(s) qualifying for (1)). + + If condition (1) holds but not condition (2), GSS_Inquire_cred() + should indicate INITIATE-ONLY for "cred_usage". If condition (2) + holds but not condition (1), GSS_Inquire_cred() should indicate + ACCEPT-ONLY for "cred_usage". + + Callers requiring finer disambiguation among available combinations + of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms should call the + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() routine, passing that routine one of the + mech OIDs returned by GSS_Inquire_cred(). + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.1.4: GSS_Add_cred call + + Inputs: + + o input_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE - handle to credential + structure created with prior GSS_Acquire_cred() or + GSS_Add_cred() call, or NULL to append elements to the set + which are applied for the caller when default credential + behavior is specified. + + o desired_name INTERNAL NAME - NULL requests locally-determined + default + + o initiator_time_req INTEGER - in seconds; 0 requests default + + o acceptor_time_req INTEGER - in seconds; 0 requests default + + o desired_mech OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + o cred_usage INTEGER - 0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, - NULL to request that + credential elements be added "in place" to the credential + structure identified by input_cred_handle, non-NULL pointer + to request that a new credential structure and handle be created. + + o actual_mechs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o initiator_time_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o acceptor_time_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- full set of mechanisms + supported by resulting credential. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by + the input_cred_handle argument were valid, and that the + resulting credential from GSS_Add_cred() is valid for the + durations indicated in initiator_time_rec and acceptor_time_rec, + suitable for the usage requested in cred_usage, and for the + mechanisms indicated in actual_mechs. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT indicates that the input desired_mech + specified a mechanism for which the referenced credential + already contained a credential element with overlapping + cred_usage and validity time specifiers. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the input desired_mech specified + a mechanism unsupported by the GSS-API implementation, causing + the GSS_Add_cred() operation to fail. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided desired_name + is uninterpretable or of a type unsupported by the applicable + underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the GSS_Add_cred() operation + could not be performed for that name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided desired_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so the GSS_Add_cred() operation could not be + performed for that name. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that the input_cred_handle referenced + invalid or inaccessible credentials. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, including lack of + authorization to establish or use credentials representing + the requested identity. + + GSS_Add_cred() enables callers to construct credentials iteratively + by adding credential elements in successive operations, corresponding + to different mechanisms. This offers particular value in multi- + mechanism environments, as the major_status and minor_status values + returned on each iteration are individually visible and can therefore + be interpreted unambiguously on a per-mechanism basis. + + The same input desired_name, or default reference, should be used on + all GSS_Acquire_cred() and GSS_Add_cred() calls corresponding to a + particular credential. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.1.5: GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech call + + Inputs: + + o cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE -- NULL specifies that the + credential elements used when default credential behavior is + requested are to be queried + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- specific mechanism for + which credentials are being queried + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o cred_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN + + o lifetime_rec_initiate INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o lifetime_rec_accept INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o cred_usage INTEGER, -0=INITIATE-AND-ACCEPT, 1=INITIATE-ONLY, + 2=ACCEPT-ONLY + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the credentials referenced by the + input cred_handle argument were valid, that the mechanism + indicated by the input mech_type was represented with elements + within those credentials, and that the output cred_name, + lifetime_rec_initiate, lifetime_rec_accept, and cred_usage values + represent, respectively, the credentials' associated principal + name, remaining lifetimes, and suitable usage modes. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no information could be returned + about the referenced credentials, either because the input + cred_handle was invalid or because the caller lacks + authorization to access the referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that the referenced + credentials are invalid. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the referenced + credentials have expired. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the referenced credentials do not + contain elements for the requested mechanism. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed for reasons + unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + The GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech() call enables callers in multi- + mechanism environments to acquire specific data about available + combinations of lifetimes, usage modes, and mechanisms within a + credential structure. The lifetime_rec_initiate result indicates the + available lifetime for context initiation purposes; the + lifetime_rec_accept result indicates the available lifetime for + context acceptance purposes. + +2.2: Context-level calls + + This group of calls is devoted to the establishment and management of + security contexts between peers. A context's initiator calls + GSS_Init_sec_context(), resulting in generation of a token which the + caller passes to the target. At the target, that token is passed to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). Depending on the underlying mech_type and + specified options, additional token exchanges may be performed in the + course of context establishment; such exchanges are accommodated by + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns from GSS_Init_sec_context() and + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + + Either party to an established context may invoke + GSS_Delete_sec_context() to flush context information when a context + is no longer required. GSS_Process_context_token() is used to + process received tokens carrying context-level control information. + GSS_Context_time() allows a caller to determine the length of time + for which an established context will remain valid. + GSS_Inquire_context() returns status information describing context + characteristics. GSS_Wrap_size_limit() allows a caller to determine + the size of a token which will be generated by a GSS_Wrap() + operation. GSS_Export_sec_context() and GSS_Import_sec_context() + enable transfer of active contexts between processes on an end + system. + +2.2.1: GSS_Init_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o claimant_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -NULL specifies "use + default" + + o input_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -0 specifies "none assigned + yet" + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -NULL parameter specifies "use + default" + + o deleg_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o anon_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default lifetime + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING-NULL or token received from target + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -actual mechanism always + indicated, never NULL + + o output_token OCTET STRING, -NULL or token to pass to context + target + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which an authentication server or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context initiator in order to generate an + output_token suitable for presentation to a specified target. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that context-level information was + successfully initialized, and that the returned output_token + will provide sufficient information for the target to perform + per-message processing on the newly-established context. + + o GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the target, and that a + reply must be received and passed as the input_token argument + to a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), before + per-message processing can be performed in conjunction with + this context. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks + performed on the input_token failed, preventing further + processing from being performed based on that token. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + claimant_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token + contains an incorrect integrity check, so context setup cannot + be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, + either because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the + referenced credentials are valid for context acceptor use + only, or because the caller lacks authorization to access the + referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials + provided through the input claimant_cred_handle argument are no + longer valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the + caller-provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the + input_token was detected, signifying a security-relevant + event and preventing context establishment. (This result will + be returned by GSS_Init_sec_context only for contexts where + mutual_state is TRUE.) + + o GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the input_token is too old to + be checked for integrity. This is a fatal error during context + establishment. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the input token has a + correct integrity check, but is a duplicate of a token already + processed. This is a fatal error during context establishment. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided; this major status will + be returned only for successor calls following GSS_S_CONTINUE_ + NEEDED status returns. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided targ_name is + of a type uninterpretable or unsupported by the applicable + underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so context establishment + cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided targ_name is + inconsistent in terms of internally-incorporated type specifier + information, so context establishment cannot be accomplished. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token + or of a caller request specifying a mechanism unsupported by + the local system or with the caller's active credentials + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be + accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and + that no interface-defined recovery action is available. + + This routine is used by a context initiator, and ordinarily emits one + (or, for the case of a multi-step exchange, more than one) + output_token suitable for use by the target within the selected + mech_type's protocol. Using information in the credentials structure + referenced by claimant_cred_handle, GSS_Init_sec_context() + initializes the data structures required to establish a security + context with target targ_name. The targ_name may be any valid + INTERNAL NAME; it need not be an MN. The claimant_cred_handle must + correspond to the same valid credentials structure on the initial + call to GSS_Init_sec_context() and on any successor calls resulting + from GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; different protocol + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 37] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + sequences modeled by the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED facility will require + access to credentials at different points in the context + establishment sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Init_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. If successful (i.e., if accompanied by major_status + GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and only if successful, the + initial GSS_Init_sec_context() call returns a non-zero + output_context_handle for use in future references to this context. + Once a non-zero output_context_handle has been returned, GSS-API + callers should call GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context- + related resources if errors occur in later phases of context + establishment, or when an established context is no longer required. + + When continuation attempts to GSS_Init_sec_context() are needed to + perform context establishment, the previously-returned non-zero + handle value is entered into the input_context_handle argument and + will be echoed in the returned output_context_handle argument. On + such continuation attempts (and only on continuation attempts) the + input_token value is used, to provide the token returned from the + context's target. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The input_token argument contains a message received from the target, + and is significant only on a call to GSS_Init_sec_context() which + follows a previous return indicating GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + It is the caller's responsibility to establish a communications path + to the target, and to transmit any returned output_token (independent + of the accompanying returned major_status value) to the target over + that path. The output_token can, however, be transmitted along with + the first application-provided input message to be processed by + GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() in conjunction with a successfully- + established context. + + The initiator may request various context-level functions through + input flags: the deleg_req_flag requests delegation of access rights, + the mutual_req_flag requests mutual authentication, the + replay_det_req_flag requests that replay detection features be + applied to messages transferred on the established context, and the + sequence_req_flag requests that sequencing be enforced. (See Section + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 38] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 1.2.3 for more information on replay detection and sequencing + features.) The anon_req_flag requests that the initiator's identity + not be transferred within tokens to be sent to the acceptor. + + Not all of the optionally-requestable features will be available in + all underlying mech_types. The corresponding return state values + deleg_state, mutual_state, replay_det_state, and sequence_state + indicate, as a function of mech_type processing capabilities and + initiator-provided input flags, the set of features which will be + active on the context. The returned trans_state value indicates + whether the context is transferable to other processes through use of + GSS_Export_sec_context(). These state indicators' values are + undefined unless either the routine's major_status indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE, or TRUE prot_ready_state is returned along with + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status; for the latter case, it is + possible that additional features, not confirmed or indicated along + with TRUE prot_ready_state, will be confirmed and indicated when + GSS_S_COMPLETE is subsequently returned. + + The returned anon_state and prot_ready_state values are significant + for both GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status + returns from GSS_Init_sec_context(). When anon_state is returned + TRUE, this indicates that neither the current token nor its + predecessors delivers or has delivered the initiator's identity. + Callers wishing to perform context establishment only if anonymity + support is provided should transfer a returned token from + GSS_Init_sec_context() to the peer only if it is accompanied by a + TRUE anon_state indicator. When prot_ready_state is returned TRUE in + conjunction with GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, this indicates + that per-message protection operations may be applied on the context: + see Section 1.2.7 for further discussion of this facility. + + Failure to provide the precise set of features requested by the + caller does not cause context establishment to fail; it is the + caller's prerogative to delete the context if the feature set + provided is unsuitable for the caller's use. + + The returned mech_type value indicates the specific mechanism + employed on the context, is valid only along with major_status + GSS_S_COMPLETE, and will never indicate the value for "default". + Note that, for the case of certain mechanisms which themselves + perform negotiation, the returned mech_type result may indicate + selection of a mechanism identified by an OID different than that + passed in the input mech_type argument. + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 39] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + input to GSS_Wrap() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap()) on + the established context. These state indicators' values are undefined + unless either the routine's major_status indicates GSS_S_COMPLETE, or + TRUE prot_ready_state is returned along with GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + major_status. + + The lifetime_req input specifies a desired upper bound for the + lifetime of the context to be established, with a value of 0 used to + request a default lifetime. The lifetime_rec return value indicates + the length of time for which the context will be valid, expressed as + an offset from the present; depending on mechanism capabilities, + credential lifetimes, and local policy, it may not correspond to the + value requested in lifetime_req. If no constraints on context + lifetime are imposed, this may be indicated by returning a reserved + value representing INDEFINITE lifetime_req. The value of lifetime_rec + is undefined unless the routine's major_status indicates + GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + If the mutual_state is TRUE, this fact will be reflected within the + output_token. A call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() at the target in + conjunction with such a context will return a token, to be processed + by a continuation call to GSS_Init_sec_context(), in order to + achieve mutual authentication. + +2.2.2: GSS_Accept_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o acceptor_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, -- NULL specifies + "use default" + + o input_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, -- 0 specifies + "not yet assigned" + + o chan_bindings OCTET STRING, + + o input_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, -- guaranteed to be MN + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 40] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o output_context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, -- see Section 1.2.7 for discussion + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER, - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + o delegated_cred_handle CREDENTIAL HANDLE, + + o output_token OCTET STRING -NULL or token to pass to context + initiator + + This call may block pending network interactions for those mech_types + in which a directory service or other network entity must be + consulted on behalf of a context acceptor in order to validate a + received input_token. + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that context-level data structures + were successfully initialized, and that per-message processing + can now be performed in conjunction with this context. + + o GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED indicates that control information in the + returned output_token must be sent to the initiator, and that + a response must be received and passed as the input_token + argument to a continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), + before per-message processing can be performed in conjunction + with this context. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 41] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the input_token failed, preventing further processing from + being performed based on that token. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL indicates that consistency checks + performed on the credential structure referenced by + acceptor_cred_handle failed, preventing further processing from + being performed using that credential structure. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that the received input_token contains + an incorrect integrity check, so context setup cannot be + accomplished. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the + received input_token was correct, but that the input_token + was recognized as a duplicate of an input_token already + processed. No new context is established. + + o GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN indicates that the integrity check on the received + input_token was correct, but that the input_token is too old + to be checked for duplication against previously-processed + input_tokens. No new context is established. + + o GSS_S_NO_CRED indicates that no context was established, either + because the input cred_handle was invalid, because the + referenced credentials are valid for context initiator use + only, or because the caller lacks authorization to access the + referenced credentials. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the credentials provided + through the input acceptor_cred_handle argument are no + longer valid, so context establishment cannot be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS indicates that a mismatch between the + caller-provided chan_bindings and those extracted from the + input_token was detected, signifying a security-relevant + event and preventing context establishment. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided; this major status will + be returned only for successor calls following GSS_S_CONTINUE_ + NEEDED status returns. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates receipt of a context establishment token + specifying a mechanism unsupported by the local system or with + the caller's active credentials. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 42] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that context setup could not be + accomplished for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level, and + that no interface-defined recovery action is available. + + The GSS_Accept_sec_context() routine is used by a context target. + Using information in the credentials structure referenced by the + input acceptor_cred_handle, it verifies the incoming input_token and + (following the successful completion of a context establishment + sequence) returns the authenticated src_name and the mech_type used. + The returned src_name is guaranteed to be an MN, processed by the + mechanism under which the context was established. The + acceptor_cred_handle must correspond to the same valid credentials + structure on the initial call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() and on any + successor calls resulting from GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED status returns; + different protocol sequences modeled by the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + mechanism will require access to credentials at different points in + the context establishment sequence. + + The input_context_handle argument is 0, specifying "not yet + assigned", on the first GSS_Accept_sec_context() call relating to a + given context. If successful (i.e., if accompanied by major_status + GSS_S_COMPLETE or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED), and only if successful, the + initial GSS_Accept_sec_context() call returns a non-zero + output_context_handle for use in future references to this context. + Once a non-zero output_context_handle has been returned, GSS-API + callers should call GSS_Delete_sec_context() to release context- + related resources if errors occur in later phases of context + establishment, or when an established context is no longer required. + + The chan_bindings argument is used by the caller to provide + information binding the security context to security-related + characteristics (e.g., addresses, cryptographic keys) of the + underlying communications channel. See Section 1.1.6 of this document + for more discussion of this argument's usage. + + The returned state results (deleg_state, mutual_state, + replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, trans_state, and + prot_ready_state) reflect the same information as described for + GSS_Init_sec_context(), and their values are significant under the + same return state conditions. + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 43] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The conf_avail return value indicates whether the context supports + per-message confidentiality services, and so informs the caller + whether or not a request for encryption through the conf_req_flag + input to GSS_Wrap() can be honored. In similar fashion, the + integ_avail return value indicates whether per-message integrity + services are available (through either GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap()) + on the established context. These values are significant under the + same return state conditions as described under + GSS_Init_sec_context(). + + The lifetime_rec return value is significant only in conjunction with + GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status, and indicates the length of time for + which the context will be valid, expressed as an offset from the + present. + + The mech_type return value indicates the specific mechanism employed + on the context, is valid only along with major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE, + and will never indicate the value for "default". + + The delegated_cred_handle result is significant only when deleg_state + is TRUE, and provides a means for the target to reference the + delegated credentials. The output_token result, when non-NULL, + provides a context-level token to be returned to the context + initiator to continue a multi-step context establishment sequence. As + noted with GSS_Init_sec_context(), any returned token should be + transferred to the context's peer (in this case, the context + initiator), independent of the value of the accompanying returned + major_status. + + Note: A target must be able to distinguish a context-level + input_token, which is passed to GSS_Accept_sec_context(), from the + per-message data elements passed to GSS_VerifyMIC() or GSS_Unwrap(). + These data elements may arrive in a single application message, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() must be performed before per-message + processing can be performed successfully. + +2.2.3: GSS_Delete_sec_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 44] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o output_context_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the context was recognized, and that + relevant context-specific information was flushed. If the caller + provides a non-null buffer to receive an output_context_token, and + the mechanism returns a non-NULL token into that buffer, the + returned output_context_token is ready for transfer to the + context's peer. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided, so no deletion was + performed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Delete_sec_context() operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call may block pending network interactions for mech_types in + which active notification must be made to a central server when a + security context is to be deleted. + + This call can be made by either peer in a security context, to flush + context-specific information. If a non-null output_context_token + parameter is provided by the caller, an output_context_token may be + returned to the caller. If an output_context_token is provided to + the caller, it can be passed to the context's peer to inform the + peer's GSS-API implementation that the peer's corresponding context + information can also be flushed. (Once a context is established, the + peers involved are expected to retain cached credential and context- + related information until the information's expiration time is + reached or until a GSS_Delete_sec_context() call is made.) + + The facility for context_token usage to signal context deletion is + retained for compatibility with GSS-API Version 1. For current + usage, it is recommended that both peers to a context invoke + GSS_Delete_sec_context() independently, passing a null + output_context_token buffer to indicate that no context_token is + required. Implementations of GSS_Delete_sec_context() should delete + relevant locally-stored context information. + + Attempts to perform per-message processing on a deleted context will + result in error returns. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 45] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.2.4: GSS_Process_context_token call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o input_context_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_context_token was + successfully processed in conjunction with the context + referenced by context_handle. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks + performed on the received context_token failed, preventing + further processing from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Process_context_token() operation could not be + performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to process context_tokens received from a peer once + a context has been established, with corresponding impact on + context-level state information. One use for this facility is + processing of the context_tokens generated by + GSS_Delete_sec_context(); GSS_Process_context_token() will not block + pending network interactions for that purpose. Another use is to + process tokens indicating remote-peer context establishment failures + after the point where the local GSS-API implementation has already + indicated GSS_S_COMPLETE status. + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 46] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.2.5: GSS_Context_time call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER - in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid, + and will remain valid for the amount of time indicated in + lifetime_rec. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that data items related to the + referenced context have expired. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, but that its associated credentials have expired. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This call is used to determine the amount of time for which a + currently established context will remain valid. + +2.2.6: GSS_Inquire_context call + + Input: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 47] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context initiator, + -- guaranteed to be MN + + o targ_name INTERNAL NAME, -- name of context target, + -- guaranteed to be MN + + + o lifetime_rec INTEGER -- in seconds, or reserved value for + INDEFINITE, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- the mechanism supporting this + security context + + o deleg_state BOOLEAN, + + o mutual_state BOOLEAN, + + o replay_det_state BOOLEAN, + + o sequence_state BOOLEAN, + + o anon_state BOOLEAN, + + o trans_state BOOLEAN, + + o prot_ready_state BOOLEAN, + + o conf_avail BOOLEAN, + + o integ_avail BOOLEAN, + + o locally_initiated BOOLEAN, -- TRUE if initiator, FALSE if acceptor + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context is valid + and that src_name, targ_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, deleg_state, + mutual_state, replay_det_state, sequence_state, anon_state, + trans_state, prot_ready_state, conf_avail, integ_avail, and + locally_initiated return values describe the corresponding + characteristics of the context. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context + has expired. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 48] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call is used to extract information describing characteristics + of a security context. + +2.2.7: GSS_Wrap_size_limit call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o qop INTEGER, + + o output_size INTEGER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o max_input_size INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates a successful token size determination: + an input message with a length in octets equal to the + returned max_input_size value will, when passed to GSS_Wrap() + for processing on the context identified by the context_handle + parameter and with the quality of protection specifier provided + in the qop parameter, yield an output token no larger than the + value of the provided output_size parameter. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context + has expired. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 49] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call is used to determine the largest input datum which may be + passed to GSS_Wrap() without yielding an output token larger than a + caller-specified value. + +2.2.8: GSS_Export_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o interprocess_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the referenced context has been + successfully exported to a representation in the interprocess_token, + and is no longer available for use by the caller. + + o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context export facility + is not available for use on the referenced context. (This status + should occur only for contexts for which the trans_state value is + FALSE.) Return values other than major_status and minor_status are + undefined. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the provided input + context_handle is recognized, but that the referenced context has + expired. Return values other than major_status and minor_status are + undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 50] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call generates an interprocess token for transfer to another + process within an end system, in order to transfer control of a + security context to that process. The recipient of the interprocess + token will call GSS_Import_sec_context() to accept the transfer. The + GSS_Export_sec_context() operation is defined for use only with + security contexts which are fully and successfully established (i.e., + those for which GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context() + have returned GSS_S_COMPLETE major_status). + + To ensure portability, a caller of GSS_Export_sec_context() must not + assume that a context may continue to be used once it has been + exported; following export, the context referenced by the + context_handle cannot be assumed to remain valid. Further, portable + callers must not assume that a given interprocess token can be + imported by GSS_Import_sec_context() more than once, thereby creating + multiple instantiations of a single context. GSS-API implementations + may detect and reject attempted multiple imports, but are not + required to do so. + + The internal representation contained within the interprocess token + is an implementation-defined local matter. Interprocess tokens + cannot be assumed to be transferable across different GSS-API + implementations. + + It is recommended that GSS-API implementations adopt policies suited + to their operational environments in order to define the set of + processes eligible to import a context, but specific constraints in + this area are local matters. Candidate examples include transfers + between processes operating on behalf of the same user identity, or + processes comprising a common job. However, it may be impossible to + enforce such policies in some implementations. + + In support of the above goals, implementations may protect the + transferred context data by using cryptography to protect data within + the interprocess token, or by using interprocess tokens as a means to + reference local interprocess communication facilities (protected by + other means) rather than storing the context data directly within the + tokens. + + Transfer of an open context may, for certain mechanisms and + implementations, reveal data about the credential which was used to + establish the context. Callers should, therefore, be cautious about + the trustworthiness of processes to which they transfer contexts. + Although the GSS-API implementation may provide its own set of + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 51] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + protections over the exported context, the caller is responsible for + protecting the interprocess token from disclosure, and for taking + care that the context is transferred to an appropriate destination + process. + +2.2.9: GSS_Import_sec_context call + + Inputs: + + o interprocess_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the context represented by the + input interprocess_token has been successfully transferred to + the caller, and is available for future use via the output + context_handle. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that the context represented by + the input interprocess_token has expired. Return values other + than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that the context represented by the + input interprocess_token was invalid. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that the input interprocess_token + was defective. Return values other than major_status and + minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the context import facility + is not available for use on the referenced context. Return values + other than major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + o GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that the context represented by + the input interprocess_token is unauthorized for transfer to the + caller. Return values other than major_status and minor_status + are undefined. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 52] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation failed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. Return values other than + major_status and minor_status are undefined. + + This call processes an interprocess token generated by + GSS_Export_sec_context(), making the transferred context available + for use by the caller. After a successful GSS_Import_sec_context() + operation, the imported context is available for use by the importing + process. + + For further discussion of the security and authorization issues + regarding this call, please see the discussion in Section 2.2.8. + +2.3: Per-message calls + + This group of calls is used to perform per-message protection + processing on an established security context. None of these calls + block pending network interactions. These calls may be invoked by a + context's initiator or by the context's target. The four members of + this group should be considered as two pairs; the output from + GSS_GetMIC() is properly input to GSS_VerifyMIC(), and the output + from GSS_Wrap() is properly input to GSS_Unwrap(). + + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC() support data origin authentication + and data integrity services. When GSS_GetMIC() is invoked on an + input message, it yields a per-message token containing data items + which allow underlying mechanisms to provide the specified security + services. The original message, along with the generated per-message + token, is passed to the remote peer; these two data elements are + processed by GSS_VerifyMIC(), which validates the message in + conjunction with the separate token. + + GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap() support caller-requested confidentiality + in addition to the data origin authentication and data integrity + services offered by GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_VerifyMIC(). GSS_Wrap() + outputs a single data element, encapsulating optionally enciphered + user data as well as associated token data items. The data element + output from GSS_Wrap() is passed to the remote peer and processed by + GSS_Unwrap() at that system. GSS_Unwrap() combines decipherment (as + required) with validation of data items related to authentication and + integrity. + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 53] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.3.1: GSS_GetMIC call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Sign call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Sign are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that an integrity check, suitable for an + established security context, was successfully applied and + that the message and corresponding per_msg_token are ready + for transmission. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the requested operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 54] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, apply an + integrity check to the input message (along with timestamps and/or + other data included in support of mech_type-specific mechanisms) and + return the result in per_msg_token. The qop_req parameter, + interpretation of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows + quality-of-protection control. The caller passes the message and the + per_msg_token to the target. + + The GSS_GetMIC() function completes before the message and + per_msg_token is sent to the peer; successful application of + GSS_GetMIC() does not guarantee that a corresponding GSS_VerifyMIC() + has been (or can necessarily be) performed successfully when the + message arrives at the destination. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.2: GSS_VerifyMIC call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Verify call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Verify are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o message OCTET STRING, + + o per_msg_token OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the message was successfully + verified. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 55] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the received per_msg_token failed, preventing + further processing from being performed with that token. + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that the received per_msg_token contains + an incorrect integrity check for the message. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, + and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN values appear in conjunction with the + optional per-message replay detection features described + in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are described in that section. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_VerifyMIC() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Using the security context referenced by context_handle, verify that + the input per_msg_token contains an appropriate integrity check for + the input message, and apply any active replay detection or + sequencing features. Return an indication of the quality-of- + protection applied to the processed message in the qop_state result. + Since the GSS_VerifyMIC() routine never provides a confidentiality + service, its implementations should not return non-zero values in the + confidentiality fields of the output qop_state. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.3: GSS_Wrap call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Seal call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Seal are deprecated. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 56] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN, + + o qop_req INTEGER,-0 specifies default QOP + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was successfully + processed and that the output_message is ready for + transmission. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_BAD_QOP indicates that the provided QOP value is not + recognized or supported for the context. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Wrap() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Performs the data origin authentication and data integrity functions + of GSS_GetMIC(). If the input conf_req_flag is TRUE, requests that + confidentiality be applied to the input_message. Confidentiality may + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 57] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + not be supported in all mech_types or by all implementations; the + returned conf_state flag indicates whether confidentiality was + provided for the input_message. The qop_req parameter, interpretation + of which is discussed in Section 1.2.4, allows quality-of-protection + control. + + In all cases, the GSS_Wrap() call yields a single output_message + data element containing (optionally enciphered) user data as well as + control information. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.3.4: GSS_Unwrap call + + Note: This call is functionally equivalent to the GSS_Unseal call as + defined in previous versions of this specification. In the interests + of backward compatibility, it is recommended that implementations + support this function under both names for the present; future + references to this function as GSS_Unseal are deprecated. + + Inputs: + + o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE, + + o input_message OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o conf_state BOOLEAN, + + o qop_state INTEGER, + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_message OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the input_message was + successfully processed and that the resulting output_message is + available. + + o GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN indicates that consistency checks performed + on the per_msg_token extracted from the input_message + failed, preventing further processing from being performed. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 58] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_SIG indicates that an incorrect integrity check was + detected + for the message. + + o GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN, + and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN values appear in conjunction with the + optional per-message replay detection features described + in Section 1.2.3; their semantics are described in that section. + + o GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED indicates that context-related data + items have expired, so that the requested operation cannot be + performed. + + o GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED indicates that the context is + recognized, + but that its associated credentials have expired, so + that the requested operation cannot be performed. + + o GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT indicates that no valid context was recognized + for the input context_handle provided. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the context is recognized, but + that the GSS_Unwrap() operation could not be performed for + reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Processes a data element generated (and optionally enciphered) by + GSS_Wrap(), provided as input_message. The returned conf_state value + indicates whether confidentiality was applied to the input_message. + If conf_state is TRUE, GSS_Unwrap() deciphers the input_message. + Returns an indication of the quality-of-protection applied to the + processed message in the qop_state result. GSS_Wrap() performs the + data integrity and data origin authentication checking functions of + GSS_VerifyMIC() on the plaintext data. Plaintext data is returned in + output_message. + + Mechanisms which do not support per-message protection services + should return GSS_S_FAILURE if this routine is called. + +2.4: Support calls + + This group of calls provides support functions useful to GSS-API + callers, independent of the state of established contexts. Their + characterization with regard to blocking or non-blocking status in + terms of network interactions is unspecified. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 59] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.4.1: GSS_Display_status call + + Inputs: + + o status_value INTEGER,-GSS-API major_status or minor_status + return value + + o status_type INTEGER,-1 if major_status, 2 if minor_status + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER-mech_type to be used for minor_ + status translation + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o status_string_set SET OF OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable status + representation (possibly representing more than one status event + encoded within the status_value) is available in the returned + status_string_set. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that translation in accordance with an + unsupported mech_type was requested, so translation could not + be performed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_STATUS indicates that the input status_value was + invalid, or that the input status_type carried a value other + than 1 or 2, so translation could not be performed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Provides a means for callers to translate GSS-API-returned major and + minor status codes into printable string representations. + +2.4.2: GSS_Indicate_mechs call + + Input: + + o (none) + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 60] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a set of available mechanisms has + been returned in mech_set. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of mechanism types available on + the local system. This call is intended for support of specialized + callers who need to request non-default mech_type sets from + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and should not be needed by other callers. + +2.4.3: GSS_Compare_name call + + Inputs: + + o name1 INTERNAL NAME, + + o name2 INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_equal BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that name1 and name2 were comparable, + and that the name_equal result indicates whether name1 and + name2 represent the same entity. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that one or both of name1 and + name2 contained internal type specifiers uninterpretable + by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), or that + the two names' types are different and incomparable, so that + the comparison operation could not be completed. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 61] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that one or both of the input names + was ill-formed in terms of its internal type specifier, so + the comparison operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the call's operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to compare two internal name representations to + determine whether they refer to the same entity. If either name + presented to GSS_Compare_name() denotes an anonymous principal, + GSS_Compare_name() shall indicate FALSE. It is not required that + either or both inputs name1 and name2 be MNs; for some + implementations and cases, GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE may be returned, + indicating name incomparability, for the case where neither input + name is an MN. + +2.4.4: GSS_Display_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_string OCTET STRING, + + o name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid printable name + representation is available in the returned name_string. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the provided name was of a + type uninterpretable by the applicable underlying GSS-API + mechanism(s), so no printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the contents of the provided name + were inconsistent with the internally-indicated name type, so + no printable representation could be generated. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 62] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Allows callers to translate an internal name representation into a + printable form with associated namespace type descriptor. The syntax + of the printable form is a local matter. + + If the input name represents an anonymous identity, a reserved value + (GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS) shall be returned for name_type. + +2.4.5: GSS_Import_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name_string OCTET STRING, + + o input_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a valid name representation is + output in output_name and described by the type value in + output_name_type. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input_name_type is unsupported + by the applicable underlying GSS-API mechanism(s), so the import + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the provided input_name_string + is ill-formed in terms of the input_name_type, so the import + operation could not be completed. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to provide a name representation as a contiguous octet + string, designate the type of namespace in conjunction with which it + should be parsed, and convert that representation to an internal form + suitable for input to other GSS-API routines. The syntax of the + input_name_string is defined in conjunction with its associated name + type; depending on the input_name_type, the associated + input_name_string may or may not be a printable string. Note: The + input_name_type argument serves to describe and qualify the + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 63] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + interpretation of the associated input_name_string; it does not + specify the data type of the returned output_name. + + If a mechanism claims support for a particular name type, its + GSS_Import_name() operation shall be able to accept all possible + values conformant to the external name syntax as defined for that + name type. These imported values may correspond to: + + (1) locally registered entities (for which credentials may be + acquired), + + (2) non-local entities (for which local credentials cannot be + acquired, but which may be referenced as targets of initiated + security contexts or initiators of accepted security contexts), or + to + + (3) neither of the above. + + Determination of whether a particular name belongs to class (1), (2), + or (3) as described above is not guaranteed to be performed by the + GSS_Import_name() function. + + The internal name generated by a GSS_Import_name() operation may be a + single-mechanism MN, and is likely to be an MN within a single- + mechanism implementation, but portable callers must not depend on + this property (and must not, therefore, assume that the output from + GSS_Import_name() can be passed directly to GSS_Export_name() without + first being processed through GSS_Canonicalize_name()). + +2.4.6: GSS_Release_name call + + Inputs: + + o name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input name was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name argument did not + contain a valid name. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 64] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an internal + name representation. This call's specific behavior depends on the + language and programming environment within which a GSS-API + implementation operates, and is therefore detailed within applicable + bindings specifications; in particular, this call may be superfluous + within bindings where memory management is automatic. + +2.4.7: GSS_Release_buffer call + + Inputs: + + o buffer OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input buffer was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an OCTET STRING + buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's specific + behavior depends on the language and programming environment within + which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore detailed + within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, this call + may be superfluous within bindings where memory management is + automatic. + +2.4.8: GSS_Release_OID_set call + + Inputs: + + o buffer SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 65] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the storage associated with the + input object identifier set was successfully released. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to release the storage associated with an object + identifier set object allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's + specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment + within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore + detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, + this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management + is automatic. + +2.4.9: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set call + + Inputs: + + o (none) + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Creates an object identifier set containing no object identifiers, to + which members may be subsequently added using the + GSS_Add_OID_set_member() routine. These routines are intended to be + used to construct sets of mechanism object identifiers, for input to + GSS_Acquire_cred(). + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 66] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +2.4.10: GSS_Add_OID_set_member call + + Inputs: + + o member_oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o oid_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Adds an Object Identifier to an Object Identifier set. This routine + is intended for use in conjunction with GSS_Create_empty_OID_set() + when constructing a set of mechanism OIDs for input to + GSS_Acquire_cred(). + +2.4.11: GSS_Test_OID_set_member call + + Inputs: + + o member OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + + o set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o present BOOLEAN + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 67] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Interrogates an Object Identifier set to determine whether a + specified Object Identifier is a member. This routine is intended to + be used with OID sets returned by GSS_Indicate_mechs(), + GSS_Acquire_cred(), and GSS_Inquire_cred(). + +2.4.12: GSS_Release_OID call + + Inputs: + + o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + Allows the caller to release the storage associated with an OBJECT + IDENTIFIER buffer allocated by another GSS-API call. This call's + specific behavior depends on the language and programming environment + within which a GSS-API implementation operates, and is therefore + detailed within applicable bindings specifications; in particular, + this call may be superfluous within bindings where memory management + is automatic. + +2.4.13: GSS_OID_to_str call + + Inputs: + + o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid_str OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 68] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + The function GSS_OID_to_str() returns a string representing the input + OID in numeric ASN.1 syntax format (curly-brace enclosed, space- + delimited, e.g., "{2 16 840 1 113687 1 2 1}"). The string is + releasable using GSS_Release_buffer(). If the input "oid" does not + represent a syntactically valid object identifier, GSS_S_FAILURE + status is returned and the returned oid_str result is NULL. + +2.4.14: GSS_Str_to_OID call + + Inputs: + + o oid_str OCTET STRING + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates successful completion + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the operation failed + + The function GSS_Str_to_OID() constructs and returns an OID from its + printable form; implementations should be able to accept the numeric + ASN.1 syntax form as described for GSS_OID_to_str(), and this form + should be used for portability, but implementations of this routine + may also accept other formats (e.g., "1.2.3.3"). The OID is suitable + for release using the function GSS_Release_OID(). If the input + oid_str cannot be translated into an OID, GSS_S_FAILURE status is + returned and the "oid" result is NULL. + +2.4.15: GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech call + + Input: + + o input_mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- mechanism type + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 69] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o name_type_set SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that the output name_type_set contains + a list of name types which are supported by the locally available + mechanism identified by input_mech_type. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the mechanism identified by + input_mech_type was unsupported within the local implementation, + causing the query to fail. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + Allows callers to determine the set of name types which are + supportable by a specific locally-available mechanism. + +2.4.16: GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o mech_types SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a set of object identifiers, + corresponding to the set of mechanisms suitable for processing + the input_name, is available in mech_types. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input_name could not be + processed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the type of the input_name + is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 70] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This routine returns the mechanism set with which the input_name may + be processed. After use, the mech_types object should be freed by + the caller via the GSS_Release_OID_set() call. Note: it is + anticipated that implementations of GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name() will + commonly operate based on type information describing the + capabilities of available mechanisms; it is not guaranteed that all + identified mechanisms will necessarily be able to canonicalize (via + GSS_Canonicalize_name()) a particular name. + +2.4.17: GSS_Canonicalize_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, + + o mech_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- must be explicit mechanism, + not "default" specifier + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a mechanism-specific reduction of + the input_name, as processed by the mechanism identified by + mech_type, is available in output_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_MECH indicates that the identified mechanism is + unsupported. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name does not + contain an element with suitable type for processing by the + identified mechanism. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name contains an + element with suitable type for processing by the identified + mechanism, but that this element could not be processed + successfully. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 71] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This routine reduces a GSS-API internal name, which may in general + contain elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, to a + mechanism-specific Mechanism Name (MN) by applying the translations + corresponding to the mechanism identified by mech_type. + +2.4.18: GSS_Export_name call + + Inputs: + + o input_name INTERNAL NAME, -- required to be MN + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o output_name OCTET STRING + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that a flat representation of the + input name is available in output_name. + + o GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN indicates that the input name contained + elements corresponding to multiple mechanisms, so cannot + be exported into a single-mechanism flat form. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name was an MN, + but could not be processed. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name was an MN, + but that its type is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine creates a flat name representation, suitable for + bytewise comparison or for input to GSS_Import_name() in conjunction + with the reserved GSS-API Exported Name Object OID, from a internal- + form Mechanism Name (MN) as emitted, e.g., by GSS_Canonicalize_name() + or GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + + The emitted GSS-API Exported Name Object is self-describing; no + associated parameter-level OID need be emitted by this call. This + flat representation consists of a mechanism-independent wrapper + layer, defined in Section 3.2 of this document, enclosing a + mechanism-defined name representation. + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 72] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + In all cases, the flat name output by GSS_Export_name() to correspond + to a particular input MN must be invariant over time within a + particular installation. + + The GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN status code is provided to enable + implementations to reject input names which are not MNs. It is not, + however, required for purposes of conformance to this specification + that all non-MN input names must necessarily be rejected. + +2.4.19: GSS_Duplicate_name call + + Inputs: + + o src_name INTERNAL NAME + + Outputs: + + o major_status INTEGER, + + o minor_status INTEGER, + + o dest_name INTERNAL NAME + + Return major_status codes: + + o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that dest_name references an internal + name object containing the same name as passed to src_name. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAME indicates that the input name was invalid. + + o GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE indicates that the input name's type + is unsupported by the GSS-API implementation. + + o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates that the requested operation could not + be performed for reasons unspecified at the GSS-API level. + + This routine takes input internal name src_name, and returns another + reference (dest_name) to that name which can be used even if src_name + is later freed. (Note: This may be implemented by copying or through + use of reference counts.) + +3: Data Structure Definitions for GSS-V2 Usage + + Subsections of this section define, for interoperability and + portability purposes, certain data structures for use with GSS-V2. + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 73] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +3.1: Mechanism-Independent Token Format + + This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating + representation for the initial token of a GSS-API context + establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the mechanism + type to be used on that context and enabling tokens to be interpreted + unambiguously at GSS-API peers. Use of this format is required for + initial context establishment tokens of Internet standards-track + GSS-API mechanisms; use in non-initial tokens is optional. + + The encoding format for the token tag is derived from ASN.1 and DER + (per illustrative ASN.1 syntax included later within this + subsection), but its concrete representation is defined directly in + terms of octets rather than at the ASN.1 level in order to facilitate + interoperable implementation without use of general ASN.1 processing + code. The token tag consists of the following elements, in order: + + 1. 0x60 -- Tag for [APPLICATION 0] SEQUENCE; indicates that + constructed form, definite length encoding follows. + + 2. Token length octets, specifying length of subsequent data + (i.e., the summed lengths of elements 3-5 in this list, and of the + mechanism-defined token object following the tag). This element + comprises a variable number of octets: + + 2a. If the indicated value is less than 128, it shall be + represented in a single octet with bit 8 (high order) set to "0" + and the remaining bits representing the value. + + 2b. If the indicated value is 128 or more, it shall be represented + in two or more octets, with bit 8 of the first octet set to "1" + and the remaining bits of the first octet specifying the number of + additional octets. The subsequent octets carry the value, 8 bits + per octet, most significant digit first. The minimum number of + octets shall be used to encode the length (i.e., no octets + representing leading zeros shall be included within the length + encoding). + + 3. 0x06 -- Tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER + + 4. Object identifier length -- length (number of octets) of the + encoded object identifier contained in element 5, encoded per + rules as described in 2a. and 2b. above. + + 5. Object identifier octets -- variable number of octets, encoded + per ASN.1 BER rules: + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 74] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + 5a. The first octet contains the sum of two values: (1) the top- + level object identifier component, multiplied by 40 (decimal), and + (2) the second-level object identifier component. This special + case is the only point within an object identifier encoding where + a single octet represents contents of more than one component. + + 5b. Subsequent octets, if required, encode successively-lower + components in the represented object identifier. A component's + encoding may span multiple octets, encoding 7 bits per octet (most + significant bits first) and with bit 8 set to "1" on all but the + final octet in the component's encoding. The minimum number of + octets shall be used to encode each component (i.e., no octets + representing leading zeros shall be included within a component's + encoding). + + (Note: In many implementations, elements 3-5 may be stored and + referenced as a contiguous string constant.) + + The token tag is immediately followed by a mechanism-defined token + object. Note that no independent size specifier intervenes following + the object identifier value to indicate the size of the mechanism- + defined token object. While ASN.1 usage within mechanism-defined + tokens is permitted, there is no requirement that the mechanism- + specific innerContextToken, innerMsgToken, and sealedUserData data + elements must employ ASN.1 BER/DER encoding conventions. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 75] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + The following ASN.1 syntax is included for descriptive purposes only, + to illustrate structural relationships among token and tag objects. + For interoperability purposes, token and tag encoding shall be + performed using the concrete encoding procedures described earlier in + this subsection. + + GSS-API DEFINITIONS ::= + + BEGIN + + MechType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- data structure definitions + + -- callers must be able to distinguish among + -- InitialContextToken, SubsequentContextToken, + -- PerMsgToken, and SealedMessage data elements + -- based on the usage in which they occur + + InitialContextToken ::= + -- option indication (delegation, etc.) indicated within + -- mechanism-specific token + [APPLICATION 0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE { + thisMech MechType, + innerContextToken ANY DEFINED BY thisMech + -- contents mechanism-specific + -- ASN.1 structure not required + } + + SubsequentContextToken ::= innerContextToken ANY + -- interpretation based on predecessor InitialContextToken + -- ASN.1 structure not required + + PerMsgToken ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_GetMIC and processed by GSS_VerifyMIC + -- ASN.1 structure not required + innerMsgToken ANY + + SealedMessage ::= + -- as emitted by GSS_Wrap and processed by GSS_Unwrap + -- includes internal, mechanism-defined indicator + -- of whether or not encrypted + -- ASN.1 structure not required + sealedUserData ANY + + END + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 76] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +3.2: Mechanism-Independent Exported Name Object Format + + This section specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating + representation for names exported via the GSS_Export_name() call, + including an object identifier representing the exporting mechanism. + The format of names encapsulated via this representation shall be + defined within individual mechanism drafts. Name objects of this + type will be identified with the following Object Identifier: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 4(gss-api-exported-name)} + + No name type OID is included in this mechanism-independent level of + format definition, since (depending on individual mechanism + specifications) the enclosed name may be implicitly typed or may be + explicitly typed using a means other than OID encoding. + + Length Name Description + + 2 TOK_ID Token Identifier + For exported name objects, this + must be hex 04 01. + 2 MECH_OID_LEN Length of the Mechanism OID + MECH_OID_LEN MECH_OID Mechanism OID, in DER + 4 NAME_LEN Length of name + NAME_LEN NAME Exported name; format defined in + applicable mechanism draft. + +4: Name Type Definitions + + This section includes definitions for name types and associated + syntaxes which are defined in a mechanism-independent fashion at the + GSS-API level rather than being defined in individual mechanism + specifications. + +4.1: Host-Based Service Name Form + + The following Object Identifier value is provided as a means to + identify this name form: + + {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), 6(nametypes), + 2(gss-host-based-services)} + + The recommended symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE". + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 77] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This name type is used to represent services associated with host + computers. This name form is constructed using two elements, + "service" and "hostname", as follows: + + service@hostname + + When a reference to a name of this type is resolved, the "hostname" + is canonicalized by attempting a DNS lookup and using the fully- + qualified domain name which is returned, or by using the "hostname" + as provided if the DNS lookup fails. The canonicalization operation + also maps the host's name into lower-case characters. + + The "hostname" element may be omitted. If no "@" separator is + included, the entire name is interpreted as the service specifier, + with the "hostname" defaulted to the canonicalized name of the local + host. + + Values for the "service" element are registered with the IANA. + +4.2: User Name Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended mechanism-independent + symbolic name for this type is "GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME". (Note: the same + name form and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API + mechanism, but the symbolic name recommended there begins with a + "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a named user on a local system. + Its interpretation is OS-specific. This name form is constructed as: + + username + +4.3: Machine UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended mechanism- + independent symbolic name for this type is + "GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". (Note: the same name form and OID is + defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the symbolic + name recommended there begins with a "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a numeric user identifier + corresponding to a user on a local system. Its interpretation is + OS-specific. The gss_buffer_desc representing a name of this type + should contain a locally-significant uid_t, represented in host byte + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 78] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + order. The GSS_Import_name() operation resolves this uid into a + username, which is then treated as the User Name Form. + +4.4: String UID Form + + This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + this type is "GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". (Note: the same name form + and OID is defined within the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism, but the + symbolic name recommended there begins with a "GSS_KRB5_NT_" prefix.) + + This name type is used to indicate a string of digits representing + the numeric user identifier of a user on a local system. Its + interpretation is OS-specific. This name type is similar to the + Machine UID Form, except that the buffer contains a string + representing the uid_t. + +5: Mechanism-Specific Example Scenarios + + This section provides illustrative overviews of the use of various + candidate mechanism types to support the GSS-API. These discussions + are intended primarily for readers familiar with specific security + technologies, demonstrating how GSS-API functions can be used and + implemented by candidate underlying mechanisms. They should not be + regarded as constrictive to implementations or as defining the only + means through which GSS-API functions can be realized with a + particular underlying technology, and do not demonstrate all GSS-API + features with each technology. + +5.1: Kerberos V5, single-TGT + + OS-specific login functions yield a TGT to the local realm Kerberos + server; TGT is placed in a credentials structure for the client. + Client calls GSS_Acquire_cred() to acquire a cred_handle in order to + reference the credentials for use in establishing security contexts. + + Client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(). If the requested service is + located in a different realm, GSS_Init_sec_context() gets the + necessary TGT/key pairs needed to traverse the path from local to + target realm; these data are placed in the owner's TGT cache. After + any needed remote realm resolution, GSS_Init_sec_context() yields a + service ticket to the requested service with a corresponding session + key; these data are stored in conjunction with the context. GSS-API + code sends KRB_TGS_REQ request(s) and receives KRB_TGS_REP + response(s) (in the successful case) or KRB_ERROR. + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 79] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + Assuming success, GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted + KRB_AP_REQ message, and returns it in output_token. The client sends + the output_token to the service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which verifies the authenticator, provides + the service with the client's authenticated name, and returns an + output_context_handle. + + Both parties now hold the session key associated with the service + ticket, and can use this key in subsequent GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Wrap(), and GSS_Unwrap() operations. + +5.2: Kerberos V5, double-TGT + + TGT acquisition as above. + + Note: To avoid unnecessary frequent invocations of error paths when + implementing the GSS-API atop Kerberos V5, it seems appropriate to + represent "single-TGT K-V5" and "double-TGT K-V5" with separate + mech_types, and this discussion makes that assumption. + + Based on the (specified or defaulted) mech_type, + GSS_Init_sec_context() determines that the double-TGT protocol + should be employed for the specified target. GSS_Init_sec_context() + returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status, and its returned + output_token contains a request to the service for the service's TGT. + (If a service TGT with suitably long remaining lifetime already + exists in a cache, it may be usable, obviating the need for this + step.) The client passes the output_token to the service. Note: this + scenario illustrates a different use for the GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED + status return facility than for support of mutual authentication; + note that both uses can coexist as successive operations within a + single context establishment operation. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(), which recognizes it as a request for TGT. + (Note that current Kerberos V5 defines no intra-protocol mechanism to + represent such a request.) GSS_Accept_sec_context() returns + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED major_status and provides the service's TGT in + its output_token. The service sends the output_token to the client. + + The client passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation of GSS_Init_sec_context(). GSS_Init_sec_context() caches + the received service TGT and uses it as part of a service ticket + request to the Kerberos authentication server, storing the returned + service ticket and session key in conjunction with the context. + GSS_Init_sec_context() builds a Kerberos-formatted authenticator, + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 80] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + and returns it in output_token along with GSS_S_COMPLETE return + major_status. The client sends the output_token to the service. + + Service passes the received token as the input_token argument to a + continuation call to GSS_Accept_sec_context(). + GSS_Accept_sec_context() verifies the authenticator, provides the + service with the client's authenticated name, and returns + major_status GSS_S_COMPLETE. + + GSS_GetMIC(), GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Wrap(), and GSS_Unwrap() as + above. + +5.3: X.509 Authentication Framework + + This example illustrates use of the GSS-API in conjunction with + public-key mechanisms, consistent with the X.509 Directory + Authentication Framework. + + The GSS_Acquire_cred() call establishes a credentials structure, + making the client's private key accessible for use on behalf of the + client. + + The client calls GSS_Init_sec_context(), which interrogates the + Directory to acquire (and validate) a chain of public-key + certificates, thereby collecting the public key of the service. The + certificate validation operation determines that suitable integrity + checks were applied by trusted authorities and that those + certificates have not expired. GSS_Init_sec_context() generates a + secret key for use in per-message protection operations on the + context, and enciphers that secret key under the service's public + key. + + The enciphered secret key, along with an authenticator quantity + signed with the client's private key, is included in the output_token + from GSS_Init_sec_context(). The output_token also carries a + certification path, consisting of a certificate chain leading from + the service to the client; a variant approach would defer this path + resolution to be performed by the service instead of being asserted + by the client. The client application sends the output_token to the + service. + + The service passes the received token as the input_token argument to + GSS_Accept_sec_context(). GSS_Accept_sec_context() validates the + certification path, and as a result determines a certified binding + between the client's distinguished name and the client's public key. + Given that public key, GSS_Accept_sec_context() can process the + input_token's authenticator quantity and verify that the client's + private key was used to sign the input_token. At this point, the + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 81] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + client is authenticated to the service. The service uses its private + key to decipher the enciphered secret key provided to it for per- + message protection operations on the context. + + The client calls GSS_GetMIC() or GSS_Wrap() on a data message, which + causes per-message authentication, integrity, and (optional) + confidentiality facilities to be applied to that message. The service + uses the context's shared secret key to perform corresponding + GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap() calls. + +6: Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo. + +7: Related Activities + + In order to implement the GSS-API atop existing, emerging, and future + security mechanisms: + + object identifiers must be assigned to candidate GSS-API + mechanisms and the name types which they support + + concrete data element formats and processing procedures must be + defined for candidate mechanisms + + Calling applications must implement formatting conventions which will + enable them to distinguish GSS-API tokens from other data carried in + their application protocols. + + Concrete language bindings are required for the programming + environments in which the GSS-API is to be employed, as RFC-1509 + defines for the C programming language and GSS-V1. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 82] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + +APPENDIX A + +MECHANISM DESIGN CONSTRAINTS + + The following constraints on GSS-API mechanism designs are adopted in + response to observed caller protocol requirements, and adherence + thereto is anticipated in subsequent descriptions of GSS-API + mechanisms to be documented in standards-track Internet + specifications. + + It is strongly recommended that mechanisms offering per-message + protection services also offer at least one of the replay detection + and sequencing services, as mechanisms offering neither of the latter + will fail to satisfy recognized requirements of certain candidate + caller protocols. + +APPENDIX B + + COMPATIBILITY WITH GSS-V1 + + It is the intent of this document to define an interface and + procedures which preserve compatibility between GSS-V1 (RFC-1508) + callers and GSS- V2 providers. All calls defined in GSS-V1 are + preserved, and it has been a goal that GSS-V1 callers should be able + to operate atop GSS-V2 provider implementations. Certain detailed + changes, summarized in this section, have been made in order to + resolve omissions identified in GSS-V1. + + The following GSS-V1 constructs, while supported within GSS-V2, are + deprecated: + + Names for per-message processing routines: GSS_Seal() deprecated + in favor of GSS_Wrap(); GSS_Sign() deprecated in favor of + GSS_GetMIC(); GSS_Unseal() deprecated in favor of GSS_Unwrap(); + GSS_Verify() deprecated in favor of GSS_VerifyMIC(). + + GSS_Delete_sec_context() facility for context_token usage, + allowing mechanisms to signal context deletion, is retained for + compatibility with GSS-V1. For current usage, it is recommended + that both peers to a context invoke GSS_Delete_sec_context() + independently, passing a null output_context_token buffer to + indicate that no context_token is required. Implementations of + GSS_Delete_sec_context() should delete relevant locally-stored + context information. + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 83] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + This GSS-V2 specification adds the following calls which are not + present in GSS-V1: + + Credential management calls: GSS_Add_cred(), + GSS_Inquire_cred_by_mech(). + + Context-level calls: GSS_Inquire_context(), GSS_Wrap_size_limit(), + GSS_Export_sec_context(), GSS_Import_sec_context(). + + Per-message calls: No new calls. Existing calls have been renamed. + + Support calls: GSS_Create_empty_OID_set(), + GSS_Add_OID_set_member(), GSS_Test_OID_set_member(), + GSS_Release_OID(), GSS_OID_to_str(), GSS_Str_to_OID(), + GSS_Inquire_names_for_mech(), GSS_Inquire_mechs_for_name(), + GSS_Canonicalize_name(), GSS_Export_name(), GSS_Duplicate_name(). + + This GSS-V2 specification introduces three new facilities applicable + to security contexts, indicated using the following context state + values which are not present in GSS-V1: + + anon_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context's initiator is + anonymous from the viewpoint of the target; Section 1.2.5 of this + specification provides a summary description of the GSS-V2 + anonymity support facility, support and use of which is optional. + + prot_ready_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context may be used + for per-message protection before final completion of context + establishment; Section 1.2.7 of this specification provides a + summary description of the GSS-V2 facility enabling mechanisms to + selectively permit per-message protection during context + establishment, support and use of which is optional. + + trans_state, set TRUE to indicate that a context is transferable to + another process using the GSS-V2 GSS_Export_sec_context() facility. + + These state values are represented (at the C bindings level) in + positions within a bit vector which are unused in GSS-V1, and may be + safely ignored by GSS-V1 callers. + + Relative to GSS-V1, GSS-V2 provides additional guidance to GSS-API + implementors in the following areas: implementation robustness, + credential management, behavior in multi-mechanism configurations, + naming support, and inclusion of optional sequencing services. The + token tagging facility as defined in GSS-V2, Section 3.1, is now + described directly in terms of octets to facilitate interoperable + implementation without general ASN.1 processing code; the + corresponding ASN.1 syntax, included for descriptive purposes, is + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 84] + +RFC 2078 GSS-API January 1997 + + + unchanged from that in GSS-V1. For use in conjunction with added + naming support facilities, a new Exported Name Object construct is + added. Additional name types are introduced in Section 4. + + This GSS-V2 specification adds the following major_status values + which are not defined in GSS-V1: + + GSS_S_BAD_QOP unsupported QOP value + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED operation unauthorized + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE operation unavailable + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT duplicate credential element requested + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN name contains multi-mechanism elements + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN skipped predecessor token(s) + detected + + Of these added status codes, only two values are defined to be + returnable by calls existing in GSS-V1: GSS_S_BAD_QOP (returnable by + GSS_GetMIC() and GSS_Wrap()), and GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN (returnable by + GSS_VerifyMIC() and GSS_Unwrap()). + + Additionally, GSS-V2 descriptions of certain calls present in GSS-V1 + have been updated to allow return of additional major_status values + from the set as defined in GSS-V1: GSS_Inquire_cred() has + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL and GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED defined as + returnable, GSS_Init_sec_context() has GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN, + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN, and GSS_S_BAD_MECH defined as returnable, and + GSS_Accept_sec_context() has GSS_S_BAD_MECH defined as returnable. + +Author's Address + + John Linn + OpenVision Technologies + One Main St. + Cambridge, MA 02142 USA + + Phone: +1 617.374.2245 + EMail: John.Linn@ov.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Linn Standards Track [Page 85] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f6a8a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2203.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1291 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Eisler +Request for Comments: 2203 A. Chiu +Category: Standards Track L. Ling + September 1997 + + + RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + This memo describes an ONC/RPC security flavor that allows RPC + protocols to access the Generic Security Services Application + Programming Interface (referred to henceforth as GSS-API). + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 2. The ONC RPC Message Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 3. Flavor Number Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 4. New auth_stat Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 5. Elements of the RPCSEC_GSS Security Protocol . . . . . . . . . 3 + 5.1. Version Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.2. Context Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.2.1. Mechanism and QOP Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 5.2.2. Context Creation Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 5.2.3. Context Creation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 5.2.3.1. Context Creation Response - Successful Acceptance . . . 8 + 5.2.3.1.1. Client Processing of Successful Context Creation + Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 5.2.3.2. Context Creation Response - Unsuccessful Cases . . . . . 9 + 5.3. RPC Data Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.3.1. RPC Request Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.3.2. RPC Request Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.2.1. RPC Request Data - No Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.2.2. RPC Request Data - With Data Integrity . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.2.3. RPC Request Data - With Data Privacy . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.3. Server Processing of RPC Data Requests . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.3.1. Context Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.3.2. Server Reply - Request Accepted . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.3.3.3. Server Reply - Request Denied . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + 5.3.3.4. Mapping of GSS-API Errors to Server Responses . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.1. GSS_GetMIC() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.2. GSS_VerifyMIC() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.3. GSS_Unwrap() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.3.3.4.4. GSS_Wrap() Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 5.4. Context Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 6. Set of GSS-API Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.1. Privacy of Call Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2. Sequence Number Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2.1. Sequence Numbers Above the Window . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2.2. Sequence Numbers Within or Below the Window . . . . . . 18 + 7.3. Message Stealing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + Appendix A. GSS-API Major Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + +1. Introduction + + This document describes the protocol used by the RPCSEC_GSS security + flavor. Security flavors have been called authentication flavors for + historical reasons. This memo recognizes that there are two other + security services besides authentication, integrity, and privacy, and + so defines a new RPCSEC_GSS security flavor. + + The protocol is described using the XDR language [Srinivasan-xdr]. + The reader is assumed to be familiar with ONC RPC and the security + flavor mechanism [Srinivasan-rpc]. The reader is also assumed to be + familiar with the GSS-API framework [Linn]. The RPCSEC_GSS security + flavor uses GSS-API interfaces to provide security services that are + independent of the underlying security mechanism. + +2. The ONC RPC Message Protocol + + This memo refers to the following XDR types of the ONC RPC protocol, + which are described in the document entitled Remote Procedure Call + Protocol Specification Version 2 [Srinivasan-rpc]: + + msg_type + reply_stat + auth_flavor + accept_stat + reject_stat + auth_stat + opaque_auth + rpc_msg + call_body + reply_body + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + accepted_reply + rejected_reply + +3. Flavor Number Assignment + + The RPCSEC_GSS security flavor has been assigned the value of 6: + + enum auth_flavor { + ... + RPCSEC_GSS = 6 /* RPCSEC_GSS security flavor */ + }; + +4. New auth_stat Values + + RPCSEC_GSS requires the addition of two new values to the auth_stat + enumerated type definition: + + enum auth_stat { + ... + /* + * RPCSEC_GSS errors + */ + RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM = 13, + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM = 14 + }; + + The descriptions of these two new values are defined later in this + memo. + +5. Elements of the RPCSEC_GSS Security Protocol + + An RPC session based on the RPCSEC_GSS security flavor consists of + three phases: context creation, RPC data exchange, and context + destruction. In the following discussion, protocol elements for + these three phases are described. + + The following description of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol uses some of the + definitions within XDR language description of the RPC protocol. + + Context creation and destruction use control messages that are not + dispatched to service procedures registered by an RPC server. The + program and version numbers used in these control messages are the + same as the RPC service's program and version numbers. The procedure + number used is NULLPROC (zero). A field in the credential + information (the gss_proc field which is defined in the + rpc_gss_cred_t structure below) specifies whether a message is to be + interpreted as a control message or a regular RPC message. If this + field is set to RPCSEC_GSS_DATA, no control action is implied; in + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + this case, it is a regular data message. If this field is set to any + other value, a control action is implied. This is described in the + following sections. + + Just as with normal RPC data exchange messages, the transaction + identifier (the xid field in struct rpc_msg), should be set to unique + values on each call for context creation and context destruction. + + The following definitions are used for describing the protocol. + + /* RPCSEC_GSS control procedures */ + + + enum rpc_gss_proc_t { + RPCSEC_GSS_DATA = 0, + RPCSEC_GSS_INIT = 1, + RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT = 2, + RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY = 3 + }; + + /* RPCSEC_GSS services */ + + enum rpc_gss_service_t { + /* Note: the enumerated value for 0 is reserved. */ + rpc_gss_svc_none = 1, + rpc_gss_svc_integrity = 2, + rpc_gss_svc_privacy = 3 + }; + + /* Credential */ + + /* + * Note: version 0 is reserved for possible future + * definition of a version negotiation protocol + * + */ + #define RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 1 + + struct rpc_gss_cred_t { + union switch (unsigned int version) { /* version of + RPCSEC_GSS */ + case RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1: + struct { + rpc_gss_proc_t gss_proc; /* control procedure */ + unsigned int seq_num; /* sequence number */ + rpc_gss_service_t service; /* service used */ + opaque handle<>; /* context handle */ + } rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t; + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + } + }; + + /* Maximum sequence number value */ + + #define MAXSEQ 0x80000000 + +5.1. Version Selection + + This document defines just one protocol version (RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1). + The client should assume that the server supports RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 + and issue a Context Creation message (as described in the section + RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1, the RPC response will have a reply_stat of + MSG_DENIED, a rejection status of AUTH_ERROR, and an auth_stat of + AUTH_REJECTED_CRED. + +5.2. Context Creation + + Before RPC data is exchanged on a session using the RPCSEC_GSS + flavor, a context must be set up between the client and the server. + Context creation may involve zero or more RPC exchanges. The number + of exchanges depends on the security mechanism. + +5.2.1. Mechanism and QOP Selection + + There is no facility in the RPCSEC_GSS protocol to negotiate GSS-API + mechanism identifiers or QOP values. At minimum, it is expected that + implementations of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol provide a means to: + + * specify mechanism identifiers, QOP values, and RPCSEC_GSS + service values on the client side, and to + + * enforce mechanism identifiers, QOP values, and RPCSEC_GSS + service values on a per-request basis on the server side. + + It is necessary that above capabilities exist so that applications + have the means to conform the required set of required set of + tuples (See the section entitled Set of + GSS-API Mechanisms). An application may negotiate selection within its protocol or via an out of band + protocol. Hence it may be necessary for RPCSEC_GSS implementations to + provide programming interfaces for the specification and enforcement + of . + + Additionally, implementations may depend on negotiation schemes + constructed as pseudo-mechanisms under the GSS-API. Because such + schemes are below the GSS-API layer, the RPCSEC_GSS protocol, as + specified in this document, can make use of them. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.2.2. Context Creation Requests + + The first RPC request from the client to the server initiates context + creation. Within the RPC message protocol's call_body structure, + rpcvers is set to 2. prog and vers are always those for the service + being accessed. The proc is always set to NULLPROC (zero). + + Within the RPC message protocol's cred structure, flavor is set to + RPCSEC_GSS (6). The opaque data of the cred structure (the body + field) constituting the credential encodes the rpc_gss_cred_t + structure defined previously. + + The values of the fields contained in the rpc_gss_cred_t structure + are set as follows. The version field is set to the version of the + RPCSEC_GSS protocol the client wants to use. The remainder of this + memo documents version RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1 of RPCSEC_GSS, and so the + version field would be set to RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1. The gss_proc field + must be set to RPCSEC_GSS_INIT for the first creation request. In + subsequent creation requests, the gss_proc field must be set to + RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT. In a creation request, the seq_num and + service fields are undefined and both must be ignored by the server. + In the first creation request, the handle field is NULL (opaque data + of zero length). In subsequent creation requests, handle must be + equal to the value returned by the server. The handle field serves + as the identifier for the context, and will not change for the + duration of the context, including responses to + RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT. + + The verifier field in the RPC message header is also described by the + opaque_auth structure. All creation requests have the NULL verifier + (AUTH_NONE flavor with zero length opaque data). + + Following the verifier are the call data (procedure specific + parameters). Note that the proc field of the call_body structure is + set to NULLPROC, and thus normally there would be zero octets + following the verifier. However, since there is no RPC data exchange + during a context creation, it is safe to transfer information + following the verifier. It is necessary to "overload" the call data + in this way, rather than pack the GSS-API token into the RPC header, + because RPC Version 2 restricts the amount of data that can be sent + in the header. The opaque body of the credential and verifier fields + can be each at most 400 octets long, and GSS tokens can be longer + than 800 octets. + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + The call data for a context creation request is described by the + following structure for all creation requests: + + struct rpc_gss_init_arg { + opaque gss_token<>; + }; + + Here, gss_token is the token returned by the call to GSS-API's + GSS_Init_sec_context() routine, opaquely encoded. The value of this + field will likely be different in each creation request, if there is + more than one creation request. If no token is returned by the call + to GSS_Init_sec_context(), the context must have been created + (assuming no errors), and there will not be any more creation + requests. + + When GSS_Init_sec_context() is called, the parameters + replay_det_req_flag and sequence_req_flag must be turned off. The + reasons for this are: + + * ONC RPC can be used over unreliable transports and provides no + layer to reliably re-assemble messages. Thus it is possible for + gaps in message sequencing to occur, as well as out of order + messages. + + * RPC servers can be multi-threaded, and thus the order in which + GSS-API messages are signed or wrapped can be different from the + order in which the messages are verified or unwrapped, even if + the requests are sent on reliable transports. + + * To maximize convenience of implementation, the order in which an + ONC RPC entity will verify the header and verify/unwrap the body + of an RPC call or reply is left unspecified. + + The RPCSEC_GSS protocol provides for protection from replay attack, + yet tolerates out-of-order delivery or processing of messages and + tolerates dropped requests. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.2.3. Context Creation Responses + +5.2.3.1. Context Creation Response - Successful Acceptance + + The response to a successful creation request has an MSG_ACCEPTED + response with a status of SUCCESS. The results field encodes a + response with the following structure: + + struct rpc_gss_init_res { + opaque handle<>; + unsigned int gss_major; + unsigned int gss_minor; + unsigned int seq_window; + opaque gss_token<>; + }; + + Here, handle is non-NULL opaque data that serves as the context + identifier. The client must use this value in all subsequent requests + whether control messages or otherwise). The gss_major and gss_minor + fields contain the results of the call to GSS_Accept_sec_context() + executed by the server. The values for the gss_major field are + defined in Appendix A of this document. The values for the gss_minor + field are GSS-API mechanism specific and are defined in the + mechanism's specification. If gss_major is not one of GSS_S_COMPLETE + or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the context setup has failed; in this case + handle and gss_token must be set to NULL by the server. The value of + gss_minor is dependent on the value of gss_major and the security + mechanism used. The gss_token field contains any token returned by + the GSS_Accept_sec_context() call executed by the server. A token + may be returned for both successful values of gss_major. If the + value is GSS_S_COMPLETE, it indicates that the server is not + expecting any more tokens, and the RPC Data Exchange phase must begin + on the subsequent request from the client. If the value is + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the server is expecting another token. Hence + the client must send at least one more creation request (with + gss_proc set to RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT in the request's credential) + carrying the required token. + + In a successful response, the seq_window field is set to the sequence + window length supported by the server for this context. This window + specifies the maximum number of client requests that may be + outstanding for this context. The server will accept "seq_window" + requests at a time, and these may be out of order. The client may + use this number to determine the number of threads that can + simultaneously send requests on this context. + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + If gss_major is GSS_S_COMPLETE, the verifier's (the verf element in + the response) flavor field is set to RPCSEC_GSS, and the body field + set to the checksum of the seq_window (in network order). The QOP + used for this checksum is 0 (zero), which is the default QOP. For + all other values of gss_major, a NULL verifier (AUTH_NONE flavor with + zero-length opaque data) is used. + +5.2.3.1.1. Client Processing of Successful Context Creation Responses + + If the value of gss_major in the response is GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, + then the client, per the GSS-API specification, must invoke + GSS_Init_sec_context() using the token returned in gss_token in the + context creation response. The client must then generate a context + creation request, with gss_proc set to RPCSEC_GSS_CONTINUE_INIT. + + If the value of gss_major in the response is GSS_S_COMPLETE, and if + the client's previous invocation of GSS_Init_sec_context() returned a + gss_major value of GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, then the client, per the + GSS-API specification, must invoke GSS_Init_sec_context() using the + token returned in gss_token in the context creation response. If + GSS_Init_sec_context() returns GSS_S_COMPLETE, the context is + successfully set up, and the RPC data exchange phase must begin on + the subsequent request from the client. + +5.2.3.2. Context Creation Response - Unsuccessful Cases + + An MSG_ACCEPTED reply (to a creation request) with an acceptance + status of other than SUCCESS has a NULL verifier (flavor set to + AUTH_NONE, and zero length opaque data in the body field), and is + formulated as usual for different status values. + + An MSG_DENIED reply (to a creation request) is also formulated as + usual. Note that MSG_DENIED could be returned because the server's + RPC implementation does not recognize the RPCSEC_GSS security flavor. + RFC 1831 does not specify the appropriate reply status in this + instance, but common implementation practice appears to be to return + a rejection status of AUTH_ERROR with an auth_stat of + AUTH_REJECTEDCRED. Even though two new values (RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM + and RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM) have been defined for the auth_stat type, + neither of these two can be returned in responses to context creation + requests. The auth_stat new values can be used for responses to + normal (data) requests. This is described later. + + MSG_DENIED might also be returned if the RPCSEC_GSS version number in + the credential is not supported on the server. In that case, the + server returns a rejection status of AUTH_ERROR, with an auth_stat of + + AUTH_REJECTED_CRED. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.3. RPC Data Exchange + + The data exchange phase is entered after a context has been + successfully set up. The format of the data exchanged depends on the + security service used for the request. Although clients can change + the security service and QOP used on a per-request basis, this may + not be acceptable to all RPC services; some RPC services may "lock" + the data exchange phase into using the QOP and service used on the + first data exchange message. For all three modes of service (no data + integrity, data integrity, data privacy), the RPC request header has + the same format. + +5.3.1. RPC Request Header + + The credential has the opaque_auth structure described earlier. The + flavor field is set to RPCSEC_GSS. The credential body is created by + XDR encoding the rpc_gss_cred_t structure listed earlier into an + octet stream, and then opaquely encoding this octet stream as the + body field. + + Values of the fields contained in the rpc_gss_cred_t structure are + set as follows. The version field is set to same version value that + was used to create the context, which within the scope of this memo + will always be RPCSEC_GSS_VERS_1. The gss_proc field is set to + RPCSEC_GSS_DATA. The service field is set to indicate the desired + service (one of rpc_gss_svc_none, rpc_gss_svc_integrity, or + rpc_gss_svc_privacy). The handle field is set to the context handle + value received from the RPC server during context creation. The + seq_num field can start at any value below MAXSEQ, and must be + incremented (by one or more) for successive requests. Use of + sequence numbers is described in detail when server processing of the + request is discussed. + + The verifier has the opaque_auth structure described earlier. The + flavor field is set to RPCSEC_GSS. The body field is set as follows. + The checksum of the RPC header (up to and including the credential) + is computed using the GSS_GetMIC() call with the desired QOP. This + returns the checksum as an opaque octet stream and its length. This + is encoded into the body field. Note that the QOP is not explicitly + specified anywhere in the request. It is implicit in the checksum or + encrypted data. The same QOP value as is used for the header + checksum must also be used for the data (for checksumming or + encrypting), unless the service used for the request is + rpc_gss_svc_none. + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.3.2. RPC Request Data + +5.3.2.1. RPC Request Data - No Data Integrity + + If the service specified is rpc_gss_svc_none, the data (procedure + arguments) are not integrity or privacy protected. They are sent in + exactly the same way as they would be if the AUTH_NONE flavor were + used (following the verifier). Note, however, that since the RPC + header is integrity protected, the sender will still be authenticated + in this case. + +5.3.2.2. RPC Request Data - With Data Integrity + + When data integrity is used, the request data is represented as + follows: + + struct rpc_gss_integ_data { + opaque databody_integ<>; + opaque checksum<>; + }; + + The databody_integ field is created as follows. A structure + consisting of a sequence number followed by the procedure arguments + is constructed. This is shown below as the type rpc_gss_data_t: + + struct rpc_gss_data_t { + unsigned int seq_num; + proc_req_arg_t arg; + }; + + Here, seq_num must have the same value as in the credential. The + type proc_req_arg_t is the procedure specific XDR type describing the + procedure arguments (and so is not specified here). The octet stream + corresponding to the XDR encoded rpc_gss_data_t structure and its + length are placed in the databody_integ field. Note that because the + XDR type of databody_integ is opaque, the XDR encoding of + databody_integ will include an initial four octet length field, + followed by the XDR encoded octet stream of rpc_gss_data_t. + + The checksum field represents the checksum of the XDR encoded octet + stream corresponding to the XDR encoded rpc_gss_data_t structure + (note, this is not the checksum of the databody_integ field). This + is obtained using the GSS_GetMIC() call, with the same QOP as was + used to compute the header checksum (in the verifier). The + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + GSS_GetMIC() call returns the checksum as an opaque octet stream and + its length. The checksum field of struct rpc_gss_integ_data has an + XDR type of opaque. Thus the checksum length from GSS_GetMIC() is + encoded as a four octet length field, followed by the checksum, + padded to a multiple of four octets. + +5.3.2.3. RPC Request Data - With Data Privacy + + When data privacy is used, the request data is represented as + follows: + + struct rpc_gss_priv_data { + opaque databody_priv<> + }; + + The databody_priv field is created as follows. The rpc_gss_data_t + structure described earlier is constructed again in the same way as + for the case of data integrity. Next, the GSS_Wrap() call is invoked + to encrypt the octet stream corresponding to the rpc_gss_data_t + structure, using the same value for QOP (argument qop_req to + GSS_Wrap()) as was used for the header checksum (in the verifier) and + conf_req_flag (an argument to GSS_Wrap()) of TRUE. The GSS_Wrap() + call returns an opaque octet stream (representing the encrypted + rpc_gss_data_t structure) and its length, and this is encoded as the + databody_priv field. Since databody_priv has an XDR type of opaque, + the length returned by GSS_Wrap() is encoded as the four octet + length, followed by the encrypted octet stream (padded to a multiple + of four octets). + +5.3.3. Server Processing of RPC Data Requests + +5.3.3.1. Context Management + + When a request is received by the server, the following are verified + to be acceptable: + + * the version number in the credential + + * the service specified in the credential + + * the context handle specified in the credential + + * the header checksum in the verifier (via GSS_VerifyMIC()) + + * the sequence number (seq_num) specified in the credential (more + on this follows) + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + The gss_proc field in the credential must be set to RPCSEC_GSS_DATA + for data requests (otherwise, the message will be interpreted as a + control message). + + The server maintains a window of "seq_window" sequence numbers, + starting with the last sequence number seen and extending backwards. + If a sequence number higher than the last number seen is received + (AND if GSS_VerifyMIC() on the header checksum from the verifier + returns GSS_S_COMPLETE), the window is moved forward to the new + sequence number. If the last sequence number seen is N, the server + is prepared to receive requests with sequence numbers in the range N + through (N - seq_window + 1), both inclusive. If the sequence number + received falls below this range, it is silently discarded. If the + sequence number is within this range, and the server has not seen it, + the request is accepted, and the server turns on a bit to "remember" + that this sequence number has been seen. If the server determines + that it has already seen a sequence number within the window, the + request is silently discarded. The server should select a seq_window + value based on the number requests it expects to process + simultaneously. For example, in a threaded implementation seq_window + might be equal to the number of server threads. There are no known + security issues with selecting a large window. The primary issue is + how much space the server is willing to allocate to keep track of + requests received within the window. + + The reason for discarding requests silently is that the server is + unable to determine if the duplicate or out of range request was due + to a sequencing problem in the client, network, or the operating + system, or due to some quirk in routing, or a replay attack by an + intruder. Discarding the request allows the client to recover after + timing out, if indeed the duplication was unintentional or well + intended. Note that a consequence of the silent discard is that + clients may increment the seq_num by more than one. The effect of + this is that the window will move forward more quickly. It is not + believed that there is any benefit to doing this. + + Note that the sequence number algorithm requires that the client + increment the sequence number even if it is retrying a request with + the same RPC transaction identifier. It is not infrequent for + clients to get into a situation where they send two or more attempts + and a slow server sends the reply for the first attempt. With + RPCSEC_GSS, each request and reply will have a unique sequence + number. If the client wishes to improve turn around time on the RPC + call, it can cache the RPCSEC_GSS sequence number of each request it + sends. Then when it receives a response with a matching RPC + transaction identifier, it can compute the checksum of each sequence + number in the cache to try to match the checksum in the reply's + verifier. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + The data is decoded according to the service specified in the + credential. In the case of integrity or privacy, the server ensures + that the QOP value is acceptable, and that it is the same as that + used for the header checksum in the verifier. Also, in the case of + integrity or privacy, the server will reject the message (with a + reply status of MSG_ACCEPTED, and an acceptance status of + GARBAGE_ARGS) if the sequence number embedded in the request body is + different from the sequence number in the credential. + +5.3.3.2. Server Reply - Request Accepted + + An MSG_ACCEPTED reply to a request in the data exchange phase will + have the verifier's (the verf element in the response) flavor field + set to RPCSEC_GSS, and the body field set to the checksum (the output + of GSS_GetMIC()) of the sequence number (in network order) of the + corresponding request. The QOP used is the same as the QOP used for + the corresponding request. + + If the status of the reply is not SUCCESS, the rest of the message is + formatted as usual. + + If the status of the message is SUCCESS, the format of the rest of + the message depends on the service specified in the corresponding + request message. Basically, what follows the verifier in this case + are the procedure results, formatted in different ways depending on + the requested service. + + If no data integrity was requested, the procedure results are + formatted as for the AUTH_NONE security flavor. + + If data integrity was requested, the results are encoded in exactly + the same way as the procedure arguments were in the corresponding + request. See the section 'RPC Request Data - With Data Integrity.' + The only difference is that the structure representing the + procedure's result - proc_res_arg_t - must be substituted in place of + the request argument structure proc_req_arg_t. The QOP used for the + checksum must be the same as that used for constructing the reply + verifier. + + If data privacy was requested, the results are encoded in exactly the + same way as the procedure arguments were in the corresponding + request. See the section 'RPC Request Data - With Data Privacy.' The + QOP used for encryption must be the same as that used for + constructing the reply verifier. + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +5.3.3.3. Server Reply - Request Denied + + An MSG_DENIED reply (to a data request) is formulated as usual. Two + new values (RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM and RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM) have + been defined for the auth_stat type. When the reason for denial of + the request is a reject_stat of AUTH_ERROR, one of the two new + auth_stat values could be returned in addition to the existing + values. These two new values have special significance from the + existing reasons for denial of a request. + + The server maintains a list of contexts for the clients that are + currently in session with it. Normally, a context is destroyed when + the client ends the session corresponding to it. However, due to + resource constraints, the server may destroy a context prematurely + (on an LRU basis, or if the server machine is rebooted, for example). + In this case, when a client request comes in, there may not be a + context corresponding to its handle. The server rejects the request, + with the reason RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM in this case. Upon receiving + this error, the client must refresh the context - that is, + reestablish it after destroying the old one - and try the request + again. This error is also returned if the context handle matches + that of a different context that was allocated after the client's + context was destroyed (this will be detected by a failure in + verifying the header checksum). + + If the GSS_VerifyMIC() call on the header checksum (contained in the + verifier) fails to return GSS_S_COMPLETE, the server rejects the + request and returns an auth_stat of RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM. + + When the client's sequence number exceeds the maximum the server will + allow, the server will reject the request with the reason + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM. Also, if security credentials become stale + while in use (due to ticket expiry in the case of the Kerberos V5 + mechanism, for example), the failures which result cause the + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM reason to be returned. In these cases also, + the client must refresh the context, and retry the request. + + For other errors, retrying will not rectify the problem and the + client must not refresh the context until the problem causing the + client request to be denied is rectified. + + If the version field in the credential does not match the version of + RPCSEC_GSS that was used when the context was created, the + AUTH_BADCRED value is returned. + + If there is a problem with the credential, such a bad length, illegal + control procedure, or an illegal service, the appropriate auth_stat + status is AUTH_BADCRED. + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + Other errors can be returned as appropriate. + +5.3.3.4. Mapping of GSS-API Errors to Server Responses + + During the data exchange phase, the server may invoke GSS_GetMIC(), + GSS_VerifyMIC(), GSS_Unwrap(), and GSS_Wrap(). If any of these + routines fail to return GSS_S_COMPLETE, then various unsuccessful + responses can be returned. The are described as follows for each of + the aforementioned four interfaces. + +5.3.3.4.1. GSS_GetMIC() Failure + + When GSS_GetMIC() is called to generate the verifier in the response, + a failure results in an RPC response with a reply status of + MSG_DENIED, reject status of AUTH_ERROR and an auth status of + RPCSEC_GSS_CTXPROBLEM. + + When GSS_GetMIC() is called to sign the call results (service is + rpc_gss_svc_integrity), a failure results in no RPC response being + sent. Since ONC RPC server applications will typically control when a + response is sent, the failure indication will be returned to the + server application and it can take appropriate action (such as + logging the error). + +5.3.3.4.2. GSS_VerifyMIC() Failure + + When GSS_VerifyMIC() is called to verify the verifier in request, a + failure results in an RPC response with a reply status of MSG_DENIED, + reject status of AUTH_ERROR and an auth status of + RPCSEC_GSS_CREDPROBLEM. + + When GSS_VerifyMIC() is called to verify the call arguments (service + is rpc_gss_svc_integrity), a failure results in an RPC response with + a reply status of MSG_ACCEPTED, and an acceptance status of + GARBAGE_ARGS. + +5.3.3.4.3. GSS_Unwrap() Failure + + When GSS_Unwrap() is called to decrypt the call arguments (service is + rpc_gss_svc_privacy), a failure results in an RPC response with a + reply status of MSG_ACCEPTED, and an acceptance status of + GARBAGE_ARGS. + +5.3.3.4.4. GSS_Wrap() Failure + + When GSS_Wrap() is called to encrypt the call results (service is + rpc_gss_svc_privacy), a failure results in no RPC response being + sent. Since ONC RPC server applications will typically control when a + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + response is sent, the failure indication will be returned to the + application and it can take appropriate action (such as logging the + error). + +5.4. Context Destruction + + When the client is done using the session, it must send a control + message informing the server that it no longer requires the context. + This message is formulated just like a data request packet, with the + following differences: the credential has gss_proc set to + RPCSEC_GSS_DESTROY, the procedure specified in the header is + NULLPROC, and there are no procedure arguments. The sequence number + in the request must be valid, and the header checksum in the verifier + must be valid, for the server to accept the message. The server + sends a response as it would to a data request. The client and + server must then destroy the context for the session. + + If the request to destroy the context fails for some reason, the + client need not take any special action. The server must be prepared + to deal with situations where clients never inform the server that + they no longer are in session and so don't need the server to + maintain a context. An LRU mechanism or an aging mechanism should be + employed by the server to clean up in such cases. + +6. Set of GSS-API Mechanisms + + RPCSEC_GSS is effectively a "pass-through" to the GSS-API layer, and + as such it is inappropriate for the RPCSEC_GSS specification to + enumerate a minimum set of required security mechanisms and/or + quality of protections. + + If an application protocol specification references RPCSEC_GSS, the + protocol specification must list a mandatory set of { mechanism, QOP, + service } triples, such that an implementation cannot claim + conformance to the protocol specification unless it implements the + set of triples. Within each triple, mechanism is a GSS-API security + mechanism, QOP is a valid quality-of-protection within the mechanism, + and service is either rpc_gss_svc_integrity or rpc_gss_svc_privacy. + + For example, a network filing protocol built on RPC that depends on + RPCSEC_GSS for security, might require that Kerberos V5 with the + default QOP using the rpc_gss_svc_integrity service be supported by + implementations conforming to the network filing protocol + specification. + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +7. Security Considerations + +7.1. Privacy of Call Header + + The reader will note that for the privacy option, only the call + arguments and results are encrypted. Information about the + application in the form of RPC program number, program version + number, and program procedure number is transmitted in the clear. + Encrypting these fields in the RPC call header would have changed the + size and format of the call header. This would have required revising + the RPC protocol which was beyond the scope of this proposal. Storing + the encrypted numbers in the credential would have obviated a + protocol change, but would have introduced more overloading of fields + and would have made implementations of RPC more complex. Even if the + fields were encrypted somehow, in most cases an attacker can + determine the program number and version number by examining the + destination address of the request and querying the rpcbind service + on the destination host [Srinivasan-bind]. In any case, even by not + encrypting the three numbers, RPCSEC_GSS still improves the state of + security over what existing RPC services have had available + previously. Implementors of new RPC services that are concerned about + this risk may opt to design in a "sub-procedure" field that is + included in the service specific call arguments. + +7.2. Sequence Number Attacks + +7.2.1. Sequence Numbers Above the Window + + An attacker cannot coax the server into raising the sequence number + beyond the range the legitimate client is aware of (and thus engineer + a denial of server attack) without constructing an RPC request that + will pass the header checksum. If the cost of verifying the header + checksum is sufficiently large (depending on the speed of the + processor doing the checksum and the cost of checksum algorithm), it + is possible to envision a denial of service attack (vandalism, in the + form of wasting processing resources) whereby the attacker sends + requests that are above the window. The simplest method might be for + the attacker to monitor the network traffic and then choose a + sequence number that is far above the current sequence number. Then + the attacker can send bogus requests using the above window sequence + number. + +7.2.2. Sequence Numbers Within or Below the Window + + If the attacker sends requests that are within or below the window, + then even if the header checksum is successfully verified, the server + will silently discard the requests because the server assumes it has + already processed the request. In this case, a server can optimize by + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + skipping the header checksum verification if the sequence number is + below the window, or if it is within the window, not attempt the + checksum verification if the sequence number has already been seen. + +7.3. Message Stealing Attacks + + This proposal does not address attacks where an attacker can block or + steal messages without being detected by the server. To implement + such protection would be tantamount to assuming a state in the RPC + service. RPCSEC_GSS does not worsen this situation. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +Appendix A. GSS-API Major Status Codes + + The GSS-API definition [Linn] does not include numerical values for + the various GSS-API major status codes. It is expected that this will + be addressed in future RFC. Until then, this appendix defines the + values for each GSS-API major status code listed in the GSS-API + definition. If in the future, the GSS-API definition defines values + for the codes that are different than what follows, then implementors + of RPCSEC_GSS will be obliged to map them into the values defined + below. If in the future, the GSS-API definition defines additional + status codes not defined below, then the RPCSEC_GSS definition will + subsume those additional values. + + Here are the definitions of each GSS_S_* major status that the + implementor of RPCSEC_GSS can expect in the gss_major major field of + rpc_gss_init_res. These definitions are not in RPC description + language form. The numbers are in base 16 (hexadecimal): + + GSS_S_COMPLETE 0x00000000 + GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED 0x00000001 + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN 0x00000002 + GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN 0x00000004 + GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN 0x00000008 + GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN 0x00000010 + GSS_S_BAD_MECH 0x00010000 + GSS_S_BAD_NAME 0x00020000 + GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE 0x00030000 + GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS 0x00040000 + GSS_S_BAD_STATUS 0x00050000 + GSS_S_BAD_MIC 0x00060000 + GSS_S_BAD_SIG 0x00060000 + GSS_S_NO_CRED 0x00070000 + GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT 0x00080000 + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN 0x00090000 + GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL 0x000a0000 + GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED 0x000b0000 + GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED 0x000c0000 + GSS_S_FAILURE 0x000d0000 + GSS_S_BAD_QOP 0x000e0000 + GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED 0x000f0000 + GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE 0x00100000 + GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT 0x00110000 + GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN 0x00120000 + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ 0x01000000 + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE 0x02000000 + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE 0x03000000 + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + + Note that the GSS-API major status is split into three fields as + follows: + + Most Significant Bit Least Significant Bit + |------------------------------------------------------------| + | Calling Error | Routine Error | Supplementary Info | + |------------------------------------------------------------| + Bit 31 24 23 16 15 0 + + Up to one status in the Calling Error field can be logically ORed + with up to one status in the Routine Error field which in turn can be + logically ORed with zero or more statuses in the Supplementary Info + field. If the resulting major status has a non-zero Calling Error + and/or a non-zero Routine Error, then the applicable GSS-API + operation has failed. For purposes of RPCSEC_GSS, this means that + the GSS_Accept_sec_context() call executed by the server has failed. + + If the major status is equal GSS_S_COMPLETE, then this indicates the + absence of any Errors or Supplementary Info. + + The meanings of most of the GSS_S_* status are defined in the GSS-API + definition, which the exceptions of: + + GSS_S_BAD_MIC This code has the same meaning as GSS_S_BAD_SIG. + + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ + A required input parameter could not be read. + + GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE + A required input parameter could not be written. + + GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE + A parameter was malformed. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +Acknowledgements + + Much of the protocol was based on the AUTH_GSSAPI security flavor + developed by Open Vision Technologies [Jaspan]. In particular, we + acknowledge Barry Jaspan, Marc Horowitz, John Linn, and Ellen + McDermott. + + Raj Srinivasan designed RPCSEC_GSS [Eisler] with input from Mike + Eisler. Raj, Roland Schemers, Lin Ling, and Alex Chiu contributed to + Sun Microsystems' implementation of RPCSEC_GSS. + + Brent Callaghan, Marc Horowitz, Barry Jaspan, John Linn, Hilarie + Orman, Martin Rex, Ted Ts'o, and John Wroclawski analyzed the + specification and gave valuable feedback. + + Steve Nahm and Kathy Slattery reviewed various drafts of this + specification. + + Much of content of Appendix A was excerpted from John Wray's Work in + Progress on GSS-API Version 2 C-bindings. + +References + + [Eisler] Eisler, M., Schemers, R., and Srinivasan, R. + (1996). "Security Mechanism Independence in ONC + RPC," Proceedings of the Sixth Annual USENIX + Security Symposium, pp. 51-65. + + [Jaspan] Jaspan, B. (1995). "GSS-API Security for ONC + RPC," `95 Proceedings of The Internet Society + Symposium on Network and Distributed System + Security, pp. 144- 151. + + [Linn] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application + Program Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January + 1997. + + [Srinivasan-bind] Srinivasan, R., "Binding Protocols for + ONC RPC Version 2", RFC 1833, August 1995. + + [Srinivasan-rpc] Srinivasan, R., "RPC: Remote Procedure Call + Protocol Specification Version 2", RFC 1831, + August 1995. + + [Srinivasan-xdr] Srinivasan, R., "XDR: External Data + Representation Standard", RFC 1832, August 1995. + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification September 1997 + + +Authors' Addresses + + Michael Eisler + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + M/S UCOS03 + 2550 Garcia Avenue + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: +1 (719) 599-9026 + EMail: mre@eng.sun.com + + + Alex Chiu + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + M/S UMPK17-203 + 2550 Garcia Avenue + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: +1 (415) 786-6465 + EMail: hacker@eng.sun.com + + + Lin Ling + Sun Microsystems, Inc. + M/S UMPK17-201 + 2550 Garcia Avenue + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: +1 (415) 786-5084 + EMail: lling@eng.sun.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eisler, et. al. Standards Track [Page 23] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1fbfcbf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/standardisation/rfc2228.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1515 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group M. Horowitz +Request for Comments: 2228 Cygnus Solutions +Updates: 959 S. Lunt +Category: Standards Track Bellcore + October 1997 + + FTP Security Extensions + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + This document defines extensions to the FTP specification STD 9, RFC + 959, "FILE TRANSFER PROTOCOL (FTP)" (October 1985). These extensions + provide strong authentication, integrity, and confidentiality on both + the control and data channels with the introduction of new optional + commands, replies, and file transfer encodings. + + The following new optional commands are introduced in this + specification: + + AUTH (Authentication/Security Mechanism), + ADAT (Authentication/Security Data), + PROT (Data Channel Protection Level), + PBSZ (Protection Buffer Size), + CCC (Clear Command Channel), + MIC (Integrity Protected Command), + CONF (Confidentiality Protected Command), and + ENC (Privacy Protected Command). + + A new class of reply types (6yz) is also introduced for protected + replies. + + None of the above commands are required to be implemented, but + interdependencies exist. These dependencies are documented with the + commands. + + Note that this specification is compatible with STD 9, RFC 959. + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +1. Introduction + + The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in STD 9, RFC 959 + and in place on the Internet uses usernames and passwords passed in + cleartext to authenticate clients to servers (via the USER and PASS + commands). Except for services such as "anonymous" FTP archives, + this represents a security risk whereby passwords can be stolen + through monitoring of local and wide-area networks. This either aids + potential attackers through password exposure and/or limits + accessibility of files by FTP servers who cannot or will not accept + the inherent security risks. + + Aside from the problem of authenticating users in a secure manner, + there is also the problem of authenticating servers, protecting + sensitive data and/or verifying its integrity. An attacker may be + able to access valuable or sensitive data merely by monitoring a + network, or through active means may be able to delete or modify the + data being transferred so as to corrupt its integrity. An active + attacker may also initiate spurious file transfers to and from a site + of the attacker's choice, and may invoke other commands on the + server. FTP does not currently have any provision for the encryption + or verification of the authenticity of commands, replies, or + transferred data. Note that these security services have value even + to anonymous file access. + + Current practice for sending files securely is generally either: + + 1. via FTP of files pre-encrypted under keys which are manually + distributed, + + 2. via electronic mail containing an encoding of a file encrypted + under keys which are manually distributed, + + 3. via a PEM message, or + + 4. via the rcp command enhanced to use Kerberos. + + None of these means could be considered even a de facto standard, and + none are truly interactive. A need exists to securely transfer files + using FTP in a secure manner which is supported within the FTP + protocol in a consistent manner and which takes advantage of existing + security infrastructure and technology. Extensions are necessary to + the FTP specification if these security services are to be introduced + into the protocol in an interoperable way. + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + Although the FTP control connection follows the Telnet protocol, and + Telnet has defined an authentication and encryption option [TELNET- + SEC], [RFC-1123] explicitly forbids the use of Telnet option + negotiation over the control connection (other than Synch and IP). + + Also, the Telnet authentication and encryption option does not + provide for integrity protection only (without confidentiality), and + does not address the protection of the data channel. + +2. FTP Security Overview + + At the highest level, the FTP security extensions seek to provide an + abstract mechanism for authenticating and/or authorizing connections, + and integrity and/or confidentiality protecting commands, replies, + and data transfers. + + In the context of FTP security, authentication is the establishment + of a client's identity and/or a server's identity in a secure way, + usually using cryptographic techniques. The basic FTP protocol does + not have a concept of authentication. + + Authorization is the process of validating a user for login. The + basic authorization process involves the USER, PASS, and ACCT + commands. With the FTP security extensions, authentication + established using a security mechanism may also be used to make the + authorization decision. + + Without the security extensions, authentication of the client, as + this term is usually understood, never happens. FTP authorization is + accomplished with a password, passed on the network in the clear as + the argument to the PASS command. The possessor of this password is + assumed to be authorized to transfer files as the user named in the + USER command, but the identity of the client is never securely + established. + + An FTP security interaction begins with a client telling the server + what security mechanism it wants to use with the AUTH command. The + server will either accept this mechanism, reject this mechanism, or, + in the case of a server which does not implement the security + extensions, reject the command completely. The client may try + multiple security mechanisms until it requests one which the server + accepts. This allows a rudimentary form of negotiation to take + place. (If more complex negotiation is desired, this may be + implemented as a security mechanism.) The server's reply will + indicate if the client must respond with additional data for the + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + security mechanism to interpret. If none is needed, this will + usually mean that the mechanism is one where the password (specified + by the PASS command) is to be interpreted differently, such as with a + token or one-time password system. + + If the server requires additional security information, then the + client and server will enter into a security data exchange. The + client will send an ADAT command containing the first block of + security data. The server's reply will indicate if the data exchange + is complete, if there was an error, or if more data is needed. The + server's reply can optionally contain security data for the client to + interpret. If more data is needed, the client will send another ADAT + command containing the next block of data, and await the server's + reply. This exchange can continue as many times as necessary. Once + this exchange completes, the client and server have established a + security association. This security association may include + authentication (client, server, or mutual) and keying information for + integrity and/or confidentiality, depending on the mechanism in use. + + The term "security data" here is carefully chosen. The purpose of + the security data exchange is to establish a security association, + which might not actually include any authentication at all, between + the client and the server as described above. For instance, a + Diffie-Hellman exchange establishes a secret key, but no + authentication takes place. If an FTP server has an RSA key pair but + the client does not, then the client can authenticate the server, but + the server cannot authenticate the client. + + Once a security association is established, authentication which is a + part of this association may be used instead of or in addition to the + standard username/password exchange for authorizing a user to connect + to the server. A username specified by the USER command is always + required to specify the identity to be used on the server. + + In order to prevent an attacker from inserting or deleting commands + on the control stream, if the security association supports + integrity, then the server and client must use integrity protection + on the control stream, unless it first transmits a CCC command to + turn off this requirement. Integrity protection is performed with + the MIC and ENC commands, and the 63z reply codes. The CCC command + and its reply must be transmitted with integrity protection. + Commands and replies may be transmitted without integrity (that is, + in the clear or with confidentiality only) only if no security + association is established, the negotiated security association does + not support integrity, or the CCC command has succeeded. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + Once the client and server have negotiated with the PBSZ command an + acceptable buffer size for encapsulating protected data over the data + channel, the security mechanism may also be used to protect data + channel transfers. + + Policy is not specified by this document. In particular, client and + server implementations may choose to implement restrictions on what + operations can be performed depending on the security association + which exists. For example, a server may require that a client + authorize via a security mechanism rather than using a password, + require that the client provide a one-time password from a token, + require at least integrity protection on the command channel, or + require that certain files only be transmitted encrypted. An + anonymous ftp client might refuse to do file transfers without + integrity protection in order to insure the validity of files + downloaded. + + No particular set of functionality is required, except as + dependencies described in the next section. This means that none of + authentication, integrity, or confidentiality are required of an + implementation, although a mechanism which does none of these is not + of much use. For example, it is acceptable for a mechanism to + implement only integrity protection, one-way authentication and/or + encryption, encryption without any authentication or integrity + protection, or any other subset of functionality if policy or + technical considerations make this desirable. Of course, one peer + might require as a matter of policy stronger protection than the + other is able to provide, preventing perfect interoperability. + +3. New FTP Commands + + The following commands are optional, but dependent on each other. + They are extensions to the FTP Access Control Commands. + + The reply codes documented here are generally described as + recommended, rather than required. The intent is that reply codes + describing the full range of success and failure modes exist, but + that servers be allowed to limit information presented to the client. + For example, a server might implement a particular security + mechanism, but have a policy restriction against using it. The + server should respond with a 534 reply code in this case, but may + respond with a 504 reply code if it does not wish to divulge that the + disallowed mechanism is supported. If the server does choose to use + a different reply code than the recommended one, it should try to use + a reply code which only differs in the last digit. In all cases, the + server must use a reply code which is documented as returnable from + the command received, and this reply code must begin with the same + digit as the recommended reply code for the situation. + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + AUTHENTICATION/SECURITY MECHANISM (AUTH) + + The argument field is a Telnet string identifying a supported + mechanism. This string is case-insensitive. Values must be + registered with the IANA, except that values beginning with "X-" + are reserved for local use. + + If the server does not recognize the AUTH command, it must respond + with reply code 500. This is intended to encompass the large + deployed base of non-security-aware ftp servers, which will + respond with reply code 500 to any unrecognized command. If the + server does recognize the AUTH command but does not implement the + security extensions, it should respond with reply code 502. + + If the server does not understand the named security mechanism, it + should respond with reply code 504. + + If the server is not willing to accept the named security + mechanism, it should respond with reply code 534. + + If the server is not able to accept the named security mechanism, + such as if a required resource is unavailable, it should respond + with reply code 431. + + If the server is willing to accept the named security mechanism, + but requires security data, it must respond with reply code 334. + + If the server is willing to accept the named security mechanism, + and does not require any security data, it must respond with reply + code 234. + + If the server is responding with a 334 reply code, it may include + security data as described in the next section. + + Some servers will allow the AUTH command to be reissued in order + to establish new authentication. The AUTH command, if accepted, + removes any state associated with prior FTP Security commands. + The server must also require that the user reauthorize (that is, + reissue some or all of the USER, PASS, and ACCT commands) in this + case (see section 4 for an explanation of "authorize" in this + context). + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + AUTHENTICATION/SECURITY DATA (ADAT) + + The argument field is a Telnet string representing base 64 encoded + security data (see Section 9, "Base 64 Encoding"). If a reply + code indicating success is returned, the server may also use a + string of the form "ADAT=base64data" as the text part of the reply + if it wishes to convey security data back to the client. + + The data in both cases is specific to the security mechanism + specified by the previous AUTH command. The ADAT command, and the + associated replies, allow the client and server to conduct an + arbitrary security protocol. The security data exchange must + include enough information for both peers to be aware of which + optional features are available. For example, if the client does + not support data encryption, the server must be made aware of + this, so it will know not to send encrypted command channel + replies. It is strongly recommended that the security mechanism + provide sequencing on the command channel, to insure that commands + are not deleted, reordered, or replayed. + + The ADAT command must be preceded by a successful AUTH command, + and cannot be issued once a security data exchange completes + (successfully or unsuccessfully), unless it is preceded by an AUTH + command to reset the security state. + + If the server has not yet received an AUTH command, or if a prior + security data exchange completed, but the security state has not + been reset with an AUTH command, it should respond with reply code + 503. + + If the server cannot base 64 decode the argument, it should + respond with reply code 501. + + If the server rejects the security data (if a checksum fails, for + instance), it should respond with reply code 535. + + If the server accepts the security data, and requires additional + data, it should respond with reply code 335. + + If the server accepts the security data, but does not require any + additional data (i.e., the security data exchange has completed + successfully), it must respond with reply code 235. + + If the server is responding with a 235 or 335 reply code, then it + may include security data in the text part of the reply as + specified above. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + If the ADAT command returns an error, the security data exchange + will fail, and the client must reset its internal security state. + If the client becomes unsynchronized with the server (for example, + the server sends a 234 reply code to an AUTH command, but the + client has more data to transmit), then the client must reset the + server's security state. + + PROTECTION BUFFER SIZE (PBSZ) + + The argument is a decimal integer representing the maximum size, + in bytes, of the encoded data blocks to be sent or received during + file transfer. This number shall be no greater than can be + represented in a 32-bit unsigned integer. + + This command allows the FTP client and server to negotiate a + maximum protected buffer size for the connection. There is no + default size; the client must issue a PBSZ command before it can + issue the first PROT command. + + The PBSZ command must be preceded by a successful security data + exchange. + + If the server cannot parse the argument, or if it will not fit in + 32 bits, it should respond with a 501 reply code. + + If the server has not completed a security data exchange with the + client, it should respond with a 503 reply code. + + Otherwise, the server must reply with a 200 reply code. If the + size provided by the client is too large for the server, it must + use a string of the form "PBSZ=number" in the text part of the + reply to indicate a smaller buffer size. The client and the + server must use the smaller of the two buffer sizes if both buffer + sizes are specified. + + DATA CHANNEL PROTECTION LEVEL (PROT) + + The argument is a single Telnet character code specifying the data + channel protection level. + + This command indicates to the server what type of data channel + protection the client and server will be using. The following + codes are assigned: + + C - Clear + S - Safe + E - Confidential + P - Private + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + The default protection level if no other level is specified is + Clear. The Clear protection level indicates that the data channel + will carry the raw data of the file transfer, with no security + applied. The Safe protection level indicates that the data will + be integrity protected. The Confidential protection level + indicates that the data will be confidentiality protected. The + Private protection level indicates that the data will be integrity + and confidentiality protected. + + It is reasonable for a security mechanism not to provide all data + channel protection levels. It is also reasonable for a mechanism + to provide more protection at a level than is required (for + instance, a mechanism might provide Confidential protection, but + include integrity-protection in that encoding, due to API or other + considerations). + + The PROT command must be preceded by a successful protection + buffer size negotiation. + + If the server does not understand the specified protection level, + it should respond with reply code 504. + + If the current security mechanism does not support the specified + protection level, the server should respond with reply code 536. + + If the server has not completed a protection buffer size + negotiation with the client, it should respond with a 503 reply + code. + + The PROT command will be rejected and the server should reply 503 + if no previous PBSZ command was issued. + + If the server is not willing to accept the specified protection + level, it should respond with reply code 534. + + If the server is not able to accept the specified protection + level, such as if a required resource is unavailable, it should + respond with reply code 431. + + Otherwise, the server must reply with a 200 reply code to indicate + that the specified protection level is accepted. + + CLEAR COMMAND CHANNEL (CCC) + + This command does not take an argument. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + It is desirable in some environments to use a security mechanism + to authenticate and/or authorize the client and server, but not to + perform any integrity checking on the subsequent commands. This + might be used in an environment where IP security is in place, + insuring that the hosts are authenticated and that TCP streams + cannot be tampered, but where user authentication is desired. + + If unprotected commands are allowed on any connection, then an + attacker could insert a command on the control stream, and the + server would have no way to know that it was invalid. In order to + prevent such attacks, once a security data exchange completes + successfully, if the security mechanism supports integrity, then + integrity (via the MIC or ENC command, and 631 or 632 reply) must + be used, until the CCC command is issued to enable non-integrity + protected control channel messages. The CCC command itself must + be integrity protected. + + Once the CCC command completes successfully, if a command is not + protected, then the reply to that command must also not be + protected. This is to support interoperability with clients which + do not support protection once the CCC command has been issued. + + This command must be preceded by a successful security data + exchange. + + If the command is not integrity-protected, the server must respond + with a 533 reply code. + + If the server is not willing to turn off the integrity + requirement, it should respond with a 534 reply code. + + Otherwise, the server must reply with a 200 reply code to indicate + that unprotected commands and replies may now be used on the + command channel. + + INTEGRITY PROTECTED COMMAND (MIC) and + CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTED COMMAND (CONF) and + PRIVACY PROTECTED COMMAND (ENC) + + The argument field of MIC is a Telnet string consisting of a base + 64 encoded "safe" message produced by a security mechanism + specific message integrity procedure. The argument field of CONF + is a Telnet string consisting of a base 64 encoded "confidential" + message produced by a security mechanism specific confidentiality + procedure. The argument field of ENC is a Telnet string + consisting of a base 64 encoded "private" message produced by a + security mechanism specific message integrity and confidentiality + procedure. + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + The server will decode and/or verify the encoded message. + + This command must be preceded by a successful security data + exchange. + + A server may require that the first command after a successful + security data exchange be CCC, and not implement the protection + commands at all. In this case, the server should respond with a + 502 reply code. + + If the server cannot base 64 decode the argument, it should + respond with a 501 reply code. + + If the server has not completed a security data exchange with the + client, it should respond with a 503 reply code. + + If the server has completed a security data exchange with the + client using a mechanism which supports integrity, and requires a + CCC command due to policy or implementation limitations, it should + respond with a 503 reply code. + + If the server rejects the command because it is not supported by + the current security mechanism, the server should respond with + reply code 537. + + If the server rejects the command (if a checksum fails, for + instance), it should respond with reply code 535. + + If the server is not willing to accept the command (if privacy is + required by policy, for instance, or if a CONF command is received + before a CCC command), it should respond with reply code 533. + + Otherwise, the command will be interpreted as an FTP command. An + end-of-line code need not be included, but if one is included, it + must be a Telnet end-of-line code, not a local end-of-line code. + + The server may require that, under some or all circumstances, all + commands be protected. In this case, it should make a 533 reply + to commands other than MIC, CONF, and ENC. + +4. Login Authorization + + The security data exchange may, among other things, establish the + identity of the client in a secure way to the server. This identity + may be used as one input to the login authorization process. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + In response to the FTP login commands (AUTH, PASS, ACCT), the server + may choose to change the sequence of commands and replies specified + by RFC 959 as follows. There are also some new replies available. + + If the server is willing to allow the user named by the USER command + to log in based on the identity established by the security data + exchange, it should respond with reply code 232. + + If the security mechanism requires a challenge/response password, it + should respond to the USER command with reply code 336. The text + part of the reply should contain the challenge. The client must + display the challenge to the user before prompting for the password + in this case. This is particularly relevant to more sophisticated + clients or graphical user interfaces which provide dialog boxes or + other modal input. These clients should be careful not to prompt for + the password before the username has been sent to the server, in case + the user needs the challenge in the 336 reply to construct a valid + password. + +5. New FTP Replies + + The new reply codes are divided into two classes. The first class is + new replies made necessary by the new FTP Security commands. The + second class is a new reply type to indicate protected replies. + + 5.1. New individual reply codes + + 232 User logged in, authorized by security data exchange. + 234 Security data exchange complete. + 235 [ADAT=base64data] + ; This reply indicates that the security data exchange + ; completed successfully. The square brackets are not + ; to be included in the reply, but indicate that + ; security data in the reply is optional. + + 334 [ADAT=base64data] + ; This reply indicates that the requested security mechanism + ; is ok, and includes security data to be used by the client + ; to construct the next command. The square brackets are not + ; to be included in the reply, but indicate that + ; security data in the reply is optional. + 335 [ADAT=base64data] + ; This reply indicates that the security data is + ; acceptable, and more is required to complete the + ; security data exchange. The square brackets + ; are not to be included in the reply, but indicate + ; that security data in the reply is optional. + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + 336 Username okay, need password. Challenge is "...." + ; The exact representation of the challenge should be chosen + ; by the mechanism to be sensible to the human user of the + ; system. + + 431 Need some unavailable resource to process security. + + 533 Command protection level denied for policy reasons. + 534 Request denied for policy reasons. + 535 Failed security check (hash, sequence, etc). + 536 Requested PROT level not supported by mechanism. + 537 Command protection level not supported by security mechanism. + + 5.2. Protected replies. + + One new reply type is introduced: + + 6yz Protected reply + + There are three reply codes of this type. The first, reply + code 631 indicates an integrity protected reply. The + second, reply code 632, indicates a confidentiality and + integrity protected reply. the third, reply code 633, + indicates a confidentiality protected reply. + + The text part of a 631 reply is a Telnet string consisting + of a base 64 encoded "safe" message produced by a security + mechanism specific message integrity procedure. The text + part of a 632 reply is a Telnet string consisting of a base + 64 encoded "private" message produced by a security + mechanism specific message confidentiality and integrity + procedure. The text part of a 633 reply is a Telnet string + consisting of a base 64 encoded "confidential" message + produced by a security mechanism specific message + confidentiality procedure. + + The client will decode and verify the encoded reply. How + failures decoding or verifying replies are handled is + implementation-specific. An end-of-line code need not be + included, but if one is included, it must be a Telnet end- + of-line code, not a local end-of-line code. + + A protected reply may only be sent if a security data + exchange has succeeded. + + The 63z reply may be a multiline reply. In this case, the + plaintext reply must be broken up into a number of + fragments. Each fragment must be protected, then base 64 + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + encoded in order into a separate line of the multiline + reply. There need not be any correspondence between the + line breaks in the plaintext reply and the encoded reply. + Telnet end-of-line codes must appear in the plaintext of the + encoded reply, except for the final end-of-line code, which + is optional. + + The multiline reply must be formatted more strictly than the + continuation specification in RFC 959. In particular, each + line before the last must be formed by the reply code, + followed immediately by a hyphen, followed by a base 64 + encoded fragment of the reply. + + For example, if the plaintext reply is + + 123-First line + Second line + 234 A line beginning with numbers + 123 The last line + + then the resulting protected reply could be any of the + following (the first example has a line break only to fit + within the margins): + + 631 base64(protect("123-First line\r\nSecond line\r\n 234 A line + 631-base64(protect("123-First line\r\n")) + 631-base64(protect("Second line\r\n")) + 631-base64(protect(" 234 A line beginning with numbers\r\n")) + 631 base64(protect("123 The last line")) + + 631-base64(protect("123-First line\r\nSecond line\r\n 234 A line b")) + 631 base64(protect("eginning with numbers\r\n123 The last line\r\n")) + +6. Data Channel Encapsulation + + When data transfers are protected between the client and server (in + either direction), certain transformations and encapsulations must be + performed so that the recipient can properly decode the transmitted + file. + + The sender must apply all protection services after transformations + associated with the representation type, file structure, and transfer + mode have been performed. The data sent over the data channel is, + for the purposes of protection, to be treated as a byte stream. + + When performing a data transfer in an authenticated manner, the + authentication checks are performed on individual blocks of the file, + rather than on the file as a whole. Consequently, it is possible for + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + insertion attacks to insert blocks into the data stream (i.e., + replays) that authenticate correctly, but result in a corrupted file + being undetected by the receiver. To guard against such attacks, the + specific security mechanism employed should include mechanisms to + protect against such attacks. Many GSS-API mechanisms usable with + the specification in Appendix I, and the Kerberos mechanism in + Appendix II do so. + + The sender must take the input byte stream, and break it up into + blocks such that each block, when encoded using a security mechanism + specific procedure, will be no larger than the buffer size negotiated + by the client with the PBSZ command. Each block must be encoded, + then transmitted with the length of the encoded block prepended as a + four byte unsigned integer, most significant byte first. + + When the end of the file is reached, the sender must encode a block + of zero bytes, and send this final block to the recipient before + closing the data connection. + + The recipient will read the four byte length, read a block of data + that many bytes long, then decode and verify this block with a + security mechanism specific procedure. This must be repeated until a + block encoding a buffer of zero bytes is received. This indicates + the end of the encoded byte stream. + + Any transformations associated with the representation type, file + structure, and transfer mode are to be performed by the recipient on + the byte stream resulting from the above process. + + When using block transfer mode, the sender's (cleartext) buffer size + is independent of the block size. + + The server will reply 534 to a STOR, STOU, RETR, LIST, NLST, or APPE + command if the current protection level is not at the level dictated + by the server's security requirements for the particular file + transfer. + + If any data protection services fail at any time during data transfer + at the server end (including an attempt to send a buffer size greater + than the negotiated maximum), the server will send a 535 reply to the + data transfer command (either STOR, STOU, RETR, LIST, NLST, or APPE). + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +7. Potential policy considerations + + While there are no restrictions on client and server policy, there + are a few recommendations which an implementation should implement. + + - Once a security data exchange takes place, a server should require + all commands be protected (with integrity and/or confidentiality), + and it should protect all replies. Replies should use the same + level of protection as the command which produced them. This + includes replies which indicate failure of the MIC, CONF, and ENC + commands. In particular, it is not meaningful to require that + AUTH and ADAT be protected; it is meaningful and useful to require + that PROT and PBSZ be protected. In particular, the use of CCC is + not recommended, but is defined in the interest of + interoperability between implementations which might desire such + functionality. + + - A client should encrypt the PASS command whenever possible. It is + reasonable for the server to refuse to accept a non-encrypted PASS + command if the server knows encryption is available. + + - Although no security commands are required to be implemented, it + is recommended that an implementation provide all commands which + can be implemented, given the mechanisms supported and the policy + considerations of the site (export controls, for instance). + +8. Declarative specifications + + These sections are modelled after sections 5.3 and 5.4 of RFC 959, + which describe the same information, except for the standard FTP + commands and replies. + + 8.1. FTP Security commands and arguments + + AUTH + ADAT + PROT + PBSZ + MIC + CONF + ENC + + ::= + ::= + ; must be formatted as described in section 9 + ::= C | S | E | P + ::= any decimal integer from 1 to (2^32)-1 + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + 8.2. Command-Reply sequences + + Security Association Setup + AUTH + 234 + 334 + 502, 504, 534, 431 + 500, 501, 421 + ADAT + 235 + 335 + 503, 501, 535 + 500, 501, 421 + Data protection negotiation commands + PBSZ + 200 + 503 + 500, 501, 421, 530 + PROT + 200 + 504, 536, 503, 534, 431 + 500, 501, 421, 530 + Command channel protection commands + MIC + 535, 533 + 500, 501, 421 + CONF + 535, 533 + 500, 501, 421 + ENC + 535, 533 + 500, 501, 421 + Security-Enhanced login commands (only new replies listed) + USER + 232 + 336 + Data channel commands (only new replies listed) + STOR + 534, 535 + STOU + 534, 535 + RETR + 534, 535 + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + LIST + 534, 535 + NLST + 534, 535 + APPE + 534, 535 + + In addition to these reply codes, any security command can return + 500, 501, 502, 533, or 421. Any ftp command can return a reply + code encapsulated in a 631, 632, or 633 reply once a security data + exchange has completed successfully. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +9. State Diagrams + + This section includes a state diagram which demonstrates the flow of + authentication and authorization in a security enhanced FTP + implementation. The rectangular blocks show states where the client + must issue a command, and the diamond blocks show states where the + server must issue a response. + + + ,------------------, USER + __\| Unauthenticated |_________\ + | /| (new connection) | /| + | `------------------' | + | | | + | | AUTH | + | V | + | / \ | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 234 | + |<--------< >------------->. | + | \ / | | + | \_/ | | + | | | | + | | 334 | | + | V | | + | ,--------------------, | | + | | Need Security Data |<--. | | + | `--------------------' | | | + | | | | | + | | ADAT | | | + | V | | | + | / \ | | | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 335 | | | + `<--------< >-----------' | | + \ / | | + \_/ | | + | | | + | 235 | | + V | | + ,---------------. | | + ,--->| Authenticated |<--------' | After the client and server + | `---------------' | have completed authenti- + | | | cation, command must be + | | USER | integrity-protected if + | | | integrity is available. The + | |<-------------------' CCC command may be issued to + | V relax this restriction. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + | / \ + | 4yz,5yz / \ 2yz + |<--------< >------------->. + | \ / | + | \_/ | + | | | + | | 3yz | + | V | + | ,---------------. | + | | Need Password | | + | `---------------' | + | | | + | | PASS | + | V | + | / \ | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 2yz | + |<--------< >------------->| + | \ / | + | \_/ | + | | | + | | 3yz | + | V | + | ,--------------. | + | | Need Account | | + | `--------------' | + | | | + | | ACCT | + | V | + | / \ | + | 4yz,5yz / \ 2yz | + `<--------< >------------->| + \ / | + \_/ | + | | + | 3yz | + V | + ,-------------. | + | Authorized |/________| + | (Logged in) |\ + `-------------' + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +10. Base 64 Encoding + + Base 64 encoding is the same as the Printable Encoding described in + Section 4.3.2.4 of [RFC-1421], except that line breaks must not be + included. This encoding is defined as follows. + + Proceeding from left to right, the bit string resulting from the + mechanism specific protection routine is encoded into characters + which are universally representable at all sites, though not + necessarily with the same bit patterns (e.g., although the character + "E" is represented in an ASCII-based system as hexadecimal 45 and as + hexadecimal C5 in an EBCDIC-based system, the local significance of + the two representations is equivalent). + + A 64-character subset of International Alphabet IA5 is used, enabling + 6 bits to be represented per printable character. (The proposed + subset of characters is represented identically in IA5 and ASCII.) + The character "=" signifies a special processing function used for + padding within the printable encoding procedure. + + The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output + strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right + across a 24-bit input group output from the security mechanism + specific message protection procedure, each 6-bit group is used as an + index into an array of 64 printable characters, namely "[A-Z][a- + z][0-9]+/". The character referenced by the index is placed in the + output string. These characters are selected so as to be universally + representable, and the set excludes characters with particular + significance to Telnet (e.g., "", "", IAC). + + Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available + in an input group at the end of a message. A full encoding quantum + is always completed at the end of a message. When fewer than 24 + input bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on + the right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Output + character positions which are not required to represent actual input + data are set to the character "=". Since all canonically encoded + output is an integral number of octets, only the following cases can + arise: (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral + multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be + an integral multiple of 4 characters with no "=" padding, (2) the + final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits; here, the final + unit of encoded output will be two characters followed by two "=" + padding characters, or (3) the final quantum of encoding input is + exactly 16 bits; here, the final unit of encoded output will be three + characters followed by one "=" padding character. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + Implementors must keep in mind that the base 64 encodings in ADAT, + MIC, CONF, and ENC commands, and in 63z replies may be arbitrarily + long. Thus, the entire line must be read before it can be processed. + Several successive reads on the control channel may be necessary. It + is not appropriate to for a server to reject a command containing a + base 64 encoding simply because it is too long (assuming that the + decoding is otherwise well formed in the context in which it was + sent). + + Case must not be ignored when reading commands and replies containing + base 64 encodings. + +11. Security Considerations + + This entire document deals with security considerations related to + the File Transfer Protocol. + + Third party file transfers cannot be secured using these extensions, + since a security context cannot be established between two servers + using these facilities (no control connection exists between servers + over which to pass ADAT tokens). Further work in this area is + deferred. + +12. Acknowledgements + + I would like to thank the members of the CAT WG, as well as all + participants in discussions on the "cat-ietf@mit.edu" mailing list, + for their contributions to this document. I would especially like to + thank Sam Sjogren, John Linn, Ted Ts'o, Jordan Brown, Michael Kogut, + Derrick Brashear, John Gardiner Myers, Denis Pinkas, and Karri Balk + for their contributions to this work. Of course, without Steve Lunt, + the author of the first six revisions of this document, it would not + exist at all. + +13. References + + [TELNET-SEC] Borman, D., "Telnet Authentication and Encryption + Option", Work in Progress. + + [RFC-1123] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- + Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989. + + [RFC-1421] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic + Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures", + RFC 1421, February 1993. + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +14. Author's Address + + Marc Horowitz + Cygnus Solutions + 955 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 354 7688 + EMail: marc@cygnus.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +Appendix I: Specification under the GSSAPI + + In order to maximise the utility of new security mechanisms, it is + desirable that new mechanisms be implemented as GSSAPI mechanisms + rather than as FTP security mechanisms. This will enable existing + ftp implementations to support the new mechanisms more easily, since + little or no code will need to be changed. In addition, the + mechanism will be usable by other protocols, such as IMAP, which are + built on top of the GSSAPI, with no additional specification or + implementation work needed by the mechanism designers. + + The security mechanism name (for the AUTH command) associated with + all mechanisms employing the GSSAPI is GSSAPI. If the server + supports a security mechanism employing the GSSAPI, it must respond + with a 334 reply code indicating that an ADAT command is expected + next. + + The client must begin the authentication exchange by calling + GSS_Init_Sec_Context, passing in 0 for input_context_handle + (initially), and a targ_name equal to output_name from + GSS_Import_Name called with input_name_type of Host-Based Service and + input_name_string of "ftp@hostname" where "hostname" is the fully + qualified host name of the server with all letters in lower case. + (Failing this, the client may try again using input_name_string of + "host@hostname".) The output_token must then be base 64 encoded and + sent to the server as the argument to an ADAT command. If + GSS_Init_Sec_Context returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, then the client + must expect a token to be returned in the reply to the ADAT command. + This token must subsequently be passed to another call to + GSS_Init_Sec_Context. In this case, if GSS_Init_Sec_Context returns + no output_token, then the reply code from the server for the previous + ADAT command must have been 235. If GSS_Init_Sec_Context returns + GSS_S_COMPLETE, then no further tokens are expected from the server, + and the client must consider the server authenticated. + + The server must base 64 decode the argument to the ADAT command and + pass the resultant token to GSS_Accept_Sec_Context as input_token, + setting acceptor_cred_handle to NULL (for "use default credentials"), + and 0 for input_context_handle (initially). If an output_token is + returned, it must be base 64 encoded and returned to the client by + including "ADAT=base64string" in the text of the reply. If + GSS_Accept_Sec_Context returns GSS_S_COMPLETE, the reply code must be + 235, and the server must consider the client authenticated. If + GSS_Accept_Sec_Context returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the reply code + must be 335. Otherwise, the reply code should be 535, and the text + of the reply should contain a descriptive error message. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + The chan_bindings input to GSS_Init_Sec_Context and + GSS_Accept_Sec_Context should use the client internet address and + server internet address as the initiator and acceptor addresses, + respectively. The address type for both should be GSS_C_AF_INET. No + application data should be specified. + + Since GSSAPI supports anonymous peers to security contexts, it is + possible that the client's authentication of the server does not + actually establish an identity. + + The procedure associated with MIC commands, 631 replies, and Safe + file transfers is: + + GSS_Wrap for the sender, with conf_flag == FALSE + + GSS_Unwrap for the receiver + + The procedure associated with ENC commands, 632 replies, and Private + file transfers is: + + GSS_Wrap for the sender, with conf_flag == TRUE + GSS_Unwrap for the receiver + + CONF commands and 633 replies are not supported. + + Both the client and server should inspect the value of conf_avail to + determine whether the peer supports confidentiality services. + + When the security state is reset (when AUTH is received a second + time, or when REIN is received), this should be done by calling the + GSS_Delete_sec_context function. + +Appendix II: Specification under Kerberos version 4 + + The security mechanism name (for the AUTH command) associated with + Kerberos Version 4 is KERBEROS_V4. If the server supports + KERBEROS_V4, it must respond with a 334 reply code indicating that an + ADAT command is expected next. + + The client must retrieve a ticket for the Kerberos principal + "ftp.hostname@realm" by calling krb_mk_req(3) with a principal name + of "ftp", an instance equal to the first part of the canonical host + name of the server with all letters in lower case (as returned by + krb_get_phost(3)), the server's realm name (as returned by + krb_realmofhost(3)), and an arbitrary checksum. The ticket must then + be base 64 encoded and sent as the argument to an ADAT command. + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + + If the "ftp" principal name is not a registered principal in the + Kerberos database, then the client may fall back on the "rcmd" + principal name (same instance and realm). However, servers must + accept only one or the other of these principal names, and must not + be willing to accept either. Generally, if the server has a key for + the "ftp" principal in its srvtab, then that principal only must be + used, otherwise the "rcmd" principal only must be used. + + The server must base 64 decode the argument to the ADAT command and + pass the result to krb_rd_req(3). The server must add one to the + checksum from the authenticator, convert the result to network byte + order (most significant byte first), and sign it using + krb_mk_safe(3), and base 64 encode the result. Upon success, the + server must reply to the client with a 235 code and include + "ADAT=base64string" in the text of the reply. Upon failure, the + server should reply 535. + + Upon receipt of the 235 reply from the server, the client must parse + the text of the reply for the base 64 encoded data, decode it, + convert it from network byte order, and pass the result to + krb_rd_safe(3). The client must consider the server authenticated if + the resultant checksum is equal to one plus the value previously + sent. + + The procedure associated with MIC commands, 631 replies, and Safe + file transfers is: + + krb_mk_safe(3) for the sender + krb_rd_safe(3) for the receiver + + The procedure associated with ENC commands, 632 replies, and Private + file transfers is: + + krb_mk_priv(3) for the sender + krb_rd_priv(3) for the receiver + + CONF commands and 633 replies are not supported. + + Note that this specification for KERBEROS_V4 contains no provision + for negotiating alternate means for integrity and confidentiality + routines. Note also that the ADAT exchange does not convey whether + the peer supports confidentiality services. + + In order to stay within the allowed PBSZ, implementors must take note + that a cleartext buffer will grow by 31 bytes when processed by + krb_mk_safe(3) and will grow by 26 bytes when processed by + krb_mk_priv(3). + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions October 1997 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published + andand distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Horowitz & Lunt Standards Track [Page 27] + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/whatis.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/whatis.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97d4da2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/whatis.texi @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +@node What is Kerberos?, Building and Installing, Introduction, Top +@chapter What is Kerberos? + +@quotation +@flushleft + Now this Cerberus had three heads of dogs, + the tail of a dragon, and on his back the + heads of all sorts of snakes. + --- Pseudo-Apollodorus Library 2.5.12 +@end flushleft +@end quotation + +Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services on a network. +It is built upon the assumption that the network is ``unsafe''. For +example, data sent over the network can be eavesdropped and altered, and +addresses can also be faked. Therefore they cannot be used for +authentication purposes. +@cindex authentication + +Kerberos is a trusted third-party service. That means that there is a +third party (the kerberos server) that is trusted by all the entities on +the network (users and services, usually called @dfn{principals}). All +principals share a secret password (or key) with the kerberos server and +this enables principals to verify that the messages from the kerberos +server are authentic. Thus trusting the kerberos server, users and +services can authenticate each other. + +@section Basic mechanism + +@ifinfo +@macro sub{arg} +<\arg\> +@end macro +@end ifinfo + +@tex +@def@xsub#1{$_{#1}$} +@global@let@sub=@xsub +@end tex + +@ifhtml +@macro sub{arg} +<\arg\> +@end macro +@end ifhtml + +@quotation +@strong{Note:} This discussion is about Kerberos version 4, but version +5 works similarly. +@end quotation + +In Kerberos, principals use @dfn{tickets} to prove that they are who +they claim to be. In the following example, @var{A} is the initiator of +the authentication exchange, usually a user, and @var{B} is the service +that @var{A} wishes to use. + +To obtain a ticket for a specific service, @var{A} sends a ticket +request to the kerberos server. The request contains @var{A}'s and +@var{B}'s names (along with some other fields). The kerberos server +checks that both @var{A} and @var{B} are valid principals. + +Having verified the validity of the principals, it creates a packet +containing @var{A}'s and @var{B}'s names, @var{A}'s network address +(@var{A@sub{addr}}), the current time (@var{t@sub{issue}}), the lifetime +of the ticket (@var{life}), and a secret @dfn{session key} +@cindex session key +(@var{K@sub{AB}}). This packet is encrypted with @var{B}'s secret key +(@var{K@sub{B}}). The actual ticket (@var{T@sub{AB}}) looks like this: +(@{@var{A}, @var{B}, @var{A@sub{addr}}, @var{t@sub{issue}}, @var{life}, +@var{K@sub{AB}}@}@var{K@sub{B}}). + +The reply to @var{A} consists of the ticket (@var{T@sub{AB}}), @var{B}'s +name, the current time, the lifetime of the ticket, and the session key, all +encrypted in @var{A}'s secret key (@{@var{B}, @var{t@sub{issue}}, +@var{life}, @var{K@sub{AB}}, @var{T@sub{AB}}@}@var{K@sub{A}}). @var{A} +decrypts the reply and retains it for later use. + +@sp 1 + +Before sending a message to @var{B}, @var{A} creates an authenticator +consisting of @var{A}'s name, @var{A}'s address, the current time, and a +``checksum'' chosen by @var{A}, all encrypted with the secret session +key (@{@var{A}, @var{A@sub{addr}}, @var{t@sub{current}}, +@var{checksum}@}@var{K@sub{AB}}). This is sent together with the ticket +received from the kerberos server to @var{B}. Upon reception, @var{B} +decrypts the ticket using @var{B}'s secret key. Since the ticket +contains the session key that the authenticator was encrypted with, +@var{B} can now also decrypt the authenticator. To verify that @var{A} +really is @var{A}, @var{B} now has to compare the contents of the ticket +with that of the authenticator. If everything matches, @var{B} now +considers @var{A} as properly authenticated. + +@c (here we should have some more explanations) + +@section Different attacks + +@subheading Impersonating A + +An impostor, @var{C} could steal the authenticator and the ticket as it +is transmitted across the network, and use them to impersonate +@var{A}. The address in the ticket and the authenticator was added to +make it more difficult to perform this attack. To succeed @var{C} will +have to either use the same machine as @var{A} or fake the source +addresses of the packets. By including the time stamp in the +authenticator, @var{C} does not have much time in which to mount the +attack. + +@subheading Impersonating B + +@var{C} can hijack @var{B}'s network address, and when @var{A} sends +her credentials, @var{C} just pretend to verify them. @var{C} can't +be sure that she is talking to @var{A}. + +@section Defense strategies + +It would be possible to add a @dfn{replay cache} +@cindex replay cache +to the server side. The idea is to save the authenticators sent during +the last few minutes, so that @var{B} can detect when someone is trying +to retransmit an already used message. This is somewhat impractical +(mostly regarding efficiency), and is not part of Kerberos 4; MIT +Kerberos 5 contains it. + +To authenticate @var{B}, @var{A} might request that @var{B} sends +something back that proves that @var{B} has access to the session +key. An example of this is the checksum that @var{A} sent as part of the +authenticator. One typical procedure is to add one to the checksum, +encrypt it with the session key and send it back to @var{A}. This is +called @dfn{mutual authentication}. + +The session key can also be used to add cryptographic checksums to the +messages sent between @var{A} and @var{B} (known as @dfn{message +integrity}). Encryption can also be added (@dfn{message +confidentiality}). This is probably the best approach in all cases. +@cindex integrity +@cindex confidentiality + +@section Further reading + +The original paper on Kerberos from 1988 is @cite{Kerberos: An +Authentication Service for Open Network Systems}, by Jennifer Steiner, +Clifford Neuman and Jeffrey I. Schiller. + +A less technical description can be found in @cite{Designing an +Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes} by Bill Bryant, also +from 1988. + +These documents can be found on our web-page at +@url{http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-krb/}. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/doc/win2k.texi b/crypto/heimdal/doc/win2k.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5ec057 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/doc/win2k.texi @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +@node Windows 2000 compatability, Acknowledgments, Kerberos 4 issues, Top +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@chapter Windows 2000 compatability + +Windows 2000 (formerly known as Windows NT 5) from Microsoft implements +Kerberos 5. Their implementation, however, has some quirks, +peculiarities, and bugs. This chapter is a short summary of the things +that we have found out while trying to test Heimdal against Windows +2000. Another big problem with the Kerberos implementation in Windows +2000 is the almost complete lack of documentation. + +This information should apply to Heimdal @value{VERSION} and Windows +2000 RC1. It's of course subject all the time and mostly consists of +our not so inspired guesses. Hopefully it's still somewhat useful. + +@menu +* Encryption types:: +* Authorization data:: +@end menu + +@node Encryption types, Authorization data, Windows 2000 compatability, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@section Encryption types + +Windows 2000 supports both the standard DES encryptions (des-cbc-crc and +des-cbc-md5) and its own proprietary encryption that is based on md4 and +rc4 and which you cannot get hold of how it works with a NDA. To enable +a given principal to use DES, it needs to have DES keys in the database. +To do this, you need to enable DES keys for the particular principal +with the user administration tool and then change the password. + +@node Authorization data, , Encryption types, Windows 2000 compatability +@comment node-name, next, previous, up +@section Authorization data + +The Windows 2000 KDC also adds extra authorization data in tickets. +It is at this point unclear what triggers it to do this. The format of +this data is unknown and according to Microsoft, subject to change. A +simple way of getting hold of the data to be able to understand it +better is described here. + +@enumerate +@item Find the client example on using the SSPI in the SDK documentation. +@item Change ``AuthSamp'' in the source code to lowercase. +@item Build the program. +@item Add the ``authsamp'' principal with a known password to the +database. Make sure it has a DES key. +@item Run @kbd{ktutil add} to add the key for that principal to a +keytab. +@item Run @kbd{appl/test/nt_gss_server -p 2000 -s authsamp +--dump-auth=file} where file is an appropriate file. +@item It should authenticate and dump for you the authorization data in +the file. +@item The tool @kbd{lib/asn1/asn1_print} is somewhat useful for +analyzing the data. +@end enumerate + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/etc/services.append b/crypto/heimdal/etc/services.append new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3a31f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/etc/services.append @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# +# $Id: services.append,v 1.4 1999/07/23 21:36:03 assar Exp $ +# +# Kerberos services +# +kerberos 88/udp kerberos-sec # Kerberos v5 UDP +kerberos 88/tcp kerberos-sec # Kerberos v5 TCP +kpasswd 464/udp # password changing +kpasswd 464/tdp # password changing +klogin 543/tcp # Kerberos authenticated rlogin +kshell 544/tcp krcmd # and remote shell +ekshell 545/tcp # Kerberos encrypted remote shell -kfall +ekshell2 2106/tcp # What U of Colorado @ Boulder uses? +kerberos-adm 749/udp # v5 kadmin +kerberos-adm 749/tcp # v5 kadmin +kerberos-iv 750/udp kdc # Kerberos authentication--udp +kerberos-iv 750/tcp kdc # Kerberos authentication--tcp +kerberos_master 751/udp # v4 kadmin +kerberos_master 751/tcp # v4 kadmin +krb_prop 754/tcp hprop # Kerberos slave propagation +kpop 1109/tcp # Pop with Kerberos +eklogin 2105/tcp # Kerberos encrypted rlogin +rkinit 2108/tcp # Kerberos remote kinit +kf 2110/tcp # forward credentials +kx 2111/tcp # X over kerberos +kip 2112/tcp # IP over kerberos +kauth 2120/tcp # Remote kauth diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9d240b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.30 1999/12/21 17:03:11 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = kadm5 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = bits +CHECK_LOCAL = + +INCLUDES = -DHOST=\"$(CANONICAL_HOST)\" + +include_HEADERS = krb5-types.h + +krb5-types.h: bits$(EXEEXT) + ./bits$(EXEEXT) krb5-types.h + +CLEANFILES = \ + asn1.h \ + asn1_err.h \ + base64.h \ + com_err.h \ + com_right.h \ + der.h \ + des.h \ + editline.h \ + err.h \ + getarg.h \ + glob.h \ + gssapi.h \ + hdb.h \ + hdb_asn1.h \ + hdb_err.h \ + heim_err.h \ + kafs.h \ + krb5-protos.h \ + krb5-private.h \ + krb5-types.h \ + krb5.h \ + krb5_err.h \ + md4.h \ + md5.h \ + otp.h \ + parse_time.h \ + parse_units.h \ + resolve.h \ + roken-common.h \ + roken.h \ + sha.h \ + sl.h \ + xdbm.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd23443 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/include/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,748 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.30 1999/12/21 17:03:11 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -DHOST=\"$(CANONICAL_HOST)\" + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la +CHECK_LOCAL = + +SUBDIRS = kadm5 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = bits + +include_HEADERS = krb5-types.h + +CLEANFILES = asn1.h asn1_err.h base64.h com_err.h com_right.h der.h des.h editline.h err.h getarg.h glob.h gssapi.h hdb.h hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h heim_err.h kafs.h krb5-protos.h krb5-private.h krb5-types.h krb5.h krb5_err.h md4.h md5.h otp.h parse_time.h parse_units.h resolve.h roken-common.h roken.h sha.h sl.h xdbm.h + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +noinst_PROGRAMS = bits$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I. +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS 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$(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign include/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +config.h: stamp-h + @if test ! -f $@; then \ + rm -f stamp-h; \ + $(MAKE) stamp-h; \ + else :; fi +stamp-h: $(srcdir)/config.h.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES= CONFIG_HEADERS=include/config.h \ + $(SHELL) ./config.status + @echo timestamp > stamp-h 2> /dev/null +$(srcdir)/config.h.in: $(srcdir)/stamp-h.in + @if test ! -f $@; then \ + rm -f $(srcdir)/stamp-h.in; \ + $(MAKE) $(srcdir)/stamp-h.in; \ + else :; fi +$(srcdir)/stamp-h.in: $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOHEADER) + @echo timestamp > $(srcdir)/stamp-h.in 2> /dev/null + +mostlyclean-hdr: + +clean-hdr: + +distclean-hdr: + -rm -f config.h + +maintainer-clean-hdr: + 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+# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/bits.c b/crypto/heimdal/include/bits.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5eb9bd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/include/bits.c @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: bits.c,v 1.16 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static void +my_strupr(char *s) +{ + char *p = s; + + while(*p){ + if(islower((unsigned char)*p)) + *p = toupper((unsigned char)*p); + p++; + } +} + + +#define BITSIZE(TYPE) \ +{ \ + int b = 0; TYPE x = 1, zero = 0; char *pre = "u_"; \ + char tmp[128], tmp2[128]; \ + while(x){ x <<= 1; b++; if(x < zero) pre=""; } \ + if(b >= len){ \ + int tabs; \ + sprintf(tmp, "%sint%d_t" , pre, len); \ + sprintf(tmp2, "typedef %s %s;", #TYPE, tmp); \ + my_strupr(tmp); \ + tabs = 5 - strlen(tmp2) / 8; \ + fprintf(f, "%s", tmp2); \ + while(tabs-- > 0) fprintf(f, "\t"); \ + fprintf(f, "/* %2d bits */\n", b); \ + return; \ + } \ +} + +static void +try_signed(FILE *f, int len) +{ + BITSIZE(signed char); + BITSIZE(short); + BITSIZE(int); + BITSIZE(long); +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + BITSIZE(long long); +#endif + fprintf(f, "/* There is no %d bit type */\n", len); +} + +static void +try_unsigned(FILE *f, int len) +{ + BITSIZE(unsigned char); + BITSIZE(unsigned short); + BITSIZE(unsigned int); + BITSIZE(unsigned long); +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG + BITSIZE(unsigned long long); +#endif + fprintf(f, "/* There is no %d bit type */\n", len); +} + +static int +print_bt(FILE *f, int flag) +{ + if(flag == 0){ + fprintf(f, "/* For compatibility with various type definitions */\n"); + fprintf(f, "#ifndef __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__\n"); + fprintf(f, "#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__\n"); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } + return 1; +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *f; + int flag; + char *fn, *hb; + + if(argc < 2){ + fn = "bits.h"; + hb = "__BITS_H__"; + f = stdout; + } else { + char *p; + fn = argv[1]; + hb = malloc(strlen(fn) + 5); + sprintf(hb, "__%s__", fn); + for(p = hb; *p; p++){ + if(!isalnum((unsigned char)*p)) + *p = '_'; + } + f = fopen(argv[1], "w"); + } + fprintf(f, "/* %s -- this file was generated for %s by\n", fn, HOST); + fprintf(f, " %*s %s */\n\n", (int)strlen(fn), "", + "$Id: bits.c,v 1.16 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $"); + fprintf(f, "#ifndef %s\n", hb); + fprintf(f, "#define %s\n", hb); + fprintf(f, "\n"); +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H + fprintf(f, "#include \n"); +#endif + fprintf(f, "\n"); + + flag = 0; +#ifndef HAVE_INT8_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 8); +#endif /* HAVE_INT8_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_INT16_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 16); +#endif /* HAVE_INT16_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_INT32_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 32); +#endif /* HAVE_INT32_T */ +#if 0 +#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_signed (f, 64); +#endif /* HAVE_INT64_T */ +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT8_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 8); +#endif /* HAVE_INT8_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT16_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 16); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT16_T */ +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT32_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 32); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT32_T */ +#if 0 +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T + flag = print_bt(f, flag); + try_unsigned (f, 64); +#endif /* HAVE_U_INT64_T */ +#endif + + if(flag){ + fprintf(f, "\n"); + fprintf(f, "#endif /* __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ */\n\n"); + } + fprintf(f, "#endif /* %s */\n", hb); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/config.h.in b/crypto/heimdal/include/config.h.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cbd298 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/include/config.h.in @@ -0,0 +1,1164 @@ +/* include/config.h.in. Generated automatically from configure.in by autoheader. */ + +/* Define to empty if the keyword does not work. */ +#undef const + +/* Define to `int' if doesn't define. */ +#undef gid_t + +/* Define as __inline if that's what the C compiler calls it. */ +#undef inline + +/* Define to `long' if doesn't define. */ +#undef off_t + +/* Define to `int' if doesn't define. */ +#undef pid_t + +/* Define as the return type of signal handlers (int or void). */ +#undef RETSIGTYPE + +/* Define to `unsigned' if doesn't define. */ +#undef size_t + +/* Define if you have the ANSI C header files. */ +#undef STDC_HEADERS + +/* Define if you can safely include both and . */ +#undef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME + +/* Define if your declares struct tm. */ +#undef TM_IN_SYS_TIME + +/* Define to `int' if doesn't define. */ +#undef uid_t + +/* Define if the X Window System is missing or not being used. */ +#undef X_DISPLAY_MISSING + +/* Define if lex declares yytext as a char * by default, not a char[]. */ +#undef YYTEXT_POINTER + +/* Define if you have the XauFileName function. */ +#undef HAVE_XAUFILENAME + +/* Define if you have the XauReadAuth function. */ +#undef HAVE_XAUREADAUTH + +/* Define if you have the XauWriteAuth function. */ +#undef HAVE_XAUWRITEAUTH + +/* Define if you have the _getpty function. */ +#undef HAVE__GETPTY + +/* Define if you have the _scrsize function. */ +#undef HAVE__SCRSIZE + +/* Define if you have the asnprintf function. */ +#undef HAVE_ASNPRINTF + +/* Define if you have the asprintf function. */ +#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF + +/* Define if you have the cap_set_proc function. */ +#undef HAVE_CAP_SET_PROC + +/* Define if you have the cgetent function. */ +#undef HAVE_CGETENT + +/* Define if you have the chown function. */ +#undef HAVE_CHOWN + +/* Define if you have the copyhostent function. */ +#undef HAVE_COPYHOSTENT + +/* Define if you have the crypt function. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPT + +/* Define if you have the daemon function. */ +#undef HAVE_DAEMON + +/* Define if you have the dbm_firstkey function. */ +#undef HAVE_DBM_FIRSTKEY + +/* Define if you have the dbopen function. */ +#undef HAVE_DBOPEN + +/* Define if you have the dlopen function. */ +#undef HAVE_DLOPEN + +/* Define if you have the dn_expand function. */ +#undef HAVE_DN_EXPAND + +/* Define if you have the el_init function. */ +#undef HAVE_EL_INIT + +/* Define if you have the err function. */ +#undef HAVE_ERR + +/* Define if you have the errx function. */ +#undef HAVE_ERRX + +/* Define if you have the fchown function. */ +#undef HAVE_FCHOWN + +/* Define if you have the fcntl function. */ +#undef HAVE_FCNTL + +/* Define if you have the flock function. */ +#undef HAVE_FLOCK + +/* Define if you have the fnmatch function. */ +#undef HAVE_FNMATCH + +/* Define if you have the freeaddrinfo function. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO + +/* Define if you have the freehostent function. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEHOSTENT + +/* Define if you have the gai_strerror function. */ +#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR + +/* Define if you have the getaddrinfo function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + +/* Define if you have the getcwd function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETCWD + +/* Define if you have the getdtablesize function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETDTABLESIZE + +/* Define if you have the getegid function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETEGID + +/* Define if you have the geteuid function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETEUID + +/* Define if you have the getgid function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETGID + +/* Define if you have the gethostbyname function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME + +/* Define if you have the gethostbyname2 function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME2 + +/* Define if you have the gethostname function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETHOSTNAME + +/* Define if you have the getipnodebyaddr function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYADDR + +/* Define if you have the getipnodebyname function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYNAME + +/* Define if you have the getlogin function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETLOGIN + +/* Define if you have the getmsg function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETMSG + +/* Define if you have the getnameinfo function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO + +/* Define if you have the getopt function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETOPT + +/* Define if you have the getpwnam_r function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPWNAM_R + +/* Define if you have the getrlimit function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT + +/* Define if you have the getsockopt function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETSOCKOPT + +/* Define if you have the getspnam function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETSPNAM + +/* Define if you have the gettimeofday function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +/* Define if you have the getudbnam function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUDBNAM + +/* Define if you have the getuid function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUID + +/* Define if you have the getusershell function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL + +/* Define if you have the grantpt function. */ +#undef HAVE_GRANTPT + +/* Define if you have the hstrerror function. */ +#undef HAVE_HSTRERROR + +/* Define if you have the inet_aton function. */ +#undef HAVE_INET_ATON + +/* Define if you have the inet_ntop function. */ +#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP + +/* Define if you have the inet_pton function. */ +#undef HAVE_INET_PTON + +/* Define if you have the initgroups function. */ +#undef HAVE_INITGROUPS + +/* Define if you have the innetgr function. */ +#undef HAVE_INNETGR + +/* Define if you have the iruserok function. */ +#undef HAVE_IRUSEROK + +/* Define if you have the krb_disable_debug function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_DISABLE_DEBUG + +/* Define if you have the krb_enable_debug function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_ENABLE_DEBUG + +/* Define if you have the krb_get_our_ip_for_realm function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB_GET_OUR_IP_FOR_REALM + +/* Define if you have the logwtmp function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP + +/* Define if you have the lstat function. */ +#undef HAVE_LSTAT + +/* Define if you have the memmove function. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE + +/* Define if you have the mkstemp function. */ +#undef HAVE_MKSTEMP + +/* Define if you have the mktime function. */ +#undef HAVE_MKTIME + +/* Define if you have the ptsname function. */ +#undef HAVE_PTSNAME + +/* Define if you have the putenv function. */ +#undef HAVE_PUTENV + +/* Define if you have the rand function. */ +#undef HAVE_RAND + +/* Define if you have the random function. */ +#undef HAVE_RANDOM + +/* Define if you have the rcmd function. */ +#undef HAVE_RCMD + +/* Define if you have the readv function. */ +#undef HAVE_READV + +/* Define if you have the recvmsg function. */ +#undef HAVE_RECVMSG + +/* Define if you have the res_search function. */ +#undef HAVE_RES_SEARCH + +/* Define if you have the revoke function. */ +#undef HAVE_REVOKE + +/* Define if you have the sa_family_t function. */ +#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T + +/* Define if you have the select function. */ +#undef HAVE_SELECT + +/* Define if you have the sendmsg function. */ +#undef HAVE_SENDMSG + +/* Define if you have the setegid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETEGID + +/* Define if you have the setenv function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETENV + +/* Define if you have the seteuid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETEUID + +/* Define if you have the setitimer function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETITIMER + +/* Define if you have the setlim function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLIM + +/* Define if you have the setlogin function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN + +/* Define if you have the setpcred function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPCRED + +/* Define if you have the setpgid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPGID + +/* Define if you have the setproctitle function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + +/* Define if you have the setregid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETREGID + +/* Define if you have the setresgid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRESGID + +/* Define if you have the setresuid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRESUID + +/* Define if you have the setreuid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETREUID + +/* Define if you have the setsid function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETSID + +/* Define if you have the setsockopt function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETSOCKOPT + +/* Define if you have the setutent function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETUTENT + +/* Define if you have the sgi_getcapabilitybyname function. */ +#undef HAVE_SGI_GETCAPABILITYBYNAME + +/* Define if you have the sigaction function. */ +#undef HAVE_SIGACTION + +/* Define if you have the socket function. */ +#undef HAVE_SOCKET + +/* Define if you have the socklen_t function. */ +#undef HAVE_SOCKLEN_T + +/* Define if you have the strcasecmp function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRCASECMP + +/* Define if you have the strdup function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRDUP + +/* Define if you have the strerror function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRERROR + +/* Define if you have the strftime function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRFTIME + +/* Define if you have the strlcat function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLCAT + +/* Define if you have the strlcpy function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLCPY + +/* Define if you have the strlwr function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLWR + +/* Define if you have the strncasecmp function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNCASECMP + +/* Define if you have the strndup function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNDUP + +/* Define if you have the strnlen function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNLEN + +/* Define if you have the strptime function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRPTIME + +/* Define if you have the strsep function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSEP + +/* Define if you have the strstr function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSTR + +/* Define if you have the strtok_r function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRTOK_R + +/* Define if you have the struct_addrinfo function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO + +/* Define if you have the struct_sockaddr function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR + +/* Define if you have the struct_sockaddr_storage function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE + +/* Define if you have the strupr function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUPR + +/* Define if you have the swab function. */ +#undef HAVE_SWAB + +/* Define if you have the sysconf function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSCONF + +/* Define if you have the sysctl function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSCTL + +/* Define if you have the syslog function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSLOG + +/* Define if you have the tgetent function. */ +#undef HAVE_TGETENT + +/* Define if you have the timegm function. */ +#undef HAVE_TIMEGM + +/* Define if you have the ttyname function. */ +#undef HAVE_TTYNAME + +/* Define if you have the ttyslot function. */ +#undef HAVE_TTYSLOT + +/* Define if you have the umask function. */ +#undef HAVE_UMASK + +/* Define if you have the uname function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNAME + +/* Define if you have the unlockpt function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNLOCKPT + +/* Define if you have the unsetenv function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNSETENV + +/* Define if you have the vasnprintf function. */ +#undef HAVE_VASNPRINTF + +/* Define if you have the vasprintf function. */ +#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF + +/* Define if you have the verr function. */ +#undef HAVE_VERR + +/* Define if you have the verrx function. */ +#undef HAVE_VERRX + +/* Define if you have the vhangup function. */ +#undef HAVE_VHANGUP + +/* Define if you have the vsyslog function. */ +#undef HAVE_VSYSLOG + +/* Define if you have the vwarn function. */ +#undef HAVE_VWARN + +/* Define if you have the vwarnx function. */ +#undef HAVE_VWARNX + +/* Define if you have the warn function. */ +#undef HAVE_WARN + +/* Define if you have the warnx function. */ +#undef HAVE_WARNX + +/* Define if you have the writev function. */ +#undef HAVE_WRITEV + +/* Define if you have the yp_get_default_domain function. */ +#undef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_FTP_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ARPA_TELNET_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BIND_BITYPES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BSDSETJMP_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CAPABILITY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CURSES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DB_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DB_185_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DBM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DLFCN_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ERR_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ERRNO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FNMATCH_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GRP_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_IO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NDBM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NET_IF_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETDB_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_MACHTYPES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_VAR_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINFO_NI_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PATHS_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PTHREAD_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PTY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PWD_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_RESOLV_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_RPCSVC_DBM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SAC_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MODULES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SGTTY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SIAD_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SIGNAL_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STANDARDS_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STROPTS_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CATEGORY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_IOCCOM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PROC_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTYIO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTYVAR_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STR_TTY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTTY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TERMIO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMEB_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TTY_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSLOG_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERM_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERMIO_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TERMIOS_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TIME_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UDB_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTIL_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMP_H + +/* Define if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H + +/* Define if you have the X11 library (-lX11). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBX11 + +/* Define if you have the Xau library (-lXau). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBXAU + +/* Define if you have the c_r library (-lc_r). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBC_R + +/* Define if you have the crypt library (-lcrypt). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT + +/* Define if you have the curses library (-lcurses). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBCURSES + +/* Define if you have the dl library (-ldl). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBDL + +/* Define if you have the edit library (-ledit). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBEDIT + +/* Define if you have the gdbm library (-lgdbm). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBGDBM + +/* Define if you have the inet6 library (-linet6). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBINET6 + +/* Define if you have the ip6 library (-lip6). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBIP6 + +/* Define if you have the ncurses library (-lncurses). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBNCURSES + +/* Define if you have the ndbm library (-lndbm). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBNDBM + +/* Define if you have the nsl library (-lnsl). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBNSL + +/* Define if you have the resolv library (-lresolv). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBRESOLV + +/* Define if you have the socket library (-lsocket). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET + +/* Define if you have the syslog library (-lsyslog). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBSYSLOG + +/* Define if you have the termcap library (-ltermcap). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBTERMCAP + +/* Define if you have the util library (-lutil). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL + +/* Name of package */ +#undef PACKAGE + +/* Version number of package */ +#undef VERSION + +/* Define to what version of SunOS you are running. */ +#undef SunOS + +/* define if your compiler has __attribute__ */ +#undef HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ + +/* Define if you have the krb4 package. */ +#undef KRB4 + +/* define if krb_put_int takes four arguments. */ +#undef HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT + +/* Define to one if your krb.h doesn't */ +#undef KRB_VERIFY_SECURE + +/* Define to two if your krb.h doesn't */ +#undef KRB_VERIFY_SECURE_FAIL + +/* Define to zero if your krb.h doesn't */ +#undef KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE + +/* Enable Kerberos 5 support in applications. */ +#undef KRB5 + +/* Define if you want to use the KDC as a kaserver. */ +#undef KASERVER + +/* Define if you want support in hprop for reading kaserver databases */ +#undef KASERVER_DB + +/* Define if you want OTP support in applications. */ +#undef OTP + +/* Define to enable basic OSF C2 support. */ +#undef HAVE_OSFC2 + +/* Define if you have the readline package. */ +#undef READLINE + +/* Define if you have the hesiod package. */ +#undef HESIOD + +/* define if target is big endian */ +#undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN + +/* define if sys/param.h defines the endiness */ +#undef ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H + +/* Define this to what the type ssize_t should be. */ +#undef ssize_t + +/* Define this to what the type mode_t should be. */ +#undef mode_t + +/* Define this to what the type sig_atomic_t should be. */ +#undef sig_atomic_t + +/* Define if you want to use Netinfo instead of krb5.conf. */ +#undef HAVE_NETINFO + +/* Define if you have IPv6. */ +#undef HAVE_IPV6 + +/* define if you have a working snprintf */ +#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for snprintf() */ +#undef NEED_SNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if you have a working vsnprintf */ +#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vsnprintf() */ +#undef NEED_VSNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if you have a glob() that groks + GLOB_BRACE, GLOB_NOCHECK, GLOB_QUOTE, and GLOB_TILDE */ +#undef HAVE_GLOB + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for glob() */ +#undef NEED_GLOB_PROTO + +/* Define if getlogin has POSIX flavour (and not BSD). */ +#undef POSIX_GETLOGIN + +/* Define if getpwnam_r has POSIX flavour. */ +#undef POSIX_GETPWNAM_R + +/* Define if signal handlers return void. */ +#undef VOID_RETSIGTYPE + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for hstrerror() */ +#undef NEED_HSTRERROR_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for asprintf() */ +#undef NEED_ASPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vasprintf() */ +#undef NEED_VASPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for asnprintf() */ +#undef NEED_ASNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for vasnprintf() */ +#undef NEED_VASNPRINTF_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for setenv() */ +#undef NEED_SETENV_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for unsetenv() */ +#undef NEED_UNSETENV_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for gethostname() */ +#undef NEED_GETHOSTNAME_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for mkstemp() */ +#undef NEED_MKSTEMP_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for getusershell() */ +#undef NEED_GETUSERSHELL_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for inet_aton() */ +#undef NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO + +/* Define if realloc(NULL) doesn't work. */ +#undef BROKEN_REALLOC + +/* define if prototype of gethostbyname is compatible with + struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *) */ +#undef GETHOSTBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if prototype of gethostbyaddr is compatible with + struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const void *, size_t, int) */ +#undef GETHOSTBYADDR_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if prototype of getservbyname is compatible with + struct servent *getservbyname(const char *, const char *) */ +#undef GETSERVBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if prototype of openlog is compatible with + void openlog(const char *, int, int) */ +#undef OPENLOG_PROTO_COMPATIBLE + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for crypt() */ +#undef NEED_CRYPT_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strtok_r() */ +#undef NEED_STRTOK_R_PROTO + +/* define if the system is missing a prototype for strsep() */ +#undef NEED_STRSEP_PROTO + +/* define if you have h_errno */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRNO + +/* define if your system declares h_errno */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRNO_DECLARATION + +/* define if you have h_errlist */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRLIST + +/* define if your system declares h_errlist */ +#undef HAVE_H_ERRLIST_DECLARATION + +/* define if you have h_nerr */ +#undef HAVE_H_NERR + +/* define if your system declares h_nerr */ +#undef HAVE_H_NERR_DECLARATION + +/* define if you have __progname */ +#undef HAVE___PROGNAME + +/* define if your system declares __progname */ +#undef HAVE___PROGNAME_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares optarg */ +#undef HAVE_OPTARG_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares optind */ +#undef HAVE_OPTIND_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares opterr */ +#undef HAVE_OPTERR_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares optopt */ +#undef HAVE_OPTOPT_DECLARATION + +/* define if your system declares environ */ +#undef HAVE_ENVIRON_DECLARATION + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_addr. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_host. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_id. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_pid. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_PID + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_type. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE + +/* Define if struct utmp has field ut_user. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER + +/* Define if struct utmpx has field ut_exit. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_EXIT + +/* Define if struct utmpx has field ut_syslen. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_SYSLEN + +/* Define if struct tm has field tm_gmtoff. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_GMTOFF + +/* Define if struct tm has field tm_zone. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_ZONE + +/* define if you have timezone */ +#undef HAVE_TIMEZONE + +/* define if your system declares timezone */ +#undef HAVE_TIMEZONE_DECLARATION + +/* define if struct winsize is declared in sys/termios.h */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE + +/* define if struct winsize has ws_xpixel */ +#undef HAVE_WS_XPIXEL + +/* define if struct winsize has ws_ypixel */ +#undef HAVE_WS_YPIXEL + +/* define if you have struct spwd */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD + +/* Define if struct sockaddr has field sa_len. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + +/* Define if el_init takes four arguments. */ +#undef HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_EL_INIT + +/* Define if you have a readline compatible library. */ +#undef HAVE_READLINE + +/* Define if you want authentication support in telnet. */ +#undef AUTHENTICATION + +/* Define if you want encryption support in telnet. */ +#undef ENCRYPTION + +/* Define if you want to use DES encryption in telnet. */ +#undef DES_ENCRYPTION + +/* Define this to enable diagnostics in telnet. */ +#undef DIAGNOSTICS + +/* Define this to enable old environment option in telnet. */ +#undef OLD_ENVIRON + +/* Define this if you want support for broken ENV_{VAR,VAL} telnets. */ +#undef ENV_HACK + +/* Define if you have streams ptys. */ +#undef STREAMSPTY + + +#undef BINDIR +#undef LIBDIR +#undef LIBEXECDIR +#undef SBINDIR + +#undef HAVE_INT8_T +#undef HAVE_INT16_T +#undef HAVE_INT32_T +#undef HAVE_INT64_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT8_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT16_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT32_T +#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T + +#if defined(HAVE_FOUR_VALUED_KRB_PUT_INT) || !defined(KRB4) +#define KRB_PUT_INT(F, T, L, S) krb_put_int((F), (T), (L), (S)) +#else +#define KRB_PUT_INT(F, T, L, S) krb_put_int((F), (T), (S)) +#endif + +#ifdef BROKEN_REALLOC +#define realloc(X, Y) isoc_realloc((X), (Y)) +#define isoc_realloc(X, Y) ((X) ? realloc((X), (Y)) : malloc(Y)) +#endif + +#ifdef VOID_RETSIGTYPE +#define SIGRETURN(x) return +#else +#define SIGRETURN(x) return (RETSIGTYPE)(x) +#endif + +#define RCSID(msg) \ +static /**/const char *const rcsid[] = { (const char *)rcsid, "\100(#)" msg } + +#undef PROTOTYPES + +/* Maximum values on all known systems */ +#define MaxHostNameLen (64+4) +#define MaxPathLen (1024+4) + +#if defined(HAVE_SGTTY_H) && defined(__NeXT__) +#define SGTTY +#endif + +/* + * Define NDBM if you are using the 4.3 ndbm library (which is part of + * libc). If not defined, 4.2 dbm will be assumed. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_DBM_FIRSTKEY) +#define NDBM +#endif + +/* telnet stuff ----------------------------------------------- */ + +#if defined(ENCRYPTION) && !defined(AUTHENTICATION) +#define AUTHENTICATION 1 +#endif + +/* Set this to the default system lead string for telnetd + * can contain %-escapes: %s=sysname, %m=machine, %r=os-release + * %v=os-version, %t=tty, %h=hostname, %d=date and time + */ +#undef USE_IM + +/* Used with login -p */ +#undef LOGIN_ARGS + +/* set this to a sensible login */ +#ifndef LOGIN_PATH +#define LOGIN_PATH BINDIR "/login" +#endif + +/* random defines */ + +/* + * Defining this enables lots of useful (and used) extensions on + * glibc-based systems such as Linux + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +/* + * this assumes that KRB_C_BIGENDIAN is used. + * if we can find out endianess at compile-time, do so, + * otherwise WORDS_BIGENDIAN should already have been defined + */ + +#if ENDIANESS_IN_SYS_PARAM_H +# include +# include +# if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN +# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 +# endif +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0647b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +CLEANFILES = admin.h kadm5_err.h private.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..895c9f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/include/kadm5/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.6 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = 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+.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/include/stamp-h.in b/crypto/heimdal/include/stamp-h.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/install-sh b/crypto/heimdal/install-sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..89fc9b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/install-sh @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# +# install - install a program, script, or datafile +# This comes from X11R5. +# +# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent +# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it +# when there is no Makefile. +# +# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written +# from scratch. +# + + +# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script + +# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. +doit="${DOITPROG-}" + + +# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars. + +mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}" +cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}" +chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}" +chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}" +chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}" +stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}" +rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}" +mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}" + +tranformbasename="" +transform_arg="" +instcmd="$mvprog" +chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755" +chowncmd="" +chgrpcmd="" +stripcmd="" +rmcmd="$rmprog -f" +mvcmd="$mvprog" +src="" +dst="" +dir_arg="" + +while [ x"$1" != x ]; do + case $1 in + -c) instcmd="$cpprog" + shift + continue;; + + -d) dir_arg=true + shift + continue;; + + -m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -s) stripcmd="$stripprog" + shift + continue;; + + -t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'` + shift + continue;; + + -b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'` + shift + continue;; + + *) if [ x"$src" = x ] + then + src=$1 + else + # this colon is to work around a 386BSD /bin/sh bug + : + dst=$1 + fi + shift + continue;; + esac +done + +if [ x"$src" = x ] +then + echo "install: no input file specified" + exit 1 +else + true +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]; then + dst=$src + src="" + + if [ -d $dst ]; then + instcmd=: + else + instcmd=mkdir + fi +else + +# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command +# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad +# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'. + + if [ -f $src -o -d $src ] + then + true + else + echo "install: $src does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + + if [ x"$dst" = x ] + then + echo "install: no destination specified" + exit 1 + else + true + fi + +# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; if your system +# does not like double slashes in filenames, you may need to add some logic + + if [ -d $dst ] + then + dst="$dst"/`basename $src` + else + true + fi +fi + +## this sed command emulates the dirname command +dstdir=`echo $dst | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'` + +# Make sure that the destination directory exists. +# this part is taken from Noah Friedman's mkinstalldirs script + +# Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case. +if [ ! -d "$dstdir" ]; then +defaultIFS=' +' +IFS="${IFS-${defaultIFS}}" + +oIFS="${IFS}" +# Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason. +IFS='%' +set - `echo ${dstdir} | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'` +IFS="${oIFS}" + +pathcomp='' + +while [ $# -ne 0 ] ; do + pathcomp="${pathcomp}${1}" + shift + + if [ ! -d "${pathcomp}" ] ; + then + $mkdirprog "${pathcomp}" + else + true + fi + + pathcomp="${pathcomp}/" +done +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ] +then + $doit $instcmd $dst && + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dst; else true ; fi +else + +# If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now. + + if [ x"$transformarg" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + dstfile=`basename $dst $transformbasename | + sed $transformarg`$transformbasename + fi + +# don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename + + if [ x"$dstfile" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + true + fi + +# Make a temp file name in the proper directory. + + dsttmp=$dstdir/#inst.$$# + +# Move or copy the file name to the temp name + + $doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp && + + trap "rm -f ${dsttmp}" 0 && + +# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits + +# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to +# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore +# errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command. + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + +# Now rename the file to the real destination. + + $doit $rmcmd -f $dstdir/$dstfile && + $doit $mvcmd $dsttmp $dstdir/$dstfile + +fi && + + +exit 0 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..542667e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +2000-01-02 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c: check initial flag in ticket and allow users to change + their own password if it's set + * ext.c (do_ext_keytab): set timestamp + +1999-12-14 Assar Westerlund + + * del_enctype.c (usage): don't use arg_printusage + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * del_enctype.c (del_enctype): try not to leak memory + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_mod): use kadm5_s_modify_principal (no + _with_key) + + * kadmin.c: add `del_enctype' + + * del_enctype.c (del_enctype): new function for deleting enctypes + from a principal + + * Makefile.am (kadmin_SOURCES): add del_enctype.c + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * server.c: cope with old clients + + * kadmin_locl.h: remove version string + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (kadmin_LDADD): add LIB_dlopen + +1999-10-01 Assar Westerlund + + * ank.c (add_one_principal): `password' can cactually be NULL in + the overwrite code, check for it. + +1999-09-20 Assar Westerlund + + * mod.c (mod_entry): print the correct principal name in error + messages. From Love + +1999-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (init): also create `changepw/kerberos' + + * version4.c: only create you loose packets when we fail decoding + and not when an operation is not performed for some reason + (decode_packet): read the service key from the hdb + (dispatch, decode_packet): return proper error messages + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): add password quality functions + +1999-08-27 Johan Danielsson + + * server.c (handle_v5): give more informative message if + KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND + +1999-08-26 Johan Danielsson + + * kadmind.c: use HDB keytabs + +1999-08-25 Assar Westerlund + + * cpw.c (set_password): use correct variable. From Love + + + * server.c (v5_loop): use correct error code + + * ank.c (add_one_principal): initialize `default_ent' + +1999-08-21 Assar Westerlund + + * random_password.c: new file, stolen from krb4 + + * kadmin_locl.h: add prototype for random_password + + * cpw.c: add support for --random-password + + * ank.c: add support for --random-password + + * Makefile.am (kadmin_SOURCES): add random_password.c + +1999-08-19 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (edit_timet): break when we manage to parse the time not + the inverse. + + * mod.c: add parsing of lots of options. From Love + + + * ank.c: add setting of expiration and password expiration + + * kadmin_locl.h: update util.c prototypes + + * util.c: move-around. clean-up, rename, make consistent (and + some other weird stuff). based on patches from Love + + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): initialize password + (handle_v4): remove unused variable `ret' + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (handle_v4): more error checking and more correct + error messages + + * server.c (v5_loop, kadmind_loop): more error checking and more + correct error messages + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * util.c (str2timeval, edit_time): functions for parsing and + editing times. Based on patches from Love . + (edit_entry): call new functions + + * mod.c (mod_entry): allow modifying expiration times + + * kadmin_locl.h (str2timeval): add prototype + + * ank.c (add_one_principal): allow setting expiration times + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (v5_loop): handle data allocation with krb5_data_alloc + and check return value + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): read the key in the strange order + it's sent + + * util.c (edit_entry): look at default + (edit_time): always set mask even if value == 0 + + * kadmin_locl.h (edit_entry): update + + * ank.c: make ank use the values of the default principal for + prompting + + * version4.c (values_to_ent): convert key data correctly + +1999-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (create_random_entry): more correct setting of mask + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * server.c (handle_v5): read sendauth version correctly. + +1999-05-14 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (error_code): try to handle really old krb4 + distributions + +1999-05-11 Assar Westerlund + + * init.c (init): initialize realm_max_life and realm_max_rlife + +1999-05-07 Assar Westerlund + + * ank.c (add_new_key): initialize more variables + +1999-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * version4.c (kadm_ser_cpw): always allow a user to change her + password + (kadm_ser_*): make logging work + clean-up and restructure + + * kadmin_locl.h (set_entry): add prototype + + * kadmin.c (usage): update usage string + + * init.c (init): new arguments realm-max-ticket-life and + realm-max-renewable-life + + * util.c (edit_time, edit_attributes): don't do anything if it's + already set + (set_entry): new function + + * ank.c (add_new_key): new options for setting max-ticket-life, + max-renewable-life, and attributes + + * server.c (v5_loop): remove unused variable + + * kadmin_locl.h: add prototypes + + * version4.c: re-insert krb_err.h and other miss + + * server.c (kadmind_loop): break-up and restructure + + * version4.c: add ACL checks more error code checks restructure + +1999-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * load.c: check for (un-)encrypted keys + + * dump.c: use hdb_print_entry + + * version4.c: version 4 support + + * Makefile.am: link with krb4 + + * kadmin_locl.h: include + + * server.c: move from lib/kadm5, and add basic support for krb4 + kadmin protocol + + * kadmind.c: move recvauth to kadmind_loop() diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bafb55 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.25 2000/01/06 08:04:13 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +sbin_PROGRAMS = kadmin + +libexec_PROGRAMS = kadmind + +kadmin_SOURCES = \ + ank.c \ + cpw.c \ + del.c \ + del_enctype.c \ + dump.c \ + ext.c \ + get.c \ + init.c \ + kadmin.c \ + load.c \ + mod.c \ + rename.c \ + util.c \ + random_password.c \ + kadmin_locl.h + +if KRB4 +KRB4LIB = $(LIB_krb4) +version4_c = version4.c +endif + +kadmind_SOURCES = kadmind.c server.c kadmin_locl.h $(version4_c) + +EXTRA_kadmind_SOURCES = version4.c + +COMMON_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +kadmind_LDADD = $(KRB4LIB) $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(COMMON_LDADD) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) + +kadmin_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la \ + $(LIB_readline) \ + $(COMMON_LDADD) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7fa775 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,702 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.25 2000/01/06 08:04:13 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_readline) $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +sbin_PROGRAMS = kadmin + +libexec_PROGRAMS = kadmind + +kadmin_SOURCES = ank.c cpw.c del.c del_enctype.c dump.c ext.c get.c init.c kadmin.c load.c mod.c rename.c util.c random_password.c kadmin_locl.h + + +@KRB4_TRUE@KRB4LIB = $(LIB_krb4) +@KRB4_TRUE@version4_c = version4.c + +kadmind_SOURCES = kadmind.c server.c kadmin_locl.h $(version4_c) + +EXTRA_kadmind_SOURCES = version4.c + +COMMON_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) $(DBLIB) + + +kadmind_LDADD = $(KRB4LIB) $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la $(COMMON_LDADD) $(LIB_dlopen) + + +kadmin_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la $(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la $(LIB_readline) $(COMMON_LDADD) $(LIB_dlopen) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +libexec_PROGRAMS = kadmind$(EXEEXT) +sbin_PROGRAMS = kadmin$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(libexec_PROGRAMS) $(sbin_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +@KRB4_TRUE@kadmind_OBJECTS = kadmind.$(OBJEXT) server.$(OBJEXT) \ +@KRB4_TRUE@version4.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_FALSE@kadmind_OBJECTS = kadmind.$(OBJEXT) server.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_TRUE@kadmind_DEPENDENCIES = \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@kadmind_DEPENDENCIES = \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kadmind_LDFLAGS = +kadmin_OBJECTS = ank.$(OBJEXT) cpw.$(OBJEXT) del.$(OBJEXT) \ +del_enctype.$(OBJEXT) dump.$(OBJEXT) ext.$(OBJEXT) get.$(OBJEXT) \ +init.$(OBJEXT) kadmin.$(OBJEXT) load.$(OBJEXT) mod.$(OBJEXT) \ +rename.$(OBJEXT) util.$(OBJEXT) random_password.$(OBJEXT) +kadmin_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5clnt.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/sl/libsl.la $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kadmin_LDFLAGS = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +DIST_COMMON = ChangeLog Makefile.am Makefile.in + + +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) + +TAR = tar +GZIP_ENV = --best +SOURCES = $(kadmind_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_kadmind_SOURCES) $(kadmin_SOURCES) +OBJECTS = $(kadmind_OBJECTS) $(kadmin_OBJECTS) + +all: all-redirect +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .1 .3 .5 .8 .S .c .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .et .h .lo .o .obj .s .x +$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign kadmin/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +mostlyclean-libexecPROGRAMS: + +clean-libexecPROGRAMS: + -test -z "$(libexec_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(libexec_PROGRAMS) + +distclean-libexecPROGRAMS: + +maintainer-clean-libexecPROGRAMS: + +install-libexecPROGRAMS: $(libexec_PROGRAMS) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) + @list='$(libexec_PROGRAMS)'; for p in $$list; do \ + if test -f $$p; then \ + echo " $(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'|sed '$(transform)'|sed 's/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`"; \ + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/`echo $$p|sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'|sed '$(transform)'|sed 's/$$/$(EXEEXT)/'`; \ + else :; fi; \ + done + +uninstall-libexecPROGRAMS: 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./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ank.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ank.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7068912 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ank.c @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ank.c,v 1.19 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * fetch the default principal corresponding to `princ' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_default (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal def_principal; + krb5_realm *realm = krb5_princ_realm(context->context, princ); + + ret = krb5_make_principal (context->context, &def_principal, + *realm, "default", NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_get_principal (context, def_principal, default_ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, def_principal); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add the principal `name' to the database. + * Prompt for all data not given by the input parameters. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +add_one_principal (const char *name, + int rand_key, + int rand_password, + char *password, + const char *max_ticket_life, + const char *max_renewable_life, + const char *attributes, + const char *expiration, + const char *pw_expiration) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ, defrec; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec *default_ent = NULL; + krb5_principal princ_ent = NULL; + int mask = 0; + int default_mask = 0; + char pwbuf[1024]; + + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, name, &princ_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + return ret; + } + princ.principal = princ_ent; + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + + ret = set_entry(context, &princ, &mask, + max_ticket_life, max_renewable_life, + expiration, pw_expiration, attributes); + if (ret) + goto out; + + default_ent = &defrec; + ret = get_default (kadm_handle, princ_ent, default_ent); + if (ret) { + default_ent = NULL; + default_mask = 0; + } else { + default_mask = KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_MAX_LIFE | KADM5_MAX_RLIFE | + KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME | KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION; + } + + edit_entry(&princ, &mask, default_ent, default_mask); + if(rand_key) { + princ.attributes |= KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + strlcpy (pwbuf, "hemlig", sizeof(pwbuf)); + password = pwbuf; + } else if (rand_password) { + random_password (pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf)); + password = pwbuf; + } else if(password == NULL) { + char *princ_name; + char *prompt; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ_ent, &princ_name); + asprintf (&prompt, "%s's Password: ", princ_name); + free (princ_name); + ret = des_read_pw_string (pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), prompt, 1); + free (prompt); + if (ret) + goto out; + password = pwbuf; + } + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask, password); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_create_principal"); + if(rand_key) { + krb5_keyblock *new_keys; + int n_keys, i; + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, + &new_keys, &n_keys); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_randkey_principal"); + n_keys = 0; + } + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &new_keys[i]); + free(new_keys); + kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KVNO | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + princ.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + princ.kvno = 1; + kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, + KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_KVNO); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + } else if (rand_password) { + char *princ_name; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ_ent, &princ_name); + printf ("added %s with password `%s'\n", princ_name, password); + free (princ_name); + } +out: + if (princ_ent) + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + if(default_ent) + kadm5_free_principal_ent (context, default_ent); + if (password != NULL) + memset (password, 0, strlen(password)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * the ank command + */ + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "random-key", 'r', arg_flag, NULL, "set random key" }, + { "random-password", 0, arg_flag, NULL, "set random password" }, + { "password", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "princial's password" }, + { "max-ticket-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, "max ticket lifetime", + "lifetime"}, + { "max-renewable-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "max renewable lifetime", "lifetime" }, + { "attributes", 0, arg_string, NULL, "principal attributes", + "attributes"}, + { "expiration-time",0, arg_string, NULL, "Expiration time", + "time"}, + { "pw-expiration-time", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "Password expiration time", "time"} +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "ank", "principal"); +} + +/* + * Parse arguments and add all the principals. + */ + +int +add_new_key(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *password = NULL; + int random_key = 0; + int random_password = 0; + int optind = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *max_ticket_life = NULL; + char *max_renewable_life = NULL; + char *attributes = NULL; + char *expiration = NULL; + char *pw_expiration = NULL; + int i; + int num; + + args[0].value = &random_key; + args[1].value = &random_password; + args[2].value = &password; + args[3].value = &max_ticket_life; + args[4].value = &max_renewable_life; + args[5].value = &attributes; + args[6].value = &expiration; + args[7].value = &pw_expiration; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + if(optind == argc) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + + num = 0; + if (random_key) + ++num; + if (random_password) + ++num; + if (password) + ++num; + + if (num > 1) { + printf ("give only one of " + "--random-key, --random-password, --password\n"); + return 0; + } + + for (i = optind; i < argc; ++i) { + ret = add_one_principal (argv[i], random_key, random_password, + password, + max_ticket_life, + max_renewable_life, + attributes, + expiration, + pw_expiration); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "adding %s", argv[i]); + break; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/cpw.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/cpw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bd71a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/cpw.c @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: cpw.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:04:57 joda Exp $"); + +struct cpw_entry_data { + int random_key; + int random_password; + char *password; +}; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "random-key", 'r', arg_flag, NULL, "set random key" }, + { "random-password", 0, arg_flag, NULL, "set random password" }, + { "password", 'p', arg_string, NULL, "princial's password" }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "cpw", "principal..."); +} + +static int +set_random_key (krb5_principal principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int num_keys; + + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, principal, &keys, &num_keys); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[i]); + free(keys); + return 0; +} + +static int +set_random_password (krb5_principal principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char pw[128]; + + random_password (pw, sizeof(pw)); + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, principal, pw); + if (ret == 0) { + char *princ_name; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &princ_name); + + printf ("%s's password set to `%s'\n", princ_name, pw); + free (princ_name); + } + memset (pw, 0, sizeof(pw)); + return ret; +} + +static int +set_password (krb5_principal principal, char *password) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + char pwbuf[128]; + + if(password == NULL) { + char *princ_name; + char *prompt; + + krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &princ_name); + asprintf(&prompt, "%s's Password: ", princ_name); + free (princ_name); + ret = des_read_pw_string(pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), prompt, 1); + free (prompt); + if(ret){ + return 0; /* XXX error code? */ + } + password = pwbuf; + } + if(ret == 0) + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, principal, password); + memset(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf)); + return ret; +} + +static int +do_cpw_entry(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + struct cpw_entry_data *e = data; + + if (e->random_key) + return set_random_key (principal); + else if (e->random_password) + return set_random_password (principal); + else + return set_password (principal, e->password); +} + +int +cpw_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + int optind = 0; + struct cpw_entry_data data; + int num; + + data.random_key = 0; + data.random_password = 0; + data.password = NULL; + + args[0].value = &data.random_key; + args[1].value = &data.random_password; + args[2].value = &data.password; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + usage(); + return 0; + } + + num = 0; + if (data.random_key) + ++num; + if (data.random_password) + ++num; + if (data.password) + ++num; + + if (num > 1) { + printf ("give only one of " + "--random-key, --random-password, --password\n"); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_cpw_entry, &data); + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39ee24e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: del.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +static int +do_del_entry(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + return kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handle, principal); +} + +int +del_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + + for(i = 1; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_del_entry, NULL); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del_enctype.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del_enctype.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d772b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/del_enctype.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: del_enctype.c,v 1.4 1999/12/14 02:37:49 assar Exp $"); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf (stderr, "Usage: del_enctype principal enctypes...\n"); +} + +/* + * del_enctype principal enctypes... + */ + +int +del_enctype(int argc, char **argv) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + krb5_principal princ_ent = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *princ_name; + int i, j, k; + krb5_key_data *new_key_data; + int n_etypes; + krb5_enctype *etypes; + + if (argc < 3) { + usage (); + return 0; + } + + memset (&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + princ_name = argv[1]; + n_etypes = argc - 2; + etypes = malloc (n_etypes * sizeof(*etypes)); + if (etypes == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "out of memory"); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < n_etypes; ++i) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype (context, argv[i + 2], &etypes[i]); + if (ret) { + krb5_warnx (context, "bad enctype `%s'", argv[i + 2]); + goto out2; + } + } + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princ_name, &princ_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", princ_name); + goto out2; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + krb5_warnx (context, "no such principal: %s", princ_name); + goto out2; + } + + new_key_data = malloc(princ.n_key_data * sizeof(*new_key_data)); + if (new_key_data == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "out of memory"); + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < princ.n_key_data; ++i) { + krb5_key_data *key = &princ.key_data[i]; + int docopy = 1; + + for (k = 0; k < n_etypes; ++k) + if (etypes[k] == key->key_data_type[0]) { + docopy = 0; + break; + } + if (docopy) { + new_key_data[j++] = *key; + } else { + int16_t ignore; + + kadm5_free_key_data (kadm_handle, &ignore, key); + } + } + + free (princ.key_data); + princ.n_key_data = j; + princ.key_data = new_key_data; + + ret = kadm5_modify_principal (kadm_handle, &princ, KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_modify_principal"); +out: + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); +out2: + free (etypes); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/dump.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/dump.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a57309c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/dump.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: dump.c,v 1.26 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +int +dump(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + FILE *f; + HDB *db = _kadm5_s_get_db(kadm_handle); + int decrypt = 0; + int optind = 0; + + struct getargs args[] = { + { "decrypt", 'd', arg_flag, NULL, "decrypt keys" } + }; + args[0].value = &decrypt; + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), "kadmin dump", + "[dump-file]"); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + if(argc < 1) + f = stdout; + else + f = fopen(argv[0], "w"); + + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0600); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_open"); + if(f != stdout) + fclose(f); + return 0; + } + + hdb_foreach(context, db, decrypt ? HDB_F_DECRYPT : 0, hdb_print_entry, f); + + if(f != stdout) + fclose(f); + db->close(context, db); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ext.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ext.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d2be17 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ext.c,v 1.5 2000/01/02 03:58:02 assar Exp $"); + +struct ext_keytab_data { + krb5_keytab keytab; +}; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, NULL, "keytab to use" }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, "ext", "principal..."); +} + +static int +do_ext_keytab(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + struct ext_keytab_data *e = data; + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, principal, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KVNO|KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < princ.n_key_data; i++){ + krb5_keytab_entry key; + krb5_key_data *k = &princ.key_data[i]; + key.principal = princ.principal; + key.vno = k->key_data_kvno; + key.keyblock.keytype = k->key_data_type[0]; + key.keyblock.keyvalue.length = k->key_data_length[0]; + key.keyblock.keyvalue.data = k->key_data_contents[0]; + key.timestamp = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, e->keytab, &key); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_add_entry"); + } + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + return 0; +} + +int +ext_keytab(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + int optind = 0; + char *keytab = NULL; + struct ext_keytab_data data; + + args[0].value = &keytab; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)){ + usage(); + return 0; + } + if(keytab) + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab, &data.keytab); + else + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &data.keytab); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve"); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) + foreach_principal(argv[i], do_ext_keytab, &data); + + krb5_kt_close(context, data.keytab); + + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/get.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/get.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1492ca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/get.c @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +struct get_entry_data { + void (*header)(void); + void (*format)(kadm5_principal_ent_t); +}; + +static void +print_entry_terse(kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + char *p; + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ->principal, &p); + printf(" %s\n", p); + free(p); +} + +static void +print_header_short(void) +{ + printf("%-20s ", "Principal"); + + printf("%-10s ", "Expires"); + + printf("%-10s ", "PW-exp"); + + printf("%-10s ", "PW-change"); + + printf("%-9s ", "Max life"); + + printf("%-9s ", "Max renew"); + + printf("\n"); +} + +static void +print_entry_short(kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + char buf[1024]; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short(context, princ->principal, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-20s ", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->princ_expire_time, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->pw_expiration, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->last_pwd_change, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-9s ", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_renewable_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-9s ", buf); + +#if 0 + time_t2str(princ->mod_date, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + printf("%-10s ", buf); + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ->mod_name, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%-24s", buf); +#endif + + printf("\n"); +} + +static void +print_entry_long(kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + char buf[1024]; + int i; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ->principal, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Principal", buf); + time_t2str(princ->princ_expire_time, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Principal expires", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->pw_expiration, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Password expires", buf); + + time_t2str(princ->last_pwd_change, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last password change", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Max ticket life", buf); + + deltat2str(princ->max_renewable_life, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Max renewable life", buf); + printf("%24s: %d\n", "Kvno", princ->kvno); + printf("%24s: %d\n", "Mkvno", princ->mkvno); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Policy", princ->policy ? princ->policy : "none"); + time_t2str(princ->last_success, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last successful login", buf); + time_t2str(princ->last_failed, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last failed login", buf); + printf("%24s: %d\n", "Failed login count", princ->fail_auth_count); + time_t2str(princ->mod_date, buf, sizeof(buf), 1); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Last modified", buf); + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, princ->mod_name, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Modifier", buf); + attributes2str (princ->attributes, buf, sizeof(buf)); + printf("%24s: %s\n", "Attributes", buf); + + printf("%24s: ", "Keytypes(salts)"); + + for (i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; ++i) { + krb5_key_data *k = &princ->key_data[i]; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *e_string, *s_string; + + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string (context, + k->key_data_type[0], + &e_string); + if (ret) + asprintf (&e_string, "unknown(%d)", k->key_data_type[0]); + + ret = krb5_salttype_to_string (context, + k->key_data_type[0], + k->key_data_type[1], + &s_string); + if (ret) + asprintf (&s_string, "unknown(%d)", k->key_data_type[1]); + + printf ("%s%s(%s)", (i != 0) ? ", " : "", e_string, s_string); + free (e_string); + free (s_string); + } + printf("\n\n"); +} + +static int +do_get_entry(krb5_principal principal, void *data) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct get_entry_data *e = data; + + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, principal, + &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK|KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if(ret) + return ret; + else { + if(e->header) { + (*e->header)(); + e->header = NULL; /* XXX only once */ + } + (e->format)(&princ); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + } + return 0; +} + +int +get_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct get_entry_data data; + struct getargs args[] = { + { "long", 'l', arg_flag, NULL, "long format" }, + { "terse", 't', arg_flag, NULL, "terse format" }, + }; + int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + int optind = 0; + int long_flag = 0; + int terse_flag = 0; + + args[0].value = &long_flag; + args[1].value = &terse_flag; + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + goto usage; + if(optind == argc) + goto usage; + + if(long_flag) { + data.format = print_entry_long; + data.header = NULL; + } else if(terse_flag) { + data.format = print_entry_terse; + data.header = NULL; + } else { + data.format = print_entry_short; + data.header = print_header_short; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_get_entry, &data); + return 0; +usage: + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "get", "principal..."); + return 0; +} + +int +list_princs(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct get_entry_data data; + + data.format = print_entry_terse; + data.header = NULL; + + for(i = 1; i < argc; i++) + ret = foreach_principal(argv[i], do_get_entry, &data); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/init.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b889131 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: init.c,v 1.23 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +create_random_entry(krb5_principal princ, + unsigned max_life, + unsigned max_rlife, + u_int32_t attributes) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + int mask = 0; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + int n_keys, i; + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + ent.principal = princ; + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + if (max_life) { + ent.max_life = max_life; + mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; + } + if (max_rlife) { + ent.max_renewable_life = max_rlife; + mask |= KADM5_MAX_RLIFE; + } + ent.attributes |= attributes | KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask, "hemlig"); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ, &keys, &n_keys); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keys[i]); + free(keys); + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ, &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + if(ret) + return ret; + ent.attributes &= (~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + ent.kvno = 1; + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, + KADM5_ATTRIBUTES|KADM5_KVNO); + kadm5_free_principal_ent (kadm_handle, &ent); + if(ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm-max-ticket-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "realm max ticket lifetime" }, + { "realm-max-renewable-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "realm max renewable lifetime" }, +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(void) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, "ank", "principal"); +} + +int +init(int argc, char **argv) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + int i; + char *realm_max_life = NULL; + char *realm_max_rlife = NULL; + HDB *db; + int optind = 0; + krb5_deltat max_life, max_rlife; + + args[0].value = &realm_max_life; + args[1].value = &realm_max_rlife; + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + usage(); + return 0; + } + + if (realm_max_life) { + if (str2deltat (realm_max_life, &max_life) != 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", realm_max_life); + return 0; + } + } + if (realm_max_rlife) { + if (str2deltat (realm_max_rlife, &max_rlife) != 0) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", realm_max_rlife); + return 0; + } + } + + db = _kadm5_s_get_db(kadm_handle); + + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_open"); + return 0; + } + db->close(context, db); + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + krb5_principal princ; + const char *realm = argv[i]; + + /* Create `krbtgt/REALM' */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, "krbtgt", realm, NULL); + if (realm_max_life == NULL) { + max_life = 0; + edit_deltat ("Realm max ticket life", &max_life, NULL, 0); + } + if (realm_max_rlife == NULL) { + max_rlife = 0; + edit_deltat("Realm max renewable ticket life", &max_rlife, + NULL, 0); + } + create_random_entry(princ, max_life, max_rlife, 0); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `kadmin/changepw' */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "kadmin", "changepw", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 5*60, 5*60, + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED| + KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE| + KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE| + KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `kadmin/admin' */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "kadmin", "admin", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 60*60, 60*60, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `changepw/kerberos' (for v4 compat) */ + krb5_make_principal(context, &princ, realm, + "changepw", "kerberos", NULL); + create_random_entry(princ, 60*60, 60*60, 0); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + + /* Create `default' */ + { + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + int mask = 0; + + memset (&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + krb5_make_principal(context, &ent.principal, realm, + "default", NULL); + mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; + ent.max_life = 24 * 60 * 60; + mask |= KADM5_MAX_RLIFE; + ent.max_renewable_life = 7 * ent.max_life; + ent.attributes = KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES; + + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask, ""); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_create_principal"); + + krb5_free_principal(context, ent.principal); + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9172d6e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin.c @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: kadmin.c,v 1.26 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +static char *config_file; +static char *keyfile; +static int local_flag; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static char *realm; +static char *admin_server; +static int server_port = 0; +static char *client_name; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "principal", 'p', arg_string, &client_name, + "principal to authenticate as" }, + { + "config-file", 'c', arg_string, &config_file, + "location of config file", "file" + }, + { + "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, + "location of master key file", "file" + }, + { + "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { + "admin-server", 'a', arg_string, &admin_server, + "server to contact", "host" + }, + { + "server-port", 's', arg_integer, &server_port, + "server to contact", "port number" + }, + { "local", 'l', arg_flag, &local_flag, "local admin mode" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static SL_cmd commands[] = { + /* commands that are only available with `-l' */ + { + "dump", dump, "dump [file]", + "Dumps the database in a human readable format to the\n" + "specified file, or the standard out." + }, + { + "load", load, "load file", + "Loads a previously dumped file." + }, + { + "merge", merge, "merge file" , + "Merges the contents of a dump file into the database." + }, + { + "init", init, "init realm...", + "Initializes the default principals for a realm.\n" + "Creates the database if necessary." + }, + /* common commands */ + { + "add", add_new_key, "add principal" , + "Adds a principal to the database." + }, + { "add_new_key"}, + { "ank"}, + { + "passwd", cpw_entry, "passwd expression..." , + "Changes the password of one or more principals\n" + "matching the expressions." + }, + { "change_password"}, + { "cpw"}, + { + "delete", del_entry, "delete expression...", + "Deletes all principals matching the expressions." + }, + { "del_entry" }, + { + "del_enctype", del_enctype, "del_enctype principal enctype...", + "Delete all the mentioned enctypes for principal." + }, + { + "ext_keytab", ext_keytab, "ext_keytab expression...", + "Extracts the keys of all principals matching the expressions,\n" + "and stores them in a keytab." + }, + { + "get", get_entry, "get expression...", + "Shows information about principals matching the expressions." + }, + { "get_entry" }, + { + "rename", rename_entry, "rename source target", + "Renames `source' to `target'." + }, + { + "modify", mod_entry, "modify principal", + "Modifies some attributes of the specified principal." + }, + { + "privileges", get_privs, "privileges", + "Shows which kinds of operations you are allowed to perform." + }, + { + "list", list_princs, "list expression...", + "Lists principals in a terse format. The same as `get -t'." + }, + { "help", help, "help"}, + { "?"}, + { "exit", exit_kadmin, "exit"}, + { NULL} +}; + +krb5_context context; +void *kadm_handle; + +int +help(int argc, char **argv) +{ + sl_help(commands, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +int +exit_kadmin (int argc, char **argv) +{ + return 1; +} + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "[command]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +get_privs(int argc, char **argv) +{ + u_int32_t privs; + char str[128]; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + + ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handle, &privs); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_get_privs"); + else{ + ret =_kadm5_privs_to_string(privs, str, sizeof(str)); + printf("%s\n", str); + } + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_section *cf = NULL; + kadm5_config_params conf; + int optind = 0; + int e; + SL_cmd *cmd; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + krb5_init_context(&context); + + while((e = getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind))) + warnx("error at argument `%s'", argv[optind]); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (config_file == NULL) + config_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.conf"; + + if(krb5_config_parse_file(config_file, &cf) == 0) { + const char *p = krb5_config_get_string (context, cf, + "kdc", "key-file", NULL); + if (p) + keyfile = strdup(p); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm); /* XXX should be fixed + some other way */ + conf.realm = realm; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + } + + if (admin_server) { + conf.admin_server = admin_server; + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER; + } + + if (server_port) { + conf.kadmind_port = htons(server_port); + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT; + } + + if(local_flag){ + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + cmd = commands; + } else { + ret = kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + cmd = commands + 4; /* XXX */ + } + + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password"); + if (argc != 0) { + ret = sl_command (cmd, argc, argv); + if(ret == -1) + krb5_warnx (context, "unrecognized command: %s", argv[0]); + } else + ret = sl_loop (cmd, "kadmin> ") != 0; + + kadm5_destroy(kadm_handle); + krb5_config_file_free (context, cf); + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..240ca2c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmin_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: kadmin_locl.h,v 1.24 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __ADMIN_LOCL_H__ +#define __ADMIN_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +extern krb5_context context; +extern void * kadm_handle; + +#define DECL(X) int X(int, char **) + +DECL(add_new_key); +DECL(cpw_entry); +DECL(del_entry); +DECL(del_enctype); +DECL(exit_kadmin); +DECL(ext_keytab); +DECL(get_entry); +DECL(get_privs); +DECL(help); +DECL(list_princs); +DECL(mod_entry); +DECL(rename_entry); +DECL(init); +DECL(dump); +DECL(load); +DECL(merge); + +#define ALLOC(X) ((X) = malloc(sizeof(*(X)))) + +/* util.c */ + +void attributes2str(krb5_flags attributes, char *str, size_t len); +int str2attributes(const char *str, krb5_flags *flags); +int parse_attributes (const char *resp, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, int bit); +int edit_attributes (const char *prompt, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, + int bit); + +void time_t2str(time_t t, char *str, size_t len, int include_time); +int str2time_t (const char *str, time_t *time); +int parse_timet (const char *resp, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, int bit); +int edit_timet (const char *prompt, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, + int bit); + +void deltat2str(unsigned t, char *str, size_t len); +int str2deltat(const char *str, krb5_deltat *delta); +int parse_deltat (const char *resp, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit); +int edit_deltat (const char *prompt, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit); + +int edit_entry(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int *mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent, int default_mask); +int set_entry(krb5_context context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int *mask, + const char *max_ticket_life, + const char *max_renewable_life, + const char *expiration, + const char *pw_expiration, + const char *attributes); +int +foreach_principal(const char *exp, + int (*func)(krb5_principal, void*), + void *data); + +void get_response(const char *prompt, const char *def, char *buf, size_t len); + +/* server.c */ + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context, krb5_keytab, int); + +/* version4.c */ + +void +handle_v4(krb5_context context, int len, int fd); + +/* random_password.c */ + +void +random_password(char *pw, size_t len); + +#endif /* __ADMIN_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmind.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmind.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b4fb0d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/kadmind.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kadmind.c,v 1.16 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +static char *config_file; +static char *keyfile; +static char *keytab_str = "HDB:"; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int debug_flag; +static int debug_port; +char *realm; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { + "config-file", 'c', arg_string, &config_file, + "location of config file", "file" + }, + { + "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, + "location of master key file", "file" + }, + { + "keytab", 0, arg_string, &keytab_str, + "what keytab to use", "keytab" + }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm, + "realm to use", "realm" + }, + { "debug", 'd', arg_flag, &debug_flag, + "enable debugging" + }, + { "debug-port", 'p', arg_integer,&debug_port, + "port to use with debug", "port" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +krb5_context context; + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (ret); +} + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop (krb5_context, krb5_auth_context, krb5_keytab, int); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_section *cf; + int optind = 0; + int e; + krb5_log_facility *logf; + krb5_keytab keytab; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + krb5_init_context(&context); + + ret = krb5_openlog(context, "kadmind", &logf); + ret = krb5_set_warn_dest(context, logf); + + while((e = getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind))) + warnx("error at argument `%s'", argv[optind]); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + if (config_file == NULL) + config_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.conf"; + + if(krb5_config_parse_file(config_file, &cf) == 0) { + const char *p = krb5_config_get_string (context, cf, + "kdc", "key-file", NULL); + if (p) + keyfile = strdup(p); + } + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve"); + + { + int fd = 0; + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + if(debug_flag){ + if(debug_port == 0) + debug_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos-adm", + "tcp", 749); + else + debug_port = htons(debug_port); + mini_inetd(debug_port); + } + if(realm) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm); /* XXX */ + kadmind_loop(context, ac, keytab, fd); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/load.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/load.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f9f2b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/load.c @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: load.c,v 1.34 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +struct entry{ + char *principal; + char *key; + char *max_life; + char *max_renew; + char *created; + char *modified; + char *valid_start; + char *valid_end; + char *pw_end; + char *flags; + char *etypes; +}; + +static char * +skip_next(char *p) +{ + while(*p && !isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + p++; + *p++ = 0; + while(*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++; + return p; +} + +static time_t* +parse_time_string(time_t *t, char *s) +{ + int year, month, date, hour, minute, second; + struct tm tm; + if(strcmp(s, "-") == 0) + return NULL; + if(t == NULL) + t = malloc(sizeof(*t)); + sscanf(s, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d", + &year, &month, &date, &hour, &minute, &second); + tm.tm_year = year - 1900; + tm.tm_mon = month - 1; + tm.tm_mday = date; + tm.tm_hour = hour; + tm.tm_min = minute; + tm.tm_sec = second; + tm.tm_isdst = 0; + *t = timegm(&tm); + return t; +} + +static unsigned* +parse_integer(unsigned *u, char *s) +{ + if(strcmp(s, "-") == 0) + return NULL; + if(u == NULL) + u = malloc(sizeof(*u)); + sscanf(s, "%u", u); + return u; +} + +static void +parse_keys(hdb_entry *ent, char *str) +{ + int tmp; + char *p; + int i; + + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + sscanf(p, "%d", &tmp); + ent->kvno = tmp; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + while(p){ + Key *key; + key = realloc(ent->keys.val, + (ent->keys.len + 1) * sizeof(*ent->keys.val)); + if(key == NULL) + abort(); + ent->keys.val = key; + key = ent->keys.val + ent->keys.len; + ent->keys.len++; + memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); + if(sscanf(p, "%d", &tmp) == 1) { + key->mkvno = malloc(sizeof(*key->mkvno)); + *key->mkvno = tmp; + } else + key->mkvno = NULL; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + sscanf(p, "%d", &tmp); + key->key.keytype = tmp; + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + krb5_data_alloc(&key->key.keyvalue, (strlen(p) - 1) / 2 + 1); + for(i = 0; i < strlen(p); i += 2){ + sscanf(p + i, "%02x", &tmp); + ((u_char*)key->key.keyvalue.data)[i / 2] = tmp; + } + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + if(strcmp(p, "-") != 0){ + unsigned type; + size_t p_len; + if(sscanf(p, "%u/", &type) != 1){ + abort (); + } + p = strchr(p, '/'); + if(p == NULL) + abort (); + p++; + p_len = strlen(p); + + key->salt = malloc(sizeof(*key->salt)); + key->salt->type = type; + + if (p_len) { + if(*p == '\"'){ + krb5_data_copy(&key->salt->salt, p + 1, p_len - 2); + }else{ + krb5_data_alloc(&key->salt->salt, (p_len - 1) / 2 + 1); + for(i = 0; i < p_len; i += 2){ + sscanf(p + i, "%02x", &tmp); + ((u_char*)key->salt->salt.data)[i / 2] = tmp; + } + } + } else + krb5_data_zero (&key->salt->salt); + } + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + } +} + +static Event* +parse_event(Event *ev, char *str) +{ + char *p; + if(strcmp(str, "-") == 0) + return NULL; + if(ev == NULL) + ev = malloc(sizeof(*ev)); + memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev)); + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + parse_time_string(&ev->time, p); + p = strsep(&str, ":"); + krb5_parse_name(context, p, &ev->principal); + return ev; +} + +static HDBFlags +parse_hdbflags2int(char *str) +{ + unsigned i; + parse_integer(&i, str); + + return int2HDBFlags(i); +} + +#if 0 +static void +parse_etypes(char *str, unsigned **val, unsigned *len) +{ + unsigned v; + + *val = NULL; + *len = 0; + while(sscanf(str, "%u", &v) == 1) { + *val = realloc(*val, (*len+1) * sizeof(**val)); + (*val)[(*len)++] = v; + str = strchr(str, ':'); + if(str == NULL) + break; + str++; + } +} +#endif + +static void +doit(char *filename, int merge) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + FILE *f; + char s[1024]; + char *p; + int line; + int flags = O_RDWR; + struct entry e; + hdb_entry ent; + HDB *db = _kadm5_s_get_db(kadm_handle); + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(f == NULL){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "fopen(%s)", filename); + return; + } + if(!merge) + flags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC; + ret = db->open(context, db, flags, 0600); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "hdb_open"); + fclose(f); + return; + } + line = 0; + while(fgets(s, sizeof(s), f)){ + line++; + e.principal = s; + for(p = s; *p; p++){ + if(*p == '\\') + p++; + else if(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) { + *p = 0; + break; + } + } + p = skip_next(p); + + e.key = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.created = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.modified = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.valid_start = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.valid_end = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.pw_end = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.max_life = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.max_renew = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.flags = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + e.etypes = p; + p = skip_next(p); + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, e.principal, &ent.principal); + if(ret){ + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d:%s (%s)\n", + filename, + line, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret), + e.principal); + continue; + } + + parse_keys(&ent, e.key); + + parse_event(&ent.created_by, e.created); + ent.modified_by = parse_event(NULL, e.modified); + ent.valid_start = parse_time_string(NULL, e.valid_start); + ent.valid_end = parse_time_string(NULL, e.valid_end); + ent.pw_end = parse_time_string(NULL, e.pw_end); + ent.max_life = parse_integer(NULL, e.max_life); + ent.max_renew = parse_integer(NULL, e.max_renew); + ent.flags = parse_hdbflags2int(e.flags); +#if 0 + ALLOC(ent.etypes); + parse_etypes(e.etypes, &ent.etypes->val, &ent.etypes->len); + if(ent.etypes->len == 0) { + free(ent.etypes); + ent.etypes = NULL; + } +#endif + + db->store(context, db, HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context, &ent); + } + db->close(context, db); + fclose(f); +} + +int +load(int argc, char **argv) +{ + if(argc < 2){ + krb5_warnx(context, "Usage: load filename"); + return 0; + } + doit(argv[1], 0); + return 0; +} + +int +merge(int argc, char **argv) +{ + if(argc < 2){ + krb5_warnx(context, "Usage: merge filename"); + return 0; + } + doit(argv[1], 1); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/mod.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/mod.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48d00a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/mod.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mod.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +static int parse_args (krb5_context context, kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int argc, char **argv, int *optind, char *name, + int *mask); + +static int +parse_args(krb5_context context, kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int argc, char **argv, int *optind, char *name, + int *mask) +{ + char *attr_str = NULL; + char *max_life_str = NULL; + char *max_rlife_str = NULL; + char *expiration_str = NULL; + char *pw_expiration_str = NULL; + int ret, i; + + struct getargs args[] = { + {"attributes", 'a', arg_string, NULL, "Attributies", + "attributes"}, + {"max-ticket-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, "max ticket lifetime", + "lifetime"}, + {"max-renewable-life", 0, arg_string, NULL, + "max renewable lifetime", "lifetime" }, + {"expiration-time", 0, arg_string, + NULL, "Expiration time", "time"}, + {"pw-expiration-time", 0, arg_string, + NULL, "Password expiration time", "time"}, + }; + + i = 0; + args[i++].value = &attr_str; + args[i++].value = &max_life_str; + args[i++].value = &max_rlife_str; + args[i++].value = &expiration_str; + args[i++].value = &pw_expiration_str; + + *optind = 0; /* XXX */ + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + argc, argv, optind)){ + arg_printusage(args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + name ? name : "", + "principal"); + return -1; + } + + ret = set_entry(context, ent, mask, max_life_str, max_rlife_str, + expiration_str, pw_expiration_str, attr_str); + if (ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +int +mod_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + kadm5_principal_ent_rec princ; + int mask = 0; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ_ent = NULL; + int optind; + + memset (&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + + ret = parse_args (context, &princ, argc, argv, + &optind, "mod", &mask); + if (ret) + return 0; + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) { + printf ("Usage: mod [options] principal\n"); + return 0; + } + + krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &princ_ent); + + if (mask == 0) { + memset(&princ, 0, sizeof(princ)); + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ_ent, &princ, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | + KADM5_MAX_LIFE | KADM5_MAX_RLIFE | + KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME | + KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION); + if (ret) { + printf ("no such principal: %s\n", argv[0]); + krb5_free_principal (context, princ_ent); + return 0; + } + edit_entry(&princ, &mask, NULL, 0); + + } else { + princ.principal = princ_ent; + } + + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &princ, mask); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_modify_principal"); + if(princ_ent) + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &princ); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/random_password.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/random_password.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aabe08c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/random_password.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: random_password.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +/* This file defines some a function that generates a random password, + that can be used when creating a large amount of principals (such + as for a batch of students). Since this is a political matter, you + should think about how secure generated passwords has to be. + + Both methods defined here will give you at least 55 bits of + entropy. + */ + +/* If you want OTP-style passwords, define OTP_STYLE */ + +#ifdef OTP_STYLE +#include +#else +static void generate_password(char **pw, int num_classes, ...); +#endif + +void +random_password(char *pw, size_t len) +{ +#ifdef OTP_STYLE + { + des_cblock newkey; + + des_new_random_key(&newkey); + otp_print_stddict (newkey, pw, len); + strlwr(pw); + } +#else + char *pass; + generate_password(&pass, 3, + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz", 7, + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ", 2, + "@$%&*()-+=:,/<>1234567890", 1); + strlcpy(pw, pass, len); + memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass)); + free(pass); +#endif +} + +/* some helper functions */ + +#ifndef OTP_STYLE +/* return a random value in range 0-127 */ +static int +RND(des_cblock *key, int *left) +{ + if(*left == 0){ + des_new_random_key(key); + *left = 8; + } + (*left)--; + return ((unsigned char*)key)[*left]; +} + +/* This a helper function that generates a random password with a + number of characters from a set of character classes. + + If there are n classes, and the size of each class is Pi, and the + number of characters from each class is Ni, the number of possible + passwords are (given that the character classes are disjoint): + + n n + ----- / ---- \ + | | Ni | \ | + | | Pi | \ Ni| ! + | | ---- * | / | + | | Ni! | /___ | + i=1 \ i=1 / + + Since it uses the RND function above, neither the size of each + class, nor the total length of the generated password should be + larger than 127 (without fixing RND). + + */ +static void +generate_password(char **pw, int num_classes, ...) +{ + struct { + const char *str; + int len; + int freq; + } *classes; + va_list ap; + int len, i; + des_cblock rbuf; /* random buffer */ + int rleft = 0; + + classes = malloc(num_classes * sizeof(*classes)); + va_start(ap, num_classes); + len = 0; + for(i = 0; i < num_classes; i++){ + classes[i].str = va_arg(ap, const char*); + classes[i].len = strlen(classes[i].str); + classes[i].freq = va_arg(ap, int); + len += classes[i].freq; + } + va_end(ap); + *pw = malloc(len + 1); + if(*pw == NULL) + return; + for(i = 0; i < len; i++) { + int j; + int x = RND(&rbuf, &rleft) % (len - i); + int t = 0; + for(j = 0; j < num_classes; j++) { + if(x < t + classes[j].freq) { + (*pw)[i] = classes[j].str[RND(&rbuf, &rleft) % classes[j].len]; + classes[j].freq--; + break; + } + t += classes[j].freq; + } + } + (*pw)[len] = '\0'; + memset(rbuf, 0, sizeof(rbuf)); + free(classes); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/rename.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/rename.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d8a48e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/rename.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +int +rename_entry(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ1, princ2; + + if(argc != 3){ + krb5_warnx(context, "rename source target"); + return 0; + } + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[1], &princ1); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name(%s)", argv[1]); + return 0; + } + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[2], &princ2); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ2); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name(%s)", argv[2]); + return 0; + } + ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handle, princ1, princ2); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "rename"); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ1); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ2); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/server.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d491e46 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/server.c @@ -0,0 +1,506 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: server.c,v 1.24 2000/01/02 03:58:45 assar Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadmind_dispatch(void *kadm_handle, krb5_boolean initial, + krb5_data *in, krb5_data *out) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + int32_t cmd, mask, tmp; + kadm5_server_context *context = kadm_handle; + char client[128], name[128], name2[128]; + char *op = ""; + krb5_principal princ, princ2; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + char *password, *exp; + krb5_keyblock *new_keys; + int n_keys; + char **princs; + int n_princs; + krb5_storage *sp; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, context->caller, + client, sizeof(client)); + + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in); + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &cmd); + switch(cmd){ + case kadm_get:{ + op = "GET"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_GET); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, princ, &ent, mask); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + } + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + break; + } + case kadm_delete:{ + op = "DELETE"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handle, princ); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_create:{ + op = "CREATE"; + ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context->context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context->context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, ent.principal, + name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_ADD); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context->context, &ent); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, + mask, password); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_modify:{ + op = "MODIFY"; + ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, ent.principal, + name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, &ent); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_rename:{ + op = "RENAME"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ2); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ2, name2, sizeof(name2)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s -> %s", + client, op, name, name2); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, + KADM5_PRIV_ADD|KADM5_PRIV_DELETE); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handle, princ, princ2); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ2); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_chpass:{ + op = "CHPASS"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + + /* + * The change is allowed if at least one of: + * a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an initial ticket + * b) the user is on the CPW ACL. + */ + + if (initial + && krb5_principal_compare (context->context, context->caller, + princ)) + ret = 0; + else + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_CPW); + + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, princ, password); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); + free(password); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_randkey:{ + op = "RANDKEY"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + /* + * The change is allowed if at least one of: + * a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an initial ticket + * b) the user is on the CPW ACL. + */ + + if (initial + && krb5_principal_compare (context->context, context->caller, + princ)) + ret = 0; + else + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_CPW); + + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal(kadm_handle, princ, + &new_keys, &n_keys); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + int i; + krb5_store_int32(sp, n_keys); + for(i = 0; i < n_keys; i++){ + krb5_store_keyblock(sp, new_keys[i]); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context->context, &new_keys[i]); + } + } + break; + } + case kadm_get_privs:{ + ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handle, &mask); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0) + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + break; + } + case kadm_get_princs:{ + op = "LIST"; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) + goto fail; + if(tmp){ + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &exp); + if(ret) + goto fail; + }else + exp = NULL; + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, exp ? exp : "*"); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(context, KADM5_PRIV_LIST); + if(ret){ + free(exp); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handle, exp, &princs, &n_princs); + free(exp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + int i; + krb5_store_int32(sp, n_princs); + for(i = 0; i < n_princs; i++) + krb5_store_string(sp, princs[i]); + kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handle, princs, &n_princs); + } + break; + } + default: + krb5_warnx(context->context, "%s: UNKNOWN OP %d", client, cmd); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_int32(sp, KADM5_FAILURE); + break; + } + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context->context, ret, "%s", op); + sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +} + +static void +v5_loop (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_boolean initial, + void *kadm_handle, + int fd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ssize_t n; + unsigned long len; + u_char tmp[4]; + struct iovec iov[2]; + krb5_data in, out, msg, reply; + + for (;;) { + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, tmp, 4); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + if (n == 0) + exit (0); + _krb5_get_int (tmp, &len, 4); + + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&in, len); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_data_alloc"); + + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, in.data, in.length); + if (n == 0) + exit (0); + if(n < 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "read error: %d", errno); + ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, ac, &in, &out, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_rd_priv"); + krb5_data_free(&in); + kadmind_dispatch(kadm_handle, initial, &out, &msg); + krb5_data_free(&out); + ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, ac, &msg, &reply, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&msg); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_mk_priv"); + + _krb5_put_int(tmp, reply.length, 4); + + iov[0].iov_base = tmp; + iov[0].iov_len = 4; + iov[1].iov_base = reply.data; + iov[1].iov_len = reply.length; + n = writev(fd, iov, 2); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + if(n < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "writev"); + if(n < iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "short write"); + } +} + +static krb5_boolean +match_appl_version(void *data, const char *appl_version) +{ + unsigned minor; + if(sscanf(appl_version, "KADM0.%u", &minor) != 1) + return 0; + *(unsigned*)data = minor; + return 1; +} + +static void +handle_v5(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int len, + int fd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_char version[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)]; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + krb5_principal server; + char *client; + void *kadm_handle; + ssize_t n; + krb5_boolean initial; + + unsigned kadm_version; + kadm5_config_params realm_params; + + if (len != sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "bad sendauth len %d", len); + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, version, len); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "reading sendauth version"); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF reading sendauth version"); + if(memcmp(version, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) != 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "bad sendauth version %.8s", version); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, &server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE); + ret = krb5_recvauth_match_version(context, &ac, &fd, + match_appl_version, &kadm_version, + server, KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + keytab, &ticket); + if(ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { + char *name; + krb5_unparse_name(context, server, &name); + krb5_errx(context, 1, "krb5_recvauth: %s (%s)", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret), + name); + } + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + + memset(&realm_params, 0, sizeof(realm_params)); + + if(kadm_version == 1) { + krb5_data enc_data, params; + ret = krb5_read_message(context, &fd, &enc_data); + ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, ac, &enc_data, ¶ms, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&enc_data); + _kadm5_unmarshal_params(context, ¶ms, &realm_params); + } + + initial = ticket->ticket.flags.initial; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ticket->client, &client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &realm_params, + 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if(ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + v5_loop (context, ac, initial, kadm_handle, fd); +} + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int fd) +{ + unsigned char tmp[4]; + ssize_t n; + unsigned long len; + + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, tmp, 4); + if(n == 0) + exit(0); + if(n < 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "read error: %d", errno); + _krb5_get_int(tmp, &len, 4); + if(len > 0xffff && (len & 0xffff) == ('K' << 8) + 'A') { + len >>= 16; +#ifdef KRB4 + handle_v4(context, len, fd); +#else + krb5_errx(context, 1, "packet appears to be version 4"); +#endif + } else { + handle_v5(context, ac, keytab, len, fd); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/util.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f30c8c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/util.c @@ -0,0 +1,520 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: util.c,v 1.23 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * util.c - functions for parsing, unparsing, and editing different + * types of data used in kadmin. + */ + +/* + * attributes + */ + +struct units kdb_attrs[] = { + { "new-princ", KRB5_KDB_NEW_PRINC }, + { "support-desmd5", KRB5_KDB_SUPPORT_DESMD5 }, + { "pwchange-service", KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE }, + { "disallow-svr", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR }, + { "requires-pw-change", KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE }, + { "requires-hw-auth", KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH }, + { "requires-pre-auth", KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH }, + { "disallow-all-tix", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX }, + { "disallow-dup-skey", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY }, + { "disallow-proxiable", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE }, + { "disallow-renewable", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE }, + { "disallow-tgt-based", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED }, + { "disallow-forwardable", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE }, + { "disallow-postdated", KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED }, + { NULL } +}; + +/* + * convert the attributes in `attributes' into a printable string + * in `str, len' + */ + +void +attributes2str(krb5_flags attributes, char *str, size_t len) +{ + unparse_flags (attributes, kdb_attrs, str, len); +} + +/* + * convert the string in `str' into attributes in `flags' + * return 0 if parsed ok, else -1. + */ + +int +str2attributes(const char *str, krb5_flags *flags) +{ + int res; + + res = parse_flags (str, kdb_attrs, *flags); + if (res < 0) + return res; + else { + *flags = res; + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * try to parse the string `resp' into attributes in `attr', also + * setting the `bit' in `mask' if attributes are given and valid. + */ + +int +parse_attributes (const char *resp, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, int bit) +{ + krb5_flags tmp = *attr; + + if (resp[0] == '\0') + return 0; + else if (str2attributes(resp, &tmp) == 0) { + *attr = tmp; + if (mask) + *mask |= bit; + return 0; + } else if(*resp == '?') { + print_flags_table (kdb_attrs, stderr); + } else { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to parse '%s'\n", resp); + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit the attributes in `attr', prompting with `prompt' + */ + +int +edit_attributes (const char *prompt, krb5_flags *attr, int *mask, int bit) +{ + char buf[1024], resp[1024]; + + if (mask && (*mask & bit)) + return 0; + + attributes2str(*attr, buf, sizeof(buf)); + for (;;) { + get_response("Attributes", buf, resp, sizeof(resp)); + if (parse_attributes (resp, attr, mask, bit) == 0) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * time_t + * the special value 0 means ``never'' + */ + +/* + * Convert the time `t' to a string representation in `str' (of max + * size `len'). If include_time also include time, otherwise just + * date. + */ + +void +time_t2str(time_t t, char *str, size_t len, int include_time) +{ + if(t) { + if(include_time) + strftime(str, len, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC", gmtime(&t)); + else + strftime(str, len, "%Y-%m-%d", gmtime(&t)); + } else + snprintf(str, len, "never"); +} + +/* + * Convert the time representation in `str' to a time in `time'. + * Return 0 if succesful, else -1. + */ + +int +str2time_t (const char *str, time_t *time) +{ + const char *p; + struct tm tm; + + memset (&tm, 0, sizeof (tm)); + + if(strcasecmp(str, "never") == 0) { + *time = 0; + return 0; + } + + p = strptime (str, "%Y-%m-%d", &tm); + + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + + /* Do it on the end of the day */ + tm.tm_hour = 23; + tm.tm_min = 59; + tm.tm_sec = 59; + + strptime (p, "%H:%M:%S", &tm); + + *time = tm2time (tm, 0); + return 0; +} + +/* + * try to parse the time in `resp' storing it in `value' + */ + +int +parse_timet (const char *resp, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + time_t tmp; + + if (str2time_t(resp, &tmp) == 0) { + *value = tmp; + if(mask) + *mask |= bit; + return 0; + } else if(*resp == '?') { + printf ("Print date on format YYYY-mm-dd [hh:mm:ss]\n"); + } else { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to parse time '%s'\n", resp); + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit the time in `value' + */ + +int +edit_timet (const char *prompt, krb5_timestamp *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + char buf[1024], resp[1024]; + + if (mask && (*mask & bit)) + return 0; + + time_t2str (*value, buf, sizeof (buf), 0); + + for (;;) { + get_response(prompt, buf, resp, sizeof(resp)); + if (parse_timet (resp, value, mask, bit) == 0) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * deltat + * the special value 0 means ``unlimited'' + */ + +/* + * convert the delta_t value in `t' into a printable form in `str, len' + */ + +void +deltat2str(unsigned t, char *str, size_t len) +{ + if(t) + unparse_time(t, str, len); + else + snprintf(str, len, "unlimited"); +} + +/* + * parse the delta value in `str', storing result in `*delta' + * return 0 if ok, else -1 + */ + +int +str2deltat(const char *str, krb5_deltat *delta) +{ + int res; + + if(strcasecmp(str, "unlimited") == 0) { + *delta = 0; + return 0; + } + res = parse_time(str, "day"); + if (res < 0) + return res; + else { + *delta = res; + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * try to parse the string in `resp' into a deltad in `value' + * `mask' will get the bit `bit' set if a value was given. + */ + +int +parse_deltat (const char *resp, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + krb5_deltat tmp; + + if (str2deltat(resp, &tmp) == 0) { + *value = tmp; + if (mask) + *mask |= bit; + return 0; + } else if(*resp == '?') { + print_time_table (stderr); + } else { + fprintf (stderr, "Unable to parse time '%s'\n", resp); + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit the deltat in `value' + */ + +int +edit_deltat (const char *prompt, krb5_deltat *value, int *mask, int bit) +{ + char buf[1024], resp[1024]; + + if (mask && (*mask & bit)) + return 0; + + deltat2str(*value, buf, sizeof(buf)); + for (;;) { + get_response(prompt, buf, resp, sizeof(resp)); + if (parse_deltat (resp, value, mask, bit) == 0) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * allow the user to edit `ent' + */ + +int +edit_entry(kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, int *mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t default_ent, int default_mask) +{ + if (default_ent && (default_mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE)) + ent->max_life = default_ent->max_life; + edit_deltat ("Max ticket life", &ent->max_life, mask, + KADM5_MAX_LIFE); + + if (default_ent && (default_mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)) + ent->max_renewable_life = default_ent->max_renewable_life; + edit_deltat ("Max renewable life", &ent->max_renewable_life, mask, + KADM5_MAX_RLIFE); + + if (default_ent && (default_mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME)) + ent->princ_expire_time = default_ent->princ_expire_time; + edit_timet ("Principal expiration time", &ent->princ_expire_time, mask, + KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME); + + if (default_ent && (default_mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)) + ent->pw_expiration = default_ent->pw_expiration; + edit_timet ("Password expiration time", &ent->pw_expiration, mask, + KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION); + + if (default_ent && (default_mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES)) + ent->attributes = default_ent->attributes & ~KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX; + edit_attributes ("Attributes", &ent->attributes, mask, + KADM5_ATTRIBUTES); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse the arguments, set the fields in `ent' and the `mask' for the + * entries having been set. + * Return 1 on failure and 0 on success. + */ + +int +set_entry(krb5_context context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int *mask, + const char *max_ticket_life, + const char *max_renewable_life, + const char *expiration, + const char *pw_expiration, + const char *attributes) +{ + if (max_ticket_life != NULL) { + if (parse_deltat (max_ticket_life, &ent->max_life, + mask, KADM5_MAX_LIFE)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", max_ticket_life); + return 1; + } + } + if (max_renewable_life != NULL) { + if (parse_deltat (max_renewable_life, &ent->max_renewable_life, + mask, KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", max_renewable_life); + return 1; + } + } + + if (expiration) { + if (parse_timet (expiration, &ent->princ_expire_time, + mask, KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", expiration); + return 1; + } + } + if (pw_expiration) { + if (parse_timet (pw_expiration, &ent->pw_expiration, + mask, KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", pw_expiration); + return 1; + } + } + if (attributes != NULL) { + if (parse_attributes (attributes, &ent->attributes, + mask, KADM5_ATTRIBUTES)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "unable to parse `%s'", attributes); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Does `string' contain any globing characters? + */ + +static int +is_expression(const char *string) +{ + const char *p; + int quote = 0; + + for(p = string; *p; p++) { + if(quote) { + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\\') + quote++; + else if(strchr("[]*?", *p) != NULL) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* loop over all principals matching exp */ +int +foreach_principal(const char *exp, + int (*func)(krb5_principal, void*), + void *data) +{ + char **princs; + int num_princs; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ_ent; + int is_expr; + + /* if this isn't an expression, there is no point in wading + through the whole database looking for matches */ + is_expr = is_expression(exp); + if(is_expr) + ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handle, exp, &princs, &num_princs); + if(!is_expr || ret == KADM5_AUTH_LIST) { + /* we might be able to perform the requested opreration even + if we're not allowed to list principals */ + num_princs = 1; + princs = malloc(sizeof(*princs)); + if(princs == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + princs[0] = strdup(exp); + if(princs[0] == NULL){ + free(princs); + return ENOMEM; + } + } else if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_get_principals"); + return ret; + } + for(i = 0; i < num_princs; i++) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princs[i], &princ_ent); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name(%s)", princs[i]); + continue; + } + ret = (*func)(princ_ent, data); + if(ret) { + char *tmp; + krb5_error_code ret2; + + ret2 = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ_ent, &tmp); + if(ret2) { + krb5_warn(context, ret2, "krb5_unparse_name"); + krb5_warn(context, ret, ""); + } else { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", tmp); + free(tmp); + } + } + krb5_free_principal(context, princ_ent); + } + kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handle, princs, &num_princs); + return 0; +} + +/* + * prompt with `prompt' and default value `def', and store the reply + * in `buf, len' + */ + +void +get_response(const char *prompt, const char *def, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + char *p; + + printf("%s [%s]:", prompt, def); + if(fgets(buf, len, stdin) == NULL) + *buf = '\0'; + p = strchr(buf, '\n'); + if(p) + *p = '\0'; + if(strcmp(buf, "") == 0) + strncpy(buf, def, len); + buf[len-1] = 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/version4.c b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/version4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77ac029 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kadmin/version4.c @@ -0,0 +1,985 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include + +#define Principal krb4_Principal +#define kadm_get krb4_kadm_get +#undef ALLOC +#include +#include +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: version4.c,v 1.16 1999/11/25 22:32:47 assar Exp $"); + +#define KADM_NO_OPCODE -1 +#define KADM_NO_ENCRYPT -2 + +/* + * make an error packet if we fail encrypting + */ + +static void +make_you_loose_packet(int code, krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_data_alloc(reply, KADM_VERSIZE + 4); + memcpy(reply->data, KADM_ULOSE, KADM_VERSIZE); + _krb5_put_int((char*)reply->data + KADM_VERSIZE, code, 4); +} + +static int +ret_fields(krb5_storage *sp, char *fields) +{ + return sp->fetch(sp, fields, FLDSZ); +} + +static int +store_fields(krb5_storage *sp, char *fields) +{ + return sp->store(sp, fields, FLDSZ); +} + +static void +ret_vals(krb5_storage *sp, Kadm_vals *vals) +{ + int field; + char *tmp_string; + + memset(vals, 0, sizeof(*vals)); + + ret_fields(sp, vals->fields); + + for(field = 31; field >= 0; field--) { + if(IS_FIELD(field, vals->fields)) { + switch(field) { + case KADM_NAME: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->name, tmp_string, sizeof(vals->name)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_INST: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->instance, tmp_string, + sizeof(vals->instance)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_EXPDATE: + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->exp_date); + break; + case KADM_ATTR: + krb5_ret_int16(sp, &vals->attributes); + break; + case KADM_MAXLIFE: + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &vals->max_life); + break; + case KADM_DESKEY: + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->key_high); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->key_low); + break; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + case KADM_MODDATE: + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &vals->mod_date); + break; + case KADM_MODNAME: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->mod_name, tmp_string, + sizeof(vals->mod_name)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_MODINST: + krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &tmp_string); + strlcpy(vals->mod_instance, tmp_string, + sizeof(vals->mod_instance)); + free(tmp_string); + break; + case KADM_KVNO: + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &vals->key_version); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + } +} + +static void +store_vals(krb5_storage *sp, Kadm_vals *vals) +{ + int field; + + store_fields(sp, vals->fields); + + for(field = 31; field >= 0; field--) { + if(IS_FIELD(field, vals->fields)) { + switch(field) { + case KADM_NAME: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->name); + break; + case KADM_INST: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->instance); + break; + case KADM_EXPDATE: + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->exp_date); + break; + case KADM_ATTR: + krb5_store_int16(sp, vals->attributes); + break; + case KADM_MAXLIFE: + krb5_store_int8(sp, vals->max_life); + break; + case KADM_DESKEY: + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->key_high); + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->key_low); + break; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + case KADM_MODDATE: + krb5_store_int32(sp, vals->mod_date); + break; + case KADM_MODNAME: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->mod_name); + break; + case KADM_MODINST: + krb5_store_stringz(sp, vals->mod_instance); + break; + case KADM_KVNO: + krb5_store_int8(sp, vals->key_version); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + } +} + +static int +flags_4_to_5(char *flags) +{ + int i; + int32_t mask = 0; + for(i = 31; i >= 0; i--) { + if(IS_FIELD(i, flags)) + switch(i) { + case KADM_NAME: + case KADM_INST: + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + case KADM_EXPDATE: + mask |= KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION; + case KADM_MAXLIFE: + mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + case KADM_KVNO: + mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA; + case KADM_MODDATE: + mask |= KADM5_MOD_TIME; + case KADM_MODNAME: + case KADM_MODINST: + mask |= KADM5_MOD_NAME; +#endif + } + } + return mask; +} + +static void +ent_to_values(krb5_context context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int32_t mask, + Kadm_vals *vals) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + + memset(vals, 0, sizeof(*vals)); + if(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) { + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, ent->principal, + vals->name, vals->instance, realm); + SET_FIELD(KADM_NAME, vals->fields); + SET_FIELD(KADM_INST, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + time_t exp = 0; + if(ent->princ_expire_time != 0) + exp = ent->princ_expire_time; + if(ent->pw_expiration != 0 && (exp == 0 || exp > ent->pw_expiration)) + exp = ent->pw_expiration; + if(exp) { + vals->exp_date = exp; + SET_FIELD(KADM_EXPDATE, vals->fields); + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(ent->max_life == 0) + vals->max_life = 255; + else + vals->max_life = krb_time_to_life(0, ent->max_life); + SET_FIELD(KADM_MAXLIFE, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + if(ent->n_key_data > 0) { +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + vals->key_version = ent->key_data[0].key_data_kvno; + SET_FIELD(KADM_KVNO, vals->fields); +#endif + } + /* XXX the key itself? */ + } +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + vals->mod_date = ent->mod_date; + SET_FIELD(KADM_MODDATE, vals->fields); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + krb5_524_conv_principal(context, ent->mod_name, + vals->mod_name, vals->mod_instance, realm); + SET_FIELD(KADM_MODNAME, vals->fields); + SET_FIELD(KADM_MODINST, vals->fields); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * convert the kadm4 values in `vals' to `ent' (and `mask') + */ + +static krb5_error_code +values_to_ent(krb5_context context, + Kadm_vals *vals, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + int32_t *mask) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + *mask = 0; + memset(ent, 0, sizeof(*ent)); + + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_NAME, vals->fields)) { + char *inst = NULL; + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_INST, vals->fields)) + inst = vals->instance; + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, + vals->name, + inst, + NULL, + &ent->principal); + if(ret) + return ret; + *mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + } + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_EXPDATE, vals->fields)) { + ent->pw_expiration = vals->exp_date; + *mask |= KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION; + } + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MAXLIFE, vals->fields)) { + ent->max_life = krb_life_to_time(0, vals->max_life); + *mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE; + } + + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_DESKEY, vals->fields)) { + int i; + ent->key_data = calloc(3, sizeof(*ent->key_data)); + if(ent->key_data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + u_int32_t key_low, key_high; + + ent->key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2; +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_KVNO, vals->fields)) + ent->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = vals->key_version; +#endif + ent->key_data[i].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + ent->key_data[i].key_data_length[0] = 8; + if((ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] = malloc(8)) == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + key_low = ntohl(vals->key_low); + key_high = ntohl(vals->key_high); + memcpy(ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], + &key_low, 4); + memcpy((char*)ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] + 4, + &key_high, 4); + ent->key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PW_SALT; + ent->key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0; + ent->key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL; + } + ent->key_data[1].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ent->key_data[2].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + ent->n_key_data = 3; + *mask |= KADM5_KEY_DATA; + } + +#ifdef EXTENDED_KADM + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MODDATE, vals->fields)) { + ent->mod_date = vals->mod_date; + *mask |= KADM5_MOD_TIME; + } + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MODNAME, vals->fields)) { + char *inst = NULL; + if(IS_FIELD(KADM_MODINST, vals->fields)) + inst = vals->mod_instance; + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, + vals->mod_name, + inst, + NULL, + &ent->mod_name); + if(ret) + return ret; + *mask |= KADM5_MOD_NAME; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to translate a KADM5 error code into a v4 kadmin one. + */ + +static int +error_code(int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case 0: + return 0; + case KADM5_FAILURE : + case KADM5_AUTH_GET : + case KADM5_AUTH_ADD : + case KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY : + case KADM5_AUTH_DELETE : + case KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT : + return KADM_UNAUTH; + case KADM5_BAD_DB : + return KADM_UK_RERROR; + case KADM5_DUP : + return KADM_INUSE; + case KADM5_RPC_ERROR : + case KADM5_NO_SRV : + return KADM_NO_SERV; + case KADM5_NOT_INIT : + return KADM_NO_CONN; + case KADM5_UNK_PRINC : + return KADM_NOENTRY; + case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT : +#ifdef KADM_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT + return KADM_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT; +#else + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; +#endif + case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS : +#ifdef KADM_PASS_Q_CLASS + return KADM_PASS_Q_CLASS; +#else + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; +#endif + case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT : +#ifdef KADM_PASS_Q_DICT + return KADM_PASS_Q_DICT; +#else + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; +#endif + case KADM5_PASS_REUSE : + case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON : + case KADM5_BAD_PASSWORD : + return KADM_INSECURE_PW; + case KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL : + return KADM_IMMUTABLE; + case KADM5_POLICY_REF : + case KADM5_INIT : + case KADM5_BAD_HIST_KEY : + case KADM5_UNK_POLICY : + case KADM5_BAD_MASK : + case KADM5_BAD_CLASS : + case KADM5_BAD_LENGTH : + case KADM5_BAD_POLICY : + case KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL : + case KADM5_BAD_AUX_ATTR : + case KADM5_BAD_HISTORY : + case KADM5_BAD_MIN_PASS_LIFE : + case KADM5_BAD_SERVER_HANDLE : + case KADM5_BAD_STRUCT_VERSION : + case KADM5_OLD_STRUCT_VERSION : + case KADM5_NEW_STRUCT_VERSION : + case KADM5_BAD_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_OLD_LIB_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_OLD_SERVER_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_NEW_LIB_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_NEW_SERVER_API_VERSION : + case KADM5_SECURE_PRINC_MISSING : + case KADM5_NO_RENAME_SALT : + case KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS : + case KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS : + case KADM5_AUTH_LIST : + case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW : + case KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE : + case KADM5_MISSING_CONF_PARAMS : + case KADM5_BAD_SERVER_NAME : + default : + return KADM_UNAUTH; /* XXX */ + } +} + +/* + * server functions + */ + +static int +kadm_ser_cpw(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + char key[8]; + char *password = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: cpw %s", + principal_string, principal_string); + + ret = message->fetch(message, key + 4, 4); + ret = message->fetch(message, key, 4); + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(message, &password); + + if(password) { + krb5_data pwd_data; + const char *tmp; + + pwd_data.data = password; + pwd_data.length = strlen(password); + + tmp = kadm5_check_password_quality (context, principal, &pwd_data); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + krb5_store_stringz (reply, (char *)tmp); + ret = KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT; + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal(kadm_handle, principal, password); + } else { + krb5_key_data key_data[3]; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2; + key_data[i].key_data_kvno = 0; + /* key */ + key_data[i].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + key_data[i].key_data_length[0] = 8; + key_data[i].key_data_contents[0] = malloc(8); + memcpy(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], &key, 8); + /* salt */ + key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_PW_SALT; + key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = 0; + key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = NULL; + } + key_data[0].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + key_data[1].key_data_type[0] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ret = kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key(kadm_handle, + principal, 3, key_data); + } + + if(ret != 0) { + krb5_store_stringz(reply, (char*)krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto fail; + } + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat cpw"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_add(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + int32_t mask; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, out; + Kadm_vals values; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values); + + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: add %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_ADD); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key(kadm_handle, &ent, mask); + if(ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + goto fail; + } + + mask = KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION | KADM5_MAX_LIFE | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_MOD_TIME | KADM5_MOD_NAME; + + kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal, &out, mask); + ent_to_values(context, &out, mask, &values); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &out); + store_vals(reply, &values); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat add"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_get(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + Kadm_vals values; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, out; + int32_t mask; + char flags[FLDSZ]; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values); + /* XXX BRAIN DAMAGE! these flags are not stored in the same order + as in the header */ + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[3]); + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[2]); + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[1]); + krb5_ret_int8(message, &flags[0]); + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: get %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_GET); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + mask = flags_4_to_5(flags); + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal, &out, mask); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ent_to_values(context, &out, mask, &values); + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &out); + + store_vals(reply, &values); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat get"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_mod(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + Kadm_vals values1, values2; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, out; + int32_t mask; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values1); + /* why are the old values sent? is the mask the same in the old and + the new entry? */ + ret_vals(message, &values2); + + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values2, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: mod %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_s_modify_principal(kadm_handle, &ent, mask); + if(ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_s_modify_principal"); + goto fail; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal, &out, mask); + if(ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_s_modify_principal"); + goto fail; + } + + ent_to_values(context, &out, mask, &values1); + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &out); + + store_vals(reply, &values1); + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat mod"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +kadm_ser_del(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_storage *message, + krb5_storage *reply) +{ + Kadm_vals values; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + int32_t mask; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[128]; + + ret_vals(message, &values); + + ret = values_to_ent(context, &values, &ent, &mask); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(context, ent.principal, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: del %s", + principal_string, name); + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission (kadm_handle, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handle, ent.principal); + + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handle, &ent); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + return 0; +fail: + krb5_warn(context, ret, "v4-compat add"); + return error_code(ret); +} + +static int +dispatch(krb5_context context, + void *kadm_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *principal_string, + krb5_data msg, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + int retval; + int8_t command; + krb5_storage *sp_in, *sp_out; + + sp_in = krb5_storage_from_data(&msg); + krb5_ret_int8(sp_in, &command); + + sp_out = krb5_storage_emem(); + sp_out->store(sp_out, KADM_VERSTR, KADM_VERSIZE); + krb5_store_int32(sp_out, 0); + + switch(command) { + case CHANGE_PW: + retval = kadm_ser_cpw(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case ADD_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_add(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case GET_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_get(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case MOD_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_mod(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + case DEL_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_del(context, kadm_handle, principal, + principal_string, + sp_in, sp_out); + break; + default: + krb5_warnx(context, "v4-compat %s: unknown opcode: %d", + principal_string, command); + retval = KADM_NO_OPCODE; + break; + } + krb5_storage_free(sp_in); + if(retval) { + sp_out->seek(sp_out, KADM_VERSIZE, SEEK_SET); + krb5_store_int32(sp_out, retval); + } + krb5_storage_to_data(sp_out, reply); + krb5_storage_free(sp_out); + return retval; +} + +/* + * Decode a v4 kadmin packet in `message' and create a reply in `reply' + */ + +static void +decode_packet(krb5_context context, + struct sockaddr_in *admin_addr, + struct sockaddr_in *client_addr, + krb5_data message, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + int ret; + KTEXT_ST authent; + AUTH_DAT ad; + MSG_DAT msg_dat; + off_t off = 0; + unsigned long rlen; + char sname[] = "changepw", sinst[] = "kerberos"; + unsigned long checksum; + des_key_schedule schedule; + char *msg = message.data; + void *kadm_handle; + krb5_principal client; + char *client_str; + + if(message.length < KADM_VERSIZE + || strncmp(msg, KADM_VERSTR, KADM_VERSIZE) != 0) { + make_you_loose_packet (KADM_BAD_VER, reply); + return; + } + + off = KADM_VERSIZE; + off += _krb5_get_int(msg + off, &rlen, 4); + memset(&authent, 0, sizeof(authent)); + authent.length = message.length - rlen - KADM_VERSIZE - 4; + memcpy(authent.dat, (char*)msg + off, authent.length); + off += authent.length; + + { + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_keyblock *key; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &principal, NULL, + "changepw", "kerberos", NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + make_you_loose_packet (KADM_NOMEM, reply); + return; + } + ret = krb5_kt_read_service_key(context, + "HDB:", + principal, + 0, +/* ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,*/ + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + &key); + krb5_free_principal(context, principal); + if(ret) { + if(ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) + make_you_loose_packet(KADM_NO_AUTH, reply); + else + /* XXX */ + make_you_loose_packet(KADM_NO_AUTH, reply); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_kt_read_service_key"); + return; + } + + if(key->keyvalue.length != 8) + krb5_abortx(context, "key has wrong length (%lu)", + (unsigned long)key->keyvalue.length); + krb_set_key(key->keyvalue.data, 0); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, key); + } + + ret = krb_rd_req(&authent, sname, sinst, + client_addr->sin_addr.s_addr, &ad, NULL); + + if(ret) { + make_you_loose_packet(krb_err_base + ret, reply); + krb5_warnx(context, "krb_rd_req: %d", ret); + return; + } + + krb5_425_conv_principal(context, ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + &client); + krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &client_str); + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_str, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + make_you_loose_packet (KADM_NOMEM, reply); + goto out; + } + + checksum = des_quad_cksum((des_cblock*)(msg + off), NULL, rlen, + 0, &ad.session); + if(checksum != ad.checksum) { + krb5_warnx(context, "decode_packet: bad checksum"); + make_you_loose_packet (KADM_BAD_CHK, reply); + goto out; + } + des_set_key(&ad.session, schedule); + ret = krb_rd_priv(msg + off, rlen, schedule, &ad.session, + client_addr, admin_addr, &msg_dat); + if (ret) { + make_you_loose_packet (krb_err_base + ret, reply); + krb5_warnx(context, "krb_rd_priv: %d", ret); + goto out; + } + + { + krb5_data d, r; + int retval; + + d.data = msg_dat.app_data; + d.length = msg_dat.app_length; + + retval = dispatch(context, kadm_handle, + client, client_str, d, &r); + krb5_data_alloc(reply, r.length + 26); + reply->length = krb_mk_priv(r.data, reply->data, r.length, + schedule, &ad.session, + admin_addr, client_addr); + if((ssize_t)reply->length < 0) { + make_you_loose_packet(KADM_NO_ENCRYPT, reply); + goto out; + } + } +out: + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + free(client_str); +} + +void +handle_v4(krb5_context context, + int len, + int fd) +{ + int first = 1; + struct sockaddr_in admin_addr, client_addr; + int addr_len; + krb5_data message, reply; + ssize_t n; + + addr_len = sizeof(client_addr); + if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&admin_addr, &addr_len) < 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "getsockname"); + addr_len = sizeof(client_addr); + if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&client_addr, &addr_len) < 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "getpeername"); + + while(1) { + if(first) { + /* first time around, we have already read len, and two + bytes of the version string */ + krb5_data_alloc(&message, len); + memcpy(message.data, "KA", 2); + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, (char*)message.data + 2, + len - 2); + if (n == 0) + exit (0); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + first = 0; + } else { + char buf[2]; + unsigned long tmp; + ssize_t n; + + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, buf, sizeof(2)); + if (n == 0) + exit (0); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + _krb5_get_int(buf, &tmp, 2); + krb5_data_alloc(&message, tmp); + n = krb5_net_read(context, &fd, message.data, message.length); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "EOF in krb5_net_read"); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_read"); + } + decode_packet(context, &admin_addr, &client_addr, + message, &reply); + krb5_data_free(&message); + { + char buf[2]; + + _krb5_put_int(buf, reply.length, sizeof(buf)); + n = krb5_net_write(context, &fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_write"); + n = krb5_net_write(context, &fd, reply.data, reply.length); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "krb5_net_write"); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + } + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/524.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/524.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb188de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/524.c @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: 524.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +krb5_error_code +do_524(Ticket *t, krb5_data *reply, const char *from, struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_principal sprinc = NULL; + krb5_crypto crypto; + hdb_entry *server; + Key *skey; + krb5_data et_data; + EncTicketPart et; + EncryptedData ticket; + krb5_storage *sp; + char *spn = NULL; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KTXT_LEN + 4 * 4]; + size_t len; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&sprinc, t->sname, t->realm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, sprinc, &spn); + server = db_fetch(sprinc); + if(server == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to convert ticket from %s for unknown principal %s", + from, spn); + goto out; + } + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, server, t->enc_part.etype, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "No suitable key found for server (%s) " + "when converting ticket from ", spn, from); + goto out; + } + krb5_crypto_init(context, &skey->key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + &t->enc_part, + &et_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decrypt ticket from %s for %s", from, spn); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decode_EncTicketPart(context, et_data.data, et_data.length, + &et, &len); + krb5_data_free(&et_data); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decode ticket from %s for %s", from, spn); + goto out; + } + { + krb5_principal client; + char *cpn; + principalname2krb5_principal(&client, et.cname, et.crealm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &cpn); + kdc_log(1, "524-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn); + free(cpn); + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + } + + if(et.endtime < kdc_time){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket expired (%s)", spn); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED; + goto out; + } + if(et.flags.invalid){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket not valid (%s)", spn); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV; + goto out; + } + { + krb5_addresses *save_caddr, new_addr; + krb5_address v4_addr; + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address(addr, &v4_addr); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to convert address (%s)", spn); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + goto out; + } + + if (et.caddr && !krb5_address_search (context, &v4_addr, et.caddr)) { + kdc_log(0, "Incorrect network address (%s)", spn); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + krb5_free_address(context, &v4_addr); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto out; + } + if(v4_addr.addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_INET) { + /* we need to collapse the addresses in the ticket to a + single address; best guess is to use the address the + connection came from */ + save_caddr = et.caddr; + new_addr.len = 1; + new_addr.val = &v4_addr; + et.caddr = &new_addr; + } + ret = encode_v4_ticket(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + &et, &t->sname, &len); + if(v4_addr.addr_type == KRB5_ADDRESS_INET) + et.caddr = save_caddr; + } + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode v4 ticket (%s)", spn); + goto out; + } + ret = get_des_key(server, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "No DES key for server (%s)", spn); + goto out; + } + ret = encrypt_v4_ticket(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, + skey->key.keyvalue.data, &ticket); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encrypt v4 ticket (%s)", spn); + goto out; + } +out: + /* make reply */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + if(ret == 0){ + krb5_store_int32(sp, server->kvno); /* is this right? */ + krb5_store_data(sp, ticket.cipher); + /* Aargh! This is coded as a KTEXT_ST. */ + sp->seek(sp, MAX_KTXT_LEN - ticket.cipher.length, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32(sp, 0); /* mbz */ + free_EncryptedData(&ticket); + } + ret = krb5_storage_to_data(sp, reply); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + if(spn) + free(spn); + if(sprinc) + krb5_free_principal(context, sprinc); + hdb_free_entry(context, server); + free(server); + return ret; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e3df20 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.33 1999/05/13 23:32:35 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = string2key + +sbin_PROGRAMS = kstash + +libexec_PROGRAMS = hprop hpropd kdc + +man_MANS = kdc.8 kstash.8 hprop.8 hpropd.8 + +hprop_SOURCES = hprop.c hprop-common.c hprop.h kadb.h +hpropd_SOURCES = hpropd.c hprop-common.c hprop.h + +kstash_SOURCES = kstash.c headers.h + +string2key_SOURCES = string2key.c headers.h + +kdc_SOURCES = \ + 524.c \ + config.c \ + connect.c \ + kaserver.c \ + kdc_locl.h \ + kerberos4.c \ + kerberos4.h \ + kerberos5.c \ + log.c \ + main.c \ + misc.c \ + rx.h + + +hprop_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_kdb) $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +hpropd_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_kdb) $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ba90e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,799 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.33 1999/05/13 23:32:35 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +bin_PROGRAMS = string2key + +sbin_PROGRAMS = kstash + +libexec_PROGRAMS = hprop hpropd kdc + +man_MANS = kdc.8 kstash.8 hprop.8 hpropd.8 + +hprop_SOURCES = hprop.c hprop-common.c hprop.h kadb.h +hpropd_SOURCES = hpropd.c hprop-common.c hprop.h + +kstash_SOURCES = kstash.c headers.h + +string2key_SOURCES = string2key.c headers.h + +kdc_SOURCES = 524.c config.c connect.c kaserver.c kdc_locl.h kerberos4.c kerberos4.h kerberos5.c log.c main.c misc.c rx.h + + +hprop_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_kdb) $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) $(DBLIB) + + +hpropd_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_kdb) $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) $(DBLIB) + + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) $(DBLIB) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +bin_PROGRAMS = string2key$(EXEEXT) +libexec_PROGRAMS = hprop$(EXEEXT) hpropd$(EXEEXT) kdc$(EXEEXT) +sbin_PROGRAMS = kstash$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) $(libexec_PROGRAMS) $(sbin_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +string2key_OBJECTS = string2key.$(OBJEXT) +string2key_LDADD = $(LDADD) +string2key_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +string2key_LDFLAGS = +hprop_OBJECTS = hprop.$(OBJEXT) hprop-common.$(OBJEXT) +hprop_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +hprop_LDFLAGS = +hpropd_OBJECTS = hpropd.$(OBJEXT) hprop-common.$(OBJEXT) +hpropd_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +hpropd_LDFLAGS = +kdc_OBJECTS = 524.$(OBJEXT) config.$(OBJEXT) connect.$(OBJEXT) \ +kaserver.$(OBJEXT) kerberos4.$(OBJEXT) kerberos5.$(OBJEXT) \ +log.$(OBJEXT) main.$(OBJEXT) misc.$(OBJEXT) +kdc_LDADD = $(LDADD) +kdc_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kdc_LDFLAGS = +kstash_OBJECTS = kstash.$(OBJEXT) +kstash_LDADD = $(LDADD) +kstash_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kstash_LDFLAGS = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +man8dir 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of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/config.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/config.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba76432 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/config.c @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: config.c,v 1.28 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +static char *config_file; +int require_preauth = -1; +char *keyfile; +static char *max_request_str; +size_t max_request; +time_t kdc_warn_pwexpire; +struct dbinfo *databases; +HDB **db; +int num_db; +char *port_str; +int enable_http = -1; +krb5_boolean encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep; /* bug compatibility */ + +krb5_boolean check_ticket_addresses; +krb5_boolean allow_null_ticket_addresses; + +#ifdef KRB4 +char *v4_realm; +#endif +#ifdef KASERVER +krb5_boolean enable_kaserver = -1; +#endif + +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { + "config-file", 'c', arg_string, &config_file, + "location of config file", "file" + }, + { + "require-preauth", 'p', arg_negative_flag, &require_preauth, + "don't require pa-data in as-reqs" + }, + { + "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, + "location of master key file", "file" + }, + { + "max-request", 0, arg_string, &max_request, + "max size for a kdc-request", "size" + }, +#if 0 + { + "database", 'd', arg_string, &databases, + "location of database", "database" + }, +#endif + { "enable-http", 'H', arg_flag, &enable_http, "turn on HTTP support" }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { + "v4-realm", 'r', arg_string, &v4_realm, + "realm to serve v4-requests for" + }, +#endif +#ifdef KASERVER + { + "kaserver", 'K', arg_negative_flag, &enable_kaserver, + "turn off kaserver support" + }, +#endif + { "ports", 'P', arg_string, &port_str, + "ports to listen to" + }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 'v', arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +get_dbinfo(krb5_config_section *cf) +{ + krb5_config_binding *top_binding = NULL; + krb5_config_binding *db_binding; + krb5_config_binding *default_binding = NULL; + struct dbinfo *di, **dt; + const char *default_dbname = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; + const char *default_mkey = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; + const char *p; + + databases = NULL; + dt = &databases; + while((db_binding = (krb5_config_binding *) + krb5_config_get_next(context, cf, &top_binding, + krb5_config_list, + "kdc", + "database", + NULL))) { + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "realm", NULL); + if(p == NULL) { + if(default_binding) { + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: more than one realm-less " + "database specification"); + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: using the first encountered"); + } else + default_binding = db_binding; + continue; + } + di = calloc(1, sizeof(*di)); + di->realm = strdup(p); + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "dbname", NULL); + if(p) + di->dbname = strdup(p); + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "mkey_file", NULL); + if(p) + di->mkey_file = strdup(p); + *dt = di; + dt = &di->next; + } + if(default_binding) { + di = calloc(1, sizeof(*di)); + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, default_binding, "dbname", NULL); + if(p) { + di->dbname = strdup(p); + default_dbname = p; + } + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, default_binding, "mkey_file", NULL); + if(p) { + di->mkey_file = strdup(p); + default_mkey = p; + } + *dt = di; + dt = &di->next; + } else { + di = calloc(1, sizeof(*di)); + di->dbname = strdup(default_dbname); + di->mkey_file = strdup(default_mkey); + *dt = di; + dt = &di->next; + } + for(di = databases; di; di = di->next) { + if(di->dbname == NULL) + di->dbname = strdup(default_dbname); + if(di->mkey_file == NULL) { + p = strrchr(di->dbname, '.'); + if(p == NULL || strchr(p, '/') != NULL) + asprintf(&di->mkey_file, "%s.mkey", di->dbname); + else + asprintf(&di->mkey_file, "%.*s.mkey", + (int)(p - di->dbname), di->dbname); + } + } +} + +void +configure(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_config_section *cf = NULL; + int optind = 0; + int e; + const char *p; + + while((e = getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind))) + warnx("error at argument `%s'", argv[optind]); + + if(help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage(1); + + if(config_file == NULL) + config_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.conf"; + + if(krb5_config_parse_file(config_file, &cf)) + cf = NULL; + + if(keyfile == NULL){ + p = krb5_config_get_string (context, cf, + "kdc", + "key-file", + NULL); + if(p) + keyfile = strdup(p); + } + + + get_dbinfo(cf); + + if(max_request_str){ + max_request = parse_bytes(max_request_str, NULL); + } + + if(max_request == 0){ + p = krb5_config_get_string (context, + cf, + "kdc", + "max-request", + NULL); + if(p) + max_request = parse_bytes(p, NULL); + } + + if(require_preauth == -1) + require_preauth = krb5_config_get_bool(context, cf, "kdc", + "require-preauth", NULL); + + if(port_str == NULL){ + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, cf, "kdc", "ports", NULL); + if (p != NULL) + port_str = strdup(p); + } + if(enable_http == -1) + enable_http = krb5_config_get_bool(context, cf, "kdc", + "enable-http", NULL); + check_ticket_addresses = + krb5_config_get_bool(context, cf, "kdc", + "check-ticket-addresses", NULL); + allow_null_ticket_addresses = + krb5_config_get_bool(context, cf, "kdc", + "allow-null-ticket-addresses", NULL); +#ifdef KRB4 + if(v4_realm == NULL){ + p = krb5_config_get_string (context, cf, + "kdc", + "v4-realm", + NULL); + if(p) + v4_realm = strdup(p); + } +#endif +#ifdef KASERVER + if (enable_kaserver == -1) + enable_kaserver = krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, cf, TRUE, + "kdc", + "enable-kaserver", + NULL); +#endif + + encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep = krb5_config_get_bool(context, cf, "kdc", + "encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep", + NULL); + + kdc_warn_pwexpire = krb5_config_get_time (context, cf, + "kdc", + "kdc_warn_pwexpire", + NULL); + kdc_openlog(cf); + if(cf) + krb5_config_file_free (context, cf); + if(max_request == 0) + max_request = 64 * 1024; + if(require_preauth == -1) + require_preauth = 1; + if (port_str == NULL) + port_str = "+"; +#ifdef KRB4 + if(v4_realm == NULL){ + v4_realm = malloc(40); /* REALM_SZ */ + krb_get_lrealm(v4_realm, 1); + } +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/connect.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/connect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62b5bea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/connect.c @@ -0,0 +1,727 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: connect.c,v 1.68 1999/12/02 17:04:58 joda Exp $"); + +struct port_desc{ + int family; + int type; + int port; +}; + +static struct port_desc *ports; +static int num_ports; + +static void +add_port(int family, int port, const char *protocol) +{ + int type; + int i; + + if(strcmp(protocol, "udp") == 0) + type = SOCK_DGRAM; + else if(strcmp(protocol, "tcp") == 0) + type = SOCK_STREAM; + else + return; + for(i = 0; i < num_ports; i++){ + if(ports[i].type == type + && ports[i].port == port + && ports[i].family == family) + return; + } + ports = realloc(ports, (num_ports + 1) * sizeof(*ports)); + ports[num_ports].family = family; + ports[num_ports].type = type; + ports[num_ports].port = port; + num_ports++; +} + +static void +add_port_service(int family, const char *service, int port, + const char *protocol) +{ + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, service, protocol, port); + add_port (family, port, protocol); +} + +static void +add_port_string (int family, const char *port_str, const char *protocol) +{ + struct servent *sp; + int port; + + sp = roken_getservbyname (port_str, protocol); + if (sp != NULL) { + port = sp->s_port; + } else { + char *end; + + port = htons(strtol(port_str, &end, 0)); + if (end == port_str) + return; + } + add_port (family, port, protocol); +} + +static void +add_standard_ports (int family) +{ + add_port_service(family, "kerberos", 88, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos", 88, "tcp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-sec", 88, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-sec", 88, "tcp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-iv", 750, "udp"); + add_port_service(family, "kerberos-iv", 750, "tcp"); + if(enable_http) + add_port_service(family, "http", 80, "tcp"); +#ifdef KASERVER + if (enable_kaserver) + add_port_service(family, "afs3-kaserver", 7004, "udp"); +#endif +} + +static void +parse_ports(const char *str) +{ + char *pos = NULL; + char *p; + char *str_copy = strdup (str); + + p = strtok_r(str_copy, " \t", &pos); + while(p != NULL) { + if(strcmp(p, "+") == 0) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + add_standard_ports(AF_INET6); +#endif + add_standard_ports(AF_INET); + } else { + char *q = strchr(p, '/'); + if(q){ + *q++ = 0; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + add_port_string(AF_INET6, p, q); +#endif + add_port_string(AF_INET, p, q); + }else { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + add_port_string(AF_INET6, p, "udp"); + add_port_string(AF_INET6, p, "tcp"); +#endif + add_port_string(AF_INET, p, "udp"); + add_port_string(AF_INET, p, "tcp"); + } + } + + p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &pos); + } + free (str_copy); +} + +struct descr { + int s; + int type; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t size; + size_t len; + time_t timeout; +}; + +/* + * Create the socket (family, type, port) in `d' + */ + +static void +init_socket(struct descr *d, krb5_address *a, int family, int type, int port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int sa_size; + + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->s = -1; + + ret = krb5_addr2sockaddr (a, sa, &sa_size, port); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_anyaddr"); + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; + return; + } + + if (sa->sa_family != family) + return; + + d->s = socket(family, type, 0); + if(d->s < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "socket(%d, %d, 0)", family, type); + d->s = -1; + return; + } +#if defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) && defined(SOL_SOCKET) && defined(SO_REUSEADDR) + { + int one = 1; + setsockopt(d->s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&one, sizeof(one)); + } +#endif + d->type = type; + + if(bind(d->s, sa, sa_size) < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "bind(%d)", ntohs(port)); + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; + return; + } + if(type == SOCK_STREAM && listen(d->s, SOMAXCONN) < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "listen"); + close(d->s); + return; + } +} + +/* + * Allocate descriptors for all the sockets that we should listen on + * and return the number of them. + */ + +static int +init_sockets(struct descr **desc) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i, j; + struct descr *d; + int num = 0; + krb5_addresses addresses; + + ret = krb5_get_all_server_addrs (context, &addresses); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_all_server_addrs"); + parse_ports(port_str); + d = malloc(addresses.len * num_ports * sizeof(*d)); + if (d == NULL) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "malloc(%u) failed", num_ports * sizeof(*d)); + + for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++){ + for (j = 0; j < addresses.len; ++j) { + init_socket(&d[num], &addresses.val[j], + ports[i].family, ports[i].type, ports[i].port); + if(d[num].s != -1){ + char a_str[80]; + size_t len; + + krb5_print_address (&addresses.val[j], a_str, + sizeof(a_str), &len); + + kdc_log(5, "listening on %s port %u/%s", + a_str, + ntohs(ports[i].port), + (ports[i].type == SOCK_STREAM) ? "tcp" : "udp"); + /* XXX */ + num++; + } + } + } + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addresses); + d = realloc(d, num * sizeof(*d)); + if (d == NULL && num != 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "realloc(%u) failed", num * sizeof(*d)); + *desc = d; + return num; +} + + +static int +process_request(unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_data *reply, + int *sendlength, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *addr) +{ + KDC_REQ req; +#ifdef KRB4 + Ticket ticket; +#endif + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t i; + + gettimeofday(&now, NULL); + if(decode_AS_REQ(buf, len, &req, &i) == 0){ + ret = as_rep(&req, reply, from, addr); + free_AS_REQ(&req); + return ret; + }else if(decode_TGS_REQ(buf, len, &req, &i) == 0){ + ret = tgs_rep(&req, reply, from, addr); + free_TGS_REQ(&req); + return ret; + } +#ifdef KRB4 + else if(maybe_version4(buf, len)){ + *sendlength = 0; /* elbitapmoc sdrawkcab XXX */ + do_version4(buf, len, reply, from, (struct sockaddr_in*)addr); + return 0; + }else if(decode_Ticket(buf, len, &ticket, &i) == 0){ + ret = do_524(&ticket, reply, from, addr); + free_Ticket(&ticket); + return ret; + } +#endif +#ifdef KASERVER + else if (enable_kaserver) { + ret = do_kaserver (buf, len, reply, from, (struct sockaddr_in*)addr); + return ret; + } +#endif + + return -1; +} + +static void +addr_to_string(struct sockaddr *addr, size_t addr_len, char *str, size_t len) +{ + krb5_address a; + krb5_sockaddr2address(addr, &a); + if(krb5_print_address(&a, str, len, &len) == 0) { + krb5_free_address(context, &a); + return; + } + krb5_free_address(context, &a); + snprintf(str, len, "", addr->sa_family); +} + +static void +do_request(void *buf, size_t len, int sendlength, + int socket, struct sockaddr *from, size_t from_len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data reply; + char addr[128]; + + addr_to_string(from, from_len, addr, sizeof(addr)); + + reply.length = 0; + ret = process_request(buf, len, &reply, &sendlength, addr, from); + if(reply.length){ + kdc_log(5, "sending %d bytes to %s", reply.length, addr); + if(sendlength){ + unsigned char len[4]; + len[0] = (reply.length >> 24) & 0xff; + len[1] = (reply.length >> 16) & 0xff; + len[2] = (reply.length >> 8) & 0xff; + len[3] = reply.length & 0xff; + if(sendto(socket, len, sizeof(len), 0, from, from_len) < 0) { + kdc_log (0, "sendto(%s): %s", addr, strerror(errno)); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + return; + } + } + if(sendto(socket, reply.data, reply.length, 0, from, from_len) < 0) { + kdc_log (0, "sendto(%s): %s", addr, strerror(errno)); + krb5_data_free(&reply); + return; + } + krb5_data_free(&reply); + } + if(ret) + kdc_log(0, "Failed processing %lu byte request from %s", + (unsigned long)len, addr); +} + +static void +handle_udp(struct descr *d) +{ + unsigned char *buf; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int from_len; + int n; + + buf = malloc(max_request); + if(buf == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to allocate %u bytes", max_request); + return; + } + + from_len = sizeof(__ss); + n = recvfrom(d->s, buf, max_request, 0, + sa, &from_len); + if(n < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "recvfrom"); + goto out; + } + if(n == 0) { + goto out; + } + do_request(buf, n, 0, d->s, sa, from_len); +out: + free (buf); +} + +static void +clear_descr(struct descr *d) +{ + if(d->buf) + memset(d->buf, 0, d->size); + d->len = 0; + if(d->s != -1) + close(d->s); + d->s = -1; +} + + +/* remove HTTP %-quoting from buf */ +static int +de_http(char *buf) +{ + char *p, *q; + for(p = q = buf; *p; p++, q++) { + if(*p == '%') { + unsigned int x; + if(sscanf(p + 1, "%2x", &x) != 1) + return -1; + *q = x; + p += 2; + } else + *q = *p; + } + *q = '\0'; + return 0; +} + +#define TCP_TIMEOUT 4 + +/* + * accept a new TCP connection on `d[index]' + */ + +static void +add_new_tcp (struct descr *d, int index, int min_free) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int s; + int from_len; + + from_len = sizeof(__ss); + s = accept(d[index].s, sa, &from_len); + if(s < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "accept"); + return; + } + if(min_free == -1){ + close(s); + return; + } + + d[min_free].s = s; + d[min_free].timeout = time(NULL) + TCP_TIMEOUT; + d[min_free].type = SOCK_STREAM; +} + +/* + * Grow `d' to handle at least `n'. + * Return != 0 if fails + */ + +static int +grow_descr (struct descr *d, size_t n) +{ + if (d->size - d->len < n) { + unsigned char *tmp; + + d->size += max(1024, d->len + n); + if (d->size >= max_request) { + kdc_log(0, "Request exceeds max request size (%u bytes).", + d->size); + clear_descr(d); + return -1; + } + tmp = realloc (d->buf, d->size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to re-allocate %u bytes.", d->size); + clear_descr(d); + return -1; + } + d->buf = tmp; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to handle the TCP data at `d->buf, d->len'. + * Return -1 if failed, 0 if succesful, and 1 if data is complete. + */ + +static int +handle_vanilla_tcp (struct descr *d) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t len; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(d->buf, d->len); + if (sp == NULL) { + kdc_log (0, "krb5_storage_from_mem failed"); + return -1; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &len); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(d->len - 4 >= len) { + memcpy(d->buf, d->buf + 4, d->len - 4); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to handle the TCP/HTTP data at `d->buf, d->len'. + * Return -1 if failed, 0 if succesful, and 1 if data is complete. + */ + +static int +handle_http_tcp (struct descr *d, const char *addr) +{ + char *s, *p, *t; + void *data; + char *proto; + int len; + + s = (char *)d->buf; + + p = strstr(s, "\r\n"); + if (p == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", addr); + return -1; + } + *p = 0; + + p = NULL; + t = strtok_r(s, " \t", &p); + if (t == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", addr); + return -1; + } + t = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &p); + if(t == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", addr); + return -1; + } + data = malloc(strlen(t)); + if (data == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to allocate %u bytes", strlen(t)); + return -1; + } + if(*t == '/') + t++; + if(de_http(t) != 0) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", addr); + kdc_log(5, "Request: %s", t); + free(data); + return -1; + } + proto = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &p); + if (proto == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Malformed HTTP request from %s", addr); + free(data); + return -1; + } + len = base64_decode(t, data); + if(len <= 0){ + const char *msg = + " 404 Not found\r\n" + "Server: Heimdal/" VERSION "\r\n" + "Content-type: text/html\r\n" + "Content-transfer-encoding: 8bit\r\n\r\n" + "404 Not found\r\n" + "

404 Not found

\r\n" + "That page doesn't exist, maybe you are looking for " + "Heimdal?\r\n"; + write(d->s, proto, strlen(proto)); + write(d->s, msg, strlen(msg)); + kdc_log(0, "HTTP request from %s is non KDC request", addr); + kdc_log(5, "Request: %s", t); + free(data); + return -1; + } + { + const char *msg = + " 200 OK\r\n" + "Server: Heimdal/" VERSION "\r\n" + "Content-type: application/octet-stream\r\n" + "Content-transfer-encoding: binary\r\n\r\n"; + write(d->s, proto, strlen(proto)); + write(d->s, msg, strlen(msg)); + } + memcpy(d->buf, data, len); + d->len = len; + free(data); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Handle incoming data to the TCP socket in `d[index]' + */ + +static void +handle_tcp(struct descr *d, int index, int min_free) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + char addr[32]; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int from_len; + int n; + int ret = 0; + + if (d[index].timeout == 0) { + add_new_tcp (d, index, min_free); + return; + } + + /* + * We can't trust recvfrom to return an address so we always call + * getpeername. + */ + + n = recvfrom(d[index].s, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, NULL, NULL); + if(n < 0){ + krb5_warn(context, errno, "recvfrom"); + return; + } + from_len = sizeof(__ss); + if (getpeername(d[index].s, sa, &from_len) < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "getpeername"); + return; + } + addr_to_string(sa, from_len, addr, sizeof(addr)); + if (grow_descr (&d[index], n)) + return; + memcpy(d[index].buf + d[index].len, buf, n); + d[index].len += n; + if(d[index].len > 4 && d[index].buf[0] == 0) { + ret = handle_vanilla_tcp (&d[index]); + } else if(enable_http && + d[index].len >= 4 && + strncmp((char *)d[index].buf, "GET ", 4) == 0 && + strncmp((char *)d[index].buf + d[index].len - 4, + "\r\n\r\n", 4) == 0) { + ret = handle_http_tcp (&d[index], addr); + if (ret < 0) + clear_descr (d + index); + } else if (d[index].len > 4) { + kdc_log (0, "TCP data of strange type from %s", addr); + return; + } + if (ret < 0) + return; + else if (ret == 1) { + do_request(d[index].buf, d[index].len, 1, + d[index].s, sa, from_len); + clear_descr(d + index); + } +} + +void +loop(void) +{ + struct descr *d; + int ndescr; + + ndescr = init_sockets(&d); + if(ndescr <= 0) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No sockets!"); + while(exit_flag == 0){ + struct timeval tmout; + fd_set fds; + int min_free = -1; + int max_fd = 0; + int i; + FD_ZERO(&fds); + for(i = 0; i < ndescr; i++){ + if(d[i].s >= 0){ + if(d[i].type == SOCK_STREAM && + d[i].timeout && d[i].timeout < time(NULL)){ + struct sockaddr sa; + int salen = sizeof(sa); + char addr[32]; + + getpeername(d[i].s, &sa, &salen); + addr_to_string(&sa, salen, addr, sizeof(addr)); + kdc_log(1, "TCP-connection from %s expired after %u bytes", + addr, d[i].len); + clear_descr(&d[i]); + continue; + } + if(max_fd < d[i].s) + max_fd = d[i].s; + FD_SET(d[i].s, &fds); + }else if(min_free < 0 || i < min_free) + min_free = i; + } + if(min_free == -1){ + struct descr *tmp; + tmp = realloc(d, (ndescr + 4) * sizeof(*d)); + if(tmp == NULL) + krb5_warnx(context, "No memory"); + else{ + d = tmp; + memset(d + ndescr, 0, 4 * sizeof(*d)); + for(i = ndescr; i < ndescr + 4; i++) + d[i].s = -1; + min_free = ndescr; + ndescr += 4; + } + } + + tmout.tv_sec = TCP_TIMEOUT; + tmout.tv_usec = 0; + switch(select(max_fd + 1, &fds, 0, 0, &tmout)){ + case 0: + break; + case -1: + krb5_warn(context, errno, "select"); + break; + default: + for(i = 0; i < ndescr; i++) + if(d[i].s >= 0 && FD_ISSET(d[i].s, &fds)) { + if(d[i].type == SOCK_DGRAM) + handle_udp(&d[i]); + else if(d[i].type == SOCK_STREAM) + handle_tcp(d, i, min_free); + } + } + } + free (d); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/headers.h b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/headers.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9c3eb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/headers.h @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: headers.h,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __HEADERS_H__ +#define __HEADERS_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include /* copy_octet_string */ + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#define Principal Principal4 +#include +#endif + +#define ALLOC(X) ((X) = malloc(sizeof(*(X)))) + +#endif /* __HEADERS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop-common.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop-common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..660725f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop-common.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hprop-common.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +send_priv(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_data *data, int fd) +{ + krb5_data packet; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, + ac, + data, + &packet, + NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, &fd, &packet); + krb5_data_free(&packet); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +recv_priv(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context ac, int fd, krb5_data *out) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + + ret = krb5_read_message (context, &fd, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, ac, &data, out, NULL); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +send_clear(krb5_context context, int fd, krb5_data data) +{ + return krb5_write_message (context, &fd, &data); +} + +krb5_error_code +recv_clear(krb5_context context, int fd, krb5_data *out) +{ + return krb5_read_message (context, &fd, out); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.8 b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d700577 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.8 @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +.\" $Id: hprop.8,v 1.3 1997/09/03 20:33:04 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd September 3, 1997 +.Dt HPROP 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm hprop +.Nd +propagate the KDC database +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 4DEhnv +.Op Fl d Ar file +.Op Fl -database= Ns Ar file +.Op Fl -decrypt +.Op Fl -encrypt +.Op Fl -help +.Op Fl k +.Op Fl -keytab= Ns Ar file +.Op Fl m Ar file +.Op Fl -master-key= Ns Ar file +.Op Fl -stdout +.Op Fl -v4-db +.Op Fl -verbose +.Op Fl -version +.Ar host ... +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +propagates the database from a master KDC to a slave. It connects to +all +.Ar hosts +specified on the command by opening a TCP connection to port 754 +(service hprop) and sends the database in encrypted form. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl d Ar file +.It Fl -database= Ns Ar file +The database to be propagated. +.It Fl D +.It Fl -decrypt +The encryption keys in the database can either be in clear, or +encrypted with a master key. This option thansmits the database with +unencrypted keys. +.It Fl E +.It Fl -encrypt +This option thansmits the database with encrypted keys. +.It Fl k +.It Fl -keytab= Ns Ar file +The keytab to use for fetching the key to be used for authenticating +to the propagation daemon(s). The key +.Pa kadmin/hprop +is used from this keytab. +.It Fl m Ar file +.It Fl -master-key= Ns Ar file +Where to find the master key to encrypt or decrypt keys with. +.It Fl n +.It Fl -stdout +Dump the database on stdout, in a format that can be fed to hpropd. +.It Fl 4 +.It Fl -v4-db +Use a version 4 database. This option is only available if the code is +compiled with Kerberos 4 support. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr hpropd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3be6a6f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.c @@ -0,0 +1,676 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hprop.c,v 1.40 1999/12/04 18:02:18 assar Exp $"); + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +static char *ktname = HPROP_KEYTAB; +static char *database; +static char *mkeyfile; +static int to_stdout; +static int verbose_flag; +static int encrypt_flag; +static int decrypt_flag; +static EncryptionKey mkey5; +static krb5_data msched5; + +static int v4_db; +static int ka_db; +static char *afs_cell; + +#ifdef KRB4 +static char *realm; + +#ifdef KASERVER_DB +static int kaspecials_flag; +#endif +#endif + +static int +open_socket(krb5_context context, const char *hostname) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), + "%u", + ntohs(krb5_getportbyname (context, "hprop", "tcp", HPROP_PORT))); + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) { + warnx ("%s: %s", hostname, gai_strerror(error)); + return -1; + } + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + int s; + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + warn ("connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return s; + } + warnx ("failed to contact %s", hostname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return -1; +} + +struct prop_data{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + int sock; +}; + +int hdb_entry2value(krb5_context, hdb_entry*, krb5_data*); + +static krb5_error_code +v5_prop(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *appdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct prop_data *pd = appdata; + krb5_data data; + + if(encrypt_flag) + _hdb_seal_keys_int(entry, 0, msched5); + if(decrypt_flag) + _hdb_unseal_keys_int(entry, 0, msched5); + + ret = hdb_entry2value(context, entry, &data); + if(ret) return ret; + + if(to_stdout) + ret = send_clear(context, STDOUT_FILENO, data); + else + ret = send_priv(context, pd->auth_context, &data, pd->sock); + krb5_data_free(&data); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +static des_cblock mkey4; +static des_key_schedule msched4; +static char realm_buf[REALM_SZ]; + +static int +v4_prop(void *arg, Principal *p) +{ + struct prop_data *pd = arg; + hdb_entry ent; + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, p->name, p->instance, realm, + &ent.principal); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, + "krb5_425_conv_principal %s.%s@%s", + p->name, p->instance, realm); + return 0; + } + + if(verbose_flag) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name_short(pd->context, ent.principal, &s); + krb5_warnx(pd->context, "%s.%s -> %s", p->name, p->instance, s); + free(s); + } + + ent.kvno = p->key_version; + ent.keys.len = 3; + ent.keys.val = malloc(ent.keys.len * sizeof(*ent.keys.val)); + ent.keys.val[0].mkvno = NULL; +#if 0 + ent.keys.val[0].mkvno = malloc (sizeof(*ent.keys.val[0].mkvno)); + *(ent.keys.val[0].mkvno) = p->kdc_key_ver; /* XXX */ +#endif + ent.keys.val[0].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[0].salt)); + ent.keys.val[0].salt->type = pa_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[0].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + krb5_data_alloc(&ent.keys.val[0].key.keyvalue, sizeof(des_cblock)); + + { + unsigned char *key = ent.keys.val[0].key.keyvalue.data; + unsigned char null_key[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + memcpy(key, &p->key_low, 4); + memcpy(key + 4, &p->key_high, 4); + kdb_encrypt_key((des_cblock*)key, (des_cblock*)key, + &mkey4, msched4, DES_DECRYPT); + if(memcmp(key, null_key, sizeof(null_key)) == 0) { + free_Key(&ent.keys.val[0]); + ent.keys.val = 0; + ent.flags.invalid = 1; + } + } + copy_Key(&ent.keys.val[0], &ent.keys.val[1]); + ent.keys.val[1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + copy_Key(&ent.keys.val[0], &ent.keys.val[2]); + ent.keys.val[2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + + ALLOC(ent.max_life); + *ent.max_life = krb_life_to_time(0, p->max_life); + if(*ent.max_life == NEVERDATE){ + free(ent.max_life); + ent.max_life = NULL; + } + + ALLOC(ent.pw_end); + *ent.pw_end = p->exp_date; + ret = krb5_make_principal(pd->context, &ent.created_by.principal, + realm, + "kadmin", + "hprop", + NULL); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + ent.created_by.time = time(NULL); + ALLOC(ent.modified_by); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, p->mod_name, p->mod_instance, + realm, &ent.modified_by->principal); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, "%s.%s@%s", p->name, p->instance, realm); + ent.modified_by->principal = NULL; + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + ent.modified_by->time = p->mod_date; + + ent.flags.forwardable = 1; + ent.flags.renewable = 1; + ent.flags.proxiable = 1; + ent.flags.postdate = 1; + ent.flags.client = 1; + ent.flags.server = 1; + + /* special case password changing service */ + if(strcmp(p->name, "changepw") == 0 && + strcmp(p->instance, "kerberos") == 0) { + ent.flags.forwardable = 0; + ent.flags.renewable = 0; + ent.flags.proxiable = 0; + ent.flags.postdate = 0; + ent.flags.initial = 1; + ent.flags.change_pw = 1; + } + + ret = v5_prop(pd->context, NULL, &ent, pd); + + if (strcmp (p->name, "krbtgt") == 0 + && strcmp (realm, p->instance) != 0) { + krb5_free_principal (pd->context, ent.principal); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal (pd->context, p->name, + realm, p->instance, + &ent.principal); + if (ret == 0) + ret = v5_prop (pd->context, NULL, &ent, pd); + } + +out: + hdb_free_entry(pd->context, &ent); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef KASERVER_DB + +#include "kadb.h" + +/* read a `ka_entry' from `fd' at offset `pos' */ +static void +read_block(krb5_context context, int fd, int32_t pos, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + if(lseek(fd, 64 + pos, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "lseek(%u)", 64 + pos); + ret = read(fd, buf, len); + if(ret < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "read(%u)", len); + if(ret != len) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "read(%u) = %u", len, ret); +} + +static int +ka_convert(struct prop_data *pd, int fd, struct ka_entry *ent, + const char *cell) +{ + int32_t flags = ntohl(ent->flags); + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry hdb; + + if(!kaspecials_flag + && (flags & KAFNORMAL) == 0) /* remove special entries */ + return 0; + memset(&hdb, 0, sizeof(hdb)); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, ent->name, ent->instance, realm, + &hdb.principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(pd->context, ret, + "krb5_425_conv_principal (%s.%s@%s)", + ent->name, ent->instance, realm); + return 0; + } + hdb.kvno = ntohl(ent->kvno); + hdb.keys.len = 3; + hdb.keys.val = malloc(hdb.keys.len * sizeof(*hdb.keys.val)); + hdb.keys.val[0].mkvno = NULL; + hdb.keys.val[0].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*hdb.keys.val[0].salt)); + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->type = hdb_afs3_salt; + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->salt.data = strdup(cell); + hdb.keys.val[0].salt->salt.length = strlen(cell); + + hdb.keys.val[0].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + krb5_data_copy(&hdb.keys.val[0].key.keyvalue, ent->key, sizeof(ent->key)); + copy_Key(&hdb.keys.val[0], &hdb.keys.val[1]); + hdb.keys.val[1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + copy_Key(&hdb.keys.val[0], &hdb.keys.val[2]); + hdb.keys.val[2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + + ALLOC(hdb.max_life); + *hdb.max_life = ntohl(ent->max_life); + + if(ntohl(ent->pw_end) != NEVERDATE && ntohl(ent->pw_end) != -1){ + ALLOC(hdb.pw_end); + *hdb.pw_end = ntohl(ent->pw_end); + } + + ret = krb5_make_principal(pd->context, &hdb.created_by.principal, + realm, + "kadmin", + "hprop", + NULL); + hdb.created_by.time = time(NULL); + + if(ent->mod_ptr){ + struct ka_entry mod; + ALLOC(hdb.modified_by); + read_block(pd->context, fd, ntohl(ent->mod_ptr), &mod, sizeof(mod)); + + krb5_425_conv_principal(pd->context, mod.name, mod.instance, realm, + &hdb.modified_by->principal); + hdb.modified_by->time = ntohl(ent->mod_time); + memset(&mod, 0, sizeof(mod)); + } + + hdb.flags.forwardable = 1; + hdb.flags.renewable = 1; + hdb.flags.proxiable = 1; + hdb.flags.postdate = 1; + /* XXX - AFS 3.4a creates krbtgt.REALMOFCELL as NOTGS+NOSEAL */ + if (strcmp(ent->name, "krbtgt") == 0 && + (flags & (KAFNOTGS|KAFNOSEAL)) == (KAFNOTGS|KAFNOSEAL)) + flags &= ~(KAFNOTGS|KAFNOSEAL); + + hdb.flags.client = (flags & KAFNOTGS) == 0; + hdb.flags.server = (flags & KAFNOSEAL) == 0; + + ret = v5_prop(pd->context, NULL, &hdb, pd); + hdb_free_entry(pd->context, &hdb); + return ret; +} + +static int +ka_dump(struct prop_data *pd, const char *file, const char *cell) +{ + struct ka_header header; + int i; + int fd = open(file, O_RDONLY); + + if(fd < 0) + krb5_err(pd->context, 1, errno, "open(%s)", file); + read_block(pd->context, fd, 0, &header, sizeof(header)); + if(header.version1 != header.version2) + krb5_errx(pd->context, 1, "Version mismatch in header: %d/%d", + ntohl(header.version1), ntohl(header.version2)); + if(ntohl(header.version1) != 5) + krb5_errx(pd->context, 1, "Unknown database version %d (expected 5)", + ntohl(header.version1)); + for(i = 0; i < ntohl(header.hashsize); i++){ + int32_t pos = ntohl(header.hash[i]); + while(pos){ + struct ka_entry ent; + read_block(pd->context, fd, pos, &ent, sizeof(ent)); + ka_convert(pd, fd, &ent, cell); + pos = ntohl(ent.next); + } + } + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KASERVER_DB */ + +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "master-key", 'm', arg_string, &mkeyfile, "v5 master key file", "file" }, +#ifdef KRB4 +#endif + { "database", 'd', arg_string, &database, "database", "file" }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "v4-db", '4', arg_flag, &v4_db, "use version 4 database" }, + { "v4-realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm, "v4 realm to use" }, +#endif +#ifdef KASERVER_DB + { "ka-db", 'K', arg_flag, &ka_db, "use kaserver database" }, + { "cell", 'c', arg_string, &afs_cell, "name of AFS cell" }, + { "kaspecials", 'S', arg_flag, &kaspecials_flag, "dump KASPECIAL keys"}, +#endif + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &ktname, "keytab to use for authentication", "keytab" }, + { "decrypt", 'D', arg_flag, &decrypt_flag, "decrypt keys" }, + { "encrypt", 'E', arg_flag, &encrypt_flag, "encrypt keys" }, + { "stdout", 'n', arg_flag, &to_stdout, "dump to stdout" }, + { "verbose", 'v', arg_flag, &verbose_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "host ..."); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +get_creds(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *cache) +{ + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt init_opts; + krb5_preauthtype preauth = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; + krb5_creds creds; + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, ktname, &keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_resolve"); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &client, NULL, + "kadmin", HPROP_NAME, NULL); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&init_opts); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(&init_opts, &preauth, 1); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(context, &creds, client, keytab, 0, NULL, &init_opts); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + + ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close"); + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, cache); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_gen_new"); + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, *cache, client); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, *cache, &creds); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); +} + +static void +iterate (krb5_context context, + const char *database, + const char *afs_cell, + HDB *db, + int v4_db, int ka_db, + struct prop_data *pd) +{ +#ifdef KRB4 + if(v4_db) { + int e = kerb_db_iterate ((k_iter_proc_t)v4_prop, pd); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "kerb_db_iterate: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); +#ifdef KASERVER_DB + } else if(ka_db) { + int e = ka_dump(pd, database, afs_cell); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "ka_dump: %s", krb_get_err_text(e)); +#endif + } else +#endif + { + krb5_error_code ret = hdb_foreach(context, db, HDB_F_DECRYPT, + v5_prop, pd); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_foreach"); + } +} + +static int +dump_database (krb5_context context, int v4_db, int ka_db, + const char *database, const char *afs_cell, + HDB *db) +{ + struct prop_data pd; + + pd.context = context; + pd.auth_context = NULL; + pd.sock = STDOUT_FILENO; + + iterate (context, database, afs_cell, db, v4_db, ka_db, &pd); + return 0; +} + +static int +propagate_database (krb5_context context, int v4_db, int ka_db, + const char *database, const char *afs_cell, + HDB *db, krb5_ccache ccache, + int optind, int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_principal server; + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + + for(i = optind; i < argc; i++){ + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + int fd; + struct prop_data pd; + krb5_data data; + + fd = open_socket(context, argv[i]); + if(fd < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "connect %s", argv[i]); + continue; + } + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, argv[i], + HPROP_NAME, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal(%s)", argv[i]); + close(fd); + continue; + } + + auth_context = NULL; + ret = krb5_sendauth(context, + &auth_context, + &fd, + HPROP_VERSION, + NULL, + server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, /* in_data */ + NULL, /* in_creds */ + ccache, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); + + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_sendauth"); + close(fd); + continue; + } + + pd.context = context; + pd.auth_context = auth_context; + pd.sock = fd; + + iterate (context, database, afs_cell, db, + v4_db, ka_db, &pd); + + data.data = NULL; + data.length = 0; + ret = send_priv(context, auth_context, &data, fd); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "send_priv"); + + ret = recv_priv(context, auth_context, fd, &data); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "recv_priv"); + else + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context); + close(fd); + } + return 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + HDB *db; + int optind = 0; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + exit(1); + + if(encrypt_flag && decrypt_flag) + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "Only one of `--encrypt' and `--decrypt' is meaningful"); + + if(!to_stdout) + get_creds(context, &ccache); + + ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, mkeyfile, &mkey5); + if(ret && ret != ENOENT) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_read_master_key"); + if(ret) { + if(encrypt_flag || decrypt_flag) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No master key file found"); + } else { + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, mkey5, &msched5); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_process_master_key"); + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4_db +#ifdef KASERVER_DB + || ka_db +#endif +) { + int e; + + if (realm == NULL) { + e = krb_get_lrealm(realm_buf, 1); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "krb_get_lrealm: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); + realm = realm_buf; + } + } + + if(v4_db) { + int e = kerb_db_set_name (database); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "kerb_db_set_name: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); + e = kdb_get_master_key(0, &mkey4, msched4); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "kdb_get_master_key: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); + } else +#ifdef KASERVER_DB + if (ka_db) { + /* no preparation required */ + } else +#endif +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = hdb_create (context, &db, database); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create: %s", database); + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + } + + if (to_stdout) + dump_database (context, v4_db, ka_db, + database, afs_cell, db); + else + propagate_database (context, v4_db, ka_db, + database, afs_cell, + db, ccache, + optind, argc, argv); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.h b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3802c5d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hprop.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: hprop.h,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __HPROP_H__ +#define __HPROP_H__ + +#include "headers.h" + +#define HPROP_VERSION "hprop-0.0" +#define HPROP_NAME "hprop" +#define HPROP_KEYTAB "FILE:/etc/hprop.keytab" +#define HPROP_PORT 754 + +#ifndef NEVERDATE +#define NEVERDATE ((1U << 31) - 1) +#endif + +krb5_error_code send_priv(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context, krb5_data*, int); +krb5_error_code recv_priv(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context, int, krb5_data*); +krb5_error_code send_clear(krb5_context context, int fd, krb5_data data); +krb5_error_code recv_clear(krb5_context context, int fd, krb5_data *out); + +#endif /* __HPROP_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.8 b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de4249a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.\" $Id: hpropd.8,v 1.1 1997/08/27 23:42:34 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Aug 27, 1997 +.Dt HPROPD 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm hpropd +.Nd +receive a propagated database +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl d Ar database +.Op Fl -database= Ns Ar database +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +receives databases sent by +.Nm hprop . +and writes it as a local database. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl d Ar database +.It Fl -database= Ns Ar database +the database to create. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr hprop 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df29240 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/hpropd.c @@ -0,0 +1,419 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hpropd.c,v 1.22 2000/01/06 21:39:24 assar Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +static des_cblock mkey4; +static des_key_schedule msched4; + +static char * +time2str(time_t t) +{ + static char buf[128]; + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d%H%M", gmtime(&t)); + return buf; +} + +static int +dump_krb4(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, int fd) +{ + char name[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char buf[1024]; + char *p; + int i; + int ret; + char *princ_name; + Event *modifier; + krb5_realm *realms; + int cmp; + + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, ent->principal, + name, instance, realm); + if (ret) { + krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &princ_name); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", princ_name); + free(princ_name); + return -1; + } + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &realms); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_get_default_realms"); + return -1; + } + + cmp = strcmp (realms[0], ent->principal->realm); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + if (cmp != 0) + return -1; + + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s ", name, + (strlen(instance) != 0) ? instance : "*"); + + if (ent->max_life) { + asprintf(&p, "%d", krb_time_to_life(0, *ent->max_life)); + strcat(buf, p); + free(p); + } else + strcat(buf, "255"); + strcat(buf, " "); + + i = 0; + while (i < ent->keys.len && + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype != KEYTYPE_DES) + ++i; + + if (i == ent->keys.len) { + krb5_warnx(context, "No DES key for %s.%s", name, instance); + return -1; + } + + if (ent->keys.val[i].mkvno) + asprintf(&p, "%d ", *ent->keys.val[i].mkvno); + else + asprintf(&p, "%d ", 1); + strcat(buf, p); + free(p); + + asprintf(&p, "%d ", ent->kvno); + strcat(buf, p); + free(p); + + asprintf(&p, "%d ", 0); /* Attributes are always 0*/ + strcat(buf, p); + free(p); + + { + u_int32_t *key = ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.data; + kdb_encrypt_key((des_cblock*)key, (des_cblock*)key, + &mkey4, msched4, DES_ENCRYPT); + asprintf(&p, "%x %x ", (int)htonl(*key), (int)htonl(*(key+1))); + strcat(buf, p); + free(p); + } + + if (ent->pw_end == NULL) + strcat(buf, time2str(60*60*24*365*50)); /* passwd will never expire */ + else + strcat(buf, time2str(*ent->pw_end)); + strcat(buf, " "); + + if (ent->modified_by == NULL) + modifier = &ent->created_by; + else + modifier = ent->modified_by; + + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, modifier->principal, + name, instance, realm); + if (ret) { + krb5_unparse_name(context, modifier->principal, &princ_name); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "%s", princ_name); + free(princ_name); + return -1; + } + asprintf(&p, "%s %s %s\n", time2str(modifier->time), + (strlen(name) != 0) ? name : "*", + (strlen(instance) != 0) ? instance : "*"); + strcat(buf, p); + free(p); + + ret = write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (ret == -1) + krb5_warnx(context, "write"); + return 0; +} +#endif /* KRB4 */ + +static int inetd_flag = -1; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int print_dump; +static char *database = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; +static int from_stdin; +#ifdef KRB4 +static int v4dump; +#endif + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "database", 'd', arg_string, &database, "database", "file" }, + { "stdin", 'n', arg_flag, &from_stdin, "read from stdin" }, + { "print", 0, arg_flag, &print_dump, "print dump to stdout" }, + { "inetd", 'i', arg_negative_flag, &inetd_flag, + "Not started from inetd" }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "v4dump", '4', arg_flag, &v4dump, "create v4 type DB" }, +#endif + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, NULL, NULL }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, NULL} +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_principal c1, c2; + krb5_authenticator authent; + krb5_keytab keytab; + int fd; + HDB *db; + char hostname[128]; + int optind = 0; + char *tmp_db; + krb5_log_facility *fac; + int nprincs; +#ifdef KRB4 + int e; + int fd_out; +#endif + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + exit(1); + + ret = krb5_openlog(context, "hpropd", &fac); + if(ret) + ; + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, fac); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump && database == HDB_DEFAULT_DB) + database = "/var/kerberos/524_dump"; +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage(1); + + if(from_stdin) + fd = STDIN_FILENO; + else { + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss; + int sin_len = sizeof(ss); + char addr_name[256]; + + fd = STDIN_FILENO; + if (inetd_flag == -1) { + if (getpeername (fd, sa, &sin_len) < 0) + inetd_flag = 0; + else + inetd_flag = 1; + } + if (!inetd_flag) { + mini_inetd (krb5_getportbyname (context, "hprop", "tcp", + HPROP_PORT)); + } + sin_len = sizeof(ss); + if(getpeername(fd, sa, &sin_len) < 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "getpeername"); + + if (inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, + socket_get_address (sa), + addr_name, + sizeof(addr_name)) == NULL) + strlcpy (addr_name, "unknown address", + sizeof(addr_name)); + + krb5_log(context, fac, 0, "Connection from %s", addr_name); + + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, hostname, HPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default"); + + ret = krb5_recvauth(context, &ac, &fd, HPROP_VERSION, + server, 0, keytab, NULL); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + + ret = krb5_auth_getauthenticator(context, ac, &authent); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_auth_getauthenticator"); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &c1, NULL, "kadmin", "hprop", NULL); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + principalname2krb5_principal(&c2, authent->cname, authent->crealm); + if(!krb5_principal_compare(context, c1, c2)) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name(context, c2, &s); + krb5_errx(context, 1, "Unauthorized connection from %s", s); + } + krb5_free_principal(context, c1); + krb5_free_principal(context, c2); + + ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close"); + } + + if(!print_dump) { + asprintf(&tmp_db, "%s~", database); +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + fd_out = open(tmp_db, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if (fd_out == -1) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "%s", strerror(errno)); + } + else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = hdb_create(context, &db, tmp_db); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create(%s)", tmp_db); + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_open(%s)", tmp_db); + } + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + e = kdb_get_master_key(0, &mkey4, msched4); + if(e) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "kdb_get_master_key: %s", + krb_get_err_text(e)); + } +#endif /* KRB4 */ + + nprincs = 0; + while(1){ + krb5_data data; + hdb_entry entry; + + if(from_stdin){ + ret = recv_clear(context, fd, &data); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "recv_clear"); + }else{ + ret = recv_priv(context, ac, fd, &data); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "recv_priv"); + } + + if(data.length == 0) { + if(!from_stdin) { + data.data = NULL; + data.length = 0; + send_priv(context, ac, &data, fd); + } + if(!print_dump) { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + ret = rename(tmp_db, database); + if (ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "rename"); + ret = close(fd_out); + if (ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "close"); + } else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = db->rename(context, db, database); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_rename"); + ret = db->close(context, db); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_close"); + } + } + break; + } + ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &entry); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_value2entry"); + if(print_dump) + hdb_print_entry(context, db, &entry, stdout); + else { +#ifdef KRB4 + if (v4dump) { + ret = dump_krb4(context, &entry, fd_out); + if(!ret) nprincs++; + } + else +#endif /* KRB4 */ + { + ret = db->store(context, db, 0, &entry); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_EXISTS) { + char *s; + krb5_unparse_name(context, entry.principal, &s); + krb5_warnx(context, "Entry exists: %s", s); + free(s); + } else if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "db_store"); + else + nprincs++; + } + } + hdb_free_entry(context, &entry); + } + if (!print_dump) + krb5_log(context, fac, 0, "Received %d principals", nprincs); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kadb.h b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kadb.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e85dbe2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kadb.h @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kadb.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __kadb_h__ +#define __kadb_h__ + +#define HASHSIZE 8191 + +struct ka_header { + int32_t version1; /* file format version, should + match version2 */ + int32_t size; + int32_t free_ptr; + int32_t eof_ptr; + int32_t kvno_ptr; + int32_t stats[8]; + int32_t admin_accounts; + int32_t special_keys_version; + int32_t hashsize; /* allocated size of hash */ + int32_t hash[HASHSIZE]; + int32_t version2; +}; + +struct ka_entry { + int32_t flags; /* see below */ + int32_t next; /* next in hash list */ + int32_t pw_end; /* expiration date */ + int32_t mod_time; /* time last modified */ + int32_t mod_ptr; /* pointer to modifier */ + int32_t pw_change; /* last pw change */ + int32_t max_life; /* max ticket life */ + int32_t kvno; + int32_t foo2[2]; /* huh? */ + char name[64]; + char instance[64]; + char key[8]; +}; + +#define KAFNORMAL (1<<0) +#define KAFADMIN (1<<2) /* an administrator */ +#define KAFNOTGS (1<<3) /* ! allow principal to get or use TGT */ +#define KAFNOSEAL (1<<5) /* ! allow principal as server in GetTicket */ +#define KAFNOCPW (1<<6) /* ! allow principal to change its own key */ +#define KAFSPECIAL (1<<8) /* set if special AuthServer principal */ + +#endif /* __kadb_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kaserver.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kaserver.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc155fa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kaserver.c @@ -0,0 +1,794 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kaserver.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KASERVER + +#include "kerberos4.h" +#include + +#define KA_AUTHENTICATION_SERVICE 731 +#define KA_TICKET_GRANTING_SERVICE 732 +#define KA_MAINTENANCE_SERVICE 733 + +#define AUTHENTICATE_OLD 1 +#define CHANGEPASSWORD 2 +#define GETTICKET_OLD 3 +#define SETPASSWORD 4 +#define SETFIELDS 5 +#define CREATEUSER 6 +#define DELETEUSER 7 +#define GETENTRY 8 +#define LISTENTRY 9 +#define GETSTATS 10 +#define DEBUG 11 +#define GETPASSWORD 12 +#define GETRANDOMKEY 13 +#define AUTHENTICATE 21 +#define AUTHENTICATE_V2 22 +#define GETTICKET 23 + +/* XXX - Where do we get these? */ + +#define RXGEN_OPCODE (-455) + +#define KADATABASEINCONSISTENT (180480L) +#define KAEXIST (180481L) +#define KAIO (180482L) +#define KACREATEFAIL (180483L) +#define KANOENT (180484L) +#define KAEMPTY (180485L) +#define KABADNAME (180486L) +#define KABADINDEX (180487L) +#define KANOAUTH (180488L) +#define KAANSWERTOOLONG (180489L) +#define KABADREQUEST (180490L) +#define KAOLDINTERFACE (180491L) +#define KABADARGUMENT (180492L) +#define KABADCMD (180493L) +#define KANOKEYS (180494L) +#define KAREADPW (180495L) +#define KABADKEY (180496L) +#define KAUBIKINIT (180497L) +#define KAUBIKCALL (180498L) +#define KABADPROTOCOL (180499L) +#define KANOCELLS (180500L) +#define KANOCELL (180501L) +#define KATOOMANYUBIKS (180502L) +#define KATOOMANYKEYS (180503L) +#define KABADTICKET (180504L) +#define KAUNKNOWNKEY (180505L) +#define KAKEYCACHEINVALID (180506L) +#define KABADSERVER (180507L) +#define KABADUSER (180508L) +#define KABADCPW (180509L) +#define KABADCREATE (180510L) +#define KANOTICKET (180511L) +#define KAASSOCUSER (180512L) +#define KANOTSPECIAL (180513L) +#define KACLOCKSKEW (180514L) +#define KANORECURSE (180515L) +#define KARXFAIL (180516L) +#define KANULLPASSWORD (180517L) +#define KAINTERNALERROR (180518L) +#define KAPWEXPIRED (180519L) +#define KAREUSED (180520L) +#define KATOOSOON (180521L) +#define KALOCKED (180522L) + +static void +decode_rx_header (krb5_storage *sp, + struct rx_header *h) +{ + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->epoch); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->connid); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->callid); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->seqno); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &h->serialno); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->type); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->flags); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->status); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &h->secindex); + krb5_ret_int16(sp, &h->reserved); + krb5_ret_int16(sp, &h->serviceid); +} + +static void +encode_rx_header (struct rx_header *h, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->epoch); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->connid); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->callid); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->seqno); + krb5_store_int32(sp, h->serialno); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->type); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->flags); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->status); + krb5_store_int8(sp, h->secindex); + krb5_store_int16(sp, h->reserved); + krb5_store_int16(sp, h->serviceid); +} + +static void +init_reply_header (struct rx_header *hdr, + struct rx_header *reply_hdr, + u_char type, + u_char flags) +{ + reply_hdr->epoch = hdr->epoch; + reply_hdr->connid = hdr->connid; + reply_hdr->callid = hdr->callid; + reply_hdr->seqno = 1; + reply_hdr->serialno = 1; + reply_hdr->type = type; + reply_hdr->flags = flags; + reply_hdr->status = 0; + reply_hdr->secindex = 0; + reply_hdr->reserved = 0; + reply_hdr->serviceid = hdr->serviceid; +} + +static void +make_error_reply (struct rx_header *hdr, + u_int32_t ret, + krb5_data *reply) + +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + struct rx_header reply_hdr; + + init_reply_header (hdr, &reply_hdr, HT_ABORT, HF_LAST); + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + encode_rx_header (&reply_hdr, sp); + krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + krb5_storage_to_data (sp, reply); + krb5_storage_free (sp); +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_xdr_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int ret; + int size; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + data->length = size; + if (size) { + u_char foo[4]; + size_t pad = (4 - size % 4) % 4; + + data->data = malloc(size); + if (data->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = sp->fetch(sp, data->data, size); + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_CC_END; + if (pad) { + ret = sp->fetch(sp, foo, pad); + if (ret != pad) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_CC_END; + } + } else + data->data = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_store_xdr_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data) +{ + u_char zero[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0}; + int ret; + size_t pad; + + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, data.length); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = sp->store(sp, data.data, data.length); + if(ret != data.length){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_CC_END; + } + pad = (4 - data.length % 4) % 4; + if (pad) { + ret = sp->store(sp, zero, pad); + if (ret != pad) { + if (ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_CC_END; + } + } + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +create_reply_ticket (struct rx_header *hdr, + Key *skey, + char *name, char *instance, char *realm, + struct sockaddr_in *addr, + int life, + int kvno, + int32_t max_seq_len, + char *sname, char *sinstance, + u_int32_t challenge, + char *label, + des_cblock *key, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + KTEXT_ST ticket; + des_cblock session; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_data enc_data; + des_key_schedule schedule; + struct rx_header reply_hdr; + des_cblock zero; + size_t pad; + unsigned fyrtiosjuelva; + + /* create the ticket */ + + des_new_random_key(&session); + + krb_create_ticket (&ticket, 0, name, instance, realm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, + &session, life, kdc_time, + sname, sinstance, skey->key.keyvalue.data); + + /* create the encrypted part of the reply */ + sp = krb5_storage_emem (); + krb5_generate_random_block(&fyrtiosjuelva, sizeof(fyrtiosjuelva)); + fyrtiosjuelva &= 0xffffffff; + krb5_store_int32 (sp, fyrtiosjuelva); +#if 0 + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 4711); /* XXX */ +#endif + krb5_store_int32 (sp, challenge); + sp->store (sp, session, 8); + memset (&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, kdc_time); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, kdc_time + krb_life_to_time (0, life)); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, kvno); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, ticket.length); + krb5_store_stringz (sp, name); + krb5_store_stringz (sp, instance); +#if 1 /* XXX - Why shouldn't the realm go here? */ + krb5_store_stringz (sp, ""); +#else + krb5_store_stringz (sp, realm); +#endif + krb5_store_stringz (sp, sname); + krb5_store_stringz (sp, sinstance); + sp->store (sp, ticket.dat, ticket.length); + sp->store (sp, label, strlen(label)); + + /* pad to DES block */ + memset (zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + pad = (8 - sp->seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) % 8) % 8; + sp->store (sp, zero, pad); + + krb5_storage_to_data (sp, &enc_data); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + + if (enc_data.length > max_seq_len) { + krb5_data_free (&enc_data); + make_error_reply (hdr, KAANSWERTOOLONG, reply); + return 0; + } + + /* encrypt it */ + des_set_key (key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)enc_data.data, + (des_cblock *)enc_data.data, + enc_data.length, + schedule, + key, + DES_ENCRYPT); + memset (&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + /* create the reply packet */ + init_reply_header (hdr, &reply_hdr, HT_DATA, HF_LAST); + sp = krb5_storage_emem (); + encode_rx_header (&reply_hdr, sp); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, max_seq_len); + krb5_store_xdr_data (sp, enc_data); + krb5_data_free (&enc_data); + krb5_storage_to_data (sp, reply); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_auth_args (krb5_storage *sp, + char **name, + char **instance, + time_t *start_time, + time_t *end_time, + krb5_data *request, + int32_t *max_seq_len) +{ + krb5_data data; + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *name = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*name == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (*name, data.data, data.length); + (*name)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *instance = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*instance == NULL) { + free (*name); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*instance, data.data, data.length); + (*instance)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *start_time = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *end_time = tmp; + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, request); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, max_seq_len); + /* ignore the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static void +do_authenticate (struct rx_header *hdr, + krb5_storage *sp, + struct sockaddr_in *addr, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *name = NULL; + char *instance = NULL; + time_t start_time; + time_t end_time; + krb5_data request; + int32_t max_seq_len; + hdb_entry *client_entry = NULL; + hdb_entry *server_entry = NULL; + Key *ckey = NULL; + Key *skey = NULL; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + krb5_storage *reply_sp; + time_t max_life; + u_int8_t life; + int32_t chal; + + krb5_data_zero (&request); + + unparse_auth_args (sp, &name, &instance, &start_time, &end_time, + &request, &max_seq_len); + + client_entry = db_fetch4 (name, instance, v4_realm); + if (client_entry == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Client not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + name, instance, v4_realm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + server_entry = db_fetch4 ("krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm); + if (server_entry == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + "krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(client_entry, &ckey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(server_entry, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* try to decode the `request' */ + memcpy (&key, ckey->key.keyvalue.data, sizeof(key)); + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)request.data, + (des_cblock *)request.data, + request.length, + schedule, + &key, + DES_DECRYPT); + memset (&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + /* check for the magic label */ + if (memcmp ((char *)request.data + 4, "gTGS", 4) != 0) { + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADREQUEST, reply); + goto out; + } + + reply_sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (request.data, 4); + krb5_ret_int32 (reply_sp, &chal); + krb5_storage_free (reply_sp); + + /* life */ + max_life = end_time - kdc_time; + if (client_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *client_entry->max_life); + if (server_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server_entry->max_life); + + life = krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, kdc_time + max_life); + + create_reply_ticket (hdr, skey, + name, instance, v4_realm, + addr, life, client_entry->kvno, + max_seq_len, + "krbtgt", v4_realm, + chal + 1, "tgsT", + &key, reply); + memset (&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + +out: + if (request.length) { + memset (request.data, 0, request.length); + krb5_data_free (&request); + } + if (name) + free (name); + if (instance) + free (instance); + if (client_entry) { + hdb_free_entry (context, client_entry); + free (client_entry); + } + if (server_entry) { + hdb_free_entry (context, server_entry); + free (server_entry); + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_getticket_args (krb5_storage *sp, + int *kvno, + char **auth_domain, + krb5_data *ticket, + char **name, + char **instance, + krb5_data *times, + int32_t *max_seq_len) +{ + krb5_data data; + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *kvno = tmp; + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *auth_domain = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*auth_domain == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (*auth_domain, data.data, data.length); + (*auth_domain)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, ticket); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *name = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*name == NULL) { + free (*auth_domain); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*name, data.data, data.length); + (*name)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, &data); + *instance = malloc(data.length + 1); + if (*instance == NULL) { + free (*auth_domain); + free (*name); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (*instance, data.data, data.length); + (*instance)[data.length] = '\0'; + krb5_data_free (&data); + + krb5_ret_xdr_data (sp, times); + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, max_seq_len); + /* ignore the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static void +do_getticket (struct rx_header *hdr, + krb5_storage *sp, + struct sockaddr_in *addr, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int kvno; + char *auth_domain = NULL; + krb5_data aticket; + char *name = NULL; + char *instance = NULL; + krb5_data times; + int32_t max_seq_len; + hdb_entry *server_entry = NULL; + hdb_entry *krbtgt_entry = NULL; + Key *kkey = NULL; + Key *skey = NULL; + des_cblock key; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock session; + time_t max_life; + int8_t life; + time_t start_time, end_time; + char pname[ANAME_SZ]; + char pinst[INST_SZ]; + char prealm[REALM_SZ]; + + krb5_data_zero (&aticket); + krb5_data_zero (×); + + unparse_getticket_args (sp, &kvno, &auth_domain, &aticket, + &name, &instance, ×, &max_seq_len); + + server_entry = db_fetch4 (name, instance, v4_realm); + if (server_entry == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + name, instance, v4_realm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + krbtgt_entry = db_fetch4 ("krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm); + if (krbtgt_entry == NULL) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + "krbtgt", v4_realm, v4_realm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOENT, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(krbtgt_entry, &kkey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* find a DES key */ + ret = get_des_key(server_entry, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_error_reply (hdr, KANOKEYS, reply); + goto out; + } + + /* decrypt the incoming ticket */ + memcpy (&key, kkey->key.keyvalue.data, sizeof(key)); + + /* unpack the ticket */ + { + KTEXT_ST ticket; + u_char flags; + int life; + u_int32_t time_sec; + char sname[ANAME_SZ]; + char sinstance[SNAME_SZ]; + u_int32_t paddress; + + ticket.length = aticket.length; + memcpy (ticket.dat, aticket.data, ticket.length); + + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + decomp_ticket (&ticket, &flags, pname, pinst, prealm, + &paddress, session, &life, &time_sec, + sname, sinstance, + &key, schedule); + + if (strcmp (sname, "krbtgt") != 0 + || strcmp (sinstance, v4_realm) != 0) { + kdc_log(0, "no TGT: %s.%s for %s.%s@%s", + sname, sinstance, + pname, pinst, prealm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADTICKET, reply); + goto out; + } + + if (kdc_time > krb_life_to_time(time_sec, life)) { + kdc_log(0, "TGT expired: %s.%s@%s", + pname, pinst, prealm); + make_error_reply (hdr, KABADTICKET, reply); + goto out; + } + } + + /* decrypt the times */ + des_set_key (&session, schedule); + des_ecb_encrypt (times.data, + times.data, + schedule, + DES_DECRYPT); + memset (&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + /* and extract them */ + { + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (times.data, times.length); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + start_time = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + end_time = tmp; + krb5_storage_free (sp); + } + + /* life */ + max_life = end_time - kdc_time; + if (krbtgt_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *krbtgt_entry->max_life); + if (server_entry->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server_entry->max_life); + + life = krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, kdc_time + max_life); + + create_reply_ticket (hdr, skey, + pname, pinst, prealm, + addr, life, server_entry->kvno, + max_seq_len, + name, instance, + 0, "gtkt", + &session, reply); + memset (&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + +out: + if (aticket.length) { + memset (aticket.data, 0, aticket.length); + krb5_data_free (&aticket); + } + if (times.length) { + memset (times.data, 0, times.length); + krb5_data_free (×); + } + if (auth_domain) + free (auth_domain); + if (name) + free (name); + if (instance) + free (instance); + if (krbtgt_entry) { + hdb_free_entry (context, krbtgt_entry); + free (krbtgt_entry); + } + if (server_entry) { + hdb_free_entry (context, server_entry); + free (server_entry); + } +} + +krb5_error_code +do_kaserver(unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + struct rx_header hdr; + u_int32_t op; + krb5_storage *sp; + + if (len < RX_HEADER_SIZE) + return -1; + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (buf, len); + + decode_rx_header (sp, &hdr); + buf += RX_HEADER_SIZE; + len -= RX_HEADER_SIZE; + + switch (hdr.type) { + case HT_DATA : + break; + case HT_ACK : + case HT_BUSY : + case HT_ABORT : + case HT_ACKALL : + case HT_CHAL : + case HT_RESP : + case HT_DEBUG : + default: + /* drop */ + goto out; + } + + + if (hdr.serviceid != KA_AUTHENTICATION_SERVICE + && hdr.serviceid != KA_TICKET_GRANTING_SERVICE) { + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &op); + switch (op) { + case AUTHENTICATE : + do_authenticate (&hdr, sp, addr, reply); + break; + case GETTICKET : + do_getticket (&hdr, sp, addr, reply); + break; + case AUTHENTICATE_OLD : + case CHANGEPASSWORD : + case GETTICKET_OLD : + case SETPASSWORD : + case SETFIELDS : + case CREATEUSER : + case DELETEUSER : + case GETENTRY : + case LISTENTRY : + case GETSTATS : + case DEBUG : + case GETPASSWORD : + case GETRANDOMKEY : + case AUTHENTICATE_V2 : + default : + make_error_reply (&hdr, RXGEN_OPCODE, reply); + break; + } + +out: + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* KASERVER */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc.8 b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8925111 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc.8 @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +.\" $Id: kdc.8,v 1.3 1997/08/09 00:20:38 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd July 27, 1997 +.Dt KDC 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kdc +.Nd +Kerberos 5 server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl c Ar file +.Op Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +.Op Fl k Ar file +.Op Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Op Fl p +.Op Fl -no-require-preauth +.Op Fl r Ar realm +.Op Fl -v4-realm= Ns Ar realm + +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +serves requests for tickets. When it starts, it first checks the flags +passed, any options that are not specified with a command line flag is +taken from a config file, or from a default compiled-in value. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl c Ar file +.It Fl -config-file= Ns Ar file +Specifies the location of the config file, the default is +.Pa /var/heimdal/kdc.conf . +This is the only value that can't be specified in the config file. +.It Fl k Ar file +.It Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +The location of the master-key file. All keys in the database is +encrypted with this master key. The use of a master key is currently +optional, so there is no default. +.Em "Don't specify a master key file if your database is not encrypted." +.It Fl p +.It Fl -no-require-preauth +Turn off the requirement for pre-autentication in the initial +AS-REQ. The use of pre-authentication makes it more difficult to do +offline password attacks. You might want to turn it off if you have +clients that doesn't do pre-authentication. Since the version 4 +protocol doesn't support any pre-authentication, so serving version 4 +clients is just about the same as not requiring pre-athentication. The +default is to require pre-authentication. +.It Fl r Ar realm +.It Fl -v4-realm= Ns Ar realm +What realm this server should act as when dealing with version 4 +requests. The database can contain any number of realms, but since the +version 4 protocol doesn't contain a realm for the server, it must be +explicitly specified. The default is whatever is returned by +.Fn krb_get_lrealm . +This option is only availabe if the KDC has been compiled with version +4 support. +.El +.Pp +All activities , are logged to one or more destinations, see +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +and +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 . +The entity used for logging is +.Nm kdc . +.Sh CONFIGURATION FILE +The configuration file has the same syntax as the +.Pa krb5.conf +file (you can actually put the configuration in +.Pa /etc/krb5.conf , +and then start the KDC with +.Fl -config-file= Ns Ar /etc/krb5.conf ) . +All options should be in a section called +.Dq kdc . +Options are called the same as the long option name, and takes the +same arguments. The only difference is the pre-authentication flag, +that has to be specified as: +.Pp +.Dl require-preauth = no +.Pp +(in fact you can specify the option as +.Fl -require-preauth=no ) . +.Pp +An example of a config file: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[kdc] + require-preauth = no + v4-realm = FOO.SE + key-file = /key-file +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7275576 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kdc_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * $Id: kdc_locl.h,v 1.39 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $ + */ + +#ifndef __KDC_LOCL_H__ +#define __KDC_LOCL_H__ + +#include "headers.h" + +extern krb5_context context; + +extern int require_preauth; +extern sig_atomic_t exit_flag; +extern char *keyfile; +extern size_t max_request; +extern time_t kdc_warn_pwexpire; +extern struct dbinfo { + char *realm; + char *dbname; + char *mkey_file; + struct dbinfo *next; +} *databases; +extern HDB **db; +extern int num_db; +extern char *port_str; +extern int enable_http; +extern krb5_boolean encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep; +extern krb5_boolean check_ticket_addresses; +extern krb5_boolean allow_null_ticket_addresses; + +#ifdef KRB4 +extern char *v4_realm; +#endif +#ifdef KASERVER +extern krb5_boolean enable_kaserver; +#endif + +extern struct timeval now; +#define kdc_time (now.tv_sec) + +krb5_error_code as_rep (KDC_REQ*, krb5_data*, const char*, struct sockaddr*); +void configure (int, char**); +hdb_entry* db_fetch (krb5_principal); +void kdc_log (int, const char*, ...); +char* kdc_log_msg (int, const char*, ...); +char* kdc_log_msg_va (int, const char*, va_list); +void kdc_openlog (krb5_config_section*); +void loop (void); +void set_master_key (EncryptionKey); +krb5_error_code tgs_rep (KDC_REQ*, krb5_data*, const char*, struct sockaddr *); +Key* unseal_key (Key*); + +#ifdef KRB4 +hdb_entry* db_fetch4 (const char*, const char*, const char*); +krb5_error_code do_524 (Ticket*, krb5_data*, const char*, struct sockaddr*); +krb5_error_code do_version4 (unsigned char*, size_t, krb5_data*, const char*, + struct sockaddr_in*); +krb5_error_code encode_v4_ticket (void*, size_t, EncTicketPart*, + PrincipalName*, size_t*); +krb5_error_code encrypt_v4_ticket (void*, size_t, des_cblock*, EncryptedData*); +krb5_error_code get_des_key(hdb_entry*, Key**); +int maybe_version4 (unsigned char*, int); +#endif + +#ifdef KASERVER +krb5_error_code do_kaserver (unsigned char*, size_t, krb5_data*, const char*, + struct sockaddr_in*); +#endif + +#endif /* __KDC_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ff082c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.c @@ -0,0 +1,557 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kerberos4.c,v 1.24 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + +#include "kerberos4.h" + +#ifndef swap32 +static u_int32_t +swap32(u_int32_t x) +{ + return ((x << 24) & 0xff000000) | + ((x << 8) & 0xff0000) | + ((x >> 8) & 0xff00) | + ((x >> 24) & 0xff); +} +#endif /* swap32 */ + +int +maybe_version4(unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + return len > 0 && *buf == 4; +} + +static void +make_err_reply(krb5_data *reply, int code, const char *msg) +{ + KTEXT_ST er; + + /* name, instance and realm is not checked in most (all?) version + implementations; msg is also never used, but we send it anyway + (for debugging purposes) */ + + if(msg == NULL) + msg = krb_get_err_text(code); + cr_err_reply(&er, "", "", "", kdc_time, code, (char*)msg); + krb5_data_copy(reply, er.dat, er.length); +} + +static krb5_boolean +valid_princ(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ) +{ + char *s; + hdb_entry *ent; + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &s); + ent = db_fetch(princ); + if(ent == NULL){ + kdc_log(7, "Lookup %s failed", s); + free(s); + return 0; + } + kdc_log(7, "Lookup %s succeeded", s); + free(s); + hdb_free_entry(context, ent); + free(ent); + return 1; +} + +hdb_entry* +db_fetch4(const char *name, const char *instance, const char *realm) +{ + krb5_principal p; + hdb_entry *ent; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal_ext(context, name, instance, realm, + valid_princ, 0, &p); + if(ret) + return NULL; + ent = db_fetch(p); + krb5_free_principal(context, p); + return ent; +} + +krb5_error_code +get_des_key(hdb_entry *principal, Key **key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, key); + if(ret) + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, key); + if(ret) + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, key); + if(ret) + return ret; + if ((*key)->key.keyvalue.length == 0) + return KERB_ERR_NULL_KEY; + return 0; +} + +#define RCHECK(X, L) if(X){make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, "Packet too short"); goto L;} + +krb5_error_code +do_version4(unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry *client = NULL, *server = NULL; + Key *ckey, *skey; + int8_t pvno; + int8_t msg_type; + int lsb; + char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *realm = NULL; + char *sname = NULL, *sinst = NULL; + int32_t req_time; + time_t max_life; + u_int8_t life; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, len); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &pvno), out); + if(pvno != 4){ + kdc_log(0, "Protocol version mismatch (%d)", pvno); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_PKT_VER, NULL); + goto out; + } + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &msg_type), out); + lsb = msg_type & 1; + msg_type &= ~1; + switch(msg_type){ + case AUTH_MSG_KDC_REQUEST: + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &name), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &inst), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &realm), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int32(sp, &req_time), out1); + if(lsb) + req_time = swap32(req_time); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &life), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sname), out1); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sinst), out1); + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ %s.%s@%s from %s for %s.%s", + name, inst, realm, from, sname, sinst); + + client = db_fetch4(name, inst, realm); + if(client == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Client not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + name, inst, realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, NULL); + goto out1; + } + server = db_fetch4(sname, sinst, v4_realm); + if(server == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + sname, sinst, v4_realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, NULL); + goto out1; + } + + ret = get_des_key(client, &ckey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "No DES key in database (client)"); + goto out1; + } + +#if 0 + /* this is not necessary with the new code in libkrb */ + /* find a properly salted key */ + while(ckey->salt == NULL || ckey->salt->salt.length != 0) + ret = hdb_next_keytype2key(context, client, KEYTYPE_DES, &ckey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "No version-4 salted key in database -- %s.%s@%s", + name, inst, realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "No version-4 salted key in database"); + goto out1; + } +#endif + + ret = get_des_key(server, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "No DES key in database (server)"); + goto out1; + } + + max_life = krb_life_to_time(0, life); + if(client->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *client->max_life); + if(server->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server->max_life); + + life = krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, kdc_time + max_life); + + { + KTEXT_ST cipher, ticket; + KTEXT r; + des_cblock session; + + des_new_random_key(&session); + + krb_create_ticket(&ticket, 0, name, inst, v4_realm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, session, life, kdc_time, + sname, sinst, skey->key.keyvalue.data); + + create_ciph(&cipher, session, sname, sinst, v4_realm, + life, server->kvno, &ticket, kdc_time, + ckey->key.keyvalue.data); + memset(&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + r = create_auth_reply(name, inst, realm, req_time, 0, + client->pw_end ? *client->pw_end : 0, + client->kvno, &cipher); + krb5_data_copy(reply, r->dat, r->length); + memset(&cipher, 0, sizeof(cipher)); + memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket)); + } + out1: + break; + case AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST: { + int8_t kvno; + int8_t ticket_len; + int8_t req_len; + KTEXT_ST auth; + AUTH_DAT ad; + size_t pos; + krb5_principal tgt_princ = NULL; + hdb_entry *tgt = NULL; + Key *tkey; + + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &kvno), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &realm), out2); + + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, "krbtgt", realm, v4_realm, + &tgt_princ); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Converting krbtgt principal: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, + "Failed to convert v4 principal (krbtgt)"); + goto out2; + } + + tgt = db_fetch(tgt_princ); + if(tgt == NULL){ + char *s; + s = kdc_log_msg(0, "Ticket-granting ticket not " + "found in database: krbtgt.%s@%s", + realm, v4_realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, s); + free(s); + goto out2; + } + + if(tgt->kvno != kvno){ + goto out2; + } + + ret = get_des_key(tgt, &tkey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "No DES key in database (krbtgt)"); + goto out2; + } + + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &ticket_len), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &req_len), out2); + + pos = sp->seek(sp, ticket_len + req_len, SEEK_CUR); + + memset(&auth, 0, sizeof(auth)); + memcpy(&auth.dat, buf, pos); + auth.length = pos; + krb_set_key(tkey->key.keyvalue.data, 0); + ret = krb_rd_req(&auth, "krbtgt", realm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, &ad, 0); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "krb_rd_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret)); + make_err_reply(reply, ret, NULL); + goto out2; + } + + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int32(sp, &req_time), out2); + if(lsb) + req_time = swap32(req_time); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_int8(sp, &life), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sname), out2); + RCHECK(krb5_ret_stringz(sp, &sinst), out2); + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ %s.%s@%s from %s for %s.%s", + ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, from, sname, sinst); + + if(strcmp(ad.prealm, realm)){ + kdc_log(0, "Can't hop realms %s -> %s", realm, ad.prealm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, + "Can't hop realms"); + goto out2; + } + + if(strcmp(sname, "changepw") == 0){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for changepw ticket"); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, + "Can't authorize password change based on TGT"); + goto out2; + } + +#if 0 + client = db_fetch4(ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm); + if(client == NULL){ + char *s; + s = kdc_log_msg(0, "Client not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, s); + free(s); + goto out2; + } +#endif + + server = db_fetch4(sname, sinst, v4_realm); + if(server == NULL){ + char *s; + s = kdc_log_msg(0, "Server not found in database: %s.%s@%s", + sname, sinst, v4_realm); + make_err_reply(reply, KERB_ERR_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, s); + free(s); + goto out2; + } + + ret = get_des_key(server, &skey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "%s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + /* XXX */ + make_err_reply(reply, KDC_NULL_KEY, + "No DES key in database (server)"); + goto out2; + } + + max_life = krb_life_to_time(ad.time_sec, ad.life); + max_life = min(max_life, krb_life_to_time(kdc_time, life)); + life = min(life, krb_time_to_life(kdc_time, max_life)); + max_life = krb_life_to_time(0, life); +#if 0 + if(client->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *client->max_life); +#endif + if(server->max_life) + max_life = min(max_life, *server->max_life); + + { + KTEXT_ST cipher, ticket; + KTEXT r; + des_cblock session; + des_new_random_key(&session); + krb_create_ticket(&ticket, 0, ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + addr->sin_addr.s_addr, &session, life, kdc_time, + sname, sinst, skey->key.keyvalue.data); + + create_ciph(&cipher, session, sname, sinst, v4_realm, + life, server->kvno, &ticket, + kdc_time, &ad.session); + + memset(&session, 0, sizeof(session)); + memset(ad.session, 0, sizeof(ad.session)); + + r = create_auth_reply(ad.pname, ad.pinst, ad.prealm, + req_time, 0, 0, 0, &cipher); + krb5_data_copy(reply, r->dat, r->length); + memset(&cipher, 0, sizeof(cipher)); + memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket)); + } + out2: + if(tgt_princ) + krb5_free_principal(context, tgt_princ); + if(tgt){ + hdb_free_entry(context, tgt); + free(tgt); + } + + break; + } + + case AUTH_MSG_ERR_REPLY: + break; + default: + kdc_log(0, "Unknown message type: %d from %s", + msg_type, from); + + make_err_reply(reply, KFAILURE, "Unknown message type"); + } +out: + if(name) + free(name); + if(inst) + free(inst); + if(realm) + free(realm); + if(sname) + free(sname); + if(sinst) + free(sinst); + if(client){ + hdb_free_entry(context, client); + free(client); + } + if(server){ + hdb_free_entry(context, server); + free(server); + } + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return 0; +} + + +#define ETYPE_DES_PCBC 17 /* XXX */ + +krb5_error_code +encrypt_v4_ticket(void *buf, size_t len, des_cblock *key, EncryptedData *reply) +{ + des_key_schedule schedule; + + reply->etype = ETYPE_DES_PCBC; + reply->kvno = NULL; + reply->cipher.length = len; + reply->cipher.data = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && reply->cipher.data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + des_set_key(key, schedule); + des_pcbc_encrypt(buf, + reply->cipher.data, + len, + schedule, + key, + DES_ENCRYPT); + memset(schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +encode_v4_ticket(void *buf, size_t len, EncTicketPart *et, + PrincipalName *service, size_t *size) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_error_code ret; + char name[40], inst[40], realm[40]; + char sname[40], sinst[40]; + + { + krb5_principal princ; + principalname2krb5_principal(&princ, + *service, + et->crealm); + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, + princ, + sname, + sinst, + realm); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + if(ret) + return ret; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&princ, + et->cname, + et->crealm); + + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, + princ, + name, + inst, + realm); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + } + if(ret) + return ret; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, 0); /* flags */ + krb5_store_stringz(sp, name); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, inst); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + { + unsigned char tmp[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + int i; + if(et->caddr){ + for(i = 0; i < et->caddr->len; i++) + if(et->caddr->val[i].addr_type == AF_INET && + et->caddr->val[i].address.length == 4){ + memcpy(tmp, et->caddr->val[i].address.data, 4); + break; + } + } + sp->store(sp, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + } + + if((et->key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 && + et->key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 && + et->key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) || + et->key.keyvalue.length != 8) + return -1; + sp->store(sp, et->key.keyvalue.data, 8); + + { + time_t start = et->starttime ? *et->starttime : et->authtime; + krb5_store_int8(sp, krb_time_to_life(start, et->endtime)); + krb5_store_int32(sp, start); + } + + krb5_store_stringz(sp, sname); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, sinst); + + { + krb5_data data; + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + *size = (data.length + 7) & ~7; /* pad to 8 bytes */ + if(*size > len) + return -1; + memset((unsigned char*)buf - *size + 1, 0, *size); + memcpy((unsigned char*)buf - *size + 1, data.data, data.length); + krb5_data_free(&data); + } + return 0; +} + +#endif /* KRB4 */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.h b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bf3c2b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos4.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kerberos4.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KERBEROS4_H__ +#define __KERBEROS4_H__ + +hdb_entry* db_fetch4(const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm); + +#endif /* __KERBEROS4_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1108e6d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kerberos5.c @@ -0,0 +1,1639 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kerberos5.c,v 1.108 1999/12/02 17:04:59 joda Exp $"); + +#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1)) + +static void +fix_time(time_t **t) +{ + if(*t == NULL){ + ALLOC(*t); + **t = MAX_TIME; + } + if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */ +} + +static void +set_salt_padata (METHOD_DATA **m, Salt *salt) +{ + if (salt) { + ALLOC(*m); + (*m)->len = 1; + ALLOC((*m)->val); + (*m)->val->padata_type = salt->type; + copy_octet_string(&salt->salt, + &(*m)->val->padata_value); + } +} + +static PA_DATA* +find_padata(KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type) +{ + while(*start < req->padata->len){ + (*start)++; + if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == type) + return &req->padata->val[*start - 1]; + } + return NULL; +} + +#if 0 + +static krb5_error_code +find_keys(hdb_entry *client, + hdb_entry *server, + Key **ckey, + krb5_enctype *cetype, + Key **skey, + krb5_enctype *setype, + unsigned *etypes, + unsigned num_etypes) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + for(i = 0; i < num_etypes; i++) { + if(client){ + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, client, etypes[i], ckey); + if(ret) + continue; + } + if(server){ + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, server, etypes[i], skey); + if(ret) + continue; + } + if(etype) + *cetype = *setype = etypes[i]; + return 0; + } + return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +#else + +static krb5_error_code +find_etype(hdb_entry *princ, unsigned *etypes, unsigned len, + Key **key, int *index) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + + for(i = 0; i < len ; i++) { + krb5_error_code tmp; + + tmp = hdb_enctype2key(context, princ, etypes[i], key); + if (tmp == 0) { + if ((*key)->key.keyvalue.length != 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } else { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY; + } + } + } + if(index) + *index = i; + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +find_keys(hdb_entry *client, + hdb_entry *server, + Key **ckey, + krb5_enctype *cetype, + Key **skey, + krb5_enctype *setype, + int *etypes, + unsigned num_etypes) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + if(client){ + /* find client key */ + ret = find_etype(client, etypes, num_etypes, ckey, &i); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Client has no support for etypes"); + return ret; + } + *cetype = etypes[i]; + } + + if(server){ + /* find server key */ + ret = find_etype(server, etypes, num_etypes, skey, NULL); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server has no support for etypes"); + return ret; + } + *setype = (*skey)->key.keytype; + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +static krb5_error_code +encode_reply(KDC_REP *rep, EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek, + krb5_enctype etype, + int skvno, EncryptionKey *skey, + int ckvno, EncryptionKey *ckey, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + unsigned char buf[8192]; /* XXX The data could be indefinite */ + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = encode_EncTicketPart(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), et, &len); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + + + krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto); + + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + skvno, + &rep->ticket.enc_part); + + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + + if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep) + ret = encode_EncASRepPart(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + ek, &len); + else + ret = encode_EncTGSRepPart(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + ek, &len); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + krb5_crypto_init(context, ckey, 0, &crypto); + if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) { + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + ckvno, + &rep->enc_part); + ret = encode_AS_REP(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), rep, &len); + } else { + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + ckvno, + &rep->enc_part); + ret = encode_TGS_REP(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), rep, &len); + } + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + return ret; + } + krb5_data_copy(reply, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + return 0; +} + +static int +realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md) +{ + PA_DATA *pa; + pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val)); + if(pa == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + md->val = pa; + md->len++; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_pa_etype_info(METHOD_DATA *md, hdb_entry *client) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int i; + ETYPE_INFO pa; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + + + pa.len = client->keys.len; + pa.val = malloc(pa.len * sizeof(*pa.val)); + if(pa.val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for(i = 0; i < client->keys.len; i++) { + pa.val[i].etype = client->keys.val[i].key.keytype; + ALLOC(pa.val[i].salttype); + if(client->keys.val[i].salt){ +#if 0 + if(client->keys.val[i].salt->type == hdb_pw_salt) + *pa.val[i].salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */ + else if(client->keys.val[i].salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt) + *pa.val[i].salttype = 2; + else { + free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + kdc_log(0, "unknown salt-type: %d", + client->keys.val[i].salt->type); + return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if + we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you + *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming + that the cell is the same as the realm in lower + case) */ +#else + *pa.val[i].salttype = client->keys.val[i].salt->type; +#endif + krb5_copy_data(context, &client->keys.val[i].salt->salt, + &pa.val[i].salt); + } else { +#if 0 + *pa.val[i].salttype = 1; /* or 0 with salt? */ +#else + *pa.val[i].salttype = pa_pw_salt; +#endif + pa.val[i].salt = NULL; + } + } + len = length_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + buf = malloc(len); + if (buf) { + free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + return ret; + } + ret = encode_ETYPE_INFO(buf + len - 1, len, &pa, &len); + free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa); + if(ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + ret = realloc_method_data(md); + if(ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = pa_etype_info; + md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len; + md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf; + return 0; +} + +static int +check_flags(hdb_entry *client, const char *client_name, + hdb_entry *server, const char *server_name, + krb5_boolean is_as_req) +{ + if(client != NULL) { + /* check client */ + if (client->flags.invalid) { + kdc_log(0, "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if(!client->flags.client){ + kdc_log(0, "Principal may not act as client -- %s", + client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Client not yet valid -- %s", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET; + } + + if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Client expired -- %s", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP; + } + + if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time + && !server->flags.change_pw) { + kdc_log(0, "Client's key has expired -- %s", client_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED; + } + } + + /* check server */ + + if (server != NULL) { + if (server->flags.invalid) { + kdc_log(0, "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if(!server->flags.server){ + kdc_log(0, "Principal may not act as server -- %s", + server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) { + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + } + + if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Server not yet valid -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET; + } + + if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Server expired -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP; + } + + if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) { + kdc_log(0, "Server's key has expired -- %s", server_name); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_boolean +check_addresses(HostAddresses *addresses, struct sockaddr *from) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_address addr; + + if(check_ticket_addresses == 0) + return TRUE; + + if(addresses == NULL) + return allow_null_ticket_addresses; + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (from, &addr); + if(ret) + return FALSE; + + return krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +as_rep(KDC_REQ *req, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *from_addr) +{ + KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body; + AS_REP rep; + KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options; + hdb_entry *client = NULL, *server = NULL; + krb5_enctype cetype, setype; + EncTicketPart et; + EncKDCRepPart ek; + krb5_principal client_princ, server_princ; + char *client_name, *server_name; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + const char *e_text = NULL; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + Key *ckey, *skey; + + if(b->sname == NULL){ + server_name = ""; + ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + e_text = "No server in request"; + } else{ + principalname2krb5_principal (&server_princ, *(b->sname), b->realm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name); + } + + if(b->cname == NULL){ + client_name = ""; + ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + e_text = "No client in request"; + } else { + principalname2krb5_principal (&client_princ, *(b->cname), b->realm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name); + } + kdc_log(0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s", + client_name, from, server_name); + + if(ret) + goto out; + + client = db_fetch(client_princ); + if(client == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "UNKNOWN -- %s", client_name); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + server = db_fetch(server_princ); + + if(server == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "UNKNOWN -- %s", server_name); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + ret = check_flags(client, client_name, server, server_name, TRUE); + if(ret) + goto out; + + memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et)); + memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek)); + + if(req->padata){ + int i = 0; + PA_DATA *pa; + int found_pa = 0; + kdc_log(5, "Looking for pa-data -- %s", client_name); + while((pa = find_padata(req, &i, pa_enc_timestamp))){ + krb5_data ts_data; + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + time_t patime; + size_t len; + EncryptedData enc_data; + Key *pa_key; + + found_pa = 1; + + ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data, + pa->padata_value.length, + &enc_data, + &len); + if (ret) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log(5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s", + client_name); + goto out; + } + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, client, enc_data.etype, &pa_key); + if(ret){ + char *estr; + e_text = "No key matches pa-data"; + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr)) + estr = NULL; + if(estr == NULL) + kdc_log(5, "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s", + enc_data.etype, client_name); + else + kdc_log(5, "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s", + estr, client_name); + free(estr); + + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + continue; + } + + krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, + &enc_data, + &ts_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + free_EncryptedData(&enc_data); + if(ret){ + e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA"; + kdc_log (5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s", + client_name); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + continue; + } + ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data, + ts_data.length, + &p, + &len); + krb5_data_free(&ts_data); + if(ret){ + e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC"; + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + kdc_log (5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s", + client_name); + continue; + } + patime = p.patimestamp; + free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p); + if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED; + e_text = "Too large time skew"; + kdc_log(0, "Too large time skew -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + et.flags.pre_authent = 1; + kdc_log(2, "Pre-authentication succeded -- %s", client_name); + break; + } + if(found_pa == 0 && require_preauth) + goto use_pa; + /* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there + was some problem with it, other than too large skew */ + if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){ + kdc_log(0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name); + e_text = NULL; + goto out; + } + }else if (require_preauth || client->flags.require_preauth || server->flags.require_preauth) { + METHOD_DATA method_data; + PA_DATA *pa; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + krb5_data foo_data; + + use_pa: + method_data.len = 0; + method_data.val = NULL; + + ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data); + pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1]; + pa->padata_type = pa_enc_timestamp; + pa->padata_value.length = 0; + pa->padata_value.data = NULL; + + ret = get_pa_etype_info(&method_data, client); /* XXX check ret */ + + len = length_METHOD_DATA(&method_data); + buf = malloc(len); + encode_METHOD_DATA(buf + len - 1, + len, + &method_data, + &len); + free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data); + foo_data.length = len; + foo_data.data = buf; + + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP", + &foo_data, + client_princ, + server_princ, + 0, + reply); + free(buf); + kdc_log(0, "No PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP -- %s", client_name); + ret = 0; + goto out2; + } + + ret = find_keys(client, server, &ckey, &cetype, &skey, &setype, + b->etype.val, b->etype.len); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server/client has no support for etypes"); + goto out; + } + + { + char *cet; + char *set; + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet); + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set); + kdc_log(5, "Using %s/%s", cet, set); + free(cet); + free(set); + } + + + memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + rep.pvno = 5; + rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep; + copy_Realm(&b->realm, &rep.crealm); + copy_PrincipalName(b->cname, &rep.cname); + rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; + copy_Realm(&b->realm, &rep.ticket.realm); + copy_PrincipalName(b->sname, &rep.ticket.sname); + + { + char str[128]; + unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(f), KDCOptions_units, str, sizeof(str)); + if(*str) + kdc_log(2, "Requested flags: %s", str); + } + + if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey || + f.request_anonymous){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + kdc_log(0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + + et.flags.initial = 1; + if(client->flags.forwardable && server->flags.forwardable) + et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable; + else if (f.forwardable) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + if(client->flags.proxiable && server->flags.proxiable) + et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable; + else if (f.proxiable) { + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + if(client->flags.postdate && server->flags.postdate) + et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate; + else if (f.allow_postdate){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + kdc_log(0, "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + + /* check for valid set of addresses */ + if(!check_addresses(b->addresses, from_addr)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + kdc_log(0, "Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name); + goto out; + } + + krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, setype, &et.key); + copy_PrincipalName(b->cname, &et.cname); + copy_Realm(&b->realm, &et.crealm); + + { + time_t start; + time_t t; + + start = et.authtime = kdc_time; + + if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){ + ALLOC(et.starttime); + start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from; + et.flags.invalid = 1; + et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */ + } + fix_time(&b->till); + t = *b->till; + if(client->max_life) + t = min(t, start + *client->max_life); + if(server->max_life) + t = min(t, start + *server->max_life); +#if 0 + t = min(t, start + realm->max_life); +#endif + et.endtime = t; + if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){ + f.renewable = 1; + if(b->rtime == NULL){ + ALLOC(b->rtime); + *b->rtime = 0; + } + if(*b->rtime < *b->till) + *b->rtime = *b->till; + } + if(f.renewable && b->rtime){ + t = *b->rtime; + if(t == 0) + t = MAX_TIME; + if(client->max_renew) + t = min(t, start + *client->max_renew); + if(server->max_renew) + t = min(t, start + *server->max_renew); +#if 0 + t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew); +#endif + ALLOC(et.renew_till); + *et.renew_till = t; + et.flags.renewable = 1; + } + } + + if(b->addresses){ + ALLOC(et.caddr); + copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr); + } + + { + krb5_data empty_string; + + krb5_data_zero(&empty_string); + et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; + et.transited.contents = empty_string; + } + + copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key); + + /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded + * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus + * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length. + * + * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req + * + * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that, + * otherwise just a dummy lr. + */ + ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val)); + ek.last_req.len = 0; + if (client->pw_end + && (kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0 + || kdc_time + kdc_warn_pwexpire <= *client->pw_end)) { + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = 6; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->pw_end; + ++ek.last_req.len; + } + if (client->valid_end) { + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = 7; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->valid_end; + ++ek.last_req.len; + } + if (ek.last_req.len == 0) { + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = 0; + ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0; + ++ek.last_req.len; + } + ek.nonce = b->nonce; + if (client->valid_end || client->pw_end) { + ALLOC(ek.key_expiration); + if (client->valid_end) { + if (client->pw_end) + *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->valid_end, *client->pw_end); + else + *ek.key_expiration = *client->valid_end; + } else + *ek.key_expiration = *client->pw_end; + } else + ek.key_expiration = NULL; + ek.flags = et.flags; + ek.authtime = et.authtime; + if (et.starttime) { + ALLOC(ek.starttime); + *ek.starttime = *et.starttime; + } + ek.endtime = et.endtime; + if (et.renew_till) { + ALLOC(ek.renew_till); + *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till; + } + copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm); + copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname); + if(et.caddr){ + ALLOC(ek.caddr); + copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr); + } + + set_salt_padata (&rep.padata, ckey->salt); + ret = encode_reply(&rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->kvno, &skey->key, + client->kvno, &ckey->key, reply); + free_EncTicketPart(&et); + free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek); + free_AS_REP(&rep); +out: + if(ret){ + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + e_text, + NULL, + client_princ, + server_princ, + 0, + reply); + ret = 0; + } +out2: + krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ); + free(client_name); + krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ); + free(server_name); + if(client){ + hdb_free_entry(context, client); + free(client); + } + if(server){ + hdb_free_entry(context, server); + free(server); + } + + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +check_tgs_flags(KDC_REQ_BODY *b, EncTicketPart *tgt, EncTicketPart *et) +{ + KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options; + + if(f.validate){ + if(!tgt->flags.invalid || tgt->starttime == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request to validate ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + if(*tgt->starttime > kdc_time){ + kdc_log(0, "Early request to validate ticket"); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV; + } + /* XXX tkt = tgt */ + et->flags.invalid = 0; + }else if(tgt->flags.invalid){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket-granting ticket has INVALID flag set"); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID; + } + + if(f.forwardable){ + if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for forwardable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.forwardable = 1; + } + if(f.forwarded){ + if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to forward non-forwardable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.forwarded = 1; + et->caddr = b->addresses; + } + if(tgt->flags.forwarded) + et->flags.forwarded = 1; + + if(f.proxiable){ + if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for proxiable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.proxiable = 1; + } + if(f.proxy){ + if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to proxy non-proxiable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.proxy = 1; + et->caddr = b->addresses; + } + if(tgt->flags.proxy) + et->flags.proxy = 1; + + if(f.allow_postdate){ + if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for post-datable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.may_postdate = 1; + } + if(f.postdated){ + if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for postdated ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + if(b->from) + *et->starttime = *b->from; + et->flags.postdated = 1; + et->flags.invalid = 1; + }else if(b->from && *b->from > kdc_time + context->max_skew){ + kdc_log(0, "Ticket cannot be postdated"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE; + } + + if(f.renewable){ + if(!tgt->flags.renewable){ + kdc_log(0, "Bad request for renewable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + et->flags.renewable = 1; + ALLOC(et->renew_till); + fix_time(&b->rtime); + *et->renew_till = *b->rtime; + } + if(f.renew){ + time_t old_life; + if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Request to renew non-renewable ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + old_life = tgt->endtime; + if(tgt->starttime) + old_life -= *tgt->starttime; + else + old_life -= tgt->authtime; + et->endtime = min(*b->till, *et->starttime + old_life); + } + + /* checks for excess flags */ + if(f.request_anonymous){ + kdc_log(0, "Request for anonymous ticket"); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fix_transited_encoding(TransitedEncoding *tr, + const char *client_realm, + const char *server_realm, + const char *tgt_realm) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)){ + char **realms = NULL, **tmp; + int num_realms = 0; + int i; + if(tr->tr_type && tr->contents.length != 0) { + if(tr->tr_type != DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS){ + kdc_log(0, "Unknown transited type: %u", + tr->tr_type); + return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; + } + ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(tr->contents, + &realms, + &num_realms, + client_realm, + server_realm); + if(ret){ + krb5_warn(context, ret, "Decoding transited encoding"); + return ret; + } + } + tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms)); + if(tmp == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + goto free_realms; + } + realms = tmp; + realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm); + if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + goto free_realms; + } + num_realms++; + free_TransitedEncoding(tr); + tr->tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; + ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &tr->contents); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding"); + free_realms: + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) + free(realms[i]); + free(realms); + } + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +tgs_make_reply(KDC_REQ_BODY *b, + EncTicketPart *tgt, + EncTicketPart *adtkt, + AuthorizationData *auth_data, + hdb_entry *server, + hdb_entry *client, + krb5_principal client_principal, + hdb_entry *krbtgt, + krb5_enctype cetype, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + KDC_REP rep; + EncKDCRepPart ek; + EncTicketPart et; + KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_enctype etype; + Key *skey; + EncryptionKey *ekey; + + if(adtkt) { + int i; + krb5_keytype kt; + ekey = &adtkt->key; + for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_enctype_to_keytype(context, b->etype.val[i], &kt); + if(ret) + continue; + if(adtkt->key.keytype == kt) + break; + } + if(i == b->etype.len) + return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + etype = b->etype.val[i]; + }else{ + ret = find_keys(NULL, server, NULL, NULL, &skey, &etype, + b->etype.val, b->etype.len); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Server has no support for etypes"); + return ret; + } + ekey = &skey->key; + } + + memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et)); + memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek)); + + rep.pvno = 5; + rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep; + + et.authtime = tgt->authtime; + fix_time(&b->till); + et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till); + ALLOC(et.starttime); + *et.starttime = kdc_time; + + ret = check_tgs_flags(b, tgt, &et); + if(ret) + return ret; + + copy_TransitedEncoding(&tgt->transited, &et.transited); + ret = fix_transited_encoding(&et.transited, + *krb5_princ_realm(context, client_principal), + *krb5_princ_realm(context, server->principal), + *krb5_princ_realm(context, krbtgt->principal)); + if(ret){ + free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited); + return ret; + } + + + copy_Realm(krb5_princ_realm(context, server->principal), + &rep.ticket.realm); + krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server->principal); + copy_Realm(&tgt->crealm, &rep.crealm); + copy_PrincipalName(&tgt->cname, &rep.cname); + rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; + + ek.caddr = et.caddr; + if(et.caddr == NULL) + et.caddr = tgt->caddr; + + { + time_t life; + life = et.endtime - *et.starttime; + if(client && client->max_life) + life = min(life, *client->max_life); + if(server->max_life) + life = min(life, *server->max_life); + et.endtime = *et.starttime + life; + } + if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable && + et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till){ + et.flags.renewable = 1; + ALLOC(et.renew_till); + *et.renew_till = *b->till; + } + if(et.renew_till){ + time_t renew; + renew = *et.renew_till - et.authtime; + if(client && client->max_renew) + renew = min(renew, *client->max_renew); + if(server->max_renew) + renew = min(renew, *server->max_renew); + *et.renew_till = et.authtime + renew; + } + + if(et.renew_till){ + *et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till); + *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till); + et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till); + } + + *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime); + + if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID; + goto out; + } + if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){ + free(et.renew_till); + et.renew_till = NULL; + et.flags.renewable = 0; + } + + et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent; + et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent; + + /* XXX Check enc-authorization-data */ + et.authorization_data = auth_data; + + krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &et.key); + et.crealm = tgt->crealm; + et.cname = tgt->cname; + + ek.key = et.key; + /* MIT must have at least one last_req */ + ek.last_req.len = 1; + ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val)); + ek.nonce = b->nonce; + ek.flags = et.flags; + ek.authtime = et.authtime; + ek.starttime = et.starttime; + ek.endtime = et.endtime; + ek.renew_till = et.renew_till; + ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm; + ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname; + + /* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following + encryption should come from. What we have is a session + key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes + *for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible + etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look + at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt + session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say) + CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the + etype list, even if we don't want a session key with + DES3? */ + ret = encode_reply(&rep, &et, &ek, etype, adtkt ? 0 : server->kvno, ekey, + 0, &tgt->key, reply); +out: + free_TGS_REP(&rep); + free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited); + if(et.starttime) + free(et.starttime); + if(et.renew_till) + free(et.renew_till); + free_LastReq(&ek.last_req); + memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length); + free_EncryptionKey(&et.key); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +tgs_check_authenticator(krb5_auth_context ac, + KDC_REQ_BODY *b, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_authenticator auth; + size_t len; + unsigned char buf[8192]; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_auth_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth); + if(auth->cksum == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "No authenticator in request"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; + goto out; + } + /* + * according to RFC1510 it doesn't need to be keyed, + * but according to the latest draft it needs to. + */ + if ( +#if 0 +!krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype) + || +#endif + !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)) { + kdc_log(0, "Bad checksum type in authenticator: %d", + auth->cksum->cksumtype); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; + goto out; + } + + /* XXX should not re-encode this */ + ret = encode_KDC_REQ_BODY(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + b, &len); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to encode KDC-REQ-BODY: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + auth->cksum); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to verify checksum: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + } +out: + free_Authenticator(auth); + free(auth); + return ret; +} + +static Realm +is_krbtgt(PrincipalName *p) +{ + if(p->name_string.len == 2 && strcmp(p->name_string.val[0], "krbtgt") == 0) + return p->name_string.val[1]; + else + return NULL; +} + +static Realm +find_rpath(Realm r) +{ + const char *new_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "capath", + r, + NULL); + return (Realm)new_realm; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +tgs_rep2(KDC_REQ_BODY *b, + PA_DATA *tgs_req, + krb5_data *reply, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *from_addr) +{ + krb5_ap_req ap_req; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; + krb5_flags ap_req_options; + krb5_flags verify_ap_req_flags; + const char *e_text = NULL; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + hdb_entry *krbtgt = NULL; + EncTicketPart *tgt; + Key *tkey; + krb5_enctype cetype; + krb5_principal cp = NULL; + krb5_principal sp = NULL; + AuthorizationData *auth_data = NULL; + + memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req)); + ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, &tgs_req->padata_value, &ap_req); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decode AP-REQ: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + + if(!is_krbtgt(&ap_req.ticket.sname)){ + /* XXX check for ticket.sname == req.sname */ + kdc_log(0, "PA-DATA is not a ticket-granting ticket"); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + + principalname2krb5_principal(&princ, + ap_req.ticket.sname, + ap_req.ticket.realm); + + krbtgt = db_fetch(princ); + + if(krbtgt == NULL) { + char *p; + krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p); + kdc_log(0, "Ticket-granting ticket not found in database: %s", p); + free(p); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US; + goto out2; + } + + if(ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno && + *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno != krbtgt->kvno){ + char *p; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, princ, &p); + kdc_log(0, "Ticket kvno = %d, DB kvno = %d (%s)", + *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno, + krbtgt->kvno, + p); + free (p); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER; + goto out2; + } + + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, krbtgt, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &tkey); + if(ret){ + char *str; + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &str); + kdc_log(0, "No server key found for %s", str); + free(str); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER; + goto out2; + } + + if (b->kdc_options.validate) + verify_ap_req_flags = KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID; + else + verify_ap_req_flags = 0; + + ret = krb5_verify_ap_req(context, + &ac, + &ap_req, + princ, + &tkey->key, + verify_ap_req_flags, + &ap_req_options, + &ticket); + + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to verify AP-REQ: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + + cetype = ap_req.authenticator.etype; + + tgt = &ticket->ticket; + + ret = tgs_check_authenticator(ac, b, &tgt->key); + + if (b->enc_authorization_data) { + krb5_keyblock *subkey; + krb5_data ad; + ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, + ac, + &subkey); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to get remote subkey: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + if(subkey == NULL){ + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &subkey); + if(ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to get session key: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + } + if(subkey == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to get key for enc-authorization-data"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + krb5_crypto_init(context, subkey, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY, + b->enc_authorization_data, + &ad); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decrypt enc-authorization-data"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + krb5_free_keyblock(context, subkey); + ALLOC(auth_data); + ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad.data, ad.length, auth_data, NULL); + if(ret){ + free(auth_data); + auth_data = NULL; + kdc_log(0, "Failed to decode authorization data"); + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */ + goto out2; + } + } + + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + + if(ret){ + kdc_log(0, "Failed to verify authenticator: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out2; + } + + { + PrincipalName *s; + Realm r; + char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL; + hdb_entry *server = NULL, *client = NULL; + int loop = 0; + EncTicketPart adtkt; + char opt_str[128]; + + s = b->sname; + r = b->realm; + if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){ + Ticket *t; + hdb_entry *uu; + krb5_principal p; + Key *tkey; + + if(b->additional_tickets == NULL || + b->additional_tickets->len == 0){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */ + kdc_log(0, "No second ticket present in request"); + goto out; + } + t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0]; + if(!is_krbtgt(&t->sname)){ + kdc_log(0, "Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket"); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + goto out2; + } + principalname2krb5_principal(&p, t->sname, t->realm); + uu = db_fetch(p); + krb5_free_principal(context, p); + if(uu == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, uu, t->enc_part.etype, &tkey); + if(ret){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &tkey->key, &adtkt, 0); + + if(ret) + goto out; + s = &adtkt.cname; + r = adtkt.crealm; + } + + principalname2krb5_principal(&sp, *s, r); + krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn); + principalname2krb5_principal(&cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm); + krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn); + unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), KDCOptions_units, + opt_str, sizeof(opt_str)); + if(*opt_str) + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]", + cpn, from, spn, opt_str); + else + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn); + server_lookup: + server = db_fetch(sp); + + + if(server == NULL){ + Realm req_rlm, new_rlm; + if(loop++ < 2 && (req_rlm = is_krbtgt(&sp->name))){ + new_rlm = find_rpath(req_rlm); + if(new_rlm) { + kdc_log(5, "krbtgt for realm %s not found, trying %s", + req_rlm, new_rlm); + krb5_free_principal(context, sp); + free(spn); + krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, + "krbtgt", new_rlm, NULL); + krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn); + goto server_lookup; + } + } + kdc_log(0, "Server not found in database: %s", spn); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + client = db_fetch(cp); + if(client == NULL) + kdc_log(1, "Client not found in database: %s", cpn); +#if 0 + /* XXX check client only if same realm as krbtgt-instance */ + if(client == NULL){ + kdc_log(0, "Client not found in database: %s", cpn); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } +#endif + + ret = check_flags(client, cpn, server, spn, FALSE); + if(ret) + goto out; + + if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) && + !krb5_principal_compare(context, + krbtgt->principal, + server->principal)){ + kdc_log(0, "Inconsistent request."); + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH; + goto out; + } + + /* check for valid set of addresses */ + if(!check_addresses(tgt->caddr, from_addr)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + kdc_log(0, "Request from wrong address"); + goto out; + } + + ret = tgs_make_reply(b, + tgt, + b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey ? &adtkt : NULL, + auth_data, + server, + client, + cp, + krbtgt, + cetype, + reply); + + out: + free(spn); + free(cpn); + + if(server){ + hdb_free_entry(context, server); + free(server); + } + if(client){ + hdb_free_entry(context, client); + free(client); + } + + } +out2: + if(ret) + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + e_text, + NULL, + cp, + sp, + 0, + reply); + krb5_free_principal(context, cp); + krb5_free_principal(context, sp); + if (ticket) { + krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket); + free(ticket); + } + free_AP_REQ(&ap_req); + if(auth_data){ + free_AuthorizationData(auth_data); + free(auth_data); + } + + if(krbtgt){ + hdb_free_entry(context, krbtgt); + free(krbtgt); + } + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +tgs_rep(KDC_REQ *req, + krb5_data *data, + const char *from, + struct sockaddr *from_addr) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i = 0; + PA_DATA *tgs_req = NULL; + + if(req->padata == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; /* XXX ??? */ + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-DATA", from); + goto out; + } + + tgs_req = find_padata(req, &i, pa_tgs_req); + + if(tgs_req == NULL){ + ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP; + + kdc_log(0, "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-TGS-REQ", from); + goto out; + } + ret = tgs_rep2(&req->req_body, tgs_req, data, from, from_addr); +out: + if(ret && data->data == NULL){ + krb5_mk_error(context, + ret, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + 0, + data); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.8 b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9a7502 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.8 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.\" $Id: kstash.8,v 1.2 2000/01/08 10:57:31 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Aug 27, 1997 +.Dt KSTASH 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kstash +.Nd +Store the KDC master password in a file +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl k Ar file +.Op Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +allows you to the master password and store in a file that will be read +by the KDC. +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl k Ar file +.It Fl -key-file= Ns Ar file +Specify what file the master key is stored in. The default is +.Pa m-key . +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kdc 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b79fd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/kstash.c @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "headers.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kstash.c,v 1.10 1999/11/13 04:14:17 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_context context; + +char *keyfile = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; +char *v4_keyfile; +int convert_flag; +int help_flag; +int version_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "key-file", 'k', arg_string, &keyfile, "master key file", "file" }, + { "version4-key-file", '4', arg_string, &v4_keyfile, + "kerberos 4 master key file", "file" }, + { "convert-file", 0, arg_flag, &convert_flag, + "convert keytype of keyfile" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +write_keyfile(EncryptionKey key) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[1024]; + size_t len; + +#ifdef HAVE_UMASK + umask(077); +#endif + + f = fopen(keyfile, "w"); + if(f == NULL) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "%s", keyfile); + encode_EncryptionKey((unsigned char *)buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, + sizeof(buf), &key, &len); + fwrite(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, 1, f); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + if(ferror(f)) { + int e = errno; + unlink(keyfile); + krb5_err(context, 1, e, "%s", keyfile); + } + fclose(f); + chmod(keyfile, 0400); +} + +static int +convert_file(void) +{ + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + char *fn; + size_t len; + EncryptionKey key; + krb5_error_code ret; + + f = fopen(keyfile, "r"); + if(f == NULL) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "%s", keyfile); + return 1; + } + len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); + if(ferror(f)) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "fread"); + ret = 1; + goto out1; + } + fclose(f); + ret = decode_EncryptionKey(buf, len, &key, &len); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "decode_EncryptionKey"); + goto out2; + } + if(key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES) + key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + else if(key.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) { + krb5_warnx(context, "keyfile already converted"); + ret = 0; + goto out2; + } else { + krb5_warnx(context, "bad encryption key type (%d)", key.keytype); + ret = 1; + goto out2; + } + asprintf(&fn, "%s.old", keyfile); + if(fn == NULL) { + krb5_warn(context, ENOMEM, "malloc"); + ret = 1; + goto out1; + } + if(rename(keyfile, fn) < 0) { + krb5_warn(context, errno, "rename"); + ret = 1; + goto out1; + } + write_keyfile(key); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + return 0; +out1: + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + return ret ? 1 : 0; +out2: + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + return ret ? 1 : 0; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char buf[1024]; + EncryptionKey key; + FILE *f; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(convert_flag) + exit(convert_file()); + + key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; /* XXX */ + if(v4_keyfile) { + f = fopen(v4_keyfile, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "fopen(%s)", v4_keyfile); + key.keyvalue.length = sizeof(des_cblock); + key.keyvalue.data = malloc(key.keyvalue.length); + fread(key.keyvalue.data, 1, key.keyvalue.length, f); + fclose(f); + } else { + krb5_salt salt; + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + /* XXX better value? */ + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + if(des_read_pw_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "Master key: ", 1)) + exit(1); + krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, key.keytype, buf, salt, &key); + } + + write_keyfile(key); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/log.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddbdbee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: log.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_log_facility *logf; + +void +kdc_openlog(krb5_config_section *cf) +{ + char **s = NULL, **p; + krb5_initlog(context, "kdc", &logf); + if(cf) + s = krb5_config_get_strings(context, cf, "kdc", "logging", NULL); + + if(s == NULL) + s = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "logging", "kdc", NULL); + if(s){ + for(p = s; *p; p++) + krb5_addlog_dest(context, logf, *p); + krb5_config_free_strings(s); + }else + krb5_addlog_dest(context, logf, "0-1/FILE:" HDB_DB_DIR "/kdc.log"); + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, logf); +} + +char* +kdc_log_msg_va(int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *msg; + krb5_vlog_msg(context, logf, &msg, level, fmt, ap); + return msg; +} + +char* +kdc_log_msg(int level, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *s; + va_start(ap, fmt); + s = kdc_log_msg_va(level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return s; +} + +void +kdc_log(int level, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *s; + va_start(ap, fmt); + s = kdc_log_msg_va(level, fmt, ap); + if(s) free(s); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/main.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46d7aba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.21 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +sig_atomic_t exit_flag = 0; +krb5_context context; + +static RETSIGTYPE +sigterm(int sig) +{ + exit_flag = 1; +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + set_progname(argv[0]); + + krb5_init_context(&context); + + configure(argc, argv); + + if(databases == NULL) { + db = malloc(sizeof(*db)); + num_db = 1; + ret = hdb_create(context, &db[0], NULL); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create %s", HDB_DEFAULT_DB); + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile(context, db[0], NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + } else { + struct dbinfo *d; + int i; + /* count databases */ + for(d = databases, i = 0; d; d = d->next, i++); + db = malloc(i * sizeof(*db)); + for(d = databases, num_db = 0; d; d = d->next, num_db++) { + ret = hdb_create(context, &db[num_db], d->dbname); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create %s", d->dbname); + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile(context, db[num_db], d->mkey_file); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_keyfile"); + } + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + { + struct sigaction sa; + + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = sigterm; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + + sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); + } +#else + signal(SIGINT, sigterm); +#endif + loop(); + krb5_free_context(context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/misc.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e476ebc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kdc_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: misc.c,v 1.18 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +struct timeval now; + +hdb_entry* +db_fetch(krb5_principal principal) +{ + hdb_entry *ent; + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + ALLOC(ent); + ent->principal = principal; + + for(i = 0; i < num_db; i++) { + ret = db[i]->open(context, db[i], O_RDONLY, 0); + if (ret) { + kdc_log(0, "Failed to open database: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + continue; + } + ret = db[i]->fetch(context, db[i], HDB_F_DECRYPT, ent); + db[i]->close(context, db[i]); + if(ret == 0) + return ent; + } + free(ent); + return NULL; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/rx.h b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/rx.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab8ec805 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/rx.h @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: rx.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __RX_H__ +#define __RX_H__ + +/* header of a RPC packet */ + +enum rx_header_type { + HT_DATA = 1, + HT_ACK = 2, + HT_BUSY = 3, + HT_ABORT = 4, + HT_ACKALL = 5, + HT_CHAL = 6, + HT_RESP = 7, + HT_DEBUG = 8 +}; + +/* For flags in header */ + +enum rx_header_flag { + HF_CLIENT_INITIATED = 1, + HF_REQ_ACK = 2, + HF_LAST = 4, + HF_MORE = 8 +}; + +struct rx_header { + u_int32_t epoch; + u_int32_t connid; /* And channel ID */ + u_int32_t callid; + u_int32_t seqno; + u_int32_t serialno; + u_char type; + u_char flags; + u_char status; + u_char secindex; + u_int16_t reserved; /* ??? verifier? */ + u_int16_t serviceid; +/* This should be the other way around according to everything but */ +/* tcpdump */ +}; + +#define RX_HEADER_SIZE 28 + +#endif /* __RX_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kdc/string2key.c b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/string2key.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0cc871 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kdc/string2key.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "headers.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: string2key.c,v 1.18 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +int version5; +int version4; +int afs; +char *principal; +char *cell; +char *password; +char *keytype_str = "des-cbc-md5"; +int version; +int help; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version5", '5', arg_flag, &version5, "Output Kerberos v5 string-to-key" }, + { "version4", '4', arg_flag, &version4, "Output Kerberos v4 string-to-key" }, + { "afs", 'a', arg_flag, &afs, "Output AFS string-to-key" }, + { "cell", 'c', arg_string, &cell, "AFS cell to use", "cell" }, + { "password", 'w', arg_string, &password, "Password to use", "password" }, + { "principal",'p', arg_string, &principal, "Kerberos v5 principal to use", "principal" }, + { "keytype", 'k', arg_string, &keytype_str, "Keytype" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version, "print version" }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help, NULL } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int status) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, "password"); + exit(status); +} + +static void +tokey(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_salt salt, + const char *label) +{ + int i; + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, enctype, password, salt, &key); + printf("%s: ", label); + for(i = 0; i < key.keyvalue.length; i++) + printf("%02x", ((unsigned char*)key.keyvalue.data)[i]); + printf("\n"); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_salt salt; + int optind; + char buf[1024]; + krb5_enctype etype; + krb5_error_code ret; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help) + usage(0); + + if(version){ + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage(1); + + if(!version5 && !version4 && !afs) + version5 = 1; + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, keytype_str, &etype); +#if 0 + if(ret) { + krb5_keytype keytype; + ret = krb5_string_to_keytype(context, keytype_str, &keytype); + ret = krb5_keytype_to_enctype(context, keytype, &etype); + } +#endif + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", keytype_str); + + if((etype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC && + etype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 && + etype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) && + (afs || version4)) + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "DES is the only valid keytype for AFS and Kerberos 4"); + + + if(version5 && principal == NULL){ + printf("Kerberos v5 principal: "); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + principal = estrdup(buf); + } + if(afs && cell == NULL){ + printf("AFS cell: "); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + cell = estrdup(buf); + } + if(argv[0]) + password = argv[0]; + if(password == NULL){ + if(des_read_pw_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "Password: ", 0)) + return 1; + password = buf; + } + + if(version5){ + krb5_parse_name(context, principal, &princ); + krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ, &salt); + tokey(context, etype, password, salt, "Kerberos v5 key"); + krb5_free_salt(context, salt); + } + if(version4){ + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + tokey(context, ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, password, salt, "Kerberos v4 key"); + } + if(afs){ + salt.salttype = KRB5_AFS3_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.length = strlen(cell); + salt.saltvalue.data = cell; + tokey(context, ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, password, salt, "AFS key"); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fba61e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.11 1999/04/20 16:48:34 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +man_MANS = kpasswd.1 kpasswdd.8 + +bin_PROGRAMS = kpasswd + +kpasswd_SOURCES = kpasswd.c kpasswd_locl.h + +libexec_PROGRAMS = kpasswdd + +kpasswdd_SOURCES = kpasswdd.c kpasswd_locl.h + +kpasswdd_LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/kadm5/libkadm5srv.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(LDADD) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) \ + $(DBLIB) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11e169b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,758 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.11 1999/04/20 16:48:34 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ 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in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cbc83b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.1 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +.\" $Id: kpasswd.1,v 1.1 1997/08/27 23:44:08 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dt Aug 27, 1997 +.Dt KPASSWD 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kpasswd +.Nd +Kerberos 5 password changing program +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Ar principal +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is the client for changing passwords. +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +If the password quality check fails or some other error occurs, an +explanation is printed. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kpasswdd 8 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.c b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eecea78 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd.c @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kpasswd_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kpasswd.c,v 1.20 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[principal]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_principal principal; + int optind = 0; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_creds cred; + int result_code; + krb5_data result_code_string, result_string; + char pwbuf[BUFSIZ]; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, + args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), NULL); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version (NULL); + exit(0); + } + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&opt, 300); + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage(1); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + + if(argv[0]) { + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, argv[0], &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + } else + principal = NULL; + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + NULL, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + "kadmin/changepw", + &opt); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + break; + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR : + return 1; + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY : + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED : + krb5_errx(context, 1, "Password incorrect"); + break; + default: + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + } + + krb5_data_zero (&result_code_string); + krb5_data_zero (&result_string); + + if(des_read_pw_string (pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), "New password: ", 1) != 0) + return 1; + + ret = krb5_change_password (context, &cred, pwbuf, + &result_code, + &result_code_string, + &result_string); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_change_password"); + + printf ("Reply from server: %.*s\n", (int)result_string.length, + (char *)result_string.data); + + krb5_data_free (&result_code_string); + krb5_data_free (&result_string); + + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + krb5_free_context (context); + return result_code; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e05489 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswd_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kpasswd_locl.h,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KPASSWD_LOCL_H__ +#define __KPASSWD_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#endif /* __KPASSWD_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4db441 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +.\" $Id: kpasswdd.8,v 1.2 1999/04/19 16:32:01 joda Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 19, 1999 +.Dt KPASSWDD 8 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kpasswdd +.Nd +Kerberos 5 password changing server +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl -check-library= Ns Ar library +.Op Fl -check-function= Ns Ar function +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +serves request for password changes. It listens on UDP port 464 +(service kpasswd) and processes requests when they arrive. It changes +the database directly and should thus only run on the master KDC. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl -check-library= Ns Ar library +.Xc +If your system has support for dynamic loading of shared libraries, +you can use an external function to check password quality. This +option specifies which library to load. +.It Xo +.Fl -check-function= Ns Ar function +.Xc +This is the function to call in the loaded library. The function +should look like this: +.Pp +.Ft const char * +.Fn passwd_check "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" "krb5_data *password" +.Pp +.Fa context +is an initialized context; +.Fa principal +is the one who tries to change passwords, and +.Fa password +is the new password. Note that the password (in +.Fa password->data ) +is not zero terminated. +.El +.Sh DIAGNOSTICS +If an error occurs, the error message is returned to the user and/or +logged to syslog. +.Sh BUGS +The default password quality checks are too basic. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kdc 8 , +.Xr kpasswd 1 +.\".Sh ENVIRONMENT +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh SEE ALSO +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04b8ea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kpasswd/kpasswdd.c @@ -0,0 +1,634 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kpasswd_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kpasswdd.c,v 1.41 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +static krb5_context context; +static krb5_log_facility *log_facility; + +static sig_atomic_t exit_flag = 0; + +static void +send_reply (int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + krb5_data *ap_rep, + krb5_data *rest) +{ + struct msghdr msghdr; + struct iovec iov[3]; + u_int16_t len, ap_rep_len; + u_char header[6]; + u_char *p; + + if (ap_rep) + ap_rep_len = ap_rep->length; + else + ap_rep_len = 0; + + len = 6 + ap_rep_len + rest->length; + p = header; + *p++ = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = (ap_rep_len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (ap_rep_len >> 0) & 0xFF; + + memset (&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + msghdr.msg_name = (void *)sa; + msghdr.msg_namelen = sa_size; + msghdr.msg_iov = iov; + msghdr.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov)/sizeof(*iov); +#if 0 + msghdr.msg_control = NULL; + msghdr.msg_controllen = 0; +#endif + + iov[0].iov_base = (char *)header; + iov[0].iov_len = 6; + if (ap_rep_len) { + iov[1].iov_base = ap_rep->data; + iov[1].iov_len = ap_rep->length; + } else { + iov[1].iov_base = NULL; + iov[1].iov_len = 0; + } + iov[2].iov_base = rest->data; + iov[2].iov_len = rest->length; + + if (sendmsg (s, &msghdr, 0) < 0) + krb5_warn (context, errno, "sendmsg"); +} + +static int +make_result (krb5_data *data, + u_int16_t result_code, + const char *expl) +{ + krb5_data_zero (data); + + data->length = asprintf ((char **)&data->data, + "%c%c%s", + (result_code >> 8) & 0xFF, + result_code & 0xFF, + expl); + + if (data->data == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "Out of memory generating error reply"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +reply_error (krb5_principal server, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + krb5_error_code error_code, + u_int16_t result_code, + const char *expl) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data error_data; + krb5_data e_data; + + if (make_result(&e_data, result_code, expl)) + return; + + ret = krb5_mk_error (context, + error_code, + NULL, + &e_data, + NULL, + server, + 0, + &error_data); + krb5_data_free (&e_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "Could not even generate error reply"); + return; + } + send_reply (s, sa, sa_size, NULL, &error_data); + krb5_data_free (&error_data); +} + +static void +reply_priv (krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + u_int16_t result_code, + const char *expl) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + krb5_data ap_rep_data; + krb5_data e_data; + + ret = krb5_mk_rep (context, + &auth_context, + &ap_rep_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "Could not even generate error reply"); + return; + } + + if (make_result(&e_data, result_code, expl)) + return; + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, + auth_context, + &e_data, + &krb_priv_data, + NULL); + krb5_data_free (&e_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "Could not even generate error reply"); + return; + } + send_reply (s, sa, sa_size, &ap_rep_data, &krb_priv_data); + krb5_data_free (&ap_rep_data); + krb5_data_free (&krb_priv_data); +} + +/* + * Change the password for `principal', sending the reply back on `s' + * (`sa', `sa_size') to `pwd_data'. + */ + +static void +change (krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_principal principal, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + krb5_data *pwd_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *client; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent; + krb5_key_data *kd; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_keyblock new_keyblock; + const char *pwd_reason; + int unchanged; + kadm5_config_params conf; + void *kadm5_handle; + + memset (&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + + krb5_unparse_name (context, principal, &client); + + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm5_handle); + if (ret) { + free (client); + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + return; + } + + krb5_warnx (context, "Changing password for %s", client); + free (client); + + pwd_reason = kadm5_check_password_quality (context, principal, pwd_data); + if (pwd_reason != NULL ) { + krb5_warnx (context, "%s", pwd_reason); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 4, pwd_reason); + kadm5_destroy (kadm5_handle); + return; + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal (kadm5_handle, + principal, + &ent, + KADM5_KEY_DATA); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_get_principal"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + kadm5_destroy (kadm5_handle); + return; + } + + /* + * Compare with the first key to see if it already has been + * changed. If it hasn't, store the new key in the database and + * string2key all the rest of them. + */ + + kd = &ent.key_data[0]; + + salt.salttype = kd->key_data_type[1]; + salt.saltvalue.length = kd->key_data_length[1]; + salt.saltvalue.data = kd->key_data_contents[1]; + + memset (&new_keyblock, 0, sizeof(new_keyblock)); + krb5_string_to_key_data_salt (context, + kd->key_data_type[0], + *pwd_data, + salt, + &new_keyblock); + + unchanged = new_keyblock.keytype == kd->key_data_type[0] + && new_keyblock.keyvalue.length == kd->key_data_length[0] + && memcmp(new_keyblock.keyvalue.data, + kd->key_data_contents[0], + new_keyblock.keyvalue.length) == 0; + + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &new_keyblock); + + if (unchanged) { + ret = 0; + } else { + char *tmp; + + tmp = malloc (pwd_data->length + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + goto out; + } + memcpy (tmp, pwd_data->data, pwd_data->length); + tmp[pwd_data->length] = '\0'; + + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal (kadm5_handle, + principal, + tmp); + memset (tmp, 0, pwd_data->length); + free (tmp); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_s_chpass_principal"); + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 2, + "Internal error"); + goto out; + } + } + reply_priv (auth_context, s, sa, sa_size, 0, "Password changed"); +out: + kadm5_free_principal_ent (kadm5_handle, &ent); + kadm5_destroy (kadm5_handle); +} + +static int +verify (krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket, + krb5_data *out_data, + int s, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + u_char *msg, + size_t len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int16_t pkt_len, pkt_ver, ap_req_len; + krb5_data ap_req_data; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + + pkt_len = (msg[0] << 8) | (msg[1]); + pkt_ver = (msg[2] << 8) | (msg[3]); + ap_req_len = (msg[4] << 8) | (msg[5]); + if (pkt_len != len) { + krb5_warnx (context, "Strange len: %ld != %ld", + (long)pkt_len, (long)len); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, 0, 1, "Bad request"); + return 1; + } + if (pkt_ver != 0x0001) { + krb5_warnx (context, "Bad version (%d)", pkt_ver); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, 0, 1, "Wrong program version"); + return 1; + } + + ap_req_data.data = msg + 6; + ap_req_data.length = ap_req_len; + + ret = krb5_rd_req (context, + auth_context, + &ap_req_data, + server, + keytab, + NULL, + ticket); + if (ret) { + if(ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { + char *name; + krb5_unparse_name(context, server, &name); + krb5_warnx (context, "krb5_rd_req: %s (%s)", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret), name); + free(name); + } else + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_rd_req"); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, ret, 3, "Authentication failed"); + return 1; + } + + if (!(*ticket)->ticket.flags.initial) { + krb5_warnx (context, "initial flag not set"); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, ret, 1, + "Bad request"); + goto out; + } + krb_priv_data.data = msg + 6 + ap_req_len; + krb_priv_data.length = len - 6 - ap_req_len; + + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, + *auth_context, + &krb_priv_data, + out_data, + NULL); + + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_rd_priv"); + reply_error (server, s, sa, sa_size, ret, 3, "Bad request"); + goto out; + } + return 0; +out: + krb5_free_ticket (context, *ticket); + return 1; +} + +static void +process (krb5_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + int s, + krb5_address *this_addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + u_char *msg, + int len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_data out_data; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + krb5_address other_addr; + + krb5_data_zero (&out_data); + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_auth_con_init"); + return; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setflags (context, auth_context, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE); + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (sa, &other_addr); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_sockaddr2address"); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + this_addr, + &other_addr); + krb5_free_address (context, &other_addr); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_auth_con_setaddr"); + goto out; + } + + if (verify (&auth_context, server, keytab, &ticket, &out_data, + s, sa, sa_size, msg, len) == 0) { + change (auth_context, + ticket->client, + s, + sa, sa_size, + &out_data); + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + free (ticket); + } + +out: + krb5_data_free (&out_data); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); +} + +static int +doit (krb5_keytab keytab, + int port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal server; + int *sockets; + int maxfd; + char *realm; + krb5_addresses addrs; + unsigned n, i; + fd_set real_fdset; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + + ret = krb5_get_default_realm (context, &realm); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_default_realm"); + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &server, + strlen(realm), + realm, + "kadmin", + "changepw", + NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_build_principal"); + + free (realm); + + ret = krb5_get_all_server_addrs (context, &addrs); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_all_server_addrs"); + + n = addrs.len; + + sockets = malloc (n * sizeof(*sockets)); + if (sockets == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "out of memory"); + maxfd = 0; + FD_ZERO(&real_fdset); + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + int sa_size; + + krb5_addr2sockaddr (&addrs.val[i], sa, &sa_size, port); + + + sockets[i] = socket (sa->sa_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (sockets[i] < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket"); + if (bind (sockets[i], sa, sa_size) < 0) { + char str[128]; + size_t len; + ret = krb5_print_address (&addrs.val[i], str, sizeof(str), &len); + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "bind(%s)", str); + } + maxfd = max (maxfd, sockets[i]); + FD_SET(sockets[i], &real_fdset); + } + + while(exit_flag == 0) { + int ret; + fd_set fdset = real_fdset; + + ret = select (maxfd + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "select"); + } + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i], &fdset)) { + u_char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int addrlen = sizeof(__ss); + + ret = recvfrom (sockets[i], buf, sizeof(buf), 0, + sa, &addrlen); + if (ret < 0) { + if(errno == EINTR) + break; + else + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "recvfrom"); + } + + process (server, keytab, sockets[i], + &addrs.val[i], + sa, addrlen, + buf, ret); + } + } + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addrs); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + krb5_free_context (context); + return 0; +} + +static RETSIGTYPE +sigterm(int sig) +{ + exit_flag = 1; +} + +const char *check_library = NULL; +const char *check_function = NULL; +char *keytab_str = "HDB:"; +char *realm_str; +int version_flag; +int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN + { "check-library", 0, arg_string, &check_library, + "library to load password check function from", "library" }, + { "check-function", 0, arg_string, &check_function, + "password check function to load", "function" }, +#endif + { "keytab", 'k', arg_string, &keytab_str, + "keytab to get authentication key from", "kspec" }, + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm_str, "default realm", "realm" }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind; + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_error_code ret; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(realm_str) + krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm_str); + + krb5_openlog (context, "kpasswdd", &log_facility); + krb5_set_warn_dest(context, log_facility); + + ret = krb5_kt_register(context, &hdb_kt_ops); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_register"); + + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &keytab); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", keytab_str); + + kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check (context, check_library, check_function); + +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + { + struct sigaction sa; + + sa.sa_flags = 0; + sa.sa_handler = sigterm; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + + sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); + } +#else + signal(SIGINT, sigterm); +#endif + + return doit (keytab, + krb5_getportbyname (context, "kpasswd", + "udp", KPASSWD_PORT)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/krb5.conf b/crypto/heimdal/krb5.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c9f4c44 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/krb5.conf @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +[libdefaults] + default_realm = MY.REALM + clockskew = 300 + v4_instance_resolve = false + v4_name_convert = { + host = { + rcmd = host + ftp = ftp + } + plain = { + something = something-else + } + } + +[realms] + MY.REALM = { + kdc = MY.COMPUTER + } + OTHER.REALM = { + v4_instance_convert = { + kerberos = kerberos + computer = computer.some.other.domain + } + } +[domain_realm] + .my.domain = MY.REALM diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4faed9a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.25 1999/09/21 05:12:29 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +man_MANS = kinit.1 klist.1 kdestroy.1 kgetcred.1 + +bin_PROGRAMS = kinit kauth klist kdestroy kgetcred + +kinit_SOURCES = kinit.c kinit_options.c + +kauth_SOURCES = kinit.c kauth_options.c + +noinst_PROGRAMS = kverify kdecode_ticket + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(bin_PROGRAMS) + +kauth_LDADD = \ + $(LIB_kafs) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) + +kinit_LDADD = $(kauth_LDADD) + +kdestroy_LDADD = $(kauth_LDADD) + +klist_LDADD = $(kauth_LDADD) + +LDADD = \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06ec4716 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,777 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.25 1999/09/21 05:12:29 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(bin_PROGRAMS) + +man_MANS = kinit.1 klist.1 kdestroy.1 kgetcred.1 + +bin_PROGRAMS = kinit kauth klist kdestroy kgetcred + +kinit_SOURCES = kinit.c kinit_options.c + +kauth_SOURCES = kinit.c kauth_options.c + +noinst_PROGRAMS = kverify kdecode_ticket + +kauth_LDADD = $(LIB_kafs) $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(LIB_krb4) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) + + +kinit_LDADD = $(kauth_LDADD) + +kdestroy_LDADD = $(kauth_LDADD) + +klist_LDADD = $(kauth_LDADD) + +LDADD = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +bin_PROGRAMS = kinit$(EXEEXT) kauth$(EXEEXT) klist$(EXEEXT) \ +kdestroy$(EXEEXT) kgetcred$(EXEEXT) +noinst_PROGRAMS = kverify$(EXEEXT) kdecode_ticket$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +kinit_OBJECTS = kinit.$(OBJEXT) kinit_options.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_TRUE@kinit_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@kinit_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kinit_LDFLAGS = +kauth_OBJECTS = kinit.$(OBJEXT) kauth_options.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_TRUE@kauth_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@kauth_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kauth_LDFLAGS = +klist_SOURCES = klist.c +klist_OBJECTS = klist.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_TRUE@klist_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@klist_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +klist_LDFLAGS = +kdestroy_SOURCES = kdestroy.c +kdestroy_OBJECTS = kdestroy.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_TRUE@kdestroy_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@kdestroy_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kdestroy_LDFLAGS = +kgetcred_SOURCES = kgetcred.c +kgetcred_OBJECTS = kgetcred.$(OBJEXT) +kgetcred_LDADD = $(LDADD) +kgetcred_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kgetcred_LDFLAGS = +kverify_SOURCES = kverify.c +kverify_OBJECTS = kverify.$(OBJEXT) +kverify_LDADD = $(LDADD) +kverify_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kverify_LDFLAGS = +kdecode_ticket_SOURCES = kdecode_ticket.c +kdecode_ticket_OBJECTS = kdecode_ticket.$(OBJEXT) +kdecode_ticket_LDADD = $(LDADD) +kdecode_ticket_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +kdecode_ticket_LDFLAGS = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) 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+check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kauth_options.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kauth_options.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c432d32 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kauth_options.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kauth_options.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +int do_afslog = 1; +int get_v4_tgt = 1; +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd365dc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdecode_ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kdecode_ticket.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:00 joda Exp $"); + +static char *etype_str; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static void +print_and_decode_tkt (krb5_context context, + krb5_data *ticket, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_enctype enctype) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_data dec_data; + size_t len; + EncTicketPart decr_part; + krb5_keyblock key; + Ticket tkt; + + ret = decode_Ticket (ticket->data, ticket->length, &tkt, &len); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "decode_Ticket"); + + ret = krb5_string_to_key (context, enctype, "foo", server, &key); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_string_to_key"); + + krb5_crypto_init(context, &key, 0, &crypto); + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, crypto, KRB5_KU_TICKET, + &tkt.enc_part, &dec_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy (context, crypto); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData"); + ret = krb5_decode_EncTicketPart (context, dec_data.data, dec_data.length, + &decr_part, &len); + krb5_data_free (&dec_data); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_decode_EncTicketPart"); +} + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, &etype_str, + "encryption type to use", "enctype"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "service"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache cache; + krb5_creds in, *out; + int optind = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %u", ret); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_default"); + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + + if (etype_str) { + krb5_enctype enctype; + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, etype_str, &enctype); + if (ret) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "unrecognized enctype: %s", etype_str); + in.session.keytype = enctype; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &in.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &in.server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", argv[0]); + + in.times.endtime = 0; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, cache, &in, &out); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_credentials"); + + print_and_decode_tkt (context, &out->ticket, out->server, + out->session.keytype); + + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, out); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.1 b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18c5320 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.1 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +.\" $Id: kdestroy.1,v 1.2 1999/05/14 14:05:40 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Aug 27, 1997 +.Dt KDESTROY 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kdestroy +.Nd +destroy the current ticket file +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl c Ar cachefile +.Op Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachefile +.Op Fl -no-unlog +.Op Fl -no-delete-v4 +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +remove the current set of tickets. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl c Ar cachefile +.It Fl cache= Ns Ar cachefile +The cache file to remove. +.It Fl -no-unlog +Do not remove AFS tokens. +.It Fl -no-delete-v4 +Do not remove v4 tickets. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr klist 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..632d02e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kdestroy.c @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kdestroy.c,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static const char *cache; +static int help_flag; +static int version_flag; +static int unlog_flag = 1; +static int dest_tkt_flag = 1; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "cache", 'c', arg_string, &cache, "cache to destroy", "cache" }, + { "unlog", 0, arg_negative_flag, &unlog_flag, + "do not destroy tokens", NULL }, + { "delete-v4", 0, arg_negative_flag, &dest_tkt_flag, + "do not destroy v4 tickets", NULL }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, NULL, NULL }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, NULL} +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage (int status) +{ + arg_printusage (args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit (status); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + int optind = 0; + int exit_val = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_init_context: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + + if(cache == NULL) + cache = krb5_cc_default_name(context); + + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, + cache, + &ccache); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_destroy (context, ccache); + if (ret) { + warnx ("krb5_cc_destroy: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + exit_val = 1; + } + } else { + warnx ("krb5_cc_resolve(%s): %s", cache, + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + exit_val = 1; + } + + krb5_free_context (context); + +#if KRB4 + if(dest_tkt_flag && dest_tkt ()) + exit_val = 1; + if (unlog_flag && k_hasafs ()) { + if (k_unlog ()) + exit_val = 1; + } +#endif + + return exit_val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.1 b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0dbbbff --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.1 @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +.\" $Id: kgetcred.1,v 1.2 1999/05/13 22:26:35 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 14, 1999 +.Dt KGETCRED 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kgetcred +.Nd +get a ticket for a particular service +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Oo Fl e Ar enctype \*(Ba Xo +.Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype Oc +.Xc +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Ar service +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +obtains a ticket for a service. +Usually tickets for services are obtained automatically when needed +but sometimes for some odd reason you want to obtain a particular +ticket or of a special type. +.Pp +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl e Ar enctype Ns , +.Fl -enctype= Ns Ar enctype +.Xc +encryption type to use +.It Xo +.Fl -version +.Xc +.It Xo +.Fl -help +.Xc +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr klist 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..644e69e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kgetcred.c @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kgetcred.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static char *etype_str; +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "enctype", 'e', arg_string, &etype_str, + "encryption type to use", "enctype"}, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "service"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache cache; + krb5_creds in, *out; + int optind = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %u", ret); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 1) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_default"); + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + + if (etype_str) { + krb5_enctype enctype; + + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, etype_str, &enctype); + if (ret) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "unrecognized enctype: %s", etype_str); + in.session.keytype = enctype; + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &in.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[0], &in.server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", argv[0]); + + in.times.endtime = 0; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, cache, &in, &out); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_credentials"); + + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, out); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.1 b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d779365 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.1 @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +.\" $Id: kinit.1,v 1.3 1999/05/14 14:02:49 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 29, 1998 +.Dt KAUTH 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm kauth +.Nd +acquire initial tickets +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl 4 +.Op Fl -524init +.Op Fl -afslog +.Op Fl c Ar cachename +.Op Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachename +.Op Fl c Ar cachename +.Op Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachename +.Op Fl f +.Op Fl -forwardable +.Op Fl t Ar keytabname +.Op Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytabname +.Op Fl l Ar seconds +.Op Fl -lifetime= Ns Ar seconds +.Op Fl p +.Op Fl -proxiable +.Op Fl R +.Op Fl -renew +.Op Fl -renewable +.Op Fl r Ar seconds +.Op Fl -renewable-life= Ns Ar seconds +.Op Fl S Ar principal +.Op Fl -server= Ns Ar principal +.Op Fl s Ar seconds +.Op Fl -start-time= Ns Ar seconds +.Op Fl k +.Op Fl -use-keytab +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl -validate +.Op Fl e +.Op Fl -enctypes= Ns Ar enctypes +.Op Fl -fcache-version= Ns Ar version +.Op Fl -noaddresses +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Op Ar principal +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is used to authenticate to the kerberos server as +.Ar principal , +or if none is given, a system generated default, and acquire a ticket +granting ticket that can later be used to obtain tickets for other +services. +Supported options: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl c Ar cachename +.Fl -cache= Ns Ar cachename +.Xc +The credentials cache to put the acquired ticket in, if other than +default. +.It Xo +.Fl f Ns , +.Fl -forwardable +.Xc +Get ticket that can be forwarded to another host. +.It Xo +.Fl t Ar keytabname Ns , +.Fl -keytab= Ns Ar keytabname +.Xc +Don't ask for a password, but instead get the key from the specified +keytab. +.It Xo +.Fl l Ar seconds Ns , +.Fl -lifetime= Ns Ar seconds +.Xc +Specifies the lifetime of the ticket. +.It Xo +.Fl p Ns , +.Fl -proxiable +.Xc +Request tickets with the proxiable flag set. +.It Xo +.Fl R Ns , +.Fl -renew +.Xc +Try to renew ticket. The ticket must have the +.Sq renewable +flag set, and must not be expired. +.It Fl -renewable +The same as +.Fl -renewable-life , +with an infinite time. +.It Xo +.Fl r Ar seconds Ns , +.Fl -renewable-life= Ns Ar seconds +.Xc +The max renewable ticket life. +.It Xo +.Fl S Ar principal Ns , +.Fl -server= Ns Ar principal +.Xc +Get a ticket for a service other than krbtgt/LOCAL.REALM. +.It Xo +.Fl s Ar seconds Ns , +.Fl -start-time= Ns Ar seconds +.Xc +Start time of ticket, if other than the current time. +.It Xo +.Fl k Ns , +.Fl -use-keytab +.Xc +The same as +.Fl -keytab , +but with the default keytab name (normally +.Ar FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab ) . +.It Xo +.Fl v Ns , +.Fl -validate +.Xc +Try to validate an invalid ticket. +.It Xo +.Fl e , +.Fl -enctypes= Ns Ar enctypes +.Xc +Request tickets with this particular enctype. +.It Xo +.Fl -fcache-version= Ns Ar version +.Xc +Create a credentials cache of version +.Nm version . +.It Xo +.Fl -noaddresses +.Xc +Request a ticket with no addresses. +.El + +The following options are only available if +.Nm +has been compiled with support for Kerberos 4. +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl 4 Ns , +.Fl -524init +.Xc +Try to convert the obtained krbtgt to a version 4 compatible +ticket. It will store this ticket in the default Kerberos 4 ticket +file. +.It Fl -afslog +Gets AFS tickets, converts them to version 4 format, and stores them +in the kernel. Only useful if you have AFS. +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev KRB5CCNAME +Specifies the default cache file. +.It Ev KRB5_CONFIG +The directory where the +.Pa krb5.conf +can be found, default is +.Pa /etc . +.It Ev KRBTKFILE +Specifies the Kerberos 4 ticket file to store version 4 tickets in. +.El +.\".Sh FILES +.\".Sh EXAMPLES +.\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5.conf 5 , +.Xr klist 1 , +.Xr kdestroy 1 +.\".Sh STANDARDS +.\".Sh HISTORY +.\".Sh AUTHORS +.\".Sh BUGS diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..328a334 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit.c @@ -0,0 +1,391 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kinit.c,v 1.59 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +int forwardable = 0; +int proxiable = 0; +int renewable = 0; +int renew_flag = 0; +int validate_flag = 0; +int version_flag = 0; +int help_flag = 0; +int no_addrs_flag = 0; +char *lifetime = NULL; +char *renew_life = NULL; +char *server = NULL; +char *cred_cache = NULL; +char *start_str = NULL; +struct getarg_strings etype_str; +int use_keytab = 0; +char *keytab_str = NULL; +#ifdef KRB4 +extern int do_afslog; +extern int get_v4_tgt; +#endif +int fcache_version; + +struct getargs args[] = { +#ifdef KRB4 + { "524init", '4', arg_flag, &get_v4_tgt, + "obtain version 4 TGT" }, + + { "afslog", 0 , arg_flag, &do_afslog, + "obtain afs tokens" }, +#endif + { "cache", 'c', arg_string, &cred_cache, + "credentials cache", "cachename" }, + + { "forwardable", 'f', arg_flag, &forwardable, + "get forwardable tickets"}, + + { "keytab", 't', arg_string, &keytab_str, + "keytab to use", "keytabname" }, + + { "lifetime", 'l', arg_string, &lifetime, + "lifetime of tickets", "seconds"}, + + { "proxiable", 'p', arg_flag, &proxiable, + "get proxiable tickets" }, + + { "renew", 'R', arg_flag, &renew_flag, + "renew TGT" }, + + { "renewable", 0, arg_flag, &renewable, + "get renewable tickets" }, + + { "renewable-life", 'r', arg_string, &renew_life, + "renewable lifetime of tickets", "seconds" }, + + { "server", 'S', arg_string, &server, + "server to get ticket for", "principal" }, + + { "start-time", 's', arg_string, &start_str, + "when ticket gets valid", "seconds" }, + + { "use-keytab", 'k', arg_flag, &use_keytab, + "get key from keytab" }, + + { "validate", 'v', arg_flag, &validate_flag, + "validate TGT" }, + + { "enctypes", 'e', arg_strings, &etype_str, + "encryption type to use", "enctype" }, + + { "fcache-version", 0, arg_integer, &fcache_version, + "file cache version to create" }, + + { "noaddresses", 0, arg_flag, &no_addrs_flag, + "request a ticket with no addresses" }, + + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[principal]"); + exit (ret); +} + +static int +renew_validate(krb5_context context, + int renew, + int validate, + krb5_ccache cache, + const char *server, + krb5_deltat life) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds in, *out; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, cache, &in.client); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + return ret; + } + if(server) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, server, &in.server); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + goto out; + } + } else { + krb5_realm *client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, in.client); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &in.server, *client_realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, NULL); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + goto out; + } + } + flags.i = 0; + flags.b.renewable = flags.b.renew = renew; + flags.b.validate = validate; + flags.b.forwardable = forwardable; + flags.b.proxiable = proxiable; + if(life) + in.times.endtime = time(NULL) + life; + + ret = krb5_get_kdc_cred(context, + cache, + flags, + NULL, + NULL, + &in, + &out); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_get_kdc_cred"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, cache, in.client); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_creds (context, out); + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, cache, out); + krb5_free_creds (context, out); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); + goto out; + } +out: + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &in); + return ret; +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_creds cred; + int optind = 0; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_deltat start_time = 0; + krb5_deltat ticket_life = 0; + krb5_addresses no_addrs; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + memset(&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + errx(1, "krb5_init_context failed: %u", ret); + + forwardable = krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "forwardable", + NULL); + +#ifdef KRB4 + get_v4_tgt = krb5_config_get_bool_default (context, NULL, + get_v4_tgt, + "libdefaults", + "krb4_get_tickets", + NULL); +#endif + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(fcache_version) + krb5_set_fcache_version(context, fcache_version); + + if(cred_cache) + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, cred_cache, &ccache); + else + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "resolving credentials cache"); + + if (lifetime) { + int tmp = parse_time (lifetime, "s"); + if (tmp < 0) + errx (1, "unparsable time: %s", lifetime); + + ticket_life = tmp; + } + if(renew_flag || validate_flag) { + ret = renew_validate(context, renew_flag, validate_flag, + ccache, server, ticket_life); + exit(ret != 0); + } + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable (&opt, forwardable); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable (&opt, proxiable); + + if (no_addrs_flag) { + no_addrs.len = 0; + no_addrs.val = NULL; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list (&opt, &no_addrs); + } + + if(renew_life) { + int tmp = parse_time (renew_life, "s"); + if (tmp < 0) + errx (1, "unparsable time: %s", renew_life); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life (&opt, tmp); + } else if (renewable) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life (&opt, 1 << 30); + + if(ticket_life != 0) + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&opt, ticket_life); + + if(start_str) { + int tmp = parse_time (start_str, "s"); + if (tmp < 0) + errx (1, "unparsable time: %s", start_str); + + start_time = tmp; + } + + if(etype_str.num_strings) { + krb5_enctype *enctype = NULL; + int i; + enctype = malloc(etype_str.num_strings * sizeof(*enctype)); + if(enctype == NULL) + errx(1, "out of memory"); + for(i = 0; i < etype_str.num_strings; i++) { + ret = krb5_string_to_enctype(context, + etype_str.strings[i], + &enctype[i]); + if(ret) + errx(1, "unrecognized enctype: %s", etype_str.strings[i]); + } + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(&opt, enctype, + etype_str.num_strings); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage (1); + + if (argv[0]) { + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, argv[0], &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name"); + } else + principal = NULL; + + if(use_keytab || keytab_str) { + krb5_keytab kt; + if(keytab_str) + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab_str, &kt); + else + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &kt); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "resolving keytab"); + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab (context, + &cred, + principal, + kt, + start_time, + server, + &opt); + krb5_kt_close(context, kt); + } else + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + NULL, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + start_time, + server, + &opt); + switch(ret){ + case 0: + break; + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR: /* don't print anything if it was just C-c:ed */ + exit(1); + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: + krb5_errx(context, 1, "Password incorrect"); + break; + default: + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + } + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, ccache, cred.client); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, ccache, &cred); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if(get_v4_tgt) { + CREDENTIALS c; + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(context, ccache, &cred, &c); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "converting creds"); + else + tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + } + if(do_afslog && k_hasafs()) + krb5_afslog(context, ccache, NULL, NULL); +#endif + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + krb5_free_context (context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit_options.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit_options.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a7dcd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kinit_options.c @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: kinit_options.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef KRB4 +int do_afslog = 0; +int get_v4_tgt = 0; +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.1 b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e875401 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.1 @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +.\" $Id: klist.1,v 1.4 1999/05/14 14:03:55 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd Aug 27, 1997 +.Dt KLIST 1 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm klist +.Nd +list the current tickets +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl t | Fl -test +.Op Fl v | Fl -verbose +.Op Fl -version +.Op Fl -help +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +reads and displays the current tickets in the crential cache (also +knows as the ticket file). +.Pp +Options supported: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Xo +.Fl t Ns , +.Fl -test +.Xc +Test for there being an active and valid TGT for the local realm of +the user in the credential cache. +.It Xo +.Fl v Ns , +.Fl -verbose +.Xc +Verbose output. Include all information from tickets. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr kinit 1 , +.Xr kdestroy 1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9135d29 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/klist.c @@ -0,0 +1,445 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: klist.c,v 1.52 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static char* +printable_time(time_t t) +{ + static char s[128]; + strcpy(s, ctime(&t)+ 4); + s[15] = 0; + return s; +} + +static char* +printable_time_long(time_t t) +{ + static char s[128]; + strcpy(s, ctime(&t)+ 4); + s[20] = 0; + return s; +} + +static void +print_cred(krb5_context context, krb5_creds *cred) +{ + char *str; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + if(cred->times.starttime) + printf ("%s ", printable_time(cred->times.starttime)); + else + printf ("%s ", printable_time(cred->times.authtime)); + + if(cred->times.endtime > sec) + printf ("%s ", printable_time(cred->times.endtime)); + else + printf ("%-15s ", ">>>Expired<<<"); + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, cred->server, &str); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + printf ("%s\n", str); + free (str); +} + +static void +print_cred_verbose(krb5_context context, krb5_creds *cred) +{ + int j; + char *str; + krb5_error_code ret; + int first_flag; + int32_t sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cred->server, &str); + if(ret) + exit(1); + printf("Server: %s\n", str); + free (str); + { + Ticket t; + size_t len; + char *s; + + decode_Ticket(cred->ticket.data, cred->ticket.length, &t, &len); + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, t.enc_part.etype, &s); + if (ret == 0) { + printf("Ticket etype: %s", s); + free(s); + } else { + printf("Unknown etype: %d", t.enc_part.etype); + } + if(t.enc_part.kvno) + printf(", kvno %d", *t.enc_part.kvno); + printf("\n"); + if(cred->session.keytype != t.enc_part.etype) { + ret = krb5_keytype_to_string(context, cred->session.keytype, &str); + if(ret == KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP) + ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cred->session.keytype, + &str); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "session keytype"); + else { + printf("Session key: %s\n", str); + free(str); + } + } + free_Ticket(&t); + } + printf("Auth time: %s\n", printable_time_long(cred->times.authtime)); + if(cred->times.authtime != cred->times.starttime) + printf("Start time: %s\n", printable_time_long(cred->times.starttime)); + printf("End time: %s", printable_time_long(cred->times.endtime)); + if(sec > cred->times.endtime) + printf(" (expired)"); + printf("\n"); + if(cred->flags.b.renewable) + printf("Renew till: %s\n", + printable_time_long(cred->times.renew_till)); + printf("Ticket flags: "); +#define PRINT_FLAG2(f, s) if(cred->flags.b.f) { if(!first_flag) printf(", "); printf("%s", #s); first_flag = 0; } +#define PRINT_FLAG(f) PRINT_FLAG2(f, f) + first_flag = 1; + PRINT_FLAG(forwardable); + PRINT_FLAG(forwarded); + PRINT_FLAG(proxiable); + PRINT_FLAG(proxy); + PRINT_FLAG2(may_postdate, may-postdate); + PRINT_FLAG(postdated); + PRINT_FLAG(invalid); + PRINT_FLAG(renewable); + PRINT_FLAG(initial); + PRINT_FLAG2(pre_authent, pre-authenticated); + PRINT_FLAG2(hw_authent, hw-authenticated); + PRINT_FLAG2(transited_policy_checked, transited-policy-checked); + PRINT_FLAG2(ok_as_delegate, ok-as-delegate); + PRINT_FLAG(anonymous); + printf("\n"); + printf("Addresses: "); + for(j = 0; j < cred->addresses.len; j++){ + char buf[128]; + size_t len; + if(j) printf(", "); + ret = krb5_print_address(&cred->addresses.val[j], + buf, sizeof(buf), &len); + + if(ret == 0) + printf("%s", buf); + } + printf("\n\n"); +} + +/* + * Print all tickets in `ccache' on stdout, verbosily iff do_verbose. + */ + +static void +print_tickets (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_principal principal, + int do_verbose) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *str; + krb5_cc_cursor cursor; + krb5_creds creds; + + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, principal, &str); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + + printf ("%17s: %s:%s\n", + "Credentials cache", + krb5_cc_get_type(context, ccache), + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache)); + printf ("%17s: %s\n", "Principal", str); + free (str); + + if(do_verbose) + printf ("%17s: %d\n", "Cache version", + krb5_cc_get_version(context, ccache)); + + if (do_verbose && context->kdc_sec_offset) { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int val; + int sig; + + val = context->kdc_sec_offset; + sig = 1; + if (val < 0) { + sig = -1; + val = -val; + } + + unparse_time (val, buf, sizeof(buf)); + + printf ("%17s: %s%s\n", "KDC time offset", + sig == -1 ? "-" : "", buf); + } + + printf("\n"); + + ret = krb5_cc_start_seq_get (context, ccache, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_start_seq_get"); + + if(!do_verbose) + printf(" %-15s %-15s %s\n", "Issued", "Expires", "Principal"); + + while (krb5_cc_next_cred (context, + ccache, + &creds, + &cursor) == 0) { + if(do_verbose){ + print_cred_verbose(context, &creds); + }else{ + print_cred(context, &creds); + } + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &creds); + } + ret = krb5_cc_end_seq_get (context, ccache, &cursor); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_end_seq_get"); +} + +/* + * Check if there's a tgt for the realm of `principal' and ccache and + * if so return 0, else 1 + */ + +static int +check_for_tgt (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds pattern; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + int expired; + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, principal); + + ret = krb5_make_principal (context, &pattern.server, + *client_realm, KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, + NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_make_principal"); + + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred (context, ccache, 0, &pattern, &creds); + expired = time(NULL) > creds.times.endtime; + krb5_free_principal (context, pattern.server); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &creds); + if (ret) { + if (ret == KRB5_CC_END) + return 1; + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_retrieve_cred"); + } + return expired; +} + +#ifdef KRB4 +/* + * Print a list of all AFS tokens + */ + +static void +display_tokens(int do_verbose) +{ + u_int32_t i; + unsigned char t[128]; + struct ViceIoctl parms; + + parms.in = (void *)&i; + parms.in_size = sizeof(i); + parms.out = (void *)t; + parms.out_size = sizeof(t); + + for (i = 0; k_pioctl(NULL, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) == 0; i++) { + int32_t size_secret_tok, size_public_tok; + unsigned char *cell; + struct ClearToken ct; + unsigned char *r = t; + struct timeval tv; + char buf1[20], buf2[20]; + + memcpy(&size_secret_tok, r, sizeof(size_secret_tok)); + /* dont bother about the secret token */ + r += size_secret_tok + sizeof(size_secret_tok); + memcpy(&size_public_tok, r, sizeof(size_public_tok)); + r += sizeof(size_public_tok); + memcpy(&ct, r, size_public_tok); + r += size_public_tok; + /* there is a int32_t with length of cellname, but we dont read it */ + r += sizeof(int32_t); + cell = r; + + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); + strlcpy (buf1, printable_time(ct.BeginTimestamp), + sizeof(buf1)); + if (do_verbose || tv.tv_sec < ct.EndTimestamp) + strlcpy (buf2, printable_time(ct.EndTimestamp), + sizeof(buf2)); + else + strlcpy (buf2, ">>> Expired <<<", sizeof(buf2)); + + printf("%s %s ", buf1, buf2); + + if ((ct.EndTimestamp - ct.BeginTimestamp) & 1) + printf("User's (AFS ID %d) tokens for %s", ct.ViceId, cell); + else + printf("Tokens for %s", cell); + if (do_verbose) + printf(" (%d)", ct.AuthHandle); + putchar('\n'); + } +} +#endif + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; +static int do_verbose = 0; +static int do_test = 0; +#ifdef KRB4 +static int do_tokens = 0; +#endif +static char *cred_cache; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + { "cache", 'c', arg_string, &cred_cache, + "credentials cache to list", "cache" }, + { "test", 't', arg_flag, &do_test, + "test for having tickets", NULL }, +#ifdef KRB4 + { "tokens", 'T', arg_flag, &do_tokens, + "display AFS tokens", NULL }, +#endif + { "verbose", 'v', arg_flag, &do_verbose, + "Verbose output", NULL }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL} +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + ""); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main (int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal principal; + int optind = 0; + int exit_status = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc != 0) + usage (1); + + ret = krb5_init_context (&context); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_init_context"); + + if(cred_cache) { + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, cred_cache, &ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "%s", cred_cache); + } else { + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_resolve"); + } + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &principal); + if (ret) { + if(ret == ENOENT) { + if (do_test) + return 1; + else + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No ticket file: %s", + krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache)); + } else + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_get_principal"); + } + if (do_test) + exit_status = check_for_tgt (context, ccache, principal); + else + print_tickets (context, ccache, principal, do_verbose); + + ret = krb5_cc_close (context, ccache); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_close"); + + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + krb5_free_context (context); + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (!do_test && do_tokens && k_hasafs ()) + display_tokens (do_verbose); +#endif + + return exit_status; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kuser_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kuser_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2010150 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kuser_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kuser_locl.h,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KUSER_LOCL_H__ +#define __KUSER_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCCOM_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#endif /* __KUSER_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kverify.c b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kverify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..986d7c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/kuser/kverify.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kuser_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kverify.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_preauthtype pre_auth_types[] = {KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP}; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt get_options; + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt verify_options; + + krb5_init_context(&context); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&get_options); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list (&get_options, + pre_auth_types, + 1); + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init (&verify_options); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + NULL, + NULL, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, + &get_options); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_get_init_creds: %s", krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds (context, + &cred, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + &verify_options); + if (ret) + errx (1, "krb5_verify_init_creds: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + krb5_free_context (context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/45_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/45_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8104179 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/45_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef __45_LOCL_H__ +#define __45_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#endif /* __45_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50d47fd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +lib_LIBRARIES = @EXTRA_LIB45@ + +EXTRA_LIBRARIES = lib45.a + +lib45_a_SOURCES = get_ad_tkt.c mk_req.c 45_locl.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b0c7fc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,636 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/03/20 13:58:17 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ 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Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "45_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_ad_tkt.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +/* get an additional version 4 ticket via the 524 protocol */ + +#ifndef NEVERDATE +#define NEVERDATE ((unsigned long)0x7fffffffL) +#endif + +int +get_ad_tkt(char *service, char *sinstance, char *realm, int lifetime) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int code; + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache id; + krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds; + CREDENTIALS cred; + time_t now; + char pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ]; + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret) + return KFAILURE; + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + now = time(NULL); + in_creds.times.endtime = krb_life_to_time(time(NULL), lifetime); + if(in_creds.times.endtime == NEVERDATE) + in_creds.times.endtime = 0; + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, id, &in_creds.client); + if(ret){ + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, in_creds.client, + pname, pinst, prealm); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(context, service, sinstance, realm, + &in_creds.server); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, + 0, + id, + &in_creds, + &out_creds); + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.client); + krb5_free_principal(context, in_creds.server); + if(ret){ + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + return KFAILURE; + } + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(context, id, out_creds, &cred); + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + krb5_free_context(context); + krb5_free_creds(context, out_creds); + if(ret) + return KFAILURE; + code = save_credentials(cred.service, cred.instance, cred.realm, + cred.session, cred.lifetime, cred.kvno, + &cred.ticket_st, now); + if(code == NO_TKT_FIL) + code = tf_setup(&cred, pname, pinst); + memset(&cred.session, 0, sizeof(cred.session)); + return code; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/mk_req.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/mk_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7074ebf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/45/mk_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* implementation of krb_mk_req that uses 524 protocol */ + +#include "45_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mk_req.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static int lifetime = 255; + +static void +build_request(KTEXT req, char *name, char *inst, char *realm, + u_int32_t checksum) +{ + struct timeval tv; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_data data; + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, name); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, inst); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + krb5_store_int32(sp, checksum); + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + krb5_store_int8(sp, tv.tv_usec / 5000); + krb5_store_int32(sp, tv.tv_sec); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + memcpy(req->dat, data.data, data.length); + req->length = (data.length + 7) & ~7; + krb5_data_free(&data); +} + +int +krb_mk_req(KTEXT authent, char *service, char *instance, char *realm, + int32_t checksum) +{ + CREDENTIALS cr; + KTEXT_ST req; + krb5_storage *sp; + int code; + char *myrealm; + krb5_data a; + + code = krb_get_cred(service, instance, realm, &cr); + if(code || time(NULL) > krb_life_to_time(cr.issue_date, cr.lifetime)){ + code = get_ad_tkt(service, instance, realm, lifetime); + if(code == KSUCCESS) + code = krb_get_cred(service, instance, realm, &cr); + } + + if(code) + return code; + + /* XXX get user realm */ + myrealm = realm; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, KRB_PROT_VERSION); + krb5_store_int8(sp, AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, cr.kvno); + krb5_store_stringz(sp, realm); + krb5_store_int8(sp, cr.ticket_st.length); + + build_request(&req, cr.pname, cr.pinst, myrealm, checksum); + encrypt_ktext(&req, &cr.session, DES_ENCRYPT); + + krb5_store_int8(sp, req.length); + + sp->store(sp, cr.ticket_st.dat, cr.ticket_st.length); + sp->store(sp, req.dat, req.length); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &a); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + memcpy(authent->dat, a.data, a.length); + authent->length = a.length; + krb5_data_free(&a); + + memset(&cr, 0, sizeof(cr)); + memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); + + return KSUCCESS; +} + +/* + * krb_set_lifetime sets the default lifetime for additional tickets + * obtained via krb_mk_req(). + * + * It returns the previous value of the default lifetime. + */ + +int +krb_set_lifetime(int newval) +{ + int olife = lifetime; + + lifetime = newval; + return(olife); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c600c22 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 1999/04/01 15:03:37 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +if KRB4 +dir_45 = 45 +endif +if OTP +dir_otp = otp +endif + +SUBDIRS = roken editline com_err sl asn1 des krb5 \ + kafs hdb kadm5 gssapi auth $(dir_45) $(dir_otp) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c8aa71 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,604 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.16 1999/04/01 15:03:37 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = .. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ 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b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97fb2bb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.54 1999/12/21 17:03:42 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +YFLAGS = -d + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libasn1.la +libasn1_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:4:0 + +BUILT_SOURCES = \ + $(gen_files:.x=.c) \ + asn1_err.h \ + asn1_err.c + +gen_files = \ + asn1_APOptions.x \ + asn1_AP_REP.x \ + asn1_AP_REQ.x \ + asn1_AS_REP.x \ + asn1_AS_REQ.x \ + asn1_Authenticator.x \ + asn1_AuthorizationData.x \ + asn1_Checksum.x \ + asn1_EncAPRepPart.x \ + asn1_EncASRepPart.x \ + asn1_EncKDCRepPart.x \ + asn1_EncKrbCredPart.x \ + asn1_EncKrbPrivPart.x \ + asn1_EncTGSRepPart.x \ + asn1_EncTicketPart.x \ + asn1_EncryptedData.x \ + asn1_EncryptionKey.x \ + asn1_ETYPE_INFO.x \ + asn1_ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY.x \ + asn1_HostAddress.x \ + asn1_HostAddresses.x \ + asn1_KDCOptions.x \ + asn1_KDC_REP.x \ + asn1_KDC_REQ.x \ + 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foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat3-mans: + @ext=3;\ + foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +$(asn1_compile_OBJECTS): parse.h + +$(gen_files) asn1.h: asn1_files + +asn1_files: asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/k5.asn1 + ./asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/k5.asn1 + +$(libasn1_la_OBJECTS): asn1.h asn1_err.h + +$(asn1_print_OBJECTS): asn1.h + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f1f272 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# +# Error messages for the asn.1 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: asn1_err.et,v 1.5 1998/02/16 16:17:17 joda Exp $" + +error_table asn1 +prefix ASN1 +error_code BAD_TIMEFORMAT, "ASN.1 failed call to system time library" +error_code MISSING_FIELD, "ASN.1 structure is missing a required field" +error_code MISPLACED_FIELD, "ASN.1 unexpected field number" +error_code TYPE_MISMATCH, "ASN.1 type numbers are inconsistent" +error_code OVERFLOW, "ASN.1 value too large" +error_code OVERRUN, "ASN.1 encoding ended unexpectedly" +error_code BAD_ID, "ASN.1 identifier doesn't match expected value" +error_code BAD_LENGTH, "ASN.1 length doesn't match expected value" +error_code BAD_FORMAT, "ASN.1 badly-formatted encoding" +error_code PARSE_ERROR, "ASN.1 parse error" +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92e6419 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/asn1_print.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: asn1_print.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static struct et_list *et_list; + +const char *class_names[] = { + "UNIV", /* 0 */ + "APPL", /* 1 */ + "CONTEXT", /* 2 */ + "PRIVATE" /* 3 */ +}; + +const char *type_names[] = { + "PRIM", /* 0 */ + "CONS" /* 1 */ +}; + +const char *tag_names[] = { + NULL, /* 0 */ + NULL, /* 1 */ + "Integer", /* 2 */ + "BitString", /* 3 */ + "OctetString", /* 4 */ + "Null", /* 5 */ + "ObjectID", /* 6 */ + NULL, /* 7 */ + NULL, /* 8 */ + NULL, /* 9 */ + NULL, /* 10 */ + NULL, /* 11 */ + NULL, /* 12 */ + NULL, /* 13 */ + NULL, /* 14 */ + NULL, /* 15 */ + "Sequence", /* 16 */ + "Set", /* 17 */ + NULL, /* 18 */ + "PrintableString", /* 19 */ + NULL, /* 20 */ + NULL, /* 21 */ + "IA5String", /* 22 */ + "UTCTime", /* 23 */ + "GeneralizedTime", /* 24 */ + NULL, /* 25 */ + "VisibleString", /* 26 */ + "GeneralString" /* 27 */ +}; + +static int +loop (unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int indent) +{ + while (len > 0) { + int ret; + Der_class class; + Der_type type; + int tag; + size_t sz; + size_t length; + int i; + + ret = der_get_tag (buf, len, &class, &type, &tag, &sz); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_tag: %s", com_right (et_list, ret)); + buf += sz; + len -= sz; + for (i = 0; i < indent; ++i) + printf (" "); + printf ("%s %s ", class_names[class], type_names[type]); + if (tag_names[tag]) + printf ("%s = ", tag_names[tag]); + else + printf ("tag %d = ", tag); + ret = der_get_length (buf, len, &length, &sz); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_tag: %s", com_right (et_list, ret)); + buf += sz; + len -= sz; + + if (class == CONTEXT) { + printf ("[%d]\n", tag); + loop (buf, length, indent); + } else if (class == UNIV) { + switch (tag) { + case UT_Sequence : + printf ("{\n"); + loop (buf, length, indent + 2); + for (i = 0; i < indent; ++i) + printf (" "); + printf ("}\n"); + break; + case UT_Integer : { + int val; + + ret = der_get_int (buf, length, &val, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_int: %s", com_right (et_list, ret)); + printf ("integer %d\n", val); + break; + } + case UT_OctetString : { + octet_string str; + int i; + unsigned char *uc; + + ret = der_get_octet_string (buf, length, &str, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_octet_string: %s", + com_right (et_list, ret)); + printf ("(length %d), ", length); + uc = (unsigned char *)str.data; + for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i) + printf ("%02x", uc[i]); + printf ("\n"); + free (str.data); + break; + } + case UT_GeneralizedTime : + case UT_GeneralString : { + general_string str; + + ret = der_get_general_string (buf, length, &str, NULL); + if (ret) + errx (1, "der_get_general_string: %s", + com_right (et_list, ret)); + printf ("\"%s\"\n", str); + free (str); + break; + } + default : + printf ("%d bytes\n", length); + break; + } + } + buf += length; + len -= length; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +doit (const char *filename) +{ + int fd = open (filename, O_RDONLY); + struct stat sb; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + int ret; + + if(fd < 0) + err (1, "opening %s for read", filename); + if (fstat (fd, &sb) < 0) + err (1, "stat %s", filename); + len = sb.st_size; + buf = malloc (len); + if (buf == NULL) + err (1, "malloc %u", len); + if (read (fd, buf, len) != len) + errx (1, "read failed"); + close (fd); + ret = loop (buf, len, 0); + free (buf); + return ret; +} + + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "dump-file"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + initialize_asn1_error_table_r (&et_list); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + if (argc != 1) + usage (1); + return doit (argv[0]); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/check-der.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/check-der.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2f1217 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/check-der.c @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: check-der.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static void +print_bytes (unsigned const char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + printf ("%02x ", buf[i]); +} + +struct test_case { + void *val; + int byte_len; + const unsigned char *bytes; + char *name; +}; + +static int +generic_test (const struct test_case *tests, + unsigned ntests, + size_t data_size, + int (*encode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *), + int (*length)(void *), + int (*decode)(unsigned char *, size_t, void *, size_t *), + int (*cmp)(void *a, void *b)) +{ + unsigned char buf[4711]; + int i; + int failures = 0; + void *val = malloc (data_size); + + if (data_size != 0 && val == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + int ret; + size_t sz, consumed_sz, length_sz; + unsigned char *beg; + + ret = (*encode) (buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + tests[i].val, &sz); + beg = buf + sizeof(buf) - sz; + if (ret != 0) { + printf ("encoding of %s failed\n", tests[i].name); + ++failures; + } + if (sz != tests[i].byte_len) { + printf ("encoding of %s has wrong len (%lu != %lu)\n", + tests[i].name, + (unsigned long)sz, (unsigned long)tests[i].byte_len); + ++failures; + } + + length_sz = (*length) (tests[i].val); + if (sz != length_sz) { + printf ("length for %s is bad (%lu != %lu)\n", + tests[i].name, (unsigned long)length_sz, (unsigned long)sz); + ++failures; + } + + if (memcmp (beg, tests[i].bytes, tests[i].byte_len) != 0) { + printf ("encoding of %s has bad bytes:\n" + "correct: ", tests[i].name); + print_bytes (tests[i].bytes, tests[i].byte_len); + printf ("\nactual: "); + print_bytes (beg, sz); + printf ("\n"); + ++failures; + } + ret = (*decode) (beg, sz, val, &consumed_sz); + if (ret != 0) { + printf ("decoding of %s failed\n", tests[i].name); + ++failures; + } + if (sz != consumed_sz) { + printf ("different length decoding %s (%ld != %ld)\n", + tests[i].name, + (unsigned long)sz, (unsigned long)consumed_sz); + ++failures; + } + if ((*cmp)(val, tests[i].val) != 0) { + printf ("%s: comparison failed\n", tests[i].name); + ++failures; + } + } + free (val); + return failures; +} + +static int +cmp_integer (void *a, void *b) +{ + int *ia = (int *)a; + int *ib = (int *)b; + + return *ib - *ia; +} + +static int +test_integer (void) +{ + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\x00"}, + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\x7f"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\x00\x80"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\x01\x00"}, + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\x80"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\xff\x7f"}, + {NULL, 3, "\x02\x01\xff"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\xff\x01"}, + {NULL, 4, "\x02\x02\x00\xff"}, + {NULL, 6, "\x02\x04\x80\x00\x00\x00"}, + {NULL, 6, "\x02\x04\x7f\xff\xff\xff"} + }; + + int values[] = {0, 127, 128, 256, -128, -129, -1, -255, 255, + 0x80000000, 0x7fffffff}; + int i; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + tests[i].val = &values[i]; + asprintf (&tests[i].name, "integer %d", values[i]); + } + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(int), + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))encode_integer, + (int (*)(void *))length_integer, + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))decode_integer, + cmp_integer); +} + +static int +cmp_octet_string (void *a, void *b) +{ + octet_string *oa = (octet_string *)a; + octet_string *ob = (octet_string *)b; + + if (oa->length != ob->length) + return ob->length - oa->length; + + return (memcmp (oa->data, ob->data, oa->length)); +} + +static int +test_octet_string (void) +{ + octet_string s1 = {8, "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xab\xcd\xef"}; + + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 10, "\x04\x08\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xab\xcd\xef"} + }; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + tests[0].val = &s1; + asprintf (&tests[0].name, "a octet string"); + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(octet_string), + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))encode_octet_string, + (int (*)(void *))length_octet_string, + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))decode_octet_string, + cmp_octet_string); +} + +static int +cmp_general_string (void *a, void *b) +{ + unsigned char **sa = (unsigned char **)a; + unsigned char **sb = (unsigned char **)b; + + return strcmp (*sa, *sb); +} + +static int +test_general_string (void) +{ + unsigned char *s1 = "Test User 1"; + + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 13, "\x1b\x0b\x54\x65\x73\x74\x20\x55\x73\x65\x72\x20\x31"} + }; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + tests[0].val = &s1; + asprintf (&tests[0].name, "the string \"%s\"", s1); + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(unsigned char *), + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))encode_general_string, + (int (*)(void *))length_general_string, + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))decode_general_string, + cmp_general_string); +} + +static int +cmp_generalized_time (void *a, void *b) +{ + time_t *ta = (time_t *)a; + time_t *tb = (time_t *)b; + + return *tb - *ta; +} + +static int +test_generalized_time (void) +{ + struct test_case tests[] = { + {NULL, 17, "\x18\x0f""19700101000000Z"}, + {NULL, 17, "\x18\x0f""19851106210627Z"} + }; + time_t values[] = {0, 500159187}; + int i; + int ntests = sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); + + for (i = 0; i < ntests; ++i) { + tests[i].val = &values[i]; + asprintf (&tests[i].name, "time %d", (int)values[i]); + } + + return generic_test (tests, ntests, sizeof(time_t), + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))encode_generalized_time, + (int (*)(void *))length_generalized_time, + (int (*)(unsigned char *, size_t, + void *, size_t *))decode_generalized_time, + cmp_generalized_time); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret += test_integer (); + ret += test_octet_string (); + ret += test_general_string (); + ret += test_generalized_time (); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37158af --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: der.h,v 1.18 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __DER_H__ +#define __DER_H__ + +#include + +typedef enum {UNIV = 0, APPL = 1, CONTEXT = 2 , PRIVATE = 3} Der_class; + +typedef enum {PRIM = 0, CONS = 1} Der_type; + +/* Universal tags */ + +enum { + UT_Integer = 2, + UT_BitString = 3, + UT_OctetString = 4, + UT_Null = 5, + UT_ObjID = 6, + UT_Sequence = 16, + UT_Set = 17, + UT_PrintableString = 19, + UT_IA5String = 22, + UT_UTCTime = 23, + UT_GeneralizedTime = 24, + UT_VisibleString = 26, + UT_GeneralString = 27 +}; + +#define ASN1_INDEFINITE 0xdce0deed + +#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM +time_t timegm (struct tm *); +#endif + +void time2generalizedtime (time_t t, octet_string *s); + +int der_get_int (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, int *ret, size_t *size); +int der_get_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + size_t *val, size_t *size); +int der_get_general_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + general_string *str, size_t *size); +int der_get_octet_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + octet_string *data, size_t *size); +int der_get_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class *class, Der_type *type, + int *tag, size_t *size); + +int der_match_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t *size); +int der_match_tag_and_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, int tag, + size_t *length_ret, size_t *size); + +int decode_integer (const unsigned char*, size_t, int*, size_t*); +int decode_general_string (const unsigned char*, size_t, + general_string*, size_t*); +int decode_octet_string (const unsigned char*, size_t, octet_string*, size_t*); +int decode_generalized_time (const unsigned char*, size_t, time_t*, size_t*); + +int der_put_int (unsigned char *p, size_t len, int val, size_t*); +int der_put_length (unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t val, size_t*); +int der_put_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *str, size_t*); +int der_put_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *data, size_t*); +int der_put_tag (unsigned char *p, size_t len, Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t*); +int der_put_length_and_tag (unsigned char*, size_t, size_t, + Der_class, Der_type, int, size_t*); + +int encode_integer (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const int *data, size_t*); +int encode_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *data, size_t*); +int encode_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *k, size_t*); +int encode_generalized_time (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const time_t *t, size_t*); + +void free_integer (int *num); +void free_general_string (general_string *str); +void free_octet_string (octet_string *k); +void free_generalized_time (time_t *t); + +size_t length_len (size_t len); +size_t length_integer (const int *data); +size_t length_general_string (const general_string *data); +size_t length_octet_string (const octet_string *k); +size_t length_generalized_time (const time_t *t); + +int copy_general_string (const general_string *from, general_string *to); +int copy_octet_string (const octet_string *from, octet_string *to); + +int fix_dce(size_t reallen, size_t *len); + +#endif /* __DER_H__ */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_copy.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83c2446 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_copy.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +int +copy_general_string (const general_string *from, general_string *to) +{ + *to = malloc(strlen(*from) + 1); + if(*to == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + strcpy(*to, *from); + return 0; +} + +int +copy_octet_string (const octet_string *from, octet_string *to) +{ + to->length = from->length; + to->data = malloc(to->length); + if(to->length != 0 && to->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(to->data, from->data, to->length); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_free.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7191e4e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_free.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_free.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +void +free_general_string (general_string *str) +{ + free(*str); +} + +void +free_octet_string (octet_string *k) +{ + free(k->data); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_get.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_get.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f0616b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_get.c @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_get.c,v 1.27 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +#include + +/* + * All decoding functions take a pointer `p' to first position in + * which to read, from the left, `len' which means the maximum number + * of characters we are able to read, `ret' were the value will be + * returned and `size' where the number of used bytes is stored. + * Either 0 or an error code is returned. + */ + +static int +der_get_unsigned (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + unsigned *ret, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned val = 0; + size_t oldlen = len; + + while (len--) + val = val * 256 + *p++; + *ret = val; + if(size) *size = oldlen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_int (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + int *ret, size_t *size) +{ + int val = 0; + size_t oldlen = len; + + if (len--) + val = (signed char)*p++; + while (len--) + val = val * 256 + *p++; + *ret = val; + if(size) *size = oldlen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + size_t *val, size_t *size) +{ + size_t v; + + if (len <= 0) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + --len; + v = *p++; + if (v < 128) { + *val = v; + if(size) *size = 1; + } else { + int e; + size_t l; + unsigned tmp; + + if(v == 0x80){ + *val = ASN1_INDEFINITE; + if(size) *size = 1; + return 0; + } + v &= 0x7F; + if (len < v) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + e = der_get_unsigned (p, v, &tmp, &l); + if(e) return e; + *val = tmp; + if(size) *size = l + 1; + } + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_general_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + general_string *str, size_t *size) +{ + char *s; + + s = malloc (len + 1); + if (s == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (s, p, len); + s[len] = '\0'; + *str = s; + if(size) *size = len; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_octet_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + octet_string *data, size_t *size) +{ + data->length = len; + data->data = malloc(len); + if (data->data == NULL && data->length != 0) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (data->data, p, len); + if(size) *size = len; + return 0; +} + +int +der_get_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class *class, Der_type *type, + int *tag, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + *class = (Der_class)(((*p) >> 6) & 0x03); + *type = (Der_type)(((*p) >> 5) & 0x01); + *tag = (*p) & 0x1F; + if(size) *size = 1; + return 0; +} + +int +der_match_tag (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t *size) +{ + size_t l; + Der_class thisclass; + Der_type thistype; + int thistag; + int e; + + e = der_get_tag (p, len, &thisclass, &thistype, &thistag, &l); + if (e) return e; + if (class != thisclass || type != thistype) + return ASN1_BAD_ID; + if(tag > thistag) + return ASN1_MISPLACED_FIELD; + if(tag < thistag) + return ASN1_MISSING_FIELD; + if(size) *size = l; + return 0; +} + +int +der_match_tag_and_length (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + Der_class class, Der_type type, int tag, + size_t *length_ret, size_t *size) +{ + size_t l, ret = 0; + int e; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, class, type, tag, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_length (p, len, length_ret, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_integer (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + int *num, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l, reallen; + int e; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Integer, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_length (p, len, &reallen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_get_int (p, reallen, num, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_general_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + general_string *str, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_GeneralString, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + + e = der_get_general_string (p, slen, str, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +decode_octet_string (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + octet_string *k, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_OctetString, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + + e = der_get_octet_string (p, slen, k, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +static void +generalizedtime2time (const char *s, time_t *t) +{ + struct tm tm; + + memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); + sscanf (s, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", + &tm.tm_year, &tm.tm_mon, &tm.tm_mday, &tm.tm_hour, + &tm.tm_min, &tm.tm_sec); + tm.tm_year -= 1900; + tm.tm_mon -= 1; + *t = timegm (&tm); +} + +int +decode_generalized_time (const unsigned char *p, size_t len, + time_t *t, size_t *size) +{ + octet_string k; + char *times; + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + size_t slen; + + e = der_match_tag (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_GeneralizedTime, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + + e = der_get_length (p, len, &slen, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERRUN; + e = der_get_octet_string (p, slen, &k, &l); + if (e) return e; + p += l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + times = realloc(k.data, k.length + 1); + if (times == NULL){ + free(k.data); + return ENOMEM; + } + times[k.length] = 0; + generalizedtime2time (times, t); + free (times); + if(size) *size = ret; + return 0; +} + + +int +fix_dce(size_t reallen, size_t *len) +{ + if(reallen == ASN1_INDEFINITE) + return 1; + if(*len < reallen) + return -1; + *len = reallen; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_length.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_length.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5db95ba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_length.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_length.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:01 joda Exp $"); + +static size_t +length_unsigned (unsigned val) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + + do { + ++ret; + val /= 256; + } while (val); + return ret; +} + +static size_t +length_int (int val) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + + if (val == 0) + return 1; + while (val > 255 || val < -255) { + ++ret; + val /= 256; + } + if (val != 0) { + ++ret; + if ((signed char)val != val) + ++ret; + val /= 256; + } + return ret; +} + +size_t +length_len (size_t len) +{ + if (len < 128) + return 1; + else + return length_unsigned (len) + 1; +} + +size_t +length_integer (const int *data) +{ + size_t len = length_int (*data); + + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_general_string (const general_string *data) +{ + char *str = *data; + size_t len = strlen(str); + return 1 + length_len(len) + len; +} + +size_t +length_octet_string (const octet_string *k) +{ + return 1 + length_len(k->length) + k->length; +} + +size_t +length_generalized_time (const time_t *t) +{ + octet_string k; + size_t ret; + + time2generalizedtime (*t, &k); + ret = 1 + length_len(k.length) + k.length; + free (k.data); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6eeb42d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: der_locl.h,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __DER_LOCL_H__ +#define __DER_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#endif /* __DER_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_put.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_put.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce21654 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/der_put.c @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: der_put.c,v 1.22 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * All encoding functions take a pointer `p' to first position in + * which to write, from the right, `len' which means the maximum + * number of characters we are able to write and return an int + * indicating how many actually got written, or <0 in case of errors. + */ + +static int +der_put_unsigned (unsigned char *p, size_t len, unsigned val, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned char *base = p; + + if (val) { + while (len > 0 && val) { + *p-- = val % 256; + val /= 256; + --len; + } + if (val != 0) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + else { + *size = base - p; + return 0; + } + } else if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + else { + *p = 0; + *size = 1; + return 0; + } +} + +int +der_put_int (unsigned char *p, size_t len, int val, size_t *size) +{ + unsigned char *base = p; + + if(val >= 0) { + do { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = val % 256; + len--; + val /= 256; + } while(val); + if(p[1] >= 128) { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = 0; + len--; + } + } else { + val = ~val; + do { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = ~(val % 256); + len--; + val /= 256; + } while(val); + if(p[1] < 128) { + if(len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p-- = 0xff; + len--; + } + } + *size = base - p; + return 0; +} + + +int +der_put_length (unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t val, size_t *size) +{ + if (val < 128) { + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + else { + *p = val; + *size = 1; + return 0; + } + } else { + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_unsigned (p, len - 1, val, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + *p = 0x80 | l; + *size = l + 1; + return 0; + } +} + +int +der_put_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *str, size_t *size) +{ + size_t slen = strlen(*str); + + if (len < slen) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + p -= slen; + len -= slen; + memcpy (p+1, *str, slen); + *size = slen; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *data, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < data->length) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + p -= data->length; + len -= data->length; + memcpy (p+1, data->data, data->length); + *size = data->length; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_tag (unsigned char *p, size_t len, Der_class class, Der_type type, + int tag, size_t *size) +{ + if (len < 1) + return ASN1_OVERFLOW; + *p = (class << 6) | (type << 5) | tag; /* XXX */ + *size = 1; + return 0; +} + +int +der_put_length_and_tag (unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t len_val, + Der_class class, Der_type type, int tag, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_length (p, len, len_val, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_tag (p, len, class, type, tag, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_integer (unsigned char *p, size_t len, const int *data, size_t *size) +{ + int num = *data; + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_int (p, len, num, &l); + if(e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_Integer, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_general_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const general_string *data, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_general_string (p, len, data, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_GeneralString, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +encode_octet_string (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const octet_string *k, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + int e; + + e = der_put_octet_string (p, len, k, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, l, UNIV, PRIM, UT_OctetString, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} + +void +time2generalizedtime (time_t t, octet_string *s) +{ + struct tm *tm; + + s->data = malloc(16); + s->length = 15; + tm = gmtime (&t); + sprintf (s->data, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ", tm->tm_year + 1900, + tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec); +} + +int +encode_generalized_time (unsigned char *p, size_t len, + const time_t *t, size_t *size) +{ + size_t ret = 0; + size_t l; + octet_string k; + int e; + + time2generalizedtime (*t, &k); + e = der_put_octet_string (p, len, &k, &l); + free (k.data); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, k.length, UNIV, PRIM, + UT_GeneralizedTime, &l); + if (e) + return e; + p -= l; + len -= l; + ret += l; + *size = ret; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bca4516 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.c @@ -0,0 +1,351 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen.c,v 1.41 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +FILE *headerfile, *codefile, *logfile; + +#define STEM "asn1" + +static char *orig_filename; +static char header[1024]; +static char headerbase[1024] = STEM; + +void +init_generate (char *filename, char *base) +{ + orig_filename = filename; + if(base) + strcpy(headerbase, base); + sprintf(header, "%s.h", headerbase); + headerfile = fopen (header, "w"); + if (headerfile == NULL) + err (1, "open %s", header); + fprintf (headerfile, + "/* Generated from %s */\n" + "/* Do not edit */\n\n", + filename); + fprintf (headerfile, + "#ifndef __%s_h__\n" + "#define __%s_h__\n\n", headerbase, headerbase); + fprintf (headerfile, + "#include \n" + "#include \n\n"); +#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM + fprintf (headerfile, "time_t timegm (struct tm*);\n\n"); +#endif + fprintf (headerfile, + "#ifndef __asn1_common_definitions__\n" + "#define __asn1_common_definitions__\n\n"); + fprintf (headerfile, + "typedef struct octet_string {\n" + " size_t length;\n" + " void *data;\n" + "} octet_string;\n\n"); + fprintf (headerfile, +#if 0 + "typedef struct general_string {\n" + " size_t length;\n" + " char *data;\n" + "} general_string;\n\n" +#else + "typedef char *general_string;\n\n" +#endif + ); + fprintf (headerfile, "#endif\n\n"); + logfile = fopen(STEM "_files", "w"); + if (logfile == NULL) + err (1, "open " STEM "_files"); +} + +void +close_generate () +{ + fprintf (headerfile, "#endif /* __%s_h__ */\n", headerbase); + + fclose (headerfile); + fprintf (logfile, "\n"); + fclose (logfile); +} + +void +generate_constant (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, "enum { %s = %d };\n\n", + s->gen_name, s->constant); +} + +static void +space(int level) +{ + while(level-- > 0) + fprintf(headerfile, " "); +} + +static void +define_asn1 (int level, Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s", t->symbol->name); + break; + case TInteger: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "INTEGER"); + break; + case TOctetString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "OCTET STRING"); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + Type i; + int tag = -1; + + i.type = TInteger; + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "BIT STRING {\n"); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space(level + 1); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s(%d)%s\n", m->name, m->val, + m->next->val == tag?"":","); + + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "}"); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag; + int max_width = 0; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "SEQUENCE {\n"); + for (m = t->members, tag = -1; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + if(strlen(m->name) + (m->val > 9) > max_width) + max_width = strlen(m->name) + (m->val > 9); + } + max_width += 3 + 2; + if(max_width < 16) max_width = 16; + for (m = t->members, tag = -1 ; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + int width; + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + space(level + 1); + fprintf(headerfile, "%s[%d]", m->name, m->val); + width = max_width - strlen(m->name) - 3 - (m->val > 9) - 2; + fprintf(headerfile, "%*s", width, ""); + define_asn1(level + 1, m->type); + if(m->optional) + fprintf(headerfile, " OPTIONAL"); + if(m->next->val != tag) + fprintf (headerfile, ","); + fprintf (headerfile, "\n"); + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "}"); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "SEQUENCE OF "); + define_asn1 (0, t->subtype); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "GeneralizedTime"); + break; + case TGeneralString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "GeneralString"); + break; + case TApplication: + fprintf (headerfile, "[APPLICATION %d] ", t->application); + define_asn1 (level, t->subtype); + break; + default: + abort (); + } +} + +static void +define_type (int level, char *name, Type *t, int typedefp) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s %s;\n", t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "int %s;\n", name); + break; + case TUInteger: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "unsigned int %s;\n", name); + break; + case TOctetString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "octet_string %s;\n", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + Type i; + int tag = -1; + + i.type = TUInteger; + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "struct %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + char *n; + + asprintf (&n, "%s:1", m->gen_name); + define_type (level + 1, n, &i, FALSE); + free (n); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n\n", name); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "struct %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + if (m->optional) { + char *n; + + asprintf (&n, "*%s", m->gen_name); + define_type (level + 1, n, m->type, FALSE); + free (n); + } else + define_type (level + 1, m->gen_name, m->type, FALSE); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n", name); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + Type i; + + i.type = TUInteger; + i.application = 0; + + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "struct %s {\n", typedefp ? name : ""); + define_type (level + 1, "len", &i, FALSE); + define_type (level + 1, "*val", t->subtype, FALSE); + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "} %s;\n", name); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "time_t %s;\n", name); + break; + case TGeneralString: + space(level); + fprintf (headerfile, "general_string %s;\n", name); + break; + case TApplication: + define_type (level, name, t->subtype, FALSE); + break; + default: + abort (); + } +} + +static void +generate_type_header (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, "/*\n"); + fprintf (headerfile, "%s ::= ", s->name); + define_asn1 (0, s->type); + fprintf (headerfile, "\n*/\n\n"); + + fprintf (headerfile, "typedef "); + define_type (0, s->gen_name, s->type, TRUE); + + fprintf (headerfile, "\n"); +} + + +void +generate_type (const Symbol *s) +{ + char *filename; + + asprintf (&filename, "%s_%s.x", STEM, s->gen_name); + codefile = fopen (filename, "w"); + if (codefile == NULL) + err (1, "fopen %s", filename); + fprintf(logfile, "%s ", filename); + free(filename); + fprintf (codefile, + "/* Generated from %s */\n" + "/* Do not edit */\n\n" + "#include \"libasn1.h\"\n\n" +#if 0 + "#include \n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n" + "#include <" STEM ".h>\n\n" + "#include \n" + "#include \n" +#endif + ,orig_filename); + generate_type_header (s); + generate_type_encode (s); + generate_type_decode (s); + generate_type_free (s); + generate_type_length (s); + generate_type_copy (s); + generate_glue (s); + fprintf(headerfile, "\n\n"); + fclose(codefile); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..369b6e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gen.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#include +#include "symbol.h" + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9aa489 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_copy.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_copy.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +copy_primitive (const char *typename, const char *from, const char *to) +{ + fprintf (codefile, "if(copy_%s(%s, %s)) return ENOMEM;\n", + typename, from, to); +} + +static void +copy_type (const char *from, const char *to, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + copy_type (from, to, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, "if(copy_%s(%s, %s)) return ENOMEM;\n", + t->symbol->gen_name, from, to); + break; + case TInteger: + fprintf(codefile, "*(%s) = *(%s);\n", to, from); + break; + case TOctetString: + copy_primitive ("octet_string", from, to); + break; + case TBitString: { + fprintf(codefile, "*(%s) = *(%s);\n", to, from); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *f; + char *t; + + asprintf (&f, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", from, m->gen_name); + asprintf (&t, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", to, m->gen_name); + if(m->optional){ + fprintf(codefile, "if(%s) {\n", f); + fprintf(codefile, "%s = malloc(sizeof(*%s));\n", t, t); + fprintf(codefile, "if(%s == NULL) return ENOMEM;\n", t); + } + copy_type (f, t, m->type); + if(m->optional){ + fprintf(codefile, "}else\n"); + fprintf(codefile, "%s = NULL;\n", t); + } + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (f); + free (t); + } + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *f; + char *T; + + fprintf (codefile, "if(((%s)->val = " + "malloc((%s)->len * sizeof(*(%s)->val))) == NULL && (%s)->len != 0)\n", + to, from, to, from); + fprintf (codefile, "return ENOMEM;\n"); + fprintf(codefile, + "for((%s)->len = 0; (%s)->len < (%s)->len; (%s)->len++){\n", + to, to, from, to); + asprintf(&f, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len]", from, to); + asprintf(&T, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len]", to, to); + copy_type(f, T, t->subtype); + fprintf(codefile, "}\n"); + free(f); + free(T); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + fprintf(codefile, "*(%s) = *(%s);\n", to, from); + break; + case TGeneralString: + copy_primitive ("general_string", from, to); + break; + case TApplication: + copy_type (from, to, t->subtype); + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_copy (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int copy_%s (const %s *, %s *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "copy_%s(const %s *from, %s *to)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + copy_type ("from", "to", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, "return 0;\n}\n\n"); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..078ac44 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c @@ -0,0 +1,375 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_decode.c,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +decode_primitive (const char *typename, const char *name) +{ + fprintf (codefile, + "e = decode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n", + typename, + name); +} + +static void +decode_type (const char *name, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + decode_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, + "e = decode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n", + t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + decode_primitive ("integer", name); + break; + case TOctetString: + decode_primitive ("octet_string", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + int pos; + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, UNIV, PRIM, UT_BitString," + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "if(len < reallen)\n" + "return ASN1_OVERRUN;\n" + "p++;\n" + "len--;\n" + "reallen--;\n" + "ret++;\n"); + pos = 0; + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + while (m->val / 8 > pos / 8) { + fprintf (codefile, + "p++; len--; reallen--; ret++;\n"); + pos += 8; + } + fprintf (codefile, + "%s->%s = (*p >> %d) & 1;\n", + name, m->gen_name, 7 - m->val % 8); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + fprintf (codefile, + "p += reallen; len -= reallen; ret += reallen;\n"); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence," + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "{\n" + "int dce_fix;\n" + "if((dce_fix = fix_dce(reallen, &len)) < 0)\n" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n"); + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if (0 && m->type->type == TType){ + if(m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "%s = malloc(sizeof(*%s));\n", s, s); + fprintf (codefile, + "e = decode_seq_%s(p, len, %d, %d, %s, &l);\n", + m->type->symbol->gen_name, + m->val, + m->optional, + s); + if(m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "if (e == ASN1_MISSING_FIELD) {\n" + "free(%s);\n" + "%s = NULL;\n" + "e = l = 0;\n" + "}\n", + s, s); + + fprintf (codefile, "FORW;\n"); + + }else{ + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "size_t newlen, oldlen;\n\n" + "e = der_match_tag (p, len, CONTEXT, CONS, %d, &l);\n", + m->val); + fprintf (codefile, + "if (e)\n"); + if(m->optional) + /* XXX should look at e */ + fprintf (codefile, + "%s = NULL;\n", s); + else + fprintf (codefile, + "return e;\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "else {\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "e = der_get_length (p, len, &newlen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "{\n" + + "int dce_fix;\n" + "oldlen = len;\n" + "if((dce_fix = fix_dce(newlen, &len)) < 0)" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n"); + if (m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "%s = malloc(sizeof(*%s));\n", + s, s); + decode_type (s, m->type); + fprintf (codefile, + "if(dce_fix){\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "}else \n" + "len = oldlen - newlen;\n" + "}\n" + "}\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "}\n"); + } + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + fprintf(codefile, + "if(dce_fix){\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "}\n" + "}\n"); + + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence," + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "if(len < reallen)\n" + "return ASN1_OVERRUN;\n" + "len = reallen;\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, + "{\n" + "size_t origlen = len;\n" + "int oldret = ret;\n" + "ret = 0;\n" + "(%s)->len = 0;\n" + "(%s)->val = NULL;\n" + "while(ret < origlen) {\n" + "(%s)->len++;\n" + "(%s)->val = realloc((%s)->val, sizeof(*((%s)->val)) * (%s)->len);\n", + name, name, name, name, name, name, name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len-1]", name, name); + decode_type (n, t->subtype); + fprintf (codefile, + "len = origlen - ret;\n" + "}\n" + "ret += oldret;\n" + "}\n"); + free (n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + decode_primitive ("generalized_time", name); + break; + case TGeneralString: + decode_primitive ("general_string", name); + break; + case TApplication: + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, APPL, CONS, %d, " + "&reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "{\n" + "int dce_fix;\n" + "if((dce_fix = fix_dce(reallen, &len)) < 0)\n" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n", + t->application); + decode_type (name, t->subtype); + fprintf(codefile, + "if(dce_fix){\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length (p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "FORW;\n" + "}\n" + "}\n"); + + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_decode (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int " + "decode_%s(const unsigned char *, size_t, %s *, size_t *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "#define FORW " + "if(e) return e; " + "p += l; " + "len -= l; " + "ret += l\n\n"); + + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "decode_%s(const unsigned char *p," + " size_t len, %s *data, size_t *size)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + switch (s->type->type) { + case TInteger: + fprintf (codefile, "return decode_integer (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TOctetString: + fprintf (codefile, "return decode_octet_string (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TGeneralizedTime: + fprintf (codefile, "return decode_generalized_time (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TGeneralString: + fprintf (codefile, "return decode_general_string (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TBitString: + case TSequence: + case TSequenceOf: + case TApplication: + case TType: + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t ret = 0, reallen;\n" + "size_t l;\n" + "int i, e;\n\n"); + fprintf(codefile, "i = 0;\n"); /* hack to avoid `unused variable' */ + + decode_type ("data", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, + "if(size) *size = ret;\n" + "return 0;\n"); + break; + default: + abort (); + } + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} + +void +generate_seq_type_decode (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int decode_seq_%s(const unsigned char *, size_t, int, int, " + "%s *, size_t *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "decode_seq_%s(const unsigned char *p, size_t len, int tag, " + "int optional, %s *data, size_t *size)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t newlen, oldlen;\n" + "size_t l, ret = 0;\n" + "int e;\n" + "int dce_fix;\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_match_tag(p, len, CONTEXT, CONS, tag, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n"); + fprintf (codefile, + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "e = der_get_length(p, len, &newlen, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n" + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "oldlen = len;\n" + "if ((dce_fix = fix_dce(newlen, &len)) < 0)\n" + "return ASN1_BAD_FORMAT;\n" + "e = decode_%s(p, len, data, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n" + "p += l;\n" + "len -= l;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "if (dce_fix) {\n" + "size_t reallen;\n\n" + "e = der_match_tag_and_length(p, len, " + "(Der_class)0, (Der_type)0, 0, &reallen, &l);\n" + "if (e)\n" + "return e;\n" + "ret += l;\n" + "}\n", + s->gen_name); + fprintf (codefile, + "if(size) *size = ret;\n" + "return 0;\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e9b293 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_encode.c @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_encode.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +encode_primitive (const char *typename, const char *name) +{ + fprintf (codefile, + "e = encode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + typename, + name); +} + +static void +encode_type (const char *name, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + encode_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, + "e = encode_%s(p, len, %s, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + encode_primitive ("integer", name); + break; + case TOctetString: + encode_primitive ("octet_string", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + Member *m; + int pos; + int rest; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "unsigned char c = 0;\n"); + pos = t->members->prev->val; + /* fix for buggy MIT (and OSF?) code */ + if (pos > 31) + abort (); + /* + * It seems that if we do not always set pos to 31 here, the MIT + * code will do the wrong thing. + * + * I hate ASN.1 (and DER), but I hate it even more when everybody + * has to screw it up differently. + */ + pos = 31; + rest = 7 - (pos % 8); + + for (m = t->members->prev; m && tag != m->val; m = m->prev) { + while (m->val / 8 < pos / 8) { + fprintf (codefile, + "*p-- = c; len--; ret++;\n" + "c = 0;\n"); + pos -= 8; + } + fprintf (codefile, + "if(%s->%s) c |= 1<<%d;\n", name, m->gen_name, + 7 - m->val % 8); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + + fprintf (codefile, + "*p-- = c;\n" + "*p-- = %d;\n" + "len -= 2;\n" + "ret += 2;\n" + "}\n\n" + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, UNIV, PRIM," + "UT_BitString, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + rest); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members->prev; m && tag != m->val; m = m->prev) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if (m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, + "if(%s)\n", + s); +#if 1 + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "int oldret = ret;\n" + "ret = 0;\n"); +#endif + encode_type (s, m->type); + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, CONTEXT, CONS, " + "%d, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + m->val); +#if 1 + fprintf (codefile, + "ret += oldret;\n" + "}\n"); +#endif + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n"); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, + "for(i = (%s)->len - 1; i >= 0; --i) {\n" +#if 1 + "int oldret = ret;\n" + "ret = 0;\n", +#else + , +#endif + name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[i]", name); + encode_type (n, t->subtype); + fprintf (codefile, +#if 1 + "ret += oldret;\n" +#endif + "}\n" + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, UNIV, CONS, UT_Sequence, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n"); + free (n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + encode_primitive ("generalized_time", name); + break; + case TGeneralString: + encode_primitive ("general_string", name); + break; + case TApplication: + encode_type (name, t->subtype); + fprintf (codefile, + "e = der_put_length_and_tag (p, len, ret, APPL, CONS, %d, &l);\n" + "BACK;\n", + t->application); + break; + default: + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_encode (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "int " + "encode_%s(unsigned char *, size_t, const %s *, size_t *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "#define BACK if (e) return e; p -= l; len -= l; ret += l\n\n"); + + + fprintf (codefile, "int\n" + "encode_%s(unsigned char *p, size_t len," + " const %s *data, size_t *size)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + switch (s->type->type) { + case TInteger: + fprintf (codefile, "return encode_integer (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TOctetString: + fprintf (codefile, "return encode_octet_string (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TGeneralizedTime: + fprintf (codefile, "return encode_generalized_time (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TGeneralString: + fprintf (codefile, "return encode_general_string (p, len, data, size);\n"); + break; + case TBitString: + case TSequence: + case TSequenceOf: + case TApplication: + case TType: + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t ret = 0;\n" + "size_t l;\n" + "int i, e;\n\n"); + fprintf(codefile, "i = 0;\n"); /* hack to avoid `unused variable' */ + + encode_type ("data", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, "*size = ret;\n" + "return 0;\n"); + break; + default: + abort (); + } + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_free.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f6078b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_free.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_free.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +free_primitive (const char *typename, const char *name) +{ + fprintf (codefile, "free_%s(%s);\n", typename, name); +} + +static void +free_type (const char *name, const Type *t) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + free_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, "free_%s(%s);\n", t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + break; + case TOctetString: + free_primitive ("octet_string", name); + break; + case TBitString: { + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if(m->optional) + fprintf(codefile, "if(%s) {\n", s); + free_type (s, m->type); + if(m->optional) + fprintf(codefile, + "free(%s);\n" + "}\n",s); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, "while((%s)->len){\n", name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[(%s)->len-1]", name, name); + free_type(n, t->subtype); + fprintf(codefile, + "(%s)->len--;\n" + "}\n", + name); + fprintf(codefile, + "free((%s)->val);\n", name); + free(n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + break; + case TGeneralString: + free_primitive ("general_string", name); + break; + case TApplication: + free_type (name, t->subtype); + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_free (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "void free_%s (%s *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, "void\n" + "free_%s(%s *data)\n" + "{\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + free_type ("data", s->type); + fprintf (codefile, "}\n\n"); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f6280a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_glue.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +generate_2int (const Symbol *s) +{ + Type *t = s->type; + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + fprintf (headerfile, + "unsigned %s2int(%s);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "unsigned %s2int(%s f)\n" + "{\n" + "unsigned r = 0;\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + fprintf (codefile, "if(f.%s) r |= (1U << %d);\n", + m->gen_name, m->val); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + fprintf (codefile, "return r;\n" + "}\n\n"); +} + +static void +generate_int2 (const Symbol *s) +{ + Type *t = s->type; + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + fprintf (headerfile, + "%s int2%s(unsigned);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "%s int2%s(unsigned n)\n" + "{\n" + "\t%s flags;\n\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + for (m = t->members; m && m->val != tag; m = m->next) { + fprintf (codefile, "\tflags.%s = (n >> %d) & 1;\n", + m->gen_name, m->val); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + fprintf (codefile, "\treturn flags;\n" + "}\n\n"); +} + +/* + * This depends on the bit string being declared in increasing order + */ + +static void +generate_units (const Symbol *s) +{ + Type *t = s->type; + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + fprintf (headerfile, + "extern struct units %s_units[];", + s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "struct units %s_units[] = {\n", + s->gen_name); + + if(t->members) + for (m = t->members->prev; m && m->val != tag; m = m->prev) { + fprintf (codefile, + "\t{\"%s\",\t1U << %d},\n", m->gen_name, m->val); + + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + } + + fprintf (codefile, + "\t{NULL,\t0}\n" + "};\n\n"); +} + +void +generate_glue (const Symbol *s) +{ + switch(s->type->type) { + case TBitString : + generate_2int (s); + generate_int2 (s); + generate_units (s); + break; + default : + break; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_length.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_length.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c3566d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_length.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: gen_length.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static void +length_primitive (const char *typename, + const char *name, + const char *variable) +{ + fprintf (codefile, "%s += length_%s(%s);\n", variable, typename, name); +} + +static void +length_type (const char *name, const Type *t, const char *variable) +{ + switch (t->type) { + case TType: +#if 0 + length_type (name, t->symbol->type); +#endif + fprintf (codefile, "%s += length_%s(%s);\n", + variable, t->symbol->gen_name, name); + break; + case TInteger: + length_primitive ("integer", name, variable); + break; + case TOctetString: + length_primitive ("octet_string", name, variable); + break; + case TBitString: { + /* + * XXX - Hope this is correct + * look at TBitString case in `encode_type' + */ + fprintf (codefile, "%s += 7;\n", variable); + break; + } + case TSequence: { + Member *m; + int tag = -1; + + if (t->members == NULL) + break; + + for (m = t->members; m && tag != m->val; m = m->next) { + char *s; + + asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->%s", + m->optional ? "" : "&", name, m->gen_name); + if (m->optional) + fprintf (codefile, "if(%s)", s); + fprintf (codefile, "{\n" + "int oldret = %s;\n" + "%s = 0;\n", variable, variable); + length_type (s, m->type, "ret"); + fprintf (codefile, "%s += 1 + length_len(%s) + oldret;\n", + variable, variable); + fprintf (codefile, "}\n"); + if (tag == -1) + tag = m->val; + free (s); + } + fprintf (codefile, + "%s += 1 + length_len(%s);\n", variable, variable); + break; + } + case TSequenceOf: { + char *n; + + fprintf (codefile, + "{\n" + "int oldret = %s;\n" + "int i;\n" + "%s = 0;\n", + variable, variable); + + fprintf (codefile, "for(i = (%s)->len - 1; i >= 0; --i){\n", name); + asprintf (&n, "&(%s)->val[i]", name); + length_type(n, t->subtype, variable); + fprintf (codefile, "}\n"); + + fprintf (codefile, + "%s += 1 + length_len(%s) + oldret;\n" + "}\n", variable, variable); + free(n); + break; + } + case TGeneralizedTime: + length_primitive ("generalized_time", name, variable); + break; + case TGeneralString: + length_primitive ("general_string", name, variable); + break; + case TApplication: + length_type (name, t->subtype, variable); + fprintf (codefile, "ret += 1 + length_len (ret);\n"); + break; + default : + abort (); + } +} + +void +generate_type_length (const Symbol *s) +{ + fprintf (headerfile, + "size_t length_%s(const %s *);\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + fprintf (codefile, + "size_t\n" + "length_%s(const %s *data)\n" + "{\n" + "size_t ret = 0;\n", + s->gen_name, s->gen_name); + + length_type ("data", s->type, "ret"); + fprintf (codefile, "return ret;\n}\n\n"); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ee37ae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/gen_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gen_locl.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __GEN_LOCL_H__ +#define __GEN_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "hash.h" +#include "symbol.h" + +void generate_type (const Symbol *); +void generate_constant (const Symbol *); +void generate_type_encode (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_decode (const Symbol *s); +void generate_seq_type_decode (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_free (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_length (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_copy (const Symbol *s); +void generate_type_maybe (const Symbol *s); +void generate_glue (const Symbol *s); + +void init_generate (char *filename, char *basename); +void close_generate(void); +int yyparse(void); + +extern FILE *headerfile, *codefile, *logfile; + +#endif /* __GEN_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8d3eb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Hash table functions + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hash.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static Hashentry *_search(Hashtab * htab, /* The hash table */ + void *ptr); /* And key */ + +Hashtab * +hashtabnew(int sz, + int (*cmp) (void *, void *), + unsigned (*hash) (void *)) +{ + Hashtab *htab; + int i; + + assert(sz > 0); + + htab = (Hashtab *) malloc(sizeof(Hashtab) + (sz - 1) * sizeof(Hashentry *)); + for (i = 0; i < sz; ++i) + htab->tab[i] = NULL; + + if (htab == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + htab->cmp = cmp; + htab->hash = hash; + htab->sz = sz; + return htab; + } +} + +/* Intern search function */ + +static Hashentry * +_search(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr) +{ + Hashentry *hptr; + + assert(htab && ptr); + + for (hptr = htab->tab[(*htab->hash) (ptr) % htab->sz]; + hptr; + hptr = hptr->next) + if ((*htab->cmp) (ptr, hptr->ptr) == 0) + break; + return hptr; +} + +/* Search for element in hash table */ + +void * +hashtabsearch(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr) +{ + Hashentry *tmp; + + tmp = _search(htab, ptr); + return tmp ? tmp->ptr : tmp; +} + +/* add element to hash table */ +/* if already there, set new value */ +/* !NULL if succesful */ + +void * +hashtabadd(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr) +{ + Hashentry *h = _search(htab, ptr); + Hashentry **tabptr; + + assert(htab && ptr); + + if (h) + free((void *) h->ptr); + else { + h = (Hashentry *) malloc(sizeof(Hashentry)); + if (h == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + tabptr = &htab->tab[(*htab->hash) (ptr) % htab->sz]; + h->next = *tabptr; + *tabptr = h; + h->prev = tabptr; + if (h->next) + h->next->prev = &h->next; + } + h->ptr = ptr; + return h; +} + +/* delete element with key key. Iff freep, free Hashentry->ptr */ + +int +_hashtabdel(Hashtab * htab, void *ptr, int freep) +{ + Hashentry *h; + + assert(htab && ptr); + + h = _search(htab, ptr); + if (h) { + if (freep) + free(h->ptr); + if ((*(h->prev) = h->next)) + h->next->prev = h->prev; + free(h); + return 0; + } else + return -1; +} + +/* Do something for each element */ + +void +hashtabforeach(Hashtab * htab, int (*func) (void *ptr, void *arg), + void *arg) +{ + Hashentry **h, *g; + + assert(htab); + + for (h = htab->tab; h < &htab->tab[htab->sz]; ++h) + for (g = *h; g; g = g->next) + if ((*func) (g->ptr, arg)) + return; +} + +/* standard hash-functions for strings */ + +unsigned +hashadd(const char *s) +{ /* Standard hash function */ + unsigned i; + + assert(s); + + for (i = 0; *s; ++s) + i += *s; + return i; +} + +unsigned +hashcaseadd(const char *s) +{ /* Standard hash function */ + unsigned i; + + assert(s); + + for (i = 0; *s; ++s) + i += toupper(*s); + return i; +} + +#define TWELVE (sizeof(unsigned)) +#define SEVENTYFIVE (6*sizeof(unsigned)) +#define HIGH_BITS (~((unsigned)(~0) >> TWELVE)) + +unsigned +hashjpw(const char *ss) +{ /* another hash function */ + unsigned h = 0; + unsigned g; + const unsigned char *s = (const unsigned char *)ss; + + for (; *s; ++s) { + h = (h << TWELVE) + *s; + if ((g = h & HIGH_BITS)) + h = (h ^ (g >> SEVENTYFIVE)) & ~HIGH_BITS; + } + return h; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b54e102 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * hash.h. Header file for hash table functions + */ + +/* $Id: hash.h,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +struct hashentry { /* Entry in bucket */ + struct hashentry **prev; + struct hashentry *next; + void *ptr; +}; + +typedef struct hashentry Hashentry; + +struct hashtab { /* Hash table */ + int (*cmp)(void *, void *); /* Compare function */ + unsigned (*hash)(void *); /* hash function */ + int sz; /* Size */ + Hashentry *tab[1]; /* The table */ +}; + +typedef struct hashtab Hashtab; + +/* prototypes */ + +Hashtab *hashtabnew(int sz, + int (*cmp)(void *, void *), + unsigned (*hash)(void *)); /* Make new hash table */ + +void *hashtabsearch(Hashtab *htab, /* The hash table */ + void *ptr); /* The key */ + + +void *hashtabadd(Hashtab *htab, /* The hash table */ + void *ptr); /* The element */ + +int _hashtabdel(Hashtab *htab, /* The table */ + void *ptr, /* Key */ + int freep); /* Free data part? */ + +void hashtabforeach(Hashtab *htab, + int (*func)(void *ptr, void *arg), + void *arg); + +unsigned hashadd(const char *s); /* Standard hash function */ +unsigned hashcaseadd(const char *s); /* Standard hash function */ +unsigned hashjpw(const char *s); /* another hash function */ + +/* macros */ + + /* Don't free space */ +#define hashtabdel(htab,key) _hashtabdel(htab,key,FALSE) + +#define hashtabfree(htab,key) _hashtabdel(htab,key,TRUE) /* Do! */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a7f4199 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/k5.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +KERBEROS5 DEFINITIONS ::= +BEGIN + +nt-unknown INTEGER ::= 0 -- Name type not known +nt-principal INTEGER ::= 1 -- Just the name of the principal as in +nt-srv-inst INTEGER ::= 2 -- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt) +nt-srv-hst INTEGER ::= 3 -- Service with host name as instance +nt-srv-xhst INTEGER ::= 4 -- Service with host as remaining components +nt-uid INTEGER ::= 5 -- Unique ID + +Realm ::= GeneralString +PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + name-type[0] INTEGER, + name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString +} + +-- this is not part of RFC1510 +Principal ::= SEQUENCE { + name[0] PrincipalName, + realm[1] Realm +} + +HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE { + addr-type[0] INTEGER, + address[1] OCTET STRING +} + +-- This is from RFC1510. +-- +-- HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { +-- addr-type[0] INTEGER, +-- address[1] OCTET STRING +-- } + +-- This seems much better. +HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress + + +KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- Specifying UTC time zone (Z) + +AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + ad-type[0] INTEGER, + ad-data[1] OCTET STRING +} + +APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + use-session-key(1), + mutual-required(2) +} + +TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + may-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + invalid(7), + renewable(8), + initial(9), + pre-authent(10), + hw-authent(11), + transited-policy-checked(12), + ok-as-delegate(13), + anonymous(14) +} + +KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING { + reserved(0), + forwardable(1), + forwarded(2), + proxiable(3), + proxy(4), + allow-postdate(5), + postdated(6), + unused7(7), + renewable(8), + unused9(9), + unused10(10), + unused11(11), + request-anonymous(14), + disable-transited-check(26), + renewable-ok(27), + enc-tkt-in-skey(28), + renew(30), + validate(31) +} + + +LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + lr-type[0] INTEGER, + lr-value[1] KerberosTime +} + +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext +} + +EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + keytype[0] INTEGER, + keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING +} + +-- encoded Transited field +TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE { + tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered + contents[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + realm[1] Realm, + sname[2] PrincipalName, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} +-- Encrypted part of ticket +EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE { + flags[0] TicketFlags, + key[1] EncryptionKey, + crealm[2] Realm, + cname[3] PrincipalName, + transited[4] TransitedEncoding, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL +} + +Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + checksum[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + crealm[1] Realm, + cname[2] PrincipalName, + cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + cusec[4] INTEGER, + ctime[5] KerberosTime, + subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + } + +PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE { + -- might be encoded AP-REQ + padata-type[1] INTEGER, + padata-value[2] OCTET STRING +} + +ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE { + etype[0] INTEGER, + salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, + salttype[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY + +METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA + +KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + kdc-options[0] KDCOptions, + cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, -- Used only in AS-REQ + realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm + -- Also client's in AS-REQ + sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + nonce[7] INTEGER, + etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER, -- EncryptionType, + -- in preference order + addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL, + enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL, + -- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding + additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL +} + +KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[1] INTEGER, + msg-type[2] INTEGER, + padata[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL, + req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY +} + +AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ +TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ + +-- padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP +-- padata-value ::= EncryptedData - PA-ENC-TS-ENC + +PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE { + patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time + pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + padata[2] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL, + crealm[3] Realm, + cname[4] PrincipalName, + ticket[5] Ticket, + enc-part[6] EncryptedData +} + +AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP +TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP + +EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + last-req[1] LastReq, + nonce[2] INTEGER, + key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + flags[4] TicketFlags, + authtime[5] KerberosTime, + starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[7] KerberosTime, + renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[9] Realm, + sname[10] PrincipalName, + caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart +EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart + +AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ap-options[2] APOptions, + ticket[3] Ticket, + authenticator[4] EncryptedData +} + +AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[2] EncryptedData +} + +EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE { + ctime[0] KerberosTime, + cusec[1] INTEGER, + subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY, + cksum[3] Checksum +} + +KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} +EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE { + user-data[0] OCTET STRING, + timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr +} + +KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED + tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket, + enc-part[3] EncryptedData +} + +KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + key[0] EncryptionKey, + prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL, + pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL, + authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL, + sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL +} + +EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE { + ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo, + nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, + r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL +} + +KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE { + pvno[0] INTEGER, + msg-type[1] INTEGER, + ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + stime[4] KerberosTime, + susec[5] INTEGER, + error-code[6] INTEGER, + crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL, + cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, + realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm + sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name + e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL, + e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL +} + +pvno INTEGER ::= 5 -- current Kerberos protocol version number + +-- message types + +krb-as-req INTEGER ::= 10 -- Request for initial authentication +krb-as-rep INTEGER ::= 11 -- Response to KRB_AS_REQ request +krb-tgs-req INTEGER ::= 12 -- Request for authentication based on TGT +krb-tgs-rep INTEGER ::= 13 -- Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request +krb-ap-req INTEGER ::= 14 -- application request to server +krb-ap-rep INTEGER ::= 15 -- Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL +krb-safe INTEGER ::= 20 -- Safe (checksummed) application message +krb-priv INTEGER ::= 21 -- Private (encrypted) application message +krb-cred INTEGER ::= 22 -- Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials +krb-error INTEGER ::= 30 -- Error response + +-- pa-data types + +pa-tgs-req INTEGER ::= 1 +pa-enc-timestamp INTEGER ::= 2 +pa-pw-salt INTEGER ::= 3 +pa-enc-unix-time INTEGER ::= 5 +pa-sandia-secureid INTEGER ::= 6 +pa-sesame INTEGER ::= 7 +pa-osf-dce INTEGER ::= 8 +pa-cybersafe-secureid INTEGER ::= 9 +pa-afs3-salt INTEGER ::= 10 +pa-etype-info INTEGER ::= 11 +sam-challenge INTEGER ::= 12 -- (sam/otp) +sam-response INTEGER ::= 13 -- (sam/otp) +pa-pk-as-req INTEGER ::= 14 -- (pkinit) +pa-pk-as-rep INTEGER ::= 15 -- (pkinit) +pa-pk-as-sign INTEGER ::= 16 -- (pkinit) +pa-pk-key-req INTEGER ::= 17 -- (pkinit) +pa-pk-key-rep INTEGER ::= 18 -- (pkinit) +-- checksumtypes + +CRC32 INTEGER ::= 1 +rsa-md4 INTEGER ::= 2 +rsa-md4-des INTEGER ::= 3 +des-mac INTEGER ::= 4 +des-mac-k INTEGER ::= 5 +rsa-md4-des-k INTEGER ::= 6 +rsa-md5 INTEGER ::= 7 +rsa-md5-des INTEGER ::= 8 +rsa-md5-des3 INTEGER ::= 9 +hmac-sha1-des3 INTEGER ::= 12 + +-- transited encodings + +DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS INTEGER ::= 1 + +END + +-- etags -r '/\([A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9]*\).*::=/\1/' k5.asn1 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66d708c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: lex.h,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +void error_message (char *, ...); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.l b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.l new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3fbf71 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/lex.l @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: lex.l,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#include "symbol.h" +#include "parse.h" + +void error_message(char *, ...); + +static unsigned lineno = 1; + +/* ","|"{"|"}"|"("|")"|"["|"]"|"|" { return *yytext; } */ +%} + + +%% +INTEGER { return INTEGER; } +SEQUENCE { return SEQUENCE; } +OF { return OF; } +OCTET { return OCTET; } +STRING { return STRING; } +GeneralizedTime { return GeneralizedTime; } +GeneralString { return GeneralString; } +BIT { return BIT; } +APPLICATION { return APPLICATION; } +OPTIONAL { return OPTIONAL; } +BEGIN { return TBEGIN; } +END { return END; } +DEFINITIONS { return DEFINITIONS; } +EXTERNAL { return EXTERNAL; } +[,{}()|] { return *yytext; } +"[" { return *yytext; } +"]" { return *yytext; } +::= { return EEQUAL; } +--[^\n]*\n { ; } +-?[0-9]+ { yylval.constant = atoi(yytext); return CONSTANT; } +[A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9_]* { yylval.name = strdup (yytext); return IDENTIFIER; } +[ \t] ; +\n { lineno++; } +. { error_message("Ignoring char(%c)\n", *yytext); } +%% + +#ifndef yywrap /* XXX */ +int +yywrap () +{ + return 1; +} +#endif + +void +error_message (char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start (args, format); + fprintf (stderr, ":%d: ", lineno); + vfprintf (stderr, format, args); + va_end (args); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/libasn1.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/libasn1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90eda60 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/libasn1.h @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: libasn1.h,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __LIBASN1_H__ +#define __LIBASN1_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "asn1.h" +#include "der.h" +#include "asn1_err.h" +#include + +#endif /* __LIBASN1_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/main.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..538af5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/main.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: main.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +extern FILE *yyin; + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "[asn1-file [name]]"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ret; + char *file; + char *name = NULL; + int optind = 0; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + if (argc == optind) { + file = "stdin"; + name = "stdin"; + yyin = stdin; + } else { + file = argv[optind]; + yyin = fopen (file, "r"); + if (yyin == NULL) + err (1, "open %s", file); + name = argv[optind + 1]; + } + + init_generate (file, name); + initsym (); + ret = yyparse (); + close_generate (); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/parse.y b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/parse.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9e82b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/parse.y @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse.y,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +%{ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include "symbol.h" +#include "lex.h" +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: parse.y,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static Type *new_type (Typetype t); +void yyerror (char *); +int yylex(void); + +static void append (Member *l, Member *r); + +%} + +%union { + int constant; + char *name; + Type *type; + Member *member; +} + +%token INTEGER SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING GeneralizedTime GeneralString +%token BIT APPLICATION OPTIONAL EEQUAL TBEGIN END DEFINITIONS EXTERNAL +%token IDENTIFIER +%token CONSTANT + +%type constant optional2 +%type type +%type memberdecls memberdecl bitdecls bitdecl + +%start envelope + +%% + +envelope : IDENTIFIER DEFINITIONS EEQUAL TBEGIN specification END {} + ; + +specification : + | specification declaration + ; + +declaration : extern_decl + | type_decl + | constant_decl + ; + +extern_decl : IDENTIFIER EXTERNAL + { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + s->stype = Stype; + } + ; + +type_decl : IDENTIFIER EEQUAL type + { + Symbol *s = addsym ($1); + s->stype = Stype; + s->type = $3; + generate_type (s); + } + ; + +constant_decl : IDENTIFIER type EEQUAL constant + { + Symbol *s = addsym ($1); + s->stype = SConstant; + s->constant = $4; + generate_constant (s); + } + ; + +type : INTEGER { $$ = new_type(TInteger); } + | OCTET STRING { $$ = new_type(TOctetString); } + | GeneralString { $$ = new_type(TGeneralString); } + | GeneralizedTime { $$ = new_type(TGeneralizedTime); } + | SEQUENCE OF type + { + $$ = new_type(TSequenceOf); + $$->subtype = $3; + } + | SEQUENCE '{' memberdecls '}' + { + $$ = new_type(TSequence); + $$->members = $3; + } + | BIT STRING '{' bitdecls '}' + { + $$ = new_type(TBitString); + $$->members = $4; + } + | IDENTIFIER + { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + $$ = new_type(TType); + if(s->stype != Stype) + error_message ("%s is not a type\n", $1); + else + $$->symbol = s; + } + | '[' APPLICATION constant ']' type + { + $$ = new_type(TApplication); + $$->subtype = $5; + $$->application = $3; + } + ; + +memberdecls : { $$ = NULL; } + | memberdecl { $$ = $1; } + | memberdecls ',' memberdecl { $$ = $1; append($$, $3); } + ; + +memberdecl : IDENTIFIER '[' constant ']' type optional2 + { + $$ = malloc(sizeof(*$$)); + $$->name = $1; + $$->gen_name = strdup($1); + output_name ($$->gen_name); + $$->val = $3; + $$->optional = $6; + $$->type = $5; + $$->next = $$->prev = $$; + } + ; + +optional2 : { $$ = 0; } + | OPTIONAL { $$ = 1; } + ; + +bitdecls : { $$ = NULL; } + | bitdecl { $$ = $1; } + | bitdecls ',' bitdecl { $$ = $1; append($$, $3); } + ; + +bitdecl : IDENTIFIER '(' constant ')' + { + $$ = malloc(sizeof(*$$)); + $$->name = $1; + $$->gen_name = strdup($1); + output_name ($$->gen_name); + $$->val = $3; + $$->optional = 0; + $$->type = NULL; + $$->prev = $$->next = $$; + } + ; + +constant : CONSTANT { $$ = $1; } + | IDENTIFIER { + Symbol *s = addsym($1); + if(s->stype != SConstant) + error_message ("%s is not a constant\n", + s->name); + else + $$ = s->constant; + } + ; +%% + +void +yyerror (char *s) +{ + error_message ("%s\n", s); +} + +static Type * +new_type (Typetype tt) +{ + Type *t = malloc(sizeof(*t)); + if (t == NULL) { + error_message ("out of memory in malloc(%u)", sizeof(*t)); + exit (1); + } + t->type = tt; + t->application = 0; + t->members = NULL; + t->subtype = NULL; + t->symbol = NULL; + return t; +} + +static void +append (Member *l, Member *r) +{ + l->prev->next = r; + r->prev = l->prev; + l->prev = r; + r->next = l; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e6e741 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gen_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: symbol.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +static Hashtab *htab; + +static int +cmp (void *a, void *b) +{ + Symbol *s1 = (Symbol *)a; + Symbol *s2 = (Symbol *)b; + + return strcmp (s1->name, s2->name); +} + +static unsigned +hash (void *a) +{ + Symbol *s = (Symbol *)a; + + return hashjpw (s->name); +} + +void +initsym () +{ + htab = hashtabnew (101, cmp, hash); +} + + +void +output_name (char *s) +{ + char *p; + + for (p = s; *p; ++p) + if (*p == '-') + *p = '_'; +} + +Symbol* +addsym (char *name) +{ + Symbol key, *s; + + key.name = name; + s = (Symbol *)hashtabsearch (htab, (void *)&key); + if (s == NULL) { + s = (Symbol *)malloc (sizeof (*s)); + s->name = name; + s->gen_name = strdup(name); + output_name (s->gen_name); + s->stype = SUndefined; + hashtabadd (htab, s); + } + return s; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc4707f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/symbol.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: symbol.h,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _SYMBOL_H +#define _SYMBOL_H + +enum typetype { TInteger, TOctetString, TBitString, TSequence, TSequenceOf, + TGeneralizedTime, TGeneralString, TApplication, TType, + TUInteger }; + +typedef enum typetype Typetype; + +struct type; + +struct member { + char *name; + char *gen_name; + int val; + int optional; + struct type *type; + struct member *next, *prev; +}; + +typedef struct member Member; + +struct symbol; + +struct type { + Typetype type; + int application; + Member *members; + struct type *subtype; + struct symbol *symbol; +}; + +typedef struct type Type; + +struct symbol { + char *name; + char *gen_name; + enum { SUndefined, SConstant, Stype } stype; + int constant; + Type *type; +}; + +typedef struct symbol Symbol; + +void initsym (void); +Symbol *addsym (char *); +void output_name (char *); +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/timegm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/timegm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdc997f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/asn1/timegm.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "der_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: timegm.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:02 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM + +static int +is_leap(unsigned y) +{ + y += 1900; + return (y % 4) == 0 && ((y % 100) != 0 || (y % 400) == 0); +} + +time_t +timegm (struct tm *tm) +{ + static const unsigned ndays[2][12] ={ + {31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31}, + {31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31}}; + time_t res = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 70; i < tm->tm_year; ++i) + res += is_leap(i) ? 366 : 365; + + for (i = 0; i < tm->tm_mon; ++i) + res += ndays[is_leap(tm->tm_year)][i]; + res += tm->tm_mday - 1; + res *= 24; + res += tm->tm_hour; + res *= 60; + res += tm->tm_min; + res *= 60; + res += tm->tm_sec; + return res; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_TIMEGM */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b1ebaf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +1999-12-30 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/Makefile.am: try to link with shared libraries if we don't + find any static ones + +1999-12-20 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia.c: don't use string concatenation with TKT_ROOT + +1999-11-15 Assar Westerlund + + * */lib/Makefile.in: set LIBNAME. From Enrico Scholz + + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): need realm for v5 -> v4 + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): update to new + krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-09-28 Assar Westerlund + + * sia/sia.c (doauth): use krb5_get_local_realms and + krb5_verify_user_lrealm + + * afskauthlib/verify.c (verify_krb5): remove krb5_kuserok. use + krb5_verify_user_lrealm + +1999-08-11 Johan Danielsson + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: make this compile w/o krb4 + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: incorporate patches from Miroslav Ruda + + +Thu Apr 8 14:35:34 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia.c: remove definition of KRB_VERIFY_USER (moved to + config.h) + + * sia/Makefile.am: make it build w/o krb4 + + * afskauthlib/verify.c: add krb5 support + + * afskauthlib/Makefile.am: build afskauthlib.so + +Wed Apr 7 14:06:22 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia.c: make it compile w/o krb4 + + * sia/Makefile.am: make it compile w/o krb4 + +Thu Apr 1 18:09:23 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/sia_locl.h: POSIX_GETPWNAM_R is defined in config.h + +Sun Mar 21 14:08:30 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * sia/Makefile.in: add posix_getpw.c + + * sia/Makefile.am: makefile for sia + + * sia/posix_getpw.c: move from sia.c + + * sia/sia_locl.h: merge with krb5 version + + * sia/sia.c: merge with krb5 version + + * sia/sia5.c: remove unused variables diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0310dc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 1999/03/21 17:11:08 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +DIST_SUBDIRS = afskauthlib pam sia diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aab069e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,599 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 1999/03/21 17:11:08 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = 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install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +afskauthlib.so: $(OBJS) + $(LD) -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L) + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +$(OBJS): $(top_builddir)/include/config.h + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c23119 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/afskauthlib/verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verify.c,v 1.20 1999/12/02 16:58:37 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +static char krb5ccname[128]; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +static char krbtkfile[128]; +#endif + +/* + In some cases is afs_gettktstring called twice (once before + afs_verify and once after afs_verify). + In some cases (rlogin with access allowed via .rhosts) + afs_verify is not called! + So we can't rely on correct value in krbtkfile in some + cases! +*/ + +static int correct_tkfilename=0; +static int pag_set=0; + +#ifdef KRB4 +static void +set_krbtkfile(uid_t uid) +{ + snprintf (krbtkfile, sizeof(krbtkfile), "%s%d", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)uid); + krb_set_tkt_string (krbtkfile); + correct_tkfilename = 1; +} +#endif + +/* XXX this has to be the default cache name, since the KRB5CCNAME + * environment variable isn't exported by login/xdm + */ + +#ifdef KRB5 +static void +set_krb5ccname(uid_t uid) +{ + snprintf (krb5ccname, sizeof(krb5ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d", uid); +#ifdef KRB4 + snprintf (krbtkfile, sizeof(krbtkfile), "%s%d", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)uid); +#endif + correct_tkfilename = 1; +} +#endif + +static void +set_spec_krbtkfile(void) +{ + int fd; +#ifdef KRB4 + snprintf (krbtkfile, sizeof(krbtkfile), "%s_XXXXXX", TKT_ROOT); + fd = mkstemp(krbtkfile); + close(fd); + unlink(krbtkfile); + krb_set_tkt_string (krbtkfile); +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + snprintf(krb5ccname, sizeof(krb5ccname),"FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_XXXXXX"); + fd=mkstemp(krb5ccname+5); + close(fd); + unlink(krb5ccname+5); +#endif +} + +#ifdef KRB5 +static int +verify_krb5(struct passwd *pwd, + char *password, + int32_t *exp, + int quiet) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal principal; + + krb5_init_context(&context); + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, pwd->pw_name, &principal); + if (ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_parse_name: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + + set_krb5ccname(pwd->pw_uid); + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, krb5ccname, &ccache); + if(ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_cc_resolve: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(context, + principal, + ccache, + password, + TRUE, + NULL); + if(ret) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_verify_user: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + goto out; + } + + if(chown(krb5_cc_get_name(context, ccache), pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid)) { + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "chown: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, errno)); + goto out; + } + +#ifdef KRB4 + if (krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "krb4_get_tickets", + NULL)) { + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_creds mcred, cred; + krb5_realm realm; + + krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm); + krb5_make_principal(context, &mcred.server, realm, + "krbtgt", + realm, + NULL); + free (realm); + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, ccache, 0, &mcred, &cred); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(context, ccache, &cred, &c); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "converting creds"); + else { + set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid); + tf_setup(&c, c.pname, c.pinst); + } + memset(&c, 0, sizeof(c)); + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + } else + syslog(LOG_AUTH|LOG_DEBUG, "krb5_cc_retrieve_cred: %s", + krb5_get_err_text(context, ret)); + + krb5_free_principal(context, mcred.server); + } + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set = 1; + krb5_afslog_uid_home(context, ccache, NULL, NULL, + pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + } +#endif +out: + if(ret && !quiet) + printf ("%s\n", krb5_get_err_text (context, ret)); + return ret; +} +#endif + +#ifdef KRB4 +static int +verify_krb4(struct passwd *pwd, + char *password, + int32_t *exp, + int quiet) +{ + int ret = 1; + char lrealm[REALM_SZ]; + + if (krb_get_lrealm (lrealm, 1) != KFAILURE) { + set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid); + ret = krb_verify_user (pwd->pw_name, "", lrealm, password, + KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL); + if (ret == KSUCCESS) { + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag (); + pag_set = 1; + krb_afslog_uid_home (0, 0, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_dir); + } + } else if (!quiet) + printf ("%s\n", krb_get_err_text (ret)); + } + return ret; +} +#endif + +int +afs_verify(char *name, + char *password, + int32_t *exp, + int quiet) +{ + int ret = 1; + struct passwd *pwd = k_getpwnam (name); + + if(pwd == NULL) + return 1; + if (ret) + ret = unix_verify_user (name, password); +#ifdef KRB5 + if (ret) + ret = verify_krb5(pwd, password, exp, quiet); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + if(ret) + ret = verify_krb4(pwd, password, exp, quiet); +#endif + return ret; +} + +char * +afs_gettktstring (void) +{ + char *ptr; + struct passwd *pwd; + + if (!correct_tkfilename) { + ptr = getenv("LOGNAME"); + if (ptr != NULL && ((pwd = getpwnam(ptr)) != NULL)) { + set_krb5ccname(pwd->pw_uid); +#ifdef KRB4 + set_krbtkfile(pwd->pw_uid); + if (!pag_set && k_hasafs()) { + k_setpag(); + pag_set=1; + } +#endif + } else { + set_spec_krbtkfile(); + } + } +#ifdef KRB5 + setenv("KRB5CCNAME",krb5ccname,1); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + setenv("KRBTKFILE",krbtkfile,1); + return krbtkfile; +#else + return ""; +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..abde2d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 1999/04/01 14:57:04 joda Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37f8d22 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,491 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.2 1999/04/01 14:57:04 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp 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bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g 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./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d919bf8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.c @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* This code is extremely ugly, and would probably be better off + beeing completely rewritten */ + + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: pam.c,v 1.22 1999/12/02 16:58:37 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define PAM_SM_AUTH +#define PAM_SM_SESSION +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +static int +cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *data, int error_code) +{ + if(error_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + dest_tkt(); + free(data); + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + +static int +doit(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *name, char *inst, char *pwd, char *tkt) +{ + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + int ret; + + pam_set_data(pamh, "KRBTKFILE", strdup(tkt), cleanup); + krb_set_tkt_string(tkt); + + krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1); + ret = krb_verify_user(name, inst, realm, pwd, KRB_VERIFY_SECURE, NULL); + memset(pwd, 0, strlen(pwd)); + switch(ret){ + case KSUCCESS: + return PAM_SUCCESS; + case KDC_PR_UNKNOWN: + return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; + case SKDC_CANT: + case SKDC_RETRY: + case RD_AP_TIME: + return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; + default: + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } +} + +static int +auth_login(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, char *user, struct pam_conv *conv) +{ + int ret; + struct pam_message msg, *pmsg; + struct pam_response *resp; + char prompt[128]; + + pmsg = &msg; + msg.msg_style = PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF; + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's Password: ", user); + msg.msg = prompt; + + ret = conv->conv(1, (const struct pam_message**)&pmsg, + &resp, conv->appdata_ptr); + if(ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + { + char tkt[1024]; + struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(user); + + if(pw){ + snprintf(tkt, sizeof(tkt), + "%s%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)pw->pw_uid); + ret = doit(pamh, user, "", resp->resp, tkt); + if(ret == PAM_SUCCESS) + chown(tkt, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + }else + ret = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN; + memset(resp->resp, 0, strlen(resp->resp)); + free(resp->resp); + free(resp); + } + return ret; +} + +static int +auth_su(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, char *user, struct pam_conv *conv) +{ + int ret; + struct passwd *pw; + struct pam_message msg, *pmsg; + struct pam_response *resp; + char prompt[128]; + krb_principal pr; + + pr.realm[0] = 0; + ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, "login: "); + if(ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if(strcmp(user, "root") == 0){ + strlcpy(pr.name, pw->pw_name, sizeof(pr.name)); + strlcpy(pr.instance, "root", sizeof(pr.instance)); + }else{ + strlcpy(pr.name, user, sizeof(pr.name)); + pr.instance[0] = 0; + } + pmsg = &msg; + msg.msg_style = PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF; + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's Password: ", krb_unparse_name(&pr)); + msg.msg = prompt; + + ret = conv->conv(1, (const struct pam_message**)&pmsg, + &resp, conv->appdata_ptr); + if(ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + { + char tkt[1024]; + + snprintf(tkt, sizeof(tkt),"%s_%s_to_%s", + TKT_ROOT, pw->pw_name, user); + ret = doit(pamh, pr.name, pr.instance, resp->resp, tkt); + if(ret == PAM_SUCCESS) + chown(tkt, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); + memset(resp->resp, 0, strlen(resp->resp)); + free(resp->resp); + free(resp); + } + return ret; +} + +int +pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) +{ + char *user; + int ret; + struct pam_conv *conv; + ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, "login: "); + if(ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, (void*)&conv); + if(ret != PAM_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + + if(getuid() != geteuid()) + return auth_su(pamh, flags, user, conv); + else + return auth_login(pamh, flags, user, conv); +} + +int +pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) +{ + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + + +int +pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) +{ + char *tkt, *var; + void *user; + const char *homedir = NULL; + + if(pam_get_item (pamh, PAM_USER, &user) == PAM_SUCCESS) { + struct passwd *pwd; + + pwd = getpwnam ((char *)user); + if (pwd != NULL) + homedir = pwd->pw_dir; + } + + pam_get_data(pamh, "KRBTKFILE", (const void**)&tkt); + var = malloc(strlen("KRBTKFILE=") + strlen(tkt) + 1); + strcpy(var, "KRBTKFILE="); + strcat(var, tkt); + putenv(var); + pam_putenv(pamh, var); + if(k_hasafs()){ + k_setpag(); + krb_afslog_home(0, 0, homedir); + } + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + + +int +pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv) +{ + dest_tkt(); + if(k_hasafs()) + k_unlog(); + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42497d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/pam/pam.conf.add @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +To enable PAM in dtlogin and /bin/login under SunOS 5.6 apply this patch: + +--- /etc/pam.conf.DIST Mon Jul 20 15:37:46 1998 ++++ /etc/pam.conf Tue Nov 30 18:47:22 1999 +@@ -4,12 +4,14 @@ + # + # Authentication management + # ++login auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so + login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_dial_auth.so.1 + # + rlogin auth sufficient /usr/lib/security/pam_rhosts_auth.so.1 + rlogin auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # ++dtlogin auth sufficient /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so + dtlogin auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # + rsh auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_rhosts_auth.so.1 +@@ -24,6 +26,8 @@ + # + # Session management + # ++dtlogin session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so ++login session required /usr/athena/lib/pam_krb4.so + other session required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 + # + # Password management +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +To enable PAM in /bin/login and xdm under Red Hat 6.1 apply these patches: + +--- /etc/pam.d/login~ Thu Jul 8 00:14:02 1999 ++++ /etc/pam.d/login Mon Aug 30 14:33:12 1999 +@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@ + #%PAM-1.0 ++# Updated to work with kerberos ++auth sufficient /lib/security/pam_krb4.so + auth required /lib/security/pam_securetty.so + auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok + auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so + account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so + password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so nullok use_authtok shadow ++session required /lib/security/pam_krb4.so + session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so +--- /etc/pam.d/xdm~ Mon Jun 14 17:39:05 1999 ++++ /etc/pam.d/xdm Mon Aug 30 14:54:51 1999 +@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ + #%PAM-1.0 ++auth sufficient /lib/security/pam_krb4.so + auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok + auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so + account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so + password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok ++session required /lib/security/pam_krb4.so + session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so + session optional /lib/security/pam_console.so +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +This stuff may work under some other system. + +# To get this to work, you will have to add entries to /etc/pam.conf +# +# To make login kerberos-aware, you might change pam.conf to look +# like: + +# login authorization +login auth sufficient /lib/security/pam_krb4.so +login auth required /lib/security/pam_securetty.so +login auth required /lib/security/pam_unix_auth.so +login account required /lib/security/pam_unix_acct.so +login password required /lib/security/pam_unix_passwd.so +login session required /lib/security/pam_krb4.so +login session required /lib/security/pam_unix_session.so diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efba5c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/12/30 03:47:03 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +WFLAGS += $(WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT) + +DEFS = @DEFS@ + +## this is horribly ugly, but automake/libtool doesn't allow us to +## unconditionally build shared libraries, and it does not allow us to +## link with non-installed libraries + +if KRB4 +KAFS=$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/.libs/libkafs.a +KAFS_S=$(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/.libs/libkafs.so +endif + +L = \ + $(KAFS) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.a \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/.libs/libasn1.a \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/.libs/libdes.a \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/.libs/libcom_err.a \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.a \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +L_shared = \ + $(KAFS_S) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.so \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/.libs/libasn1.so \ + $(LIB_krb4) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/.libs/libdes.so \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/.libs/libcom_err.so \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/roken/.libs/libroken.so \ + $(LIB_getpwnam_r) \ + -lc + +EXTRA_DIST = sia.c krb5_matrix.conf krb5+c2_matrix.conf security.patch + +foodir = $(libdir) +foo_DATA = libsia_krb5.so + +LDFLAGS = -rpath $(libdir) -hidden -exported_symbol siad_\* + +OBJS = sia.o posix_getpw.o + +libsia_krb5.so: $(OBJS) + if test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.a; then \ + ld -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L); \ + elif test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.so; then \ + ld -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared); \ + else \ + echo "missing libraries"; exit 1; \ + fi + ostrip -x -z $@ + +CLEANFILES = libsia_krb5.so $(OBJS) so_locations + +SUFFIXES += .c .o + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb36b4e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,551 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.5 1999/12/30 03:47:03 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x .c .o + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + 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if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +libsia_krb5.so: $(OBJS) + if test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.a; then \ + ld -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L); \ + elif test -f $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/.libs/libkrb5.so; then \ + ld -shared -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(L_shared); \ + else \ + echo "missing libraries"; exit 1; \ + fi + ostrip -x -z $@ + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b90e02 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4+c2_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +# Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +# (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +# are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# +# 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +# may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +# without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +# ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +# SUCH DAMAGE. + +# $Id: krb4+c2_matrix.conf,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:37 joda Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 4 + C2) + +siad_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_estab=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_finger=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_password=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_shell=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chk_user=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f55a81 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb4_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +# (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +# are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# +# 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors +# may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software +# without specific prior written permission. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +# ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +# IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +# ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +# SUCH DAMAGE. + +# $Id: krb4_matrix.conf,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:37 joda Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 4 + BSD) + +siad_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_estab=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_finger=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_password=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_shell=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_user=(KRB4,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb4.so)(BSD,libc.so) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2952e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5+c2_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id: krb5+c2_matrix.conf,v 1.2 1998/11/26 20:58:18 assar Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 5 + C2) + +siad_init=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_estab=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_finger=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_password=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chg_shell=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) +siad_chk_user=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e49366a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/krb5_matrix.conf @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $Id: krb5_matrix.conf,v 1.1 1997/05/15 18:34:18 joda Exp $ + +# sia matrix configuration file (Kerberos 5 + BSD) + +siad_init=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_invoker=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_init=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so) +siad_ses_authent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_estab=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_launch=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_suauthent=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_reauthent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_finger=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_password=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chg_shell=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so) +siad_ses_release=(KRB5,/usr/athena/lib/libsia_krb5.so)(BSD,libc.so) +siad_chk_user=(BSD,libc.so) diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c5961dc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/posix_getpw.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "sia_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: posix_getpw.c,v 1.1 1999/03/21 17:07:02 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef POSIX_GETPWNAM_R +/* + * These functions translate from the old Digital UNIX 3.x interface + * to POSIX.1c. + */ + +int +posix_getpwnam_r(const char *name, struct passwd *pwd, + char *buffer, int len, struct passwd **result) +{ + int ret = getpwnam_r(name, pwd, buffer, len); + if(ret == 0) + *result = pwd; + else{ + *result = NULL; + ret = _Geterrno(); + if(ret == 0){ + ret = ERANGE; + _Seterrno(ret); + } + } + return ret; +} + +int +posix_getpwuid_r(uid_t uid, struct passwd *pwd, + char *buffer, int len, struct passwd **result) +{ + int ret = getpwuid_r(uid, pwd, buffer, len); + if(ret == 0) + *result = pwd; + else{ + *result = NULL; + ret = _Geterrno(); + if(ret == 0){ + ret = ERANGE; + _Seterrno(ret); + } + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* POSIX_GETPWNAM_R */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/security.patch b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/security.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c407876 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/security.patch @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +--- /sbin/init.d/security~ Tue Aug 20 22:44:09 1996 ++++ /sbin/init.d/security Fri Nov 1 14:52:56 1996 +@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ + SECURITY=BASE + fi + ;; +- BASE) ++ BASE|KRB4) + ;; + *) + echo "security configuration set to default (BASE)." diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01e2ac0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia.c @@ -0,0 +1,672 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "sia_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sia.c,v 1.33 1999/12/20 09:46:44 joda Exp $"); + +int +siad_init(void) +{ + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_chk_invoker(void) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_chk_invoker")); + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_ses_init(SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind) +{ + struct state *s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_init")); + if(s == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + krb5_init_context(&s->context); +#endif + entity->mech[pkgind] = (int*)s; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +static int +setup_name(SIAENTITY *e, prompt_t *p) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "setup_name")); + e->name = malloc(SIANAMEMIN + 1); + if(e->name == NULL){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to malloc %u bytes", SIANAMEMIN+1)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + p->prompt = (unsigned char*)"login: "; + p->result = (unsigned char*)e->name; + p->min_result_length = 1; + p->max_result_length = SIANAMEMIN; + p->control_flags = 0; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +static int +setup_password(SIAENTITY *e, prompt_t *p) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "setup_password")); + e->password = malloc(SIAMXPASSWORD + 1); + if(e->password == NULL){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to malloc %u bytes", SIAMXPASSWORD+1)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + p->prompt = (unsigned char*)"Password: "; + p->result = (unsigned char*)e->password; + p->min_result_length = 0; + p->max_result_length = SIAMXPASSWORD; + p->control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + + +static int +doauth(SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind, char *name) +{ + struct passwd pw, *pwd; + char pwbuf[1024]; + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + krb5_realm *realms, *r; + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_error_code ret; +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + char *toname, *toinst; + int ret; + struct passwd fpw, *fpwd; + char fpwbuf[1024]; + int secure; +#endif + + if(getpwnam_r(name, &pw, pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), &pwd) != 0){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to getpwnam(%s)", name)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + ret = krb5_get_default_realms(s->context, &realms); + + for (r = realms; *r != NULL; ++r) { + krb5_make_principal (s->context, &principal, *r, entity->name, NULL); + + if(krb5_kuserok(s->context, principal, entity->name)) + break; + } + krb5_free_host_realm (s->context, realms); + if (*r == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + + sprintf(s->ticket, "FILE:/tmp/krb5_cc%d_%d", pwd->pw_uid, getpid()); + ret = krb5_cc_resolve(s->context, s->ticket, &ccache); + if(ret) + return SIADFAIL; +#endif + +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + snprintf(s->ticket, sizeof(s->ticket), + "%s%u_%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid, (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_get_lrealm(realm, 1); + toname = name; + toinst = ""; + if(entity->authtype == SIA_A_SUAUTH){ + uid_t ouid; +#ifdef HAVE_SIAENTITY_OUID + ouid = entity->ouid; +#else + ouid = getuid(); +#endif + if(getpwuid_r(ouid, &fpw, fpwbuf, sizeof(fpwbuf), &fpwd) != 0){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "failed to getpwuid(%u)", ouid)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + snprintf(s->ticket, sizeof(s->ticket), "%s_%s_to_%s_%d", + TKT_ROOT, fpwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_name, getpid()); + if(strcmp(pwd->pw_name, "root") == 0){ + toname = fpwd->pw_name; + toinst = pwd->pw_name; + } + } + if(entity->authtype == SIA_A_REAUTH) + snprintf(s->ticket, sizeof(s->ticket), "%s", tkt_string()); + + krb_set_tkt_string(s->ticket); + + setuid(0); /* XXX fix for fix in tf_util.c */ + if(krb_kuserok(toname, toinst, realm, name)){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "%s.%s@%s is not allowed to login as %s", + toname, toinst, realm, name)); + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + ret = krb5_verify_user_lrealm(s->context, principal, ccache, + entity->password, 1, NULL); + if(ret){ + /* if this is most likely a local user (such as + root), just silently return failure when the + principal doesn't exist */ + if(ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN && + ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN) + SIALOG("WARNING", "krb5_verify_user(%s): %s", + entity->name, error_message(ret)); + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + if (getuid () == 0) + secure = KRB_VERIFY_SECURE; + else + secure = KRB_VERIFY_NOT_SECURE; + + ret = krb_verify_user(toname, toinst, realm, + entity->password, secure, NULL); + if(ret){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "krb_verify_user: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret))); + if(ret != KDC_PR_UNKNOWN) + /* since this is most likely a local user (such as + root), just silently return failure when the + principal doesn't exist */ + SIALOG("WARNING", "krb_verify_user(%s.%s): %s", + toname, toinst, krb_get_err_text(ret)); + return SIADFAIL; + } +#endif + if(sia_make_entity_pwd(pwd, entity) == SIAFAIL) + return SIADFAIL; + s->valid = 1; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + + +static int +common_auth(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + prompt_t prompts[2], *pr; + char *name; + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "common_auth")); + if((siastat == SIADSUCCESS) && (geteuid() == 0)) + return SIADSUCCESS; + if(entity == NULL) { + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "entity == NULL")); + return SIADFAIL | SIADSTOP; + } + name = entity->name; + if(entity->acctname) + name = entity->acctname; + + if((collect != NULL) && entity->colinput) { + int num; + pr = prompts; + if(name == NULL){ + if(setup_name(entity, pr) != SIADSUCCESS) + return SIADFAIL; + pr++; + } + if(entity->password == NULL){ + if(setup_password(entity, pr) != SIADSUCCESS) + return SIADFAIL; + pr++; + } + num = pr - prompts; + if(num == 1){ + if((*collect)(240, SIAONELINER, (unsigned char*)"", num, + prompts) != SIACOLSUCCESS){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "collect failed")); + return SIADFAIL | SIADSTOP; + } + } else if(num > 0){ + if((*collect)(0, SIAFORM, (unsigned char*)"", num, + prompts) != SIACOLSUCCESS){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "collect failed")); + return SIADFAIL | SIADSTOP; + } + } + } + if(name == NULL) + name = entity->name; + if(name == NULL || name[0] == '\0'){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "name is null")); + return SIADFAIL; + } + + if(entity->password == NULL || strlen(entity->password) > SIAMXPASSWORD){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "entity->password is null")); + return SIADFAIL; + } + + return doauth(entity, pkgind, name); +} + + +int +siad_ses_authent(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_authent")); + return common_auth(collect, entity, siastat, pkgind); +} + +int +siad_ses_estab(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_estab")); + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_ses_launch(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int pkgind) +{ + static char env[MaxPathLen]; + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_launch")); + if(s->valid){ +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + chown(s->ticket + sizeof("FILE:") - 1, + entity->pwd->pw_uid, + entity->pwd->pw_gid); + snprintf(env, sizeof(env), "KRB5CCNAME=%s", s->ticket); +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 + chown(s->ticket, entity->pwd->pw_uid, entity->pwd->pw_gid); + snprintf(env, sizeof(env), "KRBTKFILE=%s", s->ticket); +#endif + putenv(env); + } +#ifdef KRB4 + if (k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + k_setpag(); + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(entity->pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + krb_afslog_home(0, 0, entity->pwd->pw_dir); + } +#endif + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_ses_release(SIAENTITY *entity, int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_release")); + if(entity->mech[pkgind]){ +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; + krb5_free_context(s->context); +#endif + free(entity->mech[pkgind]); + } + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_ses_suauthent(sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_suauth")); + if(geteuid() != 0) + return SIADFAIL; + if(entity->name == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + if(entity->name[0] == '\0') { + free(entity->name); + entity->name = strdup("root"); + if (entity->name == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + } + return common_auth(collect, entity, siastat, pkgind); +} + +int +siad_ses_reauthent (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + SIAENTITY *entity, + int siastat, + int pkgind) +{ + int ret; + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_ses_reauthent")); + if(entity == NULL || entity->name == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + ret = common_auth(collect, entity, siastat, pkgind); + if((ret & SIADSUCCESS)){ + /* launch isn't (always?) called when doing reauth, so we must + duplicate some code here... */ + struct state *s = (struct state*)entity->mech[pkgind]; + chown(s->ticket, entity->pwd->pw_uid, entity->pwd->pw_gid); +#ifdef KRB4 + if(k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(entity->pwd->pw_dir, + cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, 0); + krb_afslog_home(0, 0, entity->pwd->pw_dir); + } +#endif + } + return ret; +} + +int +siad_chg_finger (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_chg_finger")); + return SIADFAIL; +} + +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 +int +siad_chg_password (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} +#endif + +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 +static void +sia_message(sia_collect_func_t *collect, int rendition, + const char *title, const char *message) +{ + prompt_t prompt; + prompt.prompt = (unsigned char*)message; + (*collect)(0, rendition, (unsigned char*)title, 1, &prompt); +} + +static int +init_change(sia_collect_func_t *collect, krb_principal *princ) +{ + prompt_t prompt; + char old_pw[MAX_KPW_LEN+1]; + char *msg; + char tktstring[128]; + int ret; + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "init_change")); + prompt.prompt = (unsigned char*)"Old password: "; + prompt.result = (unsigned char*)old_pw; + prompt.min_result_length = 0; + prompt.max_result_length = sizeof(old_pw) - 1; + prompt.control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + asprintf(&msg, "Changing password for %s", krb_unparse_name(princ)); + if(msg == NULL){ + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "out of memory")); + return SIADFAIL; + } + ret = (*collect)(60, SIAONELINER, (unsigned char*)msg, 1, &prompt); + free(msg); + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "ret = %d", ret)); + if(ret != SIACOLSUCCESS) + return SIADFAIL; + snprintf(tktstring, sizeof(tktstring), + "%s_cpw_%u", TKT_ROOT, (unsigned)getpid()); + krb_set_tkt_string(tktstring); + + ret = krb_get_pw_in_tkt(princ->name, princ->instance, princ->realm, + PWSERV_NAME, KADM_SINST, 1, old_pw); + if (ret != KSUCCESS) { + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "krb_get_pw_in_tkt: %s", krb_get_err_text(ret))); + if (ret == INTK_BADPW) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Incorrect old password."); + else + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Kerberos error."); + memset(old_pw, 0, sizeof(old_pw)); + return SIADFAIL; + } + if(chown(tktstring, getuid(), -1) < 0){ + dest_tkt(); + return SIADFAIL; + } + memset(old_pw, 0, sizeof(old_pw)); + return SIADSUCCESS; +} + +int +siad_chg_password (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + prompt_t prompts[2]; + krb_principal princ; + int ret; + char new_pw1[MAX_KPW_LEN+1]; + char new_pw2[MAX_KPW_LEN+1]; + static struct et_list *et_list; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + SIA_DEBUG(("DEBUG", "siad_chg_password")); + if(collect == NULL) + return SIADFAIL; + + if(username == NULL) + username = getlogin(); + + ret = krb_parse_name(username, &princ); + if(ret) + return SIADFAIL; + if(princ.realm[0] == '\0') + krb_get_lrealm(princ.realm, 1); + + if(et_list == NULL) { + initialize_kadm_error_table_r(&et_list); + initialize_krb_error_table_r(&et_list); + } + + ret = init_change(collect, &princ); + if(ret != SIADSUCCESS) + return ret; + +again: + prompts[0].prompt = (unsigned char*)"New password: "; + prompts[0].result = (unsigned char*)new_pw1; + prompts[0].min_result_length = MIN_KPW_LEN; + prompts[0].max_result_length = sizeof(new_pw1) - 1; + prompts[0].control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + prompts[1].prompt = (unsigned char*)"Verify new password: "; + prompts[1].result = (unsigned char*)new_pw2; + prompts[1].min_result_length = MIN_KPW_LEN; + prompts[1].max_result_length = sizeof(new_pw2) - 1; + prompts[1].control_flags = SIARESINVIS; + if((*collect)(120, SIAFORM, (unsigned char*)"", 2, prompts) != + SIACOLSUCCESS) { + dest_tkt(); + return SIADFAIL; + } + if(strcmp(new_pw1, new_pw2) != 0){ + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Password mismatch."); + goto again; + } + ret = kadm_check_pw(new_pw1); + if(ret) { + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", com_right(et_list, ret)); + goto again; + } + + memset(new_pw2, 0, sizeof(new_pw2)); + ret = kadm_init_link (PWSERV_NAME, KRB_MASTER, princ.realm); + if (ret != KADM_SUCCESS) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "Error initing kadmin connection", + com_right(et_list, ret)); + else { + des_cblock newkey; + char *pw_msg; /* message from server */ + + des_string_to_key(new_pw1, &newkey); + ret = kadm_change_pw_plain((unsigned char*)&newkey, new_pw1, &pw_msg); + memset(newkey, 0, sizeof(newkey)); + + if (ret == KADM_INSECURE_PW) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "Insecure password", pw_msg); + else if (ret != KADM_SUCCESS) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "Error changing password", + com_right(et_list, ret)); + } + memset(new_pw1, 0, sizeof(new_pw1)); + + if (ret != KADM_SUCCESS) + sia_message(collect, SIAWARNING, "", "Password NOT changed."); + else + sia_message(collect, SIAINFO, "", "Password changed."); + + dest_tkt(); + if(ret) + return SIADFAIL; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} +#endif + +int +siad_chg_shell (sia_collect_func_t *collect, + const char *username, + int argc, + char *argv[]) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getpwent(struct passwd *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getpwuid (uid_t uid, + struct passwd *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getpwnam (const char *name, + struct passwd *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_setpwent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_endpwent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getgrent(struct group *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getgrgid (gid_t gid, + struct group *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_getgrnam (const char *name, + struct group *result, + char *buf, + int bufsize, + struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_setgrent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_endgrent (struct sia_context *context) +{ + return SIADFAIL; +} + +int +siad_chk_user (const char *logname, int checkflag) +{ + if(checkflag != CHGPASSWD) + return SIADFAIL; + return SIADSUCCESS; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f3f74d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/auth/sia/sia_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* $Id: sia_locl.h,v 1.2 1999/04/01 16:09:22 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __sia_locl_h__ +#define __sia_locl_h__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +#define SIA_KRB5 +#elif defined(KRB4) +#define SIA_KRB4 +#endif + +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef SIA_KRB4 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif + +#include + +#ifndef POSIX_GETPWNAM_R + +#define getpwnam_r posix_getpwnam_r +#define getpwuid_r posix_getpwuid_r + +#endif /* POSIX_GETPWNAM_R */ + +#ifndef DEBUG +#define SIA_DEBUG(X) +#else +#define SIA_DEBUG(X) SIALOG X +#endif + +struct state{ +#ifdef SIA_KRB5 + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; +#endif + char ticket[MaxPathLen]; + int valid; +}; + +#endif /* __sia_locl_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15441f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4.h */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* $Id: rc4.h,v 1.2 1999/10/21 12:58:31 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef HEADER_RC4_H +#define HEADER_RC4_H + +typedef unsigned int RC4_INT; + +typedef struct rc4_key_st { + RC4_INT x,y; + RC4_INT data[256]; +} RC4_KEY; + + +void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, unsigned char *data); +void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, unsigned char *indata, + unsigned char *outdata); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_enc.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b1686f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "rc4.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rc4_enc.c,v 1.2 1999/10/21 12:58:43 joda Exp $"); + +/* RC4 as implemented from a posting from + * Newsgroups: sci.crypt + * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) + * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. + * Message-ID: + * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT + */ + +void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, unsigned long len, unsigned char *indata, + unsigned char *outdata) + { + register RC4_INT *d; + register RC4_INT x,y,tx,ty; + int i; + + x=key->x; + y=key->y; + d=key->data; + +#define LOOP(in,out) \ + x=((x+1)&0xff); \ + tx=d[x]; \ + y=(tx+y)&0xff; \ + d[x]=ty=d[y]; \ + d[y]=tx; \ + (out) = d[(tx+ty)&0xff]^ (in); + +#ifndef RC4_INDEX +#define RC4_LOOP(a,b,i) LOOP(*((a)++),*((b)++)) +#else +#define RC4_LOOP(a,b,i) LOOP(a[i],b[i]) +#endif + + i=(int)(len>>3L); + if (i) + { + for (;;) + { + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,0); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,1); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,2); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,3); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,4); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,5); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,6); + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,7); +#ifdef RC4_INDEX + indata+=8; + outdata+=8; +#endif + if (--i == 0) break; + } + } + i=(int)len&0x07; + if (i) + { + for (;;) + { + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,0); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,1); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,2); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,3); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,4); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,5); if (--i == 0) break; + RC4_LOOP(indata,outdata,6); if (--i == 0) break; + } + } + key->x=x; + key->y=y; + } diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_skey.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_skey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5bce46 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4_skey.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4_skey.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include "des_locl.h" +#include "rc4.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rc4_skey.c,v 1.2 1999/10/21 12:58:52 joda Exp $"); + +/* RC4 as implemented from a posting from + * Newsgroups: sci.crypt + * From: sterndark@netcom.com (David Sterndark) + * Subject: RC4 Algorithm revealed. + * Message-ID: + * Date: Wed, 14 Sep 1994 06:35:31 GMT + */ + +void RC4_set_key(RC4_KEY *key, int len, register unsigned char *data) + { + register RC4_INT tmp; + register int id1,id2; + register RC4_INT *d; + unsigned int i; + + d= &(key->data[0]); + for (i=0; i<256; i++) + d[i]=i; + key->x = 0; + key->y = 0; + id1=id2=0; + +#define SK_LOOP(n) { \ + tmp=d[(n)]; \ + id2 = (data[id1] + tmp + id2) & 0xff; \ + if (++id1 == len) id1=0; \ + d[(n)]=d[id2]; \ + d[id2]=tmp; } + + for (i=0; i < 256; i+=4) + { + SK_LOOP(i+0); + SK_LOOP(i+1); + SK_LOOP(i+2); + SK_LOOP(i+3); + } + } + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4test.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5abf8cf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/des/rc4test.c @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* crypto/rc4/rc4test.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef NO_RC4 +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("No RC4 support\n"); + return(0); +} +#else +#include + +unsigned char keys[7][30]={ + {8,0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}, + {8,0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}, + {8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}, + {4,0xef,0x01,0x23,0x45}, + {8,0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef}, + {4,0xef,0x01,0x23,0x45}, + }; + +unsigned char data_len[7]={8,8,8,20,28,10}; +unsigned char data[7][30]={ + {0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xab,0xcd,0xef,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, + 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9A,0xBC,0xDE,0xF0, + 0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9A,0xBC,0xDE,0xF0, + 0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9A,0xBC,0xDE,0xF0, + 0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0xff}, + {0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xff}, + {0}, + }; + +unsigned char output[7][30]={ + {0x75,0xb7,0x87,0x80,0x99,0xe0,0xc5,0x96,0x00}, + {0x74,0x94,0xc2,0xe7,0x10,0x4b,0x08,0x79,0x00}, + {0xde,0x18,0x89,0x41,0xa3,0x37,0x5d,0x3a,0x00}, + {0xd6,0xa1,0x41,0xa7,0xec,0x3c,0x38,0xdf, + 0xbd,0x61,0x5a,0x11,0x62,0xe1,0xc7,0xba, + 0x36,0xb6,0x78,0x58,0x00}, + {0x66,0xa0,0x94,0x9f,0x8a,0xf7,0xd6,0x89, + 0x1f,0x7f,0x83,0x2b,0xa8,0x33,0xc0,0x0c, + 0x89,0x2e,0xbe,0x30,0x14,0x3c,0xe2,0x87, + 0x40,0x01,0x1e,0xcf,0x00}, + {0xd6,0xa1,0x41,0xa7,0xec,0x3c,0x38,0xdf,0xbd,0x61,0x00}, + {0}, + }; + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { + int i,err=0; + int j; + unsigned char *p; + RC4_KEY key; + unsigned char buf[512],obuf[512]; + + for (i=0; i<512; i++) buf[i]=0x01; + + for (i=0; i<6; i++) + { + RC4_set_key(&key,keys[i][0],&(keys[i][1])); + memset(obuf,0x00,sizeof(obuf)); + RC4(&key,data_len[i],&(data[i][0]),obuf); + if (memcmp(obuf,output[i],data_len[i]+1) != 0) + { + printf("error calculating RC4\n"); + printf("output:"); + for (j=0; j> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (n >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (n >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (n >> 24) & 0xFF; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decode_om_uint32(u_char *p, OM_uint32 *n) +{ + *n = (p[0] << 0) | (p[1] << 8) | (p[2] << 16) | (p[3] << 24); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hash_input_chan_bindings (const gss_channel_bindings_t b, + u_char *p) +{ + u_char num[4]; + struct md5 md5; + + md5_init(&md5); + encode_om_uint32 (b->initiator_addrtype, num); + md5_update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + encode_om_uint32 (b->initiator_address.length, num); + md5_update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + if (b->initiator_address.length) + md5_update (&md5, + b->initiator_address.value, + b->initiator_address.length); + encode_om_uint32 (b->acceptor_addrtype, num); + md5_update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + encode_om_uint32 (b->acceptor_address.length, num); + md5_update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + if (b->acceptor_address.length) + md5_update (&md5, + b->acceptor_address.value, + b->acceptor_address.length); + encode_om_uint32 (b->application_data.length, num); + md5_update (&md5, num, sizeof(num)); + if (b->application_data.length) + md5_update (&md5, + b->application_data.value, + b->application_data.length); + md5_finito (&md5, p); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum ( + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + OM_uint32 flags, + Checksum *result) +{ + u_char *p; + + result->cksumtype = 0x8003; + result->checksum.length = 24; + result->checksum.data = malloc (result->checksum.length); + if (result->checksum.data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + p = result->checksum.data; + encode_om_uint32 (16, p); + p += 4; + if (input_chan_bindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) { + memset (p, 0, 16); + } else { + hash_input_chan_bindings (input_chan_bindings, p); + } + p += 16; + encode_om_uint32 (flags, p); + p += 4; + if (p - (u_char *)result->checksum.data != result->checksum.length) + abort (); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum( + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + Checksum *cksum, + OM_uint32 *flags) +{ + unsigned char hash[16]; + unsigned char *p; + OM_uint32 length; + + /* XXX should handle checksums > 24 bytes */ + if(cksum->cksumtype != 0x8003 || cksum->checksum.length != 24) + return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + + p = cksum->checksum.data; + decode_om_uint32(p, &length); + if(length != sizeof(hash)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + p += 4; + + if (input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) { + if(hash_input_chan_bindings(input_chan_bindings, hash) != 0) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if(memcmp(hash, p, sizeof(hash)) != 0) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + p += sizeof(hash); + + decode_om_uint32(p, flags); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2524003 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:4:0 + +1999-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): always set + `output_token' + * init_sec_context.c (init_auth): always initialize `output_token' + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): always set + `output_token' + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 0:3:0 + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:2:0 + +1999-09-21 Assar Westerlund + + * init_sec_context.c (gss_init_sec_context): initialize `ticket' + + * gssapi.h (gss_ctx_id_t_desc): add ticket in here. ick. + + * delete_sec_context.c (gss_delete_sec_context): free ticket + + * accept_sec_context.c (gss_accept_sec_context): stove away + `krb5_ticket' in context so that ugly programs such as + gss_nt_server can get at it. uck. + +1999-09-20 Johan Danielsson + + * accept_sec_context.c: set minor_status + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * display_status.c (calling_error, routine_error): right shift the + code to make it possible to index into the arrays + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * gssapi.h (GSS_C_AF_INET6): add + + * import_name.c (import_hostbased_name): set minor_status + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 0:1:0 + +Wed Apr 7 14:05:15 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * display_status.c: set minor_status + + * init_sec_context.c: set minor_status + + * lib/gssapi/init.c: remove donep (check gssapi_krb5_context + directly) + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff4ef63 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.17 2000/01/06 21:47:40 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I$(srcdir)/../krb5 + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libgssapi.la +libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:4:0 + +include_HEADERS = gssapi.h + +libgssapi_la_SOURCES = \ + 8003.c \ + accept_sec_context.c \ + acquire_cred.c \ + add_oid_set_member.c \ + canonicalize_name.c \ + compare_name.c \ + context_time.c \ + create_emtpy_oid_set.c \ + decapsulate.c \ + delete_sec_context.c \ + display_name.c \ + display_status.c \ + duplicate_name.c \ + encapsulate.c \ + export_name.c \ + external.c \ + get_mic.c \ + gssapi.h \ + gssapi_locl.h \ + import_name.c \ + indicate_mechs.c \ + init.c \ + init_sec_context.c \ + inquire_context.c \ + inquire_cred.c \ + release_buffer.c \ + release_cred.c \ + release_name.c \ + release_oid_set.c \ + test_oid_set_member.c \ + unwrap.c \ + v1.c \ + verify_mic.c \ + wrap.c diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e658c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,654 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.17 2000/01/06 21:47:40 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include -I$(srcdir)/../krb5 + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libgssapi.la +libgssapi_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:4:0 + +include_HEADERS = gssapi.h + +libgssapi_la_SOURCES = 8003.c accept_sec_context.c acquire_cred.c add_oid_set_member.c canonicalize_name.c compare_name.c context_time.c create_emtpy_oid_set.c decapsulate.c delete_sec_context.c display_name.c display_status.c duplicate_name.c encapsulate.c export_name.c external.c get_mic.c gssapi.h gssapi_locl.h import_name.c indicate_mechs.c init.c init_sec_context.c inquire_context.c inquire_cred.c release_buffer.c release_cred.c release_name.c release_oid_set.c test_oid_set_member.c unwrap.c v1.c verify_mic.c wrap.c + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +libgssapi_la_LIBADD = +libgssapi_la_OBJECTS = 8003.lo accept_sec_context.lo acquire_cred.lo \ +add_oid_set_member.lo canonicalize_name.lo compare_name.lo \ +context_time.lo create_emtpy_oid_set.lo decapsulate.lo \ +delete_sec_context.lo display_name.lo display_status.lo \ +duplicate_name.lo encapsulate.lo export_name.lo external.lo get_mic.lo \ +import_name.lo indicate_mechs.lo init.lo init_sec_context.lo \ +inquire_context.lo inquire_cred.lo release_buffer.lo release_cred.lo \ +release_name.lo release_oid_set.lo test_oid_set_member.lo unwrap.lo \ +v1.lo verify_mic.lo wrap.lo +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) 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"$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d9a2b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/accept_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: accept_sec_context.c,v 1.15 1999/12/26 18:32:08 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_keytab gss_keytab; + +OM_uint32 +gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity (char *identity) +{ + char *p; + if(gss_keytab != NULL) { + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, gss_keytab); + gss_keytab = NULL; + } + asprintf(&p, "FILE:%s", identity); + if(p == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + krb5_kt_resolve(gssapi_krb5_context, p, &gss_keytab); + free(p); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_OID * mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_data indata; + krb5_flags ap_options; + OM_uint32 flags; + krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; + krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; + + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + + if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { + *context_handle = malloc(sizeof(**context_handle)); + if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + } + + (*context_handle)->auth_context = NULL; + (*context_handle)->source = NULL; + (*context_handle)->target = NULL; + (*context_handle)->flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->more_flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->ticket = NULL; + + kret = krb5_auth_con_init (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + { + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_auth_con_getflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &tmp); + tmp |= KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE; + krb5_auth_con_setflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + tmp); + } + + ret = gssapi_krb5_decapsulate (input_token_buffer, + &indata, + "\x01\x00"); + if (ret) { + kret = 0; + goto failure; + } + + if (acceptor_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + if (gss_keytab != NULL) { + keytab = gss_keytab; + } + } else if (acceptor_cred_handle->keytab != NULL) { + keytab = acceptor_cred_handle->keytab; + } + + kret = krb5_rd_req (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context, + &indata, + (acceptor_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) ? NULL + : acceptor_cred_handle->principal, + keytab, + &ap_options, + &ticket); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ticket->client, + &(*context_handle)->source); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + if (src_name) { + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ticket->client, + src_name); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + } + + { + krb5_authenticator authenticator; + + kret = krb5_auth_getauthenticator(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &authenticator); + if(kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum(input_chan_bindings, + authenticator->cksum, + &flags); + krb5_free_authenticator(gssapi_krb5_context, &authenticator); + if (kret) { + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + } + + if (ret_flags) + *ret_flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= OPEN; + + if (mech_type) + *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + if (time_rec) + *time_rec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + if(flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) { + krb5_data outbuf; + + kret = krb5_mk_rep (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context, + &outbuf); + if (kret) { + krb5_data_free (&outbuf); + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + ret = gssapi_krb5_encapsulate (&outbuf, + output_token, + "\x02\x00"); + if (ret) { + kret = 0; + goto failure; + } + } else { + output_token->length = 0; + } + + (*context_handle)->ticket = ticket; + ticket = NULL; + +#if 0 + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); +#endif + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +failure: + if (ticket != NULL) + krb5_free_ticket (gssapi_krb5_context, ticket); + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if((*context_handle)->source) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->source); + if((*context_handle)->target) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->target); + free (*context_handle); + *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + *minor_status = kret; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..821bbc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/acquire_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: acquire_cred.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + gss_cred_id_t handle; + OM_uint32 ret; + + handle = (gss_cred_id_t)malloc(sizeof(*handle)); + if (handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + ret = gss_duplicate_name(minor_status, desired_name, &handle->principal); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + /* XXX */ + handle->lifetime = time_req; + + handle->keytab = NULL; + handle->usage = cred_usage; + + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, &handle->mechanisms); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM, + &handle->mechanisms); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, handle, NULL, time_rec, NULL, + actual_mechs); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + *output_cred_handle = handle; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..996c5cf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/add_oid_set_member.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add_oid_set_member.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member_oid, + gss_OID_set * oid_set + ) +{ + size_t n = (*oid_set)->count; + + (*oid_set)->elements = realloc ((*oid_set)->elements, + n * sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); + if ((*oid_set)->elements == NULL) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + (*oid_set)->count = n; + (*oid_set)->elements[n-1] = *member_oid; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..afa39f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/canonicalize_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: canonicalize_name.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * output_name + ) +{ + return gss_duplicate_name (minor_status, input_name, output_name); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5926b15 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/compare_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: compare_name.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t name1, + const gss_name_t name2, + int * name_equal + ) +{ + gssapi_krb5_init (); + *name_equal = krb5_principal_compare (gssapi_krb5_context, + name1, name2); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/context_time.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/context_time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a04ce8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/context_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: context_time.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 lifetime; + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_error_code kret; + int32_t timeret; + + gssapi_krb5_init(); + + ret = gss_inquire_context(minor_status, context_handle, + NULL, NULL, &lifetime, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + kret = krb5_timeofday(gssapi_krb5_context, &timeret); + if (kret) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + *time_rec = lifetime - timeret; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..acec30e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/create_emtpy_oid_set.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: create_emtpy_oid_set.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * oid_set + ) +{ + *oid_set = malloc(sizeof(**oid_set)); + if (*oid_set == NULL) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + (*oid_set)->count = 0; + (*oid_set)->elements = NULL; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3603c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/decapsulate.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: decapsulate.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_verify_header(u_char **str, + size_t total_len, + char *type) +{ + size_t len, len_len, mech_len, foo; + int e; + u_char *p = *str; + + if (*p++ != 0x60) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1, &len, &len_len); + if (e || 1 + len_len + len != total_len) + abort (); + p += len_len; + if (*p++ != 0x06) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1 - len_len - 1, + &mech_len, &foo); + if (e) + abort (); + p += foo; + if (mech_len != GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + if (memcmp(p, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + p += mech_len; + if (memcmp (p, type, 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += 2; + *str = p; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * Remove the GSS-API wrapping from `in_token' giving `out_data. + * Does not copy data, so just free `in_token'. + */ + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_decapsulate( + gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + krb5_data *out_data, + char *type +) +{ + u_char *p; + OM_uint32 ret; + + p = input_token_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header(&p, + input_token_buffer->length, + type); + if (ret) + return ret; + + out_data->length = input_token_buffer->length - + (p - (u_char *)input_token_buffer->value); + out_data->data = p; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/delete_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/delete_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..514206c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/delete_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: delete_sec_context.c,v 1.5 1999/12/26 18:31:06 assar Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token + ) +{ + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if((*context_handle)->source) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->source); + if((*context_handle)->target) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->target); + if ((*context_handle)->ticket) + krb5_free_ticket (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->ticket); + free (*context_handle); + if (output_token) + output_token->length = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/display_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/display_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4efed14 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/display_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: display_name.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_display_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID * output_name_type + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + char *buf; + size_t len; + + gssapi_krb5_init (); + kret = krb5_unparse_name (gssapi_krb5_context, + input_name, + &buf); + if (kret) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + len = strlen (buf); + output_name_buffer->length = len; + output_name_buffer->value = malloc(len + 1); + if (output_name_buffer->value == NULL) { + free (buf); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy (output_name_buffer->value, buf, len); + ((char *)output_name_buffer->value)[len] = '\0'; + free (buf); + if (output_name_type) + *output_name_type = GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/display_status.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/display_status.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f08c47e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/display_status.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: display_status.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +static char * +calling_error(OM_uint32 v) +{ + static char *msgs[] = { + NULL, /* 0 */ + "A required input parameter could not be read.", /* */ + "A required output parameter could not be written.", /* */ + "A parameter was malformed" + }; + + v >>= GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET; + + if (v == 0) + return ""; + else if (v >= sizeof(msgs)/sizeof(*msgs)) + return "unknown calling error"; + else + return msgs[v]; +} + +static char * +routine_error(OM_uint32 v) +{ + static char *msgs[] = { + NULL, /* 0 */ + "An unsupported mechanism was requested", + "An invalid name was supplied", + "A supplied name was of an unsupported type", + "Incorrect channel bindings were supplied", + "An invalid status code was supplied", + "A token had an invalid MIC", + "No credentials were supplied, " + "or the credentials were unavailable or inaccessible.", + "No context has been established", + "A token was invalid", + "A credential was invalid", + "The referenced credentials have expired", + "The context has expired", + "Miscellaneous failure (see text)", + "The quality-of-protection requested could not be provide", + "The operation is forbidden by local security policy", + "The operation or option is not available", + "The requested credential element already exists", + "The provided name was not a mechanism name.", + }; + + v >>= GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET; + + if (v == 0) + return ""; + else if (v >= sizeof(msgs)/sizeof(*msgs)) + return "unknown routine error"; + else + return msgs[v]; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + OM_uint32 status_value, + int status_type, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 *message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string) +{ + char *buf; + + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + *minor_status = 0; + + if (mech_type != GSS_C_NO_OID && + mech_type != GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM) + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + + if (status_type == GSS_C_GSS_CODE) { + asprintf (&buf, "%s %s", + calling_error(GSS_CALLING_ERROR(status_value)), + routine_error(GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(status_value))); + if (buf == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + } else if (status_type == GSS_C_MECH_CODE) { + buf = strdup(krb5_get_err_text (gssapi_krb5_context, status_value)); + if (buf == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + } else + return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS; + + *message_context = 0; + + status_string->length = strlen(buf); + status_string->value = buf; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/duplicate_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/duplicate_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3118d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/duplicate_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: duplicate_name.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t src_name, + gss_name_t * dest_name + ) +{ + krb5_error_code kret; + + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + src_name, + dest_name); + if (kret) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + else + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b8636bc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/encapsulate.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: encapsulate.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +void +gssapi_krb5_encap_length (size_t data_len, + size_t *len, + size_t *total_len) +{ + size_t len_len; + + *len = 1 + 1 + GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length + 2 + data_len; + + len_len = length_len(*len); + + *total_len = 1 + len_len + *len; +} + +u_char * +gssapi_krb5_make_header (u_char *p, + size_t len, + u_char *type) +{ + int e; + size_t len_len, foo; + + *p++ = 0x60; + len_len = length_len(len); + e = der_put_length (p + len_len - 1, len_len, len, &foo); + if(e || foo != len_len) + abort (); + p += len_len; + *p++ = 0x06; + *p++ = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + memcpy (p, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->elements, GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length); + p += GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM->length; + memcpy (p, type, 2); + p += 2; + return p; +} + +/* + * Give it a krb5_data and it will encapsulate with extra GSS-API wrappings. + */ + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_encapsulate( + krb5_data *in_data, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + u_char *type +) +{ + size_t len, outer_len; + u_char *p; + + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (in_data->length, &len, &outer_len); + + output_token->length = outer_len; + output_token->value = malloc (outer_len); + if (output_token->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header (output_token->value, len, type); + memcpy (p, in_data->data, in_data->length); + krb5_data_free (in_data); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/export_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/export_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efbd9c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/export_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: export_name.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_export_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t exported_name + ) +{ + return gss_display_name(minor_status, + input_name, + exported_name, + NULL); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/external.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/external.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19e8306 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/external.c @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: external.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user_name(1)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_user_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME = &gss_c_nt_user_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_machine_uid_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_machine_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_string_uid_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_string_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 2(gss-host-based-services)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_hostbased_service_oid_desc = +{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE = &gss_c_nt_hostbased_service_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 3(gss-anonymous-name)}. The constant + * and GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_anonymous_oid_desc = +{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS = &gss_c_nt_anonymous_oid_desc; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 4(gss-api-exported-name)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_c_nt_export_name_oid_desc = +{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}; + +gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME = &gss_c_nt_export_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * krb5(2) krb5_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this type + * is "GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME". + */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_nt_principal_name_oid_desc = +{10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x01"}; + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME = &gss_krb5_nt_principal_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) user_name(1)}. The recommended symbolic name for this + * type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME". + */ + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME = &gss_c_nt_user_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. The recommended symbolic name for + * this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME". + */ + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_machine_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * This name form shall be represented by the Object Identifier {iso(1) + * member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) gssapi(2) + * generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. The recommended symbolic name for + * this type is "GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME". + */ + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME = &gss_c_nt_string_uid_name_oid_desc; + +/* + * To support ongoing experimentation, testing, and evolution of the + * specification, the Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as defined in this + * and any successor memos will be identified with the following Object + * Identifier, as defined in RFC-1510, until the specification is + * advanced to the level of Proposed Standard RFC: + * + * {iso(1), org(3), dod(5), internet(1), security(5), kerberosv5(2)} + * + * Upon advancement to the level of Proposed Standard RFC, the Kerberos + * V5 GSS-API mechanism will be identified by an Object Identifier + * having the value: + * + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) infosys(1) + * gssapi(2) krb5(2)} + */ + +#if 0 /* This is the old OID */ + +static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_mechanism_oid_desc = +{5, (void *)"\x2b\x05\x01\x05\x02"}; + +#endif + +static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_mechanism_oid_desc = +{9, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}; + +gss_OID GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM = &gss_krb5_mechanism_oid_desc; + +/* + * Context for krb5 calls. + */ + +krb5_context gssapi_krb5_context; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/get_mic.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/get_mic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b779c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/get_mic.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_mic.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_get_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ) +{ + u_char *p; + struct md5 md5; + u_char hash[16]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock key; + des_cblock zero; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len; + + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (22, &len, &total_len); + + message_token->length = total_len; + message_token->value = malloc (total_len); + if (message_token->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header(message_token->value, + len, + "\x01\x01"); + + memcpy (p, "\x00\x00", 2); + p += 2; + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4); + p += 4; + + /* Fill in later */ + memset (p, 0, 16); + p += 16; + + /* checksum */ + md5_init (&md5); + md5_update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + md5_update (&md5, message_buffer->value, + message_buffer->length); + md5_finito (&md5, hash); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key); + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)hash, + (des_cblock *)hash, sizeof(hash), schedule, &zero); + memcpy (p - 8, hash, 8); + + /* sequence number */ + krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + p -= 16; + p[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (p + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xFF, + 4); + + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p, (des_cblock *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)(p + 8), DES_ENCRYPT); + + krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c1b606 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi.h @@ -0,0 +1,742 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gssapi.h,v 1.14 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef GSSAPI_H_ +#define GSSAPI_H_ + +/* + * First, include stddef.h to get size_t defined. + */ +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#include + +/* + * Now define the three implementation-dependent types. + */ + +typedef u_int32_t OM_uint32; + +/* + * This is to avoid having to include + */ + +struct krb5_auth_context_data; + +struct Principal; + +/* typedef void *gss_name_t; */ + +typedef struct Principal *gss_name_t; + +typedef struct gss_ctx_id_t_desc_struct { + struct krb5_auth_context_data *auth_context; + gss_name_t source, target; + OM_uint32 flags; + enum { LOCAL = 1, OPEN = 2} more_flags; + struct krb5_ticket *ticket; +} gss_ctx_id_t_desc; + +typedef gss_ctx_id_t_desc *gss_ctx_id_t; + +typedef struct gss_OID_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 length; + void *elements; +} gss_OID_desc, *gss_OID; + +typedef struct gss_OID_set_desc_struct { + size_t count; + gss_OID elements; +} gss_OID_set_desc, *gss_OID_set; + +struct krb5_keytab_data; + +typedef int gss_cred_usage_t; + +typedef struct gss_cred_id_t_desc_struct { + gss_name_t principal; + struct krb5_keytab_data *keytab; + OM_uint32 lifetime; + gss_cred_usage_t usage; + gss_OID_set mechanisms; +} gss_cred_id_t_desc; + +typedef gss_cred_id_t_desc *gss_cred_id_t; + +typedef struct gss_buffer_desc_struct { + size_t length; + void *value; +} gss_buffer_desc, *gss_buffer_t; + +typedef struct gss_channel_bindings_struct { + OM_uint32 initiator_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc initiator_address; + OM_uint32 acceptor_addrtype; + gss_buffer_desc acceptor_address; + gss_buffer_desc application_data; +} *gss_channel_bindings_t; + +/* + * For now, define a QOP-type as an OM_uint32 + */ +typedef OM_uint32 gss_qop_t; + +/* + * Flag bits for context-level services. + */ +#define GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 1 +#define GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 2 +#define GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 4 +#define GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 8 +#define GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 16 +#define GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 32 +#define GSS_C_ANON_FLAG 64 +#define GSS_C_PROT_READY_FLAG 128 +#define GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG 256 + +/* + * Credential usage options + */ +#define GSS_C_BOTH 0 +#define GSS_C_INITIATE 1 +#define GSS_C_ACCEPT 2 + +/* + * Status code types for gss_display_status + */ +#define GSS_C_GSS_CODE 1 +#define GSS_C_MECH_CODE 2 + +/* + * The constant definitions for channel-bindings address families + */ +#define GSS_C_AF_UNSPEC 0 +#define GSS_C_AF_LOCAL 1 +#define GSS_C_AF_INET 2 +#define GSS_C_AF_IMPLINK 3 +#define GSS_C_AF_PUP 4 +#define GSS_C_AF_CHAOS 5 +#define GSS_C_AF_NS 6 +#define GSS_C_AF_NBS 7 +#define GSS_C_AF_ECMA 8 +#define GSS_C_AF_DATAKIT 9 +#define GSS_C_AF_CCITT 10 +#define GSS_C_AF_SNA 11 +#define GSS_C_AF_DECnet 12 +#define GSS_C_AF_DLI 13 +#define GSS_C_AF_LAT 14 +#define GSS_C_AF_HYLINK 15 +#define GSS_C_AF_APPLETALK 16 +#define GSS_C_AF_BSC 17 +#define GSS_C_AF_DSS 18 +#define GSS_C_AF_OSI 19 +#define GSS_C_AF_X25 21 +#define GSS_C_AF_INET6 24 + +#define GSS_C_AF_NULLADDR 255 + +/* + * Various Null values + */ +#define GSS_C_NO_NAME ((gss_name_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ((gss_buffer_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_OID ((gss_OID) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_OID_SET ((gss_OID_set) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT ((gss_ctx_id_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL ((gss_cred_id_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ((gss_channel_bindings_t) 0) +#define GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER {0, NULL} + +/* + * Some alternate names for a couple of the above + * values. These are defined for V1 compatibility. + */ +#define GSS_C_NULL_OID GSS_C_NO_OID +#define GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET GSS_C_NO_OID_SET + +/* + * Define the default Quality of Protection for per-message + * services. Note that an implementation that offers multiple + * levels of QOP may define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT to be either zero + * (as done here) to mean "default protection", or to a specific + * explicit QOP value. However, a value of 0 should always be + * interpreted by a GSSAPI implementation as a request for the + * default protection level. + */ +#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT 0 + +/* + * Expiration time of 2^32-1 seconds means infinite lifetime for a + * credential or security context + */ +#define GSS_C_INDEFINITE 0xfffffffful + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x01"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) user_name(1)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) machine_uid_name(2)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {10, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12" + * "\x01\x02\x01\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554) + * infosys(1) gssapi(2) generic(1) string_uid_name(3)}. + * The constant GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME should be + * initialized to point to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x02"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 2(gss-host-based-services)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\01\x05\x06\x03"}, + * corresponding to an object identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 3(gss-anonymous-name)}. The constant + * and GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS; + +/* + * The implementation must reserve static storage for a + * gss_OID_desc object containing the value + * {6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x06\x04"}, + * corresponding to an object-identifier value of + * {1(iso), 3(org), 6(dod), 1(internet), 5(security), + * 6(nametypes), 4(gss-api-exported-name)}. The constant + * GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME should be initialized to point + * to that gss_OID_desc. + */ +extern gss_OID GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME; + +/* + * This if for kerberos5 names. + */ + +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME; +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_USER_NAME; +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME; +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_NT_STRING_UID_NAME; + +extern gss_OID GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + +/* Major status codes */ + +#define GSS_S_COMPLETE 0 + +/* + * Some "helper" definitions to make the status code macros obvious. + */ +#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET 24 +#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET 16 +#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET 0 +#define GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK 0377ul +#define GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK 0377ul +#define GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK 0177777ul + +/* + * The macros that test status codes for error conditions. + * Note that the GSS_ERROR() macro has changed slightly from + * the V1 GSSAPI so that it now evaluates its argument + * only once. + */ +#define GSS_CALLING_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET)) +#define GSS_ROUTINE_ERROR(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET)) +#define GSS_SUPPLEMENTARY_INFO(x) \ + (x & (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_MASK << GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET)) +#define GSS_ERROR(x) \ + (x & ((GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) | \ + (GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_MASK << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET))) + +/* + * Now the actual status code definitions + */ + +/* + * Calling errors: + */ +#define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ \ + (1ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE \ + (2ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CALL_BAD_STRUCTURE \ + (3ul << GSS_C_CALLING_ERROR_OFFSET) + +/* + * Routine errors: + */ +#define GSS_S_BAD_MECH (1ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_NAME (2ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE (3ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + +#define GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS (4ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_STATUS (5ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_SIG (6ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_MIC GSS_S_BAD_SIG +#define GSS_S_NO_CRED (7ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT (8ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN (9ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL (10ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED (11ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (12ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_FAILURE (13ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_BAD_QOP (14ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED (15ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE (16ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_ELEMENT (17ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) +#define GSS_S_NAME_NOT_MN (18ul << GSS_C_ROUTINE_ERROR_OFFSET) + +/* + * Supplementary info bits: + */ +#define GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 0)) +#define GSS_S_DUPLICATE_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 1)) +#define GSS_S_OLD_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 2)) +#define GSS_S_UNSEQ_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 3)) +#define GSS_S_GAP_TOKEN (1ul << (GSS_C_SUPPLEMENTARY_OFFSET + 4)) + +/* + * From RFC1964: + * + * 4.1.1. Non-Kerberos-specific codes + */ + +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_SERVICE_NAME 1 + /* "No @ in SERVICE-NAME name string" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_STRING_UID 2 + /* "STRING-UID-NAME contains nondigits" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_NOUSER 3 + /* "UID does not resolve to username" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_VALIDATE_FAILED 4 + /* "Validation error" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BUFFER_ALLOC 5 + /* "Couldn't allocate gss_buffer_t data" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_MSG_CTX 6 + /* "Message context invalid" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_WRONG_SIZE 7 + /* "Buffer is the wrong size" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_BAD_USAGE 8 + /* "Credential usage type is unknown" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_G_UNKNOWN_QOP 9 + /* "Unknown quality of protection specified" */ + + /* + * 4.1.2. Kerberos-specific-codes + */ + +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH 10 + /* "Principal in credential cache does not match desired name" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_KEYTAB_NOMATCH 11 + /* "No principal in keytab matches desired name" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_TGT_MISSING 12 + /* "Credential cache has no TGT" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_NO_SUBKEY 13 + /* "Authenticator has no subkey" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED 14 + /* "Context is already fully established" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_SIGN_TYPE 15 + /* "Unknown signature type in token" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_BAD_LENGTH 16 + /* "Invalid field length in token" */ +#define GSS_KRB5_S_KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE 17 + /* "Attempt to use incomplete security context" */ + +/* + * Finally, function prototypes for the GSS-API routines. + */ + +OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_accept_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_OID * mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec, + gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_process_context_token + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_delete_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t output_token + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_context_time + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_get_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_unwrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_display_status + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + OM_uint32 status_value, + int status_type, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 * message_context, + gss_buffer_t status_string + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * mech_set + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_compare_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t name1, + const gss_name_t name2, + int * name_equal + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_display_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, + gss_OID * output_name_type + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + const gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t * output_name + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_export_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_buffer_t exported_name + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t * input_name + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * set + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage, + gss_OID_set * mechanisms + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_name_t * targ_name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime_rec, + gss_OID * mech_type, + OM_uint32 * ctx_flags, + int * locally_initiated, + int * open + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 * max_input_size + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_cred ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle, + const gss_name_t desired_name, + const gss_OID desired_mech, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + OM_uint32 initiator_time_req, + OM_uint32 acceptor_time_req, + gss_cred_id_t * output_cred_handle, + gss_OID_set * actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 * initiator_time_rec, + OM_uint32 * acceptor_time_rec + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_mech ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * initiator_lifetime, + OM_uint32 * acceptor_lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_export_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + gss_buffer_t interprocess_token + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_import_sec_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_create_empty_oid_set ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * oid_set + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_add_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member_oid, + gss_OID_set * oid_set + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member, + const gss_OID_set set, + int * present + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_names_for_mech ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID mechanism, + gss_OID_set * name_types + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_mechs_for_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + gss_OID_set * mech_types + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_canonicalize_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t input_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + gss_name_t * output_name + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_duplicate_name ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_name_t src_name, + gss_name_t * dest_name + ); + +/* + * The following routines are obsolete variants of gss_get_mic, + * gss_verify_mic, gss_wrap and gss_unwrap. They should be + * provided by GSSAPI V2 implementations for backwards + * compatibility with V1 applications. Distinct entrypoints + * (as opposed to #defines) should be provided, both to allow + * GSSAPI V1 applications to link against GSSAPI V2 implementations, + * and to retain the slight parameter type differences between the + * obsolete versions of these routines and their current forms. + */ + +OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + int * qop_state + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ); + +OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + int * qop_state + ); + +/* + * kerberos mechanism specific functions + */ + +OM_uint32 gsskrb5_register_acceptor_identity + (char *identity); + +#endif /* GSSAPI_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f488a20 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/gssapi_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: gssapi_locl.h,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef GSSAPI_LOCL_H +#define GSSAPI_LOCL_H + +#include +#include + +extern krb5_context gssapi_krb5_context; + +void gssapi_krb5_init (void); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum ( + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + OM_uint32 flags, + Checksum *result); + +krb5_error_code +gssapi_krb5_verify_8003_checksum ( + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + Checksum *cksum, + OM_uint32 *flags); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_encapsulate( + krb5_data *in_data, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + u_char *type); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_decapsulate( + gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer, + krb5_data *out_data, + char *type); + +void +gssapi_krb5_encap_length (size_t data_len, + size_t *len, + size_t *total_len); + +u_char * +gssapi_krb5_make_header (u_char *p, + size_t len, + u_char *type); + +OM_uint32 +gssapi_krb5_verify_header(u_char **str, + size_t total_len, + char *type); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_getsomekey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + des_cblock *key); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/import_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/import_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cb94c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/import_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: import_name.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:03 joda Exp $"); + +static OM_uint32 +import_krb5_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_name_t *output_name) +{ + krb5_error_code kerr; + char *tmp; + + tmp = malloc (input_name_buffer->length + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + memcpy (tmp, + input_name_buffer->value, + input_name_buffer->length); + tmp[input_name_buffer->length] = '\0'; + + kerr = krb5_parse_name (gssapi_krb5_context, + tmp, + output_name); + free (tmp); + if (kerr == 0) + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + else if (kerr == KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR || kerr == KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED) + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + else + return GSS_S_FAILURE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +import_hostbased_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_name_t *output_name) +{ + krb5_error_code kerr; + char *tmp; + char *p; + char *host; + char local_hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + tmp = malloc (input_name_buffer->length + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + memcpy (tmp, + input_name_buffer->value, + input_name_buffer->length); + tmp[input_name_buffer->length] = '\0'; + + p = strchr (tmp, '@'); + if (p != NULL) { + *p = '\0'; + host = p + 1; + } else { + if (gethostname(local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)) < 0) { + *minor_status = errno; + free (tmp); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + host = local_hostname; + } + + kerr = krb5_sname_to_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + host, + tmp, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + output_name); + free (tmp); + *minor_status = kerr; + if (kerr == 0) + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + else if (kerr == KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR || kerr == KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED) + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + else + return GSS_S_FAILURE; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_import_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + const gss_OID input_name_type, + gss_name_t * output_name + ) +{ + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + if (input_name_type == GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE) + return import_hostbased_name (minor_status, + input_name_buffer, + output_name); + else if (input_name_type == GSS_C_NO_OID + || input_name_type == GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME + || input_name_type == GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME) + /* default printable syntax */ + return import_krb5_name (minor_status, + input_name_buffer, + output_name); + else + return GSS_S_BAD_NAMETYPE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/indicate_mechs.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/indicate_mechs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26e018e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/indicate_mechs.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: indicate_mechs.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_indicate_mechs + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * mech_set + ) +{ + *mech_set = malloc(sizeof(**mech_set)); + if (*mech_set == NULL) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + (*mech_set)->count = 1; + (*mech_set)->elements = malloc((*mech_set)->count * sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); + if ((*mech_set)->elements == NULL) { + free (*mech_set); + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + (*mech_set)->elements[0] = *GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/init.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c01490 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +void +gssapi_krb5_init (void) +{ + if(gssapi_krb5_context == NULL) + krb5_init_context (&gssapi_krb5_context); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f9bbc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/init_sec_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_sec_context.c,v 1.18 1999/12/26 18:31:36 assar Exp $"); + +static OM_uint32 +init_auth + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + krb5_error_code kret; + krb5_flags ap_options; + krb5_creds this_cred, *cred; + krb5_data outbuf; + krb5_ccache ccache; + u_int32_t flags; + Authenticator *auth; + krb5_data authenticator; + Checksum cksum; + krb5_enctype enctype; + + output_token->length = 0; + output_token->value = NULL; + + outbuf.length = 0; + outbuf.data = NULL; + + *minor_status = 0; + + *context_handle = malloc(sizeof(**context_handle)); + if (*context_handle == NULL) { + *minor_status = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + (*context_handle)->auth_context = NULL; + (*context_handle)->source = NULL; + (*context_handle)->target = NULL; + (*context_handle)->flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->more_flags = 0; + (*context_handle)->ticket = NULL; + + kret = krb5_auth_con_init (gssapi_krb5_context, + &(*context_handle)->auth_context); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + { + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_auth_con_getflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &tmp); + tmp |= KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE; + krb5_auth_con_setflags(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + tmp); + } + + if (actual_mech_type) + *actual_mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + flags = 0; + ap_options = 0; + if (req_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + if (req_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) { + flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG; + ap_options |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED; + } + if (req_flags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + if (req_flags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + if (req_flags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) + ; /* XXX */ + flags |= GSS_C_CONF_FLAG; + flags |= GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG; + flags |= GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG; + flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG; + + if (ret_flags) + *ret_flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->flags = flags; + (*context_handle)->more_flags = LOCAL; + + kret = krb5_cc_default (gssapi_krb5_context, &ccache); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_cc_get_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + ccache, + &(*context_handle)->source); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_copy_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + target_name, + &(*context_handle)->target); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + memset(&this_cred, 0, sizeof(this_cred)); + this_cred.client = (*context_handle)->source; + this_cred.server = (*context_handle)->target; + this_cred.times.endtime = 0; + this_cred.session.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + + kret = krb5_get_credentials (gssapi_krb5_context, + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE, + ccache, + &this_cred, + &cred); + + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + krb5_auth_con_setkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &cred->session); + + kret = gssapi_krb5_create_8003_checksum (input_chan_bindings, + flags, + &cksum); + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + +#if 1 + enctype = (*context_handle)->auth_context->keyblock->keytype; +#else + if ((*context_handle)->auth_context->enctype) + enctype = (*context_handle)->auth_context->enctype; + else { + kret = krb5_keytype_to_enctype(gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context->keyblock->keytype, + &enctype); + if (kret) + return kret; + } +#endif + + + + kret = krb5_build_authenticator (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + enctype, + cred, + &cksum, + &auth, + &authenticator); + + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + kret = krb5_build_ap_req (gssapi_krb5_context, + enctype, + cred, + ap_options, + authenticator, + &outbuf); + + if (kret) { + *minor_status = kret; + ret = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto failure; + } + + ret = gssapi_krb5_encapsulate (&outbuf, + output_token, + "\x01\x00"); + if (ret) { + *minor_status = kret; + goto failure; + } + + if (flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) { + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + } else { + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= OPEN; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + +failure: + krb5_auth_con_free (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context); + if((*context_handle)->source) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->source); + if((*context_handle)->target) + krb5_free_principal (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->target); + free (*context_handle); + krb5_data_free (&outbuf); + *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + return ret; +} + +static OM_uint32 +repl_mutual + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + krb5_error_code kret; + krb5_data indata; + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl; + + ret = gssapi_krb5_decapsulate (input_token, + &indata, + "\x02\x00"); + if (ret) { + /* XXX - Handle AP_ERROR */ + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + kret = krb5_rd_rep (gssapi_krb5_context, + (*context_handle)->auth_context, + &indata, + &repl); + if (kret) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (gssapi_krb5_context, + repl); + + output_token->length = 0; + + (*context_handle)->more_flags |= OPEN; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * gss_init_sec_context + */ + +OM_uint32 gss_init_sec_context + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t initiator_cred_handle, + gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle, + const gss_name_t target_name, + const gss_OID mech_type, + OM_uint32 req_flags, + OM_uint32 time_req, + const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, + const gss_buffer_t input_token, + gss_OID * actual_mech_type, + gss_buffer_t output_token, + OM_uint32 * ret_flags, + OM_uint32 * time_rec + ) +{ + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) + return init_auth (minor_status, + initiator_cred_handle, + context_handle, + target_name, + mech_type, + req_flags, + time_req, + input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + actual_mech_type, + output_token, + ret_flags, + time_rec); + else + return repl_mutual(minor_status, + initiator_cred_handle, + context_handle, + target_name, + mech_type, + req_flags, + time_req, + input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + actual_mech_type, + output_token, + ret_flags, + time_rec); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/inquire_context.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/inquire_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6463253 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/inquire_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_context.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_context ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_name_t * src_name, + gss_name_t * targ_name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime_rec, + gss_OID * mech_type, + OM_uint32 * ctx_flags, + int * locally_initiated, + int * open + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + if (src_name) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name (minor_status, + context_handle->source, + src_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + if (targ_name) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name (minor_status, + context_handle->target, + targ_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + if (lifetime_rec) + *lifetime_rec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + if (mech_type) + *mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM; + + if (ctx_flags) + *ctx_flags = context_handle->flags; + + if (locally_initiated) + *locally_initiated = context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL; + + if (open) + *open = context_handle->more_flags & OPEN; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e181f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/inquire_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: inquire_cred.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_name_t * name, + OM_uint32 * lifetime, + gss_cred_usage_t * cred_usage, + gss_OID_set * mechanisms + ) +{ + OM_uint32 ret; + + if (cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (name != NULL) { + ret = gss_duplicate_name(minor_status, cred_handle->principal, name); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + } + if (lifetime != NULL) { + *lifetime = cred_handle->lifetime; + } + if (cred_usage != NULL) { + *cred_usage = cred_handle->usage; + } + if (mechanisms != NULL) { + ret = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mechanisms); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + ret = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, + &cred_handle->mechanisms->elements[0], + mechanisms); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + } + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_buffer.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85f971f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_buffer.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_buffer + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_buffer_t buffer + ) +{ + free (buffer->value); + buffer->length = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ee876e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_cred.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_cred + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t * cred_handle + ) +{ + if (*cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + gssapi_krb5_init (); + + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->principal); + if ((*cred_handle)->keytab != NULL) + krb5_kt_close(gssapi_krb5_context, (*cred_handle)->keytab); + gss_release_oid_set(NULL, &(*cred_handle)->mechanisms); + free(*cred_handle); + *cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_name.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_name.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c0fcd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_name.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_name.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_name + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_name_t * input_name + ) +{ + gssapi_krb5_init (); + krb5_free_principal(gssapi_krb5_context, + *input_name); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_oid_set.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_oid_set.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe7171e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/release_oid_set.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: release_oid_set.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_release_oid_set + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_OID_set * set + ) +{ + free ((*set)->elements); + free (*set); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/test_oid_set_member.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/test_oid_set_member.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47e9fa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/test_oid_set_member.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: test_oid_set_member.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_test_oid_set_member ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_OID member, + const gss_OID_set set, + int * present + ) +{ + size_t i; + + *present = 0; + for (i = 0; i < set->count; ++i) + if (member->length == set->elements[i].length + && memcmp (member->elements, + set->elements[i].elements, + member->length) == 0) { + *present = 1; + break; + } + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/unwrap.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/unwrap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45b1df1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/unwrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: unwrap.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 +gss_krb5_getsomekey(const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + des_cblock *key) +{ + /* XXX this is ugly, and probably incorrect... */ + krb5_keyblock *skey; + krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_getkey(gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &skey); + if(skey == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + memcpy(key, skey->keyvalue.data, sizeof(*key)); + krb5_free_keyblock(gssapi_krb5_context, skey); + return 0; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_unwrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ) +{ + u_char *p, *pad; + size_t len; + struct md5 md5; + u_char hash[16], seq_data[8]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock key; + des_cblock zero; + int i; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t padlength; + OM_uint32 ret; + int cstate; + + p = input_message_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + input_message_buffer->length, + "\x02\x01"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) == 0) { + cstate = 1; + } else if (memcmp (p, "\xFF\xFF", 2) == 0) { + cstate = 0; + } else + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 2; + if(conf_state != NULL) + *conf_state = cstate; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + p += 2; + p += 16; + + len = p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value; + + if(cstate) { + /* decrypt data */ + gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); ++i) + key[i] ^= 0xf0; + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p, + (des_cblock *)p, + input_message_buffer->length - len, + schedule, + &zero, + DES_DECRYPT); + + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + } + /* check pad */ + + pad = (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value + input_message_buffer->length - 1; + padlength = *pad; + + for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--) + ; + if (i != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + md5_init (&md5); + md5_update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + md5_update (&md5, p, input_message_buffer->length - len); + md5_finito (&md5, hash); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key); + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)hash, + (des_cblock *)hash, sizeof(hash), schedule, &zero); + if (memcmp (p - 8, hash, 8) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + + /* verify sequence number */ + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + seq_data[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq_data[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq_data[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq_data[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq_data + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0xFF : 0, + 4); + + p -= 16; + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p, (des_cblock *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)hash, DES_DECRYPT); + + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + if (memcmp (p, seq_data, 8) != 0) { + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + /* copy out data */ + + output_message_buffer->length = input_message_buffer->length + - len - 8 - padlength; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc(output_message_buffer->length); + if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + memcpy (output_message_buffer->value, + p + 24, + output_message_buffer->length); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/v1.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/v1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34091ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/v1.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: v1.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +/* These functions are for V1 compatibility */ + +OM_uint32 gss_sign + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t message_token + ) +{ + return gss_get_mic(minor_status, + context_handle, + (gss_qop_t)qop_req, + message_buffer, + message_token); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_verify + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + int * qop_state + ) +{ + return gss_verify_mic(minor_status, + context_handle, + message_buffer, + token_buffer, + (gss_qop_t *)qop_state); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_seal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + int qop_req, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ) +{ + return gss_wrap(minor_status, + context_handle, + conf_req_flag, + (gss_qop_t)qop_req, + input_message_buffer, + conf_state, + output_message_buffer); +} + +OM_uint32 gss_unseal + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + int * qop_state + ) +{ + return gss_unwrap(minor_status, + context_handle, + input_message_buffer, + output_message_buffer, + conf_state, + (gss_qop_t *)qop_state); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/verify_mic.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/verify_mic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4342a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/verify_mic.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: verify_mic.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + const gss_buffer_t message_buffer, + const gss_buffer_t token_buffer, + gss_qop_t * qop_state + ) +{ + u_char *p; + struct md5 md5; + u_char hash[16], seq_data[8]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock key; + des_cblock zero; + int32_t seq_number; + OM_uint32 ret; + + p = token_buffer->value; + ret = gssapi_krb5_verify_header (&p, + token_buffer->length, + "\x01\x01"); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (memcmp(p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + p += 2; + if (memcmp (p, "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0) + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + p += 4; + p += 16; + + /* verify checksum */ + md5_init (&md5); + md5_update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + md5_update (&md5, message_buffer->value, + message_buffer->length); + md5_finito (&md5, hash); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); +#if 0 + memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->key.keyvalue.data, + sizeof(key)); +#endif + memcpy (&key, context_handle->auth_context->remote_subkey->keyvalue.data, + sizeof(key)); + + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)hash, + (des_cblock *)hash, sizeof(hash), schedule, &zero); + if (memcmp (p - 8, hash, 8) != 0) { + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + /* verify sequence number */ + + krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + seq_data[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + seq_data[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + seq_data[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + seq_data[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (seq_data + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0xFF : 0, + 4); + + p -= 16; + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p, (des_cblock *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)hash, DES_DECRYPT); + + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + + if (memcmp (p, seq_data, 8) != 0) { + return GSS_S_BAD_MIC; + } + + krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/wrap.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98ee689 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/gssapi/wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "gssapi_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: wrap.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap_size_limit ( + OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + OM_uint32 req_output_size, + OM_uint32 * max_input_size + ) +{ + size_t len, total_len, padlength; + padlength = 8 - (req_output_size % 8); + len = req_output_size + 8 + padlength + 22; + gssapi_krb5_encap_length(len, &len, &total_len); + *max_input_size = (OM_uint32)total_len; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +OM_uint32 gss_wrap + (OM_uint32 * minor_status, + const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + const gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + int * conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer + ) +{ + u_char *p; + struct md5 md5; + u_char hash[16]; + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock key; + des_cblock zero; + int i; + int32_t seq_number; + size_t len, total_len, padlength; + + padlength = 8 - (input_message_buffer->length % 8); + len = input_message_buffer->length + 8 + padlength + 22; + gssapi_krb5_encap_length (len, &len, &total_len); + + output_message_buffer->length = total_len; + output_message_buffer->value = malloc (total_len); + if (output_message_buffer->value == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + p = gssapi_krb5_make_header(output_message_buffer->value, + len, + "\x02\x01"); + + + /* SGN_ALG */ + memcpy (p, "\x00\x00", 2); + p += 2; + /* SEAL_ALG */ + if(conf_req_flag) + memcpy (p, "\x00\x00", 2); + else + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff", 2); + p += 2; + /* Filler */ + memcpy (p, "\xff\xff", 2); + p += 2; + + /* fill in later */ + memset (p, 0, 16); + p += 16; + + /* confounder + data + pad */ + des_new_random_key((des_cblock*)p); + memcpy (p + 8, input_message_buffer->value, + input_message_buffer->length); + memset (p + 8 + input_message_buffer->length, padlength, padlength); + + /* checksum */ + md5_init (&md5); + md5_update (&md5, p - 24, 8); + md5_update (&md5, p, input_message_buffer->length + padlength + 8); + md5_finito (&md5, hash); + + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key); + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)hash, + (des_cblock *)hash, sizeof(hash), schedule, &zero); + memcpy (p - 8, hash, 8); + + /* sequence number */ + krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + &seq_number); + + p -= 16; + p[0] = (seq_number >> 0) & 0xFF; + p[1] = (seq_number >> 8) & 0xFF; + p[2] = (seq_number >> 16) & 0xFF; + p[3] = (seq_number >> 24) & 0xFF; + memset (p + 4, + (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 0 : 0xFF, + 4); + + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p, (des_cblock *)p, 8, + schedule, (des_cblock *)(p + 8), DES_ENCRYPT); + + krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber (gssapi_krb5_context, + context_handle->auth_context, + ++seq_number); + + /* encrypt the data */ + p += 16; + + if(conf_req_flag) { + gss_krb5_getsomekey(context_handle, &key); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); ++i) + key[i] ^= 0xf0; + des_set_key (&key, schedule); + memset (&zero, 0, sizeof(zero)); + des_cbc_encrypt ((des_cblock *)p, + (des_cblock *)p, + 8 + input_message_buffer->length + padlength, + schedule, + &zero, + DES_ENCRYPT); + + memset (key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset (schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + } + if(conf_state != NULL) + *conf_state = conf_req_flag; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c4341e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.33 2000/01/06 21:45:41 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += -I../asn1 -I$(srcdir)/../asn1 + +BUILT_SOURCES = asn1_Key.c asn1_Event.c asn1_HDBFlags.c asn1_hdb_entry.c \ + asn1_Salt.c hdb_err.c hdb_err.h + +foo = asn1_Key.x asn1_Event.x asn1_HDBFlags.x asn1_hdb_entry.x asn1_Salt.x + +CLEANFILES = $(BUILT_SOURCES) $(foo) hdb_asn1.h asn1_files + +noinst_PROGRAMS = convert_db +LDADD = libhdb.la \ + ../krb5/libkrb5.la \ + ../asn1/libasn1.la \ + ../des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libhdb.la +libhdb_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 4:1:1 + +libhdb_la_SOURCES = \ + keytab.c \ + hdb.c \ + common.c \ + db.c \ + ndbm.c \ + print.c \ + $(BUILT_SOURCES) + +include_HEADERS = hdb.h hdb_err.h hdb_asn1.h hdb-protos.h hdb-private.h + +libhdb_la_LIBADD = + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/hdb-protos.h $(srcdir)/hdb-private.h + +$(srcdir)/hdb-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o hdb-protos.h $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) || rm -f hdb-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/hdb-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -p hdb-private.h $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) || rm -f hdb-private.h + +$(foo) hdb_asn1.h: asn1_files + +asn1_files: ../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 + ../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 hdb_asn1 + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +$(convert_db_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +hdb_err.h: hdb_err.et diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef92550 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,709 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.33 2000/01/06 21:45:41 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ 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$(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/hdb-protos.h $(srcdir)/hdb-private.h + +$(srcdir)/hdb-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o hdb-protos.h $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) || rm -f hdb-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/hdb-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -p hdb-private.h $(libhdb_la_SOURCES) || rm -f hdb-private.h + +$(foo) hdb_asn1.h: asn1_files + +asn1_files: ../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 + ../asn1/asn1_compile$(EXEEXT) $(srcdir)/hdb.asn1 hdb_asn1 + +$(libhdb_la_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +$(convert_db_OBJECTS): hdb_asn1.h hdb_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +hdb_err.h: hdb_err.et + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/common.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e95667 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +int +hdb_principal2key(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, krb5_data *key) +{ + Principal new; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + int ret; + + ret = copy_Principal(p, &new); + if(ret) + goto out; + new.name.name_type = 0; + len = length_Principal(&new); + buf = malloc(len); + if(buf == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = encode_Principal(buf + len - 1, len, &new, &len); + if(ret){ + free(buf); + goto out; + } + key->data = buf; + key->length = len; +out: + free_Principal(&new); + return ret; +} + +int +hdb_key2principal(krb5_context context, krb5_data *key, krb5_principal p) +{ + return decode_Principal(key->data, key->length, p, NULL); +} + +int +hdb_entry2value(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, krb5_data *value) +{ + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + int ret; + + len = length_hdb_entry(ent); + buf = malloc(len); + if(buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = encode_hdb_entry(buf + len - 1, len, ent, &len); + if(ret){ + free(buf); + return ret; + } + value->data = buf; + value->length = len; + return 0; +} + +int +hdb_value2entry(krb5_context context, krb5_data *value, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + return decode_hdb_entry(value->data, value->length, ent, NULL); +} + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_fetch(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_data key, value; + int code; + + hdb_principal2key(context, entry->principal, &key); + code = db->_get(context, db, key, &value); + krb5_data_free(&key); + if(code) + return code; + hdb_value2entry(context, &value, entry); + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) + hdb_unseal_keys (db, entry); + krb5_data_free(&value); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_store(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_data key, value; + int code; + + hdb_principal2key(context, entry->principal, &key); + hdb_seal_keys(db, entry); + hdb_entry2value(context, entry, &value); + code = db->_put(context, db, flags & HDB_F_REPLACE, key, value); + krb5_data_free(&value); + krb5_data_free(&key); + return code; +} + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_data key; + int code; + + hdb_principal2key(context, entry->principal, &key); + code = db->_del(context, db, key); + krb5_data_free(&key); + return code; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/convert_db.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/convert_db.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b257809 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/convert_db.c @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* Converts a database from version 0.0* to 0.1. This is done by + * making three copies of each DES key (DES-CBC-CRC, DES-CBC-MD4, and + * DES-CBC-MD5). + * + * Use with care. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" +#include "getarg.h" + +RCSID("$Id: convert_db.c,v 1.8 1999/05/09 22:47:47 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +update_keytypes(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *data) +{ + int i; + int n = 0; + Key *k; + int save_len; + Key *save_val; + HDB *new = data; + krb5_error_code ret; + + for(i = 0; i < entry->keys.len; i++) + if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES) + n += 2; + else if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES3) + n += 1; + k = malloc(sizeof(*k) * (entry->keys.len + n)); + n = 0; + for(i = 0; i < entry->keys.len; i++) { + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n]); + if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES) { + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n+1]); + k[n+1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n+2]); + k[n+2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + n += 2; + } + else if(entry->keys.val[i].key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES3) { + copy_Key(&entry->keys.val[i], &k[n+1]); + k[n+1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5; + n += 1; + } + n++; + } + save_len = entry->keys.len; + save_val = entry->keys.val; + entry->keys.len = n; + entry->keys.val = k; + ret = new->store(context, new, HDB_F_REPLACE, entry); + entry->keys.len = save_len; + entry->keys.val = save_val; + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) + free_Key(&k[i]); + free(k); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +update_version2(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *data) +{ + HDB *new = data; + if(!db->master_key_set) { + int i; + for(i = 0; i < entry->keys.len; i++) { + free(entry->keys.val[i].mkvno); + entry->keys.val[i].mkvno = NULL; + } + } + new->store(context, new, HDB_F_REPLACE, entry); + return 0; +} + +char *old_database = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; +char *new_database = HDB_DEFAULT_DB ".new"; +char *mkeyfile; +int update_version; +int help_flag; +int version_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "old-database", 0, arg_string, &old_database, + "name of database to convert", "file" }, + { "new-database", 0, arg_string, &new_database, + "name of converted database", "file" }, + { "master-key", 0, arg_string, &mkeyfile, + "v5 master key file", "file" }, + { "update-version", 0, arg_flag, &update_version, + "update the database to the current version" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag } +}; + +static int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + HDB *db, *new; + EncryptionKey key; + int optind = 0; + int master_key_set = 0; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + krb5_std_usage(1, args, num_args); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(NULL, 1, ret, "krb5_init_context"); + + ret = hdb_create(context, &db, old_database); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create"); + + ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, mkeyfile, &key); + if(ret == 0) { + if(key.keytype == KEYTYPE_DES) + key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + + ret = hdb_set_master_key(context, db, key); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_key"); + master_key_set = 1; + } + ret = hdb_create(context, &new, new_database); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_create"); + if (master_key_set) { + ret = hdb_set_master_key(context, new, key); + if (ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_set_master_key"); + } + ret = db->open(context, db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_BADVERSION) { + krb5_data tag; + krb5_data version; + int foo; + unsigned ver; + tag.data = HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY; + tag.length = strlen(tag.data); + ret = (*db->_get)(context, db, tag, &version); + if(ret) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "database is wrong version, " + "but couldn't find version key (%s)", + HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY); + foo = sscanf(version.data, "%u", &ver); + krb5_data_free (&version); + if(foo != 1) + krb5_errx(context, 1, "database version is not a number"); + if(ver == 1 && HDB_DB_FORMAT == 2) { + krb5_warnx(context, "will upgrade database from version %d to %d", + ver, HDB_DB_FORMAT); + krb5_warnx(context, "rerun to do other conversions"); + update_version = 1; + } else + krb5_errx(context, 1, + "don't know how to upgrade from version %d to %d", + ver, HDB_DB_FORMAT); + } else if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", old_database); + ret = new->open(context, new, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, 0600); + if(ret) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "%s", new_database); + if(update_version) + ret = hdb_foreach(context, db, 0, update_version2, new); + else + ret = hdb_foreach(context, db, 0, update_keytypes, new); + if(ret != 0) + krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_foreach"); + db->close(context, db); + new->close(context, new); + krb5_warnx(context, "wrote converted database to `%s'", new_database); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/db.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/db.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4699437 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/db.c @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: db.c,v 1.25 1999/12/02 17:05:04 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_DB_H + +static krb5_error_code +DB_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + d->close(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_clear_master_key (context, db); + free(db->name); + free(db); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + int fd = (*d->fd)(d); + if(fd < 0) + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + return hdb_lock(fd, operation); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + int fd = (*d->fd)(d); + if(fd < 0) + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; + return hdb_unlock(fd); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry, int flag) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT key, value; + krb5_data key_data, data; + int code; + + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(code == -1) + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; + code = d->seq(d, &key, &value, flag); + db->unlock(context, db); /* XXX check value */ + if(code == -1) + return errno; + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + key_data.data = key.data; + key_data.length = key.size; + data.data = value.data; + data.length = value.size; + if (hdb_value2entry(context, &data, entry)) + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, R_NEXT); + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) + hdb_unseal_keys (db, entry); + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + entry->principal = malloc(sizeof(*entry->principal)); + hdb_key2principal(context, &key_data, entry->principal); + } + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, R_FIRST); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +DB_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return DB_seq(context, db, flags, entry, R_NEXT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name) +{ + int ret; + char *old, *new; + + asprintf(&old, "%s.db", db->name); + asprintf(&new, "%s.db", new_name); + ret = rename(old, new); + free(old); + free(new); + if(ret) + return errno; + + free(db->name); + db->name = strdup(new_name); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__get(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key, krb5_data *reply) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k, v; + int code; + + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->get(d, &k, &v, 0); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code < 0) + return errno; + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + krb5_data_copy(reply, v.data, v.size); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__put(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int replace, + krb5_data key, krb5_data value) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k, v; + int code; + + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + v.data = value.data; + v.size = value.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->put(d, &k, &v, replace ? 0 : R_NOOVERWRITE); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code < 0) + return errno; + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_EXISTS; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB__del(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key) +{ + DB *d = (DB*)db->db; + DBT k; + krb5_error_code code; + k.data = key.data; + k.size = key.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = d->del(d, &k, 0); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + if(code < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DB_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + char *fn; + krb5_error_code ret; + + asprintf(&fn, "%s.db", db->name); + if (fn == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + db->db = dbopen(fn, flags, mode, DB_BTREE, NULL); + free(fn); + /* try to open without .db extension */ + if(db->db == NULL && errno == ENOENT) + db->db = dbopen(db->name, flags, mode, DB_BTREE, NULL); + if(db->db == NULL) + return errno; + if((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + else + ret = hdb_init_db(context, db); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return 0; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_db_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, + const char *filename) +{ + *db = malloc(sizeof(**db)); + if (*db == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + (*db)->db = NULL; + (*db)->name = strdup(filename); + (*db)->master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->openp = 0; + (*db)->open = DB_open; + (*db)->close = DB_close; + (*db)->fetch = _hdb_fetch; + (*db)->store = _hdb_store; + (*db)->remove = _hdb_remove; + (*db)->firstkey = DB_firstkey; + (*db)->nextkey= DB_nextkey; + (*db)->lock = DB_lock; + (*db)->unlock = DB_unlock; + (*db)->rename = DB_rename; + (*db)->_get = DB__get; + (*db)->_put = DB__put; + (*db)->_del = DB__del; + (*db)->destroy = DB_destroy; + return 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb-private.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb-private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce868bd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb-private.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __hdb_private_h__ +#define __hdb_private_h__ + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_fetch __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + unsigned flags, + hdb_entry *entry)); + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_remove __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + hdb_entry *entry)); + +void +_hdb_seal_keys_int __P(( + hdb_entry *ent, + int key_version, + krb5_data schedule)); + +krb5_error_code +_hdb_store __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + unsigned flags, + hdb_entry *entry)); + +void +_hdb_unseal_keys_int __P(( + hdb_entry *ent, + int key_version, + krb5_data schedule)); + +#endif /* __hdb_private_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb-protos.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb-protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0f15b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb-protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __hdb_protos_h__ +#define __hdb_protos_h__ + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +krb5_error_code +hdb_check_db_format __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_clear_master_key __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_create __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB **db, + const char *filename)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_db_create __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB **db, + const char *filename)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_enctype2key __P(( + krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *e, + krb5_enctype enctype, + Key **key)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_entry2string __P(( + krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *ent, + char **str)); + +int +hdb_entry2value __P(( + krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *ent, + krb5_data *value)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_foreach __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + unsigned flags, + hdb_foreach_func_t func, + void *data)); + +void +hdb_free_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *ent)); + +void +hdb_free_key __P((Key *key)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_init_db __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db)); + +int +hdb_key2principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_data *key, + krb5_principal p)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_lock __P(( + int fd, + int operation)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_ndbm_create __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB **db, + const char *filename)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_next_enctype2key __P(( + krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *e, + krb5_enctype enctype, + Key **key)); + +int +hdb_principal2key __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal p, + krb5_data *key)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_print_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + hdb_entry *entry, + void *data)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_process_master_key __P(( + krb5_context context, + EncryptionKey key, + krb5_data *schedule)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_read_master_key __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *filename, + EncryptionKey *key)); + +void +hdb_seal_keys __P(( + HDB *db, + hdb_entry *ent)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_key __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + EncryptionKey key)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_keyfile __P(( + krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + const char *keyfile)); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unlock __P((int fd)); + +void +hdb_unseal_keys __P(( + HDB *db, + hdb_entry *ent)); + +int +hdb_value2entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_data *value, + hdb_entry *ent)); + +#endif /* __hdb_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99537d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +-- $Id: hdb.asn1,v 1.7 1999/05/03 16:48:52 joda Exp $ +HDB DEFINITIONS ::= +BEGIN + +EncryptionKey EXTERNAL +KerberosTime EXTERNAL +Principal EXTERNAL + +HDB_DB_FORMAT INTEGER ::= 2 -- format of database, + -- update when making changes + +-- these should have the same value as the pa-* counterparts +hdb-pw-salt INTEGER ::= 3 +hdb-afs3-salt INTEGER ::= 10 + +Salt ::= SEQUENCE { + type[0] INTEGER, + salt[1] OCTET STRING +} + +Key ::= SEQUENCE { + mkvno[0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- master key version number + key[1] EncryptionKey, + salt[2] Salt OPTIONAL +} + +Event ::= SEQUENCE { + time[0] KerberosTime, + principal[1] Principal OPTIONAL +} + +HDBFlags ::= BIT STRING { + initial(0), -- require as-req + forwardable(1), -- may issue forwardable + proxiable(2), -- may issue proxiable + renewable(3), -- may issue renewable + postdate(4), -- may issue postdatable + server(5), -- may be server + client(6), -- may be client + invalid(7), -- entry is invalid + require-preauth(8), -- must use preauth + change-pw(9), -- change password service + require-hwauth(10), -- must use hwauth + ok-as-delegate(11), -- as in TicketFlags + user-to-user(12), -- may use user-to-user auth + immutable(13) -- may not be deleted +} + +hdb_entry ::= SEQUENCE { + principal[0] Principal OPTIONAL, -- this is optional only + -- for compatibility with libkrb5 + kvno[1] INTEGER, + keys[2] SEQUENCE OF Key, + created-by[3] Event, + modified-by[4] Event OPTIONAL, + valid-start[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + valid-end[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + pw-end[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL, + max-life[8] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + max-renew[9] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + flags[10] HDBFlags, + etypes[11] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER OPTIONAL +} + +END diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..edf6677 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.c @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: hdb.c,v 1.35 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +hdb_next_enctype2key(krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *e, + krb5_enctype enctype, + Key **key) +{ + Key *k; + + for (k = *key ? *key : e->keys.val; + k < e->keys.val + e->keys.len; + k++) + if(k->key.keytype == enctype){ + *key = k; + return 0; + } + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_enctype2key(krb5_context context, + hdb_entry *e, + krb5_enctype enctype, + Key **key) +{ + *key = NULL; + return hdb_next_enctype2key(context, e, enctype, key); +} + +/* this is a bit ugly, but will get better when the crypto framework + gets fixed */ + +krb5_error_code +hdb_process_master_key(krb5_context context, EncryptionKey key, + krb5_data *schedule) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(key.keytype != ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + + ret = krb5_data_alloc (schedule, sizeof(des_key_schedule)); + if (ret) + return ret; + + des_set_key((des_cblock*)key.keyvalue.data, schedule->data); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_read_master_key(krb5_context context, const char *filename, + EncryptionKey *key) +{ + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[256]; + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + if(filename == NULL) + filename = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return errno; + len = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); + if(ferror(f)) + ret = errno; + else + ret = decode_EncryptionKey(buf, len, key, &len); + fclose(f); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + return ret; +} + +void +_hdb_unseal_keys_int(hdb_entry *ent, int key_version, krb5_data schedule) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){ + des_cblock iv; + int num = 0; + if(ent->keys.val[i].mkvno == NULL) + continue; + if(*ent->keys.val[i].mkvno != key_version) + ; + memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); + + des_cfb64_encrypt(ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.data, + ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.data, + ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.length, + schedule.data, &iv, &num, 0); + free(ent->keys.val[i].mkvno); + ent->keys.val[i].mkvno = NULL; + } +} + +void +hdb_unseal_keys(HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + if (db->master_key_set == 0) + return; + _hdb_unseal_keys_int(ent, db->master_key_version, db->master_key); +} + +void +_hdb_seal_keys_int(hdb_entry *ent, int key_version, krb5_data schedule) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){ + des_cblock iv; + int num = 0; + + if(ent->keys.val[i].mkvno != NULL) + continue; + memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); + des_cfb64_encrypt(ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.data, + ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.data, + ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue.length, + schedule.data, &iv, &num, 1); + ent->keys.val[i].mkvno = malloc(sizeof(*ent->keys.val[i].mkvno)); + *ent->keys.val[i].mkvno = key_version; + } +} + +void +hdb_seal_keys(HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + if (db->master_key_set == 0) + return; + + _hdb_seal_keys_int(ent, db->master_key_version, db->master_key); +} + +void +hdb_free_key(Key *key) +{ + memset(key->key.keyvalue.data, + 0, + key->key.keyvalue.length); + free_Key(key); + free(key); +} + + +krb5_error_code +hdb_lock(int fd, int operation) +{ + int i, code; + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++){ + code = flock(fd, (operation == HDB_RLOCK ? LOCK_SH : LOCK_EX) | LOCK_NB); + if(code == 0 || errno != EWOULDBLOCK) + break; + sleep(1); + } + if(code == 0) + return 0; + if(errno == EWOULDBLOCK) + return HDB_ERR_DB_INUSE; + return HDB_ERR_CANT_LOCK_DB; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_unlock(int fd) +{ + int code; + code = flock(fd, LOCK_UN); + if(code) + return 4711 /* XXX */; + return 0; +} + +void +hdb_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; ++i) { + Key *k = &ent->keys.val[i]; + + memset (k->key.keyvalue.data, 0, k->key.keyvalue.length); + } + free_hdb_entry(ent); +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_foreach(krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + unsigned flags, + hdb_foreach_func_t func, + void *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry entry; + ret = db->firstkey(context, db, flags, &entry); + while(ret == 0){ + ret = (*func)(context, db, &entry, data); + hdb_free_entry(context, &entry); + if(ret == 0) + ret = db->nextkey(context, db, flags, &entry); + } + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + ret = 0; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_check_db_format(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_data tag; + krb5_data version; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned ver; + int foo; + + tag.data = HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY; + tag.length = strlen(tag.data); + ret = (*db->_get)(context, db, tag, &version); + if(ret) + return ret; + foo = sscanf(version.data, "%u", &ver); + krb5_data_free (&version); + if (foo != 1) + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + if(ver != HDB_DB_FORMAT) + return HDB_ERR_BADVERSION; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_init_db(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data tag; + krb5_data version; + char ver[32]; + + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + if(ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return ret; + + tag.data = HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY; + tag.length = strlen(tag.data); + snprintf(ver, sizeof(ver), "%u", HDB_DB_FORMAT); + version.data = ver; + version.length = strlen(version.data) + 1; /* zero terminated */ + ret = (*db->_put)(context, db, 0, tag, version); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, const char *filename) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + if(filename == NULL) + filename = HDB_DEFAULT_DB; + initialize_hdb_error_table_r(&context->et_list); +#ifdef HAVE_DB_H + ret = hdb_db_create(context, db, filename); +#elif HAVE_NDBM_H + ret = hdb_ndbm_create(context, db, filename); +#else + krb5_errx(context, 1, "No database support! (hdb_create)"); +#endif + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_key (krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + EncryptionKey key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, key, &db->master_key); + if (ret) + return ret; +#if 0 /* XXX - why? */ + des_set_random_generator_seed(key.keyvalue.data); +#endif + db->master_key_set = 1; + db->master_key_version = 0; /* XXX */ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_set_master_keyfile (krb5_context context, + HDB *db, + const char *keyfile) +{ + EncryptionKey key; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, keyfile, &key); + if (ret) { + if (ret != ENOENT) + return ret; + return 0; + } + ret = hdb_set_master_key(context, db, key); + memset(key.keyvalue.data, 0, key.keyvalue.length); + free_EncryptionKey(&key); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_clear_master_key (krb5_context context, + HDB *db) +{ + if (db->master_key_set) { + memset(db->master_key.data, 0, db->master_key.length); + krb5_data_free(&db->master_key); + db->master_key_set = 0; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4cb001 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: hdb.h,v 1.26 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __HDB_H__ +#define __HDB_H__ + +#include + +#include + +enum hdb_lockop{ HDB_RLOCK, HDB_WLOCK }; + +/* flags for various functions */ +#define HDB_F_DECRYPT 1 /* decrypt keys */ +#define HDB_F_REPLACE 2 /* replace entry */ + +typedef struct HDB{ + void *db; + char *name; + int master_key_set; + krb5_data master_key; + int master_key_version; + int openp; + + krb5_error_code (*open)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, int, mode_t); + krb5_error_code (*close)(krb5_context, struct HDB*); + krb5_error_code (*fetch)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*store)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*remove)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*firstkey)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, + unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*nextkey)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, + unsigned, hdb_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*lock)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, int operation); + krb5_error_code (*unlock)(krb5_context, struct HDB*); + krb5_error_code (*rename)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, const char*); + krb5_error_code (*_get)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, krb5_data, krb5_data*); + krb5_error_code (*_put)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, int, + krb5_data, krb5_data); + krb5_error_code (*_del)(krb5_context, struct HDB*, krb5_data); + krb5_error_code (*destroy)(krb5_context, struct HDB*); +}HDB; + +#define HDB_DB_DIR "/var/heimdal" +#define HDB_DEFAULT_DB HDB_DB_DIR "/heimdal" +#define HDB_DB_FORMAT_ENTRY "hdb/db-format" + +typedef krb5_error_code (*hdb_foreach_func_t)(krb5_context, HDB*, + hdb_entry*, void*); +extern krb5_kt_ops hdb_kt_ops; + +#include + +#endif /* __HDB_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb_err.et b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a08a2d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# +# Error messages for the hdb library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: hdb_err.et,v 1.4 1998/02/16 16:29:15 joda Exp $" + +error_table hdb + +prefix HDB_ERR + +index 1 +#error_code INUSE, "Entry already exists in database" +error_code UK_SERROR, "Database store error" +error_code UK_RERROR, "Database read error" +error_code NOENTRY, "No such entry in the database" +error_code DB_INUSE, "Database is locked or in use--try again later" +error_code DB_CHANGED, "Database was modified during read" +error_code RECURSIVELOCK, "Attempt to lock database twice" +error_code NOTLOCKED, "Attempt to unlock database when not locked" +error_code BADLOCKMODE, "Invalid kdb lock mode" +error_code CANT_LOCK_DB, "Insufficient access to lock database" +error_code EXISTS, "Entry already exists in database" +error_code BADVERSION, "Wrong database version" + +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..76ba479 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/hdb_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: hdb_locl.h,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __HDB_LOCL_H__ +#define __HDB_LOCL_H__ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(HAVE_DB_185_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NDBM_H +#include +#endif + +int hdb_principal2key(krb5_context, krb5_principal, krb5_data*); +int hdb_key2principal(krb5_context, krb5_data*, krb5_principal); + +krb5_error_code hdb_lock(int, int); +krb5_error_code hdb_unlock(int); + +krb5_error_code _hdb_fetch(krb5_context, HDB*, unsigned, hdb_entry*); +krb5_error_code _hdb_store(krb5_context, HDB*, unsigned, hdb_entry*); +krb5_error_code _hdb_remove(krb5_context, HDB*, hdb_entry*); + +#endif /* __HDB_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/keytab.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/keytab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9be75d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/keytab.c @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +/* keytab backend for HDB databases */ + +RCSID("$Id: keytab.c,v 1.2 1999/08/26 13:24:05 joda Exp $"); + +struct hdb_data { + char *dbname; + char *mkey; + HDB *db; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct hdb_data *d; + const char *db, *mkey; + d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + db = name; + mkey = strchr(name, ':'); + if(mkey == NULL || mkey[1] == '\0') { + if(*name == '\0') + d->dbname = NULL; + else { + d->dbname = strdup(name); + if(d->dbname == NULL) { + free(d); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + d->mkey = NULL; + } else { + if((mkey - db) == 0) { + d->dbname = NULL; + } else { + d->dbname = malloc(mkey - db); + if(d->dbname == NULL) { + free(d); + return ENOMEM; + } + strncpy(d->dbname, db, mkey - db); + d->dbname[mkey - db] = '\0'; + } + d->mkey = strdup(mkey + 1); + if(d->mkey == NULL) { + free(d->dbname); + free(d); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + ret = hdb_create(context, &d->db, d->dbname); + if(ret) { + free(d->dbname); + free(d->mkey); + free(d); + return ret; + } + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile (context, d->db, d->mkey); + if(ret) { + (*d->db->destroy)(context, d->db); + free(d->dbname); + free(d->mkey); + free(d); + return ret; + } + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct hdb_data *d = id->data; + (*d->db->destroy)(context, d->db); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + struct hdb_data *d = id->data; + snprintf(name, namesize, "%s%s%s", + d->dbname ? d->dbname : "", + (d->dbname || d->mkey) ? ":" : "", + d->mkey ? d->mkey : ""); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +hdb_get_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno kvno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + hdb_entry ent; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct hdb_data *d = id->data; + int i; + + ret = (*d->db->open)(context, d->db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (ret) + return ret; + ent.principal = (krb5_principal)principal; + ret = (*d->db->fetch)(context, d->db, HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + (*d->db->close)(context, d->db); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + else if(ret) + return ret; + if(kvno && ent.kvno != kvno) { + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + } + if(enctype == 0) + if(ent.keys.len > 0) + enctype = ent.keys.val[0].key.keytype; + ret = KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + for(i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; i++) { + if(ent.keys.val[i].key.keytype == enctype) { + krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry->principal); + entry->vno = ent.kvno; + krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, + &ent.keys.val[i].key, + &entry->keyblock); + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + return ret; +} + +krb5_kt_ops hdb_kt_ops = { + "HDB", + hdb_resolve, + hdb_get_name, + hdb_close, + hdb_get_entry, + NULL, /* start_seq_get */ + NULL, /* next_entry */ + NULL, /* end_seq_get */ + NULL, /* add */ + NULL /* remove */ +}; + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/libasn1.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/libasn1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03d951a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/libasn1.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: libasn1.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __LIBASN1_H__ +#define __LIBASN1_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "hdb_asn1.h" +#include +#include + +#endif /* __LIBASN1_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/ndbm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/ndbm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79ca978 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/ndbm.c @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ndbm.c,v 1.26 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_NDBM_H + +struct ndbm_db { + DBM *db; + int lock_fd; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_destroy(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = hdb_clear_master_key (context, db); + free(db->name); + free(db); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_lock(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int operation) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + return hdb_lock(d->lock_fd, operation); +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_unlock(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + return hdb_unlock(d->lock_fd); +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_seq(krb5_context context, HDB *db, + unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry, int first) + +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum key, value; + krb5_data key_data, data; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(first) + key = dbm_firstkey(d->db); + else + key = dbm_nextkey(d->db); + if(key.dptr == NULL) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + key_data.data = key.dptr; + key_data.length = key.dsize; + ret = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(ret) return ret; + value = dbm_fetch(d->db, key); + db->unlock(context, db); + data.data = value.dptr; + data.length = value.dsize; + if(hdb_value2entry(context, &data, entry)) + return NDBM_seq(context, db, flags, entry, 0); + if (db->master_key_set && (flags & HDB_F_DECRYPT)) + hdb_unseal_keys (db, entry); + if (entry->principal == NULL) { + entry->principal = malloc (sizeof(*entry->principal)); + hdb_key2principal (context, &key_data, entry->principal); + } + return 0; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_firstkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return NDBM_seq(context, db, flags, entry, 1); +} + + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_nextkey(krb5_context context, HDB *db, unsigned flags, hdb_entry *entry) +{ + return NDBM_seq(context, db, flags, entry, 0); +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_rename(krb5_context context, HDB *db, const char *new_name) +{ + /* XXX this function will break */ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + + int ret; + char *old_dir, *old_pag, *new_dir, *new_pag; + char *new_lock; + int lock_fd; + + /* lock old and new databases */ + ret = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(ret) return ret; + asprintf(&new_lock, "%s.lock", new_name); + lock_fd = open(new_lock, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + free(new_lock); + if(lock_fd < 0) { + ret = errno; + db->unlock(context, db); + return ret; + } + ret = hdb_lock(lock_fd, HDB_WLOCK); + if(ret) { + db->unlock(context, db); + close(lock_fd); + return ret; + } + + asprintf(&old_dir, "%s.dir", db->name); + asprintf(&old_pag, "%s.pag", db->name); + asprintf(&new_dir, "%s.dir", new_name); + asprintf(&new_pag, "%s.pag", new_name); + + ret = rename(old_dir, new_dir) || rename(old_pag, new_pag); + free(old_dir); + free(old_pag); + free(new_dir); + free(new_pag); + hdb_unlock(lock_fd); + db->unlock(context, db); + + if(ret) { + close(lock_fd); + return errno; + } + + close(d->lock_fd); + d->lock_fd = lock_fd; + + free(db->name); + db->name = strdup(new_name); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM__get(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key, krb5_data *reply) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum k, v; + int code; + + k.dptr = key.data; + k.dsize = key.length; + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_RLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + v = dbm_fetch(d->db, k); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(v.dptr == NULL) + return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY; + + krb5_data_copy(reply, v.dptr, v.dsize); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM__put(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int replace, + krb5_data key, krb5_data value) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum k, v; + int code; + + k.dptr = key.data; + k.dsize = key.length; + v.dptr = value.data; + v.dsize = value.length; + + code = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(code) + return code; + code = dbm_store(d->db, k, v, replace ? DBM_REPLACE : DBM_INSERT); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code == 1) + return HDB_ERR_EXISTS; + if (code < 0) + return code; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM__del(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_data key) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = (struct ndbm_db *)db->db; + datum k; + int code; + krb5_error_code ret; + + k.dptr = key.data; + k.dsize = key.length; + ret = db->lock(context, db, HDB_WLOCK); + if(ret) return ret; + code = dbm_delete(d->db, k); + db->unlock(context, db); + if(code < 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_open(krb5_context context, HDB *db, int flags, mode_t mode) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct ndbm_db *d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + char *lock_file; + + if(d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + asprintf(&lock_file, "%s.lock", (char*)db->name); + if(lock_file == NULL) { + free(d); + return ENOMEM; + } + d->db = dbm_open((char*)db->name, flags, mode); + if(d->db == NULL){ + free(d); + free(lock_file); + return errno; + } + d->lock_fd = open(lock_file, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + free(lock_file); + if(d->lock_fd < 0){ + dbm_close(d->db); + free(d); + return errno; + } + db->db = d; + if((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + ret = hdb_check_db_format(context, db); + else + ret = hdb_init_db(context, db); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + return 0; + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +NDBM_close(krb5_context context, HDB *db) +{ + struct ndbm_db *d = db->db; + dbm_close(d->db); + close(d->lock_fd); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_ndbm_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db, + const char *filename) +{ + *db = malloc(sizeof(**db)); + if (*db == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + (*db)->db = NULL; + (*db)->name = strdup(filename); + (*db)->master_key_set = 0; + (*db)->openp = 0; + (*db)->open = NDBM_open; + (*db)->close = NDBM_close; + (*db)->fetch = _hdb_fetch; + (*db)->store = _hdb_store; + (*db)->remove = _hdb_remove; + (*db)->firstkey = NDBM_firstkey; + (*db)->nextkey= NDBM_nextkey; + (*db)->lock = NDBM_lock; + (*db)->unlock = NDBM_unlock; + (*db)->rename = NDBM_rename; + (*db)->_get = NDBM__get; + (*db)->_put = NDBM__put; + (*db)->_del = NDBM__del; + (*db)->destroy = NDBM_destroy; + return 0; +} + + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/print.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/print.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5db3166 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/hdb/print.c @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "hdb_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: print.c,v 1.4 1999/12/26 13:50:22 assar Exp $"); + +/* + This is the present contents of a dump line. This might change at + any time. Fields are separated by white space. + + principal + keyblock + kvno + keys... + mkvno + enctype + keyvalue + salt (- means use normal salt) + creation date and principal + modification date and principal + principal valid from date (not used) + principal valid end date (not used) + principal key expires (not used) + max ticket life + max renewable life + flags + */ + +static void +append_hex(char *str, krb5_data *data) +{ + int i, s = 1; + char *p; + + p = data->data; + for(i = 0; i < data->length; i++) + if(!isalnum((unsigned char)p[i]) && p[i] != '.'){ + s = 0; + break; + } + if(s){ + p = calloc(1, data->length + 2 + 1); + p[0] = '\"'; + p[data->length + 1] = '\"'; + memcpy(p + 1, data->data, data->length); + }else{ + p = calloc(1, data->length * 2 + 1); + for(i = 0; i < data->length; i++) + sprintf(p + 2 * i, "%02x", ((u_char*)data->data)[i]); + } + strcat(str, p); + free(p); +} + +static char * +time2str(time_t t) +{ + static char buf[128]; + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", gmtime(&t)); + return buf; +} + +static krb5_error_code +event2string(krb5_context context, Event *ev, char **str) +{ + char *p; + char *pr; + krb5_error_code ret; + if(ev == NULL){ + *str = strdup("-"); + return (*str == NULL) ? ENOMEM : 0; + } + if (ev->principal == NULL) { + pr = strdup("UNKNOWN"); + if (pr == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + } else { + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ev->principal, &pr); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + ret = asprintf(&p, "%s:%s", time2str(ev->time), pr); + free(pr); + if(ret < 0) + return ENOMEM; + *str = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +hdb_entry2string(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, char **str) +{ + char *p; + char buf[1024] = ""; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + + /* --- principal */ + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &p); + if(ret) + return ret; + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + /* --- kvno */ + asprintf(&p, "%d", ent->kvno); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + /* --- keys */ + for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){ + /* --- mkvno, keytype */ + if(ent->keys.val[i].mkvno) + asprintf(&p, ":%d:%d:", + *ent->keys.val[i].mkvno, + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype); + else + asprintf(&p, "::%d:", + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + /* --- keydata */ + append_hex(buf, &ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue); + strlcat(buf, ":", sizeof(buf)); + /* --- salt */ + if(ent->keys.val[i].salt){ + asprintf(&p, "%u/", ent->keys.val[i].salt->type); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + append_hex(buf, &ent->keys.val[i].salt->salt); + }else + strlcat(buf, "-", sizeof(buf)); + } + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + /* --- created by */ + event2string(context, &ent->created_by, &p); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + /* --- modified by */ + event2string(context, ent->modified_by, &p); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + + /* --- valid start */ + if(ent->valid_start) + strlcat(buf, time2str(*ent->valid_start), sizeof(buf)); + else + strlcat(buf, "-", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + /* --- valid end */ + if(ent->valid_end) + strlcat(buf, time2str(*ent->valid_end), sizeof(buf)); + else + strlcat(buf, "-", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + /* --- password ends */ + if(ent->pw_end) + strlcat(buf, time2str(*ent->pw_end), sizeof(buf)); + else + strlcat(buf, "-", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + /* --- max life */ + if(ent->max_life){ + asprintf(&p, "%d", *ent->max_life); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + }else + strlcat(buf, "-", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + /* --- max renewable life */ + if(ent->max_renew){ + asprintf(&p, "%d", *ent->max_renew); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + }else + strlcat(buf, "-", sizeof(buf)); + + strlcat(buf, " ", sizeof(buf)); + + /* --- flags */ + asprintf(&p, "%d", HDBFlags2int(ent->flags)); + strlcat(buf, p, sizeof(buf)); + free(p); + + *str = strdup(buf); + + return 0; +} + +/* print a hdb_entry to (FILE*)data; suitable for hdb_foreach */ + +krb5_error_code +hdb_print_entry(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *entry, void *data) +{ + char *p; + hdb_entry2string(context, entry, &p); + fprintf((FILE*)data, "%s\n", p); + free(p); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c04ecb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5srv.la): bump version to 5:1:0 + + * context_s.c (_kadm5_s_init_context): handle params == NULL + +1999-12-26 Assar Westerlund + + * get_s.c (kadm5_s_get_principal): handle modified_by->principal + == NULL + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:1:0 + + * init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): handle getting back port + number from admin host + (kadm5_c_init_with_context): remove `proto/' part before doing + getaddrinfo() + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 and 4:0:0 + + * init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_context): don't use unitialized + stuff + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * replay_log.c: adapt to changed kadm5_log_foreach + + * log.c (kadm5_log_foreach): change to take a + `kadm5_server_context' + + * init_c.c: use krb5_warn{,x} + + * dump_log.c: adapt to changed kadm5_log_foreach + + * init_c.c: re-write to use getaddrinfo + * Makefile.am (install-build-headers): add dependency + +1999-12-03 Johan Danielsson + + * log.c (kadm5_log_foreach): pass context + + * dump_log.c: print more interesting things + +1999-12-02 Johan Danielsson + + * ipropd_master.c (process_msg): check for short reads + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * modify_s.c (kadm5_s_modify_principal): support key_data + (kadm5_s_modify_principal_with_key): remove + + * admin.h (kadm5_s_modify_principal_with_key): remove + +1999-11-20 Assar Westerlund + + * context_s.c (find_db_spec): ugly cast work-around. + +1999-11-14 Assar Westerlund + + * context_s.c (_kadm5_s_init_context): call krb5_add_et_list so + that we aren't dependent on the layout of krb5_context_data + * init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): call krb5_add_et_list so that + we aren't dependent on the layout of krb5_context_data + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * password_quality.c (kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check): use + correct types for function pointers + +1999-11-09 Johan Danielsson + + * randkey_s.c: always bail out if the fetch fails + + * admin.h (kadm5_config_params): remove fields we're not using + + * ipropd_slave.c: allow passing a realm + + * ipropd_master.c: allow passing a realm + + * dump_log.c: allow passing a realm + + * acl.c: correctly get acl file + + * private.h (kadm5_server_context): add config_params struct and + remove acl_file; bump protocol version number + + * marshall.c: marshalling of config parameters + + * init_c.c (kadm5_c_init_with_context): try to cope with old + servers + + * init_s.c (kadm5_s_init_with_context): actually use some passed + values + + * context_s.c (_kadm5_s_init_context): get dbname, acl_file, and + stash_file from the config parameters, try to figure out these if + they're not provided + +1999-11-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (install-build-headers): use `cp' instead of + INSTALL_DATA + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:0 and 3:0:0 (they access fields + directly in libkrb5's context - bad functions) + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys_randomly): set enctypes correctly in + the copied keys + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version of kadm5srv to 3:0:2 (new password + quality functions). + set version of kdam5clnt to 2:1:1 (no interface changes) + + * Makefile.am (LDADD): add $(LIB_dlopen) + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * randkey_s.c (kadm5_s_randkey_principal): use + _kadm5_set_keys_randomly + + * set_keys.c (free_keys): free more memory + (_kadm5_set_keys): a little bit more generic + (_kadm5_set_keys_randomly): new function for setting random keys. + +1999-10-14 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys): ignore old keys when setting new + ones and always add 3 DES keys and one 3DES key + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (_kadm5_c_init_context): use `krb5_get_krb_admin_hst'. + check return value from strdup + +1999-09-26 Assar Westerlund + + * acl.c (_kadm5_privs_to_string): forgot one strcpy_truncate -> + strlcpy + +1999-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * dump_log.c: remove unused `optind' + + * replay_log.c: remove unused `optind' + +1999-09-13 Assar Westerlund + + * chpass_c.c (kadm5_c_chpass_principal): new _kadm5_client_recv + + * send_recv.c (_kadm5_client_recv): return result in a `krb5_data' + so that we avoid copying it and don't need to dimension in + advance. change all callers. + +1999-09-10 Assar Westerlund + + * password_quality.c: new file + + * admin.h + (kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check,kadm5_check_password_quality): + add prototypes + + * Makefile.am (S_SOURCES): add password_quality.c + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: update versions to 2:0:1 + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): make princ_expire_time == 0 + and pw_expiration == 0 mean never + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * log.c (kadm5_log_flush): extra cast + +1999-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * marshall.c (store_principal_ent): encoding princ_expire_time and + pw_expiration in correct order + +1999-06-28 Assar Westerlund + + * randkey_s.c (kadm5_s_randkey_principal): nuke old mkvno, + otherwise hdb will think that the new random keys are already + encrypted which will cause lots of confusion later. + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): handle 0 == unlimited + correctly. From Michal Vocu + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): use get_default_username + +1999-05-23 Assar Westerlund + + * create_s.c (create_principal): if there's no default entry the + mask should be zero. + +1999-05-21 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): use $USERNAME + +1999-05-17 Johan Danielsson + + * init_c.c (get_cred_cache): figure out principal + +1999-05-05 Johan Danielsson + + * send_recv.c: cleanup _kadm5_client_{send,recv} + +1999-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * set_keys.c (_kadm5_set_keys2): don't check the recently created + memory for NULL pointers + + * private.h (_kadm5_setup_entry): change prototype + + * modify_s.c: call new _kadm5_setup_entry + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): change so that it takes three + masks, one for what bits to set and one for each of principal and + def containing the bits that are set there. + + * create_s.c: call new _kadm5_setup_entry + + * create_s.c (get_default): check return value + (create_principal): send wider mask to _kadm5_setup_entry + +1999-05-04 Johan Danielsson + + * send_recv.c (_kadm5_client_recv): handle arbitrarily sized + packets, check for errors + + * get_c.c: check for failure from _kadm5_client_{send,recv} + +1999-05-04 Assar Westerlund + + * init_c.c (get_new_cache): don't abort when interrupted from + password prompt + + * destroy_c.c (kadm5_c_destroy): check if we should destroy the + auth context + +1999-05-03 Johan Danielsson + + * chpass_s.c: fix arguments to _kadm5_set_keys2 + + * private.h: proto + + * set_keys.c: clear mkvno + + * rename_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * randkey_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * modify_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * log.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before logging + + * get_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before logging + + * get_princs_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * delete_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * create_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * chpass_s.c: add flags to fetch and store; seal keys before + logging + + * Makefile.am: remove server.c + + * admin.h: add prototypes + + * ent_setup.c (_kadm5_setup_entry): set key_data + + * set_keys.c: add _kadm5_set_keys2 to sey keys from key_data + + * modify_s.c: add kadm5_s_modify_principal_with_key + + * create_s.c: add kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key + + * chpass_s.c: add kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key + + * kadm5_locl.h: move stuff to private.h + + * private.h: move stuff from kadm5_locl.h + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e043f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.32 2000/01/06 21:53:30 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkadm5srv.la libkadm5clnt.la +libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 5:1:0 +libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 4:1:0 +sbin_PROGRAMS = dump_log replay_log + +libexec_PROGRAMS = ipropd-master ipropd-slave + +kadm5includedir = $(includedir)/kadm5 +buildkadm5include = $(buildinclude)/kadm5 + +kadm5include_HEADERS = kadm5_err.h admin.h private.h + +install-build-headers:: $(kadm5include_HEADERS) + @foo='$(kadm5include_HEADERS)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo "cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f";\ + cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +C_SOURCES = \ + admin.h \ + chpass_c.c \ + common_glue.c \ + create_c.c \ + delete_c.c \ + destroy_c.c \ + flush_c.c \ + free.c \ + get_c.c \ + get_princs_c.c \ + init_c.c \ + kadm5_err.c \ + kadm5_locl.h \ + marshall.c \ + modify_c.c \ + private.h \ + privs_c.c \ + randkey_c.c \ + rename_c.c \ + send_recv.c + +S_SOURCES = \ + acl.c \ + admin.h \ + chpass_s.c \ + common_glue.c \ + context_s.c \ + create_s.c \ + delete_s.c \ + destroy_s.c \ + ent_setup.c \ + error.c \ + flush_s.c \ + free.c \ + get_princs_s.c \ + get_s.c \ + init_s.c \ + kadm5_err.c \ + kadm5_locl.h \ + log.c \ + marshall.c \ + modify_s.c \ + private.h \ + privs_s.c \ + randkey_s.c \ + rename_s.c \ + set_keys.c \ + set_modifier.c \ + password_quality.c + +libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES = $(S_SOURCES) server_glue.c +libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES = $(C_SOURCES) client_glue.c + +dump_log_SOURCES = dump_log.c kadm5_locl.h + +replay_log_SOURCES = replay_log.c kadm5_locl.h + +ipropd_master_SOURCES = ipropd_master.c iprop.h kadm5_locl.h + +ipropd_slave_SOURCES = ipropd_slave.c iprop.h kadm5_locl.h + +LDADD = \ + libkadm5srv.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(DBLIB) \ + $(LIB_dlopen) + +CLEANFILES = kadm5_err.c kadm5_err.h + +$(libkadm5srv_la_OBJECTS): kadm5_err.h + +client_glue.lo server_glue.lo: $(srcdir)/common_glue.c + +# to help stupid solaris make + +kadm5_err.h: kadm5_err.et diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0872ca9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,812 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.32 2000/01/06 21:53:30 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkadm5srv.la libkadm5clnt.la +libkadm5srv_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 5:1:0 +libkadm5clnt_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 4:1:0 +sbin_PROGRAMS = dump_log replay_log + +libexec_PROGRAMS = ipropd-master ipropd-slave + +kadm5includedir = $(includedir)/kadm5 +buildkadm5include = $(buildinclude)/kadm5 + +kadm5include_HEADERS = kadm5_err.h admin.h private.h + +C_SOURCES = admin.h chpass_c.c common_glue.c create_c.c delete_c.c destroy_c.c flush_c.c free.c get_c.c get_princs_c.c init_c.c kadm5_err.c kadm5_locl.h marshall.c modify_c.c private.h privs_c.c randkey_c.c rename_c.c send_recv.c + + +S_SOURCES = acl.c admin.h chpass_s.c common_glue.c context_s.c create_s.c delete_s.c destroy_s.c ent_setup.c error.c flush_s.c free.c get_princs_s.c get_s.c init_s.c kadm5_err.c kadm5_locl.h log.c marshall.c modify_s.c private.h privs_s.c randkey_s.c rename_s.c set_keys.c set_modifier.c password_quality.c + + +libkadm5srv_la_SOURCES = $(S_SOURCES) server_glue.c +libkadm5clnt_la_SOURCES = $(C_SOURCES) client_glue.c + +dump_log_SOURCES = dump_log.c kadm5_locl.h + +replay_log_SOURCES = replay_log.c kadm5_locl.h + +ipropd_master_SOURCES = ipropd_master.c iprop.h kadm5_locl.h + +ipropd_slave_SOURCES = ipropd_slave.c iprop.h kadm5_locl.h + +LDADD = libkadm5srv.la $(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(LIB_roken) $(DBLIB) $(LIB_dlopen) + + +CLEANFILES = kadm5_err.c kadm5_err.h +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ 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$(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la +ipropd_master_LDFLAGS = +ipropd_slave_OBJECTS = ipropd_slave.$(OBJEXT) +ipropd_slave_LDADD = $(LDADD) +ipropd_slave_DEPENDENCIES = libkadm5srv.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la +ipropd_slave_LDFLAGS = +dump_log_OBJECTS = dump_log.$(OBJEXT) +dump_log_LDADD = $(LDADD) +dump_log_DEPENDENCIES = libkadm5srv.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la +dump_log_LDFLAGS = +replay_log_OBJECTS = replay_log.$(OBJEXT) +replay_log_LDADD = $(LDADD) +replay_log_DEPENDENCIES = libkadm5srv.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/hdb/libhdb.la $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la \ +$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la +replay_log_LDFLAGS = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ 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> $(distdir)/$$x"; \ + $(NROFF_MAN) $(srcdir)/$$i > $(distdir)/$$x; \ + done + +dist-hook: dist-cat1-mans dist-cat3-mans dist-cat5-mans dist-cat8-mans + +install-cat1-mans: + @ext=1;\ + foo='$(man1_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.1) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat1/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat1dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat3-mans: + @ext=3;\ + foo='$(man3_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.3) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat3/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat3dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat5-mans: + @ext=5;\ + foo='$(man5_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.5) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +install-build-headers:: $(kadm5include_HEADERS) + @foo='$(kadm5include_HEADERS)'; \ + for f in $$foo; do \ + f=`basename $$f`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then file="$(srcdir)/$$f"; \ + else file="$$f"; fi; \ + if cmp -s $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f 2> /dev/null ; then \ + : ; else \ + echo "cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f";\ + cp $$file $(buildkadm5include)/$$f; \ + fi ; \ + done + +$(libkadm5srv_la_OBJECTS): kadm5_err.h + +client_glue.lo server_glue.lo: $(srcdir)/common_glue.c + +# to help stupid solaris make + +kadm5_err.h: kadm5_err.et + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/acl.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f42c60 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: acl.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +static struct units acl_units[] = { + { "all", KADM5_PRIV_ALL }, + { "change-password",KADM5_PRIV_CPW }, + { "cpw", KADM5_PRIV_CPW }, + { "list", KADM5_PRIV_LIST }, + { "delete", KADM5_PRIV_DELETE }, + { "modify", KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY }, + { "add", KADM5_PRIV_ADD }, + { "get", KADM5_PRIV_GET }, + { NULL } +}; + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_string_to_privs(const char *s, u_int32_t* privs) +{ + int flags; + flags = parse_flags(s, acl_units, 0); + if(flags < 0) + return KADM5_FAILURE; + *privs = flags; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_privs_to_string(u_int32_t privs, char *string, size_t len) +{ + if(privs == 0) + strlcpy(string, "none", len); + else + unparse_flags(privs, acl_units + 1, string, len); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_init(kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[128]; + krb5_principal princ; + int flags; + krb5_error_code ret; + + krb5_parse_name(context->context, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, &princ); + ret = krb5_principal_compare(context->context, context->caller, princ); + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + if(ret != 0){ + context->acl_flags = KADM5_PRIV_ALL; + return 0; + } + + flags = -1; + f = fopen(context->config.acl_file, "r"); + if(f){ + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)){ + char *foo = NULL, *p; + p = strtok_r(buf, " \t\n", &foo); + if(p == NULL) + continue; + ret = krb5_parse_name(context->context, p, &princ); + if(ret) + continue; + if(!krb5_principal_compare(context->context, + context->caller, princ)){ + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + continue; + } + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ); + p = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &foo); + if(p == NULL) + continue; + ret = _kadm5_string_to_privs(p, &flags); + break; + } + fclose(f); + } + if(flags == -1) + flags = 0; + context->acl_flags = flags; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_check_permission(kadm5_server_context *context, unsigned op) +{ + unsigned res = ~context->acl_flags & op; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_GET) + return KADM5_AUTH_GET; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_ADD) + return KADM5_AUTH_ADD; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY) + return KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_DELETE) + return KADM5_AUTH_DELETE; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_CPW) + return KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW; + if(res & KADM5_PRIV_LIST) + return KADM5_AUTH_LIST; + if(res) + return KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/admin.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/admin.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cb08a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/admin.h @@ -0,0 +1,698 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* $Id: admin.h,v 1.15 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KADM5_ADMIN_H__ +#define __KADM5_ADMIN_H__ + +#define KADM5_API_VERSION_1 1 +#define KADM5_API_VERSION_2 2 + +#ifndef USE_KADM5_API_VERSION +#define USE_KADM5_API_VERSION KADM5_API_VERSION_2 +#endif + +#if USE_KADM5_API_VERSION != KADM5_API_VERSION_2 +#error No support for API versions other than 2 +#endif + +#define KADM5_STRUCT_VERSION 0 + +#include + +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED 0x00000001 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE 0x00000002 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED 0x00000004 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE 0x00000008 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE 0x00000010 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY 0x00000020 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX 0x00000040 +#define KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH 0x00000080 +#define KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH 0x00000100 +#define KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE 0x00000200 +#define KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR 0x00001000 +#define KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE 0x00002000 +#define KRB5_KDB_SUPPORT_DESMD5 0x00004000 +#define KRB5_KDB_NEW_PRINC 0x00008000 + +#define KADM5_PRINCIPAL 0x000001 +#define KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME 0x000002 +#define KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION 0x000004 +#define KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE 0x000008 +#define KADM5_ATTRIBUTES 0x000010 +#define KADM5_MAX_LIFE 0x000020 +#define KADM5_MOD_TIME 0x000040 +#define KADM5_MOD_NAME 0x000080 +#define KADM5_KVNO 0x000100 +#define KADM5_MKVNO 0x000200 +#define KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES 0x000400 +#define KADM5_POLICY 0x000800 +#define KADM5_POLICY_CLR 0x001000 +#define KADM5_MAX_RLIFE 0x002000 +#define KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS 0x004000 +#define KADM5_LAST_FAILED 0x008000 +#define KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT 0x010000 +#define KADM5_KEY_DATA 0x020000 +#define KADM5_TL_DATA 0x040000 + +#define KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK (~(KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_TL_DATA)) + +#define KADM5_PW_MAX_LIFE 0x004000 +#define KADM5_PW_MIN_LIFE 0x008000 +#define KADM5_PW_MIN_LENGTH 0x010000 +#define KADM5_PW_MIN_CLASSES 0x020000 +#define KADM5_PW_HISTORY_NUM 0x040000 +#define KADM5_REF_COUNT 0x080000 + +#define KADM5_POLICY_NORMAL_MASK (~0) + +#define KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE "kadmin/admin" +#define KADM5_HIST_PRINCIPAL "kadmin/history" +#define KADM5_CHANGEPW_SERVICE "kadmin/changepw" + +typedef struct _krb5_key_data { + int16_t key_data_ver; /* Version */ + int16_t key_data_kvno; /* Key Version */ + int16_t key_data_type[2]; /* Array of types */ + int16_t key_data_length[2]; /* Array of lengths */ + void** key_data_contents[2];/* Array of pointers */ +} krb5_key_data; + +typedef struct _krb5_tl_data { + struct _krb5_tl_data* tl_data_next; + int16_t tl_data_type; + int16_t tl_data_length; + void **tl_data_contents; +} krb5_tl_data; + +typedef struct _kadm5_principal_ent_t { + krb5_principal principal; + + krb5_timestamp princ_expire_time; + krb5_timestamp last_pwd_change; + krb5_timestamp pw_expiration; + krb5_deltat max_life; + krb5_principal mod_name; + krb5_timestamp mod_date; + krb5_flags attributes; + krb5_kvno kvno; + krb5_kvno mkvno; + + char * policy; + u_int32_t aux_attributes; + + krb5_deltat max_renewable_life; + krb5_timestamp last_success; + krb5_timestamp last_failed; + krb5_kvno fail_auth_count; + int16_t n_key_data; + int16_t n_tl_data; + krb5_tl_data *tl_data; + krb5_key_data *key_data; +} kadm5_principal_ent_rec, *kadm5_principal_ent_t; + +typedef struct _kadm5_policy_ent_t { + char *policy; + + u_int32_t pw_min_life; + u_int32_t pw_max_life; + u_int32_t pw_min_length; + u_int32_t pw_min_classes; + u_int32_t pw_history_num; + u_int32_t policy_refcnt; +} kadm5_policy_ent_rec, *kadm5_policy_ent_t; + +#define KADM5_CONFIG_REALM (1 << 0) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_PROFILE (1 << 1) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT (1 << 2) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER (1 << 3) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_DBNAME (1 << 4) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADBNAME (1 << 5) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADB_LOCKFILE (1 << 6) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ACL_FILE (1 << 7) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_DICT_FILE (1 << 8) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_KEYTAB (1 << 9) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD (1 << 10) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_STASH_FILE (1 << 11) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MKEY_NAME (1 << 12) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ENCTYPE (1 << 13) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MAX_LIFE (1 << 14) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_MAX_RLIFE (1 << 15) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_EXPIRATION (1 << 16) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_FLAGS (1 << 17) +#define KADM5_CONFIG_ENCTYPES (1 << 18) + +#define KADM5_PRIV_GET (1 << 0) +#define KADM5_PRIV_ADD (1 << 1) +#define KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY (1 << 2) +#define KADM5_PRIV_DELETE (1 << 3) +#define KADM5_PRIV_LIST (1 << 4) +#define KADM5_PRIV_CPW (1 << 5) +#define KADM5_PRIV_ALL (KADM5_PRIV_GET | KADM5_PRIV_ADD | KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY | KADM5_PRIV_DELETE | KADM5_PRIV_LIST | KADM5_PRIV_CPW) + +typedef struct { + int XXX; +}krb5_key_salt_tuple; + +typedef struct _kadm5_config_params { + u_int32_t mask; + + /* Client and server fields */ + char *realm; + int kadmind_port; + + /* client fields */ + char *admin_server; + + /* server fields */ + char *dbname; + char *acl_file; + + /* server library (database) fields */ + char *stash_file; +} kadm5_config_params; + +typedef krb5_error_code kadm5_ret_t; + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_chpass_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_create_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_delete_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_destroy __P((void *server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_flush __P((void *server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principals __P(( + void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_privs __P(( + void *server_handle, + u_int32_t *privs)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds __P(( + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password __P(( + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey __P(( + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_modify_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_randkey_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_rename_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_destroy __P((void *server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_flush __P((void *server_handle)); + +void +kadm5_free_key_data __P(( + void *server_handle, + int16_t *n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data)); + +void +kadm5_free_name_list __P(( + void *server_handle, + char **names, + int *count)); + +void +kadm5_free_principal_ent __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principals __P(( + void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_privs __P(( + void *server_handle, + u_int32_t *privs)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds __P(( + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password __P(( + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey __P(( + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_randkey_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_rename_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_key_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_key_data *key)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent_mask __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t *mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_tl_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_tl_data *tl)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + int n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_delete_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_destroy __P((void *server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_flush __P((void *server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principals __P(( + void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_privs __P(( + void *server_handle, + u_int32_t *privs)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds __P(( + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password __P(( + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey __P(( + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_modify_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_randkey_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_rename_principal __P(( + void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_key_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_key_data *key)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent_mask __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_tl_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_tl_data *tl)); + +void +kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check(krb5_context context, + const char *check_library, + const char *check_function); + +const char * +kadm5_check_password_quality (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *pwd_data); + +#if 0 +/* unimplemented functions */ +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_decrypt_key(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, int32_t + ktype, int32_t stype, int32_t + kvno, krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_keysalt *keysalt, int *kvnop); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_policy(void *server_handle, + kadm5_policy_ent_t policy, u_int32_t mask); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy); + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_policy(void *server_handle, + kadm5_policy_ent_t policy, + u_int32_t mask); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy, kadm5_policy_ent_t ent); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policies(void *server_handle, char *exp, + char ***pols, int *count); + +void +kadm5_free_policy_ent(kadm5_policy_ent_t policy); + +#endif + +#endif /* __KADM5_ADMIN_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/chpass_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/chpass_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aaec48f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/chpass_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: chpass_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_chpass); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + krb5_store_string(sp, password); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e915124 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/chpass_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: chpass_s.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + 0, &ent); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + goto out; + ret = _kadm5_set_keys(context, &ent, password); + if(ret) + goto out2; + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_KVNO); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_chpass_principal_with_key(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + int n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + goto out; + ret = _kadm5_set_keys2(&ent, n_key_data, key_data); + if(ret) + goto out2; + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_KVNO); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/client_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/client_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..395577d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/client_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: client_glue.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_password(client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_skey(client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_creds(client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_creds_ctx(context, + client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/common_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/common_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38c551c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/common_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common_glue.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +#define __CALL(F, P) (*((kadm5_common_context*)server_handle)->funcs.F)P; + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + char *password) +{ + return __CALL(chpass_principal, (server_handle, princ, password)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password) +{ + return __CALL(create_principal, (server_handle, princ, mask, password)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ) +{ + return __CALL(delete_principal, (server_handle, princ)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_destroy (void *server_handle) +{ + return __CALL(destroy, (server_handle)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_flush (void *server_handle) +{ + return __CALL(flush, (server_handle)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + return __CALL(get_principal, (server_handle, princ, out, mask)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + return __CALL(modify_principal, (server_handle, princ, mask)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + return __CALL(randkey_principal, (server_handle, princ, new_keys, n_keys)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_rename_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target) +{ + return __CALL(rename_principal, (server_handle, source, target)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principals(void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count) +{ + return __CALL(get_principals, (server_handle, exp, princs, count)); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_privs(void *server_handle, + u_int32_t *privs) +{ + return __CALL(get_privs, (server_handle, privs)); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/context_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/context_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc52576 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/context_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: context_s.c,v 1.13 2000/01/06 21:40:08 assar Exp $"); + +static void +set_funcs(kadm5_server_context *c) +{ +#define SET(C, F) (C)->funcs.F = kadm5_s_ ## F + SET(c, chpass_principal); + SET(c, chpass_principal); + SET(c, create_principal); + SET(c, delete_principal); + SET(c, destroy); + SET(c, flush); + SET(c, get_principal); + SET(c, get_principals); + SET(c, get_privs); + SET(c, modify_principal); + SET(c, randkey_principal); + SET(c, rename_principal); +} + +struct database_spec { + char *dbpath; + char *logfile; + char *mkeyfile; + char *aclfile; +}; + +static void +set_field(krb5_context context, krb5_config_binding *binding, + const char *dbname, const char *name, const char *ext, + char **variable) +{ + const char *p; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, binding, name, NULL); + if(p) + *variable = strdup(p); + else { + p = strrchr(dbname, '.'); + if(p == NULL) + asprintf(variable, "%s.%s", dbname, ext); + else + asprintf(variable, "%.*s.%s", (int)(p - dbname), dbname, ext); + } +} + +static void +set_socket_name(const char *dbname, struct sockaddr_un *un) +{ + const char *p; + memset(un, 0, sizeof(*un)); + un->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + p = strrchr(dbname, '.'); + if(p == NULL) + snprintf(un->sun_path, sizeof(un->sun_path), "%s.signal", + dbname); + else + snprintf(un->sun_path, sizeof(un->sun_path), "%.*s.signal", + (int)(p - dbname), dbname); +} + +static void +set_config(kadm5_server_context *ctx, + krb5_config_binding *binding) +{ + const char *p; + if(ctx->config.dbname == NULL) { + p = krb5_config_get_string(ctx->context, binding, "dbname", NULL); + if(p) + ctx->config.dbname = strdup(p); + else + ctx->config.dbname = strdup(HDB_DEFAULT_DB); + } + if(ctx->log_context.log_file == NULL) + set_field(ctx->context, binding, ctx->config.dbname, + "log_file", "log", &ctx->log_context.log_file); + set_socket_name(ctx->config.dbname, &ctx->log_context.socket_name); + if(ctx->config.acl_file == NULL) + set_field(ctx->context, binding, ctx->config.dbname, + "acl_file", "acl", &ctx->config.acl_file); + /* XXX calling a file a `stash file' isn't very clever */ + if(ctx->config.stash_file == NULL) + set_field(ctx->context, binding, ctx->config.dbname, + "mkey_file", "mkey", &ctx->config.stash_file); +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +find_db_spec(kadm5_server_context *ctx) +{ + krb5_config_binding *top_binding = NULL; + krb5_config_binding *db_binding; + krb5_config_binding *default_binding = NULL; + krb5_context context = ctx->context; + + while((db_binding = (krb5_config_binding *) + krb5_config_get_next(context, + NULL, &top_binding, + krb5_config_list, + "kdc", + "database", + NULL))) { + const char *p; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, db_binding, "realm", NULL); + if(p == NULL) { + if(default_binding) { + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: more than one realm-less " + "database specification"); + krb5_warnx(context, "WARNING: using the first encountered"); + } else + default_binding = db_binding; + continue; + } + if(strcmp(ctx->config.realm, p) != 0) + continue; + + set_config(ctx, db_binding); + return 0; + } + if(default_binding) + set_config(ctx, default_binding); + else { + ctx->config.dbname = strdup(HDB_DEFAULT_DB); + ctx->config.acl_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/kadmind.acl"; + ctx->config.stash_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key"; + ctx->log_context.log_file = HDB_DB_DIR "/log"; + memset(&ctx->log_context.socket_name, 0, + sizeof(ctx->log_context.socket_name)); + ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_path, + KADM5_LOG_SIGNAL, + sizeof(ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_path)); + } + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_s_init_context(kadm5_server_context **ctx, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_context context) +{ + *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); + if(*ctx == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); + set_funcs(*ctx); + (*ctx)->context = context; + krb5_add_et_list (context, initialize_kadm5_error_table_r); +#define is_set(M) (params && params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_ ## M) + if(is_set(REALM)) + (*ctx)->config.realm = strdup(params->realm); + else + krb5_get_default_realm(context, &(*ctx)->config.realm); + if(is_set(DBNAME)) + (*ctx)->config.dbname = strdup(params->dbname); + if(is_set(ACL_FILE)) + (*ctx)->config.acl_file = strdup(params->acl_file); + if(is_set(STASH_FILE)) + (*ctx)->config.stash_file = strdup(params->stash_file); + + find_db_spec(*ctx); + + /* PROFILE can't be specified for now */ + /* KADMIND_PORT is supposed to be used on the server also, + but this doesn't make sense */ + /* ADMIN_SERVER is client only */ + /* ADNAME is not used at all (as far as I can tell) */ + /* ADB_LOCKFILE ditto */ + /* DICT_FILE */ + /* ADMIN_KEYTAB */ + /* MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD is not supported */ + /* MKEY_NAME neither */ + /* ENCTYPE */ + /* MAX_LIFE */ + /* MAX_RLIFE */ + /* EXPIRATION */ + /* FLAGS */ + /* ENCTYPES */ + + return 0; +} + +HDB * +_kadm5_s_get_db(void *server_handle) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + return context->db; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/create_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/create_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45eb3e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/create_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: create_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_create); + kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + krb5_store_string(sp, password); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/create_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/create_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e352f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/create_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: create_s.c,v 1.16 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +get_default(kadm5_server_context *context, krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t def) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_principal def_principal; + krb5_realm *realm = krb5_princ_realm(context->context, princ); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context->context, &def_principal, + *realm, "default", NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_s_get_principal(context, def_principal, def, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, def_principal); + return ret; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +create_principal(kadm5_server_context *context, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t required_mask, + u_int32_t forbidden_mask) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec defrec, *defent; + u_int32_t def_mask; + + if((mask & required_mask) != required_mask) + return KADM5_BAD_MASK; + if((mask & forbidden_mask)) + return KADM5_BAD_MASK; + if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && strcmp(princ->policy, "default")) + /* XXX no real policies for now */ + return KADM5_UNK_POLICY; + memset(ent, 0, sizeof(*ent)); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, princ->principal, + &ent->principal); + if(ret) + return ret; + + defent = &defrec; + ret = get_default(context, princ->principal, defent); + if(ret) { + defent = NULL; + def_mask = 0; + } else { + def_mask = KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_MAX_LIFE | KADM5_MAX_RLIFE; + } + + ret = _kadm5_setup_entry(ent, mask | def_mask, + princ, mask, + defent, def_mask); + if(defent) + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, defent); + + ent->created_by.time = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, context->caller, + &ent->created_by.principal); + + return ret; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal_with_key(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + + ret = create_principal(context, princ, mask, &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_KEY_DATA, + KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE | KADM5_MOD_TIME + | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MKVNO + | KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES + | KADM5_POLICY_CLR | KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS + | KADM5_LAST_FAILED | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT); + if(ret) + goto out; + + ret = _kadm5_set_keys2(&ent, princ->n_key_data, princ->key_data); + if(ret) + goto out; + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_create (context, &ent); + + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + char *password) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + + ret = create_principal(context, princ, mask, &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL, + KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE | KADM5_MOD_TIME + | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MKVNO + | KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_KEY_DATA + | KADM5_POLICY_CLR | KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS + | KADM5_LAST_FAILED | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT); + if(ret) + goto out; + + /* XXX this should be fixed */ + ent.keys.len = 4; + ent.keys.val = calloc(ent.keys.len, sizeof(*ent.keys.val)); + ent.keys.val[0].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC; + /* flag as version 4 compatible salt; ignored by _kadm5_set_keys + if we don't want to be compatible */ + ent.keys.val[0].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[0].salt)); + ent.keys.val[0].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[1].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4; + ent.keys.val[1].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[1].salt)); + ent.keys.val[1].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[2].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + ent.keys.val[2].salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*ent.keys.val[2].salt)); + ent.keys.val[2].salt->type = hdb_pw_salt; + ent.keys.val[3].key.keytype = ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1; + ret = _kadm5_set_keys(context, &ent, password); + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_create (context, &ent); + + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/delete_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/delete_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71a3cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/delete_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: delete_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_delete_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_delete); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if (ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if(sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/delete_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/delete_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef326587b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/delete_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: delete_s.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_delete_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context->context, ret, "opening database"); + return ret; + } + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) + goto out2; + if(ent.flags.immutable) { + ret = KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL; + goto out; + } + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_delete (context, princ); + + ret = context->db->remove(context->context, context->db, &ent); +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out2: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/destroy_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/destroy_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b42c84c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/destroy_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: destroy_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_destroy(void *server_handle) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + + free(context->realm); + free(context->admin_server); + close(context->sock); + if (context->ac != NULL) + krb5_auth_con_free(context->context, context->ac); + if(context->my_context) + krb5_free_context(context->context); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22158d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/destroy_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: destroy_s.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:05 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_destroy(void *server_handle) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + krb5_context kcontext = context->context; + + ret = context->db->destroy(kcontext, context->db); + if(context->my_context) + krb5_free_context(kcontext); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/dump_log.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/dump_log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68a3f53 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/dump_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" +#include "parse_time.h" + +RCSID("$Id: dump_log.c,v 1.9 1999/12/04 19:49:43 assar Exp $"); + +static char *op_names[] = { + "get", + "delete", + "create", + "rename", + "chpass", + "modify", + "randkey", + "get_privs", + "get_princs" +}; + +static void +print_entry(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + char t[256]; + u_int32_t mask; + hdb_entry ent; + krb5_principal source; + char *name1, *name2; + krb5_data data; + krb5_context context = server_context->context; + + off_t end = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) + len; + + krb5_error_code ret; + + strftime(t, sizeof(t), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", localtime(×tamp)); + + if(op < kadm_get || op > kadm_get_princs) { + printf("unknown op: %d\n", op); + sp->seek(sp, end, SEEK_SET); + return; + } + + printf ("%s: ver = %u, timestamp = %s, len = %u\n", + op_names[op], ver, t, len); + switch(op) { + case kadm_delete: + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &source); + krb5_unparse_name(context, source, &name1); + printf(" %s\n", name1); + free(name1); + krb5_free_principal(context, source); + break; + case kadm_rename: + krb5_data_alloc(&data, len); + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &source); + sp->fetch(sp, data.data, data.length); + hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &ent); + krb5_unparse_name(context, source, &name1); + krb5_unparse_name(context, ent.principal, &name2); + printf(" %s -> %s\n", name1, name2); + free(name1); + free(name2); + krb5_free_principal(context, source); + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + break; + case kadm_create: + krb5_data_alloc(&data, len); + sp->fetch(sp, data.data, data.length); + ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &ent); + if(ret) + abort(); + mask = ~0; + goto foo; + case kadm_modify: + krb5_data_alloc(&data, len); + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + sp->fetch(sp, data.data, data.length); + ret = hdb_value2entry(context, &data, &ent); + if(ret) + abort(); + foo: + if(ent.principal /* mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL */) { + krb5_unparse_name(context, ent.principal, &name1); + printf(" principal = %s\n", name1); + free(name1); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if(ent.valid_end == NULL) { + strcpy(t, "never"); + } else { + strftime(t, sizeof(t), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", + localtime(ent.valid_end)); + } + printf(" expires = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if(ent.valid_end == NULL) { + strcpy(t, "never"); + } else { + strftime(t, sizeof(t), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", + localtime(ent.valid_end)); + } + printf(" password exp = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) { + } + if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + unparse_flags(HDBFlags2int(ent.flags), + HDBFlags_units, t, sizeof(t)); + printf(" attributes = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(ent.max_life == NULL) + strcpy(t, "for ever"); + else + unparse_time(*ent.max_life, t, sizeof(t)); + printf(" max life = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(ent.max_renew == NULL) + strcpy(t, "for ever"); + else + unparse_time(*ent.max_renew, t, sizeof(t)); + printf(" max rlife = %s\n", t); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + printf(" mod time\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + printf(" mod name\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_KVNO) { + printf(" kvno = %d\n", ent.kvno); + } + if(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + printf(" mkvno\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) { + printf(" aux attributes\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + printf(" policy\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) { + printf(" mod time\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { + printf(" last success\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { + printf(" last failed\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + printf(" fail auth count\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + printf(" key data\n"); + } + if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + printf(" tl data\n"); + } + hdb_free_entry(context, &ent); + break; + default: + abort(); + } + sp->seek(sp, end, SEEK_SET); +} + +char *realm; +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_init"); + + ret = kadm5_log_foreach (server_context, print_entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_foreach"); + + ret = kadm5_log_end (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_end"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46653c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ent_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ent_setup.c,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +#define set_value(X, V) do { if((X) == NULL) (X) = malloc(sizeof(*(X))); *(X) = V; } while(0) +#define set_null(X) do { if((X) != NULL) free((X)); (X) = NULL; } while (0) + +static void +attr_to_flags(unsigned attr, HDBFlags *flags) +{ + flags->postdate = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED); + flags->forwardable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE); + flags->initial = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED); + flags->renewable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE); + flags->proxiable = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE); + /* DUP_SKEY */ + flags->invalid = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX); + flags->require_preauth = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH); + /* HW_AUTH */ + flags->server = !(attr & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR); + flags->change_pw = !!(attr & KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE); + flags->client = 1; /* XXX */ +} + +/* + * Create the hdb entry `ent' based on data from `princ' with + * `princ_mask' specifying what fields to be gotten from there and + * `mask' specifying what fields we want filled in. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_setup_entry(hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t princ_mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t def, + u_int32_t def_mask) +{ + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME + && princ_mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if (princ->princ_expire_time) + set_value(ent->valid_end, princ->princ_expire_time); + else + set_null(ent->valid_end); + } + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION + && princ_mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if (princ->pw_expiration) + set_value(ent->pw_end, princ->pw_expiration); + else + set_null(ent->pw_end); + } + if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + if (princ_mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + attr_to_flags(princ->attributes, &ent->flags); + } else if(def_mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + attr_to_flags(def->attributes, &ent->flags); + ent->flags.invalid = 0; + } else { + ent->flags.client = 1; + ent->flags.server = 1; + ent->flags.forwardable = 1; + ent->flags.proxiable = 1; + ent->flags.renewable = 1; + ent->flags.postdate = 1; + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(princ_mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(princ->max_life) + set_value(ent->max_life, princ->max_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_life); + } else if(def_mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if(def->max_life) + set_value(ent->max_life, def->max_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_life); + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_KVNO + && princ_mask & KADM5_KVNO) + ent->kvno = princ->kvno; + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(princ_mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(princ->max_renewable_life) + set_value(ent->max_renew, princ->max_renewable_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_renew); + } else if(def_mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if(def->max_renewable_life) + set_value(ent->max_renew, def->max_renewable_life); + else + set_null(ent->max_renew); + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA + && princ_mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + _kadm5_set_keys2(ent, princ->n_key_data, princ->key_data); + } + if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + /* XXX */ + } + if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + /* XXX */ + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/error.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11b1ded --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: error.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_error_code(kadm5_ret_t code) +{ + switch(code){ + case HDB_ERR_EXISTS: + return KADM5_DUP; + case HDB_ERR_NOENTRY: + return KADM5_UNK_PRINC; + } + return code; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4808259 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: flush.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01cdcf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: flush_c.c,v 1.1 1999/03/23 18:23:36 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dffbe2f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/flush_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: flush_s.c,v 1.1 1999/03/23 18:23:37 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_flush(void *server_handle) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/free.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fcc1e70 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/free.c @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: free.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +void +kadm5_free_key_data(void *server_handle, + int16_t *n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < *n_key_data; i++){ + if(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0]){ + memset(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], + 0, + key_data[i].key_data_length[0]); + free(key_data[i].key_data_contents[0]); + } + if(key_data[i].key_data_contents[1]) + free(key_data[i].key_data_contents[1]); + } + *n_key_data = 0; +} + + +void +kadm5_free_principal_ent(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + if(princ->principal) + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ->principal); + if(princ->mod_name) + krb5_free_principal(context->context, princ->mod_name); + kadm5_free_key_data(server_handle, &princ->n_key_data, princ->key_data); + while(princ->n_tl_data && princ->tl_data) { + krb5_tl_data *tp; + tp = princ->tl_data; + princ->tl_data = tp->tl_data_next; + princ->n_tl_data--; + memset(tp->tl_data_contents, 0, tp->tl_data_length); + free(tp->tl_data_contents); + free(tp); + } + if (princ->key_data != NULL) + free (princ->key_data); +} + +void +kadm5_free_name_list(void *server_handle, + char **names, + int *count) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < *count; i++) + free(names[i]); + free(names); + *count = 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ca672a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_c.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_get); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if (ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0) + kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_princs_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_princs_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0956052 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_princs_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_princs_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_principals(void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_get_princs); + krb5_store_int32(sp, exp != NULL); + if(exp) + krb5_store_string(sp, exp); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0) { + int i; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + *princs = calloc(tmp + 1, sizeof(**princs)); + if (*princs == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for(i = 0; i < tmp; i++) + krb5_ret_string(sp, &(*princs)[i]); + *count = tmp; + } +out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2702bae --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_princs_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_princs_s.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +struct foreach_data { + const char *exp; + char *exp2; + char **princs; + int count; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +add_princ(struct foreach_data *d, char *princ) +{ + char **tmp; + tmp = realloc(d->princs, (d->count + 1) * sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + d->princs = tmp; + d->princs[d->count++] = princ; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +foreach(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent, void *data) +{ + struct foreach_data *d = data; + char *princ; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, ent->principal, &princ); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(d->exp){ + if(fnmatch(d->exp, princ, 0) == 0 || fnmatch(d->exp2, princ, 0) == 0) + ret = add_princ(d, princ); + else + free(princ); + }else{ + ret = add_princ(d, princ); + } + if(ret) + free(princ); + return ret; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principals(void *server_handle, + const char *exp, + char ***princs, + int *count) +{ + struct foreach_data d; + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) { + krb5_warn(context->context, ret, "opening database"); + return ret; + } + d.exp = exp; + { + krb5_realm r; + krb5_get_default_realm(context->context, &r); + asprintf(&d.exp2, "%s@%s", exp, r); + free(r); + } + d.princs = NULL; + d.count = 0; + ret = hdb_foreach(context->context, context->db, 0, foreach, &d); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + if(ret == 0) + ret = add_princ(&d, NULL); + if(ret == 0){ + *princs = d.princs; + *count = d.count - 1; + }else + kadm5_free_name_list(context, d.princs, &d.count); + free(d.exp2); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12613b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/get_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_s.c,v 1.11 1999/12/26 19:38:23 assar Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t out, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDONLY, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + if(ret) + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); + if(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, ent.principal, + &out->principal); + if(ret) + goto out; + if(mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME && ent.valid_end) + out->princ_expire_time = *ent.valid_end; + if(mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION && ent.pw_end) + out->pw_expiration = *ent.pw_end; + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES){ + out->attributes |= ent.flags.postdate ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.forwardable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.initial ? KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED : 0; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.renewable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.proxiable ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.invalid ? KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX : 0; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.require_preauth ? KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH : 0; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.server ? 0 : KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR; + out->attributes |= ent.flags.change_pw ? KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE : 0; + } + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE && ent.max_life) + out->max_life = *ent.max_life; + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + if(ent.modified_by) + out->mod_date = ent.modified_by->time; + else + out->mod_date = ent.created_by.time; + } + if(mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + if(ent.modified_by) { + if (ent.modified_by->principal != NULL) + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, + ent.modified_by->principal, + &out->mod_name); + } else + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, + ent.created_by.principal, + &out->mod_name); + } + if(ret) + goto out; + + if(mask & KADM5_KVNO) + out->kvno = ent.kvno; + if(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + int n; + out->mkvno = 0; /* XXX */ + for(n = 0; n < ent.keys.len; n++) + if(ent.keys.val[n].mkvno) { + out->mkvno = *ent.keys.val[n].mkvno; /* XXX this isn't right */ + break; + } + } + if(mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_POLICY) + out->policy = NULL; + if(mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE && ent.max_renew) + out->max_renewable_life = *ent.max_renew; + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) + /* XXX implement */; + if(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA){ + int i; + Key *key; + krb5_key_data *kd; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_data *sp; + krb5_get_pw_salt(context->context, ent.principal, &salt); + out->key_data = malloc(ent.keys.len * sizeof(*out->key_data)); + for(i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; i++){ + key = &ent.keys.val[i]; + kd = &out->key_data[i]; + kd->key_data_ver = 2; + kd->key_data_kvno = ent.kvno; + kd->key_data_type[0] = key->key.keytype; + if(key->salt) + kd->key_data_type[1] = key->salt->type; + else + kd->key_data_type[1] = pa_pw_salt; + /* setup key */ + kd->key_data_length[0] = key->key.keyvalue.length; + kd->key_data_contents[0] = malloc(kd->key_data_length[0]); + if(kd->key_data_contents[0] == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + break; + } + memcpy(kd->key_data_contents[0], key->key.keyvalue.data, + kd->key_data_length[0]); + /* setup salt */ + if(key->salt) + sp = &key->salt->salt; + else + sp = &salt.saltvalue; + kd->key_data_length[1] = sp->length; + kd->key_data_contents[1] = malloc(kd->key_data_length[1]); + if(kd->key_data_length[1] != 0 + && kd->key_data_contents[1] == NULL) { + memset(kd->key_data_contents[0], 0, kd->key_data_length[0]); + ret = ENOMEM; + break; + } + memcpy(kd->key_data_contents[1], sp->data, kd->key_data_length[1]); + out->n_key_data = i + 1; + } + krb5_free_salt(context->context, salt); + } + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(context, out); + goto out; + } + if(mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) + /* XXX implement */; +out: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); + + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/init_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/init_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f6429df --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/init_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,602 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +RCSID("$Id: init_c.c,v 1.34 1999/12/20 14:05:49 assar Exp $"); + +static void +set_funcs(kadm5_client_context *c) +{ +#define SET(C, F) (C)->funcs.F = kadm5 ## _c_ ## F + SET(c, chpass_principal); + SET(c, chpass_principal); + SET(c, create_principal); + SET(c, delete_principal); + SET(c, destroy); + SET(c, flush); + SET(c, get_principal); + SET(c, get_principals); + SET(c, get_privs); + SET(c, modify_principal); + SET(c, randkey_principal); + SET(c, rename_principal); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_c_init_context(kadm5_client_context **ctx, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_context context) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *colon; + + *ctx = malloc(sizeof(**ctx)); + if(*ctx == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memset(*ctx, 0, sizeof(**ctx)); + krb5_add_et_list (context, initialize_kadm5_error_table_r); + set_funcs(*ctx); + (*ctx)->context = context; + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM) + (*ctx)->realm = strdup(params->realm); + else + krb5_get_default_realm((*ctx)->context, &(*ctx)->realm); + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_ADMIN_SERVER) + (*ctx)->admin_server = strdup(params->admin_server); + else { + char **hostlist; + + ret = krb5_get_krb_admin_hst (context, &(*ctx)->realm, &hostlist); + if (ret) + return ret; + (*ctx)->admin_server = strdup(*hostlist); + krb5_free_krbhst (context, hostlist); + } + + if ((*ctx)->admin_server == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + colon = strchr ((*ctx)->admin_server, ':'); + if (colon != NULL) + *colon++ = '\0'; + + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = 0; + + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT) + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = params->kadmind_port; + else if (colon != NULL) { + char *end; + + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = htons(strtol (colon, &end, 0)); + } + if ((*ctx)->kadmind_port == 0) + (*ctx)->kadmind_port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos-adm", + "tcp", 749); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_kadm_ticket(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal client, + const char *server_name) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds in, *out; + + memset(&in, 0, sizeof(in)); + in.client = client; + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, server_name, &in.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0, id, &in, &out); + if(ret == 0) + krb5_free_creds(context, out); + krb5_free_principal(context, in.server); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_new_cache(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + const char *server_name, + krb5_ccache *ret_cache) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_ccache id; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + if(password == NULL && prompter == NULL) { + krb5_keytab kt; + if(keytab == NULL) + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &kt); + else + ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytab, &kt); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab (context, + &cred, + client, + kt, + 0, + server_name, + &opt); + krb5_kt_close(context, kt); + } else { + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + client, + password, + prompter, + NULL, + 0, + server_name, + &opt); + } + switch(ret){ + case 0: + break; + case KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR: /* don't print anything if it was just C-c:ed */ + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY: + case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED: + return KADM5_BAD_PASSWORD; + default: + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &id); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, id, cred.client); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, id, &cred); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + *ret_cache = id; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_cache(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *server_name, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_ccache *ret_cache) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id = NULL; + krb5_principal default_client = NULL, client = NULL; + + /* treat empty password as NULL */ + if(password && *password == '\0') + password = NULL; + if(server_name == NULL) + server_name = KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE; + + if(client_name != NULL) { + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, client_name, &client); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + if(password != NULL || prompter != NULL) { + /* get principal from default cache, ok if this doesn't work */ + ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id); + if(ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, id, &default_client); + if(ret) { + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + id = NULL; + } + } + + if(client == NULL) + client = default_client; + if(client == NULL) { + const char *user; + + user = get_default_username (); + + if(user == NULL) + return KADM5_FAILURE; + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &client, + NULL, user, "admin", NULL); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + if(client != default_client) { + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + default_client = NULL; + if (id != NULL) { + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + id = NULL; + } + } + } else if(ccache != NULL) + id = ccache; + + + if(id && (default_client == NULL || + krb5_principal_compare(context, client, default_client))) { + ret = get_kadm_ticket(context, id, client, server_name); + if(ret == 0) { + *ret_cache = id; + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + if (default_client != client) + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + return 0; + } + if(ccache != NULL) + /* couldn't get ticket from cache */ + return -1; + } + /* get creds via AS request */ + if(id) + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + if (client != default_client) + krb5_free_principal(context, default_client); + + ret = get_new_cache(context, client, password, prompter, keytab, + server_name, ret_cache); + krb5_free_principal(context, client); + return ret; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_context(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_client_context *ctx; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_ccache cc; + int s; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + int error; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + char *hostname, *slash; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + + ret = _kadm5_c_init_context(&ctx, realm_params, context); + if(ret) + return ret; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(ctx->kadmind_port)); + + hostname = ctx->admin_server; + slash = strchr (hostname, '/'); + if (slash != NULL) + hostname = slash + 1; + + error = getaddrinfo (hostname, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return KADM5_BAD_SERVER_NAME; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "connect(%s)", hostname); + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + if (a == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + krb5_warnx (context, "failed to contact %s", hostname); + return KADM5_FAILURE; + } + ret = get_cred_cache(context, client_name, service_name, + password, prompter, keytab, ccache, &cc); + + if(ret) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + close(s); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, &server); + if(ret) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if(ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, cc); + close(s); + return ret; + } + ctx->ac = NULL; + + ret = krb5_sendauth(context, &ctx->ac, &s, + KADMIN_APPL_VERSION, NULL, + server, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, NULL, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if(ret == 0) { + krb5_data params, enc_data; + ret = _kadm5_marshal_params(context, realm_params, ¶ms); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, + ctx->ac, + ¶ms, + &enc_data, + NULL); + + ret = krb5_write_message(context, &s, &enc_data); + + krb5_data_free(¶ms); + krb5_data_free(&enc_data); + } else if(ret == KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS) { + close(s); + + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return errno; + } + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (s); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return errno; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + ret = krb5_sendauth(context, &ctx->ac, &s, + KADMIN_OLD_APPL_VERSION, NULL, + server, AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, NULL, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL); + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if(ret) { + close(s); + return ret; + } + + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + if(ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, cc); + if(ret) { + close(s); + return ret; + } + ctx->sock = s; + *server_handle = ctx; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +init_context(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + const char *keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + krb5_init_context(&context); + ret = kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + password, + prompter, + keytab, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return init_context(client_name, + password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + keytab, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return init_context(client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + keytab, + NULL, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_c_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return init_context(client_name, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +#if 0 +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init(char *client_name, char *pass, + char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/init_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/init_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c1f3d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/init_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_s.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_context(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + ret = _kadm5_s_init_context(&ctx, realm_params, context); + if(ret) + return ret; + + assert(ctx->config.dbname != NULL); + assert(ctx->config.stash_file != NULL); + assert(ctx->config.acl_file != NULL); + assert(ctx->log_context.log_file != NULL); + assert(ctx->log_context.socket_name.sun_path[0] != '\0'); + + ret = hdb_create(ctx->context, &ctx->db, ctx->config.dbname); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = hdb_set_master_keyfile (ctx->context, + ctx->db, ctx->config.stash_file); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ctx->log_context.log_fd = -1; + + ctx->log_context.socket_fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + + ret = krb5_parse_name(ctx->context, client_name, &ctx->caller); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = _kadm5_acl_init(ctx); + if(ret) + return ret; + + *server_handle = ctx; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + krb5_init_context(&context); + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + krb5_init_context(&context); + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_context(context, + client_name, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + krb5_context context; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_server_context *ctx; + + krb5_init_context(&context); + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx(context, + client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_context(context); + return ret; + } + ctx = *server_handle; + ctx->my_context = 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/iprop.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/iprop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..499f515 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/iprop.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: iprop.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __IPROP_H__ +#define __IPROP_H__ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif + +#define IPROP_VERSION "iprop-0.0" + +#define KADM5_SLAVE_ACL HDB_DB_DIR "/slaves" + +#define IPROP_NAME "iprop" + +enum iprop_cmd { I_HAVE = 1, FOR_YOU = 2 }; + +#endif /* __IPROP_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2e71a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ipropd_master.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +static int +make_signal_socket (krb5_context context) +{ + struct sockaddr_un addr; + int fd; + + fd = socket (AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket AF_UNIX"); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strncpy (addr.sun_path, KADM5_LOG_SIGNAL, sizeof(addr.sun_path)); + addr.sun_path[sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1] = '\0'; + unlink (addr.sun_path); + if (bind (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "bind %s", addr.sun_path); + return fd; +} + +static int +make_listen_socket (krb5_context context) +{ + int fd; + int one = 1; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + + fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket AF_INET"); + setsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one, sizeof(one)); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr.sin_port = htons(4711); + if(bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "bind"); + if (listen(fd, SOMAXCONN) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "listen"); + return fd; +} + +struct slave { + int fd; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + char *name; + krb5_auth_context ac; + u_int32_t version; + struct slave *next; +}; + +typedef struct slave slave; + +static int +check_acl (krb5_context context, const char *name) +{ + FILE *fp; + char buf[256]; + int ret = 1; + + fp = fopen (KADM5_SLAVE_ACL, "r"); + if (fp == NULL) + return 1; + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) { + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1 ] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1 ] = '\0'; + if (strcmp (buf, name) == 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + fclose (fp); + return ret; +} + +static void +add_slave (krb5_context context, slave **root, int fd) +{ + krb5_principal server; + krb5_error_code ret; + slave *s; + int addr_len; + krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL; + char hostname[128]; + + s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + if (s == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "add_slave: no memory"); + return; + } + s->name = NULL; + s->ac = NULL; + + addr_len = sizeof(s->addr); + s->fd = accept (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&s->addr, &addr_len); + if (s->fd < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "accept"); + goto error; + } + gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, hostname, IPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + goto error; + } + + ret = krb5_recvauth (context, &s->ac, &s->fd, + IPROP_VERSION, server, 0, NULL, &ticket); + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + goto error; + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, ticket->client, &s->name); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + goto error; + } + if (check_acl (context, s->name)) { + krb5_warnx (context, "%s not in acl", s->name); + goto error; + } + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + printf ("connection from %s\n", s->name); + + s->version = 0; + s->next = *root; + *root = s; + return; +error: + if (s->name) + free (s->name); + if (s->ac) + krb5_auth_con_free(context, s->ac); + if (ticket) + krb5_free_ticket (context, ticket); + close (s->fd); + free(s); +} + +static void +remove_slave (krb5_context context, slave *s, slave **root) +{ + slave **p; + + close (s->fd); + free (s->name); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, s->ac); + + for (p = root; *p; p = &(*p)->next) + if (*p == s) { + *p = s->next; + break; + } + free (s); +} + +static int +send_complete (krb5_context context, slave *s) +{ + abort (); +} + +static int +send_diffs (krb5_context context, slave *s, int log_fd, + u_int32_t current_version) +{ + krb5_storage *sp, *data_sp; + u_int32_t ver; + time_t timestamp; + enum kadm_ops op; + u_int32_t len; + off_t right, left; + krb5_data data; + krb5_data priv_data; + int ret = 0; + + if (s->version == current_version) + return 0; + + sp = kadm5_log_goto_end (log_fd); + right = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + printf ("%ld, looking for %d\n", (long)right, s->version); + for (;;) { + if (kadm5_log_previous (sp, &ver, ×tamp, &op, &len)) + abort (); + printf ("version = %d\n", ver); + left = sp->seek(sp, -16, SEEK_CUR); + if (ver == s->version) + return 0; + if (ver == s->version + 1) + break; + if (left == 0) + return send_complete (context, s); + } + krb5_data_alloc (&data, right - left + 4); + sp->fetch (sp, (char *)data.data + 4, data.length - 4); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + _krb5_put_int(data.data, FOR_YOU, 4); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, s->ac, &data, &priv_data, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb_mk_priv"); + return 0; + } + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, &s->fd, &priv_data); + krb5_data_free (&priv_data); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_write_message"); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +process_msg (krb5_context context, slave *s, int log_fd, + u_int32_t current_version) +{ + int ret = 0; + krb5_data in, out; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_read_message (context, &s->fd, &in); + if (ret) + return 1; + + if(in.length == 0) { + krb5_warnx(context, "process_msg: short message"); + return 1; + } + + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, s->ac, &in, &out, NULL); + krb5_data_free (&in); + if (ret) { + krb5_warn (context, ret, "krb5_rd_priv"); + return 1; + } + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (out.data, out.length); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + switch (tmp) { + case I_HAVE : + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + s->version = tmp; + ret = send_diffs (context, s, log_fd, current_version); + break; + case FOR_YOU : + default : + krb5_warnx (context, "Ignoring command %d", tmp); + break; + } + + krb5_data_free (&out); + return ret; +} + +char *realm; +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + int signal_fd, listen_fd; + int log_fd; + slave *slaves = NULL; + u_int32_t current_version, old_version = 0; + + int optind; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + log_fd = open (server_context->log_context.log_file, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (log_fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "open %s", + server_context->log_context.log_file); + + signal_fd = make_signal_socket (context); + listen_fd = make_listen_socket (context); + + for (;;) { + slave *p; + fd_set readset; + int max_fd = 0; + struct timeval to = {30, 0}; + u_int32_t vers; + + FD_ZERO(&readset); + FD_SET(signal_fd, &readset); + max_fd = max(max_fd, signal_fd); + FD_SET(listen_fd, &readset); + max_fd = max(max_fd, listen_fd); + + for (p = slaves; p != NULL; p = p->next) { + FD_SET(p->fd, &readset); + max_fd = max(max_fd, p->fd); + } + + ret = select (max_fd + 1, + &readset, NULL, NULL, &to); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "select"); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + old_version = current_version; + kadm5_log_get_version (log_fd, ¤t_version); + + if (current_version > old_version) + for (p = slaves; p != NULL; p = p->next) + send_diffs (context, p, log_fd, current_version); + } + + if (ret && FD_ISSET(signal_fd, &readset)) { + struct sockaddr_un peer_addr; + int peer_len = sizeof(peer_addr); + + if(recvfrom(signal_fd, &vers, sizeof(vers), 0, + (struct sockaddr *)&peer_addr, &peer_len) < 0) { + krb5_warn (context, errno, "recvfrom"); + continue; + } + printf ("signal: %u\n", vers); + --ret; + old_version = current_version; + kadm5_log_get_version (log_fd, ¤t_version); + for (p = slaves; p != NULL; p = p->next) + send_diffs (context, p, log_fd, current_version); + } + + for(p = slaves; p != NULL && ret--; p = p->next) + if (FD_ISSET(p->fd, &readset)) { + if(process_msg (context, p, log_fd, current_version)) + remove_slave (context, p, &slaves); + } + + if (ret && FD_ISSET(listen_fd, &readset)) { + add_slave (context, &slaves, listen_fd); + --ret; + } + + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..76884eb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/ipropd_slave.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ipropd_slave.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +static int +connect_to_master (krb5_context context, const char *master) +{ + int fd; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + struct hostent *he; + + fd = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "socket AF_INET"); + memset (&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + addr.sin_port = htons(4711); + he = roken_gethostbyname (master); + if (he == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "gethostbyname: %s", hstrerror(h_errno)); + memcpy (&addr.sin_addr, he->h_addr, sizeof(addr.sin_addr)); + if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) + krb5_err (context, 1, errno, "connect"); + return fd; +} + +static void +get_creds(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *cache, const char *host) +{ + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt init_opts; +#if 0 + krb5_preauthtype preauth = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; +#endif + krb5_creds creds; + char my_hostname[128]; + char *server; + + ret = krb5_kt_default(context, &keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_default"); + + gethostname (my_hostname, sizeof(my_hostname)); + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, my_hostname, IPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &client); + if (ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&init_opts); +#if 0 + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(&init_opts, &preauth, 1); +#endif + + asprintf (&server, "%s/%s", IPROP_NAME, host); + if (server == NULL) + krb5_errx (context, 1, "malloc: no memory"); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(context, &creds, client, keytab, + 0, server, &init_opts); + free (server); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_get_init_creds"); + + ret = krb5_kt_close(context, keytab); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_kt_close"); + + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, cache); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_gen_new"); + + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, *cache, client); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_initialize"); + + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, *cache, &creds); + if(ret) krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_store_cred"); +} + +static void +ihave (krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int fd, u_int32_t version) +{ + int ret; + u_char buf[8]; + krb5_storage *sp; + krb5_data data, priv_data; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (buf, 8); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, I_HAVE); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, version); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + data.length = 8; + data.data = buf; + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, auth_context, &data, &priv_data, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb_mk_priv"); + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, &fd, &priv_data); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_write_message"); + + krb5_data_free (&priv_data); +} + +static void +receive (krb5_context context, + krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_server_context *server_context) +{ + int ret; + off_t left, right; + void *buf; + int32_t vers; + + ret = server_context->db->open(context, + server_context->db, + O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + + do { + int32_t len, timestamp, tmp; + enum kadm_ops op; + + if(krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &vers) != 0) + return; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, ×tamp); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + op = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &len); + if (vers <= server_context->log_context.version) + sp->seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + } while(vers <= server_context->log_context.version); + + left = sp->seek (sp, -16, SEEK_CUR); + right = sp->seek (sp, 0, SEEK_END); + buf = malloc (right - left); + if (buf == NULL) { + krb5_warnx (context, "malloc: no memory"); + return; + } + sp->seek (sp, left, SEEK_SET); + sp->fetch (sp, buf, right - left); + write (server_context->log_context.log_fd, buf, right-left); + fsync (server_context->log_context.log_fd); + free (buf); + + sp->seek (sp, left, SEEK_SET); + + for(;;) { + int32_t len, timestamp, tmp; + enum kadm_ops op; + + if(krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &vers) != 0) + break; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, ×tamp); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + op = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &len); + + ret = kadm5_log_replay (server_context, + op, vers, len, sp); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (context, ret, "kadm5_log_replay"); + else + server_context->log_context.version = vers; + sp->seek (sp, 8, SEEK_CUR); + } + + ret = server_context->db->close (context, server_context->db); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->close"); +} + +char *realm; +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "realm", 'r', arg_string, &realm }, + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_context context; + krb5_auth_context auth_context; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + kadm5_config_params conf; + int master_fd; + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_principal server; + + int optind; + + optind = krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + if(realm) { + conf.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM; + conf.realm = realm; + } + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_init"); + + get_creds(context, &ccache, argv[1]); + + master_fd = connect_to_master (context, argv[1]); + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, argv[1], IPROP_NAME, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal"); + + auth_context = NULL; + ret = krb5_sendauth (context, &auth_context, &master_fd, + IPROP_VERSION, NULL, server, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, NULL, NULL, + ccache, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_sendauth"); + + ihave (context, auth_context, master_fd, + server_context->log_context.version); + + for (;;) { + int ret; + krb5_data data, out; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_read_message (context, &master_fd, &data); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_read_message"); + + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, auth_context, &data, &out, NULL); + krb5_data_free (&data); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_rd_priv"); + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem (out.data, out.length); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + switch (tmp) { + case FOR_YOU : + receive (context, sp, server_context); + ihave (context, auth_context, master_fd, + server_context->log_context.version); + break; + case I_HAVE : + default : + krb5_warnx (context, "Ignoring command %d", tmp); + break; + } + krb5_storage_free (sp); + krb5_data_free (&out); + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/kadm5_err.et b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/kadm5_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000..506a554 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/kadm5_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# +# Error messages for the kadm5 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: kadm5_err.et,v 1.4 1998/02/16 16:37:17 joda Exp $" + +error_table ovk kadm5 + +prefix KADM5 +error_code FAILURE, "Operation failed for unspecified reason" +error_code AUTH_GET, "Operation requires `get' privilege" +error_code AUTH_ADD, "Operation requires `add' privilege" +error_code AUTH_MODIFY, "Operation requires `modify' privilege" +error_code AUTH_DELETE, "Operation requires `delete' privilege" +error_code AUTH_INSUFFICIENT, "Insufficient authorization for operation" +error_code BAD_DB, "Database inconsistency detected" +error_code DUP, "Principal or policy already exists" +error_code RPC_ERROR, "Communication failure with server" +error_code NO_SRV, "No administration server found for realm" +error_code BAD_HIST_KEY, "Password history principal key version mismatch" +error_code NOT_INIT, "Connection to server not initialized" +error_code UNK_PRINC, "Principal does not exist" +error_code UNK_POLICY, "Policy does not exist" +error_code BAD_MASK, "Invalid field mask for operation" +error_code BAD_CLASS, "Invalid number of character classes" +error_code BAD_LENGTH, "Invalid password length" +error_code BAD_POLICY, "Invalid policy name" +error_code BAD_PRINCIPAL, "Invalid principal name." +error_code BAD_AUX_ATTR, "Invalid auxillary attributes" +error_code BAD_HISTORY, "Invalid password history count" +error_code BAD_MIN_PASS_LIFE, "Password minimum life is greater then password maximum life" +error_code PASS_Q_TOOSHORT, "Password is too short" +error_code PASS_Q_CLASS, "Password does not contain enough character classes" +error_code PASS_Q_DICT, "Password is in the password dictionary" +error_code PASS_REUSE, "Can't resuse password" +error_code PASS_TOOSOON, "Current password's minimum life has not expired" +error_code POLICY_REF, "Policy is in use" +error_code INIT, "Connection to server already initialized" +error_code BAD_PASSWORD, "Incorrect password" +error_code PROTECT_PRINCIPAL, "Can't change protected principal" +error_code BAD_SERVER_HANDLE, "Programmer error! Bad Admin server handle" +error_code BAD_STRUCT_VERSION, "Programmer error! Bad API structure version" +error_code OLD_STRUCT_VERSION, "API structure version specified by application is no longer supported" +error_code NEW_STRUCT_VERSION, "API structure version specified by application is unknown to libraries" +error_code BAD_API_VERSION, "Programmer error! Bad API version" +error_code OLD_LIB_API_VERSION, "API version specified by application is no longer supported by libraries" +error_code OLD_SERVER_API_VERSION,"API version specified by application is no longer supported by server" +error_code NEW_LIB_API_VERSION, "API version specified by application is unknown to libraries" +error_code NEW_SERVER_API_VERSION,"API version specified by application is unknown to server" +error_code SECURE_PRINC_MISSING,"Database error! Required principal missing" +error_code NO_RENAME_SALT, "The salt type of the specified principal does not support renaming" +error_code BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS, "Invalid configuration parameter for remote KADM5 client" +error_code BAD_SERVER_PARAMS, "Invalid configuration parameter for local KADM5 client." +error_code AUTH_LIST, "Operation requires `list' privilege" +error_code AUTH_CHANGEPW, "Operation requires `change-password' privilege" +error_code BAD_TL_TYPE, "Programmer error! Invalid tagged data list element type" +error_code MISSING_CONF_PARAMS, "Required parameters in kdc.conf missing" +error_code BAD_SERVER_NAME, "Bad krb5 admin server hostname" diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9344a2c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/kadm5_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kadm5_locl.h,v 1.21 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KADM5_LOCL_H__ +#define __KADM5_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "admin.h" +#include "kadm5_err.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include "private.h" + +#endif /* __KADM5_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/log.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9dc38c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,666 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: log.c,v 1.13 1999/12/04 19:50:35 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * A log record consists of: + * + * version number 4 bytes + * time in seconds 4 bytes + * operation (enum kadm_ops) 4 bytes + * length of record 4 bytes + * data... n bytes + * length of record 4 bytes + * version number 4 bytes + * + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_get_version (int fd, + u_int32_t *ver) +{ + int ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + int32_t old_version; + + ret = lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_END); + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + if(ret == 0) { + *ver = 0; + return 0; + } + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd (fd); + sp->seek(sp, -4, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &old_version); + *ver = old_version; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_END); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_init (kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + int fd; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + if (log_context->log_fd != -1) + return 0; + fd = open (log_context->log_file, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + if (flock (fd, LOCK_EX) < 0) { + close (fd); + return errno; + } + + ret = kadm5_log_get_version (fd, &log_context->version); + if (ret) + return ret; + + log_context->log_fd = fd; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_end (kadm5_server_context *context) +{ + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + int fd = log_context->log_fd; + + flock (fd, LOCK_UN); + close(fd); + log_context->log_fd = -1; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_preamble (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_storage *sp, + enum kadm_ops op) +{ + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + kadm5_ret_t kadm_ret; + + kadm_ret = kadm5_log_init (context); + if (kadm_ret) + return kadm_ret; + + krb5_store_int32 (sp, ++log_context->version); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, time(NULL)); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, op); + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_postamble (kadm5_log_context *context, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_store_int32 (sp, context->version); + return 0; +} + +/* + * flush the log record in `sp'. + */ + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_flush (kadm5_log_context *log_context, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_data data; + size_t len; + int ret; + + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data); + len = data.length; + ret = write (log_context->log_fd, data.data, len); + if (ret != len) { + krb5_data_free(&data); + return errno; + } + if (fsync (log_context->log_fd) < 0) { + krb5_data_free(&data); + return errno; + } + /* + * Try to send a signal to any running `ipropd-master' + */ + sendto (log_context->socket_fd, + (void *)&log_context->version, + sizeof(log_context->version), + 0, + (struct sockaddr *)&log_context->socket_name, + sizeof(log_context->socket_name)); + + krb5_data_free(&data); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Add a `create' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_create (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_data value; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = hdb_entry2value (context->context, ent, &value); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_create); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&value); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, value.length); + sp->store(sp, value.data, value.length); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, value.length); + krb5_data_free (&value); + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read the data of a create log record from `sp' and change the + * database. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_create (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + hdb_entry ent; + + krb5_data_alloc (&data, len); + sp->fetch (sp, data.data, len); + ret = hdb_value2entry (context->context, &data, &ent); + krb5_data_free(&data); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &ent); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add a `delete' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_delete (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal princ) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + off_t off; + off_t len; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_delete); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 0); + off = sp->seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_principal (sp, princ); + len = sp->seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) - off; + sp->seek(sp, -(len + 4), SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + sp->seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `delete' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_delete (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + hdb_entry ent; + + krb5_ret_principal (sp, &ent.principal); + + ret = context->db->remove(context->context, context->db, &ent); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, ent.principal); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Add a `rename' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_rename (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal source, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + off_t off; + off_t len; + krb5_data value; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = hdb_entry2value (context->context, ent, &value); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_rename); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&value); + return ret; + } + krb5_store_int32 (sp, 0); + off = sp->seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_principal (sp, source); + sp->store(sp, value.data, value.length); + krb5_data_free (&value); + len = sp->seek (sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) - off; + + sp->seek(sp, -(len + 4), SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + sp->seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `rename' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_rename (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal source; + hdb_entry source_ent, target_ent; + krb5_data value; + off_t off; + size_t princ_len, data_len; + + off = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_principal (sp, &source); + princ_len = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR) - off; + data_len = len - princ_len; + krb5_data_alloc (&value, data_len); + sp->fetch (sp, value.data, data_len); + ret = hdb_value2entry (context->context, &value, &target_ent); + krb5_data_free(&value); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; + } + ret = context->db->store (context->context, context->db, 0, &target_ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &target_ent); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; + } + source_ent.principal = source; + ret = context->db->remove (context->context, context->db, &source_ent); + krb5_free_principal (context->context, source); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Add a `modify' operation to the log. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_modify (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_data value; + u_int32_t len; + kadm5_log_context *log_context = &context->log_context; + + sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + ret = hdb_entry2value (context->context, ent, &value); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_preamble (context, sp, kadm_modify); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (&value); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + return ret; + } + len = value.length + 4; + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, mask); + sp->store(sp, value.data, value.length); + krb5_data_free (&value); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, len); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_postamble (log_context, sp); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free (sp); + return ret; + } + ret = kadm5_log_flush (log_context, sp); + krb5_storage_free (sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = kadm5_log_end (context); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a `modify' log operation from `sp' and apply it. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_modify (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t mask; + krb5_data value; + hdb_entry ent, log_ent; + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &mask); + len -= 4; + krb5_data_alloc (&value, len); + sp->fetch (sp, value.data, len); + ret = hdb_value2entry (context->context, &value, &log_ent); + krb5_data_free(&value); + if (ret) + return ret; + ent.principal = log_ent.principal; + log_ent.principal = NULL; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_DECRYPT, &ent); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + if (ent.valid_end == NULL) + ent.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*ent.valid_end)); + *ent.valid_end = *log_ent.valid_end; + } + if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + if (ent.pw_end == NULL) + ent.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*ent.pw_end)); + *ent.pw_end = *log_ent.pw_end; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + ent.flags = log_ent.flags; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + if (ent.max_life == NULL) + ent.max_life = malloc (sizeof(*ent.max_life)); + *ent.max_life = *log_ent.max_life; + } + if ((mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) && (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME)) { + if (ent.modified_by == NULL) { + ent.modified_by = malloc(sizeof(*ent.modified_by)); + } else + free_Event(ent.modified_by); + copy_Event(log_ent.modified_by, ent.modified_by); + } + if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) { + ent.kvno = log_ent.kvno; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + if (ent.max_renew == NULL) + ent.max_renew = malloc (sizeof(*ent.max_renew)); + *ent.max_renew = *log_ent.max_renew; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + abort (); /* XXX */ + } + if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + size_t len; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; ++i) + free_Key(&ent.keys.val[i]); + free (ent.keys.val); + + len = log_ent.keys.len; + + ent.keys.len = len; + ent.keys.val = malloc(len * sizeof(*ent.keys.val)); + for (i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; ++i) + copy_Key(&log_ent.keys.val[i], + &ent.keys.val[i]); + } + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &ent); + hdb_free_entry (context->context, &log_ent); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Call `func' for each log record in the log in `context' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_foreach (kadm5_server_context *context, + void (*func)(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp)) +{ + int fd = context->log_context.log_fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + + lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd (fd); + for (;;) { + int32_t ver, timestamp, op, len; + + if(krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &ver) != 0) + break; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, ×tamp); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &op); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &len); + (*func)(context, ver, timestamp, op, len, sp); + sp->seek(sp, 8, SEEK_CUR); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Go to end of log. + */ + +krb5_storage * +kadm5_log_goto_end (int fd) +{ + krb5_storage *sp; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd (fd); + sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_END); + return sp; +} + +/* + * Return previous log entry. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_previous (krb5_storage *sp, + u_int32_t *ver, + time_t *timestamp, + enum kadm_ops *op, + u_int32_t *len) +{ + off_t off; + int32_t tmp; + + sp->seek(sp, -8, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *len = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *ver = tmp; + off = 24 + *len; + sp->seek(sp, -off, SEEK_CUR); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + assert(tmp == *ver); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *timestamp = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *op = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + assert(tmp == *len); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Replay a record from the log + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay (kadm5_server_context *context, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + switch (op) { + case kadm_create : + return kadm5_log_replay_create (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_delete : + return kadm5_log_replay_delete (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_rename : + return kadm5_log_replay_rename (context, ver, len, sp); + case kadm_modify : + return kadm5_log_replay_modify (context, ver, len, sp); + default : + return KADM5_FAILURE; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/marshall.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/marshall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9828837 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/marshall.c @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: marshall.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_key_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_key_data *key) +{ + krb5_data c; + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_ver); + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_kvno); + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[0]); + c.length = key->key_data_length[0]; + c.data = key->key_data_contents[0]; + krb5_store_data(sp, c); + krb5_store_int32(sp, key->key_data_type[1]); + c.length = key->key_data_length[1]; + c.data = key->key_data_contents[1]; + krb5_store_data(sp, c); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_key_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_key_data *key) +{ + krb5_data c; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_ver = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_kvno = tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_type[0] = tmp; + krb5_ret_data(sp, &c); + key->key_data_length[0] = c.length; + key->key_data_contents[0] = c.data; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + key->key_data_type[1] = tmp; + krb5_ret_data(sp, &c); + key->key_data_length[1] = c.length; + key->key_data_contents[1] = c.data; + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_tl_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_tl_data *tl) +{ + krb5_data c; + krb5_store_int32(sp, tl->tl_data_type); + c.length = tl->tl_data_length; + c.data = tl->tl_data_contents; + krb5_store_data(sp, c); + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_tl_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_tl_data *tl) +{ + krb5_data c; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + tl->tl_data_type = tmp; + krb5_ret_data(sp, &c); + tl->tl_data_length = c.length; + tl->tl_data_contents = c.data; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + int i; + + if (mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ->principal); + if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->princ_expire_time); + if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->pw_expiration); + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->last_pwd_change); + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->max_life); + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->mod_name != NULL); + if(princ->mod_name) + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ->mod_name); + } + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->mod_date); + if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->attributes); + if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->kvno); + if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->mkvno); + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->policy != NULL); + if(princ->policy) + krb5_store_string(sp, princ->policy); + } + if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->aux_attributes); + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->max_renewable_life); + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->last_success); + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->last_failed); + if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->fail_auth_count); + if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->n_key_data); + for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++) + kadm5_store_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]); + } + if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + krb5_tl_data *tp; + + krb5_store_int32(sp, princ->n_tl_data); + for(tp = princ->tl_data; tp; tp = tp->tl_data_next) + kadm5_store_tl_data(sp, tp); + } + return 0; +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_store_principal_ent_mask(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + return store_principal_ent (sp, princ, mask); +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +ret_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + int i; + int32_t tmp; + + if (mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ->principal); + + if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->princ_expire_time = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->pw_expiration = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->last_pwd_change = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->max_life = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(tmp) + krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ->mod_name); + else + princ->mod_name = NULL; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->mod_date = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->attributes = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->kvno = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->mkvno = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(tmp) + krb5_ret_string(sp, &princ->policy); + else + princ->policy = NULL; + } + if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->aux_attributes = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->max_renewable_life = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->last_success = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->last_failed = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->fail_auth_count = tmp; + } + if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->n_key_data = tmp; + princ->key_data = malloc(princ->n_key_data * sizeof(*princ->key_data)); + for(i = 0; i < princ->n_key_data; i++) + kadm5_ret_key_data(sp, &princ->key_data[i]); + } + if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + princ->n_tl_data = tmp; + princ->tl_data = NULL; + for(i = 0; i < princ->n_tl_data; i++){ + krb5_tl_data *tp = malloc(sizeof(*tp)); + kadm5_ret_tl_data(sp, tp); + tp->tl_data_next = princ->tl_data; + princ->tl_data = tp; + } + } + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ) +{ + return ret_principal_ent (sp, princ, ~0); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_ret_principal_ent_mask(krb5_storage *sp, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t *mask) +{ + int32_t tmp; + + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &tmp); + *mask = tmp; + return ret_principal_ent (sp, princ, *mask); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_marshal_params(krb5_context context, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_data *out) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = krb5_storage_emem(); + + krb5_store_int32(sp, params->mask & (KADM5_CONFIG_REALM)); + + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM) + krb5_store_string(sp, params->realm); + krb5_storage_to_data(sp, out); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + return 0; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_unmarshal_params(krb5_context context, + krb5_data *in, + kadm5_config_params *params) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in); + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, ¶ms->mask); + + if(params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM) + krb5_ret_string(sp, ¶ms->realm); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/modify_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/modify_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a64ccc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/modify_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: modify_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_modify); + kadm5_store_principal_ent(sp, princ); + krb5_store_int32(sp, mask); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return tmp; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/modify_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/modify_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4157202 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/modify_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: modify_s.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +static kadm5_ret_t +modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask, + u_int32_t forbidden_mask) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + if((mask & forbidden_mask)) + return KADM5_BAD_MASK; + if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && strcmp(princ->policy, "default")) + return KADM5_UNK_POLICY; + + ent.principal = princ->principal; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = _kadm5_setup_entry(&ent, mask, princ, mask, NULL, 0); + if(ret) + goto out2; + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + mask | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t mask) +{ + return modify_principal(server_handle, princ, mask, + KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE | KADM5_MOD_TIME + | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MKVNO + | KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS + | KADM5_LAST_FAILED); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/password_quality.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/password_quality.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86d35f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/password_quality.c @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: password_quality.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:06 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef HAVE_DLFCN_H +#include +#endif + +static const char * +simple_passwd_quality (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *pwd) +{ + if (pwd->length < 6) + return "Password too short"; + else + return NULL; +} + +typedef const char* (*passwd_quality_check_func)(krb5_context, + krb5_principal, + krb5_data*); + +static passwd_quality_check_func passwd_quality_check = simple_passwd_quality; + +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN +extern const char *check_library; +extern const char *check_function; + +#define PASSWD_VERSION 0 + +#endif + +/* + * setup the password quality hook + */ + +void +kadm5_setup_passwd_quality_check(krb5_context context, + const char *check_library, + const char *check_function) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_DLOPEN + void *handle; + void *sym; + int *version; + int flags; + const char *tmp; + +#ifdef RTLD_NOW + flags = RTLD_NOW; +#else + flags = 0; +#endif + + if(check_library == NULL) { + tmp = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "password_quality", + "check_library", + NULL); + if(tmp != NULL) + check_library = tmp; + } + if(check_function == NULL) { + tmp = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "password_quality", + "check_function", + NULL); + if(tmp != NULL) + check_function = tmp; + } + if(check_library != NULL && check_function == NULL) + check_function = "passwd_check"; + + if(check_library == NULL) + return; + handle = dlopen(check_library, flags); + if(handle == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "failed to open `%s'", check_library); + return; + } + version = dlsym(handle, "version"); + if(version == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "didn't find `version' symbol in `%s'", check_library); + dlclose(handle); + return; + } + if(*version != PASSWD_VERSION) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "version of loaded library is %d (expected %d)", + *version, PASSWD_VERSION); + dlclose(handle); + return; + } + sym = dlsym(handle, check_function); + if(sym == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, + "didn't find `%s' symbol in `%s'", + check_function, check_library); + dlclose(handle); + return; + } + passwd_quality_check = (passwd_quality_check_func) sym; +#endif /* HAVE_DLOPEN */ +} + +const char * +kadm5_check_password_quality (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *pwd_data) +{ + return (*passwd_quality_check) (context, principal, pwd_data); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/private.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e56a0f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/private.h @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: private.h,v 1.10 1999/12/04 23:09:34 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __kadm5_private_h__ +#define __kadm5_private_h__ + +struct kadm_func { + kadm5_ret_t (*chpass_principal) (void *, krb5_principal, char*); + kadm5_ret_t (*create_principal) (void*, kadm5_principal_ent_t, + u_int32_t, char*); + kadm5_ret_t (*delete_principal) (void*, krb5_principal); + kadm5_ret_t (*destroy) (void*); + kadm5_ret_t (*flush) (void*); + kadm5_ret_t (*get_principal) (void*, krb5_principal, + kadm5_principal_ent_t, u_int32_t); + kadm5_ret_t (*get_principals) (void*, const char*, char***, int*); + kadm5_ret_t (*get_privs) (void*, u_int32_t*); + kadm5_ret_t (*modify_principal) (void*, kadm5_principal_ent_t, u_int32_t); + kadm5_ret_t (*randkey_principal) (void*, krb5_principal, + krb5_keyblock**, int*); + kadm5_ret_t (*rename_principal) (void*, krb5_principal, krb5_principal); +}; + +/* XXX should be integrated */ +typedef struct kadm5_common_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_boolean my_context; + struct kadm_func funcs; + void *data; +}kadm5_common_context; + +typedef struct kadm5_log_peer { + int fd; + char *name; + krb5_auth_context ac; + struct kadm5_log_peer *next; +} kadm5_log_peer; + +typedef struct kadm5_log_context { + char *log_file; + int log_fd; + u_int32_t version; + struct sockaddr_un socket_name; + int socket_fd; +} kadm5_log_context; + +typedef struct kadm5_server_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_boolean my_context; + struct kadm_func funcs; + /* */ + kadm5_config_params config; + HDB *db; + krb5_principal caller; + unsigned acl_flags; + kadm5_log_context log_context; +}kadm5_server_context; + +typedef struct kadm5_client_context { + krb5_context context; + krb5_boolean my_context; + struct kadm_func funcs; + /* */ + krb5_auth_context ac; + char *realm; + char *admin_server; + int kadmind_port; + int sock; +}kadm5_client_context; + +enum kadm_ops { + kadm_get, + kadm_delete, + kadm_create, + kadm_rename, + kadm_chpass, + kadm_modify, + kadm_randkey, + kadm_get_privs, + kadm_get_princs +}; + +#define KADMIN_APPL_VERSION "KADM0.1" +#define KADMIN_OLD_APPL_VERSION "KADM0.0" + +#define KADM5_LOG_SIGNAL HDB_DB_DIR "/signal" + +kadm5_ret_t _kadm5_privs_to_string (u_int32_t, char*, size_t); + +kadm5_ret_t _kadm5_string_to_privs (const char*, u_int32_t*); + +HDB *_kadm5_s_get_db (void *); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_check_permission __P(( + kadm5_server_context *context, + unsigned op)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_acl_init __P((kadm5_server_context *context)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_c_init_context __P(( + kadm5_client_context **ctx, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_context context)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_recv __P(( + kadm5_client_context *context, + krb5_data *reply)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_send __P(( + kadm5_client_context *context, + krb5_storage *sp)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_error_code __P((kadm5_ret_t code)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_s_init_context __P(( + kadm5_server_context **ctx, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_context context)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys __P(( + kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + const char *password)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys2 __P(( + hdb_entry *ent, + int16_t n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys_randomly __P((kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_modifier __P(( + kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_setup_entry __P(( + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, + u_int32_t princ_mask, + kadm5_principal_ent_t def, + u_int32_t def_mask)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_get_version (int fd, + u_int32_t *ver); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_init (kadm5_server_context *context); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_create (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_delete (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal princ); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_rename (kadm5_server_context *context, + krb5_principal source, + hdb_entry *ent); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_modify (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + u_int32_t mask); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_end (kadm5_server_context *context); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_foreach (kadm5_server_context *context, + void (*func)(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp)); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_create (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_delete (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_rename (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay_modify (kadm5_server_context *context, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_replay (kadm5_server_context *context, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t ver, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp); + +krb5_storage * +kadm5_log_goto_end (int fd); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_log_previous (krb5_storage *sp, + u_int32_t *ver, + time_t *timestamp, + enum kadm_ops *op, + u_int32_t *len); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_marshal_params __P((krb5_context context, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_data *out)); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_unmarshal_params __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_data *in, + kadm5_config_params *params)); + + + +#endif /* __kadm5_private_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/privs_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/privs_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25d4976 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/privs_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: privs_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_get_privs(void *server_handle, u_int32_t *privs) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_get_privs); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if (ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0){ + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + *privs = tmp; + } + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/privs_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/privs_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85cd5d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/privs_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: privs_s.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_get_privs(void *server_handle, u_int32_t *privs) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + *privs = context->acl_flags; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/randkey_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/randkey_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7531b6e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/randkey_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: randkey_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_randkey); + krb5_store_principal(sp, princ); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0){ + krb5_keyblock *k; + int i; + + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + k = malloc(tmp * sizeof(*k)); + if (k == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + for(i = 0; i < tmp; i++) + krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, &k[i]); + *n_keys = tmp; + *new_keys = k; + } +out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25c8571 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/randkey_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: randkey_s.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Set the keys of `princ' to random values, returning the random keys + * in `new_keys', `n_keys'. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + hdb_entry ent; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + + ent.principal = princ; + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out; + + ret = _kadm5_set_keys_randomly (context, + &ent, + new_keys, + n_keys); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out3; + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_modify (context, + &ent, + KADM5_PRINCIPAL | KADM5_MOD_NAME | KADM5_MOD_TIME | + KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_KVNO); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, + HDB_F_REPLACE, &ent); +out3: + if (ret) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < *n_keys; ++i) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context->context, &(*new_keys)[i]); + free (*new_keys); + *new_keys = NULL; + *n_keys = 0; + } +out2: + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/rename_c.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/rename_c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d33e611 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/rename_c.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename_c.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_c_rename_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target) +{ + kadm5_client_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + krb5_storage *sp; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + int32_t tmp; + krb5_data reply; + + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (sp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_store_int32(sp, kadm_rename); + krb5_store_principal(sp, source); + krb5_store_principal(sp, target); + ret = _kadm5_client_send(context, sp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = _kadm5_client_recv(context, &reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + sp = krb5_storage_from_data (&reply); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ENOMEM; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free (&reply); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/rename_s.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/rename_s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7f9038 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/rename_s.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rename_s.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_s_rename_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target) +{ + kadm5_server_context *context = server_handle; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + hdb_entry ent, ent2; + ent.principal = source; + if(krb5_principal_compare(context->context, source, target)) + return KADM5_DUP; /* XXX is this right? */ + if(!krb5_realm_compare(context->context, source, target)) + return KADM5_FAILURE; /* XXX better code */ + ret = context->db->open(context->context, context->db, O_RDWR, 0); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = context->db->fetch(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret){ + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + goto out; + } + ret = _kadm5_set_modifier(context, &ent); + if(ret) + goto out2; + { + /* fix salt */ + int i; + Salt salt; + krb5_salt salt2; + krb5_get_pw_salt(context->context, source, &salt2); + salt.type = hdb_pw_salt; + salt.salt = salt2.saltvalue; + for(i = 0; i < ent.keys.len; i++){ + if(ent.keys.val[i].salt == NULL){ + ent.keys.val[i].salt = malloc(sizeof(*ent.keys.val[i].salt)); + ret = copy_Salt(&salt, ent.keys.val[i].salt); + if(ret) + break; + } + } + krb5_free_salt(context->context, salt2); + } + if(ret) + goto out2; + ent2.principal = ent.principal; + ent.principal = target; + + hdb_seal_keys(context->db, &ent); + + kadm5_log_rename (context, + source, + &ent); + + ret = context->db->store(context->context, context->db, 0, &ent); + if(ret){ + ent.principal = ent2.principal; + goto out2; + } + ret = context->db->remove(context->context, context->db, &ent2); + ent.principal = ent2.principal; +out2: + context->db->close(context->context, context->db); + hdb_free_entry(context->context, &ent); +out: + return _kadm5_error_code(ret); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/replay_log.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/replay_log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0e05ee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/replay_log.c @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "iprop.h" + +RCSID("$Id: replay_log.c,v 1.7 1999/12/04 19:51:11 assar Exp $"); + +static void +apply_entry(kadm5_server_context *server_context, + u_int32_t ver, + time_t timestamp, + enum kadm_ops op, + u_int32_t len, + krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + printf ("ver %u... ", ver); + fflush (stdout); + + ret = kadm5_log_replay (server_context, + op, ver, len, sp); + if (ret) + krb5_warn (server_context->context, ret, "kadm5_log_replay"); + + + printf ("done\n"); +} + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + void *kadm_handle; + kadm5_config_params conf; + kadm5_server_context *server_context; + + krb5_program_setup(&context, argc, argv, args, num_args, NULL); + + if(help_flag) + krb5_std_usage(0, args, num_args); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf)); + ret = kadm5_init_with_password_ctx (context, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &conf, 0, 0, + &kadm_handle); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + + server_context = (kadm5_server_context *)kadm_handle; + + ret = server_context->db->open(context, + server_context->db, + O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->open"); + + ret = kadm5_log_init (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "kadm5_log_init"); + + ret = kadm5_log_foreach (server_context, apply_entry); + if(ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_foreach"); + ret = kadm5_log_end (server_context); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(context, ret, "kadm5_log_end"); + ret = server_context->db->close (context, server_context->db); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "db->close"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/sample_passwd_check.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/sample_passwd_check.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ff5122 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/sample_passwd_check.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +/* $Id: sample_passwd_check.c,v 1.1 1999/09/10 10:11:03 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#include + +/* specify the api-version this library conforms to */ + +int version = 0; + +/* just check the length of the password, this is what the default + check does, but this lets you specify the minimum length in + krb5.conf */ +const char* +check_length(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal prinipal, + krb5_data *password) +{ + int min_length = krb5_config_get_int_default(context, NULL, 6, + "password_quality", + "min_length", + NULL); + if(password->length < min_length) + return "Password too short"; + return NULL; +} + +#ifdef DICTPATH + +/* use cracklib to check password quality; this requires a patch for + cracklib that can be found at + ftp://ftp.pdc.kth.se/pub/krb/src/cracklib.patch */ + +const char* +check_cracklib(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_data *password) +{ + char *s = malloc(password->length + 1); + char *msg; + char *strings[2]; + if(s == NULL) + return NULL; /* XXX */ + strings[0] = principal->name.name_string.val[0]; /* XXX */ + strings[1] = NULL; + memcpy(s, password->data, password->length); + s[password->length] = '\0'; + msg = FascistCheck(s, DICTPATH, strings); + memset(s, 0, password->length); + free(s); + return msg; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/send_recv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/send_recv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51f6972 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/send_recv.c @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: send_recv.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_send(kadm5_client_context *context, krb5_storage *sp) +{ + krb5_data msg, out; + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len; + krb5_storage *sock; + + len = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&msg, len); + sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET); + sp->fetch(sp, msg.data, msg.length); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv(context->context, context->ac, &msg, &out, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&msg); + if(ret) + return ret; + + sock = krb5_storage_from_fd(context->sock); + if(sock == NULL) { + krb5_data_free(&out); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_store_data(sock, out); + krb5_storage_free(sock); + krb5_data_free(&out); + return ret; +} + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_client_recv(kadm5_client_context *context, krb5_data *reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + krb5_storage *sock; + + sock = krb5_storage_from_fd(context->sock); + if(sock == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sock, &data); + krb5_storage_free(sock); + if(ret == KRB5_CC_END) + return KADM5_RPC_ERROR; + else if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_priv(context->context, context->ac, &data, reply, NULL); + krb5_data_free(&data); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/server_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/server_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21b6077 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/server_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: server_glue.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password(const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_password(client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_password_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *password, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(context, + client_name, + password, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey(const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_skey(client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_skey_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + const char *keytab, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_skey_ctx(context, + client_name, + keytab, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds(const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_creds(client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} + +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_init_with_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, + const char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +{ + return kadm5_s_init_with_creds_ctx(context, + client_name, + ccache, + service_name, + realm_params, + struct_version, + api_version, + server_handle); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4d5d1a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: set_keys.c,v 1.18 1999/12/04 23:11:01 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * free all the memory used by (len, keys) + */ + +static void +free_keys (kadm5_server_context *context, + int len, Key *keys) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + free (keys[i].mkvno); + keys[i].mkvno = NULL; + if (keys[i].salt != NULL) { + free_Salt(keys[i].salt); + free(keys[i].salt); + keys[i].salt = NULL; + } + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context->context, &keys[i].key); + } + free (keys); +} + +/* + * null-ify `len', `keys' + */ + +static void +init_keys (Key *keys, int len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + keys[i].mkvno = NULL; + keys[i].salt = NULL; + keys[i].key.keyvalue.length = 0; + keys[i].key.keyvalue.data = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * the known and used DES enctypes + */ + +static krb5_enctype des_types[] = { ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 }; + +static unsigned n_des_types = 3; + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to the string-to-key of `password' + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + const char *password) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret = 0; + int i; + unsigned len; + Key *keys; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_boolean v4_salt = FALSE; + + len = n_des_types + 1; + keys = malloc (len * sizeof(*keys)); + if (keys == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + init_keys (keys, len); + + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + salt.saltvalue.length = 0; + salt.saltvalue.data = NULL; + + if (krb5_config_get_bool (context->context, + NULL, "kadmin", "use_v4_salt", NULL)) { + v4_salt = TRUE; + } else { + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt (context->context, ent->principal, &salt); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_des_types; ++i) { + ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt (context->context, + des_types[i], + password, + salt, + &keys[i].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + if (v4_salt) { + keys[i].salt = malloc (sizeof(*keys[i].salt)); + if (keys[i].salt == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + keys[i].salt->type = salt.salttype; + ret = copy_octet_string (&salt.saltvalue, &keys[i].salt->salt); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + } + + ret = krb5_string_to_key (context->context, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + password, + ent->principal, + &keys[n_des_types].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + + free_keys (context, ent->keys.len, ent->keys.val); + ent->keys.len = len; + ent->keys.val = keys; + ent->kvno++; + return ret; +out: + krb5_data_free (&salt.saltvalue); + free_keys (context, len, keys); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to (`n_key_data', `key_data') + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys2(hdb_entry *ent, + int16_t n_key_data, + krb5_key_data *key_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + + ent->keys.len = n_key_data; + ent->keys.val = malloc(ent->keys.len * sizeof(*ent->keys.val)); + if(ent->keys.val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for(i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) { + ent->keys.val[i].mkvno = NULL; + ent->keys.val[i].key.keytype = key_data[i].key_data_type[0]; + ret = krb5_data_copy(&ent->keys.val[i].key.keyvalue, + key_data[i].key_data_contents[0], + key_data[i].key_data_length[0]); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(key_data[i].key_data_ver == 2) { + Salt *salt; + salt = malloc(sizeof(*salt)); + if(salt == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ent->keys.val[i].salt = salt; + salt->type = key_data[i].key_data_type[1]; + krb5_data_copy(&salt->salt, + key_data[i].key_data_contents[1], + key_data[i].key_data_length[1]); + } else + ent->keys.val[i].salt = NULL; + } + ent->kvno++; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the keys of `ent' to random keys and return them in `n_keys' + * and `new_keys'. + */ + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_keys_randomly (kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, + int *n_keys) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret = 0; + int i; + unsigned len; + krb5_keyblock *keys; + Key *hkeys; + + len = n_des_types + 1; + keys = malloc (len * sizeof(*keys)); + if (keys == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + keys[i].keyvalue.length = 0; + keys[i].keyvalue.data = NULL; + } + + hkeys = malloc (len * sizeof(*hkeys)); + if (hkeys == NULL) { + free (keys); + return ENOMEM; + } + + init_keys (hkeys, len); + + ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock (context->context, + des_types[0], + &keys[0]); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[0], + &hkeys[0].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + + for (i = 1; i < n_des_types; ++i) { + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[0], + &keys[i]); + if (ret) + goto out; + keys[i].keytype = des_types[i]; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[0], + &hkeys[i].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + hkeys[i].key.keytype = des_types[i]; + } + + ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock (context->context, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + &keys[n_des_types]); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context->context, + &keys[n_des_types], + &hkeys[n_des_types].key); + if (ret) + goto out; + + free_keys (context, ent->keys.len, ent->keys.val); + ent->keys.len = len; + ent->keys.val = hkeys; + ent->kvno++; + *new_keys = keys; + *n_keys = len; + return ret; +out: + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context->context, &keys[i]); + free (keys); + free_keys (context, len, hkeys); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/set_modifier.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/set_modifier.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b09745 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kadm5/set_modifier.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadm5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: set_modifier.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +kadm5_ret_t +_kadm5_set_modifier(kadm5_server_context *context, + hdb_entry *ent) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + if(ent->modified_by == NULL){ + ent->modified_by = malloc(sizeof(*ent->modified_by)); + if(ent->modified_by == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + } else + free_Event(ent->modified_by); + ent->modified_by->time = time(NULL); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context->context, context->caller, + &ent->modified_by->principal); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..09ea01e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:2:1 + +1999-11-22 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): handle d->realm == NULL + +1999-11-17 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): don't look at the local realm at + all. just use the realm from the ticket file. + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:1:1 + + * afskrb5.c (get_cred): always request a DES key + +Mon Oct 18 17:40:21 1999 Bjoern Groenvall + + * common.c (find_cells): Trim trailing whitespace from + cellname. Lines starting with # are regarded as comments. + +Fri Oct 8 18:17:22 1999 Bjoern Groenvall + + * afskrb.c, common.c : Change code to make a clear distinction + between hinted realm and ticket realm. + + * kafs_locl.h: Added argument realm_hint. + + * common.c (_kafs_get_cred): Change code to acquire the ``best'' + possible ticket. Use cross-cell authentication only as method of + last resort. + + * afskrb.c (afslog_uid_int): Add realm_hint argument and extract + realm from ticket file. + + * afskrb5.c (afslog_uid_int): Added argument realm_hint. + +1999-10-03 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (get_cred): update to new krb524_convert_creds_kdc + +1999-08-12 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: ignore the comlicated aix construct if !krb4 + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + +1999-07-22 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h: define AFS_SYSCALL to 73 for Solaris 2.7 + +1999-07-07 Assar Westerlund + + * afskrb5.c (krb5_realm_of_cell): new function + + * afskrb.c (krb_realm_of_cell): new function + (afslog_uid_int): call krb_get_lrealm correctly + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (realm_of_cell): rename to _kafs_realm_of_cell and + un-staticize + +Fri Mar 19 14:52:29 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 11:24:02 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Sat Feb 27 19:46:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: remove EXTRA_DATA (as of autoconf 2.13/automake + 1.4) + +Thu Feb 11 22:57:37 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: set AIX_SRC also if !AIX + +Tue Dec 1 14:45:15 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: fix AIX linkage + +Sun Nov 22 10:40:44 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sat Nov 21 16:55:19 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * afskrb5.c: add homedir support + +Sun Sep 6 20:16:27 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * add new functionality for specifying the homedir to krb_afslog + et al + +Thu Jul 16 01:27:19 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c: reorganize order of definitions. + (try_one, try_two): conditionalize + +Thu Jul 9 18:31:52 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c (realm_of_cell): make the dns fallback work + +Wed Jul 8 01:39:44 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c (map_syscall_name_to_number): new function for finding + the number of a syscall given the name on solaris + (k_hasafs): try using map_syscall_name_to_number + +Tue Jun 30 17:19:00 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssys.c: rewrite and add support for environment variable + AFS_SYSCALL + + * Makefile.in (distclean): don't remove roken_rename.h + +Fri May 29 19:03:20 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (roken_rename.h): remove dependency + +Mon May 25 05:25:54 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + +Sun Apr 19 09:58:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sat Apr 4 15:08:48 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kafs.h: add arla paths + + * common.c (_kafs_afslog_all_local_cells): Try _PATH_ARLA_* + (_realm_of_cell): Try _PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB + +Thu Feb 19 14:50:22 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * common.c: Don't store expired tokens (this broke when using + pag-less rsh-sessions, and `non-standard' ticket files). + +Thu Feb 12 11:20:15 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: Install/uninstall one library at a time. + +Thu Feb 12 05:38:58 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (install): one library at a time. + +Mon Feb 9 23:40:32 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * common.c (find_cells): ignore empty lines + +Tue Jan 6 04:25:58 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * afssysdefs.h (AFS_SYSCALL): add FreeBSD + +Fri Jan 2 17:08:24 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * kafs.h: new VICEIOCTL's. From + + * afssysdefs.h: Add OpenBSD diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2460e55 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.19 2000/01/06 15:14:27 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(AFS_EXTRA_DEFS) + +if KRB4 +AFSLIBS = libkafs.la + +if AIX +AFSL_EXP = $(srcdir)/afsl.exp + +if AIX4 +AFS_EXTRA_LD = -bnoentry +else +AFS_EXTRA_LD = -e _nostart +endif + +if AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS +if HAVE_DLOPEN +AIX_SRC = +else +AIX_SRC = dlfcn.c +endif +AFS_EXTRA_LIBS = afslib.so +AFS_EXTRA_DEFS = +else +AIX_SRC = afslib.c +AFS_EXTRA_LIBS = +AFS_EXTRA_DEFS = -DSTATIC_AFS +endif + +else +AFSL_EXP = +AIX_SRC = +endif # AIX + +else +AFSLIBS = +endif # KRB4 + + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = $(AFSLIBS) +libkafs_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:2:1 +foodir = $(libdir) +foo_DATA = $(AFS_EXTRA_LIBS) +# EXTRA_DATA = afslib.so + +CLEANFILES= $(AFS_EXTRA_LIBS) + +include_HEADERS = kafs.h + +if KRB5 +afskrb5_c = afskrb5.c +endif + +libkafs_la_SOURCES = afssys.c afskrb.c $(afskrb5_c) common.c $(AIX_SRC) kafs_locl.h afssysdefs.h +#afslib_so_SOURCES = afslib.c + +EXTRA_libkafs_la_SOURCES = afskrb5.c dlfcn.c afslib.c dlfcn.h + +EXTRA_DIST = README.dlfcn afsl.exp afslib.exp + +man_MANS = kafs.3 + +# AIX: this almost works with gcc, but somehow it fails to use the +# correct ld, use ld instead +afslib.so: afslib.o + ld -o $@ -bM:SRE -bI:$(srcdir)/afsl.exp -bE:$(srcdir)/afslib.exp $(AFS_EXTRA_LD) afslib.o -lc + +$(OBJECTS): ../../include/config.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32b69cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,898 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.19 2000/01/06 15:14:27 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) $(AFS_EXTRA_DEFS) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +@KRB4_TRUE@AFSLIBS = libkafs.la +@KRB4_FALSE@AFSLIBS = + +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@AFSL_EXP = $(srcdir)/afsl.exp +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_FALSE@AFSL_EXP = +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX4_TRUE@AFS_EXTRA_LD = -bnoentry +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX4_FALSE@AFS_EXTRA_LD = -e _nostart +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@AIX_SRC = +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@AIX_SRC = dlfcn.c +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@AIX_SRC = afslib.c +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_FALSE@AIX_SRC = +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@AFS_EXTRA_LIBS = afslib.so +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@AFS_EXTRA_LIBS = +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@AFS_EXTRA_DEFS = +@KRB4_TRUE@@AIX_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@AFS_EXTRA_DEFS = -DSTATIC_AFS + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = $(AFSLIBS) +libkafs_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 1:2:1 +foodir = $(libdir) +foo_DATA = $(AFS_EXTRA_LIBS) +# EXTRA_DATA = afslib.so + +CLEANFILES = $(AFS_EXTRA_LIBS) + +include_HEADERS = kafs.h + +@KRB5_TRUE@afskrb5_c = afskrb5.c + +libkafs_la_SOURCES = afssys.c afskrb.c $(afskrb5_c) common.c $(AIX_SRC) kafs_locl.h afssysdefs.h +#afslib_so_SOURCES = afslib.c + +EXTRA_libkafs_la_SOURCES = afskrb5.c dlfcn.c afslib.c dlfcn.h + +EXTRA_DIST = README.dlfcn afsl.exp afslib.exp + +man_MANS = kafs.3 +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +libkafs_la_LIBADD = +@AIX_TRUE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_TRUE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_TRUE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_TRUE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb5.lo \ +@AIX_TRUE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb5.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb5.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb5.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb5.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb5.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_TRUE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_TRUE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_FALSE@common.lo +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@libkafs_la_OBJECTS = \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afssys.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@afskrb.lo \ +@AIX_FALSE@@KRB4_FALSE@@KRB5_FALSE@@HAVE_DLOPEN_FALSE@@AIX_DYNAMIC_AFS_TRUE@common.lo 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do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +# AIX: this almost works with gcc, but somehow it fails to use the +# correct ld, use ld instead +afslib.so: afslib.o + ld -o $@ -bM:SRE -bI:$(srcdir)/afsl.exp -bE:$(srcdir)/afslib.exp $(AFS_EXTRA_LD) afslib.o -lc + +$(OBJECTS): ../../include/config.h + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/README.dlfcn b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/README.dlfcn new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cee1b75 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/README.dlfcn @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +Copyright (c) 1992,1993,1995,1996, Jens-Uwe Mager, Helios Software GmbH +Not derived from licensed software. + +Permission is granted to freely use, copy, modify, and redistribute +this software, provided that the author is not construed to be liable +for any results of using the software, alterations are clearly marked +as such, and this notice is not modified. + +libdl.a +------- + +This is an emulation library to emulate the SunOS/System V.4 functions +to access the runtime linker. The functions are emulated by using the +AIX load() function and by reading the .loader section of the loaded +module to find the exports. The to be loaded module should be linked as +follows (if using AIX 3): + + cc -o module.so -bM:SRE -bE:module.exp -e _nostart $(OBJS) + +For AIX 4: + + cc -o module.so -bM:SRE -bE:module.exp -bnoentry $(OBJS) + +If you want to reference symbols from the main part of the program in a +loaded module, you will have to link against the export file of the +main part: + + cc -o main -bE:main.exp $(MAIN_OBJS) + cc -o module.so -bM:SRE -bI:main.exp -bE:module.exp -bnoentry $(OBJS) + +Note that you explicitely have to specify what functions are supposed +to be accessible from your loaded modules, this is different from +SunOS/System V.4 where any global is automatically exported. If you +want to export all globals, the following script might be of help: + +#!/bin/sh +/usr/ucb/nm -g $* | awk '$2 == "B" || $2 == "D" { print $3 }' + +The module export file contains the symbols to be exported. Because +this library uses the loader section, the final module.so file can be +stripped. C++ users should build their shared objects using the script +makeC++SharedLib (part of the IBM C++ compiler), this will make sure +that constructors and destructors for static and global objects will be +called upon loading and unloading the module. GNU C++ users should use +the -shared option to g++ to link the shared object: + + g++ -o module.so -shared $(OBJS) + +If the shared object does have permissions for anybody, the shared +object will be loaded into the shared library segment and it will stay +there even if the main application terminates. If you rebuild your +shared object after a bugfix and you want to make sure that you really +get the newest version you will have to use the "slibclean" command +before starting the application again to garbage collect the shared +library segment. If the performance utilities (bosperf) are installed +you can use the following command to see what shared objects are +loaded: + +/usr/lpp/bosperf/genkld | sort | uniq + +For easier debugging you can avoid loading the shared object into the +shared library segment alltogether by removing permissions for others +from the module.so file: + +chmod o-rwx module.so + +This will ensure you get a fresh copy of the shared object for every +dlopen() call which is loaded into the application's data segment. + +Usage +----- + +void *dlopen(const char *path, int mode); + +This routine loads the module pointed to by path and reads its export +table. If the path does not contain a '/' character, dlopen will search +for the module using the LIBPATH environment variable. It returns an +opaque handle to the module or NULL on error. The mode parameter can be +either RTLD_LAZY (for lazy function binding) or RTLD_NOW for immediate +function binding. The AIX implementation currently does treat RTLD_NOW +the same as RTLD_LAZY. The flag RTLD_GLOBAL might be or'ed into the +mode parameter to allow loaded modules to bind to global variables or +functions in other loaded modules loaded by dlopen(). If RTLD_GLOBAL is +not specified, only globals from the main part of the executable or +shared libraries are used to look for undefined symbols in loaded +modules. + + +void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol); + +This routine searches for the symbol in the module referred to by +handle and returns its address. If the symbol could not be found, the +function returns NULL. The return value must be casted to a proper +function pointer before it can be used. SunOS/System V.4 allows handle +to be a NULL pointer to refer to the module the call is made from, this +is not implemented. + +int dlclose(void *handle); + +This routine unloads the module referred to by the handle and disposes +of any local storage. this function returns -1 on failure. Any function +pointers obtained through dlsym() should be considered invalid after +closing a module. + +As AIX caches shared objects in the shared library segment, function +pointers obtained through dlsym() might still work even though the +module has been unloaded. This can introduce subtle bugs that will +segment fault later if AIX garbage collects or immediatly on +SunOS/System V.4 as the text segment is unmapped. + +char *dlerror(void); + +This routine can be used to retrieve a text message describing the most +recent error that occured on on of the above routines. This function +returns NULL if there is no error information. + +Initialization and termination handlers +--------------------------------------- + +The emulation provides for an initialization and a termination +handler. The dlfcn.h file contains a structure declaration named +dl_info with following members: + + void (*init)(void); + void (*fini)(void); + +The init function is called upon first referencing the library. The +fini function is called at dlclose() time or when the process exits. +The module should declare a variable named dl_info that contains this +structure which must be exported. These functions correspond to the +documented _init() and _fini() functions of SunOS 4.x, but these are +appearently not implemented in SunOS. When using SunOS 5.0, these +correspond to #pragma init and #pragma fini respectively. At the same +time any static or global C++ object's constructors or destructors will +be called. + +BUGS +---- + +Please note that there is currently a problem with implicitely loaded +shared C++ libaries: if you refer to a shared C++ library from a loaded +module that is not yet used by the main program, the dlopen() emulator +does not notice this and does not call the static constructors for the +implicitely loaded library. This can be easily demonstrated by +referencing the C++ standard streams from a loaded module if the main +program is a plain C program. + +Jens-Uwe Mager + +HELIOS Software GmbH +Lavesstr. 80 +30159 Hannover +Germany + +Phone: +49 511 36482-0 +FAX: +49 511 36482-69 +AppleLink: helios.de/jum +Internet: jum@helios.de + +Revison History +--------------- + +SCCS/s.dlfcn.h: + +D 1.4 95/04/25 09:36:52 jum 4 3 00018/00004/00028 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added RTLD_GLOBAL, include and C++ guards + +D 1.3 92/12/27 20:58:32 jum 3 2 00001/00001/00031 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +we always have prototypes on RS/6000 + +D 1.2 92/08/16 17:45:11 jum 2 1 00009/00000/00023 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added dl_info structure to implement initialize and terminate functions + +D 1.1 92/08/02 18:08:45 jum 1 0 00023/00000/00000 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Erstellungsdatum und -uhrzeit 92/08/02 18:08:45 von jum + +SCCS/s.dlfcn.c: + +D 1.11 96/04/10 20:12:51 jum 13 12 00037/00000/00533 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Integrated the changes from John W. Eaton to initialize +g++ generated shared objects. + +D 1.10 96/02/15 17:42:44 jum 12 10 00012/00007/00521 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +the C++ constructor and destructor chains are now called properly for either +xlC 2 or xlC 3 (CSet++). + +D 1.9 95/09/22 11:09:38 markus 10 9 00001/00008/00527 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Fix version number + +D 1.8 95/09/22 10:14:34 markus 9 8 00008/00001/00527 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Added version number for dl lib + +D 1.7 95/08/14 19:08:38 jum 8 6 00026/00004/00502 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Integrated the fixes from Kirk Benell (kirk@rsinc.com) to allow loading of +shared objects generated under AIX 4. Fixed bug that symbols with exactly +8 characters would use garbage characters from the following symbol value. + +D 1.6 95/04/25 09:38:03 jum 6 5 00046/00006/00460 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added handling of C++ static constructors and destructors, added RTLD_GLOBAL to bind against other loaded modules + +D 1.5 93/02/14 20:14:17 jum 5 4 00002/00000/00464 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added path to dlopen error message to make clear where there error occured. + +D 1.4 93/01/03 19:13:56 jum 4 3 00061/00005/00403 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +to allow calling symbols in the main module call load with L_NOAUTODEFER and +do a loadbind later with the main module. + +D 1.3 92/12/27 20:59:55 jum 3 2 00066/00008/00342 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +added search by L_GETINFO if module got loaded by LIBPATH + +D 1.2 92/08/16 17:45:43 jum 2 1 00074/00006/00276 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +implemented initialize and terminate functions, added reference counting to avoid multiple loads of the same library + +D 1.1 92/08/02 18:08:45 jum 1 0 00282/00000/00000 +MRs: +COMMENTS: +Erstellungsdatum und -uhrzeit 92/08/02 18:08:45 von jum + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afskrb.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afskrb.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..805750d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afskrb.c @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afskrb.c,v 1.13 1999/12/02 16:58:39 joda Exp $"); + +struct krb_kafs_data { + const char *realm; +}; + +static int +get_cred(kafs_data *data, const char *name, const char *inst, + const char *realm, CREDENTIALS *c) +{ + KTEXT_ST tkt; + int ret = krb_get_cred((char*)name, (char*)inst, (char*)realm, c); + + if (ret) { + ret = krb_mk_req(&tkt, (char*)name, (char*)inst, (char*)realm, 0); + if (ret == KSUCCESS) + ret = krb_get_cred((char*)name, (char*)inst, (char*)realm, c); + } + return ret; +} + +static int +afslog_uid_int(kafs_data *data, + const char *cell, + const char *realm_hint, + uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + int ret; + CREDENTIALS c; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + + if (cell == 0 || cell[0] == 0) + return _kafs_afslog_all_local_cells (data, uid, homedir); + + /* Extract realm from ticket file. */ + { + char name[ANAME_SZ], inst[INST_SZ]; + + ret = krb_get_default_principal(name, inst, realm); + if (ret != KSUCCESS) + return ret; + } + + ret = _kafs_get_cred(data, cell, realm_hint, realm, &c); + + if (ret == 0) + ret = kafs_settoken(cell, uid, &c); + return ret; +} + +static char * +get_realm(kafs_data *data, const char *host) +{ + char *r = krb_realmofhost(host); + if(r != NULL) + return strdup(r); + else + return NULL; +} + +int +krb_afslog_uid_home(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + kafs_data kd; + + kd.afslog_uid = afslog_uid_int; + kd.get_cred = get_cred; + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + kd.data = 0; + return afslog_uid_int(&kd, cell, realm_hint, uid, homedir); +} + +int +krb_afslog_uid(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint, uid_t uid) +{ + return krb_afslog_uid_home(cell, realm_hint, uid, NULL); +} + +int +krb_afslog(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint) +{ + return krb_afslog_uid(cell, realm_hint, getuid()); +} + +int +krb_afslog_home(const char *cell, const char *realm_hint, const char *homedir) +{ + return krb_afslog_uid_home(cell, realm_hint, getuid(), homedir); +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +krb_realm_of_cell(const char *cell, char **realm) +{ + kafs_data kd; + + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + return _kafs_realm_of_cell(&kd, cell, realm); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c35ea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afskrb5.c,v 1.13 1999/12/02 16:58:39 joda Exp $"); + +struct krb5_kafs_data { + krb5_context context; + krb5_ccache id; + krb5_const_realm realm; +}; + +static int +get_cred(kafs_data *data, const char *name, const char *inst, + const char *realm, CREDENTIALS *c) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds in_creds, *out_creds; + struct krb5_kafs_data *d = data->data; + + memset(&in_creds, 0, sizeof(in_creds)); + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal(d->context, name, inst, realm, + &in_creds.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(d->context, d->id, &in_creds.client); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(d->context, in_creds.server); + return ret; + } + in_creds.session.keytype = KEYTYPE_DES; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(d->context, 0, d->id, &in_creds, &out_creds); + krb5_free_principal(d->context, in_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(d->context, in_creds.client); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb524_convert_creds_kdc(d->context, d->id, out_creds, c); + krb5_free_creds(d->context, out_creds); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +afslog_uid_int(kafs_data *data, const char *cell, const char *rh, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + CREDENTIALS c; + krb5_principal princ; + krb5_realm *trealm; /* ticket realm */ + struct krb5_kafs_data *d = data->data; + + if (cell == 0 || cell[0] == 0) + return _kafs_afslog_all_local_cells (data, uid, homedir); + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (d->context, d->id, &princ); + if (ret) + return ret; + + trealm = krb5_princ_realm (d->context, princ); + + if (d->realm != NULL && strcmp (d->realm, *trealm) == 0) { + trealm = NULL; + krb5_free_principal (d->context, princ); + } + + ret = _kafs_get_cred(data, cell, d->realm, *trealm, &c); + if(trealm) + krb5_free_principal (d->context, princ); + + if(ret == 0) + ret = kafs_settoken(cell, uid, &c); + return ret; +} + +static char * +get_realm(kafs_data *data, const char *host) +{ + struct krb5_kafs_data *d = data->data; + krb5_realm *realms; + char *r; + if(krb5_get_host_realm(d->context, host, &realms)) + return NULL; + r = strdup(realms[0]); + krb5_free_host_realm(d->context, realms); + return r; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog_uid_home(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + kafs_data kd; + struct krb5_kafs_data d; + kd.afslog_uid = afslog_uid_int; + kd.get_cred = get_cred; + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + kd.data = &d; + d.context = context; + d.id = id; + d.realm = realm; + return afslog_uid_int(&kd, cell, 0, uid, homedir); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog_uid(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid) +{ + return krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id, cell, realm, uid, NULL); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm) +{ + return krb5_afslog_uid (context, id, cell, realm, getuid()); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_afslog_home(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + const char *homedir) +{ + return krb5_afslog_uid_home (context, id, cell, realm, getuid(), homedir); +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_realm_of_cell(const char *cell, char **realm) +{ + kafs_data kd; + + kd.get_realm = get_realm; + return _kafs_realm_of_cell(&kd, cell, realm); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afsl.exp b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afsl.exp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d2b00e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afsl.exp @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +#!/unix + +* This mumbo jumbo creates entry points to syscalls in _AIX + +lpioctl syscall +lsetpag syscall diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afslib.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afslib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae3b5a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afslib.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This file is only used with AIX + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afslib.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $"); + +int +aix_pioctl(char *a_path, + int o_opcode, + struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP, + int a_followSymlinks) +{ + return lpioctl(a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +} + +int +aix_setpag(void) +{ + return lsetpag(); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afslib.exp b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afslib.exp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f288717 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afslib.exp @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +#! +aix_pioctl +aix_setpag diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afssys.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afssys.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d49a65a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afssys.c @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: afssys.c,v 1.65 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $"); + +int _kafs_debug; /* this should be done in a better way */ + +#define NO_ENTRY_POINT 0 +#define SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT 1 +#define MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT 2 +#define SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT2 3 +#define SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT3 4 +#define AIX_ENTRY_POINTS 5 +#define UNKNOWN_ENTRY_POINT 6 +static int afs_entry_point = UNKNOWN_ENTRY_POINT; +static int afs_syscalls[2]; + +/* Magic to get AIX syscalls to work */ +#ifdef _AIX + +static int (*Pioctl)(char*, int, struct ViceIoctl*, int); +static int (*Setpag)(void); + +#include "dlfcn.h" + +/* + * + */ + +static int +try_aix(void) +{ +#ifdef STATIC_AFS_SYSCALLS + Pioctl = aix_pioctl; + Setpag = aix_setpag; +#else + void *ptr; + char path[MaxPathLen], *p; + /* + * If we are root or running setuid don't trust AFSLIBPATH! + */ + if (getuid() != 0 && !issuid() && (p = getenv("AFSLIBPATH")) != NULL) + strlcpy(path, p, sizeof(path)); + else + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/afslib.so", LIBDIR); + + ptr = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW); + if(ptr == NULL) { + if(_kafs_debug) { + if(errno == ENOEXEC && (p = dlerror()) != NULL) + fprintf(stderr, "dlopen(%s): %s\n", path, p); + else if (errno != ENOENT) + fprintf(stderr, "dlopen(%s): %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); + } + return 1; + } + Setpag = (int (*)(void))dlsym(ptr, "aix_setpag"); + Pioctl = (int (*)(char*, int, + struct ViceIoctl*, int))dlsym(ptr, "aix_pioctl"); +#endif + afs_entry_point = AIX_ENTRY_POINTS; + return 0; +} +#endif /* _AIX */ + +/* + * This probably only works under Solaris and could get confused if + * there's a /etc/name_to_sysnum file. + */ + +#define _PATH_ETC_NAME_TO_SYSNUM "/etc/name_to_sysnum" + +static int +map_syscall_name_to_number (const char *str, int *res) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + size_t str_len = strlen (str); + + f = fopen (_PATH_ETC_NAME_TO_SYSNUM, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return -1; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + if (strncmp (str, buf, str_len) == 0) { + char *begptr = buf + str_len; + char *endptr; + long val = strtol (begptr, &endptr, 0); + + if (val != 0 && endptr != begptr) { + fclose (f); + *res = val; + return 0; + } + } + } + fclose (f); + return -1; +} + +int +k_pioctl(char *a_path, + int o_opcode, + struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP, + int a_followSymlinks) +{ +#ifndef NO_AFS + switch(afs_entry_point){ +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT2: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT3: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[0], AFSCALL_PIOCTL, + a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +#endif +#if defined(AFS_PIOCTL) + case MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[0], + a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +#endif +#ifdef _AIX + case AIX_ENTRY_POINTS: + return Pioctl(a_path, o_opcode, a_paramsP, a_followSymlinks); +#endif + } + + errno = ENOSYS; +#ifdef SIGSYS + kill(getpid(), SIGSYS); /* You loose! */ +#endif +#endif /* NO_AFS */ + return -1; +} + +int +k_afs_cell_of_file(const char *path, char *cell, int len) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + parms.in = NULL; + parms.in_size = 0; + parms.out = cell; + parms.out_size = len; + return k_pioctl((char*)path, VIOC_FILE_CELL_NAME, &parms, 1); +} + +int +k_unlog(void) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms)); + return k_pioctl(0, VIOCUNLOG, &parms, 0); +} + +int +k_setpag(void) +{ +#ifndef NO_AFS + switch(afs_entry_point){ +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT2: + case SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT3: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[0], AFSCALL_SETPAG); +#endif +#if defined(AFS_PIOCTL) + case MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT: + return syscall(afs_syscalls[1]); +#endif +#ifdef _AIX + case AIX_ENTRY_POINTS: + return Setpag(); +#endif + } + + errno = ENOSYS; +#ifdef SIGSYS + kill(getpid(), SIGSYS); /* You loose! */ +#endif +#endif /* NO_AFS */ + return -1; +} + +static jmp_buf catch_SIGSYS; + +#ifdef SIGSYS + +static RETSIGTYPE +SIGSYS_handler(int sig) +{ + errno = 0; + signal(SIGSYS, SIGSYS_handler); /* Need to reinstall handler on SYSV */ + longjmp(catch_SIGSYS, 1); +} + +#endif + +/* + * Try to see if `syscall' is a pioctl. Return 0 iff succesful. + */ + +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) +static int +try_one (int syscall_num) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms)); + + if (setjmp(catch_SIGSYS) == 0) { + syscall(syscall_num, AFSCALL_PIOCTL, + 0, VIOCSETTOK, &parms, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (errno == EINVAL) { + afs_entry_point = SINGLE_ENTRY_POINT; + afs_syscalls[0] = syscall_num; + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Try to see if `syscall_pioctl' is a pioctl syscall. Return 0 iff + * succesful. + * + */ + +#ifdef AFS_PIOCTL +static int +try_two (int syscall_pioctl, int syscall_setpag) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms)); + + if (setjmp(catch_SIGSYS) == 0) { + syscall(syscall_pioctl, + 0, VIOCSETTOK, &parms, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (errno == EINVAL) { + afs_entry_point = MULTIPLE_ENTRY_POINT; + afs_syscalls[0] = syscall_pioctl; + afs_syscalls[1] = syscall_setpag; + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} +#endif + +int +k_hasafs(void) +{ +#if !defined(NO_AFS) && defined(SIGSYS) + RETSIGTYPE (*saved_func)(); +#endif + int saved_errno; + char *env = getenv ("AFS_SYSCALL"); + + /* + * Already checked presence of AFS syscalls? + */ + if (afs_entry_point != UNKNOWN_ENTRY_POINT) + return afs_entry_point != NO_ENTRY_POINT; + + /* + * Probe kernel for AFS specific syscalls, + * they (currently) come in two flavors. + * If the syscall is absent we recive a SIGSYS. + */ + afs_entry_point = NO_ENTRY_POINT; + + saved_errno = errno; +#ifndef NO_AFS +#ifdef SIGSYS + saved_func = signal(SIGSYS, SIGSYS_handler); +#endif + +#if defined(AFS_SYSCALL) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL2) || defined(AFS_SYSCALL3) + { + int tmp; + + if (env != NULL) { + if (sscanf (env, "%d", &tmp) == 1) { + if (try_one (tmp) == 0) + goto done; + } else { + char *end = NULL; + char *p; + char *s = strdup (env); + + if (s != NULL) { + for (p = strtok_r (s, ",", &end); + p != NULL; + p = strtok_r (NULL, ",", &end)) { + if (map_syscall_name_to_number (p, &tmp) == 0) + if (try_one (tmp) == 0) { + free (s); + goto done; + } + } + free (s); + } + } + } + } +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL || AFS_SYSCALL2 || AFS_SYSCALL3 */ + +#ifdef AFS_SYSCALL + if (try_one (AFS_SYSCALL) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL */ + +#ifdef AFS_PIOCTL + { + int tmp[2]; + + if (env != NULL && sscanf (env, "%d%d", &tmp[0], &tmp[1]) == 2) + if (try_two (tmp[0], tmp[1]) == 2) + goto done; + } +#endif /* AFS_PIOCTL */ + +#ifdef AFS_PIOCTL + if (try_two (AFS_PIOCTL, AFS_SETPAG) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_PIOCTL */ + +#ifdef AFS_SYSCALL2 + if (try_one (AFS_SYSCALL2) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL2 */ + +#ifdef AFS_SYSCALL3 + if (try_one (AFS_SYSCALL3) == 0) + goto done; +#endif /* AFS_SYSCALL3 */ + +#ifdef _AIX +#if 0 + if (env != NULL) { + char *pos = NULL; + char *pioctl_name; + char *setpag_name; + + pioctl_name = strtok_r (env, ", \t", &pos); + if (pioctl_name != NULL) { + setpag_name = strtok_r (NULL, ", \t", &pos); + if (setpag_name != NULL) + if (try_aix (pioctl_name, setpag_name) == 0) + goto done; + } + } +#endif + + if(try_aix() == 0) + goto done; +#endif + +done: +#ifdef SIGSYS + signal(SIGSYS, saved_func); +#endif +#endif /* NO_AFS */ + errno = saved_errno; + return afs_entry_point != NO_ENTRY_POINT; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afssysdefs.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afssysdefs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..574b33f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/afssysdefs.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: afssysdefs.h,v 1.21 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $ */ + +/* + * This section is for machines using single entry point AFS syscalls! + * and/or + * This section is for machines using multiple entry point AFS syscalls! + * + * SunOS 4 is an example of single entry point and sgi of multiple + * entry point syscalls. + */ + +#if SunOS == 40 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 31 +#endif + +#if SunOS >= 50 && SunOS < 57 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 105 +#endif + +#if SunOS == 57 +#define AFS_SYSCALL 73 +#endif + +#if defined(__hpux) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 50 +#define AFS_SYSCALL2 49 +#define AFS_SYSCALL3 48 +#endif + +#if defined(_AIX) +/* _AIX is too weird */ +#endif + +#if defined(__sgi) +#define AFS_PIOCTL (64+1000) +#define AFS_SETPAG (65+1000) +#endif + +#if defined(__osf__) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 232 +#define AFS_SYSCALL2 258 +#endif + +#if defined(__ultrix) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 31 +#endif + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) +#define AFS_SYSCALL 210 +#endif + +#ifdef SYS_afs_syscall +#define AFS_SYSCALL3 SYS_afs_syscall +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/common.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..207b9b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,396 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kafs_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: common.c,v 1.19 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $"); + +#define AUTH_SUPERUSER "afs" + +/* + * Here only ASCII characters are relevant. + */ + +#define IsAsciiLower(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z') + +#define ToAsciiUpper(c) ((c) - 'a' + 'A') + +static void +foldup(char *a, const char *b) +{ + for (; *b; a++, b++) + if (IsAsciiLower(*b)) + *a = ToAsciiUpper(*b); + else + *a = *b; + *a = '\0'; +} + +int +kafs_settoken(const char *cell, uid_t uid, CREDENTIALS *c) +{ + struct ViceIoctl parms; + struct ClearToken ct; + int32_t sizeof_x; + char buf[2048], *t; + int ret; + + /* + * Build a struct ClearToken + */ + ct.AuthHandle = c->kvno; + memcpy (ct.HandShakeKey, c->session, sizeof(c->session)); + ct.ViceId = uid; + ct.BeginTimestamp = c->issue_date; + ct.EndTimestamp = krb_life_to_time(c->issue_date, c->lifetime); + if(ct.EndTimestamp < time(NULL)) + return 0; /* don't store tokens that has expired (and possibly + overwriting valid tokens)*/ + +#define ODD(x) ((x) & 1) + /* According to Transarc conventions ViceId is valid iff + * (EndTimestamp - BeginTimestamp) is odd. By decrementing EndTime + * the transformations: + * + * (issue_date, life) -> (StartTime, EndTime) -> (issue_date, life) + * preserves the original values. + */ + if (uid != 0) /* valid ViceId */ + { + if (!ODD(ct.EndTimestamp - ct.BeginTimestamp)) + ct.EndTimestamp--; + } + else /* not valid ViceId */ + { + if (ODD(ct.EndTimestamp - ct.BeginTimestamp)) + ct.EndTimestamp--; + } + + t = buf; + /* + * length of secret token followed by secret token + */ + sizeof_x = c->ticket_st.length; + memcpy(t, &sizeof_x, sizeof(sizeof_x)); + t += sizeof(sizeof_x); + memcpy(t, c->ticket_st.dat, sizeof_x); + t += sizeof_x; + /* + * length of clear token followed by clear token + */ + sizeof_x = sizeof(ct); + memcpy(t, &sizeof_x, sizeof(sizeof_x)); + t += sizeof(sizeof_x); + memcpy(t, &ct, sizeof_x); + t += sizeof_x; + + /* + * do *not* mark as primary cell + */ + sizeof_x = 0; + memcpy(t, &sizeof_x, sizeof(sizeof_x)); + t += sizeof(sizeof_x); + /* + * follow with cell name + */ + sizeof_x = strlen(cell) + 1; + memcpy(t, cell, sizeof_x); + t += sizeof_x; + + /* + * Build argument block + */ + parms.in = buf; + parms.in_size = t - buf; + parms.out = 0; + parms.out_size = 0; + ret = k_pioctl(0, VIOCSETTOK, &parms, 0); + return ret; +} + +/* Try to get a db-server for an AFS cell from a AFSDB record */ + +static int +dns_find_cell(const char *cell, char *dbserver, size_t len) +{ + struct dns_reply *r; + int ok = -1; + r = dns_lookup(cell, "afsdb"); + if(r){ + struct resource_record *rr = r->head; + while(rr){ + if(rr->type == T_AFSDB && rr->u.afsdb->preference == 1){ + strlcpy(dbserver, + rr->u.afsdb->domain, + len); + ok = 0; + break; + } + rr = rr->next; + } + dns_free_data(r); + } + return ok; +} + + +/* + * Try to find the cells we should try to klog to in "file". + */ +static void +find_cells(char *file, char ***cells, int *index) +{ + FILE *f; + char cell[64]; + int i; + int ind = *index; + + f = fopen(file, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return; + while (fgets(cell, sizeof(cell), f)) { + char *t; + t = cell + strlen(cell); + for (; t >= cell; t--) + if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\t' || *t == ' ') + *t = 0; + if (cell[0] == '\0' || cell[0] == '#') + continue; + for(i = 0; i < ind; i++) + if(strcmp((*cells)[i], cell) == 0) + break; + if(i == ind){ + char **tmp; + + tmp = realloc(*cells, (ind + 1) * sizeof(**cells)); + if (tmp == NULL) + break; + *cells = tmp; + (*cells)[ind] = strdup(cell); + if ((*cells)[ind] == NULL) + break; + ++ind; + } + } + fclose(f); + *index = ind; +} + +/* + * Get tokens for all cells[] + */ +static int +afslog_cells(kafs_data *data, char **cells, int max, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < max; i++) { + int er = (*data->afslog_uid)(data, cells[i], 0, uid, homedir); + if (er) + ret = er; + } + return ret; +} + +int +_kafs_afslog_all_local_cells(kafs_data *data, uid_t uid, const char *homedir) +{ + int ret; + char **cells = NULL; + int index = 0; + + if (homedir == NULL) + homedir = getenv("HOME"); + if (homedir != NULL) { + char home[MaxPathLen]; + snprintf(home, sizeof(home), "%s/.TheseCells", homedir); + find_cells(home, &cells, &index); + } + find_cells(_PATH_THESECELLS, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_THISCELL, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_ARLA_THESECELLS, &cells, &index); + find_cells(_PATH_ARLA_THISCELL, &cells, &index); + + ret = afslog_cells(data, cells, index, uid, homedir); + while(index > 0) + free(cells[--index]); + free(cells); + return ret; +} + + +/* Find the realm associated with cell. Do this by opening + /usr/vice/etc/CellServDB and getting the realm-of-host for the + first VL-server for the cell. + + This does not work when the VL-server is living in one realm, but + the cell it is serving is living in another realm. + + Return 0 on success, -1 otherwise. + */ + +int +_kafs_realm_of_cell(kafs_data *data, const char *cell, char **realm) +{ + FILE *F; + char buf[1024]; + char *p; + int ret = -1; + + if ((F = fopen(_PATH_CELLSERVDB, "r")) + || (F = fopen(_PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB, "r"))) { + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), F)) { + if (buf[0] != '>') + continue; /* Not a cell name line, try next line */ + if (strncmp(buf + 1, cell, strlen(cell)) == 0) { + /* + * We found the cell name we're looking for. + * Read next line on the form ip-address '#' hostname + */ + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), F) == NULL) + break; /* Read failed, give up */ + p = strchr(buf, '#'); + if (p == NULL) + break; /* No '#', give up */ + p++; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + *realm = (*data->get_realm)(data, p); + if (*realm && **realm != '\0') + ret = 0; + break; /* Won't try any more */ + } + } + fclose(F); + } + if (*realm == NULL && dns_find_cell(cell, buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) { + *realm = strdup(krb_realmofhost(buf)); + if(*realm != NULL) + ret = 0; + } + return ret; +} + +int +_kafs_get_cred(kafs_data *data, + const char *cell, + const char *realm_hint, + const char *realm, + CREDENTIALS *c) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *vl_realm; + char CELL[64]; + + /* We're about to find the the realm that holds the key for afs in + * the specified cell. The problem is that null-instance + * afs-principals are common and that hitting the wrong realm might + * yield the wrong afs key. The following assumptions were made. + * + * Any realm passed to us is preferred. + * + * If there is a realm with the same name as the cell, it is most + * likely the correct realm to talk to. + * + * In most (maybe even all) cases the database servers of the cell + * will live in the realm we are looking for. + * + * Try the local realm, but if the previous cases fail, this is + * really a long shot. + * + */ + + /* comments on the ordering of these tests */ + + /* If the user passes a realm, she probably knows something we don't + * know and we should try afs@realm_hint (otherwise we're talking with a + * blondino and she might as well have it.) + */ + + if (realm_hint) { + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, cell, realm_hint, c); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, "", realm_hint, c); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + } + + foldup(CELL, cell); + + /* + * If cell == realm we don't need no cross-cell authentication. + * Try afs@REALM. + */ + if (strcmp(CELL, realm) == 0) { + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, "", realm, c); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + /* Try afs.cell@REALM below. */ + } + + /* + * If the AFS servers have a file /usr/afs/etc/krb.conf containing + * REALM we still don't have to resort to cross-cell authentication. + * Try afs.cell@REALM. + */ + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, cell, realm, c); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + + /* + * We failed to get ``first class tickets'' for afs, + * fall back to cross-cell authentication. + * Try afs@CELL. + * Try afs.cell@CELL. + */ + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, "", CELL, c); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, cell, CELL, c); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + + /* + * Perhaps the cell doesn't correspond to any realm? + * Use realm of first volume location DB server. + * Try afs.cell@VL_REALM. + * Try afs@VL_REALM??? + */ + if (_kafs_realm_of_cell(data, cell, &vl_realm) == 0 + && strcmp(vl_realm, realm) != 0 + && strcmp(vl_realm, CELL) != 0) { + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, cell, vl_realm, c); + if (ret) + ret = (*data->get_cred)(data, AUTH_SUPERUSER, "", vl_realm, c); + free(vl_realm); + if (ret == 0) return 0; + } + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/dlfcn.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/dlfcn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e664fe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/dlfcn.c @@ -0,0 +1,581 @@ +/* + * @(#)dlfcn.c 1.11 revision of 96/04/10 20:12:51 + * This is an unpublished work copyright (c) 1992 HELIOS Software GmbH + * 30159 Hannover, Germany + */ + +/* + * Changes marked with `--jwe' were made on April 7 1996 by John W. Eaton + * to support g++ and/or use with Octave. + */ + +/* + * This makes my life easier with Octave. --jwe + */ +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "dlfcn.h" + +/* + * We simulate dlopen() et al. through a call to load. Because AIX has + * no call to find an exported symbol we read the loader section of the + * loaded module and build a list of exported symbols and their virtual + * address. + */ + +typedef struct { + char *name; /* the symbols's name */ + void *addr; /* its relocated virtual address */ +} Export, *ExportPtr; + +/* + * xlC uses the following structure to list its constructors and + * destructors. This is gleaned from the output of munch. + */ +typedef struct { + void (*init)(void); /* call static constructors */ + void (*term)(void); /* call static destructors */ +} Cdtor, *CdtorPtr; + +typedef void (*GccCDtorPtr)(void); + +/* + * The void * handle returned from dlopen is actually a ModulePtr. + */ +typedef struct Module { + struct Module *next; + char *name; /* module name for refcounting */ + int refCnt; /* the number of references */ + void *entry; /* entry point from load */ + struct dl_info *info; /* optional init/terminate functions */ + CdtorPtr cdtors; /* optional C++ constructors */ + GccCDtorPtr gcc_ctor; /* g++ constructors --jwe */ + GccCDtorPtr gcc_dtor; /* g++ destructors --jwe */ + int nExports; /* the number of exports found */ + ExportPtr exports; /* the array of exports */ +} Module, *ModulePtr; + +/* + * We keep a list of all loaded modules to be able to call the fini + * handlers and destructors at atexit() time. + */ +static ModulePtr modList; + +/* + * The last error from one of the dl* routines is kept in static + * variables here. Each error is returned only once to the caller. + */ +static char errbuf[BUFSIZ]; +static int errvalid; + +/* + * The `fixed' gcc header files on AIX 3.2.5 provide a prototype for + * strdup(). --jwe + */ +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +extern char *strdup(const char *); +#endif +static void caterr(char *); +static int readExports(ModulePtr); +static void terminate(void); +static void *findMain(void); + +void *dlopen(const char *path, int mode) +{ + ModulePtr mp; + static void *mainModule; + + /* + * Upon the first call register a terminate handler that will + * close all libraries. Also get a reference to the main module + * for use with loadbind. + */ + if (!mainModule) { + if ((mainModule = findMain()) == NULL) + return NULL; + atexit(terminate); + } + /* + * Scan the list of modules if we have the module already loaded. + */ + for (mp = modList; mp; mp = mp->next) + if (strcmp(mp->name, path) == 0) { + mp->refCnt++; + return mp; + } + if ((mp = (ModulePtr)calloc(1, sizeof(*mp))) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, "calloc: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + if ((mp->name = strdup(path)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, "strdup: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(mp); + return NULL; + } + /* + * load should be declared load(const char *...). Thus we + * cast the path to a normal char *. Ugly. + */ + if ((mp->entry = (void *)load((char *)path, L_NOAUTODEFER, NULL)) == NULL) { + free(mp->name); + free(mp); + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "dlopen: %s: ", path); + /* + * If AIX says the file is not executable, the error + * can be further described by querying the loader about + * the last error. + */ + if (errno == ENOEXEC) { + char *tmp[BUFSIZ/sizeof(char *)]; + if (loadquery(L_GETMESSAGES, tmp, sizeof(tmp)) == -1) + strlcpy(errbuf, + strerror(errno), + sizeof(errbuf)); + else { + char **p; + for (p = tmp; *p; p++) + caterr(*p); + } + } else + strlcat(errbuf, + strerror(errno), + sizeof(errbuf)); + return NULL; + } + mp->refCnt = 1; + mp->next = modList; + modList = mp; + if (loadbind(0, mainModule, mp->entry) == -1) { + dlclose(mp); + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "loadbind: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + /* + * If the user wants global binding, loadbind against all other + * loaded modules. + */ + if (mode & RTLD_GLOBAL) { + ModulePtr mp1; + for (mp1 = mp->next; mp1; mp1 = mp1->next) + if (loadbind(0, mp1->entry, mp->entry) == -1) { + dlclose(mp); + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "loadbind: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + } + if (readExports(mp) == -1) { + dlclose(mp); + return NULL; + } + /* + * If there is a dl_info structure, call the init function. + */ + if (mp->info = (struct dl_info *)dlsym(mp, "dl_info")) { + if (mp->info->init) + (*mp->info->init)(); + } else + errvalid = 0; + /* + * If the shared object was compiled using xlC we will need + * to call static constructors (and later on dlclose destructors). + */ + if (mp->cdtors = (CdtorPtr)dlsym(mp, "__cdtors")) { + CdtorPtr cp = mp->cdtors; + while (cp->init || cp->term) { + if (cp->init && cp->init != (void (*)(void))0xffffffff) + (*cp->init)(); + cp++; + } + /* + * If the shared object was compiled using g++, we will need + * to call global constructors using the _GLOBAL__DI function, + * and later, global destructors using the _GLOBAL_DD + * funciton. --jwe + */ + } else if (mp->gcc_ctor = (GccCDtorPtr)dlsym(mp, "_GLOBAL__DI")) { + (*mp->gcc_ctor)(); + mp->gcc_dtor = (GccCDtorPtr)dlsym(mp, "_GLOBAL__DD"); + } else + errvalid = 0; + return mp; +} + +/* + * Attempt to decipher an AIX loader error message and append it + * to our static error message buffer. + */ +static void caterr(char *s) +{ + char *p = s; + + while (*p >= '0' && *p <= '9') + p++; + switch(atoi(s)) { + case L_ERROR_TOOMANY: + strlcat(errbuf, "to many errors", sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_NOLIB: + strlcat(errbuf, "can't load library", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_UNDEF: + strlcat(errbuf, "can't find symbol", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_RLDBAD: + strlcat(errbuf, "bad RLD", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_FORMAT: + strlcat(errbuf, "bad exec format in", sizeof(errbuf)); + strlcat(errbuf, p, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + case L_ERROR_ERRNO: + strlcat(errbuf, strerror(atoi(++p)), sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + default: + strlcat(errbuf, s, sizeof(errbuf)); + break; + } +} + +void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol) +{ + ModulePtr mp = (ModulePtr)handle; + ExportPtr ep; + int i; + + /* + * Could speed up the search, but I assume that one assigns + * the result to function pointers anyways. + */ + for (ep = mp->exports, i = mp->nExports; i; i--, ep++) + if (strcmp(ep->name, symbol) == 0) + return ep->addr; + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "dlsym: undefined symbol %s", symbol); + return NULL; +} + +char *dlerror(void) +{ + if (errvalid) { + errvalid = 0; + return errbuf; + } + return NULL; +} + +int dlclose(void *handle) +{ + ModulePtr mp = (ModulePtr)handle; + int result; + ModulePtr mp1; + + if (--mp->refCnt > 0) + return 0; + if (mp->info && mp->info->fini) + (*mp->info->fini)(); + if (mp->cdtors) { + CdtorPtr cp = mp->cdtors; + while (cp->init || cp->term) { + if (cp->term && cp->init != (void (*)(void))0xffffffff) + (*cp->term)(); + cp++; + } + /* + * If the function to handle global destructors for g++ + * exists, call it. --jwe + */ + } else if (mp->gcc_dtor) { + (*mp->gcc_dtor)(); + } + result = unload(mp->entry); + if (result == -1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "%s", strerror(errno)); + } + if (mp->exports) { + ExportPtr ep; + int i; + for (ep = mp->exports, i = mp->nExports; i; i--, ep++) + if (ep->name) + free(ep->name); + free(mp->exports); + } + if (mp == modList) + modList = mp->next; + else { + for (mp1 = modList; mp1; mp1 = mp1->next) + if (mp1->next == mp) { + mp1->next = mp->next; + break; + } + } + free(mp->name); + free(mp); + return result; +} + +static void terminate(void) +{ + while (modList) + dlclose(modList); +} + +/* + * Build the export table from the XCOFF .loader section. + */ +static int readExports(ModulePtr mp) +{ + LDFILE *ldp = NULL; + SCNHDR sh, shdata; + LDHDR *lhp; + char *ldbuf; + LDSYM *ls; + int i; + ExportPtr ep; + + if ((ldp = ldopen(mp->name, ldp)) == NULL) { + struct ld_info *lp; + char *buf; + int size = 4*1024; + if (errno != ENOENT) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + /* + * The module might be loaded due to the LIBPATH + * environment variable. Search for the loaded + * module using L_GETINFO. + */ + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + while ((i = loadquery(L_GETINFO, buf, size)) == -1 && errno == ENOMEM) { + free(buf); + size += 4*1024; + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (i == -1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", + strerror(errno)); + free(buf); + return -1; + } + /* + * Traverse the list of loaded modules. The entry point + * returned by load() does actually point to the data + * segment origin. + */ + lp = (struct ld_info *)buf; + while (lp) { + if (lp->ldinfo_dataorg == mp->entry) { + ldp = ldopen(lp->ldinfo_filename, ldp); + break; + } + if (lp->ldinfo_next == 0) + lp = NULL; + else + lp = (struct ld_info *)((char *)lp + lp->ldinfo_next); + } + free(buf); + if (!ldp) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (TYPE(ldp) != U802TOCMAGIC) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "readExports: bad magic"); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + /* + * Get the padding for the data section. This is needed for + * AIX 4.1 compilers. This is used when building the final + * function pointer to the exported symbol. + */ + if (ldnshread(ldp, _DATA, &shdata) != SUCCESS) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot read data section header"); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + if (ldnshread(ldp, _LOADER, &sh) != SUCCESS) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot read loader section header"); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + /* + * We read the complete loader section in one chunk, this makes + * finding long symbol names residing in the string table easier. + */ + if ((ldbuf = (char *)malloc(sh.s_size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", strerror(errno)); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + if (FSEEK(ldp, sh.s_scnptr, BEGINNING) != OKFSEEK) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot seek to loader section"); + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + if (FREAD(ldbuf, sh.s_size, 1, ldp) != 1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: cannot read loader section"); + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + lhp = (LDHDR *)ldbuf; + ls = (LDSYM *)(ldbuf+LDHDRSZ); + /* + * Count the number of exports to include in our export table. + */ + for (i = lhp->l_nsyms; i; i--, ls++) { + if (!LDR_EXPORT(*ls)) + continue; + mp->nExports++; + } + if ((mp->exports = (ExportPtr)calloc(mp->nExports, sizeof(*mp->exports))) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "readExports: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return -1; + } + /* + * Fill in the export table. All entries are relative to + * the entry point we got from load. + */ + ep = mp->exports; + ls = (LDSYM *)(ldbuf+LDHDRSZ); + for (i = lhp->l_nsyms; i; i--, ls++) { + char *symname; + char tmpsym[SYMNMLEN+1]; + if (!LDR_EXPORT(*ls)) + continue; + if (ls->l_zeroes == 0) + symname = ls->l_offset+lhp->l_stoff+ldbuf; + else { + /* + * The l_name member is not zero terminated, we + * must copy the first SYMNMLEN chars and make + * sure we have a zero byte at the end. + */ + strlcpy (tmpsym, ls->l_name, + SYMNMLEN + 1); + symname = tmpsym; + } + ep->name = strdup(symname); + ep->addr = (void *)((unsigned long)mp->entry + + ls->l_value - shdata.s_vaddr); + ep++; + } + free(ldbuf); + while(ldclose(ldp) == FAILURE) + ; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find the main modules entry point. This is used as export pointer + * for loadbind() to be able to resolve references to the main part. + */ +static void * findMain(void) +{ + struct ld_info *lp; + char *buf; + int size = 4*1024; + int i; + void *ret; + + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "findMail: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + while ((i = loadquery(L_GETINFO, buf, size)) == -1 && errno == ENOMEM) { + free(buf); + size += 4*1024; + if ((buf = malloc(size)) == NULL) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "findMail: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + } + if (i == -1) { + errvalid++; + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), + "findMail: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(buf); + return NULL; + } + /* + * The first entry is the main module. The entry point + * returned by load() does actually point to the data + * segment origin. + */ + lp = (struct ld_info *)buf; + ret = lp->ldinfo_dataorg; + free(buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/dlfcn.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/dlfcn.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5671e9c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/dlfcn.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * @(#)dlfcn.h 1.4 revision of 95/04/25 09:36:52 + * This is an unpublished work copyright (c) 1992 HELIOS Software GmbH + * 30159 Hannover, Germany + */ + +#ifndef __dlfcn_h__ +#define __dlfcn_h__ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Mode flags for the dlopen routine. + */ +#define RTLD_LAZY 1 /* lazy function call binding */ +#define RTLD_NOW 2 /* immediate function call binding */ +#define RTLD_GLOBAL 0x100 /* allow symbols to be global */ + +/* + * To be able to intialize, a library may provide a dl_info structure + * that contains functions to be called to initialize and terminate. + */ +struct dl_info { + void (*init)(void); + void (*fini)(void); +}; + +#if __STDC__ || defined(_IBMR2) +void *dlopen(const char *path, int mode); +void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol); +char *dlerror(void); +int dlclose(void *handle); +#else +void *dlopen(); +void *dlsym(); +char *dlerror(); +int dlclose(); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* __dlfcn_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a7b5ef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs.3 @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +.\" $Id: kafs.3,v 1.3 1998/06/30 15:41:52 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd May 7, 1997 +.Os KTH-KRB +.Dt KAFS 3 +.Sh NAME +.Nm k_hasafs , +.Nm k_pioctl , +.Nm k_unlog , +.Nm k_setpag , +.Nm k_afs_cell_of_file , +.Nm krb_afslog , +.Nm krb_afslog_uid +\" .Nm krb5_afslog , +\" .Nm krb5_afslog_uid +.Nd AFS library +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include +.Ft int +.Fn k_afs_cell_of_file "const char *path" "char *cell" "int len" +.Ft int +.Fn k_hasafs +.Ft int +.Fn k_pioctl "char *a_path" "int o_opcode" "struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP" "int a_followSymlinks" +.Ft int +.Fn k_setpag +.Ft int +.Fn k_unlog +.Ft int +.Fn krb_afslog "char *cell" "char *realm" +.Ft int +.Fn krb_afslog_uid "char *cell" "char *realm" "uid_t uid" +\" .Ft krb5_error_code +\" .Fn krb5_afslog_uid "krb5_context context" "krb5_ccache id" "const char *cell" "krb5_const_realm realm" "uid_t uid" +\" .Ft krb5_error_code +\" .Fn krb5_afslog "krb5_context context" "krb5_ccache id" "const char *cell" "krb5_const_realm realm" +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn k_hasafs +initializes some library internal structures, and tests for the +presense of AFS in the kernel, none of the other functions should be +called before +.Fn k_hasafs +is called, or if it fails. + +.Fn krb_afslog , +and +.Fn krb_afslog_uid +obtains new tokens (and possibly tickets) for the specified +.Fa cell +and +.Fa realm . +If +.Fa cell +is +.Dv NULL , +the local cell is used. If +.Fa realm +is +.Dv NULL , +the function tries to guess what realm to use. Unless you have some good knowledge of what cell or realm to use, you should pass +.Dv NULL . +.Fn krb_afslog +will use the real user-id for the +.Dv ViceId +field in the token, +.Fn krb_afslog_uid +will use +.Fa uid . + +\" .Fn krb5_afslog , +\" and +\" .Fn krb5_afslog_uid +\" are the Kerberos 5 equivalents of +\" .Fn krb_afslog , +\" and +\" .Fn krb_afslog_uid . +\" The extra arguments are the ubiquitous context, and the cache id where +\" to store any obtained tickets. Since AFS servers normally can't handle +\" Kerberos 5 tickets directly, these functions will first obtain version +\" 5 tickets for the requested cells, and then convert them to version 4 +\" tickets, that can be stashed in the kernel. To convert tickets the +\" .Fn krb524_convert_creds_kdc +\" function will be used. + +.Fn k_afs_cell_of_file +will in +.Fa cell +return the cell of a specified file, no more than +.Fa len +characters is put in +.Fa cell . + +.Fn k_pioctl +does a +.Fn pioctl +syscall with the specified arguments. This function is equivalent to +.Fn lpioctl . + +.Fn k_setpag +initializes a new PAG. + +.Fn k_unlog +removes destroys all tokens in the current PAG. + +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +The following environment variable affect the mode of operation of +.Nm kafs : +.Bl -tag +.It Ev AFS_SYSCALL +Normally, +.Nm kafs +will try to figure out the correct system call(s) that are used by AFS +by itself. If it does not manage to do that, or does it incorrectly, +you can set this variable to the system call number or list of system +call numbers that should be used. +.El +.Sh RETURN VALUES +.Fn k_hasafs +returns 1 if AFS is present in the kernel, 0 otherwise. +.Fn krb_afslog +and +.Fn krb_afslog_uid +returns 0 on success, or a kerberos error number on failure. +.Fn k_afs_cell_of_file , +.Fn k_pioctl , +.Fn k_setpag , +and +.Fn k_unlog +all return the value of the underlaying system call, 0 on success. +.Sh EXAMPLES +The following code from +.Nm login +will obtain a new PAG and tokens for the local cell and the cell of +the users home directory. +.Bd -literal +if (k_hasafs()) { + char cell[64]; + k_setpag(); + if(k_afs_cell_of_file(pwd->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb_afslog(cell, NULL); + krb_afslog(NULL, NULL); +} +.Ed +.Sh ERRORS +If any of these functions (appart from +.Fn k_hasafs ) +is called without AFS beeing present in the kernel, the process will +usually (depending on the operating system) receive a SIGSYS signal. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Rs +.%A Transarc Corporation +.%J AFS-3 Programmer's Reference +.%T File Server/Cache Manager Interface +.%D 1991 +.Re +.Sh BUGS +.Ev AFS_SYSCALL +has no effect under AIX. diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fb969e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs.h @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kafs.h,v 1.32 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KAFS_H +#define __KAFS_H + +/* XXX must include krb5.h or krb.h */ + +/* sys/ioctl.h must be included manually before kafs.h */ + +/* + */ +#define AFSCALL_PIOCTL 20 +#define AFSCALL_SETPAG 21 + +#ifndef _VICEIOCTL +#define _VICEIOCTL(id) ((unsigned int ) _IOW('V', id, struct ViceIoctl)) +#endif /* _VICEIOCTL */ + +#define VIOCSETAL _VICEIOCTL(1) +#define VIOCGETAL _VICEIOCTL(2) +#define VIOCSETTOK _VICEIOCTL(3) +#define VIOCGETVOLSTAT _VICEIOCTL(4) +#define VIOCSETVOLSTAT _VICEIOCTL(5) +#define VIOCFLUSH _VICEIOCTL(6) +#define VIOCGETTOK _VICEIOCTL(8) +#define VIOCUNLOG _VICEIOCTL(9) +#define VIOCCKSERV _VICEIOCTL(10) +#define VIOCCKBACK _VICEIOCTL(11) +#define VIOCCKCONN _VICEIOCTL(12) +#define VIOCWHEREIS _VICEIOCTL(14) +#define VIOCACCESS _VICEIOCTL(20) +#define VIOCUNPAG _VICEIOCTL(21) +#define VIOCGETFID _VICEIOCTL(22) +#define VIOCSETCACHESIZE _VICEIOCTL(24) +#define VIOCFLUSHCB _VICEIOCTL(25) +#define VIOCNEWCELL _VICEIOCTL(26) +#define VIOCGETCELL _VICEIOCTL(27) +#define VIOC_AFS_DELETE_MT_PT _VICEIOCTL(28) +#define VIOC_AFS_STAT_MT_PT _VICEIOCTL(29) +#define VIOC_FILE_CELL_NAME _VICEIOCTL(30) +#define VIOC_GET_WS_CELL _VICEIOCTL(31) +#define VIOC_AFS_MARINER_HOST _VICEIOCTL(32) +#define VIOC_GET_PRIMARY_CELL _VICEIOCTL(33) +#define VIOC_VENUSLOG _VICEIOCTL(34) +#define VIOC_GETCELLSTATUS _VICEIOCTL(35) +#define VIOC_SETCELLSTATUS _VICEIOCTL(36) +#define VIOC_FLUSHVOLUME _VICEIOCTL(37) +#define VIOC_AFS_SYSNAME _VICEIOCTL(38) +#define VIOC_EXPORTAFS _VICEIOCTL(39) +#define VIOCGETCACHEPARAMS _VICEIOCTL(40) +#define VIOC_GCPAGS _VICEIOCTL(48) + +struct ViceIoctl { + caddr_t in, out; + short in_size; + short out_size; +}; + +struct ClearToken { + int32_t AuthHandle; + char HandShakeKey[8]; + int32_t ViceId; + int32_t BeginTimestamp; + int32_t EndTimestamp; +}; + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +/* Use k_hasafs() to probe if the machine supports AFS syscalls. + The other functions will generate a SIGSYS if AFS is not supported */ + +int k_hasafs __P((void)); + +int krb_afslog __P((const char *cell, const char *realm)); +int krb_afslog_uid __P((const char *cell, const char *realm, uid_t uid)); +int krb_afslog_home __P((const char *cell, const char *realm, + const char *homedir)); +int krb_afslog_uid_home __P((const char *cell, const char *realm, uid_t uid, + const char *homedir)); + +int krb_realm_of_cell __P((const char *cell, char **realm)); + +/* compat */ +#define k_afsklog krb_afslog +#define k_afsklog_uid krb_afslog_uid + +int k_pioctl __P((char *a_path, + int o_opcode, + struct ViceIoctl *a_paramsP, + int a_followSymlinks)); +int k_unlog __P((void)); +int k_setpag __P((void)); +int k_afs_cell_of_file __P((const char *path, char *cell, int len)); + + + +/* XXX */ +#ifdef KFAILURE +#define KRB_H_INCLUDED +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION +#define KRB5_H_INCLUDED +#endif + +#ifdef KRB_H_INCLUDED +int kafs_settoken __P((const char*, uid_t, CREDENTIALS*)); +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5_H_INCLUDED +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog_uid __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid)); +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm)); +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog_uid_home __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + uid_t uid, + const char *homedir)); + +krb5_error_code krb5_afslog_home __P((krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + const char *cell, + krb5_const_realm realm, + const char *homedir)); + +krb5_error_code krb5_realm_of_cell __P((const char *cell, char **realm)); + +#endif + + +#define _PATH_VICE "/usr/vice/etc/" +#define _PATH_THISCELL _PATH_VICE "ThisCell" +#define _PATH_CELLSERVDB _PATH_VICE "CellServDB" +#define _PATH_THESECELLS _PATH_VICE "TheseCells" + +#define _PATH_ARLA_VICE "/usr/arla/etc/" +#define _PATH_ARLA_THISCELL _PATH_ARLA_VICE "ThisCell" +#define _PATH_ARLA_CELLSERVDB _PATH_ARLA_VICE "CellServDB" +#define _PATH_ARLA_THESECELLS _PATH_ARLA_VICE "TheseCells" + +extern int _kafs_debug; + +#endif /* __KAFS_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac1c2f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/kafs/kafs_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: kafs_locl.h,v 1.15 1999/12/02 16:58:40 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KAFS_LOCL_H__ +#define __KAFS_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +#include +#endif +#include + +#include + +#include "afssysdefs.h" + +struct kafs_data; +typedef int (*afslog_uid_func_t)(struct kafs_data *, + const char *cell, + const char *realm_hint, + uid_t, + const char *homedir); + +typedef int (*get_cred_func_t)(struct kafs_data*, const char*, const char*, + const char*, CREDENTIALS*); + +typedef char* (*get_realm_func_t)(struct kafs_data*, const char*); + +typedef struct kafs_data { + afslog_uid_func_t afslog_uid; + get_cred_func_t get_cred; + get_realm_func_t get_realm; + void *data; +} kafs_data; + +int _kafs_afslog_all_local_cells(kafs_data*, uid_t, const char*); + +int _kafs_get_cred(kafs_data*, const char*, const char*, const char *, + CREDENTIALS*); + +int +_kafs_realm_of_cell(kafs_data *data, const char *cell, char **realm); + +#ifdef _AIX +int aix_pioctl(char*, int, struct ViceIoctl*, int); +int aix_setpag(void); +#endif + +#endif /* __KAFS_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17551cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.95 2000/01/08 17:03:51 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +INCLUDES += $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +bin_PROGRAMS = verify_krb5_conf + +noinst_PROGRAMS = dump_config + +check_PROGRAMS = n-fold-test string-to-key-test +TESTS = n-fold-test string-to-key-test + +if KRB4 +KRB4LIB = $(LIB_krb4) +keytab_krb4_c = keytab_krb4.c +endif + +LDADD = libkrb5.la \ + $(KRB4LIB) \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ + $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la \ + $(LIB_roken) + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkrb5.la + +ERR_FILES = krb5_err.c heim_err.c + +libkrb5_la_SOURCES = \ + add_et_list.c \ + addr_families.c \ + address.c \ + aname_to_localname.c \ + asn1_glue.c \ + auth_context.c \ + build_ap_req.c \ + build_auth.c \ + cache.c \ + changepw.c \ + codec.c \ + config_file.c \ + config_file_netinfo.c \ + convert_creds.c \ + constants.c \ + context.c \ + copy_host_realm.c \ + crc.c \ + creds.c \ + crypto.c \ + data.c \ + expand_hostname.c \ + fcache.c \ + free.c \ + free_host_realm.c \ + generate_seq_number.c \ + generate_subkey.c \ + get_addrs.c \ + get_cred.c \ + get_default_principal.c \ + get_default_realm.c \ + get_for_creds.c \ + get_host_realm.c \ + get_in_tkt.c \ + get_in_tkt_pw.c \ + get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c \ + get_in_tkt_with_skey.c \ + get_port.c \ + init_creds.c \ + init_creds_pw.c \ + keyblock.c \ + keytab.c \ + keytab_file.c \ + keytab_memory.c \ + $(keytab_krb4_c) \ + keytab_keyfile.c \ + krbhst.c \ + kuserok.c \ + log.c \ + mcache.c \ + misc.c \ + mk_error.c \ + mk_priv.c \ + mk_rep.c \ + mk_req.c \ + mk_req_ext.c \ + mk_safe.c \ + net_read.c \ + net_write.c \ + n-fold.c \ + padata.c \ + principal.c \ + prog_setup.c \ + prompter_posix.c \ + rd_cred.c \ + rd_error.c \ + rd_priv.c \ + rd_rep.c \ + rd_req.c \ + rd_safe.c \ + read_message.c \ + recvauth.c \ + send_to_kdc.c \ + sendauth.c \ + set_default_realm.c \ + sock_principal.c \ + store.c \ + store_emem.c \ + store_fd.c \ + store_mem.c \ + ticket.c \ + time.c \ + transited.c \ + verify_init.c \ + verify_user.c \ + version.c \ + warn.c \ + write_message.c \ + $(ERR_FILES) + +EXTRA_libkrb5_la_SOURCES = keytab_krb4.c + +libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 7:1:0 + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/krb5-protos.h $(srcdir)/krb5-private.h + +$(srcdir)/krb5-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o krb5-protos.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/krb5-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -p krb5-private.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-private.h + +libkrb5_la_LIBADD = ../com_err/error.lo ../com_err/com_err.lo + +man_MANS = krb5.conf.5 krb5_warn.3 krb5_openlog.3 \ + krb5_425_conv_principal.3 krb5_build_principal.3 krb5_free_principal.3 \ + krb5_parse_name.3 krb5_sname_to_principal.3 krb5_unparse_name.3 + +include_HEADERS = krb5.h krb5-protos.h krb5-private.h krb5_err.h heim_err.h + +CLEANFILES = krb5_err.c krb5_err.h heim_err.c heim_err.h + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): krb5_err.h heim_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +krb5_err.h: krb5_err.et + +heim_err.h: heim_err.et diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f3652e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,956 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.95 2000/01/08 17:03:51 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include $(INCLUDE_krb4) + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +bin_PROGRAMS = verify_krb5_conf + +noinst_PROGRAMS = dump_config + +check_PROGRAMS = n-fold-test string-to-key-test +TESTS = n-fold-test string-to-key-test + +@KRB4_TRUE@KRB4LIB = $(LIB_krb4) +@KRB4_TRUE@keytab_krb4_c = keytab_krb4.c + +LDADD = libkrb5.la $(KRB4LIB) $(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la $(LIB_roken) + + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libkrb5.la + +ERR_FILES = krb5_err.c heim_err.c + +libkrb5_la_SOURCES = add_et_list.c addr_families.c address.c aname_to_localname.c asn1_glue.c auth_context.c build_ap_req.c build_auth.c cache.c changepw.c codec.c config_file.c config_file_netinfo.c convert_creds.c constants.c context.c copy_host_realm.c crc.c creds.c crypto.c data.c expand_hostname.c fcache.c free.c free_host_realm.c generate_seq_number.c generate_subkey.c get_addrs.c get_cred.c get_default_principal.c get_default_realm.c get_for_creds.c get_host_realm.c get_in_tkt.c get_in_tkt_pw.c get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c get_in_tkt_with_skey.c get_port.c init_creds.c init_creds_pw.c keyblock.c keytab.c keytab_file.c keytab_memory.c $(keytab_krb4_c) keytab_keyfile.c krbhst.c kuserok.c log.c mcache.c misc.c mk_error.c mk_priv.c mk_rep.c mk_req.c mk_req_ext.c mk_safe.c net_read.c net_write.c n-fold.c padata.c principal.c prog_setup.c prompter_posix.c rd_cred.c rd_error.c rd_priv.c rd_rep.c rd_req.c rd_safe.c read_message.c recvauth.c send_to_kdc.c sendauth.c set_default_realm.c sock_principal.c store.c store_emem.c store_fd.c store_mem.c ticket.c time.c transited.c verify_init.c verify_user.c version.c warn.c write_message.c $(ERR_FILES) + + +EXTRA_libkrb5_la_SOURCES = keytab_krb4.c + +libkrb5_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 7:1:0 + +libkrb5_la_LIBADD = ../com_err/error.lo ../com_err/com_err.lo + +man_MANS = krb5.conf.5 krb5_warn.3 krb5_openlog.3 krb5_425_conv_principal.3 krb5_build_principal.3 krb5_free_principal.3 krb5_parse_name.3 krb5_sname_to_principal.3 krb5_unparse_name.3 + + +include_HEADERS = krb5.h krb5-protos.h krb5-private.h krb5_err.h heim_err.h + +CLEANFILES = krb5_err.c krb5_err.h heim_err.c heim_err.h +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +libkrb5_la_DEPENDENCIES = ../com_err/error.lo ../com_err/com_err.lo +@KRB4_TRUE@libkrb5_la_OBJECTS = add_et_list.lo addr_families.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@address.lo aname_to_localname.lo asn1_glue.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@auth_context.lo build_ap_req.lo build_auth.lo cache.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@changepw.lo codec.lo config_file.lo config_file_netinfo.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@convert_creds.lo constants.lo context.lo copy_host_realm.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@crc.lo creds.lo crypto.lo data.lo expand_hostname.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@fcache.lo free.lo free_host_realm.lo generate_seq_number.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@generate_subkey.lo get_addrs.lo get_cred.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@get_default_principal.lo get_default_realm.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@get_for_creds.lo get_host_realm.lo get_in_tkt.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@get_in_tkt_pw.lo get_in_tkt_with_keytab.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@get_in_tkt_with_skey.lo get_port.lo init_creds.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@init_creds_pw.lo keyblock.lo keytab.lo keytab_file.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@keytab_memory.lo keytab_krb4.lo keytab_keyfile.lo krbhst.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@kuserok.lo log.lo mcache.lo misc.lo mk_error.lo mk_priv.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@mk_rep.lo mk_req.lo mk_req_ext.lo mk_safe.lo net_read.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@net_write.lo n-fold.lo padata.lo principal.lo prog_setup.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@prompter_posix.lo rd_cred.lo rd_error.lo rd_priv.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@rd_rep.lo rd_req.lo rd_safe.lo read_message.lo recvauth.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@send_to_kdc.lo sendauth.lo set_default_realm.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@sock_principal.lo store.lo store_emem.lo store_fd.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@store_mem.lo ticket.lo time.lo transited.lo verify_init.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@verify_user.lo version.lo warn.lo write_message.lo \ +@KRB4_TRUE@krb5_err.lo heim_err.lo +@KRB4_FALSE@libkrb5_la_OBJECTS = add_et_list.lo addr_families.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@address.lo aname_to_localname.lo asn1_glue.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@auth_context.lo build_ap_req.lo build_auth.lo cache.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@changepw.lo codec.lo config_file.lo config_file_netinfo.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@convert_creds.lo constants.lo context.lo copy_host_realm.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@crc.lo creds.lo crypto.lo data.lo expand_hostname.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@fcache.lo free.lo free_host_realm.lo generate_seq_number.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@generate_subkey.lo get_addrs.lo get_cred.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@get_default_principal.lo get_default_realm.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@get_for_creds.lo get_host_realm.lo get_in_tkt.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@get_in_tkt_pw.lo get_in_tkt_with_keytab.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@get_in_tkt_with_skey.lo get_port.lo init_creds.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@init_creds_pw.lo keyblock.lo keytab.lo keytab_file.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@keytab_memory.lo keytab_keyfile.lo krbhst.lo kuserok.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@log.lo mcache.lo misc.lo mk_error.lo mk_priv.lo mk_rep.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@mk_req.lo mk_req_ext.lo mk_safe.lo net_read.lo net_write.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@n-fold.lo padata.lo principal.lo prog_setup.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@prompter_posix.lo rd_cred.lo rd_error.lo rd_priv.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@rd_rep.lo rd_req.lo rd_safe.lo read_message.lo recvauth.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@send_to_kdc.lo sendauth.lo set_default_realm.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@sock_principal.lo store.lo store_emem.lo store_fd.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@store_mem.lo ticket.lo time.lo transited.lo verify_init.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@verify_user.lo version.lo warn.lo write_message.lo \ +@KRB4_FALSE@krb5_err.lo heim_err.lo +bin_PROGRAMS = verify_krb5_conf$(EXEEXT) +check_PROGRAMS = n-fold-test$(EXEEXT) string-to-key-test$(EXEEXT) +noinst_PROGRAMS = dump_config$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(bin_PROGRAMS) $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + +verify_krb5_conf_SOURCES = verify_krb5_conf.c +verify_krb5_conf_OBJECTS = verify_krb5_conf.$(OBJEXT) +verify_krb5_conf_LDADD = $(LDADD) +@KRB4_TRUE@verify_krb5_conf_DEPENDENCIES = libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB4_FALSE@verify_krb5_conf_DEPENDENCIES = libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ +@KRB4_FALSE@$(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +verify_krb5_conf_LDFLAGS = +n_fold_test_SOURCES = n-fold-test.c +n_fold_test_OBJECTS = n-fold-test.$(OBJEXT) +n_fold_test_LDADD = $(LDADD) +@KRB4_TRUE@n_fold_test_DEPENDENCIES = libkrb5.la \ +@KRB4_TRUE@$(top_builddir)/lib/des/libdes.la \ 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"$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat5/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat5dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat8-mans: + @ext=8;\ + foo='$(man8_MANS)'; \ + bar='$(man_MANS)'; \ + for i in $$bar; do \ + case $$i in \ + *.8) foo="$$foo $$i";; \ + esac; done; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir); \ + for x in $$foo; do \ + f=`echo $$x | sed 's/\.[^.]*$$/.cat8/'`; \ + if test -f "$(srcdir)/$$f"; then \ + b=`echo $$x | sed 's!$(MANRX)!\1!'`; \ + echo "$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX)";\ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/$$g $(DESTDIR)$(cat8dir)/$$b.$(CATSUFFIX);\ + fi; \ + done ;\ + fi + +install-cat-mans: install-cat1-mans install-cat3-mans install-cat5-mans install-cat8-mans + +install-data-local: install-cat-mans + +.et.h: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< +.et.c: + $(COMPILE_ET) $< + +.x.c: + @cmp -s $< $@ 2> /dev/null || cp $< $@ + +check-local:: + @foo='$(CHECK_LOCAL)'; \ + if test "$$foo"; then \ + failed=0; all=0; \ + for i in $$foo; do \ + all=`expr $$all + 1`; \ + if ./$$i --version > /dev/null 2>&1; then \ + echo "PASS: $$i"; \ + else \ + echo "FAIL: $$i"; \ + failed=`expr $$failed + 1`; \ + fi; \ + done; \ + if test "$$failed" -eq 0; then \ + banner="All $$all tests passed"; \ + else \ + banner="$$failed of $$all tests failed"; \ + fi; \ + dashes=`echo "$$banner" | sed s/./=/g`; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + echo "$$banner"; \ + echo "$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): $(srcdir)/krb5-protos.h $(srcdir)/krb5-private.h + +$(srcdir)/krb5-protos.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -o krb5-protos.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-protos.h + +$(srcdir)/krb5-private.h: + cd $(srcdir); perl ../../cf/make-proto.pl -p krb5-private.h $(libkrb5_la_SOURCES) || rm -f krb5-private.h + +$(libkrb5_la_OBJECTS): krb5_err.h heim_err.h + +# to help stupid solaris make + +krb5_err.h: krb5_err.et + +heim_err.h: heim_err.et + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/add_et_list.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/add_et_list.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cfc42f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/add_et_list.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: add_et_list.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Add a specified list of error messages to the et list in context. + * Call func (probably a comerr-generated function) with a pointer to + * the current et_list. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_et_list (krb5_context context, + void (*func)(struct et_list **)) +{ + (*func)(&context->et_list); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/addr_families.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/addr_families.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8214ba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/addr_families.c @@ -0,0 +1,544 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: addr_families.c,v 1.22 1999/12/04 17:53:33 assar Exp $"); + +struct addr_operations { + int af; + krb5_address_type atype; + size_t max_sockaddr_size; + krb5_error_code (*sockaddr2addr)(const struct sockaddr *, krb5_address *); + krb5_error_code (*sockaddr2port)(const struct sockaddr *, int16_t *); + void (*addr2sockaddr)(const krb5_address *, struct sockaddr *, + int *sa_size, int port); + void (*h_addr2sockaddr)(const char *, struct sockaddr *, int *, int); + krb5_error_code (*h_addr2addr)(const char *, krb5_address *); + krb5_boolean (*uninteresting)(const struct sockaddr *); + void (*anyaddr)(struct sockaddr *, int *, int); + int (*print_addr)(const krb5_address *, char *, size_t); + int (*parse_addr)(const char*, krb5_address *); +}; + +/* + * AF_INET - aka IPv4 implementation + */ + +static krb5_error_code +ipv4_sockaddr2addr (const struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_address *a) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + unsigned char buf[4]; + + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; + memcpy (buf, &sin->sin_addr, 4); + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, buf, 4); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv4_sockaddr2port (const struct sockaddr *sa, int16_t *port) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + *port = sin->sin_port; + return 0; +} + +static void +ipv4_addr2sockaddr (const krb5_address *a, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + memcpy (&sin->sin_addr, a->address.data, 4); + sin->sin_port = port; + *sa_size = sizeof(*sin); +} + +static void +ipv4_h_addr2sockaddr(const char *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, int *sa_size, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + *sa_size = sizeof(*sin); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = port; + sin->sin_addr = *((const struct in_addr *)addr); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv4_h_addr2addr (const char *addr, + krb5_address *a) +{ + unsigned char buf[4]; + + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; + memcpy(buf, addr, 4); + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, buf, 4); +} + +/* + * Are there any addresses that should be considered `uninteresting'? + */ + +static krb5_boolean +ipv4_uninteresting (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + if (sin->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY) + return TRUE; + + return FALSE; +} + +static void +ipv4_anyaddr (struct sockaddr *sa, int *sa_size, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + *sa_size = sizeof(*sin); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = port; + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; +} + +static int +ipv4_print_addr (const krb5_address *addr, char *str, size_t len) +{ + struct in_addr ia; + + memcpy (&ia, addr->address.data, 4); + + return snprintf (str, len, "IPv4:%s", inet_ntoa(ia)); +} + +static int +ipv4_parse_addr (const char *address, krb5_address *addr) +{ + const char *p; + struct in_addr a; + + p = strchr(address, ':'); + if(p) { + p++; + if(strncasecmp(address, "ip:", p - address) != 0 && + strncasecmp(address, "ip4:", p - address) != 0 && + strncasecmp(address, "ipv4:", p - address) != 0 && + strncasecmp(address, "inet:", p - address) != 0) + return -1; + } else + p = address; +#ifdef HAVE_INET_ATON + if(inet_aton(p, &a) == 0) + return -1; +#elif defined(HAVE_INET_ADDR) + a.s_addr = inet_addr(p); + if(a.s_addr == INADDR_NONE) + return -1; +#else + return -1; +#endif + addr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; + if(krb5_data_alloc(&addr->address, 4) != 0) + return -1; + _krb5_put_int(addr->address.data, ntohl(a.s_addr), addr->address.length); + return 0; +} + +/* + * AF_INET6 - aka IPv6 implementation + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + +static krb5_error_code +ipv6_sockaddr2addr (const struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_address *a) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sin6->sin6_addr)) { + unsigned char buf[4]; + + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET; +#ifndef IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4 +#ifdef IN6_EXTRACT_V4ADDR +#define IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4(x) (&IN6_EXTRACT_V4ADDR(x)) +#else +#define IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4(x) ((const struct in_addr *)&(x)->s6_addr[12]) +#endif +#endif + memcpy (buf, IN6_ADDR_V6_TO_V4(&sin6->sin6_addr), 4); + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, buf, 4); + } else { + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6; + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, + &sin6->sin6_addr, + sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr)); + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv6_sockaddr2port (const struct sockaddr *sa, int16_t *port) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + *port = sin6->sin6_port; + return 0; +} + +static void +ipv6_addr2sockaddr (const krb5_address *a, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + memcpy (&sin6->sin6_addr, a->address.data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr)); + sin6->sin6_port = port; + *sa_size = sizeof(*sin6); +} + +static void +ipv6_h_addr2sockaddr(const char *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + *sa_size = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + sin6->sin6_addr = *((const struct in6_addr *)addr); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ipv6_h_addr2addr (const char *addr, + krb5_address *a) +{ + a->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6; + return krb5_data_copy(&a->address, addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); +} + +/* + * + */ + +static krb5_boolean +ipv6_uninteresting (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + const struct in6_addr *in6 = (const struct in6_addr *)&sin6->sin6_addr; + + return + IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(in6) + || IN6_IS_ADDR_V4COMPAT(in6); +} + +static void +ipv6_anyaddr (struct sockaddr *sa, int *sa_size, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + *sa_size = sizeof(*sin6); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + sin6->sin6_addr = in6addr_any; +} + +static int +ipv6_print_addr (const krb5_address *addr, char *str, size_t len) +{ + char buf[128], buf2[3]; +#ifdef HAVE_INET_NTOP + if(inet_ntop(AF_INET6, addr->address.data, buf, sizeof(buf)) == NULL) +#endif + { + /* XXX this is pretty ugly, but better than abort() */ + int i; + unsigned char *p = addr->address.data; + buf[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < addr->address.length; i++) { + snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%02x", p[i]); + if(i > 0 && (i & 1) == 0) + strlcat(buf, ":", sizeof(buf)); + strlcat(buf, buf2, sizeof(buf)); + } + } + return snprintf(str, len, "IPv6:%s", buf); +} + +static int +ipv6_parse_addr (const char *address, krb5_address *addr) +{ + int ret; + struct in6_addr in6; + + ret = inet_pton(AF_INET6, address, &in6.s6_addr); + if(ret == 1) { + addr->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6; + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&addr->address, sizeof(in6.s6_addr)); + if (ret) + return -1; + memcpy(addr->address.data, in6.s6_addr, sizeof(in6.s6_addr)); + return 0; + } + return -1; +} + +#endif /* IPv6 */ + +/* + * table + */ + +static struct addr_operations at[] = { + {AF_INET, KRB5_ADDRESS_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), + ipv4_sockaddr2addr, + ipv4_sockaddr2port, + ipv4_addr2sockaddr, + ipv4_h_addr2sockaddr, + ipv4_h_addr2addr, + ipv4_uninteresting, ipv4_anyaddr, ipv4_print_addr, ipv4_parse_addr}, +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + {AF_INET6, KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), + ipv6_sockaddr2addr, + ipv6_sockaddr2port, + ipv6_addr2sockaddr, + ipv6_h_addr2sockaddr, + ipv6_h_addr2addr, + ipv6_uninteresting, ipv6_anyaddr, ipv6_print_addr, ipv6_parse_addr} +#endif +}; + +static int num_addrs = sizeof(at) / sizeof(at[0]); + +static size_t max_sockaddr_size = 0; + +/* + * generic functions + */ + +static struct addr_operations * +find_af(int af) +{ + struct addr_operations *a; + + for (a = at; a < at + num_addrs; ++a) + if (af == a->af) + return a; + return NULL; +} + +static struct addr_operations * +find_atype(int atype) +{ + struct addr_operations *a; + + for (a = at; a < at + num_addrs; ++a) + if (atype == a->atype) + return a; + return NULL; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2address (const struct sockaddr *sa, krb5_address *addr) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(sa->sa_family); + if (a == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + return (*a->sockaddr2addr)(sa, addr); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2port (const struct sockaddr *sa, int16_t *port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(sa->sa_family); + if (a == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + return (*a->sockaddr2port)(sa, port); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addr2sockaddr (const krb5_address *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_atype(addr->addr_type); + + if (a == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + (*a->addr2sockaddr)(addr, sa, sa_size, port); + return 0; +} + +size_t +krb5_max_sockaddr_size (void) +{ + if (max_sockaddr_size == 0) { + struct addr_operations *a; + + for(a = at; a < at + num_addrs; ++a) + max_sockaddr_size = max(max_sockaddr_size, a->max_sockaddr_size); + } + return max_sockaddr_size; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting(const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(sa->sa_family); + if (a == NULL) + return TRUE; + return (*a->uninteresting)(sa); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2sockaddr (int af, + const char *addr, struct sockaddr *sa, int *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(af); + if (a == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + (*a->h_addr2sockaddr)(addr, sa, sa_size, port); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2addr (int af, + const char *haddr, krb5_address *addr) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af(af); + if (a == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + return (*a->h_addr2addr)(haddr, addr); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_anyaddr (int af, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_af (af); + + if (a == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP; + + (*a->anyaddr)(sa, sa_size, port); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_print_address (const krb5_address *addr, + char *str, size_t len, size_t *ret_len) +{ + struct addr_operations *a = find_atype(addr->addr_type); + + if (a == NULL) { + char *s; + size_t l; + int i; + s = str; + l = snprintf(s, len, "TYPE_%d:", addr->addr_type); + s += l; + len -= len; + for(i = 0; i < addr->address.length; i++) { + l = snprintf(s, len, "%02x", ((char*)addr->address.data)[i]); + len -= l; + s += l; + } + *ret_len = s - str; + return 0; + } + *ret_len = (*a->print_addr)(addr, str, len); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_address(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + int i, n; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + int error; + + for(i = 0; i < num_addrs; i++) { + if(at[i].parse_addr) { + krb5_address a; + if((*at[i].parse_addr)(string, &a) == 0) { + ALLOC_SEQ(addresses, 1); + addresses->val[0] = a; + return 0; + } + } + } + + error = getaddrinfo (string, NULL, NULL, &ai); + if (error) + return -1; + + n = 0; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + ++n; + + ALLOC_SEQ(addresses, n); + + for (a = ai, i = 0; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next, ++i) { + struct addr_operations *aop = find_af (ai->ai_family); + + addresses->val[i].addr_type = aop->atype; + krb5_data_copy (&addresses->val[i].address, + ai->ai_addr, + ai->ai_addrlen); + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/address.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/address.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b0704f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/address.c @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: address.c,v 1.14 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +#if 0 +/* This is the supposedly MIT-api version */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_search(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr, + krb5_address *const *addrlist) +{ + krb5_address *a; + + while((a = *addrlist++)) + if (krb5_address_compare (context, addr, a)) + return TRUE; + return FALSE; +} +#endif + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_search(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr, + const krb5_addresses *addrlist) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < addrlist->len; ++i) + if (krb5_address_compare (context, addr, &addrlist->val[i])) + return TRUE; + return FALSE; +} + +int +krb5_address_order(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2) +{ + return (addr1->addr_type - addr2->addr_type) + || memcmp (addr1->address.data, + addr2->address.data, + addr1->address.length); +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_compare(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2) +{ + return krb5_address_order (context, addr1, addr2) == 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_address(krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *inaddr, + krb5_address *outaddr) +{ + copy_HostAddress(inaddr, outaddr); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_addresses(krb5_context context, + const krb5_addresses *inaddr, + krb5_addresses *outaddr) +{ + copy_HostAddresses(inaddr, outaddr); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_address(krb5_context context, + krb5_address *address) +{ + krb5_data_free (&address->address); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_addresses(krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + free_HostAddresses(addresses); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_append_addresses(krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *dest, + const krb5_addresses *source) +{ + krb5_address *tmp; + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + if(source->len > 0) { + tmp = realloc(dest->val, (dest->len + source->len) * sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + dest->val = tmp; + for(i = 0; i < source->len; i++) { + /* skip duplicates */ + if(krb5_address_search(context, &source->val[i], dest)) + continue; + ret = krb5_copy_address(context, + &source->val[i], + &dest->val[dest->len]); + if(ret) + return ret; + dest->len++; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create an address of type KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT from (addr, port) + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_addrport (krb5_address **res, const krb5_address *addr, int16_t port) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len = addr->address.length + 2 + 4 * 4; + u_char *p; + + *res = malloc (sizeof(**res)); + if (*res == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + (*res)->addr_type = KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&(*res)->address, len); + if (ret) { + free (*res); + return ret; + } + p = (*res)->address.data; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = (addr->addr_type ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->addr_type >> 8) & 0xFF; + + *p++ = (addr->address.length ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->address.length >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->address.length >> 16) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (addr->address.length >> 24) & 0xFF; + + memcpy (p, addr->address.data, addr->address.length); + p += addr->address.length; + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = (KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT >> 8) & 0xFF; + + *p++ = (2 ) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (2 >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (2 >> 16) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (2 >> 24) & 0xFF; + + memcpy (p, &port, 2); + p += 2; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c125580 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/aname_to_localname.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: aname_to_localname.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_aname_to_localname (krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal aname, + size_t lnsize, + char *lname) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm *lrealms, *r; + int foo = 1; + size_t len; + char *res; + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &lrealms); + if (ret) + return ret; + + for (r = lrealms; *r != NULL; ++r) { + foo = strcmp (*r, aname->realm); + if (foo == 0) + break; + } + krb5_free_host_realm (context, lrealms); + if (foo != 0) + return KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME; + + if (aname->name.name_string.len == 1) + res = aname->name.name_string.val[0]; + else if (aname->name.name_string.len == 2 + && strcmp (aname->name.name_string.val[1], "root") == 0) + res = "root"; + else + return KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME; + + len = strlen (res); + if (len >= lnsize) + return ERANGE; + strcpy (lname, res); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac83ff7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/asn1_glue.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: asn1_glue.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_principal2principalname (PrincipalName *p, + const krb5_principal from) +{ + return copy_PrincipalName(&from->name, p); +} + +krb5_error_code +principalname2krb5_principal (krb5_principal *principal, + const PrincipalName from, + const Realm realm) +{ + krb5_principal p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + copy_PrincipalName(&from, &p->name); + p->realm = strdup(realm); + *principal = p; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/auth_context.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/auth_context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94b1376 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/auth_context.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: auth_context.c,v 1.50 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_init(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context) +{ + krb5_auth_context p; + + ALLOC(p, 1); + if(!p) + return ENOMEM; + memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); + ALLOC(p->authenticator, 1); + if (!p->authenticator) { + free(p); + return ENOMEM; + } + memset (p->authenticator, 0, sizeof(*p->authenticator)); + p->flags = KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME; + + p->local_address = NULL; + p->remote_address = NULL; + p->local_port = 0; + p->remote_port = 0; + p->keytype = KEYTYPE_NULL; + p->cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_NONE; + *auth_context = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_free(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context) +{ + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth_context->authenticator); + if(auth_context->local_address){ + free_HostAddress(auth_context->local_address); + free(auth_context->local_address); + } + if(auth_context->remote_address){ + free_HostAddress(auth_context->remote_address); + free(auth_context->remote_address); + } + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->remote_subkey); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->local_subkey); + free (auth_context); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setflags(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t flags) +{ + auth_context->flags = flags; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getflags(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *flags) +{ + *flags = auth_context->flags; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_address *local_addr, + krb5_address *remote_addr) +{ + if (local_addr) { + if (auth_context->local_address) + krb5_free_address (context, auth_context->local_address); + else + auth_context->local_address = malloc(sizeof(krb5_address)); + krb5_copy_address(context, local_addr, auth_context->local_address); + } + if (remote_addr) { + if (auth_context->remote_address) + krb5_free_address (context, auth_context->remote_address); + else + auth_context->remote_address = malloc(sizeof(krb5_address)); + krb5_copy_address(context, remote_addr, auth_context->remote_address); + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + void *p_fd) +{ + int fd = *((int *)p_fd); + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_address local_k_address, remote_k_address; + krb5_address *lptr = NULL, *rptr = NULL; + struct sockaddr_storage ss_local, ss_remote; + struct sockaddr *local = (struct sockaddr *)&ss_local; + struct sockaddr *remote = (struct sockaddr *)&ss_remote; + int len; + + if (auth_context->local_address == NULL) { + len = sizeof(ss_local); + if(getsockname(fd, local, &len) < 0) { + ret = errno; + goto out; + } + krb5_sockaddr2address (local, &local_k_address); + krb5_sockaddr2port (local, &auth_context->local_port); + lptr = &local_k_address; + } + if (auth_context->remote_address == NULL) { + len = sizeof(ss_remote); + if(getpeername(fd, remote, &len) < 0) { + ret = errno; + goto out; + } + krb5_sockaddr2address (remote, &remote_k_address); + krb5_sockaddr2port (remote, &auth_context->remote_port); + rptr = &remote_k_address; + } + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs (context, + auth_context, + lptr, + rptr); +out: + if (lptr) + krb5_free_address (context, lptr); + if (rptr) + krb5_free_address (context, rptr); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getaddrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_address **local_addr, + krb5_address **remote_addr) +{ + if(*local_addr) + krb5_free_address (context, *local_addr); + *local_addr = malloc (sizeof(**local_addr)); + if (*local_addr == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_copy_address(context, + auth_context->local_address, + *local_addr); + + if(*remote_addr) + krb5_free_address (context, *remote_addr); + *remote_addr = malloc (sizeof(**remote_addr)); + if (*remote_addr == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_copy_address(context, + auth_context->remote_address, + *remote_addr); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +copy_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *in, + krb5_keyblock **out) +{ + if(in) + return krb5_copy_keyblock(context, in, out); + *out = NULL; /* is this right? */ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock) +{ + return copy_key(context, auth_context->keyblock, keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock) +{ + return copy_key(context, auth_context->local_subkey, keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock) +{ + return copy_key(context, auth_context->remote_subkey, keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + return copy_key(context, keyblock, &auth_context->keyblock); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->local_subkey) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->local_subkey); + return copy_key(context, keyblock, &auth_context->local_subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->remote_subkey) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->remote_subkey); + return copy_key(context, keyblock, &auth_context->remote_subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setcksumtype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_cksumtype cksumtype) +{ + auth_context->cksumtype = cksumtype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getcksumtype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_cksumtype *cksumtype) +{ + *cksumtype = auth_context->cksumtype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setkeytype (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keytype keytype) +{ + auth_context->keytype = keytype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getkeytype (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keytype *keytype) +{ + *keytype = auth_context->keytype; + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setenctype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype etype) +{ + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + ALLOC(auth_context->keyblock, 1); + if(auth_context->keyblock == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + auth_context->keyblock->keytype = etype; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getenctype(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype *etype) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_getenctype called"); +} +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *seqnumber) +{ + *seqnumber = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t seqnumber) +{ + auth_context->local_seqnumber = seqnumber; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *seqnumber) +{ + *seqnumber = auth_context->remote_seqnumber; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t seqnumber) +{ + auth_context->remote_seqnumber = seqnumber; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getauthenticator(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator) +{ + *authenticator = malloc(sizeof(**authenticator)); + if (*authenticator == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + copy_Authenticator(auth_context->authenticator, + *authenticator); + return 0; +} + + +void +krb5_free_authenticator(krb5_context context, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator) +{ + free_Authenticator (*authenticator); + free (*authenticator); + *authenticator = NULL; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setuserkey(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(auth_context->keyblock) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->keyblock); + return krb5_copy_keyblock(context, keyblock, &auth_context->keyblock); +} + +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_initivector(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_con_initivector called"); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setivector(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_pointer ivector) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_con_setivector called"); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setrcache(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_rcache rcache) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_auth_con_setrcache called"); +} + +#endif /* not implemented */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8a89ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/build_ap_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: build_ap_req.c,v 1.16 1999/12/02 17:05:07 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_ap_req (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_flags ap_options, + krb5_data authenticator, + krb5_data *retdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + AP_REQ ap; + Ticket t; + size_t len; + + ap.pvno = 5; + ap.msg_type = krb_ap_req; + memset(&ap.ap_options, 0, sizeof(ap.ap_options)); + ap.ap_options.use_session_key = (ap_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY) > 0; + ap.ap_options.mutual_required = (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) > 0; + + ap.ticket.tkt_vno = 5; + copy_Realm(&cred->server->realm, &ap.ticket.realm); + copy_PrincipalName(&cred->server->name, &ap.ticket.sname); + + decode_Ticket(cred->ticket.data, cred->ticket.length, &t, &len); + copy_EncryptedData(&t.enc_part, &ap.ticket.enc_part); + free_Ticket(&t); + + ap.authenticator.etype = enctype; + ap.authenticator.kvno = NULL; + ap.authenticator.cipher = authenticator; + + retdata->length = length_AP_REQ(&ap); + retdata->data = malloc(retdata->length); + if(retdata->data == NULL) + ret = ENOMEM; + else + encode_AP_REQ((unsigned char *)retdata->data + retdata->length - 1, + retdata->length, &ap, &len); + free_AP_REQ(&ap); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/build_auth.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/build_auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a38393b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/build_auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: build_auth.c,v 1.32 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_authenticator (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_creds *cred, + Checksum *cksum, + Authenticator **auth_result, + krb5_data *result) +{ + Authenticator *auth; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + auth = malloc(sizeof(*auth)); + if (auth == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + memset (auth, 0, sizeof(*auth)); + auth->authenticator_vno = 5; + copy_Realm(&cred->client->realm, &auth->crealm); + copy_PrincipalName(&cred->client->name, &auth->cname); + + { + int32_t sec, usec; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + auth->ctime = sec; + auth->cusec = usec; + } + ret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(context, auth_context, &auth->subkey); + if(ret) + goto fail; + + if(auth->subkey == NULL) { + krb5_generate_subkey (context, &cred->session, &auth->subkey); + ret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context, auth_context, auth->subkey); + if(ret) + goto fail; + } + + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + krb5_generate_seq_number (context, + &cred->session, + &auth_context->local_seqnumber); + ALLOC(auth->seq_number, 1); + *auth->seq_number = auth_context->local_seqnumber; + } else + auth->seq_number = NULL; + auth->authorization_data = NULL; + auth->cksum = cksum; + + /* XXX - Copy more to auth_context? */ + + if (auth_context) { + auth_context->authenticator->ctime = auth->ctime; + auth_context->authenticator->cusec = auth->cusec; + } + + buf_size = 1024; + buf = malloc (buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + do { + ret = krb5_encode_Authenticator (context, + buf + buf_size - 1, + buf_size, + auth, &len); + if (ret) { + if (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW) { + u_char *tmp; + + buf_size *= 2; + tmp = realloc (buf, buf_size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + buf = tmp; + } else { + goto fail; + } + } + } while(ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW); + + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &cred->session, enctype, &crypto); + ret = krb5_encrypt (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + result); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + free (buf); + + if (auth_result) + *auth_result = auth; + else { + /* Don't free the `cksum', it's allocated by the caller */ + auth->cksum = NULL; + free_Authenticator (auth); + free (auth); + } + return ret; +fail: + free_Authenticator (auth); + free (auth); + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/cache.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/cache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e78d4de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: cache.c,v 1.44 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Add a new ccache type with operations `ops', overwriting any + * existing one if `override'. + * Return an error code or 0. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_register(krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + krb5_boolean override) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < context->num_cc_ops && context->cc_ops[i].prefix; i++) { + if(strcmp(context->cc_ops[i].prefix, ops->prefix) == 0) { + if(override) + free(context->cc_ops[i].prefix); + else + return KRB5_CC_TYPE_EXISTS; + } + } + if(i == context->num_cc_ops) { + krb5_cc_ops *o = realloc(context->cc_ops, + (context->num_cc_ops + 1) * + sizeof(*context->cc_ops)); + if(o == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + context->num_cc_ops++; + context->cc_ops = o; + memset(context->cc_ops + i, 0, + (context->num_cc_ops - i) * sizeof(*context->cc_ops)); + } + memcpy(&context->cc_ops[i], ops, sizeof(context->cc_ops[i])); + context->cc_ops[i].prefix = strdup(ops->prefix); + if(context->cc_ops[i].prefix == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Allocate memory for a new ccache in `id' with operations `ops' + * and name `residual'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +allocate_ccache (krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + const char *residual, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache p; + + p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if(p == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + p->ops = ops; + *id = p; + ret = p->ops->resolve(context, id, residual); + if(ret) + free(p); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Find and allocate a ccache in `id' from the specification in `residual'. + * If the ccache name doesn't contain any colon, interpret it as a file name. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_resolve(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < context->num_cc_ops && context->cc_ops[i].prefix; i++) { + size_t prefix_len = strlen(context->cc_ops[i].prefix); + + if(strncmp(context->cc_ops[i].prefix, name, prefix_len) == 0 + && name[prefix_len] == ':') { + return allocate_ccache (context, &context->cc_ops[i], + name + prefix_len + 1, + id); + } + } + if (strchr (name, ':') == NULL) + return allocate_ccache (context, &krb5_fcc_ops, name, id); + else + return KRB5_CC_UNKNOWN_TYPE; +} + +/* + * Generate a new ccache of type `ops' in `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_gen_new(krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_ccache p; + + p = malloc (sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + p->ops = ops; + *id = p; + return p->ops->gen_new(context, id); +} + +/* + * Return the name of the ccache `id' + */ + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return id->ops->get_name(context, id); +} + +/* + * Return the type of the ccache `id'. + */ + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return id->ops->prefix; +} + +/* + * Return a pointer to a static string containing the default ccache name. + */ + +const char* +krb5_cc_default_name(krb5_context context) +{ + static char name[1024]; + char *p; + + p = getenv("KRB5CCNAME"); + if(p) + strlcpy (name, p, sizeof(name)); + else + snprintf(name, + sizeof(name), + "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%u", + (unsigned)getuid()); + return name; +} + +/* + * Open the default ccache in `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_default(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache *id) +{ + return krb5_cc_resolve(context, + krb5_cc_default_name(context), + id); +} + +/* + * Create a new ccache in `id' for `primary_principal'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal) +{ + return id->ops->init(context, id, primary_principal); +} + + +/* + * Remove the ccache `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = id->ops->destroy(context, id); + krb5_cc_close (context, id); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Stop using the ccache `id' and free the related resources. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = id->ops->close(context, id); + free(id); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Store `creds' in the ccache `id'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_store_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return id->ops->store(context, id, creds); +} + +/* + * Retrieve the credential identified by `mcreds' (and `whichfields') + * from `id' in `creds'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags whichfields, + const krb5_creds *mcreds, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_cc_cursor cursor; + krb5_cc_start_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + while((ret = krb5_cc_next_cred(context, id, creds, &cursor)) == 0){ + if(krb5_compare_creds(context, whichfields, mcreds, creds)){ + ret = 0; + break; + } + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, creds); + } + krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the principal of `id' in `principal'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + return id->ops->get_princ(context, id, principal); +} + +/* + * Start iterating over `id', `cursor' is initialized to the + * beginning. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_start_seq_get (krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return id->ops->get_first(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Retrieve the next cred pointed to by (`id', `cursor') in `creds' + * and advance `cursor'. + * Return 0 or an error code. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_next_cred (krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return id->ops->get_next(context, id, cursor, creds); +} + +/* + * Destroy the cursor `cursor'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_end_seq_get (krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return id->ops->end_get(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Remove the credential identified by `cred', `which' from `id'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_remove_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *cred) +{ + return id->ops->remove_cred(context, id, which, cred); +} + +/* + * Set the flags of `id' to `flags'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_set_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + return id->ops->set_flags(context, id, flags); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of `from' to `to'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_copy_cache(krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache from, + krb5_ccache to) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_cc_cursor cursor; + krb5_creds cred; + krb5_principal princ; + + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, from, &princ); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, to, princ); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(context, from, &cursor); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; + } + while(ret == 0 && krb5_cc_next_cred(context, from, &cred, &cursor) == 0){ + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, to, &cred); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cred); + } + krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, from, &cursor); + krb5_free_principal(context, princ); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the version of `id'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_version(krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id) +{ + if(id->ops->get_version) + return id->ops->get_version(context, id); + else + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/changepw.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/changepw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd94440 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/changepw.c @@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: changepw.c,v 1.19 1999/12/11 23:14:51 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +get_kdc_address (krb5_context context, + krb5_realm realm, + struct addrinfo **ai) +{ + struct addrinfo hints; + krb5_error_code ret; + char **hostlist; + int port = 0; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + int error; + char *host; + char *dot; + + ret = krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst (context, + &realm, + &hostlist); + if (ret) + return ret; + + host = *hostlist; + + dot = strchr (host, ':'); + if (dot != NULL) { + char *end; + + *dot++ = '\0'; + port = strtol (dot, &end, 0); + } + if (port == 0) + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kpasswd", "udp", KPASSWD_PORT); + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%u", ntohs(port)); + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; + + error = getaddrinfo (host, portstr, &hints, ai); + krb5_free_krbhst (context, hostlist); + return error; +} + +static krb5_error_code +send_request (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_creds *creds, + int sock, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int sa_size, + char *passwd) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data ap_req_data; + krb5_data krb_priv_data; + krb5_data passwd_data; + size_t len; + u_char header[6]; + u_char *p; + struct iovec iov[3]; + struct msghdr msghdr; + + krb5_data_zero (&ap_req_data); + + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED, + NULL, /* in_data */ + creds, + &ap_req_data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + passwd_data.data = passwd; + passwd_data.length = strlen(passwd); + + krb5_data_zero (&krb_priv_data); + + ret = krb5_mk_priv (context, + *auth_context, + &passwd_data, + &krb_priv_data, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto out2; + + len = 6 + ap_req_data.length + krb_priv_data.length; + p = header; + *p++ = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = (ap_req_data.length >> 8) & 0xFF; + *p++ = (ap_req_data.length >> 0) & 0xFF; + + memset(&msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + msghdr.msg_name = (void *)sa; + msghdr.msg_namelen = sa_size; + msghdr.msg_iov = iov; + msghdr.msg_iovlen = sizeof(iov)/sizeof(*iov); +#if 0 + msghdr.msg_control = NULL; + msghdr.msg_controllen = 0; +#endif + + iov[0].iov_base = (void*)header; + iov[0].iov_len = 6; + iov[1].iov_base = ap_req_data.data; + iov[1].iov_len = ap_req_data.length; + iov[2].iov_base = krb_priv_data.data; + iov[2].iov_len = krb_priv_data.length; + + if (sendmsg (sock, &msghdr, 0) < 0) + ret = errno; + + krb5_data_free (&krb_priv_data); +out2: + krb5_data_free (&ap_req_data); + return ret; +} + +static void +str2data (krb5_data *d, + char *fmt, + ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + d->length = vasprintf ((char **)&d->data, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +static krb5_error_code +process_reply (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int sock, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_char reply[BUFSIZ]; + size_t len; + u_int16_t pkt_len, pkt_ver; + krb5_data ap_rep_data; + + ret = recvfrom (sock, reply, sizeof(reply), 0, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return errno; + + len = ret; + pkt_len = (reply[0] << 8) | (reply[1]); + pkt_ver = (reply[2] << 8) | (reply[3]); + + if (pkt_len != len) { + str2data (result_string, "client: wrong len in reply"); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + if (pkt_ver != 0x0001) { + str2data (result_string, + "client: wrong version number (%d)", pkt_ver); + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + return 0; + } + + ap_rep_data.data = reply + 6; + ap_rep_data.length = (reply[4] << 8) | (reply[5]); + + if (ap_rep_data.length) { + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *ap_rep; + krb5_data priv_data; + u_char *p; + + ret = krb5_rd_rep (context, + auth_context, + &ap_rep_data, + &ap_rep); + if (ret) + return ret; + + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (context, ap_rep); + + priv_data.data = (u_char*)ap_rep_data.data + ap_rep_data.length; + priv_data.length = len - ap_rep_data.length - 6; + + ret = krb5_rd_priv (context, + auth_context, + &priv_data, + result_code_string, + NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_data_free (result_code_string); + return ret; + } + + if (result_code_string->length < 2) { + *result_code = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; + str2data (result_string, + "client: bad length in result"); + return 0; + } + p = result_code_string->data; + + *result_code = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + krb5_data_copy (result_string, + (unsigned char*)result_code_string->data + 2, + result_code_string->length - 2); + return 0; + } else { + KRB_ERROR error; + size_t size; + u_char *p; + + ret = decode_KRB_ERROR(reply + 6, len - 6, &error, &size); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + if (error.e_data->length < 2) { + krb5_warnx (context, "too short e_data to print anything usable"); + return 1; + } + + p = error.e_data->data; + *result_code = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + krb5_data_copy (result_string, + p + 2, + error.e_data->length - 2); + return 0; + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_change_password (krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + char *newpw, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + int sock; + int i; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = get_kdc_address (context, creds->client->realm, &ai); + if (ret) + goto out; + + krb5_auth_con_setflags (context, auth_context, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE); + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + sock = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) + continue; + + for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) { + fd_set fdset; + struct timeval tv; + + ret = send_request (context, + &auth_context, + creds, + sock, + a->ai_addr, + a->ai_addrlen, + newpw); + if (ret) + goto out; + + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(sock, &fdset); + tv.tv_usec = 0; + tv.tv_sec = 1 << i; + + ret = select (sock + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &tv); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) + goto out; + if (ret == 1) + break; + } + if (i == 5) { + ret = KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; + close (sock); + continue; + } + + ret = process_reply (context, + auth_context, + sock, + result_code, + result_code_string, + result_string); + close (sock); + if (ret == 0) + break; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + +out: + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/codec.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/codec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d94613 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/codec.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: codec.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +/* these functions does what the normal asn.1-functions does, but + converts the keytype to/from the on-the-wire enctypes */ + +#if 1 +#define DECODE(T, K) return decode_ ## T(data, length, t, len) +#define ENCODE(T, K) return encode_ ## T(data, length, t, len) +#else +#define DECODE(T, K) \ +{ \ + krb5_error_code ret; \ + ret = decode_ ## T((void*)data, length, t, len); \ + if(ret) \ + return ret; \ + if(K) \ + ret = krb5_decode_keyblock(context, (K), 1); \ + return ret; \ +} + +#define ENCODE(T, K) \ +{ \ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; \ + if(K) \ + ret = krb5_decode_keyblock(context, (K), 0); \ + if(ret) \ + return ret; \ + return encode_ ## T(data, length, t, len); \ +} +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTicketPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncTicketPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + DECODE(EncTicketPart, &t->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTicketPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncTicketPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + ENCODE(EncTicketPart, &t->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncASRepPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncASRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + DECODE(EncASRepPart, &t->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncASRepPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncASRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + ENCODE(EncASRepPart, &t->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncTGSRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + DECODE(EncTGSRepPart, &t->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTGSRepPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncTGSRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, &t->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncAPRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + DECODE(EncAPRepPart, t->subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncAPRepPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ + ENCODE(EncAPRepPart, t->subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_Authenticator (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + Authenticator *t, + size_t *len) +{ + DECODE(Authenticator, t->subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_Authenticator (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + Authenticator *t, + size_t *len) +{ + ENCODE(Authenticator, t->subkey); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncKrbCredPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ +#if 1 + return decode_EncKrbCredPart(data, length, t, len); +#else + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + ret = decode_EncKrbCredPart((void*)data, length, t, len); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < t->ticket_info.len; i++) + if((ret = krb5_decode_keyblock(context, &t->ticket_info.val[i].key, 1))) + break; + return ret; +#endif +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncKrbCredPart *t, + size_t *len) +{ +#if 0 + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < t->ticket_info.len; i++) + if((ret = krb5_decode_keyblock(context, &t->ticket_info.val[i].key, 0))) + break; + if(ret) return ret; +#endif + return encode_EncKrbCredPart (data, length, t, len); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ETYPE_INFO (krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + ETYPE_INFO *t, + size_t *len) +{ +#if 1 + return decode_ETYPE_INFO(data, length, t, len); +#else + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + + ret = decode_ETYPE_INFO((void*)data, length, t, len); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < t->len; i++) { + if((ret = krb5_decode_keytype(context, &t->val[i].etype, 1))) + break; + } + return ret; +#endif +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_ETYPE_INFO (krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + ETYPE_INFO *t, + size_t *len) +{ +#if 0 + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + int i; + /* XXX this will break, since we need one key-info for each enctype */ + /* XXX or do we? */ + for(i = 0; i < t->len; i++) + if((ret = krb5_decode_keytype(context, &t->val[i].etype, 0))) + break; + if(ret) return ret; +#endif + return encode_ETYPE_INFO (data, length, t, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/config_file.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/config_file.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d1ff1e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/config_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,750 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: config_file.c,v 1.38 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_NETINFO + +static int parse_section(char *p, krb5_config_section **s, + krb5_config_section **res, + char **error_message); +static int parse_binding(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, char *p, + krb5_config_binding **b, + krb5_config_binding **parent, + char **error_message); +static int parse_list(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, krb5_config_binding **parent, + char **error_message); + +/* + * Parse a section: + * + * [section] + * foo = bar + * b = { + * a + * } + * ... + * + * starting at the line in `p', storing the resulting structure in + * `s' and hooking it into `parent'. + * Store the error message in `error_message'. + */ + +static int +parse_section(char *p, krb5_config_section **s, krb5_config_section **parent, + char **error_message) +{ + char *p1; + krb5_config_section *tmp; + + p1 = strchr (p + 1, ']'); + if (p1 == NULL) { + *error_message = "missing ]"; + return -1; + } + *p1 = '\0'; + tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_message = "out of memory"; + return -1; + } + tmp->name = strdup(p+1); + if (tmp->name == NULL) { + *error_message = "out of memory"; + return -1; + } + tmp->type = krb5_config_list; + tmp->u.list = NULL; + tmp->next = NULL; + if (*s) + (*s)->next = tmp; + else + *parent = tmp; + *s = tmp; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse a brace-enclosed list from `f', hooking in the structure at + * `parent'. + * Store the error message in `error_message'. + */ + +static int +parse_list(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, krb5_config_binding **parent, + char **error_message) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int ret; + krb5_config_binding *b = NULL; + unsigned beg_lineno = *lineno; + + while(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + char *p; + + ++*lineno; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + p = buf; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '#' || *p == ';' || *p == '\0') + continue; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '}') + return 0; + if (*p == '\0') + continue; + ret = parse_binding (f, lineno, p, &b, parent, error_message); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + *lineno = beg_lineno; + *error_message = "unclosed {"; + return -1; +} + +/* + * + */ + +static int +parse_binding(FILE *f, unsigned *lineno, char *p, + krb5_config_binding **b, krb5_config_binding **parent, + char **error_message) +{ + krb5_config_binding *tmp; + char *p1, *p2; + int ret = 0; + + p1 = p; + while (*p && *p != '=' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '\0') { + *error_message = "no ="; + return -1; + } + p2 = p; + while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p != '=') { + *error_message = "no ="; + return -1; + } + ++p; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_message = "out of memory"; + return -1; + } + *p2 = '\0'; + tmp->name = strdup(p1); + tmp->next = NULL; + if (*p == '{') { + tmp->type = krb5_config_list; + tmp->u.list = NULL; + ret = parse_list (f, lineno, &tmp->u.list, error_message); + } else { + p1 = p; + p = p1 + strlen(p1); + while(p > p1 && isspace((unsigned char)*(p-1))) + --p; + *p = '\0'; + tmp->type = krb5_config_string; + tmp->u.string = strdup(p1); + } + if (*b) + (*b)->next = tmp; + else + *parent = tmp; + *b = tmp; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse the config file `fname', generating the structures into `res' + * returning error messages in `error_message' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file_debug (const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res, + unsigned *lineno, + char **error_message) +{ + FILE *f; + krb5_config_section *s; + krb5_config_binding *b; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int ret; + + s = NULL; + b = NULL; + *lineno = 0; + f = fopen (fname, "r"); + if (f == NULL) { + *error_message = "cannot open file"; + return -1; + } + *res = NULL; + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + char *p; + + ++*lineno; + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + p = buf; + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '#' || *p == ';') + continue; + if (*p == '[') { + ret = parse_section(p, &s, res, error_message); + if (ret) + return ret; + b = NULL; + } else if (*p == '}') { + *error_message = "unmatched }"; + return -1; + } else if(*p != '\0') { + ret = parse_binding(f, lineno, p, &b, &s->u.list, error_message); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + } + fclose (f); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file (const char *fname, krb5_config_section **res) +{ + char *foo; + unsigned lineno; + + return krb5_config_parse_file_debug (fname, res, &lineno, &foo); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_NETINFO */ + +static void +free_binding (krb5_context context, krb5_config_binding *b) +{ + krb5_config_binding *next_b; + + while (b) { + free (b->name); + if (b->type == krb5_config_string) + free (b->u.string); + else if (b->type == krb5_config_list) + free_binding (context, b->u.list); + else + krb5_abortx(context, "unknown binding type (%d) in free_binding", + b->type); + next_b = b->next; + free (b); + b = next_b; + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_file_free (krb5_context context, krb5_config_section *s) +{ + free_binding (context, s); + return 0; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_get_next (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + ...) +{ + const char *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, type); + ret = krb5_config_vget_next (context, c, pointer, type, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_vget_next (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + va_list args) +{ + krb5_config_binding *b; + const char *p; + + if(c == NULL) + c = context->cf; + + if (c == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (*pointer == NULL) { + b = (c != NULL) ? c : context->cf; + p = va_arg(args, const char *); + if (p == NULL) + return NULL; + } else { + b = *pointer; + p = b->name; + b = b->next; + } + + while (b) { + if (strcmp (b->name, p) == 0) { + if (*pointer == NULL) + p = va_arg(args, const char *); + else + p = NULL; + if (type == b->type && p == NULL) { + *pointer = b; + return b->u.generic; + } else if(b->type == krb5_config_list && p != NULL) { + b = b->u.list; + } else { + return NULL; + } + } else { + b = b->next; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int type, + ...) +{ + const void *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, type); + ret = krb5_config_vget (context, c, type, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const void * +krb5_config_vget (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int type, + va_list args) +{ + krb5_config_binding *foo = NULL; + + return krb5_config_vget_next (context, c, &foo, type, args); +} + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_get_list (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_list (context, c, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_vget_list (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget (context, c, krb5_config_list, args); +} + +const char * +krb5_config_get_string (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + const char *ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +const char * +krb5_config_vget_string (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget (context, c, krb5_config_string, args); +} + +char ** +krb5_config_vget_strings(krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + char **strings = NULL; + int nstr = 0; + krb5_config_binding *b = NULL; + const char *p; + + while((p = krb5_config_vget_next(context, c, &b, + krb5_config_string, args))) { + char *tmp = strdup(p); + char *pos = NULL; + char *s; + if(tmp == NULL) + goto cleanup; + s = strtok_r(tmp, " \t", &pos); + while(s){ + char **tmp = realloc(strings, (nstr + 1) * sizeof(*strings)); + if(tmp == NULL) + goto cleanup; + strings = tmp; + strings[nstr] = strdup(s); + nstr++; + if(strings[nstr-1] == NULL) + goto cleanup; + s = strtok_r(NULL, " \t", &pos); + } + free(tmp); + } + if(nstr){ + char **tmp = realloc(strings, (nstr + 1) * sizeof(*strings)); + if(strings == NULL) + goto cleanup; + strings = tmp; + strings[nstr] = NULL; + } + return strings; +cleanup: + while(nstr--) + free(strings[nstr]); + free(strings); + return NULL; + +} + +char** +krb5_config_get_strings(krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char **ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_strings(context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +void +krb5_config_free_strings(char **strings) +{ + char **s = strings; + while(s && *s){ + free(*s); + s++; + } + free(strings); +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_boolean def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *str; + str = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if(str == NULL) + return def_value; + if(strcasecmp(str, "yes") == 0 || + strcasecmp(str, "true") == 0 || + atoi(str)) return TRUE; + return FALSE; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget_bool_default (context, c, FALSE, args); +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_boolean def_value, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_boolean ret; + va_start(ap, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_bool_default(context, c, def_value, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_boolean ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_bool (context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +krb5_config_vget_time_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *str; + str = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if(str == NULL) + return def_value; + return parse_time (str, NULL); +} + +int +krb5_config_vget_time (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget_time_default (context, c, -1, args); +} + +int +krb5_config_get_time_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_time_default(context, c, def_value, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +krb5_config_get_time (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_time (context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + + +int +krb5_config_vget_int_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + va_list args) +{ + const char *str; + str = krb5_config_vget_string (context, c, args); + if(str == NULL) + return def_value; + else { + char *endptr; + long l; + l = strtol(str, &endptr, 0); + if (endptr == str) + return def_value; + else + return l; + } +} + +int +krb5_config_vget_int (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args) +{ + return krb5_config_vget_int_default (context, c, -1, args); +} + +int +krb5_config_get_int_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, def_value); + ret = krb5_config_vget_int_default(context, c, def_value, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +krb5_config_get_int (krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + va_start(ap, c); + ret = krb5_config_vget_int (context, c, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef TEST + +static int print_list (krb5_context context, FILE *f, + krb5_config_binding *l, unsigned level); +static int print_binding (krb5_context context, FILE *f, + krb5_config_binding *b, unsigned level); +static int print_section (krb5_context context, FILE *f, + krb5_config_section *s, unsigned level); +static int print_config (krb5_context context, FILE *f, + krb5_config_section *c); + +static void +tab (FILE *f, unsigned count) +{ + while(count--) + fprintf (f, "\t"); +} + +static int +print_list (krb5_context context, + FILE *f, + krb5_config_binding *l, + unsigned level) +{ + while(l) { + print_binding (context, f, l, level); + l = l->next; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +print_binding (krb5_context context, + FILE *f, + krb5_config_binding *b, + unsigned level) +{ + tab (f, level); + fprintf (f, "%s = ", b->name); + if (b->type == krb5_config_string) + fprintf (f, "%s\n", b->u.string); + else if (b->type == krb5_config_list) { + fprintf (f, "{\n"); + print_list (f, b->u.list, level + 1); + tab (f, level); + fprintf (f, "}\n"); + } else + krb5_abortx(context, "unknown binding type (%d) in print_binding", + b->type); + return 0; +} + +static int +print_section (FILE *f, krb5_config_section *s, unsigned level) +{ + fprintf (f, "[%s]\n", s->name); + print_list (f, s->u.list, level + 1); + return 0; +} + +static int +print_config (FILE *f, krb5_config_section *c) +{ + while (c) { + print_section (f, c, 0); + c = c->next; + } + return 0; +} + + +int +main(void) +{ + krb5_config_section *c; + + printf ("%d\n", krb5_config_parse_file ("/etc/krb5.conf", &c)); + print_config (stdout, c); + printf ("[libdefaults]ticket_lifetime = %s\n", + krb5_config_get_string (context, c, + "libdefaults", + "ticket_lifetime", + NULL)); + printf ("[realms]foo = %s\n", + krb5_config_get_string (context, c, + "realms", + "foo", + NULL)); + printf ("[realms]ATHENA.MIT.EDU/v4_instance_convert/lithium = %s\n", + krb5_config_get_string (context, c, + "realms", + "ATHENA.MIT.EDU", + "v4_instance_convert", + "lithium", + NULL)); + return 0; +} + +#endif /* TEST */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aeb939a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/config_file_netinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: config_file_netinfo.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Netinfo implementation from Luke Howard + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINFO +#include +static ni_status +ni_proplist2binding(ni_proplist *pl, krb5_config_section **ret) +{ + int i, j; + krb5_config_section **next = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < pl->ni_proplist_len; i++) { + if (!strcmp(pl->nipl_val[i].nip_name, "name")) + continue; + + for (j = 0; j < pl->nipl_val[i].nip_val.ni_namelist_len; j++) { + krb5_config_binding *b; + + b = malloc(sizeof(*b)); + if (b == NULL) + return NI_FAILED; + + b->next = NULL; + b->type = krb5_config_string; + b->name = ni_name_dup(pl->nipl_val[i].nip_name); + b->u.string = ni_name_dup(pl->nipl_val[i].nip_val.ninl_val[j]); + + if (next == NULL) { + *ret = b; + } else { + *next = b; + } + next = &b->next; + } + } + return NI_OK; +} + +static ni_status +ni_idlist2binding(void *ni, ni_idlist *idlist, krb5_config_section **ret) +{ + int i; + ni_status nis; + krb5_config_section **next; + + for (i = 0; i < idlist->ni_idlist_len; i++) { + ni_proplist pl; + ni_id nid; + ni_idlist children; + krb5_config_binding *b; + ni_index index; + + nid.nii_instance = 0; + nid.nii_object = idlist->ni_idlist_val[i]; + + nis = ni_read(ni, &nid, &pl); + + if (nis != NI_OK) { + return nis; + } + index = ni_proplist_match(pl, "name", NULL); + b = malloc(sizeof(*b)); + if (b == NULL) return NI_FAILED; + + if (i == 0) { + *ret = b; + } else { + *next = b; + } + + b->type = krb5_config_list; + b->name = ni_name_dup(pl.nipl_val[index].nip_val.ninl_val[0]); + b->next = NULL; + b->u.list = NULL; + + /* get the child directories */ + nis = ni_children(ni, &nid, &children); + if (nis == NI_OK) { + nis = ni_idlist2binding(ni, &children, &b->u.list); + if (nis != NI_OK) { + return nis; + } + } + + nis = ni_proplist2binding(&pl, b->u.list == NULL ? &b->u.list : &b->u.list->next); + ni_proplist_free(&pl); + if (nis != NI_OK) { + return nis; + } + next = &b->next; + } + ni_idlist_free(idlist); + return NI_OK; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file (const char *fname, krb5_config_section **res) +{ + void *ni = NULL, *lastni = NULL; + int i; + ni_status nis; + ni_id nid; + ni_idlist children; + + krb5_config_section *s; + int ret; + + s = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + if (i == 0) { + nis = ni_open(NULL, ".", &ni); + } else { + if (lastni != NULL) ni_free(lastni); + lastni = ni; + nis = ni_open(lastni, "..", &ni); + } + if (nis != NI_OK) + break; + nis = ni_pathsearch(ni, &nid, "/locations/kerberos"); + if (nis == NI_OK) { + nis = ni_children(ni, &nid, &children); + if (nis != NI_OK) + break; + nis = ni_idlist2binding(ni, &children, &s); + break; + } + } + + if (ni != NULL) ni_free(ni); + if (ni != lastni && lastni != NULL) ni_free(lastni); + + ret = (nis == NI_OK) ? 0 : -1; + if (ret == 0) { + *res = s; + } else { + *res = NULL; + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* HAVE_NETINFO */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/constants.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/constants.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8314c26 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/constants.c @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: constants.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +const char krb5_config_file[] = "/etc/krb5.conf"; +const char krb5_defkeyname[] = "/etc/v5srvtab"; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/context.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/context.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf25f7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/context.c @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: context.c,v 1.51 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +#define INIT_FIELD(C, T, E, D, F) \ + (C)->E = krb5_config_get_ ## T ## _default ((C), NULL, (D), \ + "libdefaults", F, NULL) + +#ifdef KRB4 +extern krb5_kt_ops krb4_fkt_ops; +#endif + +/* + * Set the list of etypes `ret_etypes' from the configuration variable + * `name' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +set_etypes (krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_enctype **ret_enctypes) +{ + char **etypes_str; + krb5_enctype *etypes; + + etypes_str = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + name, NULL); + if(etypes_str){ + int i, j, k; + for(i = 0; etypes_str[i]; i++); + etypes = malloc((i+1) * sizeof(*etypes)); + if (etypes == NULL) { + krb5_config_free_strings (etypes_str); + return ENOMEM; + } + for(j = 0, k = 0; j < i; j++) { + if(krb5_string_to_enctype(context, etypes_str[j], &etypes[k]) == 0) + k++; + } + etypes[k] = ETYPE_NULL; + krb5_config_free_strings(etypes_str); + *ret_enctypes = etypes; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * read variables from the configuration file and set in `context' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +init_context_from_config_file(krb5_context context) +{ + const char * tmp; + INIT_FIELD(context, time, max_skew, 5 * 60, "clockskew"); + INIT_FIELD(context, time, kdc_timeout, 3, "kdc_timeout"); + INIT_FIELD(context, int, max_retries, 3, "max_retries"); + + context->http_proxy = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "http_proxy", NULL); + + set_etypes (context, "default_etypes", &context->etypes); + set_etypes (context, "default_etypes_des", &context->etypes_des); + + /* default keytab name */ + context->default_keytab = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "default_keytab_name", + NULL); + if(context->default_keytab == NULL) + context->default_keytab = KEYTAB_DEFAULT; + + context->time_fmt = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "time_format", NULL); + if(context->time_fmt == NULL) + context->time_fmt = "%d-%b-%Y %H:%M:%S"; + context->log_utc = krb5_config_get_bool(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "log_utc", NULL); + + /* init dns-proxy slime */ + tmp = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "dns_proxy", NULL); + if(tmp) + roken_gethostby_setup(context->http_proxy, tmp); + context->default_realms = NULL; + + { + krb5_addresses addresses; + char **adr, **a; + adr = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "extra_addresses", + NULL); + memset(&addresses, 0, sizeof(addresses)); + for(a = adr; a && *a; a++) { + krb5_parse_address(context, *a, &addresses); + krb5_add_extra_addresses(context, &addresses); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &addresses); + } + krb5_config_free_strings(adr); + } + + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, scan_interfaces, TRUE, "scan_interfaces"); + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, srv_lookup, TRUE, "srv_lookup"); + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, srv_try_txt, FALSE, "srv_try_txt"); + INIT_FIELD(context, bool, srv_try_rfc2052, TRUE, "srv_try_rfc2052"); + INIT_FIELD(context, int, fcache_vno, 0, "fcache_version"); + + context->cc_ops = NULL; + context->num_cc_ops = 0; + krb5_cc_register(context, &krb5_fcc_ops, TRUE); + krb5_cc_register(context, &krb5_mcc_ops, TRUE); + + context->num_kt_types = 0; + context->kt_types = NULL; + krb5_kt_register (context, &krb5_fkt_ops); + krb5_kt_register (context, &krb5_mkt_ops); +#ifdef KRB4 + krb5_kt_register (context, &krb4_fkt_ops); +#endif + krb5_kt_register (context, &krb5_akf_ops); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_context(krb5_context *context) +{ + krb5_context p; + const char *config_file = NULL; + krb5_config_section *tmp_cf; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ALLOC(p, 1); + if(!p) + return ENOMEM; + memset(p, 0, sizeof(krb5_context_data)); + + /* init error tables */ + krb5_init_ets(p); + + if(!issuid()) + config_file = getenv("KRB5_CONFIG"); + if (config_file == NULL) + config_file = krb5_config_file; + + ret = krb5_config_parse_file (config_file, &tmp_cf); + + if (ret == 0) + p->cf = tmp_cf; +#if 0 + else + krb5_warnx (p, "Unable to parse config file %s. Ignoring.", + config_file); /* XXX */ +#endif + + ret = init_context_from_config_file(p); + if(ret) + return ret; + + *context = p; + return 0; +} + +void +krb5_free_context(krb5_context context) +{ + int i; + + free(context->etypes); + free(context->etypes_des); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, context->default_realms); + krb5_config_file_free (context, context->cf); + free_error_table (context->et_list); + for(i = 0; i < context->num_cc_ops; ++i) + free(context->cc_ops[i].prefix); + free(context->cc_ops); + free(context->kt_types); + free(context); +} + +static krb5_error_code +default_etypes(krb5_enctype **etype) +{ + krb5_enctype p[] = { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + ETYPE_NULL + }; + *etype = malloc(sizeof(p)); + if(*etype == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(*etype, p, sizeof(p)); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_in_tkt_etypes(krb5_context context, + const krb5_enctype *etypes) +{ + int i; + krb5_enctype *p = NULL; + + if(etypes) { + i = 0; + while(etypes[i]) + if(!krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i++])) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ++i; + ALLOC(p, i); + if(!p) + return ENOMEM; + memmove(p, etypes, i * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + } + if(context->etypes) + free(context->etypes); + context->etypes = p; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype **etypes) +{ + krb5_enctype *p; + int i; + + if(context->etypes) { + for(i = 0; context->etypes[i]; i++); + ++i; + ALLOC(p, i); + if(!p) + return ENOMEM; + memmove(p, context->etypes, i * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + } else + if(default_etypes(&p)) + return ENOMEM; + *etypes = p; + return 0; +} + +const char * +krb5_get_err_text(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code) +{ + const char *p = com_right(context->et_list, code); + if(p == NULL) + p = strerror(code); + return p; +} + +void +krb5_init_ets(krb5_context context) +{ + if(context->et_list == NULL){ + initialize_krb5_error_table_r(&context->et_list); + initialize_asn1_error_table_r(&context->et_list); + initialize_heim_error_table_r(&context->et_list); + } +} + +void +krb5_set_use_admin_kdc (krb5_context context, krb5_boolean flag) +{ + context->use_admin_kdc = flag; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_get_use_admin_kdc (krb5_context context) +{ + return context->use_admin_kdc; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_extra_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + + if(context->extra_addresses) + return krb5_append_addresses(context, + context->extra_addresses, addresses); + else + return krb5_set_extra_addresses(context, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_extra_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + if(context->extra_addresses) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, context->extra_addresses); + free(context->extra_addresses); + } + if(context->extra_addresses == NULL) { + context->extra_addresses = malloc(sizeof(*context->extra_addresses)); + if(context->extra_addresses == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + } + return copy_HostAddresses(addresses, context->extra_addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_extra_addresses(krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + if(context->extra_addresses == NULL) { + memset(addresses, 0, sizeof(*addresses)); + return 0; + } + return copy_HostAddresses(context->extra_addresses, addresses); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_fcache_version(krb5_context context, int version) +{ + context->fcache_vno = version; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_fcache_version(krb5_context context, int *version) +{ + *version = context->fcache_vno; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/convert_creds.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/convert_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24dea0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/convert_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: convert_creds.c,v 1.13 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +check_ticket_flags(TicketFlags f) +{ + return 0; /* maybe add some more tests here? */ +} + +/* include this here, to avoid dependencies on libkrb */ + +#define MAX_KTXT_LEN 1250 + +#define ANAME_SZ 40 +#define REALM_SZ 40 +#define SNAME_SZ 40 +#define INST_SZ 40 + +struct ktext { + unsigned int length; /* Length of the text */ + unsigned char dat[MAX_KTXT_LEN]; /* The data itself */ + u_int32_t mbz; /* zero to catch runaway strings */ +}; + +struct credentials { + char service[ANAME_SZ]; /* Service name */ + char instance[INST_SZ]; /* Instance */ + char realm[REALM_SZ]; /* Auth domain */ + des_cblock session; /* Session key */ + int lifetime; /* Lifetime */ + int kvno; /* Key version number */ + struct ktext ticket_st; /* The ticket itself */ + int32_t issue_date; /* The issue time */ + char pname[ANAME_SZ]; /* Principal's name */ + char pinst[INST_SZ]; /* Principal's instance */ +}; + + +#define TKTLIFENUMFIXED 64 +#define TKTLIFEMINFIXED 0x80 +#define TKTLIFEMAXFIXED 0xBF +#define TKTLIFENOEXPIRE 0xFF +#define MAXTKTLIFETIME (30*24*3600) /* 30 days */ +#ifndef NEVERDATE +#define NEVERDATE ((time_t)0x7fffffffL) +#endif + +static const int _tkt_lifetimes[TKTLIFENUMFIXED] = { + 38400, 41055, 43894, 46929, 50174, 53643, 57352, 61318, + 65558, 70091, 74937, 80119, 85658, 91581, 97914, 104684, + 111922, 119661, 127935, 136781, 146239, 156350, 167161, 178720, + 191077, 204289, 218415, 233517, 249664, 266926, 285383, 305116, + 326213, 348769, 372885, 398668, 426234, 455705, 487215, 520904, + 556921, 595430, 636601, 680618, 727680, 777995, 831789, 889303, + 950794, 1016537, 1086825, 1161973, 1242318, 1328218, 1420057, 1518247, + 1623226, 1735464, 1855462, 1983758, 2120925, 2267576, 2424367, 2592000 +}; + +static int +_krb_time_to_life(time_t start, time_t end) +{ + int i; + time_t life = end - start; + + if (life > MAXTKTLIFETIME || life <= 0) + return 0; +#if 0 + if (krb_no_long_lifetimes) + return (life + 5*60 - 1)/(5*60); +#endif + + if (end >= NEVERDATE) + return TKTLIFENOEXPIRE; + if (life < _tkt_lifetimes[0]) + return (life + 5*60 - 1)/(5*60); + for (i=0; isession.keytype, + &keytype); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (keytype != KEYTYPE_DES) { + krb5_creds template; + + memset (&template, 0, sizeof(template)); + template.session.keytype = KEYTYPE_DES; + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in_cred->client, &template.client); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &template); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in_cred->server, &template.server); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &template); + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, 0, ccache, + &template, &v5_creds); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &template); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = check_ticket_flags(v5_creds->flags.b); + if(ret) + goto out2; + + ret = krb5_sendto_kdc (context, + &v5_creds->ticket, + krb5_princ_realm(context, v5_creds->server), + &reply); + if (ret) + goto out2; + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(reply.data, reply.length); + if(sp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out2; + } + krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + ret = tmp; + if(ret == 0) { + memset(v4creds, 0, sizeof(*v4creds)); + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) goto out; + v4creds->kvno = tmp; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &ticket); + if(ret) goto out; + v4creds->ticket_st.length = ticket.length; + memcpy(v4creds->ticket_st.dat, ticket.data, ticket.length); + krb5_data_free(&ticket); + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, + v5_creds->server, + v4creds->service, + v4creds->instance, + v4creds->realm); + if(ret) goto out; + v4creds->issue_date = v5_creds->times.authtime; + v4creds->lifetime = _krb_time_to_life(v4creds->issue_date, + v5_creds->times.endtime); + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal(context, v5_creds->client, + v4creds->pname, + v4creds->pinst, + realm); + if(ret) goto out; + memcpy(v4creds->session, v5_creds->session.keyvalue.data, 8); + } +out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_data_free(&reply); +out2: + if (v5_creds != in_cred) + krb5_free_creds (context, v5_creds); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a8f3ec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/copy_host_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: copy_host_realm.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Copy the list of realms from `from' to `to'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_host_realm(krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *from, + krb5_realm **to) +{ + int n, i; + const krb5_realm *p; + + for (n = 0, p = from; *p != NULL; ++p) + ++n; + ++n; + *to = malloc (n * sizeof(**to)); + if (*to == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + (*to)[i] = NULL; + for (i = 0, p = from; *p != NULL; ++p, ++i) { + (*to)[i] = strdup(*p); + if ((*to)[i] == NULL) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, *to); + return ENOMEM; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/crc.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/crc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f9ef95 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/crc.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: crc.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +static u_long table[256]; + +#define CRC_GEN 0xEDB88320L + +void +_krb5_crc_init_table(void) +{ + static int flag = 0; + unsigned long crc, poly; + int i, j; + + if(flag) return; + poly = CRC_GEN; + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + crc = i; + for (j = 8; j > 0; j--) { + if (crc & 1) { + crc = (crc >> 1) ^ poly; + } else { + crc >>= 1; + } + } + table[i] = crc; + } + flag = 1; +} + +u_int32_t +_krb5_crc_update (char *p, size_t len, u_int32_t res) +{ + while (len--) + res = table[(res ^ *p++) & 0xFF] ^ (res >> 8); + return res & 0xFFFFFFFF; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/creds.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7051168 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: creds.c,v 1.14 1999/12/02 17:05:08 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_cred_contents (krb5_context context, krb5_creds *c) +{ + return krb5_free_creds_contents (context, c); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds_contents (krb5_context context, krb5_creds *c) +{ + krb5_free_principal (context, c->client); + c->client = NULL; + krb5_free_principal (context, c->server); + c->server = NULL; + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &c->session); + krb5_data_free (&c->ticket); + krb5_data_free (&c->second_ticket); + free_AuthorizationData (&c->authdata); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &c->addresses); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds_contents (krb5_context context, + const krb5_creds *incred, + krb5_creds *c) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, incred->client, &c->client); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, incred->server, &c->server); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context, &incred->session, &c->session); + if (ret) + goto fail; + c->times = incred->times; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&c->ticket, + incred->ticket.data, + incred->ticket.length); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&c->second_ticket, + incred->second_ticket.data, + incred->second_ticket.length); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = copy_AuthorizationData(&incred->authdata, &c->authdata); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_addresses (context, + &incred->addresses, + &c->addresses); + if (ret) + goto fail; + c->flags = incred->flags; + return 0; + +fail: + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, c); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds (krb5_context context, + const krb5_creds *incred, + krb5_creds **outcred) +{ + krb5_creds *c; + + c = malloc (sizeof (*c)); + if (c == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memset (c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + *outcred = c; + return krb5_copy_creds_contents (context, incred, c); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds (krb5_context context, krb5_creds *c) +{ + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, c); + free (c); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return TRUE if `mcreds' and `creds' are equal (`whichfields' + * determines what equal means). + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_compare_creds(krb5_context context, krb5_flags whichfields, + const krb5_creds *mcreds, const krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_boolean match; + + if(whichfields & KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM) + match = krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, + mcreds->server, + creds->server); + else + match = krb5_principal_compare(context, mcreds->server, creds->server); + if(match && (whichfields & KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE) && + !krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys (context, + mcreds->session.keytype, + creds->session.keytype)) + match = FALSE; + return match; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/crypto.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6db6ce --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,2314 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +RCSID("$Id: crypto.c,v 1.28 2000/01/06 20:21:13 assar Exp $"); + +#undef CRYPTO_DEBUG +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG +static void krb5_crypto_debug(krb5_context, int, size_t, krb5_keyblock*); +#endif + + +struct key_data { + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_data *schedule; +}; + +struct key_usage { + unsigned usage; + struct key_data key; +}; + +struct krb5_crypto_data { + struct encryption_type *et; + struct key_data key; + int num_key_usage; + struct key_usage *key_usage; +}; + +#define CRYPTO_ETYPE(C) ((C)->et->type) + +/* bits for `flags' below */ +#define F_KEYED 1 /* checksum is keyed */ +#define F_CPROOF 2 /* checksum is collision proof */ +#define F_DERIVED 4 /* uses derived keys */ +#define F_VARIANT 8 /* uses `variant' keys (6.4.3) */ +#define F_PSEUDO 16 /* not a real protocol type */ + +struct salt_type { + krb5_salttype type; + const char *name; + krb5_error_code (*string_to_key)(krb5_context, krb5_enctype, krb5_data, + krb5_salt, krb5_keyblock*); +}; + +struct key_type { + krb5_keytype type; /* XXX */ + const char *name; + size_t bits; + size_t size; + size_t schedule_size; +#if 0 + krb5_enctype best_etype; +#endif + void (*random_key)(krb5_context, krb5_keyblock*); + void (*schedule)(krb5_context, struct key_data *); + struct salt_type *string_to_key; +}; + +struct checksum_type { + krb5_cksumtype type; + const char *name; + size_t blocksize; + size_t checksumsize; + unsigned flags; + void (*checksum)(krb5_context, struct key_data*, void*, size_t, Checksum*); + krb5_error_code (*verify)(krb5_context, struct key_data*, + void*, size_t, Checksum*); +}; + +struct encryption_type { + krb5_enctype type; + const char *name; + size_t blocksize; + size_t confoundersize; + struct key_type *keytype; + struct checksum_type *cksumtype; + struct checksum_type *keyed_checksum; + unsigned flags; + void (*encrypt)(struct key_data *, void *, size_t, int); +}; + +#define ENCRYPTION_USAGE(U) (((U) << 8) | 0xAA) +#define INTEGRITY_USAGE(U) (((U) << 8) | 0x55) +#define CHECKSUM_USAGE(U) (((U) << 8) | 0x99) + +static struct checksum_type *_find_checksum(krb5_cksumtype type); +static struct encryption_type *_find_enctype(krb5_enctype type); +static struct key_type *_find_keytype(krb5_keytype type); +static krb5_error_code _get_derived_key(krb5_context, krb5_crypto, + unsigned, struct key_data**); +static struct key_data *_new_derived_key(krb5_crypto crypto, unsigned usage); + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +static void +DES_random_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + des_cblock *k = key->keyvalue.data; + do { + krb5_generate_random_block(k, sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_set_odd_parity(k); + } while(des_is_weak_key(k)); +} + +static void +DES_schedule(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key) +{ + des_set_key(key->key->keyvalue.data, key->schedule->data); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + char *s; + size_t len; + des_cblock tmp; + + len = password.length + salt.saltvalue.length + 1; + s = malloc(len); + if(s == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(s, password.data, password.length); + memcpy(s + password.length, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + s[len - 1] = '\0'; + des_string_to_key(s, &tmp); + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_copy(&key->keyvalue, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(s, 0, len); + free(s); + return 0; +} + +/* This defines the Andrew string_to_key function. It accepts a password + * string as input and converts its via a one-way encryption algorithm to a DES + * encryption key. It is compatible with the original Andrew authentication + * service password database. + */ + +/* + * Short passwords, i.e 8 characters or less. + */ +static void +DES_AFS3_CMU_string_to_key (krb5_data pw, + krb5_data cell, + des_cblock *key) +{ + char password[8+1]; /* crypt is limited to 8 chars anyway */ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + char c = ((i < pw.length) ? ((char*)pw.data)[i] : 0) ^ + ((i < cell.length) ? ((char*)cell.data)[i] : 0); + password[i] = c ? c : 'X'; + } + password[8] = '\0'; + + memcpy(key, crypt(password, "#~") + 2, sizeof(des_cblock)); + + /* parity is inserted into the LSB so left shift each byte up one + bit. This allows ascii characters with a zero MSB to retain as + much significance as possible. */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(des_cblock); i++) + ((unsigned char*)key)[i] <<= 1; + des_set_odd_parity (key); +} + +/* + * Long passwords, i.e 9 characters or more. + */ +static void +DES_AFS3_Transarc_string_to_key (krb5_data pw, + krb5_data cell, + des_cblock *key) +{ + des_key_schedule schedule; + des_cblock temp_key; + des_cblock ivec; + char password[512]; + size_t passlen; + + memcpy(password, pw.data, min(pw.length, sizeof(password))); + if(pw.length < sizeof(password)) + memcpy(password + pw.length, + cell.data, min(cell.length, + sizeof(password) - pw.length)); + passlen = min(sizeof(password), pw.length + cell.length); + memcpy(&ivec, "kerberos", 8); + memcpy(&temp_key, "kerberos", 8); + des_set_odd_parity (&temp_key); + des_set_key (&temp_key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)password, &ivec, passlen, schedule, &ivec); + + memcpy(&temp_key, &ivec, 8); + des_set_odd_parity (&temp_key); + des_set_key (&temp_key, schedule); + des_cbc_cksum ((des_cblock *)password, key, passlen, schedule, &ivec); + memset(&schedule, 0, sizeof(schedule)); + memset(&temp_key, 0, sizeof(temp_key)); + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + memset(password, 0, sizeof(password)); + + des_set_odd_parity (key); +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES_AFS3_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + des_cblock tmp; + if(password.length > 8) + DES_AFS3_Transarc_string_to_key(password, salt.saltvalue, &tmp); + else + DES_AFS3_CMU_string_to_key(password, salt.saltvalue, &tmp); + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_copy(&key->keyvalue, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + return 0; +} + +static void +DES3_random_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + des_cblock *k = key->keyvalue.data; + do { + krb5_generate_random_block(k, 3 * sizeof(des_cblock)); + des_set_odd_parity(&k[0]); + des_set_odd_parity(&k[1]); + des_set_odd_parity(&k[2]); + } while(des_is_weak_key(&k[0]) || + des_is_weak_key(&k[1]) || + des_is_weak_key(&k[2])); +} + +static void +DES3_schedule(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key) +{ + des_cblock *k = key->key->keyvalue.data; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + des_set_key(&k[0], s[0]); + des_set_key(&k[1], s[1]); + des_set_key(&k[2], s[2]); +} + +/* + * A = A xor B. A & B are 8 bytes. + */ + +static void +xor (des_cblock *key, const unsigned char *b) +{ + unsigned char *a = (unsigned char*)key; + a[0] ^= b[0]; + a[1] ^= b[1]; + a[2] ^= b[2]; + a[3] ^= b[3]; + a[4] ^= b[4]; + a[5] ^= b[5]; + a[6] ^= b[6]; + a[7] ^= b[7]; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES3_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + char *str; + size_t len; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + des_cblock keys[3]; + + len = password.length + salt.saltvalue.length; + str = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && str == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(str, password.data, password.length); + memcpy(str + password.length, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + { + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule s[3]; + int i; + + _krb5_n_fold(str, len, tmp, 24); + + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++){ + memcpy(keys + i, tmp + i * 8, sizeof(keys[i])); + des_set_odd_parity(keys + i); + if(des_is_weak_key(keys + i)) + xor(keys + i, (unsigned char*)"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\xf0"); + des_set_key(keys + i, s[i]); + } + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((void*)tmp, (void*)tmp, sizeof(tmp), + s[0], s[1], s[2], &ivec, DES_ENCRYPT); + memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++){ + memcpy(keys + i, tmp + i * 8, sizeof(keys[i])); + des_set_odd_parity(keys + i); + if(des_is_weak_key(keys + i)) + xor(keys + i, (unsigned char*)"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\xf0"); + } + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + } + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_copy(&key->keyvalue, keys, sizeof(keys)); + memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); + memset(str, 0, len); + free(str); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +DES3_string_to_key_derived(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len = password.length + salt.saltvalue.length; + char *s; + + s = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && s == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(s, password.data, password.length); + memcpy(s + password.length, salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length); + ret = krb5_string_to_key_derived(context, + s, + len, + enctype, + key); + memset(s, 0, len); + free(s); + return ret; +} + +/* + * ARCFOUR + */ + +static void +ARCFOUR_random_key(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_generate_random_block (key->keyvalue.data, + key->keyvalue.length); +} + +static void +ARCFOUR_schedule(krb5_context context, struct key_data *kd) +{ + RC4_set_key (kd->schedule->data, + kd->key->keyvalue.length, kd->key->keyvalue.data); +} + +static krb5_error_code +ARCFOUR_string_to_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + char *s, *p; + size_t len; + int i; + struct md4 m; + + len = 2 * (password.length + salt.saltvalue.length); + s = malloc (len); + if (len != 0 && s == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for (p = s, i = 0; i < password.length; ++i) { + *p++ = ((char *)password.data)[i]; + *p++ = 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < salt.saltvalue.length; ++i) { + *p++ = ((char *)salt.saltvalue.data)[i]; + *p++ = 0; + } + md4_init(&m); + md4_update(&m, s, len); + key->keytype = enctype; + krb5_data_alloc (&key->keyvalue, 16); + md4_finito(&m, key->keyvalue.data); + memset (s, 0, len); + free (s); + return 0; +} + +extern struct salt_type des_salt[], + des3_salt[], des3_salt_derived[], arcfour_salt[]; + +struct key_type keytype_null = { + KEYTYPE_NULL, + "null", + 0, + 0, + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; + +struct key_type keytype_des = { + KEYTYPE_DES, + "des", + 56, + sizeof(des_cblock), + sizeof(des_key_schedule), + DES_random_key, + DES_schedule, + des_salt +}; + +struct key_type keytype_des3 = { + KEYTYPE_DES3, + "des3", + 168, + 3 * sizeof(des_cblock), + 3 * sizeof(des_key_schedule), + DES3_random_key, + DES3_schedule, + des3_salt +}; + +struct key_type keytype_des3_derived = { + KEYTYPE_DES3, + "des3", + 168, + 3 * sizeof(des_cblock), + 3 * sizeof(des_key_schedule), + DES3_random_key, + DES3_schedule, + des3_salt_derived +}; + +struct key_type keytype_arcfour = { + KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR, + "arcfour", + 128, + 16, + sizeof(RC4_KEY), + ARCFOUR_random_key, + ARCFOUR_schedule, + arcfour_salt +}; + +struct key_type *keytypes[] = { + &keytype_null, + &keytype_des, + &keytype_des3_derived, + &keytype_des3, + &keytype_arcfour +}; + +static int num_keytypes = sizeof(keytypes) / sizeof(keytypes[0]); + +static struct key_type * +_find_keytype(krb5_keytype type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_keytypes; i++) + if(keytypes[i]->type == type) + return keytypes[i]; + return NULL; +} + + +struct salt_type des_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + DES_string_to_key + }, + { + KRB5_AFS3_SALT, + "afs3-salt", + DES_AFS3_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; + +struct salt_type des3_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + DES3_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; + +struct salt_type des3_salt_derived[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + DES3_string_to_key_derived + }, + { 0 } +}; + +struct salt_type arcfour_salt[] = { + { + KRB5_PW_SALT, + "pw-salt", + ARCFOUR_string_to_key + }, + { 0 } +}; + +krb5_error_code +krb5_salttype_to_string (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_salttype stype, + char **string) +{ + struct encryption_type *e; + struct salt_type *st; + + e = _find_enctype (etype); + if (e == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + for (st = e->keytype->string_to_key; st && st->type; st++) { + if (st->type == stype) { + *string = strdup (st->name); + if (*string == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; + } + } + return HEIM_ERR_SALTTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_salttype (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + const char *string, + krb5_salttype *salttype) +{ + struct encryption_type *e; + struct salt_type *st; + + e = _find_enctype (etype); + if (e == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + for (st = e->keytype->string_to_key; st && st->type; st++) { + if (strcasecmp (st->name, string) == 0) { + *salttype = st->type; + return 0; + } + } + return HEIM_ERR_SALTTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_pw_salt(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_salt *salt) +{ + size_t len; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + char *p; + + salt->salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + len = strlen(principal->realm); + for (i = 0; i < principal->name.name_string.len; ++i) + len += strlen(principal->name.name_string.val[i]); + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&salt->saltvalue, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + p = salt->saltvalue.data; + memcpy (p, principal->realm, strlen(principal->realm)); + p += strlen(principal->realm); + for (i = 0; i < principal->name.name_string.len; ++i) { + memcpy (p, + principal->name.name_string.val[i], + strlen(principal->name.name_string.val[i])); + p += strlen(principal->name.name_string.val[i]); + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_salt(krb5_context context, + krb5_salt salt) +{ + krb5_data_free(&salt.saltvalue); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_salt salt; + + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, principal, &salt); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context, enctype, password, salt, key); + krb5_free_salt(context, salt); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_data pw; + pw.data = (void*)password; + pw.length = strlen(password); + return krb5_string_to_key_data(context, enctype, pw, principal, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data_salt (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + struct encryption_type *et =_find_enctype(enctype); + struct salt_type *st; + if(et == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + for(st = et->keytype->string_to_key; st && st->type; st++) + if(st->type == salt.salttype) + return (*st->string_to_key)(context, enctype, password, salt, key); + return HEIM_ERR_SALTTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_salt (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_data pw; + pw.data = (void*)password; + pw.length = strlen(password); + return krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context, enctype, pw, salt, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + char **string) +{ + struct key_type *kt = _find_keytype(keytype); + if(kt == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + *string = strdup(kt->name); + if(*string == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_keytype(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_keytype *keytype) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_keytypes; i++) + if(strcasecmp(keytypes[i]->name, string) == 0){ + *keytype = keytypes[i]->type; + return 0; + } + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_random_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(type); + if(et == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ret = krb5_data_alloc(&key->keyvalue, et->keytype->size); + if(ret) + return ret; + key->keytype = type; + if(et->keytype->random_key) + (*et->keytype->random_key)(context, key); + else + krb5_generate_random_block(key->keyvalue.data, + key->keyvalue.length); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +_key_schedule(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(key->key->keytype); + struct key_type *kt = et->keytype; + + if(kt->schedule == NULL) + return 0; + ALLOC(key->schedule, 1); + if(key->schedule == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = krb5_data_alloc(key->schedule, kt->schedule_size); + if(ret) { + free(key->schedule); + key->schedule = NULL; + return ret; + } + (*kt->schedule)(context, key); + return 0; +} + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +static void +NONE_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ +} + +static void +CRC32_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + u_int32_t crc; + unsigned char *r = C->checksum.data; + _krb5_crc_init_table (); + crc = _krb5_crc_update (data, len, 0); + r[0] = crc & 0xff; + r[1] = (crc >> 8) & 0xff; + r[2] = (crc >> 16) & 0xff; + r[3] = (crc >> 24) & 0xff; +} + +static void +RSA_MD4_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md4 m; + md4_init(&m); + md4_update(&m, data, len); + md4_finito(&m, C->checksum.data); +} + +static void +RSA_MD4_DES_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *cksum) +{ + struct md4 md4; + des_cblock ivec; + unsigned char *p = cksum->checksum.data; + + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + md4_init(&md4); + md4_update(&md4, p, 8); + md4_update(&md4, data, len); + md4_finito(&md4, p + 8); + memset (&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)p, + (des_cblock*)p, + 24, + key->schedule->data, + &ivec, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +RSA_MD4_DES_verify(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md4 md4; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + unsigned char res[16]; + des_cblock ivec; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(C->checksum.data, + (void*)tmp, + C->checksum.length, + key->schedule->data, + &ivec, + DES_DECRYPT); + md4_init(&md4); + md4_update(&md4, tmp, 8); /* confounder */ + md4_update(&md4, data, len); + md4_finito(&md4, res); + if(memcmp(res, tmp + 8, sizeof(res)) != 0) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(res, 0, sizeof(res)); + return ret; +} + +static void +RSA_MD5_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md5 m; + md5_init(&m); + md5_update(&m, data, len); + md5_finito(&m, C->checksum.data); +} + +static void +RSA_MD5_DES_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md5 md5; + des_cblock ivec; + unsigned char *p = C->checksum.data; + + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + md5_init(&md5); + md5_update(&md5, p, 8); + md5_update(&md5, data, len); + md5_finito(&md5, p + 8); + memset (&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)p, + (des_cblock*)p, + 24, + key->schedule->data, + &ivec, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +RSA_MD5_DES_verify(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md5 md5; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + unsigned char res[16]; + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *sched = key->schedule->data; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(C->checksum.data, + (void*)tmp, + C->checksum.length, + sched[0], + &ivec, + DES_DECRYPT); + md5_init(&md5); + md5_update(&md5, tmp, 8); /* confounder */ + md5_update(&md5, data, len); + md5_finito(&md5, res); + if(memcmp(res, tmp + 8, sizeof(res)) != 0) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(res, 0, sizeof(res)); + return ret; +} + +static void +RSA_MD5_DES3_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md5 md5; + des_cblock ivec; + unsigned char *p = C->checksum.data; + des_key_schedule *sched = key->schedule->data; + + krb5_generate_random_block(p, 8); + md5_init(&md5); + md5_update(&md5, p, 8); + md5_update(&md5, data, len); + md5_finito(&md5, p + 8); + memset (&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)p, + (des_cblock*)p, + 24, + sched[0], sched[1], sched[2], + &ivec, + DES_ENCRYPT); +} + +static krb5_error_code +RSA_MD5_DES3_verify(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct md5 md5; + unsigned char tmp[24]; + unsigned char res[16]; + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *sched = key->schedule->data; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(C->checksum.data, + (void*)tmp, + C->checksum.length, + sched[0], sched[1], sched[2], + &ivec, + DES_DECRYPT); + md5_init(&md5); + md5_update(&md5, tmp, 8); /* confounder */ + md5_update(&md5, data, len); + md5_finito(&md5, res); + if(memcmp(res, tmp + 8, sizeof(res)) != 0) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(res, 0, sizeof(res)); + return ret; +} + +static void +SHA1_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *C) +{ + struct sha m; + sha_init(&m); + sha_update(&m, data, len); + sha_finito(&m, C->checksum.data); +} + +/* HMAC according to RFC2104 */ +static void +hmac(krb5_context context, + struct checksum_type *cm, + void *data, + size_t len, + struct key_data *keyblock, + Checksum *result) +{ + unsigned char *ipad, *opad; + unsigned char *key; + size_t key_len; + int i; + + if(keyblock->key->keyvalue.length > cm->blocksize){ + (*cm->checksum)(context, + keyblock, + keyblock->key->keyvalue.data, + keyblock->key->keyvalue.length, + result); + key = result->checksum.data; + key_len = result->checksum.length; + } else { + key = keyblock->key->keyvalue.data; + key_len = keyblock->key->keyvalue.length; + } + ipad = malloc(cm->blocksize + len); + opad = malloc(cm->blocksize + cm->checksumsize); + memset(ipad, 0x36, cm->blocksize); + memset(opad, 0x5c, cm->blocksize); + for(i = 0; i < key_len; i++){ + ipad[i] ^= key[i]; + opad[i] ^= key[i]; + } + memcpy(ipad + cm->blocksize, data, len); + (*cm->checksum)(context, keyblock, ipad, cm->blocksize + len, result); + memcpy(opad + cm->blocksize, result->checksum.data, + result->checksum.length); + (*cm->checksum)(context, keyblock, opad, + cm->blocksize + cm->checksumsize, result); + memset(ipad, 0, cm->blocksize + len); + free(ipad); + memset(opad, 0, cm->blocksize + cm->checksumsize); + free(opad); +} + +static void +HMAC_SHA1_DES3_checksum(krb5_context context, + struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result) +{ + struct checksum_type *c = _find_checksum(CKSUMTYPE_SHA1); + + hmac(context, c, data, len, key, result); +} + +struct checksum_type checksum_none = { + CKSUMTYPE_NONE, + "none", + 1, + 0, + 0, + NONE_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_crc32 = { + CKSUMTYPE_CRC32, + "crc32", + 1, + 4, + 0, + CRC32_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md4 = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4, + "rsa-md4", + 64, + 16, + F_CPROOF, + RSA_MD4_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md4_des = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES, + "rsa-md4-des", + 64, + 24, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_VARIANT, + RSA_MD4_DES_checksum, + RSA_MD4_DES_verify +}; +#if 0 +struct checksum_type checksum_des_mac = { + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC, + "des-mac", + 0, + 0, + 0, + DES_MAC_checksum, +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_des_mac_k = { + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC_K, + "des-mac-k", + 0, + 0, + 0, + DES_MAC_K_checksum, +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md4_des_k = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES_K, + "rsa-md4-des-k", + 0, + 0, + 0, + RSA_MD4_DES_K_checksum, + RSA_MD4_DES_K_verify, +}; +#endif +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md5 = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, + "rsa-md5", + 64, + 16, + F_CPROOF, + RSA_MD5_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md5_des = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES, + "rsa-md5-des", + 64, + 24, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_VARIANT, + RSA_MD5_DES_checksum, + RSA_MD5_DES_verify, +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_rsa_md5_des3 = { + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES3, + "rsa-md5-des3", + 64, + 24, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_VARIANT, + RSA_MD5_DES3_checksum, + RSA_MD5_DES3_verify, +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_sha1 = { + CKSUMTYPE_SHA1, + "sha1", + 64, + 20, + F_CPROOF, + SHA1_checksum, + NULL +}; +struct checksum_type checksum_hmac_sha1_des3 = { + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3, + "hmac-sha1-des3", + 64, + 20, + F_KEYED | F_CPROOF | F_DERIVED, + HMAC_SHA1_DES3_checksum, + NULL +}; + +struct checksum_type *checksum_types[] = { + &checksum_none, + &checksum_crc32, + &checksum_rsa_md4, + &checksum_rsa_md4_des, +#if 0 + &checksum_des_mac, + &checksum_des_mac_k, + &checksum_rsa_md4_des_k, +#endif + &checksum_rsa_md5, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des3, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_des3 +}; + +static int num_checksums = sizeof(checksum_types) / sizeof(checksum_types[0]); + +static struct checksum_type * +_find_checksum(krb5_cksumtype type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_checksums; i++) + if(checksum_types[i]->type == type) + return checksum_types[i]; + return NULL; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_checksum_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, /* not krb5_key_usage */ + struct checksum_type *ct, + struct key_data **key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + if(ct->flags & F_DERIVED) + ret = _get_derived_key(context, crypto, usage, key); + else if(ct->flags & F_VARIANT) { + int i; + + *key = _new_derived_key(crypto, 0xff/* KRB5_KU_RFC1510_VARIANT */); + if(*key == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, crypto->key.key, &(*key)->key); + if(ret) + return ret; + for(i = 0; i < (*key)->key->keyvalue.length; i++) + ((unsigned char*)(*key)->key->keyvalue.data)[i] ^= 0xF0; + } else { + *key = &crypto->key; + } + if(ret == 0) + ret = _key_schedule(context, *key); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +do_checksum (krb5_context context, + struct checksum_type *ct, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + int keyed_checksum; + + keyed_checksum = (ct->flags & F_KEYED) != 0; + if(keyed_checksum && crypto == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + if(keyed_checksum) + ret = get_checksum_key(context, crypto, usage, ct, &dkey); + else + dkey = NULL; + result->cksumtype = ct->type; + krb5_data_alloc(&result->checksum, ct->checksumsize); + (*ct->checksum)(context, dkey, data, len, result); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +create_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, /* not krb5_key_usage */ + krb5_cksumtype type, /* if crypto == NULL */ + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct; + + if(crypto) { + ct = crypto->et->keyed_checksum; + if(ct == NULL) + ct = crypto->et->cksumtype; + } else + ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + return do_checksum (context, ct, crypto, usage, data, len, result); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_create_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage_or_type, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result) +{ + return create_checksum(context, crypto, + CHECKSUM_USAGE(usage_or_type), + usage_or_type, data, len, result); +} + +static krb5_error_code +verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, /* not krb5_key_usage */ + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *cksum) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + int keyed_checksum; + Checksum c; + struct checksum_type *ct; + + ct = _find_checksum(cksum->cksumtype); + if(ct == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + if(ct->checksumsize != cksum->checksum.length) + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* XXX */ + keyed_checksum = (ct->flags & F_KEYED) != 0; + if(keyed_checksum && crypto == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */ + if(keyed_checksum) + ret = get_checksum_key(context, crypto, usage, ct, &dkey); + else + dkey = NULL; + if(ct->verify) + return (*ct->verify)(context, dkey, data, len, cksum); + + ret = krb5_data_alloc (&c.checksum, ct->checksumsize); + if (ret) + return ret; + + (*ct->checksum)(context, dkey, data, len, &c); + + if(c.checksum.length != cksum->checksum.length || + memcmp(c.checksum.data, cksum->checksum.data, c.checksum.length)) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + else + ret = 0; + krb5_data_free (&c.checksum); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + krb5_key_usage usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *cksum) +{ + return verify_checksum(context, crypto, + CHECKSUM_USAGE(usage), data, len, cksum); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_checksumsize(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type, + size_t *size) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + *size = ct->checksumsize; + return 0; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_keyed(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + return ct->flags & F_KEYED; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type) +{ + struct checksum_type *ct = _find_checksum(type); + if(ct == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP; + return ct->flags & F_CPROOF; +} + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +static void +NULL_encrypt(struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt) +{ +} + +static void +DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec(struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, *s, &ivec, encrypt); +} + +static void +DES_CBC_encrypt_key_ivec(struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memcpy(&ivec, key->key->keyvalue.data, sizeof(ivec)); + des_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, *s, &ivec, encrypt); +} + +static void +DES3_CBC_encrypt(struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt) +{ + des_cblock ivec; + des_key_schedule *s = key->schedule->data; + memset(&ivec, 0, sizeof(ivec)); + des_ede3_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, s[0], s[1], s[2], &ivec, encrypt); +} + +static void +ARCFOUR_encrypt(struct key_data *key, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean encrypt) +{ + +} + +/* + * these should currently be in reverse preference order. + */ + +static struct encryption_type etypes[] = { + { + ETYPE_NULL, + "null", + 1, + 0, + &keytype_null, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + 0, + NULL_encrypt, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, + "des-cbc-crc", + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_crc32, + NULL, + 0, + DES_CBC_encrypt_key_ivec, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + "des-cbc-md4", + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_rsa_md4, + &checksum_rsa_md4_des, + 0, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + "des-cbc-md5", + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_rsa_md5, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des, + 0, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5, + "des3-cbc-md5", + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des3, + &checksum_rsa_md5, + &checksum_rsa_md5_des3, + 0, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + "des3-cbc-sha1", + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des3_derived, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_des3, + F_DERIVED, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, + }, + { + ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + "old-des3-cbc-sha1", + 8, + 8, + &keytype_des3, + &checksum_sha1, + &checksum_hmac_sha1_des3, + 0, + DES3_CBC_encrypt, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE, + "des-cbc-none", + 8, + 0, + &keytype_des, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + F_PSEUDO, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, + }, + { + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE, + "des3-cbc-none", + 8, + 0, + &keytype_des3_derived, + &checksum_none, + NULL, + F_PSEUDO, + DES_CBC_encrypt_null_ivec, + }, +}; + +static unsigned num_etypes = sizeof(etypes) / sizeof(etypes[0]); + + +static struct encryption_type * +_find_enctype(krb5_enctype type) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_etypes; i++) + if(etypes[i].type == type) + return &etypes[i]; + return NULL; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_string(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + char **string) +{ + struct encryption_type *e; + e = _find_enctype(etype); + if(e == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + *string = strdup(e->name); + if(*string == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_enctype(krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_enctype *etype) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_etypes; i++) + if(strcasecmp(etypes[i].name, string) == 0){ + *etype = etypes[i].type; + return 0; + } + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_keytype(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_keytype *keytype) +{ + struct encryption_type *e = _find_enctype(etype); + if(e == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + *keytype = e->keytype->type; /* XXX */ + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctype(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + krb5_enctype *etype) +{ + struct key_type *kt = _find_keytype(keytype); + krb5_warnx(context, "krb5_keytype_to_enctype(%u)", keytype); + if(kt == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; + *etype = kt->best_etype; + return 0; +} +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + unsigned *len, + int **val) +{ + int i; + unsigned n = 0; + int *ret; + + for (i = num_etypes - 1; i >= 0; --i) { + if (etypes[i].keytype->type == keytype + && !(etypes[i].flags & F_PSEUDO)) + ++n; + } + ret = malloc(n * sizeof(int)); + if (ret == NULL && n != 0) + return ENOMEM; + n = 0; + for (i = num_etypes - 1; i >= 0; --i) { + if (etypes[i].keytype->type == keytype + && !(etypes[i].flags & F_PSEUDO)) + ret[n++] = etypes[i].type; + } + *len = n; + *val = ret; + return 0; +} + +/* + * First take the configured list of etypes for `keytype' if available, + * else, do `krb5_keytype_to_enctypes'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + unsigned *len, + int **val) +{ + int i, n; + int *ret; + + if (keytype != KEYTYPE_DES || context->etypes_des == NULL) + return krb5_keytype_to_enctypes (context, keytype, len, val); + + for (n = 0; context->etypes_des[n]; ++n) + ; + ret = malloc (n * sizeof(*ret)); + if (ret == NULL && n != 0) + return ENOMEM; + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + ret[i] = context->etypes_des[i]; + *len = n; + *val = ret; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_valid(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype) +{ + return _find_enctype(etype) != NULL; +} + +/* if two enctypes have compatible keys */ +krb5_boolean +krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype1, + krb5_enctype etype2) +{ + struct encryption_type *e1 = _find_enctype(etype1); + struct encryption_type *e2 = _find_enctype(etype2); + return e1 != NULL && e2 != NULL && e1->keytype == e2->keytype; +} + +static krb5_boolean +derived_crypto(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + return (crypto->et->flags & F_DERIVED) != 0; +} + + +#define CHECKSUMSIZE(C) ((C)->checksumsize) +#define CHECKSUMTYPE(C) ((C)->type) + +static krb5_error_code +encrypt_internal_derived(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + size_t sz, block_sz, checksum_sz; + Checksum cksum; + unsigned char *p, *q; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->keyed_checksum); + + sz = et->confoundersize + /* 4 - length */ len; + block_sz = (sz + et->blocksize - 1) &~ (et->blocksize - 1); /* pad */ + p = calloc(1, block_sz + checksum_sz); + if(p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + q = p; + krb5_generate_random_block(q, et->confoundersize); /* XXX */ + q += et->confoundersize; + memcpy(q, data, len); + + ret = create_checksum(context, + crypto, + INTEGRITY_USAGE(usage), + 0, + p, + block_sz, + &cksum); + if(ret == 0 && cksum.checksum.length != checksum_sz) + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + if(ret) { + memset(p, 0, block_sz + checksum_sz); + free(p); + return ret; + } + memcpy(p + block_sz, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length); + ret = _get_derived_key(context, crypto, ENCRYPTION_USAGE(usage), &dkey); + if(ret) { + memset(p, 0, block_sz + checksum_sz); + free(p); + return ret; + } + ret = _key_schedule(context, dkey); + if(ret) { + memset(p, 0, block_sz); + free(p); + return ret; + } +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 1, block_sz, dkey->key); +#endif + (*et->encrypt)(dkey, p, block_sz, 1); + result->data = p; + result->length = block_sz + checksum_sz; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +encrypt_internal(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + size_t sz, block_sz, checksum_sz; + Checksum cksum; + unsigned char *p, *q; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->cksumtype); + + sz = et->confoundersize + checksum_sz + len; + block_sz = (sz + et->blocksize - 1) &~ (et->blocksize - 1); /* pad */ + p = calloc(1, block_sz); + if(p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + q = p; + krb5_generate_random_block(q, et->confoundersize); /* XXX */ + q += et->confoundersize; + memset(q, 0, checksum_sz); + q += checksum_sz; + memcpy(q, data, len); + + ret = create_checksum(context, + NULL, + 0, + CHECKSUMTYPE(et->cksumtype), + p, + block_sz, + &cksum); + if(ret == 0 && cksum.checksum.length != checksum_sz) { + free_Checksum (&cksum); + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + } + if(ret) { + memset(p, 0, block_sz); + free(p); + free_Checksum(&cksum); + return ret; + } + memcpy(p + et->confoundersize, cksum.checksum.data, cksum.checksum.length); + free_Checksum(&cksum); + ret = _key_schedule(context, &crypto->key); + if(ret) { + memset(p, 0, block_sz); + free(p); + return ret; + } +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 1, block_sz, crypto->key.key); +#endif + (*et->encrypt)(&crypto->key, p, block_sz, 1); + result->data = p; + result->length = block_sz; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_internal_derived(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + size_t checksum_sz; + Checksum cksum; + unsigned char *p; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data *dkey; + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + unsigned long l; + + p = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(p, data, len); + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->keyed_checksum); + len -= checksum_sz; + + ret = _get_derived_key(context, crypto, ENCRYPTION_USAGE(usage), &dkey); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + ret = _key_schedule(context, dkey); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 0, len, dkey->key); +#endif + (*et->encrypt)(dkey, p, len, 0); + + cksum.checksum.data = p + len; + cksum.checksum.length = checksum_sz; + cksum.cksumtype = CHECKSUMTYPE(et->keyed_checksum); + + ret = verify_checksum(context, + crypto, + INTEGRITY_USAGE(usage), + p, + len, + &cksum); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + l = len - et->confoundersize; + memmove(p, p + et->confoundersize, l); + result->data = realloc(p, l); + if(p == NULL) { + free(p); + return ENOMEM; + } + result->length = l; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_internal(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char *p; + Checksum cksum; + size_t checksum_sz, l; + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + + checksum_sz = CHECKSUMSIZE(et->cksumtype); + p = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(p, data, len); + + ret = _key_schedule(context, &crypto->key); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + krb5_crypto_debug(context, 0, len, crypto->key.key); +#endif + (*et->encrypt)(&crypto->key, p, len, 0); + ret = krb5_data_copy(&cksum.checksum, p + et->confoundersize, checksum_sz); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + memset(p + et->confoundersize, 0, checksum_sz); + cksum.cksumtype = CHECKSUMTYPE(et->cksumtype); + ret = verify_checksum(context, NULL, 0, p, len, &cksum); + free_Checksum(&cksum); + if(ret) { + free(p); + return ret; + } + l = len - et->confoundersize - checksum_sz; + memmove(p, p + et->confoundersize + checksum_sz, l); + result->data = realloc(p, l); + if(result->data == NULL) { + free(p); + return ENOMEM; + } + result->length = l; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + if(derived_crypto(context, crypto)) + return encrypt_internal_derived(context, crypto, usage, + data, len, result); + else + return encrypt_internal(context, crypto, data, len, result); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + int kvno, + EncryptedData *result) +{ + result->etype = CRYPTO_ETYPE(crypto); + if(kvno){ + ALLOC(result->kvno, 1); + *result->kvno = kvno; + }else + result->kvno = NULL; + return krb5_encrypt(context, crypto, usage, data, len, &result->cipher); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result) +{ + if(derived_crypto(context, crypto)) + return decrypt_internal_derived(context, crypto, usage, + data, len, result); + else + return decrypt_internal(context, crypto, data, len, result); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + EncryptedData *e, + krb5_data *result) +{ + return krb5_decrypt(context, crypto, usage, + e->cipher.data, e->cipher.length, result); +} + +/************************************************************ + * * + ************************************************************/ + +void +krb5_generate_random_block(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + des_cblock key, out; + static des_cblock counter; + static des_key_schedule schedule; + int i; + static int initialized = 0; + + if(!initialized) { + des_new_random_key(&key); + des_set_key(&key, schedule); + memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key)); + des_new_random_key(&counter); + } + while(len > 0) { + des_ecb_encrypt(&counter, &out, schedule, DES_ENCRYPT); + for(i = 7; i >=0; i--) + if(counter[i]++) + break; + memcpy(buf, out, min(len, sizeof(out))); + len -= min(len, sizeof(out)); + buf = (char*)buf + sizeof(out); + } +} + +static void +DES3_postproc(krb5_context context, + unsigned char *k, size_t len, struct key_data *key) +{ + unsigned char x[24]; + int i, j; + + memset(x, 0, sizeof(x)); + for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) { + unsigned char foo; + + for (j = 0; j < 7; ++j) { + unsigned char b = k[7 * i + j]; + + x[8 * i + j] = b; + } + foo = 0; + for (j = 6; j >= 0; --j) { + foo |= k[7 * i + j] & 1; + foo <<= 1; + } + x[8 * i + 7] = foo; + } + k = key->key->keyvalue.data; + memcpy(k, x, 24); + memset(x, 0, sizeof(x)); + if (key->schedule) { + krb5_free_data(context, key->schedule); + key->schedule = NULL; + } + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock*)k); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock*)(k + 8)); + des_set_odd_parity((des_cblock*)(k + 16)); +} + +static krb5_error_code +derive_key(krb5_context context, + struct encryption_type *et, + struct key_data *key, + void *constant, + size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *k; + unsigned int nblocks = 0, i; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + struct key_type *kt = et->keytype; + ret = _key_schedule(context, key); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(et->blocksize * 8 < kt->bits || + len != et->blocksize) { + nblocks = (kt->bits + et->blocksize * 8 - 1) / (et->blocksize * 8); + k = malloc(nblocks * et->blocksize); + if(k == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + _krb5_n_fold(constant, len, k, et->blocksize); + for(i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) { + if(i > 0) + memcpy(k + i * et->blocksize, + k + (i - 1) * et->blocksize, + et->blocksize); + (*et->encrypt)(key, k + i * et->blocksize, et->blocksize, 1); + } + } else { + void *c = malloc(len); + size_t res_len = (kt->bits + 7) / 8; + + if(len != 0 && c == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(c, constant, len); + (*et->encrypt)(key, c, len, 1); + k = malloc(res_len); + if(res_len != 0 && k == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + _krb5_n_fold(c, len, k, res_len); + free(c); + } + + /* XXX keytype dependent post-processing */ + switch(kt->type) { + case KEYTYPE_DES3: + DES3_postproc(context, k, nblocks * et->blocksize, key); + break; + default: + krb5_warnx(context, "derive_key() called with unknown keytype (%u)", + kt->type); + ret = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL; + break; + } + memset(k, 0, nblocks * et->blocksize); + free(k); + return ret; +} + +static struct key_data * +_new_derived_key(krb5_crypto crypto, unsigned usage) +{ + struct key_usage *d = crypto->key_usage; + d = realloc(d, (crypto->num_key_usage + 1) * sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) + return NULL; + crypto->key_usage = d; + d += crypto->num_key_usage++; + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->usage = usage; + return &d->key; +} + +static krb5_error_code +_get_derived_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + struct key_data **key) +{ + int i; + struct key_data *d; + unsigned char constant[5]; + + for(i = 0; i < crypto->num_key_usage; i++) + if(crypto->key_usage[i].usage == usage) { + *key = &crypto->key_usage[i].key; + return 0; + } + d = _new_derived_key(crypto, usage); + if(d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, crypto->key.key, &d->key); + _krb5_put_int(constant, usage, 5); + derive_key(context, crypto->et, d, constant, sizeof(constant)); + *key = d; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_init(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_crypto *crypto) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ALLOC(*crypto, 1); + if(*crypto == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + if(etype == ETYPE_NULL) + etype = key->keytype; + (*crypto)->et = _find_enctype(etype); + if((*crypto)->et == NULL) { + free(*crypto); + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + } + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, key, &(*crypto)->key.key); + if(ret) { + free(*crypto); + return ret; + } + (*crypto)->key.schedule = NULL; + (*crypto)->num_key_usage = 0; + (*crypto)->key_usage = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static void +free_key_data(krb5_context context, struct key_data *key) +{ + krb5_free_keyblock(context, key->key); + if(key->schedule) { + memset(key->schedule->data, 0, key->schedule->length); + krb5_free_data(context, key->schedule); + } +} + +static void +free_key_usage(krb5_context context, struct key_usage *ku) +{ + free_key_data(context, &ku->key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto) +{ + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < crypto->num_key_usage; i++) + free_key_usage(context, &crypto->key_usage[i]); + free(crypto->key_usage); + free_key_data(context, &crypto->key); + free (crypto); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_derived(krb5_context context, + const void *str, + size_t len, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = _find_enctype(etype); + krb5_error_code ret; + struct key_data kd; + u_char *tmp; + + if(et == NULL) + return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP; + ALLOC(kd.key, 1); + kd.key->keytype = etype; + tmp = malloc (et->keytype->bits / 8); + _krb5_n_fold(str, len, tmp, et->keytype->bits / 8); + krb5_data_alloc(&kd.key->keyvalue, et->keytype->size); + kd.schedule = NULL; + DES3_postproc (context, tmp, et->keytype->bits / 8, &kd); /* XXX */ + ret = derive_key(context, + et, + &kd, + "kerberos", /* XXX well known constant */ + strlen("kerberos")); + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, kd.key, key); + free_key_data(context, &kd); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the size of an encrypted packet of length `data_len' + */ + +size_t +krb5_get_wrapped_length (krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + size_t data_len) +{ + struct encryption_type *et = crypto->et; + size_t blocksize = et->blocksize; + size_t res; + + res = (data_len + blocksize - 1) / blocksize * blocksize; + res = res + et->confoundersize + et->cksumtype->checksumsize; + return res; +} + +#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_get_keyid(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + u_int32_t *keyid) +{ + struct md5 md5; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + md5_init(&md5); + md5_update(&md5, key->keyvalue.data, key->keyvalue.length); + md5_finito(&md5, tmp); + *keyid = (tmp[12] << 24) | (tmp[13] << 16) | (tmp[14] << 8) | tmp[15]; + return 0; +} + +static void +krb5_crypto_debug(krb5_context context, + int encrypt, + size_t len, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + u_int32_t keyid; + char *kt; + krb5_get_keyid(context, key, &keyid); + krb5_enctype_to_string(context, key->keytype, &kt); + krb5_warnx(context, "%s %lu bytes with key-id %#x (%s)", + encrypt ? "encrypting" : "decrypting", + (unsigned long)len, + keyid, + kt); + free(kt); +} + +#endif /* CRYPTO_DEBUG */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/data.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/data.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21191e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/data.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: data.c,v 1.15 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +void +krb5_data_zero(krb5_data *p) +{ + p->length = 0; + p->data = NULL; +} + +void +krb5_data_free(krb5_data *p) +{ + if(p->data != NULL) + free(p->data); + p->length = 0; +} + +void +krb5_free_data(krb5_context context, + krb5_data *p) +{ + krb5_data_free(p); + free(p); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_alloc(krb5_data *p, int len) +{ + p->data = malloc(len); + if(len && p->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + p->length = len; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_realloc(krb5_data *p, int len) +{ + void *tmp; + tmp = realloc(p->data, len); + if(len && !tmp) + return ENOMEM; + p->data = tmp; + p->length = len; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_copy(krb5_data *p, const void *data, size_t len) +{ + if (len) { + if(krb5_data_alloc(p, len)) + return ENOMEM; + memmove(p->data, data, len); + } else + p->data = NULL; + p->length = len; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_data(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *indata, + krb5_data **outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + ALLOC(*outdata, 1); + if(*outdata == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = copy_octet_string(indata, *outdata); + if(ret) + free(*outdata); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/dump_config.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/dump_config.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..074595e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/dump_config.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: dump_config.c,v 1.2 1999/10/28 23:22:41 assar Exp $"); + +/* print contents of krb5.conf */ + +static void +print_tree(struct krb5_config_binding *b, int level) +{ + if (b == NULL) + return; + + printf("%*s%s%s%s", level * 4, "", + (level == 0) ? "[" : "", b->name, (level == 0) ? "]" : ""); + if(b->type == krb5_config_list) { + if(level > 0) + printf(" = {"); + printf("\n"); + print_tree(b->u.list, level + 1); + if(level > 0) + printf("%*s}\n", level * 4, ""); + } else if(b->type == krb5_config_string) { + printf(" = %s\n", b->u.string); + } + if(b->next) + print_tree(b->next, level); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_init_context(&context); + if(ret == 0) { + print_tree(context->cf, 0); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..698b300 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/expand_hostname.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: expand_hostname.c,v 1.5 2000/01/08 08:07:18 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +copy_hostname(krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname) +{ + *new_hostname = strdup (orig_hostname); + if (*new_hostname == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to make `orig_hostname' into a more canonical one in the newly + * allocated space returned in `new_hostname'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_expand_hostname (krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai, *a, hints; + int error; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + + error = getaddrinfo (orig_hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + return copy_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname); + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if (a->ai_canonname != NULL) { + *new_hostname = strdup (a->ai_canonname); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (*new_hostname == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + else + return 0; + } + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return copy_hostname (context, orig_hostname, new_hostname); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/fcache.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/fcache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df88e6f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/fcache.c @@ -0,0 +1,431 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: fcache.c,v 1.22 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct krb5_fcache{ + char *filename; + int version; +}krb5_fcache; + +struct fcc_cursor { + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; +}; + +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_1 1 +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_2 2 +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_3 3 +#define KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4 4 + +#define FCC_TAG_DELTATIME 1 + +#define FCACHE(X) ((krb5_fcache*)(X)->data.data) + +#define FILENAME(X) (FCACHE(X)->filename) + +#define FCC_CURSOR(C) ((struct fcc_cursor*)(C)) + +static char* +fcc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return FILENAME(id); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_resolve(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id, const char *res) +{ + krb5_fcache *f; + f = malloc(sizeof(*f)); + if(f == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + f->filename = strdup(res); + if(f->filename == NULL){ + free(f); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + f->version = 0; + (*id)->data.data = f; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*f); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +erase_file(const char *filename) +{ + int fd; + off_t pos; + char buf[128]; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0){ + if(errno == ENOENT) + return 0; + else + return errno; + } + pos = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END); + lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + while(pos > 0) + pos -= write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + close(fd); + unlink(filename); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_gen_new(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_fcache *f; + int fd; + char *file; + f = malloc(sizeof(*f)); + if(f == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + asprintf(&file, "/tmp/krb5cc_XXXXXX"); /* XXX */ + if(file == NULL) { + free(f); + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + } + fd = mkstemp(file); + if(fd < 0) { + free(f); + free(file); + return errno; + } + close(fd); + f->filename = file; + f->version = 0; + (*id)->data.data = f; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*f); + return 0; +} + +static void +storage_set_flags(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, int vno) +{ + int flags = 0; + switch(vno) { + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_1: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER; + break; + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_2: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER; + break; + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_3: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE; + break; + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4: + break; + default: + krb5_abortx(context, + "storage_set_flags called with bad vno (%x)", vno); + } + krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, flags); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal) +{ + krb5_fcache *f = FCACHE(id); + int ret; + int fd; + char *filename = f->filename; + + if((ret = erase_file(filename))) + return ret; + + fd = open(filename, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_BINARY, 0600); + if(fd == -1) + return errno; + { + krb5_storage *sp; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + if(context->fcache_vno != 0) + f->version = context->fcache_vno; + else + f->version = KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4; + krb5_store_int8(sp, 5); + krb5_store_int8(sp, f->version); + storage_set_flags(context, sp, f->version); + if(f->version == KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4) { + /* V4 stuff */ + if (context->kdc_sec_offset) { + krb5_store_int16 (sp, 12); /* length */ + krb5_store_int16 (sp, FCC_TAG_DELTATIME); /* Tag */ + krb5_store_int16 (sp, 8); /* length of data */ + krb5_store_int32 (sp, context->kdc_sec_offset); + krb5_store_int32 (sp, context->kdc_usec_offset); + } else { + krb5_store_int16 (sp, 0); + } + } + krb5_store_principal(sp, primary_principal); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + } + close(fd); + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + free (FILENAME(id)); + krb5_data_free(&id->data); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + char *f; + f = FILENAME(id); + + erase_file(f); + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_store_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + int fd; + char *f; + + f = FILENAME(id); + + fd = open(f, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0) + return errno; + { + krb5_storage *sp; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + storage_set_flags(context, sp, FCACHE(id)->version); + krb5_store_creds(sp, creds); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + } + close(fd); + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_read_cred (krb5_context context, + krb5_fcache *fc, + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + storage_set_flags(context, sp, fc->version); + + ret = krb5_ret_creds(sp, creds); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +init_fcc (krb5_context context, + krb5_fcache *fcache, + krb5_storage **ret_sp, + int *ret_fd) +{ + int fd; + int8_t pvno, tag; + krb5_storage *sp; + + fd = open(fcache->filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY); + if(fd < 0) + return errno; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &pvno); + if(pvno != 5) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO; + } + krb5_ret_int8(sp, &tag); /* should not be host byte order */ + fcache->version = tag; + storage_set_flags(context, sp, fcache->version); + switch (tag) { + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_4: { + int16_t length; + + krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &length); + while(length > 0) { + int16_t tag, data_len; + int i; + int8_t dummy; + + krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &tag); + krb5_ret_int16 (sp, &data_len); + switch (tag) { + case FCC_TAG_DELTATIME : + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &context->kdc_sec_offset); + krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &context->kdc_usec_offset); + break; + default : + for (i = 0; i < data_len; ++i) + krb5_ret_int8 (sp, &dummy); + break; + } + length -= 4 + data_len; + } + break; + } + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_3: + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_2: + case KRB5_FCC_FVNO_1: + break; + default : + krb5_storage_free (sp); + close (fd); + return KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO; + } + *ret_sp = sp; + *ret_fd = fd; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_fcache *f = FCACHE(id); + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + + ret = init_fcc (context, f, &sp, &fd); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_ret_principal(sp, principal); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_first (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_fcache *f = FCACHE(id); + + *cursor = malloc(sizeof(struct fcc_cursor)); + + ret = init_fcc (context, f, &FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp, + &FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_ret_principal (FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp, &principal); + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_next (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + return fcc_read_cred (context, FCACHE(id), FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp, creds); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_end_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_storage_free(FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->sp); + close (FCC_CURSOR(*cursor)->fd); + free(*cursor); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_remove_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *cred) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_set_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +fcc_get_version(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return FCACHE(id)->version; +} + +const krb5_cc_ops krb5_fcc_ops = { + "FILE", + fcc_get_name, + fcc_resolve, + fcc_gen_new, + fcc_initialize, + fcc_destroy, + fcc_close, + fcc_store_cred, + NULL, /* fcc_retrieve */ + fcc_get_principal, + fcc_get_first, + fcc_get_next, + fcc_end_get, + fcc_remove_cred, + fcc_set_flags, + fcc_get_version +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/free.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/free.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..251ec32 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/free.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: free.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_kdc_rep(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_rep *rep) +{ + free_KDC_REP(&rep->kdc_rep); + free_EncTGSRepPart(&rep->enc_part); + free_KRB_ERROR(&rep->error); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_xfree (void *ptr) +{ + free (ptr); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a69f29b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/free_host_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: free_host_realm.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Free all memory allocated by `realmlist' + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_host_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realmlist) +{ + krb5_realm *p; + + if(realmlist == NULL) + return 0; + for (p = realmlist; *p; ++p) + free (*p); + free (realmlist); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a000ea1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/generate_seq_number.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: generate_seq_number.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_seq_number(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + int32_t *seqno) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keyblock *subkey; + u_int32_t q; + u_char *p; + int i; + + ret = krb5_generate_subkey (context, key, &subkey); + if (ret) + return ret; + + q = 0; + for (p = (u_char *)subkey->keyvalue.data, i = 0; + i < subkey->keyvalue.length; + ++i, ++p) + q = (q << 8) | *p; + q &= 0xffffffff; + *seqno = q; + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, subkey); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5b2e9e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/generate_subkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: generate_subkey.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_subkey(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_keyblock **subkey) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ALLOC(*subkey, 1); + if (*subkey == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, key->keytype, *subkey); + if(ret) + free(*subkey); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_addrs.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_addrs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65a1b3c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_addrs.c @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_addrs.c,v 1.35 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +#ifdef __osf__ +/* hate */ +struct rtentry; +struct mbuf; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H */ + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_VAR_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_NETINET_IN6_VAR_H */ + +static krb5_error_code +gethostname_fallback (krb5_addresses *res) +{ + krb5_error_code err; + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + struct hostent *hostent; + + if (gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname))) + return errno; + hostent = roken_gethostbyname (hostname); + if (hostent == NULL) + return errno; + res->len = 1; + res->val = malloc (sizeof(*res->val)); + if (res->val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + res->val[0].addr_type = hostent->h_addrtype; + res->val[0].address.data = NULL; + res->val[0].address.length = 0; + err = krb5_data_copy (&res->val[0].address, + hostent->h_addr, + hostent->h_length); + if (err) { + free (res->val); + return err; + } + return 0; +} + +enum { + LOOP = 1, /* do include loopback interfaces */ + LOOP_IF_NONE = 2, /* include loopback if no other if's */ + EXTRA_ADDRESSES = 4, /* include extra addresses */ + SCAN_INTERFACES = 8 /* scan interfaces for addresses */ +}; + +/* + * Try to figure out the addresses of all configured interfaces with a + * lot of magic ioctls. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +find_all_addresses (krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *res, int flags, + int af, int siocgifconf, int siocgifflags, + size_t ifreq_sz) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int fd; + size_t buf_size; + char *buf; + struct ifconf ifconf; + int num, j = 0; + char *p; + size_t sz; + struct sockaddr sa_zero; + struct ifreq *ifr; + krb5_address lo_addr; + int got_lo = FALSE; + + buf = NULL; + res->val = NULL; + + memset (&sa_zero, 0, sizeof(sa_zero)); + fd = socket(af, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + + buf_size = 8192; + for (;;) { + buf = malloc(buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto error_out; + } + ifconf.ifc_len = buf_size; + ifconf.ifc_buf = buf; + if (ioctl (fd, siocgifconf, &ifconf) < 0) { + ret = errno; + goto error_out; + } + /* + * Can the difference between a full and a overfull buf + * be determined? + */ + + if (ifconf.ifc_len < buf_size) + break; + free (buf); + buf_size *= 2; + } + + num = ifconf.ifc_len / ifreq_sz; + res->len = num; + res->val = calloc(num, sizeof(*res->val)); + if (res->val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto error_out; + } + + j = 0; + for (p = ifconf.ifc_buf; + p < ifconf.ifc_buf + ifconf.ifc_len; + p += sz) { + struct ifreq ifreq; + struct sockaddr *sa; + + ifr = (struct ifreq *)p; + sa = &ifr->ifr_addr; + + sz = ifreq_sz; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + sz = max(sz, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name) + sa->sa_len); +#endif +#ifdef SA_LEN + sz = max(sz, SA_LEN(sa)); +#endif + memcpy (ifreq.ifr_name, ifr->ifr_name, sizeof(ifr->ifr_name)); + + if (ioctl(fd, siocgifflags, &ifreq) < 0) { + ret = errno; + goto error_out; + } + + if (!(ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) + continue; + if (memcmp (sa, &sa_zero, sizeof(sa_zero)) == 0) + continue; + if (krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting (sa)) + continue; + + if (ifreq.ifr_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) { + if (flags & LOOP_IF_NONE) { + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (sa, &lo_addr); + if (ret) + goto error_out; + got_lo = TRUE; + continue; + } else if((flags & LOOP) == 0) + continue; + } + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (sa, &res->val[j]); + if (ret) + goto error_out; + ++j; + } + if ((flags & LOOP_IF_NONE) && got_lo) { + if (j == 0) + res->val[j++] = lo_addr; + else + krb5_free_address (context, &lo_addr); + } + + if (j != num) { + void *tmp; + + res->len = j; + tmp = realloc (res->val, j * sizeof(*res->val)); + if (j != 0 && tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto error_out; + } + res->val = tmp; + } + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + +error_out: + if (got_lo) + krb5_free_address (context, &lo_addr); + while(j--) { + krb5_free_address (context, &res->val[j]); + } + free (res->val); +cleanup: + close (fd); + free (buf); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_addrs_int (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res, int flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = -1; + + if (flags & SCAN_INTERFACES) { +#if defined(AF_INET6) && defined(SIOCGIF6CONF) && defined(SIOCGIF6FLAGS) + if (ret) + ret = find_all_addresses (context, res, flags, + AF_INET6, SIOCGIF6CONF, SIOCGIF6FLAGS, + sizeof(struct in6_ifreq)); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_IPV6) && defined(SIOCGIFCONF) + if (ret) + ret = find_all_addresses (context, res, flags, + AF_INET6, SIOCGIFCONF, SIOCGIFFLAGS, + sizeof(struct ifreq)); +#endif +#if defined(AF_INET) && defined(SIOCGIFCONF) && defined(SIOCGIFFLAGS) + if (ret) + ret = find_all_addresses (context, res, flags, + AF_INET, SIOCGIFCONF, SIOCGIFFLAGS, + sizeof(struct ifreq)); + if(ret || res->len == 0) + ret = gethostname_fallback (res); +#endif + } else + ret = 0; + + if(ret == 0 && (flags & EXTRA_ADDRESSES)) { + /* append user specified addresses */ + krb5_addresses a; + ret = krb5_get_extra_addresses(context, &a); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, res); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_append_addresses(context, res, &a); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_addresses(context, res); + return ret; + } + krb5_free_addresses(context, &a); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Try to get all addresses, but return the one corresponding to + * `hostname' if we fail. + * + * Only include loopback address if there are no other. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_client_addrs (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res) +{ + int flags = LOOP_IF_NONE | EXTRA_ADDRESSES; + + if (context->scan_interfaces) + flags |= SCAN_INTERFACES; + + return get_addrs_int (context, res, flags); +} + +/* + * Try to get all local addresses that a server should listen to. + * If that fails, we return the address corresponding to `hostname'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_server_addrs (krb5_context context, krb5_addresses *res) +{ + return get_addrs_int (context, res, LOOP | SCAN_INTERFACES); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61951c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,776 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_cred.c,v 1.75 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Take the `body' and encode it into `padata' using the credentials + * in `creds'. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +make_pa_tgs_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + KDC_REQ_BODY *body, + PA_DATA *padata, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_data in_data; + krb5_error_code ret; + + buf_size = 1024; + buf = malloc (buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + do { + ret = encode_KDC_REQ_BODY(buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, + body, &len); + if (ret){ + if (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW) { + u_char *tmp; + + buf_size *= 2; + tmp = realloc (buf, buf_size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + buf = tmp; + } else { + goto out; + } + } + } while (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW); + + in_data.length = len; + in_data.data = buf + buf_size - len; + ret = krb5_mk_req_internal(context, &ac, 0, &in_data, creds, + &padata->padata_value, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM); +out: + free (buf); + if(ret) + return ret; + padata->padata_type = pa_tgs_req; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the `enc-authorization-data' in `req_body' based on `authdata' + */ + +static krb5_error_code +set_auth_data (krb5_context context, + KDC_REQ_BODY *req_body, + krb5_authdata *authdata, + krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + if(authdata->len) { + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_error_code ret; + + len = length_AuthorizationData(authdata); + buf = malloc(len); + if (buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = encode_AuthorizationData(buf + len - 1, + len, authdata, &len); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + + ALLOC(req_body->enc_authorization_data, 1); + if (req_body->enc_authorization_data == NULL) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + free (req_body->enc_authorization_data); + return ret; + } + krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY, + /* KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION? */ + buf, + len, + 0, + req_body->enc_authorization_data); + free (buf); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + } else { + req_body->enc_authorization_data = NULL; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create a tgs-req in `t' with `addresses', `flags', `second_ticket' + * (if not-NULL), `in_creds', `krbtgt', and returning the generated + * subkey in `subkey'. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +init_tgs_req (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + Ticket *second_ticket, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds *krbtgt, + unsigned nonce, + krb5_keyblock **subkey, + TGS_REQ *t) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t)); + t->pvno = 5; + t->msg_type = krb_tgs_req; + if (in_creds->session.keytype) { + ret = krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default (context, + in_creds->session.keytype, + &t->req_body.etype.len, + &t->req_body.etype.val); + } else { + ret = krb5_init_etype(context, + &t->req_body.etype.len, + &t->req_body.etype.val, + NULL); + } + if (ret) + goto fail; + t->req_body.addresses = addresses; + t->req_body.kdc_options = flags.b; + ret = copy_Realm(&in_creds->server->realm, &t->req_body.realm); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ALLOC(t->req_body.sname, 1); + if (t->req_body.sname == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + ret = copy_PrincipalName(&in_creds->server->name, t->req_body.sname); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* req_body.till should be NULL if there is no endtime specified, + but old MIT code (like DCE secd) doesn't like that */ + ALLOC(t->req_body.till, 1); + if(t->req_body.till == NULL){ + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + *t->req_body.till = in_creds->times.endtime; + + t->req_body.nonce = nonce; + if(second_ticket){ + ALLOC(t->req_body.additional_tickets, 1); + if (t->req_body.additional_tickets == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + ALLOC_SEQ(t->req_body.additional_tickets, 1); + if (t->req_body.additional_tickets->val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + ret = copy_Ticket(second_ticket, t->req_body.additional_tickets->val); + if (ret) + goto fail; + } + ALLOC(t->padata, 1); + if (t->padata == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + ALLOC_SEQ(t->padata, 1); + if (t->padata->val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + { + krb5_auth_context ac; + krb5_keyblock *key; + + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_generate_subkey (context, &krbtgt->session, &key); + if (ret) { + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context, ac, key); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + goto fail; + } + + ret = set_auth_data (context, &t->req_body, &in_creds->authdata, key); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac); + goto fail; + } + + ret = make_pa_tgs_req(context, + ac, + &t->req_body, + t->padata->val, + krbtgt); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + goto fail; + } + *subkey = key; + + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + } +fail: + if (ret) + free_TGS_REQ (t); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_krbtgt(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_realm realm, + krb5_creds **cred) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds tmp_cred; + + memset(&tmp_cred, 0, sizeof(tmp_cred)); + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, + &tmp_cred.server, + realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + realm, + NULL); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_get_credentials(context, + KRB5_GC_CACHED, + id, + &tmp_cred, + cred); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_cred.server); + if(ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +/* DCE compatible decrypt proc */ +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_tkt_with_subkey (krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_key_usage usage, + krb5_const_pointer subkey, + krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + size_t size; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + usage, + &dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if(ret && subkey){ + /* DCE compat -- try to decrypt with subkey */ + krb5_crypto_init(context, (krb5_keyblock*)subkey, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY, + &dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_EncASRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + if (ret) + ret = krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + krb5_data_free (&data); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_kdc(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds *krbtgt, + krb5_creds *out_creds) +{ + TGS_REQ req; + krb5_data enc; + krb5_data resp; + krb5_kdc_rep rep; + KRB_ERROR error; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned nonce; + krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + Ticket second_ticket; + + krb5_generate_random_block(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + nonce &= 0xffffffff; + + if(flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey){ + ret = decode_Ticket(in_creds->second_ticket.data, + in_creds->second_ticket.length, + &second_ticket, &len); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = init_tgs_req (context, + id, + addresses, + flags, + flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey ? &second_ticket : NULL, + in_creds, + krbtgt, + nonce, + &subkey, + &req); + if(flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey) + free_Ticket(&second_ticket); + if (ret) + goto out; + + buf_size = 1024; + buf = malloc (buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + do { + ret = encode_TGS_REQ (buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, + &req, &enc.length); + if (ret) { + if (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW) { + u_char *tmp; + + buf_size *= 2; + tmp = realloc (buf, buf_size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + buf = tmp; + } else { + goto out; + } + } + } while (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW); + + /* don't free addresses */ + req.req_body.addresses = NULL; + free_TGS_REQ(&req); + + enc.data = buf + buf_size - enc.length; + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* + * Send and receive + */ + + ret = krb5_sendto_kdc (context, &enc, + &krbtgt->server->name.name_string.val[1], &resp); + if(ret) + goto out; + + memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + if(decode_TGS_REP(resp.data, resp.length, &rep.kdc_rep, &len) == 0){ + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, + in_creds->client, + &out_creds->client); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, + in_creds->server, + &out_creds->server); + if(ret) + goto out; + /* this should go someplace else */ + out_creds->times.endtime = in_creds->times.endtime; + + ret = _krb5_extract_ticket(context, + &rep, + out_creds, + &krbtgt->session, + NULL, + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION, + &krbtgt->addresses, + nonce, + TRUE, + decrypt_tkt_with_subkey, + subkey); + krb5_free_kdc_rep(context, &rep); + if (ret) + goto out; + }else if(krb5_rd_error(context, &resp, &error) == 0){ + ret = error.error_code; + free_KRB_ERROR(&error); + }else if(resp.data && ((char*)resp.data)[0] == 4) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY; + else + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + krb5_data_free(&resp); +out: + if(subkey){ + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, subkey); + free(subkey); + } + if (buf) + free (buf); + return ret; + +} + +/* same as above, just get local addresses first */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_kdc_la(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_creds *krbtgt, + krb5_creds *out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_addresses addresses; + + krb5_get_all_client_addrs(context, &addresses); + ret = get_cred_kdc(context, id, flags, &addresses, + in_creds, krbtgt, out_creds); + krb5_free_addresses(context, &addresses); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_kdc_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + Ticket *second_ticket, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds + ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *krbtgt; + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if(*out_creds == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = get_krbtgt (context, + id, + in_creds->server->realm, + &krbtgt); + if(ret) { + free(*out_creds); + return ret; + } + ret = get_cred_kdc(context, id, flags, addresses, + in_creds, krbtgt, *out_creds); + krb5_free_creds (context, krbtgt); + if(ret) + free(*out_creds); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +find_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_creds **tgts, + krb5_creds *out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds mcreds; + mcreds.server = server; + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, id, KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM, + &mcreds, out_creds); + if(ret == 0) + return 0; + while(tgts && *tgts){ + if(krb5_compare_creds(context, KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM, + &mcreds, *tgts)){ + ret = krb5_copy_creds_contents(context, *tgts, out_creds); + return ret; + } + tgts++; + } + return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND; +} + +static krb5_error_code +add_cred(krb5_context context, krb5_creds ***tgts, krb5_creds *tkt) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds **tmp = *tgts; + for(i = 0; tmp && tmp[i]; i++); /* XXX */ + tmp = realloc(tmp, (i+2)*sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *tgts = tmp; + ret = krb5_copy_creds(context, tkt, &tmp[i]); + tmp[i+1] = NULL; + return ret; +} + +/* +get_cred(server) + creds = cc_get_cred(server) + if(creds) return creds + tgt = cc_get_cred(krbtgt/server_realm@any_realm) + if(tgt) + return get_cred_tgt(server, tgt) + if(client_realm == server_realm) + return NULL + tgt = get_cred(krbtgt/server_realm@client_realm) + while(tgt_inst != server_realm) + tgt = get_cred(krbtgt/server_realm@tgt_inst) + return get_cred_tgt(server, tgt) + */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_cred_from_kdc_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds, + krb5_creds ***ret_tgts) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *tgt, tmp_creds; + krb5_realm client_realm, server_realm; + + *out_creds = NULL; + + client_realm = *krb5_princ_realm(context, in_creds->client); + server_realm = *krb5_princ_realm(context, in_creds->server); + memset(&tmp_creds, 0, sizeof(tmp_creds)); + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, in_creds->client, &tmp_creds.client); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, + &tmp_creds.server, + client_realm, + KRB5_TGS_NAME, + server_realm, + NULL); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + { + krb5_creds tgts; + /* XXX try krb5_cc_retrieve_cred first? */ + ret = find_cred(context, ccache, tmp_creds.server, + *ret_tgts, &tgts); + if(ret == 0){ + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if(*out_creds == NULL) + ret = ENOMEM; + else { + ret = get_cred_kdc_la(context, ccache, flags, + in_creds, &tgts, *out_creds); + if (ret) + free (*out_creds); + } + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &tgts); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + } + if(krb5_realm_compare(context, in_creds->client, in_creds->server)) + return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND; + /* XXX this can loop forever */ + while(1){ + general_string tgt_inst; + krb5_kdc_flags f; + f.i = 0; + ret = get_cred_from_kdc_flags(context, flags, ccache, &tmp_creds, + &tgt, ret_tgts); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + ret = add_cred(context, ret_tgts, tgt); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + tgt_inst = tgt->server->name.name_string.val[1]; + if(strcmp(tgt_inst, server_realm) == 0) + break; + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &tmp_creds.server, + tgt_inst, KRB5_TGS_NAME, server_realm, NULL); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_free_creds(context, tgt); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + return ret; + } + } + + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.server); + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp_creds.client); + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if(*out_creds == NULL) + ret = ENOMEM; + else { + ret = get_cred_kdc_la(context, ccache, flags, + in_creds, tgt, *out_creds); + if (ret) + free (*out_creds); + } + krb5_free_creds(context, tgt); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_cred_from_kdc(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds, + krb5_creds ***ret_tgts) +{ + krb5_kdc_flags f; + f.i = 0; + return get_cred_from_kdc_flags(context, f, ccache, + in_creds, out_creds, ret_tgts); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials_with_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds **tgts; + int i; + + *out_creds = calloc(1, sizeof(**out_creds)); + if (*out_creds == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + ret = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(context, + ccache, + in_creds->session.keytype ? + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE : 0, + in_creds, *out_creds); + if(ret == 0) + return 0; + free(*out_creds); + if(ret != KRB5_CC_END) + return ret; + if(options & KRB5_GC_CACHED) + return KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND; + if(options & KRB5_GC_USER_USER) + flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey = 1; + tgts = NULL; + ret = get_cred_from_kdc_flags(context, flags, ccache, + in_creds, out_creds, &tgts); + for(i = 0; tgts && tgts[i]; i++){ + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, tgts[i]); + krb5_free_creds(context, tgts[i]); + } + free(tgts); + if(ret == 0 && flags.b.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0) + krb5_cc_store_cred(context, ccache, *out_creds); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + flags.i = 0; + return krb5_get_credentials_with_flags(context, options, flags, + ccache, in_creds, out_creds); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..84d7a5e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_default_principal.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_default_principal.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Try to find out what's a reasonable default principal. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_principal (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache id; + const char *user; + + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &id); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, id, princ); + krb5_cc_close (context, id); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + } + + user = get_default_username (); + if (user == NULL) + return ENOTTY; + if (getuid () == 0) { + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, princ, NULL, user, "root", NULL); + } else { + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, princ, NULL, user, NULL); + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f9b901 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_default_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_default_realm.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:09 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Return a NULL-terminated list of default realms in `realms'. + * Free this memory with krb5_free_host_realm. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realms (krb5_context context, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + if (context->default_realms == NULL) { + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_set_default_realm (context, NULL); + if (ret) + return KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM; + } + + return krb5_copy_host_realm (context, + context->default_realms, + realms); +} + +/* + * Return the first default realm. For compatability. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realm) +{ + char *res; + + if (context->default_realms == NULL + || context->default_realms[0] == NULL) { + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_set_default_realm (context, NULL); + if (ret) + return KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM; + } + + res = strdup (context->default_realms[0]); + if (res == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *realm = res; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..977515f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_for_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_for_creds.c,v 1.21 1999/12/20 00:57:37 assar Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +add_addrs(krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addr, + struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned n, i; + void *tmp; + struct addrinfo *a; + + n = 0; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + ++n; + + i = addr->len; + addr->len += n; + tmp = realloc(addr->val, addr->len * sizeof(*addr->val)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + addr->val = tmp; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (a->ai_addr, &addr->val[i++]); + if (ret) + goto fail; + } + return 0; +fail: + krb5_free_addresses (context, addr); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_fwd_tgt_creds (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const char *hostname, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_ccache ccache, + int forwardable, + krb5_data *out_data) +{ + krb5_flags flags = 0; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_error_code ret; + + flags |= KDC_OPT_FORWARDED; + + if (forwardable) + flags |= KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE; + + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + creds.client = client; + creds.server = server; + + ret = krb5_get_forwarded_creds (context, + auth_context, + ccache, + flags, + hostname, + &creds, + out_data); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_forwarded_creds (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_flags flags, + const char *hostname, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *out_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds *out_creds; + krb5_addresses addrs; + KRB_CRED cred; + KrbCredInfo *krb_cred_info; + EncKrbCredPart enc_krb_cred_part; + size_t len; + u_char buf[1024]; + int32_t sec, usec; + krb5_kdc_flags kdc_flags; + krb5_crypto crypto; + struct addrinfo *ai; + + addrs.len = 0; + addrs.val = NULL; + + ret = getaddrinfo (hostname, NULL, NULL, &ai); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = add_addrs (context, &addrs, ai); + freeaddrinfo (ai); + if (ret) + return ret; + + kdc_flags.i = flags; + + ret = krb5_get_kdc_cred (context, + ccache, + kdc_flags, + &addrs, + NULL, + in_creds, + &out_creds); + krb5_free_addresses (context, &addrs); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + memset (&cred, 0, sizeof(cred)); + cred.pvno = 5; + cred.msg_type = krb_cred; + ALLOC_SEQ(&cred.tickets, 1); + if (cred.tickets.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out2; + } + ret = decode_Ticket(out_creds->ticket.data, + out_creds->ticket.length, + cred.tickets.val, &len); + if (ret) + goto out3; + + memset (&enc_krb_cred_part, 0, sizeof(enc_krb_cred_part)); + ALLOC_SEQ(&enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out4; + } + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + ALLOC(enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out4; + } + *enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp = sec; + ALLOC(enc_krb_cred_part.usec, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.usec == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out4; + } + *enc_krb_cred_part.usec = usec; + + ret = krb5_make_addrport (&enc_krb_cred_part.s_address, + auth_context->local_address, + auth_context->local_port); + if (ret) + goto out4; + + ALLOC(enc_krb_cred_part.r_address, 1); + if (enc_krb_cred_part.r_address == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out4; + } + + ret = krb5_copy_address (context, auth_context->remote_address, + enc_krb_cred_part.r_address); + if (ret) + goto out4; + + /* fill ticket_info.val[0] */ + + enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.len = 1; + + krb_cred_info = enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.val; + + copy_EncryptionKey (&out_creds->session, &krb_cred_info->key); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->prealm, 1); + copy_Realm (&out_creds->client->realm, krb_cred_info->prealm); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->pname, 1); + copy_PrincipalName(&out_creds->client->name, krb_cred_info->pname); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->flags, 1); + *krb_cred_info->flags = out_creds->flags.b; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->authtime, 1); + *krb_cred_info->authtime = out_creds->times.authtime; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->starttime, 1); + *krb_cred_info->starttime = out_creds->times.starttime; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->endtime, 1); + *krb_cred_info->endtime = out_creds->times.endtime; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->renew_till, 1); + *krb_cred_info->renew_till = out_creds->times.renew_till; + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->srealm, 1); + copy_Realm (&out_creds->server->realm, krb_cred_info->srealm); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->sname, 1); + copy_PrincipalName (&out_creds->server->name, krb_cred_info->sname); + ALLOC(krb_cred_info->caddr, 1); + copy_HostAddresses (&out_creds->addresses, krb_cred_info->caddr); + + krb5_free_creds (context, out_creds); + + /* encode EncKrbCredPart */ + + ret = krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart (context, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + &enc_krb_cred_part, &len); + free_EncKrbCredPart (&enc_krb_cred_part); + if (ret) { + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); + return ret; + } + + krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->local_subkey, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_CRED, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + 0, + &cred.enc_part); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); + return ret; + } + + ret = encode_KRB_CRED (buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + &cred, &len); + free_KRB_CRED (&cred); + if (ret) + return ret; + out_data->length = len; + out_data->data = malloc(len); + if (out_data->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (out_data->data, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + return 0; +out4: + free_EncKrbCredPart(&enc_krb_cred_part); +out3: + free_KRB_CRED(&cred); +out2: + krb5_free_creds (context, out_creds); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8522cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_host_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_host_realm.c,v 1.25 1999/12/11 23:14:07 assar Exp $"); + +/* To automagically find the correct realm of a host (without + * [domain_realm] in krb5.conf) add a text record for your domain with + * the name of your realm, like this: + * + * krb5-realm IN TXT FOO.SE + * + * The search is recursive, so you can add entries for specific + * hosts. To find the realm of host a.b.c, it first tries + * krb5-realm.a.b.c, then krb5-realm.b.c and so on. + * + * Also supported is _kerberos (following draft-ietf-cat-krb-dns-locate-01.txt) + * + */ + +static int +copy_txt_to_realms (struct resource_record *head, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + struct resource_record *rr; + int n, i; + + for(n = 0, rr = head; rr; rr = rr->next) + if (rr->type == T_TXT) + ++n; + + if (n == 0) + return -1; + + *realms = malloc ((n + 1) * sizeof(krb5_realm)); + if (*realms == NULL) + return -1; + + for (i = 0; i < n + 1; ++i) + (*realms)[i] = NULL; + + for (i = 0, rr = head; rr; rr = rr->next) { + if (rr->type == T_TXT) { + char *tmp; + + tmp = strdup(rr->u.txt); + if (tmp == NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + free ((*realms)[i]); + free (*realms); + return -1; + } + (*realms)[i] = tmp; + ++i; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +dns_find_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *domain, + const char *dom_string, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + char dom[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + struct dns_reply *r; + int ret; + + if(*domain == '.') + domain++; + snprintf(dom, sizeof(dom), "%s.%s.", dom_string, domain); + r = dns_lookup(dom, "TXT"); + if(r == NULL) + return -1; + + ret = copy_txt_to_realms (r->head, realms); + dns_free_data(r); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Try to figure out what realms host in `domain' belong to from the + * configuration file. + */ + +static int +config_find_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *domain, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + char **tmp = krb5_config_get_strings (context, NULL, + "domain_realm", + domain, + NULL); + + if (tmp == NULL) + return -1; + *realms = tmp; + return 0; +} + +/* + * This function assumes that `host' is a FQDN (and doesn't handle the + * special case of host == NULL either). + * Try to find mapping in the config file or DNS and it that fails, + * fall back to guessing + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm_int (krb5_context context, + const char *host, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + const char *p; + + for (p = host; p != NULL; p = strchr (p + 1, '.')) { + if(config_find_realm(context, p, realms) == 0) + return 0; + else if(dns_find_realm(context, p, "krb5-realm", realms) == 0) + return 0; + else if(dns_find_realm(context, p, "_kerberos", realms) == 0) + return 0; + } + p = strchr(host, '.'); + if(p != NULL) { + p++; + *realms = malloc(2 * sizeof(krb5_realm)); + if (*realms == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + (*realms)[0] = strdup(p); + if((*realms)[0] == NULL) { + free(*realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + strupr((*realms)[0]); + (*realms)[1] = NULL; + return 0; + } + return KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN; +} + +/* + * Return the realm(s) of `host' as a NULL-terminated list in `realms'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm(krb5_context context, + const char *host, + krb5_realm **realms) +{ + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + if (host == NULL) { + if (gethostname (hostname, sizeof(hostname))) + return errno; + host = hostname; + } + + return krb5_get_host_realm_int (context, host, realms); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f65af47 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt.c @@ -0,0 +1,794 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt.c,v 1.93 2000/01/06 20:36:28 assar Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_etype (krb5_context context, + unsigned *len, + int **val, + const krb5_enctype *etypes) +{ + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_enctype *tmp; + + ret = 0; + if (etypes) + tmp = (krb5_enctype*)etypes; + else { + ret = krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes(context, + &tmp); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + for (i = 0; tmp[i]; ++i) + ; + *len = i; + *val = malloc(i * sizeof(int)); + if (i != 0 && *val == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + memmove (*val, + tmp, + i * sizeof(*tmp)); +cleanup: + if (etypes == NULL) + free (tmp); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_tkt (krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_key_usage usage, + krb5_const_pointer decrypt_arg, + krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data data; + size_t size; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + usage, + &dec_rep->kdc_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_EncASRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + if (ret) + ret = krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + &dec_rep->enc_part, + &size); + krb5_data_free (&data); + if (ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +int +_krb5_extract_ticket(krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_rep *rep, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_key_usage key_usage, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + unsigned nonce, + krb5_boolean allow_server_mismatch, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal tmp_principal; + int tmp; + time_t tmp_time; + int32_t sec_now; + + /* compare client */ + + ret = principalname2krb5_principal (&tmp_principal, + rep->kdc_rep.cname, + rep->kdc_rep.crealm); + if (ret) + goto out; + tmp = krb5_principal_compare (context, tmp_principal, creds->client); + krb5_free_principal (context, tmp_principal); + if (!tmp) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + /* extract ticket */ + { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + len = length_Ticket(&rep->kdc_rep.ticket); + buf = malloc(len); + if(buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + encode_Ticket(buf + len - 1, len, &rep->kdc_rep.ticket, &len); + creds->ticket.data = buf; + creds->ticket.length = len; + creds->second_ticket.length = 0; + creds->second_ticket.data = NULL; + } + + /* compare server */ + + ret = principalname2krb5_principal (&tmp_principal, + rep->kdc_rep.ticket.sname, + rep->kdc_rep.ticket.realm); + if (ret) + goto out; + if(allow_server_mismatch){ + krb5_free_principal(context, creds->server); + creds->server = tmp_principal; + tmp_principal = NULL; + }else{ + tmp = krb5_principal_compare (context, tmp_principal, creds->server); + krb5_free_principal (context, tmp_principal); + if (!tmp) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + } + + /* decrypt */ + + if (decrypt_proc == NULL) + decrypt_proc = decrypt_tkt; + + ret = (*decrypt_proc)(context, key, key_usage, decryptarg, rep); + if (ret) + goto out; + +#if 0 + /* XXX should this decode be here, or in the decrypt_proc? */ + ret = krb5_decode_keyblock(context, &rep->enc_part.key, 1); + if(ret) + goto out; +#endif + + /* compare nonces */ + + if (nonce != rep->enc_part.nonce) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + /* set kdc-offset */ + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec_now); + if (context->kdc_sec_offset == 0 + && krb5_config_get_bool (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "kdc_timesync", + NULL)) { + context->kdc_sec_offset = rep->enc_part.authtime - sec_now; + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec_now); + } + + /* check all times */ + + if (rep->enc_part.starttime) { + tmp_time = *rep->enc_part.starttime; + } else + tmp_time = rep->enc_part.authtime; + + if (creds->times.starttime == 0 + && abs(tmp_time - sec_now) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + goto out; + } + + if (creds->times.starttime != 0 + && tmp_time != creds->times.starttime) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + creds->times.starttime = tmp_time; + + if (rep->enc_part.renew_till) { + tmp_time = *rep->enc_part.renew_till; + } else + tmp_time = 0; + + if (creds->times.renew_till != 0 + && tmp_time > creds->times.renew_till) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + creds->times.renew_till = tmp_time; + + creds->times.authtime = rep->enc_part.authtime; + + if (creds->times.endtime != 0 + && rep->enc_part.endtime > creds->times.endtime) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; + goto out; + } + + creds->times.endtime = rep->enc_part.endtime; + + if(rep->enc_part.caddr) + krb5_copy_addresses (context, rep->enc_part.caddr, &creds->addresses); + else if(addrs) + krb5_copy_addresses (context, addrs, &creds->addresses); + else { + creds->addresses.len = 0; + creds->addresses.val = NULL; + } + creds->flags.b = rep->enc_part.flags; + + creds->authdata.len = 0; + creds->authdata.val = NULL; + creds->session.keyvalue.length = 0; + creds->session.keyvalue.data = NULL; + creds->session.keytype = rep->enc_part.key.keytype; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&creds->session.keyvalue, + rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.data, + rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.length); + +out: + memset (rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.data, 0, + rep->enc_part.key.keyvalue.length); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +make_pa_enc_timestamp(krb5_context context, PA_DATA *pa, + krb5_enctype etype, krb5_keyblock *key) +{ + PA_ENC_TS_ENC p; + u_char buf[1024]; + size_t len; + EncryptedData encdata; + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t sec, usec; + int usec2; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + p.patimestamp = sec; + usec2 = usec; + p.pausec = &usec2; + + ret = encode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, + sizeof(buf), + &p, + &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + 0, + &encdata); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = encode_EncryptedData(buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, + sizeof(buf), + &encdata, + &len); + free_EncryptedData(&encdata); + if (ret) + return ret; + pa->padata_type = pa_enc_timestamp; + pa->padata_value.length = 0; + krb5_data_copy(&pa->padata_value, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +add_padata(krb5_context context, + METHOD_DATA *md, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + int *enctypes, + unsigned netypes, + krb5_salt *salt) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + PA_DATA *pa2; + krb5_salt salt2; + int *ep; + int i; + + if(salt == NULL) { + /* default to standard salt */ + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt (context, client, &salt2); + salt = &salt2; + } + if (!enctypes) { + enctypes = (int *)context->etypes; /* XXX */ + netypes = 0; + for (ep = enctypes; *ep != ETYPE_NULL; ep++) + netypes++; + } + pa2 = realloc (md->val, (md->len + netypes) * sizeof(*md->val)); + if (pa2 == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + md->val = pa2; + + for (i = 0; i < netypes; ++i) { + krb5_keyblock *key; + + ret = (*key_proc)(context, enctypes[i], *salt, keyseed, &key); + if (ret) + continue; + ret = make_pa_enc_timestamp (context, &md->val[md->len], + enctypes[i], key); + krb5_free_keyblock (context, key); + if (ret) + return ret; + ++md->len; + } + if(salt == &salt2) + krb5_free_salt(context, salt2); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +init_as_req (krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_flags opts, + krb5_creds *creds, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + const krb5_preauthdata *preauth, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + unsigned nonce, + AS_REQ *a) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_salt salt; + + memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); + + a->pvno = 5; + a->msg_type = krb_as_req; + a->req_body.kdc_options = opts.b; + a->req_body.cname = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.cname)); + if (a->req_body.cname == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + a->req_body.sname = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.sname)); + if (a->req_body.sname == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_principal2principalname (a->req_body.cname, creds->client); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_principal2principalname (a->req_body.sname, creds->server); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = copy_Realm(&creds->client->realm, &a->req_body.realm); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + if(creds->times.starttime) { + a->req_body.from = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.from)); + if (a->req_body.from == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + *a->req_body.from = creds->times.starttime; + } + if(creds->times.endtime){ + ALLOC(a->req_body.till, 1); + *a->req_body.till = creds->times.endtime; + } + if(creds->times.renew_till){ + a->req_body.rtime = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.rtime)); + if (a->req_body.rtime == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + *a->req_body.rtime = creds->times.renew_till; + } + a->req_body.nonce = nonce; + ret = krb5_init_etype (context, + &a->req_body.etype.len, + &a->req_body.etype.val, + etypes); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* + * This means no addresses + */ + + if (addrs && addrs->len == 0) { + a->req_body.addresses = NULL; + } else { + a->req_body.addresses = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.addresses)); + if (a->req_body.addresses == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + + if (addrs) + ret = krb5_copy_addresses(context, addrs, a->req_body.addresses); + else + ret = krb5_get_all_client_addrs (context, a->req_body.addresses); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + a->req_body.enc_authorization_data = NULL; + a->req_body.additional_tickets = NULL; + + if(preauth != NULL) { + int i; + ALLOC(a->padata, 1); + if(a->padata == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + for(i = 0; i < preauth->len; i++) { + if(preauth->val[i].type == KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP){ + int j; + PA_DATA *tmp = realloc(a->padata->val, + (a->padata->len + + preauth->val[i].info.len) * + sizeof(*a->padata->val)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + a->padata->val = tmp; + for(j = 0; j < preauth->val[i].info.len; j++) { + krb5_salt *sp = &salt; + if(preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salttype) + salt.salttype = *preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salttype; + else + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + if(preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salt) + salt.saltvalue = *preauth->val[i].info.val[j].salt; + else + if(salt.salttype == KRB5_PW_SALT) + sp = NULL; + else + krb5_data_zero(&salt.saltvalue); + add_padata(context, a->padata, creds->client, + key_proc, keyseed, + &preauth->val[i].info.val[j].etype, 1, + sp); + } + } + } + } else + /* not sure this is the way to use `ptypes' */ + if (ptypes == NULL || *ptypes == KRB5_PADATA_NONE) + a->padata = NULL; + else if (*ptypes == KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP) { + ALLOC(a->padata, 1); + if (a->padata == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + a->padata->len = 0; + a->padata->val = NULL; + + /* make a v5 salted pa-data */ + add_padata(context, a->padata, creds->client, + key_proc, keyseed, a->req_body.etype.val, + a->req_body.etype.len, NULL); + + /* make a v4 salted pa-data */ + salt.salttype = KRB5_PW_SALT; + krb5_data_zero(&salt.saltvalue); + add_padata(context, a->padata, creds->client, + key_proc, keyseed, a->req_body.etype.val, + a->req_body.etype.len, &salt); + } else { + ret = KRB5_PREAUTH_BAD_TYPE; + goto fail; + } + return 0; +fail: + free_AS_REQ(a); + return ret; +} + +static int +set_ptypes(krb5_context context, + KRB_ERROR *error, + krb5_preauthtype **ptypes, + krb5_preauthdata **preauth) +{ + static krb5_preauthdata preauth2; + static krb5_preauthtype ptypes2[] = { KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP, KRB5_PADATA_NONE }; + + if(error->e_data) { + METHOD_DATA md; + int i; + decode_METHOD_DATA(error->e_data->data, + error->e_data->length, + &md, + NULL); + for(i = 0; i < md.len; i++){ + switch(md.val[i].padata_type){ + case pa_enc_timestamp: + *ptypes = ptypes2; + break; + case pa_etype_info: + *preauth = &preauth2; + ALLOC_SEQ(*preauth, 1); + (*preauth)->val[0].type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP; + krb5_decode_ETYPE_INFO(context, + md.val[i].padata_value.data, + md.val[i].padata_value.length, + &(*preauth)->val[0].info, + NULL); + break; + } + } + free_METHOD_DATA(&md); + } else { + *ptypes = ptypes2; + } + return(1); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + const krb5_preauthdata *preauth, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + AS_REQ a; + krb5_kdc_rep rep; + krb5_data req, resp; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_salt salt; + krb5_keyblock *key; + size_t size; + krb5_kdc_flags opts; + PA_DATA *pa; + krb5_enctype etype; + krb5_preauthdata *my_preauth = NULL; + unsigned nonce; + int done; + + opts.i = options; + + krb5_generate_random_block (&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + nonce &= 0xffffffff; + + do { + done = 1; + ret = init_as_req (context, + opts, + creds, + addrs, + etypes, + ptypes, + preauth, + key_proc, + keyseed, + nonce, + &a); + if (my_preauth) { + free_ETYPE_INFO(&my_preauth->val[0].info); + free (my_preauth->val); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = encode_AS_REQ ((unsigned char*)buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, + sizeof(buf), + &a, + &req.length); + free_AS_REQ(&a); + if (ret) + return ret; + + req.data = buf + sizeof(buf) - req.length; + + ret = krb5_sendto_kdc (context, &req, &creds->client->realm, &resp); + if (ret) + return ret; + + memset (&rep, 0, sizeof(rep)); + ret = decode_AS_REP(resp.data, resp.length, &rep.kdc_rep, &size); + if(ret) { + /* let's try to parse it as a KRB-ERROR */ + KRB_ERROR error; + int ret2; + + ret2 = krb5_rd_error(context, &resp, &error); + if(ret2 && resp.data && ((char*)resp.data)[0] == 4) + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY; + krb5_data_free(&resp); + if (ret2 == 0) { + ret = error.error_code; + /* if no preauth was set and KDC requires it, give it + one more try */ + if (!ptypes && !preauth + && ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED +#if 0 + || ret == KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION +#endif + && set_ptypes(context, &error, &ptypes, &my_preauth)) { + done = 0; + preauth = my_preauth; + free_KRB_ERROR(&error); + continue; + } + if(ret_as_reply) + ret_as_reply->error = error; + else + free_KRB_ERROR (&error); + return ret; + } + return ret; + } + krb5_data_free(&resp); + } while(!done); + + pa = NULL; + etype = rep.kdc_rep.enc_part.etype; + if(rep.kdc_rep.padata){ + int index = 0; + pa = krb5_find_padata(rep.kdc_rep.padata->val, rep.kdc_rep.padata->len, + pa_pw_salt, &index); + if(pa == NULL) { + index = 0; + pa = krb5_find_padata(rep.kdc_rep.padata->val, + rep.kdc_rep.padata->len, + pa_afs3_salt, &index); + } + } + if(pa) { + salt.salttype = pa->padata_type; + salt.saltvalue = pa->padata_value; + + ret = (*key_proc)(context, etype, salt, keyseed, &key); + } else { + /* make a v5 salted pa-data */ + ret = krb5_get_pw_salt (context, creds->client, &salt); + + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = (*key_proc)(context, etype, salt, keyseed, &key); + krb5_free_salt(context, salt); + } + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = _krb5_extract_ticket(context, + &rep, + creds, + key, + keyseed, + KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART, + NULL, + nonce, + FALSE, + decrypt_proc, + decryptarg); + memset (key->keyvalue.data, 0, key->keyvalue.length); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, key); + free (key); + +out: + if (ret == 0 && ret_as_reply) + *ret_as_reply = rep; + else + krb5_free_kdc_rep (context, &rep); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt(krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kdc_flags opts; + opts.i = 0; + opts.b = int2KDCOptions(options); + + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, + opts.i, + addrs, + etypes, + ptypes, + NULL, + key_proc, + keyseed, + decrypt_proc, + decryptarg, + creds, + ret_as_reply); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, ccache, creds); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, creds); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4fb8800 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_pw.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt_pw.c,v 1.15 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_password_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *password = (const char *)keyseed; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + + *key = malloc (sizeof (**key)); + if (*key == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + if (password == NULL) { + if(des_read_pw_string (buf, sizeof(buf), "Password: ", 0)) { + free (*key); + return KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR; + } + password = buf; + } + ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt (context, type, password, salt, *key); + memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password (krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + const char *password, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + return krb5_get_in_tkt (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + krb5_password_key_proc, + password, + NULL, + NULL, + creds, + ccache, + ret_as_reply); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d78ef35 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt_with_keytab.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytab_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *args = (krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *)keyseed; + krb5_keytab keytab = args->keytab; + krb5_principal principal = args->principal; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keytab real_keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + + if(keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_default(context, &real_keytab); + else + real_keytab = keytab; + + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, real_keytab, principal, + 0, enctype, &entry); + + if (keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_close (context, real_keytab); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab (krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *a; + + a = malloc(sizeof(*a)); + if (a == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + a->principal = creds->client; + a->keytab = keytab; + + return krb5_get_in_tkt (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + krb5_keytab_key_proc, + a, + NULL, + NULL, + creds, + ccache, + ret_as_reply); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..773d361 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_in_tkt_with_skey.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: get_in_tkt_with_skey.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_skey_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + return krb5_copy_keyblock (context, keyseed, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_skey (krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply) +{ + if(key == NULL) + return krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + NULL, + ccache, + creds, + ret_as_reply); + else + return krb5_get_in_tkt (context, + options, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + krb5_skey_key_proc, + key, + NULL, + NULL, + creds, + ccache, + ret_as_reply); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_port.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_port.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17bb45f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/get_port.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: get_port.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +int +krb5_getportbyname (krb5_context context, + const char *service, + const char *proto, + int default_port) +{ + struct servent *sp; + + if ((sp = roken_getservbyname (service, proto)) == NULL) { + krb5_warnx(context, "%s/%s unknown service, using default port %d", + service, proto, default_port); + return htons(default_port); + } else + return sp->s_port; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/heim_err.et b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/heim_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ec3543 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/heim_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# Error messages for the krb5 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: heim_err.et,v 1.7 1999/08/25 20:49:17 joda Exp $" + +error_table heim + +prefix HEIM_ERR + +error_code LOG_PARSE, "Error parsing log destination" +error_code V4_PRINC_NO_CONV, "Failed to convert v4 principal" +error_code SALTTYPE_NOSUPP, "Salt type is not supported by enctype" +error_code NOHOST, "Host not found" +error_code OPNOTSUPP, "Operation not supported" + +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..404fa5a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_creds.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt) +{ + memset (opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); + opt->flags = 0; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat tkt_life) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE; + opt->tkt_life = tkt_life; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat renew_life) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE; + opt->renew_life = renew_life; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int forwardable) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE; + opt->forwardable = forwardable; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int proxiable) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE; + opt->proxiable = proxiable; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_enctype *etype_list, + int etype_list_length) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST; + opt->etype_list = etype_list; + opt->etype_list_length = etype_list_length; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_addresses *addresses) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST; + opt->address_list = addresses; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list, + int preauth_list_length) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST; + opt->preauth_list_length = preauth_list_length; + opt->preauth_list = preauth_list; +} + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt(krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_data *salt) +{ + opt->flags |= KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT; + opt->salt = salt; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..84b295f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c @@ -0,0 +1,547 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: init_creds_pw.c,v 1.36 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +static int +get_config_time (krb5_context context, + char *realm, + char *name, + int def) +{ + int ret; + + ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + name, + NULL); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + name, + NULL); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; + return def; +} + +static krb5_boolean +get_config_bool (krb5_context context, + char *realm, + char *name) +{ + return krb5_config_get_bool (context, + NULL, + "realms", + realm, + name, + NULL) + || krb5_config_get_bool (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + name, + NULL); +} + +static krb5_error_code +init_cred (krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + int tmp; + int32_t now; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &now); + + memset (cred, 0, sizeof(*cred)); + + if (client) + krb5_copy_principal(context, client, &cred->client); + else { + ret = krb5_get_default_principal (context, + &cred->client); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, cred->client); + + if (start_time) + cred->times.starttime = now + start_time; + + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE) + tmp = options->tkt_life; + else + tmp = get_config_time (context, + *client_realm, + "ticket_lifetime", + 10 * 60 * 60); + cred->times.endtime = now + tmp; + + tmp = 0; + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE) + tmp = options->renew_life; + else + tmp = get_config_time (context, + *client_realm, + "renew_lifetime", + 0); + if (tmp) + cred->times.renew_till = now + tmp; + + if (in_tkt_service) { + krb5_realm server_realm; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, in_tkt_service, &cred->server); + if (ret) + goto out; + server_realm = strdup (*client_realm); + free (cred->server->realm); + krb5_princ_set_realm (context, cred->server, &server_realm); + } else { + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &cred->server, + *client_realm, KRB5_TGS_NAME, *client_realm, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + return 0; + +out: + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, cred); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse the last_req data and show it to the user if it's interesting + */ + +static void +print_expire (krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realm, + krb5_kdc_rep *rep, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int i; + LastReq *lr = &rep->enc_part.last_req; + int32_t sec; + time_t t; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + t = sec + get_config_time (context, + *realm, + "warn_pwexpire", + 7 * 24 * 60 * 60); + + for (i = 0; i < lr->len; ++i) { + if (lr->val[i].lr_type == 6 + && lr->val[i].lr_value <= t) { + char *p; + + asprintf (&p, "Your password will expire at %s", + ctime(&lr->val[i].lr_value)); + (*prompter) (context, data, p, 0, NULL); + free (p); + return; + } + } + + if (rep->enc_part.key_expiration + && *rep->enc_part.key_expiration <= t) { + char *p; + + asprintf (&p, "Your password/account will expire at %s", + ctime(rep->enc_part.key_expiration)); + (*prompter) (context, data, p, 0, NULL); + free (p); + } +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_init_creds_common(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options, + krb5_addresses **addrs, + krb5_enctype **etypes, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_preauthtype **pre_auth_types, + krb5_kdc_flags *flags) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm *client_realm; + + ret = init_cred (context, cred, client, start_time, + in_tkt_service, options); + if (ret) + return ret; + + client_realm = krb5_princ_realm (context, cred->client); + + flags->i = 0; + + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE) + flags->b.forwardable = options->forwardable; + else + flags->b.forwardable = get_config_bool (context, + *client_realm, + "forwardable"); + + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE) + flags->b.proxiable = options->proxiable; + else + flags->b.proxiable = get_config_bool (context, + *client_realm, + "proxiable"); + + if (start_time) + flags->b.postdated = 1; + if (cred->times.renew_till) + flags->b.renewable = 1; + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST) + *addrs = options->address_list; + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST) { + *etypes = malloc((options->etype_list_length + 1) + * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + if (*etypes == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (*etypes, options->etype_list, + options->etype_list_length * sizeof(krb5_enctype)); + (*etypes)[options->etype_list_length] = ETYPE_NULL; + } + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST) { + *pre_auth_types = malloc((options->preauth_list_length + 1) + * sizeof(krb5_preauthtype)); + if (*pre_auth_types == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy (*pre_auth_types, options->preauth_list, + options->preauth_list_length * sizeof(krb5_preauthtype)); + (*pre_auth_types)[options->preauth_list_length] = KRB5_PADATA_NONE; + } + if (options->flags & KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT) + ; /* XXX */ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +change_password (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + char *newpw, + size_t newpw_sz, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *old_options) +{ + krb5_prompt prompt; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds cpw_cred; + char buf1[BUFSIZ], buf2[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_data password_data; + int result_code; + krb5_data result_code_string; + krb5_data result_string; + char *p; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt options; + + memset (&cpw_cred, 0, sizeof(cpw_cred)); + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&options); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life (&options, 60); + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list (&options, + old_options->preauth_list, + old_options->preauth_list_length); + + krb5_data_zero (&result_code_string); + krb5_data_zero (&result_string); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cpw_cred, + client, + password, + prompter, + data, + 0, + "kadmin/changepw", + &options); + if (ret) + goto out; + + for(;;) { + password_data.data = buf1; + password_data.length = sizeof(buf1); + + prompt.hidden = 1; + prompt.prompt = "New password: "; + prompt.reply = &password_data; + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, "Changing password", 1, &prompt); + if (ret) + goto out; + + password_data.data = buf2; + password_data.length = sizeof(buf2); + + prompt.hidden = 1; + prompt.prompt = "Repeat new password: "; + prompt.reply = &password_data; + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, "Changing password", 1, &prompt); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (strcmp (buf1, buf2) == 0) + break; + } + + ret = krb5_change_password (context, + &cpw_cred, + buf1, + &result_code, + &result_code_string, + &result_string); + if (ret) + goto out; + asprintf (&p, "%s: %.*s\n", + result_code ? "Error" : "Success", + (int)result_string.length, + (char*)result_string.data); + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, p, 0, NULL); + free (p); + if (result_code == 0) { + strncpy (newpw, buf1, newpw_sz); + ret = 0; + } else + ret = ENOTTY; + +out: + memset (buf1, 0, sizeof(buf1)); + memset (buf2, 0, sizeof(buf2)); + krb5_data_free (&result_string); + krb5_data_free (&result_code_string); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &cpw_cred); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_password(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_addresses *addrs = NULL; + krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL; + krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types = NULL; + krb5_creds this_cred; + krb5_kdc_rep kdc_reply; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + krb5_data password_data; + int done; + + ret = get_init_creds_common(context, creds, client, start_time, + in_tkt_service, options, + &addrs, &etypes, &this_cred, &pre_auth_types, + &flags); + if(ret) + goto out; + + if (password == NULL) { + krb5_prompt prompt; + char *p; + + krb5_unparse_name (context, this_cred.client, &p); + asprintf (&prompt.prompt, "%s's Password: ", p); + free (p); + password_data.data = buf; + password_data.length = sizeof(buf); + prompt.hidden = 1; + prompt.reply = &password_data; + + ret = (*prompter) (context, data, NULL, 1, &prompt); + free (prompt.prompt); + if (ret) { + memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + ret = KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR; + goto out; + } + password = password_data.data; + } + + done = 0; + while(!done) { + memset(&kdc_reply, 0, sizeof(kdc_reply)); + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, + flags.i, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + NULL, + krb5_password_key_proc, + password, + NULL, + NULL, + &this_cred, + &kdc_reply); + switch (ret) { + case 0 : + done = 1; + break; + case KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED : + ret = change_password (context, + client, + password, + buf, + sizeof(buf), + prompter, + data, + options); + if (ret) + goto out; + password = buf; + break; + default: + goto out; + } + } + + if (prompter) + print_expire (context, + krb5_princ_realm (context, this_cred.client), + &kdc_reply, + prompter, + data); +out: + memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret == 0) + krb5_free_kdc_rep (context, &kdc_reply); + + free (pre_auth_types); + free (etypes); + if (ret == 0 && creds) + *creds = this_cred; + else + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keyblock_key_proc (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype type, + krb5_data *salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + return krb5_copy_keyblock (context, keyseed, key); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_keytab(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kdc_flags flags; + krb5_addresses *addrs = NULL; + krb5_enctype *etypes = NULL; + krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types = NULL; + krb5_creds this_cred; + krb5_keytab_key_proc_args *a; + + ret = get_init_creds_common(context, creds, client, start_time, + in_tkt_service, options, + &addrs, &etypes, &this_cred, &pre_auth_types, + &flags); + if(ret) + goto out; + + a = malloc (sizeof(*a)); + if (a == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + a->principal = this_cred.client; + a->keytab = keytab; + + ret = krb5_get_in_cred (context, + flags.i, + addrs, + etypes, + pre_auth_types, + NULL, + krb5_keytab_key_proc, + a, + NULL, + NULL, + &this_cred, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto out; + free (pre_auth_types); + free (etypes); + if (creds) + *creds = this_cred; + else + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return 0; + +out: + free (pre_auth_types); + free (etypes); + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &this_cred); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keyblock.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keyblock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89732a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keyblock.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +void +krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(keyblock) { + if (keyblock->keyvalue.data != NULL) + memset(keyblock->keyvalue.data, 0, keyblock->keyvalue.length); + krb5_data_free (&keyblock->keyvalue); + } +} + +void +krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock) +{ + if(keyblock){ + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, keyblock); + free(keyblock); + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *inblock, + krb5_keyblock *to) +{ + return copy_EncryptionKey(inblock, to); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock (krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *inblock, + krb5_keyblock **to) +{ + krb5_keyblock *k; + + k = malloc (sizeof(*k)); + if (k == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *to = k; + return krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context, inblock, k); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af853a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab.c @@ -0,0 +1,407 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab.c,v 1.45 2000/01/02 00:31:20 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * Register a new keytab in `ops' + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_register(krb5_context context, + const krb5_kt_ops *ops) +{ + struct krb5_keytab_data *tmp; + + tmp = realloc(context->kt_types, + (context->num_kt_types + 1) * sizeof(*context->kt_types)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(&tmp[context->num_kt_types], ops, + sizeof(tmp[context->num_kt_types])); + context->kt_types = tmp; + context->num_kt_types++; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Resolve the keytab name (of the form `type:residual') in `name' + * into a keytab in `id'. + * Return 0 or an error + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_keytab *id) +{ + krb5_keytab k; + int i; + const char *type, *residual; + size_t type_len; + krb5_error_code ret; + + residual = strchr(name, ':'); + if(residual == NULL) { + type = "FILE"; + type_len = strlen(type); + residual = name; + } else { + type = name; + type_len = residual - name; + residual++; + } + + for(i = 0; i < context->num_kt_types; i++) { + if(strncmp(type, context->kt_types[i].prefix, type_len) == 0) + break; + } + if(i == context->num_kt_types) + return KRB5_KT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; + + k = malloc (sizeof(*k)); + if (k == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + memcpy(k, &context->kt_types[i], sizeof(*k)); + k->data = NULL; + ret = (*k->resolve)(context, residual, k); + if(ret) { + free(k); + k = NULL; + } + *id = k; + return ret; +} + +/* + * copy the name of the default keytab into `name'. + * Return 0 or KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE if `namesize' is too short. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default_name(krb5_context context, char *name, size_t namesize) +{ + strncpy(name, context->default_keytab, namesize); + if(strlen(context->default_keytab) >= namesize) + return KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set `id' to the default keytab. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab *id) +{ + return krb5_kt_resolve (context, context->default_keytab, id); +} + +/* + * Read the key identified by `(principal, vno, enctype)' from the + * keytab in `keyprocarg' (the default if == NULL) into `*key'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_read_service_key(krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer keyprocarg, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_kvno vno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keyblock **key) +{ + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if (keyprocarg) + ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, keyprocarg, &keytab); + else + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, keytab, principal, vno, enctype, &entry); + krb5_kt_close (context, keytab); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key); + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Retrieve the name of the keytab `keytab' into `name', `namesize' + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab keytab, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + return (*keytab->get_name)(context, keytab, name, namesize); +} + +/* + * Finish using the keytab in `id'. All resources will be released. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = (*id->close)(context, id); + if(ret == 0) + free(id); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compare `entry' against `principal, vno, enctype'. + * Any of `principal, vno, enctype' might be 0 which acts as a wildcard. + * Return TRUE if they compare the same, FALSE otherwise. + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kt_compare(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno vno, + krb5_enctype enctype) +{ + if(principal != NULL && + !krb5_principal_compare(context, entry->principal, principal)) + return FALSE; + if(vno && vno != entry->vno) + return FALSE; + if(enctype && enctype != entry->keyblock.keytype) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +/* + * Retrieve the keytab entry for `principal, kvno, enctype' into `entry' + * from the keytab `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno kvno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_keytab_entry tmp; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + + if(id->get) + return (*id->get)(context, id, principal, kvno, enctype, entry); + + ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get (context, id, &cursor); + if (ret) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; /* XXX i.e. file not found */ + + entry->vno = 0; + while (krb5_kt_next_entry(context, id, &tmp, &cursor) == 0) { + if (krb5_kt_compare(context, &tmp, principal, 0, enctype)) { + if (kvno == tmp.vno) { + krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents (context, &tmp, entry); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &tmp); + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + return 0; + } else if (kvno == 0 && tmp.vno > entry->vno) { + if (entry->vno) + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, entry); + krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents (context, &tmp, entry); + } + } + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &tmp); + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get (context, id, &cursor); + if (entry->vno) + return 0; + else + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of `in' into `out'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(krb5_context context, + const krb5_keytab_entry *in, + krb5_keytab_entry *out) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out)); + out->vno = in->vno; + + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in->principal, &out->principal); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context, + &in->keyblock, + &out->keyblock); + if (ret) + goto fail; + out->timestamp = in->timestamp; + return 0; +fail: + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, out); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Free the contents of `entry'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_free_principal (context, entry->principal); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents (context, &entry->keyblock); + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +static int +xxxlock(int fd, int write) +{ + if(flock(fd, (write ? LOCK_EX : LOCK_SH) | LOCK_NB) < 0) { + sleep(1); + if(flock(fd, (write ? LOCK_EX : LOCK_SH) | LOCK_NB) < 0) + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +xxxunlock(int fd) +{ + flock(fd, LOCK_UN); +} +#endif + +/* + * Set `cursor' to point at the beginning of `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + if(id->start_seq_get == NULL) + return HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP; + return (*id->start_seq_get)(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Get the next entry from `id' pointed to by `cursor' and advance the + * `cursor'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + if(id->next_entry == NULL) + return HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP; + return (*id->next_entry)(context, id, entry, cursor); +} + +/* + * Release all resources associated with `cursor'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + if(id->end_seq_get == NULL) + return HEIM_ERR_OPNOTSUPP; + return (*id->end_seq_get)(context, id, cursor); +} + +/* + * Add the entry in `entry' to the keytab `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + if(id->add == NULL) + return KRB5_KT_NOWRITE; + return (*id->add)(context, id,entry); +} + +/* + * Remove the entry `entry' from the keytab `id'. + * Return 0 or an error. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + if(id->remove == NULL) + return KRB5_KT_NOWRITE; + return (*id->remove)(context, id, entry); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_file.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_file.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6c35e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,540 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_file.c,v 1.6 2000/01/02 00:20:22 assar Exp $"); + +#define KRB5_KT_VNO_1 1 +#define KRB5_KT_VNO_2 2 +#define KRB5_KT_VNO KRB5_KT_VNO_2 + +/* file operations -------------------------------------------- */ + +struct fkt_data { + char *filename; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int ret; + int16_t size; + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + data->length = size; + data->data = malloc(size); + if (data->data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = sp->fetch(sp, data->data, size); + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_KT_END; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_string(krb5_storage *sp, + general_string *data) +{ + int ret; + int16_t size; + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + *data = malloc(size + 1); + if (*data == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = sp->fetch(sp, *data, size); + (*data)[size] = '\0'; + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_KT_END; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, data.length); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = sp->store(sp, data.data, data.length); + if(ret != data.length){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_KT_END; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_string(krb5_storage *sp, + general_string data) +{ + int ret; + size_t len = strlen(data); + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, len); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = sp->store(sp, data, len); + if(ret != len){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_KT_END; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_keyblock(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_keyblock *p) +{ + int ret; + int16_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); /* keytype + etype */ + if(ret) return ret; + p->keytype = tmp; + ret = krb5_kt_ret_data(sp, &p->keyvalue); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_keyblock(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_keyblock *p) +{ + int ret; + + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p->keytype); /* keytype + etype */ + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_kt_store_data(sp, p->keyvalue); + return ret; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_ret_principal(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + int i; + int ret; + krb5_principal p; + int16_t tmp; + + ALLOC(p, 1); + if(p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) + return ret; + if (sp->flags & KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS) + tmp--; + p->name.name_string.len = tmp; + ret = krb5_kt_ret_string(sp, &p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + p->name.name_string.val = calloc(p->name.name_string.len, + sizeof(*p->name.name_string.val)); + if(p->name.name_string.val == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + for(i = 0; i < p->name.name_string.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_kt_ret_string(sp, p->name.name_string.val + i); + if(ret) return ret; + } + if (krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) + p->name.name_type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + else { + int32_t tmp32; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp32); + p->name.name_type = tmp32; + if (ret) + return ret; + } + *princ = p; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_store_principal(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal p) +{ + int i; + int ret; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p->name.name_string.len + 1); + else + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p->name.name_string.len); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_kt_store_string(sp, p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; i < p->name.name_string.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_kt_store_string(sp, p->name.name_string.val[i]); + if(ret) return ret; + } + if(!krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) { + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_type); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct fkt_data *d; + d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + d->filename = strdup(name); + if(d->filename == NULL) { + free(d); + return ENOMEM; + } + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + free(d->filename); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + /* This function is XXX */ + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + strlcpy(name, d->filename, namesize); + return 0; +} + +static void +storage_set_flags(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp, int vno) +{ + int flags = 0; + switch(vno) { + case KRB5_KT_VNO_1: + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE; + flags |= KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER; + break; + case KRB5_KT_VNO_2: + break; + default: + krb5_abortx(context, + "storage_set_flags called with bad vno (%x)", vno); + } + krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, flags); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_start_seq_get_int(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + int flags, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + int8_t pvno, tag; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + + c->fd = open (d->filename, flags); + if (c->fd < 0) + return errno; + c->sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(c->fd); + ret = krb5_ret_int8(c->sp, &pvno); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + return ret; + } + if(pvno != 5) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + return KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int8(c->sp, &tag); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + return ret; + } + id->version = tag; + storage_set_flags(context, c->sp, id->version); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + return fkt_start_seq_get_int(context, id, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, c); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_next_entry_int(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor, + off_t *start, + off_t *end) +{ + int32_t len; + int ret; + int8_t tmp8; + int32_t tmp32; + off_t pos; + + pos = cursor->sp->seek(cursor->sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); +loop: + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if(len < 0) { + pos = cursor->sp->seek(cursor->sp, -len, SEEK_CUR); + goto loop; + } + ret = krb5_kt_ret_principal (cursor->sp, &entry->principal); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &tmp32); + entry->timestamp = tmp32; + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_ret_int8(cursor->sp, &tmp8); + if (ret) + goto out; + entry->vno = tmp8; + ret = krb5_kt_ret_keyblock (cursor->sp, &entry->keyblock); + if (ret) + goto out; + if(start) *start = pos; + if(end) *end = *start + 4 + len; + out: + cursor->sp->seek(cursor->sp, pos + 4 + len, SEEK_SET); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + return fkt_next_entry_int(context, id, entry, cursor, NULL, NULL); +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_storage_free(cursor->sp); + close(cursor->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + int ret; + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + struct fkt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_data keytab; + int32_t len; + + fd = open (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY); + if (fd < 0) { + fd = open (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + ret = krb5_store_int8(sp, 5); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + if(id->version == 0) + id->version = KRB5_KT_VNO; + ret = krb5_store_int8 (sp, id->version); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + storage_set_flags(context, sp, id->version); + } else { + int8_t pvno, tag; + sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd); + ret = krb5_ret_int8(sp, &pvno); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + if(pvno != 5) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int8 (sp, &tag); + if (ret) { + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; + } + id->version = tag; + storage_set_flags(context, sp, id->version); + } + + { + krb5_storage *emem; + emem = krb5_storage_emem(); + if(emem == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_kt_store_principal(emem, entry->principal); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_store_int32 (emem, entry->timestamp); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_store_int8 (emem, entry->vno); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_kt_store_keyblock (emem, &entry->keyblock); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(emem); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_storage_to_data(emem, &keytab); + krb5_storage_free(emem); + if(ret) + goto out; + } + + while(1) { + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &len); + if(ret == KRB5_CC_END) { + len = keytab.length; + break; + } + if(len < 0) { + len = -len; + if(len >= keytab.length) { + sp->seek(sp, -4, SEEK_CUR); + break; + } + } + sp->seek(sp, len, SEEK_CUR); + } + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, len); + if(sp->store(sp, keytab.data, keytab.length) < 0) + ret = errno; + memset(keytab.data, 0, keytab.length); + krb5_data_free(&keytab); + out: + krb5_storage_free(sp); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +fkt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + krb5_keytab_entry e; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; + off_t pos_start, pos_end; + int found = 0; + + fkt_start_seq_get_int(context, id, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, &cursor); + while(fkt_next_entry_int(context, id, &e, &cursor, + &pos_start, &pos_end) == 0) { + if(krb5_kt_compare(context, &e, entry->principal, + entry->vno, entry->keyblock.keytype)) { + int32_t len; + unsigned char buf[128]; + found = 1; + cursor.sp->seek(cursor.sp, pos_start, SEEK_SET); + len = pos_end - pos_start - 4; + krb5_store_int32(cursor.sp, -len); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + while(len > 0) { + cursor.sp->store(cursor.sp, buf, min(len, sizeof(buf))); + len -= min(len, sizeof(buf)); + } + } + } + krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor); + if (!found) + return KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND; + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_fkt_ops = { + "FILE", + fkt_resolve, + fkt_get_name, + fkt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + fkt_start_seq_get, + fkt_next_entry, + fkt_end_seq_get, + fkt_add_entry, + fkt_remove_entry +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa14e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_keyfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_keyfile.c,v 1.7 2000/01/02 04:00:22 assar Exp $"); + +/* afs keyfile operations --------------------------------------- */ + +/* + * Minimum tools to handle the AFS KeyFile. + * + * Format of the KeyFile is: + * {[ ] * numkeys} + * + * It just adds to the end of the keyfile, deleting isn't implemented. + * Use your favorite text/hex editor to delete keys. + * + */ + +#define AFS_SERVERTHISCELL "/usr/afs/etc/ThisCell" +#define AFS_SERVERMAGICKRBCONF "/usr/afs/etc/krb.conf" + +struct akf_data { + int num_entries; + char *filename; + char *cell; + char *realm; +}; + +/* + * set `d->cell' and `d->realm' + */ + +static int +get_cell_and_realm (struct akf_data *d) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[BUFSIZ], *cp; + + f = fopen (AFS_SERVERTHISCELL, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return errno; + if (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { + fclose (f); + return EINVAL; + } + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + fclose(f); + + d->cell = strdup (buf); + if (d->cell == NULL) + return errno; + + f = fopen (AFS_SERVERMAGICKRBCONF, "r"); + if (f != NULL) { + if (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL) { + fclose (f); + return EINVAL; + } + if (buf[strlen(buf)-1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0'; + fclose(f); + } + /* uppercase */ + for (cp = buf; *cp != '\0'; cp++) + *cp = toupper(*cp); + + d->realm = strdup (buf); + if (d->realm == NULL) { + free (d->cell); + return errno; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * init and get filename + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + int ret; + struct akf_data *d = malloc(sizeof (struct akf_data)); + + if (d == NULL) + return errno; + + d->num_entries = 0; + ret = get_cell_and_realm (d); + if (ret) { + free (d); + return ret; + } + d->filename = strdup (name); + if (d->filename == NULL) { + free (d->cell); + free (d->realm); + free (d); + return ENOMEM; + } + id->data = d; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * cleanup + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + + free (d->filename); + free (d->cell); + free (d); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return filename + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t name_sz) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + + strlcpy (name, d->filename, name_sz); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Init + */ + +static krb5_error_code +akf_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + int32_t ret; + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + + c->fd = open (d->filename, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY, 0600); + if (c->fd < 0) + return errno; + + c->sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(c->fd); + ret = krb5_ret_int32(c->sp, &d->num_entries); + if(ret) { + krb5_storage_free(c->sp); + close(c->fd); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +akf_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + int32_t kvno; + off_t pos; + int ret; + + pos = cursor->sp->seek(cursor->sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + + if ((pos - 4) / (4 + 8) >= d->num_entries) + return KRB5_KT_END; + + ret = krb5_make_principal (context, &entry->principal, + d->realm, "afs", d->cell, NULL); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = krb5_ret_int32(cursor->sp, &kvno); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry->principal); + goto out; + } + + entry->vno = (int8_t) kvno; + + entry->keyblock.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5; + entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length = 8; + entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data = malloc (8); + if (entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data == NULL) { + krb5_free_principal (context, entry->principal); + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ret = cursor->sp->fetch(cursor->sp, entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data, 8); + if(ret != 8) + ret = (ret < 0) ? errno : KRB5_KT_END; + + entry->timestamp = time(NULL); + + out: + cursor->sp->seek(cursor->sp, pos + 4 + 8, SEEK_SET); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +akf_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_storage_free(cursor->sp); + close(cursor->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +akf_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct akf_data *d = id->data; + int fd, created = 0; + int32_t kvno; + + fd = open (d->filename, O_RDWR | O_BINARY); + if (fd < 0) { + fd = open (d->filename, + O_RDWR | O_BINARY | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + created = 1; + } + + if (entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length == 8 + && entry->keyblock.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) { + + int32_t len = 0; + + if (!created) { + if (lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET)) + return errno; + + if (read (fd, &len, sizeof(len)) != sizeof(len)) + return errno; + } + len += 1; + + if (lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET)) + return errno; + + if (write (fd, &len, sizeof(len)) != sizeof(len)) + return errno; + + if (lseek (fd, 4 + (len-1) * (8+4), SEEK_SET)) + return errno; + + kvno = entry->vno; + write(fd, &kvno, sizeof(kvno)); + write(fd, entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data, 8); + } + close (fd); + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_akf_ops = { + "AFSKEYFILE", + akf_resolve, + akf_get_name, + akf_close, + NULL, /* get */ + akf_start_seq_get, + akf_next_entry, + akf_end_seq_get, + akf_add_entry, + NULL /* remove */ +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1f425c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_krb4.c @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_krb4.c,v 1.5 2000/01/06 08:04:58 assar Exp $"); + +struct krb4_kt_data { + char *filename; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d; + + d = malloc (sizeof(*d)); + if (d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + d->filename = strdup (name); + if (d->filename == NULL) { + free(d); + return ENOMEM; + } + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_get_name (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t name_sz) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + + strlcpy (name, d->filename, name_sz); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_close (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + + free (d->filename); + free (d); + return 0; +} + +struct krb4_cursor_extra_data { + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + int num; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_start_seq_get_int (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + int flags, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed; + + ed = malloc (sizeof(*ed)); + if (ed == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ed->entry.principal = NULL; + ed->num = -1; + c->data = ed; + c->fd = open (d->filename, flags); + if (c->fd < 0) { + free (ed); + return errno; + } + c->sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(c->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_start_seq_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + return krb4_kt_start_seq_get_int (context, id, O_BINARY | O_RDONLY, c); +} + +static krb5_error_code +read_v4_entry (krb5_context context, + struct krb4_kt_data *d, + krb5_kt_cursor *c, + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char *service, *instance, *realm; + int8_t kvno; + des_cblock key; + + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(c->sp, &service); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(c->sp, &instance); + if (ret) { + free (service); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_ret_stringz(c->sp, &realm); + if (ret) { + free (service); + free (instance); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_425_conv_principal (context, service, instance, realm, + &ed->entry.principal); + free (service); + free (instance); + free (realm); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int8(c->sp, &kvno); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_principal (context, ed->entry.principal); + return ret; + } + ret = c->sp->fetch(c->sp, key, 8); + if (ret < 0) { + krb5_free_principal(context, ed->entry.principal); + return ret; + } + if (ret < 8) { + krb5_free_principal(context, ed->entry.principal); + return EINVAL; + } + ed->entry.vno = kvno; + ret = krb5_data_copy (&ed->entry.keyblock.keyvalue, + key, 8); + if (ret) + return ret; + ed->entry.timestamp = time(NULL); + ed->num = 0; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_next_entry (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed = c->data; + const krb5_enctype keytypes[] = {ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC}; + + if (ed->num == -1) { + ret = read_v4_entry (context, d, c, ed); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents (context, + &ed->entry, + entry); + if (ret) + return ret; + entry->keyblock.keytype = keytypes[ed->num]; + if (++ed->num == 3) { + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &ed->entry); + ed->num = -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_end_seq_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct krb4_cursor_extra_data *ed = c->data; + + krb5_storage_free (c->sp); + if (ed->num != -1) + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &ed->entry); + free (c->data); + close (c->fd); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb4_kt_add_entry (krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct krb4_kt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_error_code ret; + int fd; + char service[ANAME_SZ]; + char instance[INST_SZ]; + char realm[REALM_SZ]; + int8_t kvno; + + fd = open (d->filename, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY); + if (fd < 0) { + fd = open (d->filename, + O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY | O_CREAT, 0600); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + } + ret = krb5_524_conv_principal (context, entry->principal, + service, instance, realm); + if (ret) { + close (fd); + return ret; + } + if (entry->keyblock.keyvalue.length == 8 + && entry->keyblock.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) { + write(fd, service, strlen(service)+1); + write(fd, instance, strlen(instance)+1); + write(fd, realm, strlen(realm)+1); + kvno = entry->vno; + write(fd, &kvno, sizeof(kvno)); + write(fd, entry->keyblock.keyvalue.data, 8); + } + close (fd); + return 0; +} + +krb5_kt_ops krb4_fkt_ops = { + "krb4", + krb4_kt_resolve, + krb4_kt_get_name, + krb4_kt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + krb4_kt_start_seq_get, + krb4_kt_next_entry, + krb4_kt_end_seq_get, + krb4_kt_add_entry, /* add_entry */ + NULL /* remove_entry */ +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..924b4cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/keytab_memory.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: keytab_memory.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:10 joda Exp $"); + +/* memory operations -------------------------------------------- */ + +struct mkt_data { + krb5_keytab_entry *entries; + int num_entries; +}; + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_resolve(krb5_context context, const char *name, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct mkt_data *d; + d = malloc(sizeof(*d)); + if(d == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + d->entries = NULL; + d->num_entries = 0; + id->data = d; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_close(krb5_context context, krb5_keytab id) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < d->num_entries; i++) + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &d->entries[i]); + free(d->entries); + free(d); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + char *name, + size_t namesize) +{ + strncpy(name, "", namesize); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_start_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + /* XXX */ + c->fd = 0; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_next_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *c) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + if(c->fd >= d->num_entries) + return KRB5_KT_END; + return krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(context, &d->entries[c->fd++], entry); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_end_seq_get(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_add_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_keytab_entry *tmp; + tmp = realloc(d->entries, (d->num_entries + 1) * sizeof(*d->entries)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + d->entries = tmp; + return krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(context, entry, + &d->entries[d->num_entries++]); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mkt_remove_entry(krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry) +{ + struct mkt_data *d = id->data; + krb5_keytab_entry *e, *end; + + /* do this backwards to minimize copying */ + for(end = d->entries + d->num_entries, e = end - 1; e >= d->entries; e--) { + if(krb5_kt_compare(context, e, entry->principal, + entry->vno, entry->keyblock.keytype)) { + krb5_kt_free_entry(context, e); + memmove(e, e + 1, (end - e - 1) * sizeof(*e)); + memset(end - 1, 0, sizeof(*end)); + d->num_entries--; + end--; + } + } + e = realloc(d->entries, d->num_entries * sizeof(*d->entries)); + if(e != NULL) + d->entries = e; + return 0; +} + +const krb5_kt_ops krb5_mkt_ops = { + "MEMORY", + mkt_resolve, + mkt_get_name, + mkt_close, + NULL, /* get */ + mkt_start_seq_get, + mkt_next_entry, + mkt_end_seq_get, + mkt_add_entry, + mkt_remove_entry +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b24328a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-private.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __krb5_private_h__ +#define __krb5_private_h__ + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +void +_krb5_crc_init_table __P((void)); + +u_int32_t +_krb5_crc_update __P(( + char *p, + size_t len, + u_int32_t res)); + +int +_krb5_extract_ticket __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_rep *rep, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_key_usage key_usage, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + unsigned nonce, + krb5_boolean allow_server_mismatch, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg)); + +ssize_t +_krb5_get_int __P(( + void *buffer, + unsigned long *value, + size_t size)); + +void +_krb5_n_fold __P(( + const void *str, + size_t len, + void *key, + size_t size)); + +ssize_t +_krb5_put_int __P(( + void *buffer, + unsigned long value, + size_t size)); + +#endif /* __krb5_private_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-protos.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-protos.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8813c7a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5-protos.h @@ -0,0 +1,2352 @@ +/* This is a generated file */ +#ifndef __krb5_protos_h__ +#define __krb5_protos_h__ + +#ifdef __STDC__ +#include +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) x +#endif +#else +#ifndef __P +#define __P(x) () +#endif +#endif + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +krb5_error_code +krb524_convert_creds_kdc __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_cred, + struct credentials *v4creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + krb5_principal *princ)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal_ext __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + krb5_boolean (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal), + krb5_boolean resolve, + krb5_principal *princ)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_524_conv_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_principal principal, + char *name, + char *instance, + char *realm)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abort __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abortx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_et_list __P(( + krb5_context context, + void (*func)(struct et_list **))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_add_extra_addresses __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addresses)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_dest __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *f, + const char *p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_func __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int min, + int max, + krb5_log_log_func_t log, + krb5_log_close_func_t close, + void *data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addr2sockaddr __P(( + const krb5_address *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_compare __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2)); + +int +krb5_address_order __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr1, + const krb5_address *addr2)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_address_search __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *addr, + const krb5_addresses *addrlist)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_aname_to_localname __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal aname, + size_t lnsize, + char *lname)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_anyaddr __P(( + int af, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_append_addresses __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *dest, + const krb5_addresses *source)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_free __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getaddrs __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_address **local_addr, + krb5_address **remote_addr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getflags __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *flags)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock **keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_init __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_address *local_addr, + krb5_address *remote_addr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + void *p_fd)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setflags __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t flags)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_con_setuserkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getauthenticator __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getcksumtype __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_cksumtype *cksumtype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getkeytype __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keytype *keytype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getlocalseqnumber __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *seqnumber)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t *seqnumber)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setcksumtype __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_cksumtype cksumtype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setkeytype __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_keytype keytype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setlocalseqnumber __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t seqnumber)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_auth_setremoteseqnumber __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + int32_t seqnumber)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_ap_req __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_creds *cred, + krb5_flags ap_options, + krb5_data authenticator, + krb5_data *retdata)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_authenticator __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_creds *cred, + Checksum *cksum, + Authenticator **auth_result, + krb5_data *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_ext __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + va_list ap)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va_ext __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + va_list ap)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_close __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_copy_cache __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache from, + krb5_ccache to)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache *id)); + +const char* +krb5_cc_default_name __P((krb5_context context)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_destroy __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_end_seq_get __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_gen_new __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + krb5_ccache *id)); + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_name __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal)); + +const char* +krb5_cc_get_type __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_get_version __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_initialize __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_next_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_register __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_cc_ops *ops, + krb5_boolean override)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_remove_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *cred)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_resolve __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_ccache *id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_retrieve_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags whichfields, + const krb5_creds *mcreds, + krb5_creds *creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_set_flags __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_start_seq_get __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_cc_store_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_change_password __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + char *newpw, + int *result_code, + krb5_data *result_code_string, + krb5_data *result_string)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_checksum_is_keyed __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_checksumsize __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_cksumtype type, + size_t *size)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_closelog __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_compare_creds __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags whichfields, + const krb5_creds *mcreds, + const krb5_creds *creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_file_free __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *s)); + +void +krb5_config_free_strings __P((char **strings)); + +const void * +krb5_config_get __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int type, + ...)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_get_bool_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_boolean def_value, + ...)); + +int +krb5_config_get_int __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...)); + +int +krb5_config_get_int_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + ...)); + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_get_list __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...)); + +const void * +krb5_config_get_next __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + ...)); + +const char * +krb5_config_get_string __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...)); + +char** +krb5_config_get_strings __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...)); + +int +krb5_config_get_time __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + ...)); + +int +krb5_config_get_time_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + ...)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file __P(( + const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_config_parse_file_debug __P(( + const char *fname, + krb5_config_section **res, + unsigned *lineno, + char **error_message)); + +const void * +krb5_config_vget __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int type, + va_list args)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_config_vget_bool_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_boolean def_value, + va_list args)); + +int +krb5_config_vget_int __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args)); + +int +krb5_config_vget_int_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + va_list args)); + +const krb5_config_binding * +krb5_config_vget_list __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args)); + +const void * +krb5_config_vget_next __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + krb5_config_binding **pointer, + int type, + va_list args)); + +const char * +krb5_config_vget_string __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args)); + +char ** +krb5_config_vget_strings __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args)); + +int +krb5_config_vget_time __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + va_list args)); + +int +krb5_config_vget_time_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_config_section *c, + int def_value, + va_list args)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_address __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_address *inaddr, + krb5_address *outaddr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_addresses __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_addresses *inaddr, + krb5_addresses *outaddr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_creds *incred, + krb5_creds **outcred)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_creds_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_creds *incred, + krb5_creds *c)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_data __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *indata, + krb5_data **outdata)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_host_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *from, + krb5_realm **to)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *inblock, + krb5_keyblock **to)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_keyblock_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *inblock, + krb5_keyblock *to)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal inprinc, + krb5_principal *outprinc)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_ticket __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_ticket *from, + krb5_ticket **to)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_create_checksum __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage_or_type, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_destroy __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_crypto_init __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_crypto *crypto)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_alloc __P(( + krb5_data *p, + int len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_copy __P(( + krb5_data *p, + const void *data, + size_t len)); + +void +krb5_data_free __P((krb5_data *p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_data_realloc __P(( + krb5_data *p, + int len)); + +void +krb5_data_zero __P((krb5_data *p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_Authenticator __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + Authenticator *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ETYPE_INFO __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + ETYPE_INFO *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncAPRepPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncASRepPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncASRepPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncKrbCredPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTGSRepPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncTGSRepPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_EncTicketPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *data, + size_t length, + EncTicketPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ap_req __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + EncryptedData *e, + krb5_data *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_ticket __P(( + krb5_context context, + Ticket *ticket, + krb5_keyblock *key, + EncTicketPart *out, + krb5_flags flags)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_decode __P(( + krb5_data tr, + char ***realms, + int *num_realms, + const char *client_realm, + const char *server_realm)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_encode __P(( + char **realms, + int num_realms, + krb5_data *encoding)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_Authenticator __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + Authenticator *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_ETYPE_INFO __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + ETYPE_INFO *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncAPRepPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncASRepPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncASRepPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncKrbCredPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncKrbCredPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTGSRepPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncTGSRepPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encode_EncTicketPart __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + size_t length, + EncTicketPart *t, + size_t *len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + krb5_data *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + unsigned usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + int kvno, + EncryptedData *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_keytype __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_keytype *keytype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_to_string __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + char **string)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_enctype_valid __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_enctypes_compatible_keys __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype1, + krb5_enctype etype2)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_err __P(( + krb5_context context, + int eval, + krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 5))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_errx __P(( + krb5_context context, + int eval, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_expand_hostname __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *orig_hostname, + char **new_hostname)); + +PA_DATA * +krb5_find_padata __P(( + PA_DATA *val, + unsigned len, + int type, + int *index)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_address __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_address *address)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_addresses __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addresses)); + +void +krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *val)); + +void +krb5_free_authenticator __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator)); + +void +krb5_free_context __P((krb5_context context)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_cred_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *c)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *c)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_creds_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *c)); + +void +krb5_free_data __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_data *p)); + +void +krb5_free_error __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error *error)); + +void +krb5_free_error_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error *error)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_host_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realmlist)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_kdc_rep __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_kdc_rep *rep)); + +void +krb5_free_keyblock __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock)); + +void +krb5_free_keyblock_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_krbhst __P(( + krb5_context context, + char **hostlist)); + +void +krb5_free_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_salt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_salt salt)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_ticket __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ticket *ticket)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_fwd_tgt_creds __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const char *hostname, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_ccache ccache, + int forwardable, + krb5_data *out_data)); + +void +krb5_generate_random_block __P(( + void *buf, + size_t len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_random_keyblock __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_keyblock *key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_seq_number __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + int32_t *seqno)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_generate_subkey __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_keyblock **subkey)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_client_addrs __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *res)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_all_server_addrs __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *res)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_cred_from_kdc __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds, + krb5_creds ***ret_tgts)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_credentials_with_flags __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_in_tkt_etypes __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype **etypes)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *princ)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_realm *realm)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_default_realms __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_realm **realms)); + +const char * +krb5_get_err_text __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code code)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_extra_addresses __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addresses)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_fcache_version __P(( + krb5_context context, + int *version)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_forwarded_creds __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_flags flags, + const char *hostname, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *out_data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *host, + krb5_realm **realms)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_host_realm_int __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *host, + krb5_realm **realms)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + const krb5_preauthdata *preauth, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + const krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *ptypes, + krb5_key_proc key_proc, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_decrypt_proc decrypt_proc, + krb5_const_pointer decryptarg, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + const char *password, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_in_tkt_with_skey __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_flags options, + krb5_addresses *addrs, + const krb5_enctype *etypes, + const krb5_preauthtype *pre_auth_types, + const krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_kdc_rep *ret_as_reply)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_keytab __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init __P((krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_addresses *addresses)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_enctype *etype_list, + int etype_list_length)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int forwardable)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list, + int preauth_list_length)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + int proxiable)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat renew_life)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_data *salt)); + +void +krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life __P(( + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt, + krb5_deltat tkt_life)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_init_creds_password __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal client, + const char *password, + krb5_prompter_fct prompter, + void *data, + krb5_deltat start_time, + const char *in_tkt_service, + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_kdc_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_kdc_flags flags, + krb5_addresses *addresses, + Ticket *second_ticket, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds )); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_admin_hst __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krbhst __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_pw_salt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_salt *salt)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_get_use_admin_kdc __P((krb5_context context)); + +size_t +krb5_get_wrapped_length __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + size_t data_len)); + +int +krb5_getportbyname __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *service, + const char *proto, + int default_port)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2addr __P(( + int af, + const char *haddr, + krb5_address *addr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_h_addr2sockaddr __P(( + int af, + const char *addr, + struct sockaddr *sa, + int *sa_size, + int port)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_context __P((krb5_context *context)); + +void +krb5_init_ets __P((krb5_context context)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_init_etype __P(( + krb5_context context, + unsigned *len, + int **val, + const krb5_enctype *etypes)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_initlog __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *program, + krb5_log_facility **fac)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keyblock_key_proc __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype type, + krb5_data *salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytab_key_proc __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + unsigned *len, + int **val)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_enctypes_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + unsigned *len, + int **val)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_keytype_to_string __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytype keytype, + char **string)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_add_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_close __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kt_compare __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno vno, + krb5_enctype enctype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_keytab_entry *in, + krb5_keytab_entry *out)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab *id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_default_name __P(( + krb5_context context, + char *name, + size_t namesize)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_end_seq_get __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_free_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_const_principal principal, + krb5_kvno kvno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_get_name __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab keytab, + char *name, + size_t namesize)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_next_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_read_service_key __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer keyprocarg, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_kvno vno, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_keyblock **key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_register __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_kt_ops *ops)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_remove_entry __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_keytab_entry *entry)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_resolve __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_keytab *id)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_kt_start_seq_get __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_keytab id, + krb5_kt_cursor *cursor)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kuserok __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *luser)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 5))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log_msg __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + char **reply, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 6))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_addrport __P(( + krb5_address **res, + const krb5_address *addr, + int16_t port)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...)); + +size_t +krb5_max_sockaddr_size __P((void)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_error __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code error_code, + const char *e_text, + const krb5_data *e_data, + const krb5_principal client, + const krb5_principal server, + time_t ctime, + krb5_data *reply)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_priv __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *userdata, + krb5_data *outbuf, + void *outdata)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_rep __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_data *outbuf)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + char *service, + char *hostname, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *outbuf)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_extended __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *outbuf)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_internal __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *outbuf, + krb5_key_usage usage)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_safe __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *userdata, + krb5_data *outbuf, + void *outdata)); + +ssize_t +krb5_net_read __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *p_fd, + void *buf, + size_t len)); + +ssize_t +krb5_net_write __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *p_fd, + const void *buf, + size_t len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_openlog __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *program, + krb5_log_facility **fac)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_address __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_addresses *addresses)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_name __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_principal *principal)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_password_key_proc __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key)); + +krb5_realm* +krb5_princ_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal)); + +void +krb5_princ_set_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_realm *realm)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_principal2principalname __P(( + PrincipalName *p, + const krb5_principal from)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare_any_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_print_address __P(( + const krb5_address *addr, + char *str, + size_t len, + size_t *ret_len)); + +int +krb5_program_setup __P(( + krb5_context *context, + int argc, + char **argv, + struct getargs *args, + int num_args, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int))); + +int +krb5_prompter_posix __P(( + krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[])); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_cred __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *in_data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_error __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_data *msg, + KRB_ERROR *result)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_priv __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_data *outbuf, + void *outdata)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_rep __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_safe __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_data *outbuf, + void *outdata)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_message __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_realm_compare __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + char *appl_version, + krb5_principal server, + int32_t flags, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth_match_version __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_boolean (*match_appl_version)(void *, const char*), + void *match_data, + krb5_principal server, + int32_t flags, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_address __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_address *adr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_addrs __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_addresses *adr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_authdata __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_authdata *auth)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_creds __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_creds *creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int16 __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + int16_t *value)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int32 __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t *value)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int8 __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + int8_t *value)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_keyblock __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_keyblock *p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_principal __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal *princ)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_string __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + char **string)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_stringz __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + char **string)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_times __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_times *times)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_salttype_to_string __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_salttype stype, + char **string)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendauth __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + const char *appl_version, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_error **ret_error, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result, + krb5_creds **out_creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto_kdc __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *send, + const krb5_realm *realm, + krb5_data *receive)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_in_tkt_etypes __P(( + krb5_context context, + const krb5_enctype *etypes)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_realm __P(( + krb5_context context, + char *realm)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_extra_addresses __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_addresses *addresses)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_fcache_version __P(( + krb5_context context, + int version)); + +void +krb5_set_use_admin_kdc __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_boolean flag)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_warn_dest __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sname_to_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *hostname, + const char *sname, + int32_t type, + krb5_principal *ret_princ)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sock_to_principal __P(( + krb5_context context, + int sock, + const char *sname, + int32_t type, + krb5_principal *ret_princ)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2address __P(( + const struct sockaddr *sa, + krb5_address *addr)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sockaddr2port __P(( + const struct sockaddr *sa, + int16_t *port)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_sockaddr_uninteresting __P((const struct sockaddr *sa)); + +void +krb5_std_usage __P(( + int code, + struct getargs *args, + int num_args)); + +void +krb5_storage_clear_flags __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_flags flags)); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_emem __P((void)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_free __P((krb5_storage *sp)); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_data __P((krb5_data *data)); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_fd __P((int fd)); + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_mem __P(( + void *buf, + size_t len)); + +krb5_boolean +krb5_storage_is_flags __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_flags flags)); + +void +krb5_storage_set_flags __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_flags flags)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_to_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_address __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_address p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_addrs __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_addresses p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_authdata __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_authdata auth)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_creds __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_creds *creds)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_data __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int16 __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + int16_t value)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int32 __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t value)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int8 __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + int8_t value)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_keyblock __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_keyblock p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_principal __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal p)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_string __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + const char *s)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_stringz __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + char *s)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_times __P(( + krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_times times)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_enctype __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_enctype *etype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_keyblock *key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_keyblock *key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_data_salt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + krb5_data password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_derived __P(( + krb5_context context, + const void *str, + size_t len, + krb5_enctype etype, + krb5_keyblock *key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_key_salt __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype enctype, + const char *password, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_keyblock *key)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_keytype __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *string, + krb5_keytype *keytype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_string_to_salttype __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype etype, + const char *string, + krb5_salttype *salttype)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_timeofday __P(( + krb5_context context, + int32_t *timeret)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_short __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_us_timeofday __P(( + krb5_context context, + int32_t *sec, + int32_t *usec)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabort __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabortx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_ap_req __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags flags, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + void *data, + size_t len)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_checksum __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_crypto crypto, + krb5_key_usage usage, + void *data, + size_t len, + Checksum *cksum)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_init_creds __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal ap_req_server, + krb5_keytab ap_req_keytab, + krb5_ccache *ccache, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options)); + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init __P((krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options)); + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail __P(( + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options, + int ap_req_nofail)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *password, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user_lrealm __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *password, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verr __P(( + krb5_context context, + int eval, + krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verrx __P(( + krb5_context context, + int eval, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog_msg __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + char **reply, + int level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarn __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarnx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap)) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warn __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warnx __P(( + krb5_context context, + const char *fmt, + ...)) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_message __P(( + krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data)); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_xfree __P((void *ptr)); + +krb5_error_code +principalname2krb5_principal __P(( + krb5_principal *principal, + const PrincipalName from, + const Realm realm)); + +#endif /* __krb5_protos_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a0adb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5.conf.5 @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +.\" $Id: krb5.conf.5,v 1.7 1999/11/04 01:57:28 assar Exp $ +.\" +.Dd April 11, 1999 +.Dt KRB5.CONF 5 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm /etc/krb5.conf +.Nd +Configuration file for Kerberos 5 +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +file specifies several configuration parameters for the Kerberos 5 +library, as well as for some programs. +.Pp +The file consists of one or more sections, containing a number of +bindings. The value of each binding can be either a string or a list +of other bindings. The grammar looks like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +file: + /* empty */ + sections + +sections: + section sections + section + +section: + '[' section_name ']' bindings + +section_name: + STRING + +bindings: + binding bindings + binding + +binding: + name '=' STRING + name '=' '{' bindings '}' + +name: + STRING + +.Ed +.Li STRINGs +consists of one or more non-white space characters. +Currently recognised sections and bindings are: + +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li [libdefaults] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li default_realm = Va REALM +Default realm to use, this is also known as your +.Dq local realm . +The default is the result of +.Fn krb5_get_host_realm "local hostname" . +.It Li clockskew = Va time +Maximum time differential (in seconds) allowed when comparing +times. Default is 300 seconds (five minutes). +.It Li kdc_timeout = Va time +Maximum time to wait for a reply from the kdc, default is 3 seconds. +.It v4_name_convert +.It v4_instance_resolve +These are decribed in the +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 +manual page. +.It Li capath = Va realm-routing-table +.It Li default_etypes = Va etypes... +A list of default etypes to use. +.It Li default_etypes_des = Va etypes... +A list of default etypes to use when requesting a DES credential. +.It Li default_keytab_name = Va keytab +The keytab to use if none other is specified, default is +.Dq FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab . +.It Li kdc_timesync = Va boolean +Try to keep track of the time differential between the local machine +and the KDC, and then compensate for that when issuing requests. +.It Li max_retries = Va number +The max number of times to try to contact each KDC. +.It Li ticket_lifetime = Va time +Default ticket lifetime. +.It Li renew_lifetime = Va time +Default renewable ticket lifetime. +.It Li verify_ap_req_nofail = Va boolean +Enable to make a failure to verify obtained credentials +non-fatal. This can be useful if there is no keytab on a host. +.It Li warn_pwexpire = Va time +How soon to warn for expiring password. Default is seven days. +.It Li http_proxy = Va proxy-spec +A HTTP-proxy to use when talking to the KDC via HTTP. +.It Li dns_proxy = Va proxy-spec +Enable using DNS via HTTP. +.It Li extra_addresses = Va address... +A list of addresses to get tickets for along with all local addresses. +.It Li time_format = Va string +How to print time strings in logs, this string is passed to +.Xr strftime 3 . +.It Li log_utc = Va boolean +Write log-entries using UTC instead of your local time zone. +.El +.It Li [domain_realm] +This is a list of mappings from DNS domain to Kerberos realm. Each +binding in this section looks like: +.Pp +.Dl domain = realm +.Pp +The domain can be either a full name of a host or a trailing +component, in the latter case the domain-string should start with a +perid. +.It Li [realms] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va REALM Li = { +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li kdc = Va host[:port] +Specifies a kdc for this realm. If the optional port is absent, the +default value for the +.Dq kerberos/udp +service will be used. +.It Li v4_instance_convert +.It Li v4_name_convert +.It Li default_domain +See +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 . +.El +.It Li } +.El +.It Li [logging] +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Va entity Li = Va destination +Specifies that +.Va entity +should use the specified +.Li destination +for logging. See the +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 +manual page for a list of defined destinations. +.El +.El +.Sh EXAMPLE +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[lib_defaults] + default_domain = FOO.SE +[domain_realm] + .foo.se = FOO.SE + .bar.se = FOO.SE +[realms] + FOO.SE = { + kdc = kerberos.foo.se + v4_name_convert = { + rcmd = host + } + v4_instance_convert = { + xyz = xyz.bar.se + } + default_domain = foo.se + } +[logging] + kdc = FILE:/var/heimdal/kdc.log + kdc = SYSLOG:INFO + default = SYSLOG:INFO:USER +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 , +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr strftime 3 , +.Xr Source tm diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11cabc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5.h @@ -0,0 +1,600 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: krb5.h,v 1.162 2000/01/02 00:19:24 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KRB5_H__ +#define __KRB5_H__ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* simple constants */ + +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#define FALSE 0 +#endif + +typedef int krb5_boolean; + +typedef int32_t krb5_error_code; + +typedef int krb5_kvno; + +typedef u_int32_t krb5_flags; + +typedef void *krb5_pointer; +typedef const void *krb5_const_pointer; + +typedef octet_string krb5_data; + +struct krb5_crypto_data; +typedef struct krb5_crypto_data *krb5_crypto; + +typedef enum krb5_cksumtype { + CKSUMTYPE_NONE = 0, + CKSUMTYPE_CRC32 = 1, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4 = 2, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES = 3, + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC = 4, + CKSUMTYPE_DES_MAC_K = 5, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES_K = 6, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5 = 7, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES = 8, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES3 = 9, +/* CKSUMTYPE_SHA1 = 10,*/ + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3 = 12, + CKSUMTYPE_SHA1 = 1000, /* correct value? */ + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5 = -138 /* unofficial microsoft number */ +} krb5_cksumtype; + + +typedef enum krb5_enctype { + ETYPE_NULL = 0, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC = 1, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 = 2, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 = 3, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5 = 5, + ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1 = 7, + ETYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE = 8, + ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV = 9, + ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB = 10, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 = 16, /* with key derivation */ + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 = 23, + ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56 = 24, + ETYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS = 48, + ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE = 0x1000, + ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE = 0x1001 +} krb5_enctype; + +typedef enum krb5_preauthtype { + KRB5_PADATA_NONE = 0, + KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ, + KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ = 1, + KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP = 2, + KRB5_PADATA_ENC_SECURID +} krb5_preauthtype; + +typedef enum krb5_key_usage { + KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP = 1, + /* AS-REQ PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP padata timestamp, encrypted with the + client key (section 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TICKET = 2, + /* AS-REP Ticket and TGS-REP Ticket (includes tgs session key or + application session key), encrypted with the service key + (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART = 3, + /* AS-REP encrypted part (includes tgs session key or application + session key), encrypted with the client key (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION = 4, + /* TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + session key (section 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY = 5, + /* TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with the tgs + authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM = 6, + /* TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed + with the tgs session key (sections 5.3.2, 5.4.1) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH = 7, + /* TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator (includes tgs + authenticator subkey), encrypted with the tgs session key + (section 5.3.2) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION = 8, + /* TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs session key (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY = 9, + /* TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session key), + encrypted with the tgs authenticator subkey (section 5.4.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM = 10, + /* AP-REQ Authenticator cksum, keyed with the application session + key (section 5.3.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH = 11, + /* AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application authenticator + subkey), encrypted with the application session key (section + 5.3.2) */ + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART = 12, + /* AP-REP encrypted part (includes application session subkey), + encrypted with the application session key (section 5.5.2) */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_PRIV = 13, + /* KRB-PRIV encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.7.1) */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_CRED = 14, + /* KRB-CRED encrypted part, encrypted with a key chosen by the + application (section 5.8.1) */ + KRB5_KU_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM = 15, + /* KRB-SAFE cksum, keyed with a key chosen by the application + (section 5.6.1) */ + KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED = 16, + /* Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be encrypted using an RFC1510 encryption type. */ + KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM = 17 + /* Data which is defined in some specification outside of + Kerberos to be checksummed using an RFC1510 checksum type. */ +} krb5_key_usage; + +typedef enum krb5_salttype { + KRB5_PW_SALT = pa_pw_salt, + KRB5_AFS3_SALT = pa_afs3_salt +}krb5_salttype; + +typedef struct krb5_salt { + krb5_salttype salttype; + krb5_data saltvalue; +} krb5_salt; + +typedef ETYPE_INFO krb5_preauthinfo; + +typedef struct { + krb5_preauthtype type; + krb5_preauthinfo info; /* list of preauthinfo for this type */ +} krb5_preauthdata_entry; + +typedef struct krb5_preauthdata { + unsigned len; + krb5_preauthdata_entry *val; +}krb5_preauthdata; + +typedef enum krb5_address_type { + KRB5_ADDRESS_INET = 2, + KRB5_ADDRESS_INET6 = 24, + KRB5_ADDRESS_ADDRPORT = 256, + KRB5_ADDRESS_IPPORT = 257 +} krb5_address_type; + +enum { + AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY = 1, + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED = 2 +}; + +typedef HostAddress krb5_address; + +typedef HostAddresses krb5_addresses; + +typedef enum krb5_keytype { + KEYTYPE_NULL = 0, + KEYTYPE_DES = 1, + KEYTYPE_DES3 = 7, + KEYTYPE_ARCFOUR = 23 +} krb5_keytype; + +typedef EncryptionKey krb5_keyblock; + +typedef AP_REQ krb5_ap_req; + +struct krb5_cc_ops; + +#define KRB5_DEFAULT_CCROOT "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_" + +typedef void *krb5_cc_cursor; + +typedef struct krb5_ccache_data { + const struct krb5_cc_ops *ops; + krb5_data data; +}krb5_ccache_data; + +typedef struct krb5_ccache_data *krb5_ccache; + +typedef struct krb5_context_data *krb5_context; + +typedef Realm krb5_realm; +typedef const char *krb5_const_realm; /* stupid language */ +typedef Principal krb5_principal_data; +typedef struct Principal *krb5_principal; +typedef const struct Principal *krb5_const_principal; + +typedef time_t krb5_deltat; +typedef time_t krb5_timestamp; + +typedef struct krb5_times { + krb5_timestamp authtime; + krb5_timestamp starttime; + krb5_timestamp endtime; + krb5_timestamp renew_till; +} krb5_times; + +typedef union { + TicketFlags b; + krb5_flags i; +} krb5_ticket_flags; + +/* options for krb5_get_in_tkt() */ +#define KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE (1 << 1) +#define KDC_OPT_FORWARDED (1 << 2) +#define KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE (1 << 3) +#define KDC_OPT_PROXY (1 << 4) +#define KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE (1 << 5) +#define KDC_OPT_POSTDATED (1 << 6) +#define KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE (1 << 8) +#define KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS (1 << 14) +#define KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK (1 << 26) +#define KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK (1 << 27) +#define KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY (1 << 28) +#define KDC_OPT_RENEW (1 << 30) +#define KDC_OPT_VALIDATE (1 << 31) + +typedef union { + KDCOptions b; + krb5_flags i; +} krb5_kdc_flags; + +/* flags for krb5_verify_ap_req */ + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID (1 << 0) + +#define KRB5_GC_CACHED 1 +#define KRB5_GC_USER_USER 2 + +/* constants for compare_creds (and cc_retrieve_cred) */ +#define KRB5_TC_DONT_MATCH_REALM (1U << 31) +#define KRB5_TC_MATCH_KEYTYPE (1U << 30) + +typedef AuthorizationData krb5_authdata; + +typedef KRB_ERROR krb5_error; + +typedef struct krb5_creds { + krb5_principal client; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_keyblock session; + krb5_times times; + krb5_data ticket; + krb5_data second_ticket; + krb5_authdata authdata; + krb5_addresses addresses; + krb5_ticket_flags flags; +} krb5_creds; + +typedef struct krb5_cc_ops { + char *prefix; + char* (*get_name)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); + krb5_error_code (*resolve)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, const char *); + krb5_error_code (*gen_new)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); + krb5_error_code (*init)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal); + krb5_error_code (*destroy)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); + krb5_error_code (*close)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); + krb5_error_code (*store)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_creds*); + krb5_error_code (*retrieve)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, + krb5_flags, krb5_creds*, krb5_creds); + krb5_error_code (*get_princ)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal*); + krb5_error_code (*get_first)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor *); + krb5_error_code (*get_next)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, + krb5_cc_cursor*, krb5_creds*); + krb5_error_code (*end_get)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*remove_cred)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, + krb5_flags, krb5_creds*); + krb5_error_code (*set_flags)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_flags); + int (*get_version)(krb5_context, krb5_ccache); +} krb5_cc_ops; + +struct krb5_log_facility; + +struct krb5_config_binding { + enum { krb5_config_string, krb5_config_list } type; + char *name; + struct krb5_config_binding *next; + union { + char *string; + struct krb5_config_binding *list; + void *generic; + } u; +}; + +typedef struct krb5_config_binding krb5_config_binding; + +typedef krb5_config_binding krb5_config_section; + +typedef struct krb5_context_data { + krb5_enctype *etypes; + krb5_enctype *etypes_des; + char **default_realms; + time_t max_skew; + time_t kdc_timeout; + unsigned max_retries; + int32_t kdc_sec_offset; + int32_t kdc_usec_offset; + krb5_config_section *cf; + struct et_list *et_list; + struct krb5_log_facility *warn_dest; + krb5_cc_ops *cc_ops; + int num_cc_ops; + const char *http_proxy; + const char *time_fmt; + krb5_boolean log_utc; + const char *default_keytab; + krb5_boolean use_admin_kdc; + krb5_addresses *extra_addresses; + krb5_boolean scan_interfaces; /* `ifconfig -a' */ + krb5_boolean srv_lookup; /* do SRV lookups */ + krb5_boolean srv_try_txt; /* try TXT records also */ + krb5_boolean srv_try_rfc2052; /* try RFC2052 compatible records */ + int32_t fcache_vno; /* create cache files w/ this + version */ + int num_kt_types; /* # of registered keytab types */ + struct krb5_keytab_data *kt_types; /* registered keytab types */ +} krb5_context_data; + +enum { + KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN = 0, + KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL = 1, + KRB5_NT_SRV_INST = 2, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST = 3, + KRB5_NT_SRV_XHST = 4, + KRB5_NT_UID = 5 +}; + + +typedef struct krb5_ticket { + EncTicketPart ticket; + krb5_principal client; + krb5_principal server; +} krb5_ticket; + +typedef Authenticator krb5_authenticator_data; + +typedef krb5_authenticator_data *krb5_authenticator; + +struct krb5_rcache_data; +typedef struct krb5_rcache_data *krb5_rcache; +typedef Authenticator krb5_donot_reply; + +#define KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER 0x01 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS 0x02 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE 0x04 +#define KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE 0x08 + +typedef struct krb5_storage { + void *data; + ssize_t (*fetch)(struct krb5_storage*, void*, size_t); + ssize_t (*store)(struct krb5_storage*, void*, size_t); + off_t (*seek)(struct krb5_storage*, off_t, int); + void (*free)(struct krb5_storage*); + krb5_flags flags; +} krb5_storage; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_entry { + krb5_principal principal; + krb5_kvno vno; + krb5_keyblock keyblock; + u_int32_t timestamp; +} krb5_keytab_entry; + +typedef struct krb5_kt_cursor { + int fd; + krb5_storage *sp; + void *data; +} krb5_kt_cursor; + +struct krb5_keytab_data; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_data *krb5_keytab; + +struct krb5_keytab_data { + char *prefix; + krb5_error_code (*resolve)(krb5_context, const char*, krb5_keytab); + krb5_error_code (*get_name)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, char*, size_t); + krb5_error_code (*close)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab); + krb5_error_code (*get)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_const_principal, + krb5_kvno, krb5_enctype, krb5_keytab_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*start_seq_get)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_kt_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*next_entry)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, + krb5_keytab_entry*, krb5_kt_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*end_seq_get)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_kt_cursor*); + krb5_error_code (*add)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_keytab_entry*); + krb5_error_code (*remove)(krb5_context, krb5_keytab, krb5_keytab_entry*); + void *data; + int32_t version; +}; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_data krb5_kt_ops; + +struct krb5_keytab_key_proc_args { + krb5_keytab keytab; + krb5_principal principal; +}; + +typedef struct krb5_keytab_key_proc_args krb5_keytab_key_proc_args; + +enum { + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME = 1, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_TIME = 2, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE = 4, + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_SEQUENCE = 8 +}; + +typedef struct krb5_auth_context_data { + unsigned int flags; + + krb5_address *local_address; + krb5_address *remote_address; + int16_t local_port; + int16_t remote_port; + krb5_keyblock *keyblock; + krb5_keyblock *local_subkey; + krb5_keyblock *remote_subkey; + + int32_t local_seqnumber; + int32_t remote_seqnumber; + + krb5_authenticator authenticator; + + krb5_pointer i_vector; + + krb5_rcache rcache; + + krb5_keytype keytype; /* ¿requested key type ? */ + krb5_cksumtype cksumtype; /* ¡requested checksum type! */ + +}krb5_auth_context_data, *krb5_auth_context; + +typedef struct { + KDC_REP kdc_rep; + EncKDCRepPart enc_part; + KRB_ERROR error; +} krb5_kdc_rep; + +extern char *heimdal_version, *heimdal_long_version; + +typedef void (*krb5_log_log_func_t)(const char*, const char*, void*); +typedef void (*krb5_log_close_func_t)(void*); + +typedef struct krb5_log_facility { + const char *program; + int len; + struct facility *val; +} krb5_log_facility; + +typedef EncAPRepPart krb5_ap_rep_enc_part; + +#define KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION 1 + +#define KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION "KRB5_SENDAUTH_V1.0" + +#define KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE (6) +#define KRB5_TGS_NAME ("krbtgt") + +/* variables */ + +extern const char krb5_config_file[]; +extern const char krb5_defkeyname[]; + +typedef struct _krb5_prompt { + char *prompt; + int hidden; + krb5_data *reply; +} krb5_prompt; + +typedef int (*krb5_prompter_fct)(krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]); + +typedef krb5_error_code (*krb5_key_proc)(krb5_context context, + krb5_enctype type, + krb5_salt salt, + krb5_const_pointer keyseed, + krb5_keyblock **key); +typedef krb5_error_code (*krb5_decrypt_proc)(krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + krb5_key_usage usage, + krb5_const_pointer decrypt_arg, + krb5_kdc_rep *dec_rep); + + +typedef struct _krb5_get_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_deltat tkt_life; + krb5_deltat renew_life; + int forwardable; + int proxiable; + krb5_enctype *etype_list; + int etype_list_length; + krb5_addresses *address_list; +#if 0 /* this is the MIT-way */ + krb5_address **address_list; +#endif + /* XXX the next three should not be used, as they may be + removed later */ + krb5_preauthtype *preauth_list; + int preauth_list_length; + krb5_data *salt; +} krb5_get_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE 0x0001 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE 0x0002 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE 0x0004 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE 0x0008 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST 0x0010 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST 0x0020 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST 0x0040 +#define KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT 0x0080 + +typedef struct _krb5_verify_init_creds_opt { + krb5_flags flags; + int ap_req_nofail; +} krb5_verify_init_creds_opt; + +#define KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL 0x0001 + +extern const krb5_cc_ops krb5_fcc_ops; +extern const krb5_cc_ops krb5_mcc_ops; + +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_fkt_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_mkt_ops; +extern const krb5_kt_ops krb5_akf_ops; + +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS 0 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED 0 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR 0 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR 0 +#define KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR 0 + +#define KPASSWD_PORT 464 + +struct credentials; /* this is to keep the compiler happy */ +struct getargs; + +struct sockaddr; + +#include + +#endif /* __KRB5_H__ */ + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..231c3ff --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_425_conv_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_425_conv_principal.3,v 1.3 1999/04/11 01:47:22 joda Exp $ +.Dd April 11, 1999 +.Dt KRB5_425_CONV_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_425_conv_principal , +.Nm krb5_425_conv_principal_ext , +.Nm krb5_524_conv_principal +.Nd Converts to and from version 4 principals + +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal "krb5_context context" "const char *name" "const char *instance" "const char *realm" "krb5_principal *principal" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext "krb5_context context" "const char *name" "const char *instance" "const char *realm" "krb5_boolean (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal)" "krb5_boolean resolve" "krb5_principal *principal" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_524_conv_principal "krb5_context context" "const krb5_principal principal" "char *name" "char *instance" "char *realm" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +Converting between version 4 and version 5 principals can at best be +described as a mess. +.Pp +A version 4 principal consists of a name, an instance, and a realm. A +version 5 principal consists of one or more components, and a +realm. In some cases also the first component/name will differ between +version 4 and version 5. Furthermore the second component of a host +principal will be the fully qualified domain name of the host in +question, while the instance of a version 4 principal will only +contain the first component. Because of these problems the conversion +between principals will have to be site customized. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext +will try to convert a version 4 principal, given by +.Fa name , +.Fa instance , +and +.Fa realm , +to a version 5 principal. This can result in several possible +principals, and if +.Fa func +is non-NULL, it will be called for each candidate principal. +.Fa func +should return true if the principal was +.Dq good . +To accomplish this, +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext +will look up the name in +.Pa krb5.conf . +It first looks in the +.Li v4_name_convert/host +subsection, which should contain a list of version 4 names whose +instance should be treated as a hostname. This list can be specified +for each realm (in the +.Li realms +section), or in the +.Li libdefaults +section. If the name is found the resulting name of the principal +will be the value of this binding. The instance is then first looked +up in +.Li v4_instance_convert +for the specified realm. If found the resulting value will be used as +instance (this can be used for special cases), no further attempts +will be made to find a conversion if this fails (with +.Fa func ) . +If the +.Fa resolve +parameter is true, the instance will be looked up with +.Fn gethostbyname . +This can be a time consuming, error prone, and unsafe operation. Next +a list of hostnames will be created from the instance and the +.Li v4_domains +variable, which should contain a list of possible domains for the +specific realm. +.Pp +On the other hand, if the name is not found in a +.Li host +section, it is looked up in a +.Li v4_name_convert/plain +binding. If found here the name will be converted, but the instance +will be untouched. +.Pp +This list of default host-type conversions is compiled-in: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +v4_name_convert = { + host = { + ftp = ftp + hprop = hprop + pop = pop + rcmd = host + } +} +.Ed +.Pp +It will only be used if there isn't an entry for these names in the +config file, so you can override these defaults. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal +will call +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal_ext +with +.Dv NULL +as +.Fa func , +and the value of +.Li v4_instance_resolve +(from the +.Li libdefaults +section) as +.Fa resolve . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_524_conv_principal +basically does the opposite of +.Fn krb5_425_conv_principal , +it just doesn't have to look up any names, but will instead truncate +instances found to belong to a host principal. The +.Fa name , +.Fa instance , +and +.Fa realm +should be at least 40 characters long. + +.Sh EXAMPLES + +Since this is confusing an example is in place. +.Pp +Assume that we have the +.Dq foo.com , +and +.Dq bar.com +domains that have shared a single version 4 realm, FOO.COM. The version 4 +.Pa krb.realms +file looked like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +foo.com FOO.COM +\&.foo.com FOO.COM +\&.bar.com FOO.COM +.Ed +.Pp +A +.Pa krb5.conf +file that covers this case might look like: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[libdefaults] + v4_instance_resolve = yes +[realms] + FOO.COM = { + kdc = kerberos.foo.com + v4_instance_convert = { + foo = foo.com + } + v4_domains = foo.com + } +.Ed +.Pp +With this setup and the following host table: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +foo.com +a-host.foo.com +b-host.bar.com +.Ed +the following conversions will be made: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +rcmd.a-host \(-> host/a-host.foo.com +ftp.b-host \(-> ftp/b-host.bar.com +pop.foo \(-> pop/foo.com +ftp.other \(-> ftp/other.foo.com +other.a-host \(-> other/a-host +.Ed +.Pp +The first three are what you expect. If you remove the +.Dq v4_domains , +the fourth entry will result in an error (since the host +.Dq other +can't be found). Even if +.Dq a-host +is a valid host name, the last entry will not be converted, since the +.Dq other +name is not known to represent a host-type principal. +If you turn off +.Dq v4_instance_resolve +the second example will result in +.Dq ftp/b-host.foo.com +(because of the default domain). And all of this is of course only +valid if you have working name resolving. + +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16ccf72 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_build_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_build_principal.3,v 1.1 1997/08/14 00:03:16 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_BUILD_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_build_principal , +.Nm krb5_build_principal_ext , +.Nm krb5_build_principal_va , +.Nm krb5_build_principal_va_ext , +.Nm krb5_make_principal +.Nd Principal creation functions + +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal_ext "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "va_list ap" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va_ext "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "int realm_len" "krb5_const_realm realm" "va_list ap" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_make_principal "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal *principal" "krb5_const_realm realm" "..." + + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +These functions create a Kerberos 5 principal from a realm and a list +of components. +All of these functions return an allocated principal in the +.Fa principal +parameter, this should be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_principal +after use. +.Pp +The +.Dq build +functions take a +.Fa realm +and the length of the realm. The +.Fn krb5_build_principal +and +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va +also takes a list of components (zero-terminated strings), terminated +with +.Dv NULL . +The +.Fn krb5_build_principal_ext +and +.Fn krb5_build_principal_va_ext +takes a list of length-value pairs, the list is terminated with a zero +length. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_make_principal +is a wrapper around +.Fn krb5_build_principal . +If the realm is +.Dv NULL , +the default realm will be used. + +.Sh BUGS +You can not have a NUL in a component. Until someone can give a good +example of where it would be a good idea to have NUL's in a component, +this will not be fixed. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2362a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_create_checksum.3 @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_create_checksum.3,v 1.1 1999/04/18 13:47:11 joda Exp $ +.Dd April 7, 1999 +.Dt NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof , +.Nm krb5_checksum_is_keyed , +.Nm krb5_checksumsize , +.Nm krb5_create_checksum , +.Nm krb5_verify_checksum +.Nd creates and verifies checksums +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_create_checksum "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage_or_type" "void *data" "size_t len" "Checksum *result" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_verify_checksum "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "krb5_key_usage usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "Checksum *cksum" + +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof "krb5_context context" "krb5_cksumtype type" + +.Ft krb5_boolean +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_keyed "krb5_context context" "krb5_cksumtype type" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to create and verify checksums. +.Fn krb5_create_checksum +creates a checksum of the specified data, and puts it in +.Fa result . +If +.Fa crypto +is +.Dv NULL , +.Fa usage_or_type +specifies the checksum type to use; it must not be keyed. Otherwise +.Fa crypto +is an encryption context created by +.Fn krb5_crypto_init , +and +.Fa usage_or_type +specifies a key-usage. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_verify_checksum +verifies the +.Fa checksum , +against the provided data. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof +returns true is the specified checksum is collision proof (that it's +very unlikely that two strings has the same hash value, and that it's +hard to find two strings that has the same hash). Examples of +collision proof checksums are MD5, and SHA1, while CRC32 is not. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_checksum_is_keyed +returns true if the specified checksum type is keyed (that the hash +value is a function of both the data, and a separate key). Examples of +keyed hash algorithms are HMAC-SHA1-DES3, and RSA-MD5-DES. The +.Dq plain +hash functions MD5, and SHA1 are not keyed. + +.\" .Sh EXAMPLE +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_crypto_init 3 , +.Xr krb5_encrypt 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29db8c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_crypto_init.3 @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_crypto_init.3,v 1.1 1999/04/18 13:47:21 joda Exp $ +.Dd April 7, 1999 +.Dt NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_crypto_init , +.Nm krb5_crypto_destroy +.Nd initialize encryption context +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_crypto_init "krb5_context context" "krb5_keyblock *key" "krb5_enctype enctype" "krb5_crypto *crypto" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_crypto_destroy "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to initialize an encryption context that can +be used to encrypt or checksum data. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_crypt_init +initializes the encrytion context +.Fa crypto . +The +.Fa key +parameter is the key to use for encryption, and checksums. The +encryption type to use is taken from the key, but can be overridden +with the +.Fa enctype parameter . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_crypto_destroy +frees a previously allocated encrypion context. + +.\" .Sh EXAMPLE +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_create_checksum 3 , +.Xr krb5_encrypt 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8cc89e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_encrypt.3 @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_encrypt.3,v 1.1 1999/04/18 13:47:30 joda Exp $ +.Dd April 7, 1999 +.Dt KRB5_ENCRYPT 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_decrypt , +.Nm krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData , +.Nm krb5_encrypt , +.Nm krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData +.Nd encrypt and decrypt data +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_encrypt "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "krb5_data *result" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "int kvno" "EncryptedData *result" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_decrypt "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "void *data" "size_t len" "krb5_data *result" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData "krb5_context context" "krb5_crypto crypto" "unsigned usage" "EncryptedData *e" "krb5_data *result" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions are used to encrypt and decrypt data. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_encrypt +puts the encrypted version of +.Fa data +(of size +.Fa len ) +in +.Fa result . +If the encryption type supports using derived keys, +.Fa usage +should be the appropriate key-usage. +.Fn krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData +does the same as +.Fn krb5_encrypt , +but it puts the encrypted data in a +.Fa EncryptedData +structure instead. If +.Fa kvno +is not zero, it will be put in the +.Fa kvno field in the +.Fa EncryptedData . +.Pp +.Fn krb5_decrypt , +and +.Fn krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData +works similarly. + +.\" .Sh EXAMPLE +.\" .Sh BUGS +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_crypto_init 3 , +.Xr krb5_create_checksum 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_err.et b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_err.et new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8779df --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_err.et @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +# +# Error messages for the krb5 library +# +# This might look like a com_err file, but is not +# +id "$Id: krb5_err.et,v 1.7 1999/02/11 21:03:40 joda Exp $" + +error_table krb5 + +prefix KRB5KDC_ERR +error_code NONE, "No error" +error_code NAME_EXP, "Client's entry in database has expired" +error_code SERVICE_EXP, "Server's entry in database has expired" +error_code BAD_PVNO, "Requested protocol version not supported" +error_code C_OLD_MAST_KVNO, "Client's key is encrypted in an old master key" +error_code S_OLD_MAST_KVNO, "Server's key is encrypted in an old master key" +error_code C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, "Client not found in Kerberos database" +error_code S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, "Server not found in Kerberos database" +error_code PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE,"Principal has multiple entries in Kerberos database" +error_code NULL_KEY, "Client or server has a null key" +error_code CANNOT_POSTDATE, "Ticket is ineligible for postdating" +error_code NEVER_VALID, "Requested effective lifetime is negative or too short" +error_code POLICY, "KDC policy rejects request" +error_code BADOPTION, "KDC can't fulfill requested option" +error_code ETYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for encryption type" +error_code SUMTYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for checksum type" +error_code PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for padata type" +error_code TRTYPE_NOSUPP, "KDC has no support for transited type" +error_code CLIENT_REVOKED, "Clients credentials have been revoked" +error_code SERVICE_REVOKED, "Credentials for server have been revoked" +error_code TGT_REVOKED, "TGT has been revoked" +error_code CLIENT_NOTYET, "Client not yet valid - try again later" +error_code SERVICE_NOTYET, "Server not yet valid - try again later" +error_code KEY_EXPIRED, "Password has expired" +error_code PREAUTH_FAILED, "Preauthentication failed" +error_code PREAUTH_REQUIRED, "Additional pre-authentication required" +error_code SERVER_NOMATCH, "Requested server and ticket don't match" + +# 27-30 are reserved +index 31 +prefix KRB5KRB_AP +error_code ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY, "Decrypt integrity check failed" +error_code ERR_TKT_EXPIRED, "Ticket expired" +error_code ERR_TKT_NYV, "Ticket not yet valid" +error_code ERR_REPEAT, "Request is a replay" +error_code ERR_NOT_US, "The ticket isn't for us" +error_code ERR_BADMATCH, "Ticket/authenticator don't match" +error_code ERR_SKEW, "Clock skew too great" +error_code ERR_BADADDR, "Incorrect net address" +error_code ERR_BADVERSION, "Protocol version mismatch" +error_code ERR_MSG_TYPE, "Invalid message type" +error_code ERR_MODIFIED, "Message stream modified" +error_code ERR_BADORDER, "Message out of order" +error_code ERR_ILL_CR_TKT, "Illegal cross-realm ticket" +error_code ERR_BADKEYVER, "Key version is not available" +error_code ERR_NOKEY, "Service key not available" +error_code ERR_MUT_FAIL, "Mutual authentication failed" +error_code ERR_BADDIRECTION, "Incorrect message direction" +error_code ERR_METHOD, "Alternative authentication method required" +error_code ERR_BADSEQ, "Incorrect sequence number in message" +error_code ERR_INAPP_CKSUM, "Inappropriate type of checksum in message" +error_code PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED, "Policy rejects transited path" + +prefix KRB5KRB_ERR +error_code RESPONSE_TOO_BIG, "Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP" +# 53-59 are reserved +index 60 +error_code GENERIC, "Generic error (see e-text)" +error_code FIELD_TOOLONG, "Field is too long for this implementation" + +# 62-127 are reserved +index 128 +prefix +error_code KRB5_ERR_RCSID, "$Id: krb5_err.et,v 1.7 1999/02/11 21:03:40 joda Exp $" + +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_BADLOCKFLAG, "Invalid flag for file lock mode" +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD, "Cannot read password" +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_BADPWDMATCH, "Password mismatch" +error_code KRB5_LIBOS_PWDINTR, "Password read interrupted" + +error_code KRB5_PARSE_ILLCHAR, "Illegal character in component name" +error_code KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED, "Malformed representation of principal" + +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_CANTOPEN, "Can't open/find configuration file" +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_BADFORMAT, "Improper format of configuration file" +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_NOTENUFSPACE, "Insufficient space to return complete information" + +error_code KRB5_BADMSGTYPE, "Invalid message type specified for encoding" + +error_code KRB5_CC_BADNAME, "Credential cache name malformed" +error_code KRB5_CC_UNKNOWN_TYPE, "Unknown credential cache type" +error_code KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND, "Matching credential not found" +error_code KRB5_CC_END, "End of credential cache reached" + +error_code KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED, "Request did not supply a ticket" + +error_code KRB5KRB_AP_WRONG_PRINC, "Wrong principal in request" +error_code KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID, "Ticket has invalid flag set" + +error_code KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH, "Requested principal and ticket don't match" +error_code KRB5_KDCREP_MODIFIED, "KDC reply did not match expectations" +error_code KRB5_KDCREP_SKEW, "Clock skew too great in KDC reply" +error_code KRB5_IN_TKT_REALM_MISMATCH, "Client/server realm mismatch in initial ticket request" + +error_code KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for encryption type" +error_code KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for key type" +error_code KRB5_WRONG_ETYPE, "Requested encryption type not used in message" +error_code KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for checksum type" + +error_code KRB5_REALM_UNKNOWN, "Cannot find KDC for requested realm" +error_code KRB5_SERVICE_UNKNOWN, "Kerberos service unknown" +error_code KRB5_KDC_UNREACH, "Cannot contact any KDC for requested realm" +error_code KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME, "No local name found for principal name" + +error_code KRB5_MUTUAL_FAILED, "Mutual authentication failed" + +# some of these should be combined/supplanted by system codes + +error_code KRB5_RC_TYPE_EXISTS, "Replay cache type is already registered" +error_code KRB5_RC_MALLOC, "No more memory to allocate (in replay cache code)" +error_code KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND, "Replay cache type is unknown" +error_code KRB5_RC_UNKNOWN, "Generic unknown RC error" +error_code KRB5_RC_REPLAY, "Message is a replay" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO, "Replay I/O operation failed XXX" +error_code KRB5_RC_NOIO, "Replay cache type does not support non-volatile storage" +error_code KRB5_RC_PARSE, "Replay cache name parse/format error" + +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_EOF, "End-of-file on replay cache I/O" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_MALLOC, "No more memory to allocate (in replay cache I/O code)" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_PERM, "Permission denied in replay cache code" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_IO, "I/O error in replay cache i/o code" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN, "Generic unknown RC/IO error" +error_code KRB5_RC_IO_SPACE, "Insufficient system space to store replay information" + +error_code KRB5_TRANS_CANTOPEN, "Can't open/find realm translation file" +error_code KRB5_TRANS_BADFORMAT, "Improper format of realm translation file" + +error_code KRB5_LNAME_CANTOPEN, "Can't open/find lname translation database" +error_code KRB5_LNAME_NOTRANS, "No translation available for requested principal" +error_code KRB5_LNAME_BADFORMAT, "Improper format of translation database entry" + +error_code KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL, "Cryptosystem internal error" + +error_code KRB5_KT_BADNAME, "Key table name malformed" +error_code KRB5_KT_UNKNOWN_TYPE, "Unknown Key table type" +error_code KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND, "Key table entry not found" +error_code KRB5_KT_END, "End of key table reached" +error_code KRB5_KT_NOWRITE, "Cannot write to specified key table" +error_code KRB5_KT_IOERR, "Error writing to key table" + +error_code KRB5_NO_TKT_IN_RLM, "Cannot find ticket for requested realm" +error_code KRB5DES_BAD_KEYPAR, "DES key has bad parity" +error_code KRB5DES_WEAK_KEY, "DES key is a weak key" + +error_code KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE, "Bad encryption type" +error_code KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE, "Key size is incompatible with encryption type" +error_code KRB5_BAD_MSIZE, "Message size is incompatible with encryption type" + +error_code KRB5_CC_TYPE_EXISTS, "Credentials cache type is already registered." +error_code KRB5_KT_TYPE_EXISTS, "Key table type is already registered." + +error_code KRB5_CC_IO, "Credentials cache I/O operation failed XXX" +error_code KRB5_FCC_PERM, "Credentials cache file permissions incorrect" +error_code KRB5_FCC_NOFILE, "No credentials cache file found" +error_code KRB5_FCC_INTERNAL, "Internal file credentials cache error" +error_code KRB5_CC_WRITE, "Error writing to credentials cache file" +error_code KRB5_CC_NOMEM, "No more memory to allocate (in credentials cache code)" +error_code KRB5_CC_FORMAT, "Bad format in credentials cache" + +# errors for dual tgt library calls +error_code KRB5_INVALID_FLAGS, "Invalid KDC option combination (library internal error)" +error_code KRB5_NO_2ND_TKT, "Request missing second ticket" + +error_code KRB5_NOCREDS_SUPPLIED, "No credentials supplied to library routine" + +# errors for sendauth (and recvauth) + +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS, "Bad sendauth version was sent" +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS, "Bad application version was sent (via sendauth)" +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE, "Bad response (during sendauth exchange)" +error_code KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED, "Server rejected authentication (during sendauth exchange)" + +# errors for preauthentication + +error_code KRB5_PREAUTH_BAD_TYPE, "Unsupported preauthentication type" +error_code KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY, "Required preauthentication key not supplied" +error_code KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED, "Generic preauthentication failure" + +# version number errors + +error_code KRB5_RCACHE_BADVNO, "Unsupported replay cache format version number" +error_code KRB5_CCACHE_BADVNO, "Unsupported credentials cache format version number" +error_code KRB5_KEYTAB_BADVNO, "Unsupported key table format version number" + +# +# + +error_code KRB5_PROG_ATYPE_NOSUPP, "Program lacks support for address type" +error_code KRB5_RC_REQUIRED, "Message replay detection requires rcache parameter" +error_code KRB5_ERR_BAD_HOSTNAME, "Hostname cannot be canonicalized" +error_code KRB5_ERR_HOST_REALM_UNKNOWN, "Cannot determine realm for host" +error_code KRB5_SNAME_UNSUPP_NAMETYPE, "Conversion to service principal undefined for name type" + +error_code KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_V4_REPLY, "Initial Ticket response appears to be Version 4" +error_code KRB5_REALM_CANT_RESOLVE, "Cannot resolve KDC for requested realm" +error_code KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE, "Requesting ticket can't get forwardable tickets" +error_code KRB5_FWD_BAD_PRINCIPAL, "Bad principal name while trying to forward credentials" + +error_code KRB5_GET_IN_TKT_LOOP, "Looping detected inside krb5_get_in_tkt" +error_code KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM, "Configuration file does not specify default realm" + +error_code KRB5_SAM_UNSUPPORTED, "Bad SAM flags in obtain_sam_padata" +error_code KRB5_KT_NAME_TOOLONG, "Keytab name too long" + +end diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba5888a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_free_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_free_principal.3,v 1.1 1997/08/14 00:03:17 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_FREE_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_free_principal +.Nd Principal free function + +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft void +.Fn krb5_free_principal "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +The +.Fn krb5_free_principal +will free a principal that has been created with +.Fn krb5_build_principal , +.Fn krb5_parse_name , +or with some other function. + +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7093b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: krb5_locl.h,v 1.63 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __KRB5_LOCL_H__ +#define __KRB5_LOCL_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef _AIX +struct ether_addr; +struct mbuf; +struct sockaddr_dl; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILIO_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define ALLOC(X, N) (X) = calloc((N), sizeof(*(X))) +#define ALLOC_SEQ(X, N) do { (X)->len = (N); ALLOC((X)->val, (N)); } while(0) + +/* should this be public? */ +#define KEYTAB_DEFAULT "FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab" + +#ifndef O_BINARY +#define O_BINARY 0 +#endif + +#endif /* __KRB5_LOCL_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87040ba --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_openlog.3 @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_openlog.3,v 1.4 1999/04/07 14:06:32 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 6, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_OPENLOG 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_initlog , +.Nm krb5_openlog , +.Nm krb5_closelog , +.Nm krb5_addlog_dest , +.Nm krb5_addlog_func , +.Nm krb5_log , +.Nm krb5_vlog , +.Nm krb5_log_msg , +.Nm krb5_vlog_msg +.Nd Heimdal logging functions +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.\" ouch! +.ds xx \\*(fP\fR(\fP\\*(lI*\\*(fP +.ds xy \fR)\|\fP +.Fn "\\*(lItypedef void \\*(xxkrb5_log_log_func_t\\*(xy" "const char *time" "const char *message" "void *data" +.Fn "\\*(lItypedef void \\*(xxkrb5_log_close_func_t\\*(xy" "void *data" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_addlog_dest "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "const char *destination" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_addlog_func "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "int min" "int max" "krb5_log_log_func_t log" "krb5_log_close_func_t close" "void *data" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_closelog "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_initlog "krb5_context context" "const char *program" "krb5_log_facility **facility" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_log "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "int level" "const char *format" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_log_msg "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "char **reply" "int level" "const char *format" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_openlog "krb5_context context" "const char *program" "krb5_log_facility **facility" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vlog "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "int level" "const char *format" "va_list arglist" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vlog_msg "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" "char **reply" "int level" "const char *format" "va_list arglist" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION +These functions logs messages to one or more destinations. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_openlog +function creates a logging +.Fa facility , +that is used to log messages. A facility consists of one or more +destinations (which can be files or syslog or some other device). The +.Fa program +parameter should be the generic name of the program that is doing the +logging. This name is used to lookup which destinations to use. This +information is contained in the +.Li logging +section of the +.Pa krb5.conf +configuration file. If no entry is found for +.Fa program , +the entry for +.Li default +is used, or if that is missing too, +.Li SYSLOG +will be used as destination. +.Pp +To close a logging facility, use the +.Fn krb5_closelog +function. +.Pp +To log a message to a facility use one of the functions +.Fn krb5_log , +.Fn krb5_log_msg , +.Fn krb5_vlog , +or +.Fn krb5_vlog_msg . +The functions ending in +.Li _msg +return in +.Fa reply +a pointer to the message that just got logged. This string is allocated, +and should be freed with +.Fn free . +The +.Fa format +is a standard +.Fn printf +style format string (but see the BUGS section). +.Pp + +If you want better control of where things gets logged, you can instead of using +.Fn krb5_openlog +call +.Fn krb5_initlog , +which just initializes a facility, but doesn't define any actual logging +destinations. You can then add destinations with the +.Fn krb5_addlog_dest +and +.Fn krb5_addlog_func +functions. The first of these takes a string specifying a logging +destination, and adds this to the facility. If you want to do some +non-standard logging you can use the +.Fn krb5_addlog_func +function, which takes a function to use when logging. +The +.Fa log +function is called for each message with +.Fa time +being a string specifying the current time, and +.Fa message +the message to log. +.Fa close +is called when the facility is closed. You can pass application specific data in the +.Fa data +parameter. The +.Fa min +and +.Fa max +parameter are the same as in a destination (defined below). To specify a +max of infinity, pass -1. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_openlog +calls +.Fn krb5_initlog +and then calls +.Fn krb5_addlog_dest +for each destination found. + +.Ss Destinations + +The defined destinations (as specified in +.Pa krb5.conf ) +follows: +.Bl -tag -width "xxx" -offset indent +.It Li STDERR +This logs to the program's stderr. +.It Li FILE: Ns Pa /file +.It Li FILE= Ns Pa /file +Log to the specified file. The form using a colon appends to the file, the +form with an equal truncates the file. The truncating form keeps the file +open, while the appending form closes it after each log message (which +makes it possible to rotate logs). The truncating form is mainly for +compatibility with the MIT libkrb5. +.It Li DEVICE= Ns Pa /device +This logs to the specified device, at present this is the same as +.Li FILE:/device . +.It Li CONSOLE +Log to the console, this is the same as +.Li DEVICE=/dev/console . +.It Li SYSLOG Ns Op :priority Ns Op :facility +Send messages to the syslog system, using priority, and facility. To +get the name for one of these, you take the name of the macro passed +to +.Xr syslog 3 , +and remove the leading +.Li LOG_ +.No ( Li LOG_NOTICE +becomes +.Li NOTICE ) . +The default values (as well as the values used for unrecognised +values), are +.Li ERR , +and +.Li AUTH , +respectively. See +.Xr syslog 3 +for a list of priorities and facilities. +.El +.Pp +Each destination may optionally be prepended with a range of logging +levels, specified as +.Li min-max/ . +If the +.Fa level +parameter to +.Fn krb5_log +is within this range (inclusive) the message gets logged to this +destination, otherwise not. Either of the min and max valued may be +omitted, in this case min is assumed to be zero, and max is assumed to be +infinity. If you don't include a dash, both min and max gets set to the +specified value. If no range is specified, all messages gets logged. +.Sh EXAMPLE +.Bd -literal -offset indent +[logging] + kdc = 0/FILE:/var/log/kdc.log + kdc = 1-/SYSLOG:INFO:USER + default = STDERR +.Ed +.Pp +This will log all messages from the +.Nm kdc +program with level 0 to +.Pa /var/log/kdc.log , +other messages will be logged to syslog with priority +.Li LOG_INFO , +and facility +.Li LOG_USER . +All other programs will log all messages to their stderr. +.Sh BUGS +These functions use +.Fn asprintf +to format the message. If your operating system does not have a working +.Fn asprintf , +a replacement will be used. At present this replacement does not handle +some correct conversion specifications (like floating point numbers). Until +this is fixed, the use of these conversions should be avoided. +.Pp +If logging is done to the syslog facility, these functions might not be +thread-safe, depending on the implementation of +.Fn openlog , +and +.Fn syslog . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr syslog 3 , +.Xr krb5.conf 5 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db9236c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_parse_name.3 @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_parse_name.3,v 1.1 1997/08/14 00:03:17 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_PARSE_NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_parse_name +.Nd String to principal conversion + +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_parse_name "krb5_context context" "const char *name" "krb5_principal *principal" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +.Fn krb5_parse_name +converts a string representation of a princpal name to +.Nm krb5_principal . +The +.Fa principal +will point to allocated data that should be freed with +.Fn krb5_free_principal . +.Pp +The string should consist of one or more name components separated with slashes +.Pq Dq / , +optionally followed with an +.Dq @ +and a realm name. A slash or @ may be contained in a name component by +quoting it with a back-slash +.Pq Dq \ . +A realm should not contain slashes or colons. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aea4150 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_sname_to_principal.3 @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_sname_to_principal.3,v 1.1 1997/08/14 00:03:18 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_PRINCIPAL 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_sname_to_principal , +.Nm krb5_sock_to_principal +.Nd Create a service principal + +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_sname_to_principal "krb5_context context" "const char *hostname" "const char *sname" "int32_t type" "krb5_principal *principal" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_sock_to_principal "krb5_context context" "int socket" "const char *sname" "int32_t type" "krb5_principal *principal" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +These functions create a +.Dq service +principal that can, for instance, be used to lookup a key in a keytab. For both these function the +.Fa sname +parameter will be used for the first component of the created principal. If +.Fa sname +is +.Dv NULL , +.Dq host +will be used instead. +.Fn krb5_sname_to_principal +will use the passed +.Fa hostname +for the second component. If type +.Dv KRB5_NT_SRV_HST +this name will be looked up with +.Fn gethostbyname . +If +.Fa hostname is +.Dv NULL , +the local hostname will be used. +.Pp +.Fn krb5_sock_to_principal +will use the +.Dq sockname +of the passed +.Fa socket , +which should be a bound +.Dv AF_INET +socket. + +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_unparse_name 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13277d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_unparse_name.3 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_unparse_name.3,v 1.1 1997/08/14 00:03:19 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_UNPARSE_NAME 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_unparse_name +.\" .Nm krb5_unparse_name_ext +.Nd Principal to string conversion + +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_unparse_name "krb5_context context" "krb5_principal principal" "char **name" + +.\" .Ft krb5_error_code +.\" .Fn krb5_unparse_name_ext "krb5_context context" "krb5_const_principal principal" "char **name" "size_t *size" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +This function takes a +.Fa principal , +and will convert in to a printable representation with the same syntax as decribed in +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 . +.Fa *name +will point to allocated data and should be freed by the caller. + +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_425_conv_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_build_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_free_principal 3 , +.Xr krb5_parse_name 3 , +.Xr krb5_sname_to_principal 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..521da0e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krb5_warn.3 @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: krb5_warn.3,v 1.2 1997/08/08 03:45:55 joda Exp $ +.Dd August 8, 1997 +.Dt KRB5_WARN 3 +.Os HEIMDAL +.Sh NAME +.Nm krb5_warn , +.Nm krb5_warnx , +.Nm krb5_vwarn , +.Nm krb5_vwarnx , +.Nm krb5_err , +.Nm krb5_errx , +.Nm krb5_verr , +.Nm krb5_verrx , +.Nm krb5_set_warn_dest +.Nd Heimdal warning and error functions +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_err "krb5_context context" "int eval" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_errx "krb5_context context" "int eval" "const char *format" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_verr "krb5_context context" "int eval" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "va_list ap" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_verrx "krb5_context context" "int eval" "const char *format" "va_list ap" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vwarn "krb5_context context" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "va_list ap" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_vwarnx "krb5_context context" "const char *format" "va_list ap" + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_warn "krb5_context context" "krb5_error_code code" "const char *format" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_warnx "krb5_context context" "const char *format" "..." + +.Ft krb5_error_code +.Fn krb5_set_warn_dest "krb5_context context" "krb5_log_facility *facility" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION + +These functions prints a warning message to some destination. +.Fa format +is a printf style format specifying the message to print. The forms not ending in an +.Dq x +prints the error string associated with +.Fa code +along with the message. +The +.Dq err +functions exits with exit status +.Fa eval +after printing the message. +.Pp +The +.Fn krb5_set_warn_func +function sets the destination for warning messages to the specified +.Fa facility . +Messages logged with the +.Dq warn +functions have a log level of 1, while the +.Dq err +functions logs with level 0. + +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr krb5_openlog 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krbhst.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krbhst.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d5c4e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/krbhst.c @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: krbhst.c,v 1.23 1999/12/11 23:14:25 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * assuming that `*res' contains `*count' strings, add a copy of `string'. + */ + +static int +add_string(char ***res, int *count, const char *string) +{ + char **tmp = realloc(*res, (*count + 1) * sizeof(**res)); + + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *res = tmp; + if(string) { + tmp[*count] = strdup(string); + if(tmp[*count] == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + } else + tmp[*count] = NULL; + (*count)++; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +srv_find_realm(krb5_context context, char ***res, int *count, + const char *realm, const char *proto, const char *service) +{ + char domain[1024]; + char alt_domain[1024]; + krb5_error_code ret; + struct dns_reply *r; + struct resource_record *rr; + + snprintf(domain, sizeof(domain), "_%s._%s.%s.", service, proto, realm); + + r = dns_lookup(domain, "srv"); + if(r == NULL && context->srv_try_rfc2052) { + snprintf(alt_domain, sizeof(alt_domain), "%s.%s.%s.", + service, proto, realm); + r = dns_lookup(alt_domain, "srv"); + } + if(r == NULL && context->srv_try_txt) + r = dns_lookup(domain, "txt"); + if(r == NULL && context->srv_try_rfc2052 && context->srv_try_txt) + r = dns_lookup(alt_domain, "txt"); + if(r == NULL) + return 0; + + for(rr = r->head; rr; rr = rr->next){ + if(rr->type == T_SRV){ + char buf[1024]; + char **tmp; + + tmp = realloc(*res, (*count + 1) * sizeof(**res)); + if (tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *res = tmp; + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), + "%s/%s:%u", + proto, + rr->u.srv->target, + rr->u.srv->port); + ret = add_string(res, count, buf); + if(ret) + return ret; + }else if(rr->type == T_TXT) { + ret = add_string(res, count, rr->u.txt); + if(ret) + return ret; + } + } + dns_free_data(r); + return 0; +} + +/* + * lookup the servers for realm `realm', looking for the config string + * `conf_string' in krb5.conf or for `serv_string' in SRV records. + * return a malloc-ed list of servers in hostlist. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +get_krbhst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + const char *conf_string, + const char *serv_string, + char ***hostlist) +{ + char **res, **r; + int count; + krb5_error_code ret; + + res = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, + "realms", *realm, conf_string, NULL); + for(r = res, count = 0; r && *r; r++, count++); + + if(context->srv_lookup) { + char *s[] = { "udp", "tcp", "http" }, **q; + for(q = s; q < s + sizeof(s) / sizeof(s[0]); q++) { + ret = srv_find_realm(context, &res, &count, *realm, *q, + serv_string); + if(ret) { + krb5_config_free_strings(res); + return ret; + } + } + } + + if(count == 0) { + char buf[1024]; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "kerberos.%s", *realm); + ret = add_string(&res, &count, buf); + if(ret) { + krb5_config_free_strings(res); + return ret; + } + } + add_string(&res, &count, NULL); + *hostlist = res; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_admin_hst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return get_krbhst (context, realm, "admin_server", "kerberos-adm", + hostlist); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krb_changepw_hst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return get_krbhst (context, realm, "admin_server", "kpasswd", + hostlist); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_get_krbhst (krb5_context context, + const krb5_realm *realm, + char ***hostlist) +{ + return get_krbhst (context, realm, "kdc", "kerberos", hostlist); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_krbhst (krb5_context context, + char **hostlist) +{ + char **p; + + for (p = hostlist; *p; ++p) + free (*p); + free (hostlist); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/kuserok.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/kuserok.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae8ddec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/kuserok.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kuserok.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Return TRUE iff `principal' is allowed to login as `luser'. + */ + +krb5_boolean +krb5_kuserok (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + const char *luser) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + struct passwd *pwd; + FILE *f; + krb5_realm *realms, *r; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_boolean b; + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &realms); + if (ret) + return FALSE; + + for (r = realms; *r != NULL; ++r) { + krb5_principal local_principal; + + ret = krb5_build_principal (context, + &local_principal, + strlen(*r), + *r, + luser, + NULL); + if (ret) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + return FALSE; + } + + b = krb5_principal_compare (context, principal, local_principal); + krb5_free_principal (context, local_principal); + if (b) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + return TRUE; + } + } + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + + pwd = getpwnam (luser); /* XXX - Should use k_getpwnam? */ + if (pwd == NULL) + return FALSE; + snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/.k5login", pwd->pw_dir); + f = fopen (buf, "r"); + if (f == NULL) + return FALSE; + while (fgets (buf, sizeof(buf), f) != NULL) { + krb5_principal tmp; + + if(buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, buf, &tmp); + if (ret) { + fclose (f); + return FALSE; + } + b = krb5_principal_compare (context, principal, tmp); + krb5_free_principal (context, tmp); + if (b) { + fclose (f); + return TRUE; + } + } + fclose (f); + return FALSE; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/log.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1511e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: log.c,v 1.21 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +struct facility { + int min; + int max; + krb5_log_log_func_t log; + krb5_log_close_func_t close; + void *data; +}; + +static struct facility* +log_realloc(krb5_log_facility *f) +{ + struct facility *fp; + f->len++; + fp = realloc(f->val, f->len * sizeof(*f->val)); + if(fp == NULL) + return NULL; + f->val = fp; + fp += f->len - 1; + return fp; +} + +struct s2i{ + char *s; + int val; +}; + +#define L(X) { #X, LOG_ ## X } + +struct s2i syslogvals[] = { + L(EMERG), + L(ALERT), + L(CRIT), + L(ERR), + L(WARNING), + L(NOTICE), + L(INFO), + L(DEBUG), + + L(AUTH), +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + L(AUTHPRIV), +#endif +#ifdef LOG_CRON + L(CRON), +#endif + L(DAEMON), +#ifdef LOG_FTP + L(FTP), +#endif + L(KERN), + L(LPR), + L(MAIL), +#ifdef LOG_NEWS + L(NEWS), +#endif + L(SYSLOG), + L(USER), +#ifdef LOG_UUCP + L(UUCP), +#endif + L(LOCAL0), + L(LOCAL1), + L(LOCAL2), + L(LOCAL3), + L(LOCAL4), + L(LOCAL5), + L(LOCAL6), + L(LOCAL7), + { NULL, -1 } +}; + +static int +find_value(const char *s, struct s2i *table) +{ + while(table->s && strcasecmp(table->s, s)) + table++; + return table->val; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_initlog(krb5_context context, + const char *program, + krb5_log_facility **fac) +{ + krb5_log_facility *f = calloc(1, sizeof(*f)); + if(f == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + f->program = strdup(program); + if(f->program == NULL){ + free(f); + return ENOMEM; + } + *fac = f; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_func(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int min, + int max, + krb5_log_log_func_t log, + krb5_log_close_func_t close, + void *data) +{ + struct facility *fp = log_realloc(fac); + if(fp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + fp->min = min; + fp->max = max; + fp->log = log; + fp->close = close; + fp->data = data; + return 0; +} + + +struct syslog_data{ + int priority; +}; + +static void +log_syslog(const char *time, + const char *msg, + void *data) + +{ + struct syslog_data *s = data; + syslog(s->priority, "%s", msg); +} + +static void +close_syslog(void *data) +{ + free(data); + closelog(); +} + +static krb5_error_code +open_syslog(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *facility, int min, int max, + const char *sev, const char *fac) +{ + struct syslog_data *sd = malloc(sizeof(*sd)); + int i; + + if(sd == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + i = find_value(sev, syslogvals); + if(i == -1) + i = LOG_ERR; + sd->priority = i; + i = find_value(fac, syslogvals); + if(i == -1) + i = LOG_AUTH; + sd->priority |= i; + roken_openlog(facility->program, LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY, i); + return krb5_addlog_func(context, facility, min, max, + log_syslog, close_syslog, sd); +} + +struct file_data{ + char *filename; + char *mode; + FILE *fd; + int keep_open; +}; + +static void +log_file(const char *time, + const char *msg, + void *data) +{ + struct file_data *f = data; + if(f->keep_open == 0) + f->fd = fopen(f->filename, f->mode); + if(f->fd == NULL) + return; + fprintf(f->fd, "%s %s\n", time, msg); + if(f->keep_open == 0) + fclose(f->fd); +} + +static void +close_file(void *data) +{ + struct file_data *f = data; + if(f->keep_open && f->filename) + fclose(f->fd); + free(data); +} + +static krb5_error_code +open_file(krb5_context context, krb5_log_facility *fac, int min, int max, + char *filename, char *mode, FILE *f, int keep_open) +{ + struct file_data *fd = malloc(sizeof(*fd)); + if(fd == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + fd->filename = filename; + fd->mode = mode; + fd->fd = f; + fd->keep_open = keep_open; + + return krb5_addlog_func(context, fac, min, max, log_file, close_file, fd); +} + + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_addlog_dest(krb5_context context, krb5_log_facility *f, const char *p) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + int min = 0, max = -1, n; + char c; + n = sscanf(p, "%d%c%d/", &min, &c, &max); + if(n == 2){ + if(c == '/') { + if(min < 0){ + max = -min; + min = 0; + }else{ + max = min; + } + } + } + if(n){ + p = strchr(p, '/'); + if(p == NULL) return HEIM_ERR_LOG_PARSE; + p++; + } + if(strcmp(p, "STDERR") == 0){ + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, NULL, NULL, stderr, 1); + }else if(strcmp(p, "CONSOLE") == 0){ + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, "/dev/console", "w", NULL, 0); + }else if(strncmp(p, "FILE:", 4) == 0 && (p[4] == ':' || p[4] == '=')){ + char *fn; + FILE *file = NULL; + int keep_open = 0; + fn = strdup(p + 5); + if(fn == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + if(p[4] == '='){ + int i = open(fn, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | + O_TRUNC | O_APPEND, 0666); + if(i < 0) + return errno; + file = fdopen(i, "a"); + if(file == NULL){ + close(i); + return errno; + } + keep_open = 1; + } + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, fn, "a", file, keep_open); + }else if(strncmp(p, "DEVICE=", 6) == 0){ + ret = open_file(context, f, min, max, strdup(p + 7), "w", NULL, 0); + }else if(strncmp(p, "SYSLOG", 6) == 0){ + char *severity; + char *facility; + severity = strchr(p, ':'); + if(severity == NULL) + severity = "ERR"; + facility = strchr(severity, ':'); + if(facility == NULL) + facility = "AUTH"; + ret = open_syslog(context, f, min, max, severity, facility); + }else{ + ret = HEIM_ERR_LOG_PARSE; /* XXX */ + } + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_openlog(krb5_context context, + const char *program, + krb5_log_facility **fac) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char **p, **q; + + ret = krb5_initlog(context, program, fac); + if(ret) + return ret; + + p = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "logging", program, NULL); + if(p == NULL) + p = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "logging", "default", NULL); + if(p){ + for(q = p; *q; q++) + ret = krb5_addlog_dest(context, *fac, *q); + krb5_config_free_strings(p); + }else + ret = krb5_addlog_dest(context, *fac, "SYSLOG"); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_closelog(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac) +{ + int i; + for(i = 0; i < fac->len; i++) + (*fac->val[i].close)(&fac->val[i].data); + return 0; +} + +#undef __attribute__ +#define __attribute__(X) + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog_msg(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + char **reply, + int level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 0))) +{ + char *msg; + char buf[64]; + time_t t; + int i; + + vasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap); + t = time(NULL); + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), context->time_fmt, + context->log_utc ? gmtime(&t) : localtime(&t)); + for(i = 0; i < fac->len; i++) + if(fac->val[i].min <= level && + (fac->val[i].max < 0 || fac->val[i].max >= level)) + (*fac->val[i].log)(buf, msg, fac->val[i].data); + *reply = msg; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vlog(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + const char *fmt, + va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 0))) +{ + char *msg; + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_vlog_msg(context, fac, &msg, level, fmt, ap); + free(msg); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log_msg(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + char **reply, + const char *fmt, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 5, 6))) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_error_code ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = krb5_vlog_msg(context, fac, reply, level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_log(krb5_context context, + krb5_log_facility *fac, + int level, + const char *fmt, + ...) + __attribute__((format (printf, 4, 5))) +{ + va_list ap; + krb5_error_code ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = krb5_vlog(context, fac, level, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mcache.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mcache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d45deea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mcache.c @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mcache.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct krb5_mcache { + krb5_principal primary_principal; + struct link { + krb5_creds cred; + struct link *next; + } *creds; +} krb5_mcache; + +#define MCC_CURSOR(C) ((struct link*)(C)) + +static char* +mcc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return ""; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_resolve(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id, const char *res) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented mcc_resolve called"); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_gen_new(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache *id) +{ + krb5_mcache *m; + + m = malloc (sizeof(*m)); + if (m == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + m->primary_principal = NULL; + m->creds = NULL; + (*id)->data.data = m; + (*id)->data.length = sizeof(*m); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal primary_principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_mcache *m; + + m = (krb5_mcache *)id->data.data; + + ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, + primary_principal, + &m->primary_principal); + if (ret) + return ret; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = (krb5_mcache *)id->data.data; + struct link *l; + + krb5_free_principal (context, m->primary_principal); + l = m->creds; + while (l != NULL) { + struct link *old; + + krb5_free_creds_contents (context, &l->cred); + old = l; + l = l->next; + free (old); + } + krb5_data_free(&id->data); + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_store_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_mcache *m = (krb5_mcache *)id->data.data; + struct link *l; + + l = malloc (sizeof(*l)); + if (l == NULL) + return KRB5_CC_NOMEM; + l->next = m->creds; + m->creds = l; + memset (&l->cred, 0, sizeof(l->cred)); + ret = krb5_copy_creds_contents (context, creds, &l->cred); + if (ret) { + m->creds = l->next; + free (l); + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_get_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = (krb5_mcache *)id->data.data; + + return krb5_copy_principal (context, + m->primary_principal, + principal); +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_get_first (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + krb5_mcache *m = (krb5_mcache *)id->data.data; + *cursor = m->creds; + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_get_next (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor, + krb5_creds *creds) +{ + struct link *l; + + l = *cursor; + if (l != NULL) { + *cursor = l->next; + return krb5_copy_creds_contents (context, + &l->cred, + creds); + } else + return KRB5_CC_END; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_end_get (krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_cc_cursor *cursor) +{ + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_remove_cred(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags which, + krb5_creds *cred) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +static krb5_error_code +mcc_set_flags(krb5_context context, + krb5_ccache id, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + return 0; /* XXX */ +} + +const krb5_cc_ops krb5_mcc_ops = { + "MEMORY", + mcc_get_name, + mcc_resolve, + mcc_gen_new, + mcc_initialize, + mcc_destroy, + mcc_close, + mcc_store_cred, + NULL, /* mcc_retrieve */ + mcc_get_principal, + mcc_get_first, + mcc_get_next, + mcc_end_get, + mcc_remove_cred, + mcc_set_flags +}; diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/misc.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..baf63f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: misc.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_error.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b173db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_error.c @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: mk_error.c,v 1.14 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_error(krb5_context context, + krb5_error_code error_code, + const char *e_text, + const krb5_data *e_data, + const krb5_principal client, + const krb5_principal server, + time_t ctime, + krb5_data *reply) +{ + KRB_ERROR msg; + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + int32_t sec, usec; + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + msg.pvno = 5; + msg.msg_type = krb_error; + msg.stime = sec; + msg.susec = usec; + if(ctime) { + msg.ctime = &ctime; + } + /* Make sure we only send `protocol' error codes */ + if(error_code < KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE || error_code >= KRB5_ERR_RCSID) { + if(e_text == NULL) + e_text = krb5_get_err_text(context, error_code); + error_code = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; + } + msg.error_code = error_code - KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE; + if (e_text) + msg.e_text = (general_string*)&e_text; + if (e_data) + msg.e_data = (octet_string*)e_data; + if(server){ + msg.realm = server->realm; + msg.sname = server->name; + }else{ + msg.realm = ""; + } + if(client){ + msg.crealm = &client->realm; + msg.cname = &client->name; + } + + buf_size = 1024; + buf = malloc (buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + do { + ret = encode_KRB_ERROR(buf + buf_size - 1, + buf_size, + &msg, + &len); + if (ret) { + if (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW) { + u_char *tmp; + + buf_size *= 2; + tmp = realloc (buf, buf_size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + buf = tmp; + } else { + goto out; + } + } + } while (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW); + + reply->length = len; + reply->data = malloc(len); + if (reply->data == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + memcpy (reply->data, buf + buf_size - len, len); +out: + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_priv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_priv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ee2bed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_priv.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_priv.c,v 1.25 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_priv(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *userdata, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_PRIV s; + EncKrbPrivPart part; + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + int tmp_seq; + krb5_keyblock *key; + int32_t sec, usec; + KerberosTime sec2; + int usec2; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + /* XXX - Is this right? */ + + if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + part.user_data = *userdata; + sec2 = sec; + part.timestamp = &sec2; + usec2 = usec; + part.usec = &usec2; + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + tmp_seq = ++auth_context->local_seqnumber; + part.seq_number = &tmp_seq; + } else { + part.seq_number = NULL; + } + + part.s_address = auth_context->local_address; + part.r_address = auth_context->remote_address; + + buf_size = 1024; + buf = malloc (buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + krb5_data_zero (&s.enc_part.cipher); + + do { + ret = encode_EncKrbPrivPart (buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, + &part, &len); + if (ret) { + if (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW) { + u_char *tmp; + + buf_size *= 2; + tmp = realloc (buf, buf_size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + buf = tmp; + } else { + goto fail; + } + } + } while(ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW); + + s.pvno = 5; + s.msg_type = krb_priv; + s.enc_part.etype = key->keytype; + s.enc_part.kvno = NULL; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_encrypt (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_PRIV, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &s.enc_part.cipher); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + + do { + ret = encode_KRB_PRIV (buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, &s, &len); + + if (ret){ + if (ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW) { + u_char *tmp; + + buf_size *= 2; + tmp = realloc (buf, buf_size); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } + buf = tmp; + } else { + goto fail; + } + } + } while(ret == ASN1_OVERFLOW); + krb5_data_free (&s.enc_part.cipher); + + outbuf->length = len; + outbuf->data = malloc (len); + if (outbuf->data == NULL) { + free(buf); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (outbuf->data, buf + buf_size - len, len); + free (buf); + return 0; + +fail: + free (buf); + krb5_data_free (&s.enc_part.cipher); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_rep.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_rep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..060be03 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_rep.c @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_rep.c,v 1.16 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_rep(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + AP_REP ap; + EncAPRepPart body; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ap.pvno = 5; + ap.msg_type = krb_ap_rep; + + memset (&body, 0, sizeof(body)); + + body.ctime = (*auth_context)->authenticator->ctime; + body.cusec = (*auth_context)->authenticator->cusec; + body.subkey = NULL; + if ((*auth_context)->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + krb5_generate_seq_number (context, + (*auth_context)->keyblock, + &(*auth_context)->local_seqnumber); + body.seq_number = malloc (sizeof(*body.seq_number)); + if (body.seq_number == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *(body.seq_number) = (*auth_context)->local_seqnumber; + } else + body.seq_number = NULL; + + ap.enc_part.etype = (*auth_context)->keyblock->keytype; + ap.enc_part.kvno = NULL; + + buf_size = length_EncAPRepPart(&body); + buf = malloc (buf_size); + if (buf == NULL) { + free_EncAPRepPart (&body); + return ENOMEM; + } + + ret = krb5_encode_EncAPRepPart (context, + buf + buf_size - 1, + buf_size, + &body, + &len); + + free_EncAPRepPart (&body); + krb5_crypto_init(context, (*auth_context)->keyblock, + 0 /* ap.enc_part.etype */, &crypto); + ret = krb5_encrypt (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &ap.enc_part.cipher); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free(buf); + return ret; + } + + buf_size = length_AP_REP(&ap); + buf = realloc(buf, buf_size); + if(buf == NULL) { + free_AP_REP (&ap); + return ENOMEM; + } + ret = encode_AP_REP (buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, &ap, &len); + + free_AP_REP (&ap); + + if(len != buf_size) + krb5_abortx(context, "krb5_mk_rep: encoded length != calculated length"); + outbuf->data = buf; + outbuf->length = len; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_req.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e92d326 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_req.c,v 1.18 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + char *service, + char *hostname, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + krb5_error_code r; + krb5_creds this_cred, *cred; + char **realms; + krb5_data realm_data; + char *real_hostname; + + memset(&this_cred, 0, sizeof(this_cred)); + + r = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, ccache, &this_cred.client); + + if(r) + return r; + + r = krb5_expand_hostname (context, hostname, &real_hostname); + if (r) { + krb5_free_principal (context, this_cred.client); + return r; + } + + r = krb5_get_host_realm(context, real_hostname, &realms); + if (r) { + krb5_free_principal (context, this_cred.client); + return r; + } + realm_data.length = strlen(*realms); + realm_data.data = *realms; + + r = krb5_build_principal (context, &this_cred.server, + strlen(*realms), + *realms, + service, + real_hostname, + NULL); + free (real_hostname); + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + + if (r) { + krb5_free_principal (context, this_cred.client); + return r; + } + this_cred.times.endtime = 0; + if (auth_context && *auth_context && (*auth_context)->keytype) + this_cred.session.keytype = (*auth_context)->keytype; + + r = krb5_get_credentials (context, 0, ccache, &this_cred, &cred); + if (r) + return r; + + return krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + ap_req_options, + in_data, + cred, + outbuf); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b7b886 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_req_ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_req_ext.c,v 1.21 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_internal(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *outbuf, + krb5_key_usage usage) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data authenticator; + Checksum c; + Checksum *c_opt; + krb5_auth_context ac; + + if(auth_context) { + if(*auth_context == NULL) + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context); + else + ret = 0; + ac = *auth_context; + } else + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac); + if(ret) + return ret; + +#if 0 + { + /* This is somewhat bogus since we're possibly overwriting a + value specified by the user, but it's the easiest way to make + the code use a compatible enctype */ + Ticket ticket; + krb5_keytype ticket_keytype; + + ret = decode_Ticket(in_creds->ticket.data, + in_creds->ticket.length, + &ticket, + NULL); + krb5_enctype_to_keytype (context, + ticket.enc_part.etype, + &ticket_keytype); + + if (ticket_keytype == in_creds->session.keytype) + krb5_auth_setenctype(context, + ac, + ticket.enc_part.etype); + free_Ticket(&ticket); + } +#endif + + krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock); + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &in_creds->session, &ac->keyblock); + + if (in_data) { + if(ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) { + /* this is to make DCE secd (and older MIT kdcs?) happy */ + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + NULL, + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4, + in_data->data, + in_data->length, + &c); + } else { + krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_crypto_init(context, ac->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + crypto, + usage, + in_data->data, + in_data->length, + &c); + + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + } + c_opt = &c; + } else { + c_opt = NULL; + } + + ret = krb5_build_authenticator (context, + ac, + ac->keyblock->keytype, + in_creds, + c_opt, + NULL, + &authenticator); + if (c_opt) + free_Checksum (c_opt); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_build_ap_req (context, ac->keyblock->keytype, + in_creds, ap_req_options, authenticator, outbuf); + if(auth_context == NULL) + krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_data *outbuf) +{ + return krb5_mk_req_internal (context, + auth_context, + ap_req_options, + in_data, + in_creds, + outbuf, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_safe.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_safe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d848a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/mk_safe.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mk_safe.c,v 1.20 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_mk_safe(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *userdata, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_SAFE s; + int32_t sec, usec; + KerberosTime sec2; + int usec2; + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + int tmp_seq; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + s.pvno = 5; + s.msg_type = krb_safe; + + s.safe_body.user_data = *userdata; + krb5_us_timeofday (context, &sec, &usec); + + sec2 = sec; + s.safe_body.timestamp = &sec2; + usec2 = usec2; + s.safe_body.usec = &usec2; + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + tmp_seq = ++auth_context->local_seqnumber; + s.safe_body.seq_number = &tmp_seq; + } else + s.safe_body.seq_number = NULL; + + s.safe_body.s_address = auth_context->local_address; + s.safe_body.r_address = auth_context->remote_address; + + s.cksum.cksumtype = 0; + s.cksum.checksum.data = NULL; + s.cksum.checksum.length = 0; + + + buf_size = length_KRB_SAFE(&s); + buf = malloc(buf_size + 128); /* add some for checksum */ + if(buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = encode_KRB_SAFE (buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, &s, &len); + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &s.cksum); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) { + free (buf); + return ret; + } + + buf_size = length_KRB_SAFE(&s); + buf = realloc(buf, buf_size); + if(buf == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + ret = encode_KRB_SAFE (buf + buf_size - 1, buf_size, &s, &len); + free_Checksum (&s.cksum); + + outbuf->length = len; + outbuf->data = malloc (len); + if (outbuf->data == NULL) { + free (buf); + return ENOMEM; + } + memcpy (outbuf->data, buf + buf_size - len, len); + free (buf); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..814dc6f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/n-fold-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: n-fold-test.c,v 1.3 1999/07/22 11:45:33 assar Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 24 }; + +static struct testcase { + const char *str; + unsigned n; + unsigned char res[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {"012345", 8, + {0xbe, 0x07, 0x26, 0x31, 0x27, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x55} + }, + {"basch", 24, + {0x1a, 0xab, 0x6b, 0x42, 0x96, 0x4b, 0x98, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x8c, 0xde, + 0x2d, 0x24, 0x48, 0xba, 0x34, 0x55, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x2c, 0x97, 0x31, + 0x64, 0x3f} + }, + {"eichin", 24, + {0x65, 0x69, 0x63, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x2b, 0x4b, + 0x1b, 0x43, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x5b, 0x99, 0x5a, 0x58, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0xd0, + 0xd2, 0xdc, 0xca} + }, + {"sommerfeld", 24, + {0x2f, 0x7a, 0x98, 0x55, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0xe4, 0xab, 0xad, 0xf4, + 0xe7, 0x11, 0x92, 0xdd, 0x44, 0x2b, 0xd4, 0xff, 0x53, 0x25, 0xa5, + 0xde, 0xf7, 0x5c} + }, + {"MASSACHVSETTS INSTITVTE OF TECHNOLOGY", 24, + {0xdb, 0x3b, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x60, 0x32, 0x82, + 0xb3, 0x08, 0xa5, 0x08, 0x41, 0x22, 0x9a, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xb9, + 0x54, 0x0c, 0x1b} + }, + {"assar@NADA.KTH.SE", 24, + {0x5c, 0x06, 0xc3, 0x4d, 0x2c, 0x89, 0x05, 0xbe, 0x7a, 0x51, + 0x83, 0x6c, 0xd6, 0xf8, 0x1c, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x49, 0x16, 0x5a, + 0xb3, 0xfa, 0xa9} + }, + {"testKRBTEST.MIT.EDUtestkey", 24, + {0x50, 0x2c, 0xf8, 0x29, 0x78, 0xe5, 0xfb, 0x1a, 0x29, 0x06, + 0xbd, 0x22, 0x28, 0x91, 0x56, 0xc0, 0x06, 0xa0, 0xdc, 0xf5, 0xb6, + 0xc2, 0xda, 0x6c} + }, + {NULL, 0} +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + unsigned char data[MAXSIZE]; + struct testcase *t; + int ret = 0; + + for (t = tests; t->str; ++t) { + int i; + + _krb5_n_fold (t->str, strlen(t->str), data, t->n); + if (memcmp (data, t->res, t->n) != 0) { + printf ("n-fold(\"%s\", %d) failed\n", t->str, t->n); + printf ("should be: "); + for (i = 0; i < t->n; ++i) + printf ("%02x", t->res[i]); + printf ("\nresult was: "); + for (i = 0; i < t->n; ++i) + printf ("%02x", data[i]); + printf ("\n"); + ret = 1; + } + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/n-fold.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/n-fold.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0db5e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/n-fold.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: n-fold.c,v 1.6 1999/08/27 09:03:41 joda Exp $"); + +static void +rr13(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *tmp; + int bytes = (len + 7) / 8; + int i; + if(len == 0) + return; + { + const int bits = 13 % len; + const int lbit = len % 8; + + tmp = malloc(bytes); + memcpy(tmp, buf, bytes); + if(lbit) { + /* pad final byte with inital bits */ + tmp[bytes - 1] &= 0xff << (8 - lbit); + for(i = lbit; i < 8; i += len) + tmp[bytes - 1] |= buf[0] >> i; + } + for(i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { + int bb; + int b1, s1, b2, s2; + /* calculate first bit position of this byte */ + bb = 8 * i - bits; + while(bb < 0) + bb += len; + /* byte offset and shift count */ + b1 = bb / 8; + s1 = bb % 8; + + if(bb + 8 > bytes * 8) + /* watch for wraparound */ + s2 = (len + 8 - s1) % 8; + else + s2 = 8 - s1; + b2 = (b1 + 1) % bytes; + buf[i] = (tmp[b1] << s1) | (tmp[b2] >> s2); + } + free(tmp); + } +} + +/* Add `b' to `a', both beeing one's complement numbers. */ +static void +add1(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, size_t len) +{ + int i; + int carry = 0; + for(i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--){ + int x = a[i] + b[i] + carry; + carry = x > 0xff; + a[i] = x & 0xff; + } + for(i = len - 1; carry && i >= 0; i--){ + int x = a[i] + carry; + carry = x > 0xff; + a[i] = x & 0xff; + } +} + +void +_krb5_n_fold(const void *str, size_t len, void *key, size_t size) +{ + /* if len < size we need at most N * len bytes, ie < 2 * size; + if len > size we need at most 2 * len */ + size_t maxlen = 2 * max(size, len); + size_t l = 0; + unsigned char *tmp = malloc(maxlen); + unsigned char *buf = malloc(len); + + memcpy(buf, str, len); + memset(key, 0, size); + do { + memcpy(tmp + l, buf, len); + l += len; + rr13(buf, len * 8); + while(l >= size) { + add1(key, tmp, size); + l -= size; + if(l == 0) + break; + memmove(tmp, tmp + size, l); + } + } while(l != 0); + memset(buf, 0, len); + free(buf); + memset(tmp, 0, maxlen); + free(tmp); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/net_read.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/net_read.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cb1dc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/net_read.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: net_read.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +ssize_t +krb5_net_read (krb5_context context, + void *p_fd, + void *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int fd = *((int *)p_fd); + + return net_read (fd, buf, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/net_write.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/net_write.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cc719b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/net_write.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: net_write.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +ssize_t +krb5_net_write (krb5_context context, + void *p_fd, + const void *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int fd = *((int *)p_fd); + + return net_write (fd, buf, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/padata.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/padata.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcf7952 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/padata.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: padata.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +PA_DATA * +krb5_find_padata(PA_DATA *val, unsigned len, int type, int *index) +{ + for(; *index < len; (*index)++) + if(val[*index].padata_type == type) + return val + *index; + return NULL; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/principal.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/principal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3fd022d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/principal.c @@ -0,0 +1,898 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH +#define USE_RESOLVER +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#include "resolve.h" + +RCSID("$Id: principal.c,v 1.57 2000/01/08 08:08:03 assar Exp $"); + +#define princ_num_comp(P) ((P)->name.name_string.len) +#define princ_type(P) ((P)->name.name_type) +#define princ_comp(P) ((P)->name.name_string.val) +#define princ_ncomp(P, N) ((P)->name.name_string.val[(N)]) +#define princ_realm(P) ((P)->realm) + +void +krb5_free_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal p) +{ + if(p){ + free_Principal(p); + free(p); + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_parse_name(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + krb5_principal *principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + general_string *comp; + general_string realm; + int ncomp; + + char *p; + char *q; + char *s; + char *start; + + int n; + char c; + int got_realm = 0; + + /* count number of component */ + ncomp = 1; + for(p = (char*)name; *p; p++){ + if(*p=='\\'){ + if(!p[1]) + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + p++; + } else if(*p == '/') + ncomp++; + } + comp = calloc(ncomp, sizeof(*comp)); + if (comp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + n = 0; + start = q = p = s = strdup(name); + if (start == NULL) { + free (comp); + return ENOMEM; + } + while(*p){ + c = *p++; + if(c == '\\'){ + c = *p++; + if(c == 'n') + c = '\n'; + else if(c == 't') + c = '\t'; + else if(c == 'b') + c = '\b'; + else if(c == '0') + c = '\0'; + }else if(c == '/' || c == '@'){ + if(got_realm){ + ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + goto exit; + }else{ + comp[n] = malloc(q - start + 1); + if (comp[n] == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + strncpy(comp[n], start, q - start); + comp[n][q - start] = 0; + n++; + } + if(c == '@') + got_realm = 1; + start = q; + continue; + } + if(got_realm && (c == ':' || c == '/' || c == '\0')) { + ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + goto exit; + } + *q++ = c; + } + if(got_realm){ + realm = malloc(q - start + 1); + if (realm == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + strncpy(realm, start, q - start); + realm[q - start] = 0; + }else{ + ret = krb5_get_default_realm (context, &realm); + if (ret) + goto exit; + + comp[n] = malloc(q - start + 1); + if (comp[n] == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + strncpy(comp[n], start, q - start); + comp[n][q - start] = 0; + n++; + } + *principal = malloc(sizeof(**principal)); + if (*principal == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + (*principal)->name.name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL; + (*principal)->name.name_string.val = comp; + princ_num_comp(*principal) = n; + (*principal)->realm = realm; + free(s); + return 0; +exit: + while(n>0){ + free(comp[--n]); + } + free(comp); + free(s); + return ret; +} + +static const char quotable_chars[] = "\n\t\b\\/@"; +static const char replace_chars[] = "ntb\\/@"; + +#define add_char(BASE, INDEX, LEN, C) do { if((INDEX) < (LEN)) (BASE)[(INDEX)++] = (C); }while(0); + +static size_t +quote_string(const char *s, char *out, size_t index, size_t len) +{ + const char *p, *q; + for(p = s; *p && index < len; p++){ + if((q = strchr(quotable_chars, *p))){ + add_char(out, index, len, '\\'); + add_char(out, index, len, replace_chars[q - quotable_chars]); + }else + add_char(out, index, len, *p); + } + if(index < len) + out[index] = '\0'; + return index; +} + + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_name_fixed(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len, + krb5_boolean short_form) +{ + size_t index = 0; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(principal); i++){ + if(i) + add_char(name, index, len, '/'); + index = quote_string(princ_ncomp(principal, i), name, index, len); + if(index == len) + return ERANGE; + } + /* add realm if different from default realm */ + if(short_form) { + krb5_realm r; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &r); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(strcmp(princ_realm(principal), r) != 0) + short_form = 0; + free(r); + } + if(!short_form) { + add_char(name, index, len, '@'); + index = quote_string(princ_realm(principal), name, index, len); + if(index == len) + return ERANGE; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len) +{ + return unparse_name_fixed(context, principal, name, len, FALSE); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_fixed_short(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char *name, + size_t len) +{ + return unparse_name_fixed(context, principal, name, len, TRUE); +} + +static krb5_error_code +unparse_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name, + krb5_boolean short_flag) +{ + size_t len = 0, plen; + int i; + krb5_error_code ret; + /* count length */ + plen = strlen(princ_realm(principal)); + if(strcspn(princ_realm(principal), quotable_chars) == plen) + len += plen; + else + len += 2*plen; + len++; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(principal); i++){ + plen = strlen(princ_ncomp(principal, i)); + if(strcspn(princ_ncomp(principal, i), quotable_chars) == plen) + len += plen; + else + len += 2*plen; + len++; + } + *name = malloc(len); + if(len != 0 && *name == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + ret = unparse_name_fixed(context, principal, *name, len, short_flag); + if(ret) + free(*name); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name) +{ + return unparse_name(context, principal, name, FALSE); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_short(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name) +{ + return unparse_name(context, principal, name, TRUE); +} + +#if 0 /* not implemented */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_unparse_name_ext(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal principal, + char **name, + size_t *size) +{ + krb5_abortx(context, "unimplemented krb5_unparse_name_ext called"); +} + +#endif + +krb5_realm* +krb5_princ_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + return &princ_realm(principal); +} + + +void +krb5_princ_set_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_realm *realm) +{ + princ_realm(principal) = *realm; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, realm); + ret = krb5_build_principal_va(context, principal, rlen, realm, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +append_component(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, + general_string comp, + size_t comp_len) +{ + general_string *tmp; + size_t len = princ_num_comp(p); + tmp = realloc(princ_comp(p), (len + 1) * sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + princ_comp(p) = tmp; + princ_ncomp(p, len) = malloc(comp_len + 1); + memcpy (princ_ncomp(p, len), comp, comp_len); + princ_ncomp(p, len)[comp_len] = '\0'; + princ_num_comp(p)++; + return 0; +} + +static void +va_ext_princ(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, va_list ap) +{ + while(1){ + char *s; + int len; + len = va_arg(ap, int); + if(len == 0) + break; + s = va_arg(ap, char*); + append_component(context, p, s, len); + } +} + +static void +va_princ(krb5_context context, krb5_principal p, va_list ap) +{ + while(1){ + char *s; + s = va_arg(ap, char*); + if(s == NULL) + break; + append_component(context, p, s, strlen(s)); + } +} + + +static krb5_error_code +build_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + void (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal, va_list), + va_list ap) +{ + krb5_principal p; + + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + princ_type(p) = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL; + + princ_realm(p) = strdup(realm); + if(p->realm == NULL){ + free(p); + return ENOMEM; + } + + (*func)(context, p, ap); + *principal = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_make_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_realm r = NULL; + va_list ap; + if(realm == NULL) { + ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &r); + if(ret) + return ret; + realm = r; + } + va_start(ap, realm); + ret = krb5_build_principal_va(context, principal, strlen(realm), realm, ap); + va_end(ap); + if(r) + free(r); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + va_list ap) +{ + return build_principal(context, principal, rlen, realm, va_princ, ap); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_va_ext(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + va_list ap) +{ + return build_principal(context, principal, rlen, realm, va_ext_princ, ap); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_build_principal_ext(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal *principal, + int rlen, + krb5_const_realm realm, + ...) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, realm); + ret = krb5_build_principal_va_ext(context, principal, rlen, realm, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_principal(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal inprinc, + krb5_principal *outprinc) +{ + krb5_principal p = malloc(sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + if(copy_Principal(inprinc, p)) + return ENOMEM; + *outprinc = p; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2) +{ + int i; + if(princ_num_comp(princ1) != princ_num_comp(princ2)) + return FALSE; + for(i = 0; i < princ_num_comp(princ1); i++){ + if(strcmp(princ_ncomp(princ1, i), princ_ncomp(princ2, i)) != 0) + return FALSE; + } + return TRUE; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2) +{ + if(!krb5_realm_compare(context, princ1, princ2)) + return FALSE; + return krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, princ1, princ2); +} + + +krb5_boolean +krb5_realm_compare(krb5_context context, + krb5_const_principal princ1, + krb5_const_principal princ2) +{ + return strcmp(princ_realm(princ1), princ_realm(princ2)) == 0; +} + +struct v4_name_convert { + const char *from; + const char *to; +} default_v4_name_convert[] = { + { "ftp", "ftp" }, + { "hprop", "hprop" }, + { "pop", "pop" }, + { "rcmd", "host" }, + { NULL, NULL } +}; + +static const char* +get_name_conversion(krb5_context context, const char *realm, const char *name) +{ + struct v4_name_convert *q; + const char *p; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "v4_name_convert", "host", name, NULL); + if(p == NULL) + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", "host", name, NULL); + if(p) + return p; + + /* XXX should be possible to override default list */ + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p) + return NULL; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p) + return NULL; + for(q = default_v4_name_convert; q->from; q++) + if(strcmp(q->from, name) == 0) + return q->to; + return NULL; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal_ext(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + krb5_boolean (*func)(krb5_context, krb5_principal), + krb5_boolean resolve, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + const char *p; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal pr; + char host[128]; + + /* do the following: if the name is found in the + `v4_name_convert:host' part, is is assumed to be a `host' type + principal, and the instance is looked up in the + `v4_instance_convert' part. if not found there the name is + (optionally) looked up as a hostname, and if that doesn't yield + anything, the `default_domain' is appended to the instance + */ + + if(instance == NULL) + goto no_host; + if(instance[0] == 0){ + instance = NULL; + goto no_host; + } + p = get_name_conversion(context, realm, name); + if(p == NULL) + goto no_host; + name = p; + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "v4_instance_convert", instance, NULL); + if(p){ + instance = p; + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, instance, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + *princ = NULL; + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; + } + if(resolve){ + const char *inst = NULL; +#ifdef USE_RESOLVER + struct dns_reply *r; + r = dns_lookup(instance, "a"); + if(r && r->head && r->head->type == T_A) + inst = r->head->domain; +#else + struct hostent *hp = roken_gethostbyname(instance); + if(hp) + inst = hp->h_name; +#endif + if(inst) { + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, inst, NULL); + if(ret == 0) { + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; +#ifdef USE_RESOLVER + dns_free_data(r); +#endif + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + } + } +#ifdef USE_RESOLVER + if(r) + dns_free_data(r); +#endif + } + { + char **domains, **d; + domains = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "v4_domains", NULL); + for(d = domains; d && *d; d++){ + snprintf(host, sizeof(host), "%s.%s", instance, *d); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, host, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + krb5_config_free_strings(domains); + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + } + krb5_config_free_strings(domains); + } + + + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, "realms", realm, + "default_domain", NULL); + if(p == NULL){ + /* should this be an error or should it silently + succeed? */ + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; + } + + if (*p == '.') + ++p; + snprintf(host, sizeof(host), "%s.%s", instance, p); + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, host, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; +no_host: + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p == NULL) + p = krb5_config_get_string(context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + name, + NULL); + if(p) + name = p; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &pr, realm, name, instance, NULL); + if(func == NULL || (*func)(context, pr)){ + *princ = pr; + return 0; + } + krb5_free_principal(context, pr); + return HEIM_ERR_V4_PRINC_NO_CONV; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_425_conv_principal(krb5_context context, + const char *name, + const char *instance, + const char *realm, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + krb5_boolean resolve = krb5_config_get_bool(context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_instance_resolve", + NULL); + + return krb5_425_conv_principal_ext(context, name, instance, realm, + NULL, resolve, princ); +} + + +static int +check_list(const krb5_config_binding *l, const char *name, const char **out) +{ + while(l){ + if (l->type != krb5_config_string) + continue; + if(strcmp(name, l->u.string) == 0) { + *out = l->name; + return 1; + } + l = l->next; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +name_convert(krb5_context context, const char *name, const char *realm, + const char **out) +{ + const krb5_config_binding *l; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "host", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_SRV_HST; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "host", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_SRV_HST; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "realms", + realm, + "v4_name_convert", + "plain", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + l = krb5_config_get_list (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "v4_name_convert", + "host", + NULL); + if(l && check_list(l, name, out)) + return KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + + /* didn't find it in config file, try built-in list */ + { + struct v4_name_convert *q; + for(q = default_v4_name_convert; q->from; q++) { + if(strcmp(name, q->to) == 0) { + *out = q->from; + return KRB5_NT_SRV_HST; + } + } + } + return -1; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_524_conv_principal(krb5_context context, + const krb5_principal principal, + char *name, + char *instance, + char *realm) +{ + const char *n, *i, *r; + char tmpinst[40]; + int type = princ_type(principal); + + r = principal->realm; + + switch(principal->name.name_string.len){ + case 1: + n = principal->name.name_string.val[0]; + i = ""; + break; + case 2: + n = principal->name.name_string.val[0]; + i = principal->name.name_string.val[1]; + break; + default: + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + } + + { + const char *tmp; + int t = name_convert(context, n, r, &tmp); + if(t >= 0) { + type = t; + n = tmp; + } + } + + if(type == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST){ + char *p; + strncpy(tmpinst, i, sizeof(tmpinst)); + tmpinst[sizeof(tmpinst) - 1] = 0; + p = strchr(tmpinst, '.'); + if(p) *p = 0; + i = tmpinst; + } + + if(strlen(r) >= 40) + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + if(strlen(n) >= 40) + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + if(strlen(i) >= 40) + return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED; + strcpy(realm, r); + strcpy(name, n); + strcpy(instance, i); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create a principal in `ret_princ' for the service `sname' running + * on host `hostname'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sname_to_principal (krb5_context context, + const char *hostname, + const char *sname, + int32_t type, + krb5_principal *ret_princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char localhost[128]; + char **realms, *host = NULL; + + if(type != KRB5_NT_SRV_HST && type != KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN) + return KRB5_SNAME_UNSUPP_NAMETYPE; + if(hostname == NULL) { + gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost)); + hostname = localhost; + } + if(sname == NULL) + sname = "host"; + if(type == KRB5_NT_SRV_HST) { + ret = krb5_expand_hostname (context, hostname, &host); + if (ret) + return ret; + strlwr(host); + hostname = host; + } + ret = krb5_get_host_realm(context, hostname, &realms); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_make_principal(context, ret_princ, realms[0], sname, + hostname, NULL); + if(host) + free(host); + krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/prog_setup.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/prog_setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4693d08 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/prog_setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: prog_setup.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +void +krb5_std_usage(int code, struct getargs *args, int num_args) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, ""); + exit(code); +} + +int +krb5_program_setup(krb5_context *context, int argc, char **argv, + struct getargs *args, int num_args, + void (*usage)(int, struct getargs*, int)) +{ + int optind = 0; + + if(usage == NULL) + usage = krb5_std_usage; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + krb5_init_context(context); + + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + (*usage)(1, args, num_args); + return optind; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a849254 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/prompter_posix.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: prompter_posix.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:11 joda Exp $"); + +int +krb5_prompter_posix (krb5_context context, + void *data, + const char *banner, + int num_prompts, + krb5_prompt prompts[]) +{ + int i; + + if (banner) + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", banner); + for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; ++i) { + if (prompts[i].hidden) { + if(des_read_pw_string(prompts[i].reply->data, + prompts[i].reply->length, + prompts[i].prompt, + 0)) + return 1; + } else { + char *s = prompts[i].reply->data; + + fputs (prompts[i].prompt, stdout); + fflush (stdout); + if(fgets(prompts[i].reply->data, + prompts[i].reply->length, + stdin) == NULL) + return 1; + if(s[strlen(s) - 1] == '\n') + s[strlen(s) - 1] = '\0'; + } + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_cred.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_cred.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c330791 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_cred.c @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_cred.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_cred (krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_data *in_data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len; + KRB_CRED cred; + EncKrbCredPart enc_krb_cred_part; + krb5_data enc_krb_cred_part_data; + krb5_crypto crypto; + int i; + + ret = decode_KRB_CRED (in_data->data, in_data->length, + &cred, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (cred.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto out; + } + + if (cred.msg_type != krb_cred) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + goto out; + } + + krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->remote_subkey, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_CRED, + &cred.enc_part, + &enc_krb_cred_part_data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + + + ret = krb5_decode_EncKrbCredPart (context, + enc_krb_cred_part_data.data, + enc_krb_cred_part_data.length, + &enc_krb_cred_part, + &len); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* check sender address */ + + if (enc_krb_cred_part.s_address + && auth_context->remote_address) { + krb5_address *a; + int cmp; + + ret = krb5_make_addrport (&a, + auth_context->remote_address, + auth_context->remote_port); + if (ret) + goto out; + + + cmp = krb5_address_compare (context, + a, + enc_krb_cred_part.s_address); + + krb5_free_address (context, a); + free (a); + + if (cmp == 0) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto out; + } + } + + /* check receiver address */ + + if (enc_krb_cred_part.r_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->local_address, + enc_krb_cred_part.r_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto out; + } + + /* check timestamp */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + int32_t sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + if (enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp == NULL || + enc_krb_cred_part.usec == NULL || + abs(*enc_krb_cred_part.timestamp - sec) + > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + goto out; + } + } + + /* XXX - check replay cache */ + + /* Store the creds in the ccache */ + + for (i = 0; i < enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.len; ++i) { + KrbCredInfo *kci = &enc_krb_cred_part.ticket_info.val[i]; + krb5_creds creds; + u_char buf[1024]; + size_t len; + + memset (&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + + ret = encode_Ticket (buf + sizeof(buf) - 1, sizeof(buf), + &cred.tickets.val[i], + &len); + if (ret) + goto out; + krb5_data_copy (&creds.ticket, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + copy_EncryptionKey (&kci->key, &creds.session); + if (kci->prealm && kci->pname) + principalname2krb5_principal (&creds.client, + *kci->pname, + *kci->prealm); + if (kci->flags) + creds.flags.b = *kci->flags; + if (kci->authtime) + creds.times.authtime = *kci->authtime; + if (kci->starttime) + creds.times.starttime = *kci->starttime; + if (kci->endtime) + creds.times.endtime = *kci->endtime; + if (kci->renew_till) + creds.times.renew_till = *kci->renew_till; + if (kci->srealm && kci->sname) + principalname2krb5_principal (&creds.server, + *kci->sname, + *kci->srealm); + if (kci->caddr) + krb5_copy_addresses (context, + kci->caddr, + &creds.addresses); + krb5_cc_store_cred (context, ccache, &creds); + } + +out: + free_KRB_CRED (&cred); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_error.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_error.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df9b45e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_error.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: rd_error.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_error(krb5_context context, + krb5_data *msg, + KRB_ERROR *result) +{ + + size_t len; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = decode_KRB_ERROR(msg->data, msg->length, result, &len); + if(ret) + return ret; + result->error_code += KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE; + return 0; +} + +void +krb5_free_error_contents (krb5_context context, + krb5_error *error) +{ + free_KRB_ERROR(error); +} + +void +krb5_free_error (krb5_context context, + krb5_error *error) +{ + krb5_free_error_contents (context, error); + free (error); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_priv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_priv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0bc8564 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_priv.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_priv.c,v 1.22 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_priv(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_PRIV priv; + EncKrbPrivPart part; + size_t len; + krb5_data plain; + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + memset(&priv, 0, sizeof(priv)); + ret = decode_KRB_PRIV (inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &priv, &len); + if (ret) + goto failure; + if (priv.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto failure; + } + if (priv.msg_type != krb_priv) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + goto failure; + } + + /* XXX - Is this right? */ + + if (auth_context->local_subkey) + key = auth_context->local_subkey; + else if (auth_context->remote_subkey) + key = auth_context->remote_subkey; + else + key = auth_context->keyblock; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_PRIV, + &priv.enc_part, + &plain); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + ret = decode_EncKrbPrivPart (plain.data, plain.length, &part, &len); + krb5_data_free (&plain); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + /* check sender address */ + + if (part.s_address + && auth_context->remote_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->remote_address, + part.s_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto failure_part; + } + + /* check receiver address */ + + if (part.r_address + && auth_context->local_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->local_address, + part.r_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto failure_part; + } + + /* check timestamp */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + int32_t sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + if (part.timestamp == NULL || + part.usec == NULL || + abs(*part.timestamp - sec) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + goto failure_part; + } + } + + /* XXX - check replay cache */ + + /* check sequence number */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + if (part.seq_number == NULL || + *part.seq_number != ++auth_context->remote_seqnumber) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER; + goto failure_part; + } + } + + ret = krb5_data_copy (outbuf, part.user_data.data, part.user_data.length); + if (ret) + goto failure_part; + + free_EncKrbPrivPart (&part); + free_KRB_PRIV (&priv); + return 0; + +failure_part: + free_EncKrbPrivPart (&part); + +failure: + free_KRB_PRIV (&priv); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2c401c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_rep.c,v 1.19 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_rep(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + AP_REP ap_rep; + size_t len; + krb5_data data; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = 0; + + ret = decode_AP_REP(inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &ap_rep, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ap_rep.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto out; + } + if (ap_rep.msg_type != krb_ap_rep) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + goto out; + } + + krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART, + &ap_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + + *repl = malloc(sizeof(**repl)); + if (*repl == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + *repl, + &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if ((*repl)->ctime != auth_context->authenticator->ctime || + (*repl)->cusec != auth_context->authenticator->cusec) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((*repl)->seq_number) + auth_context->remote_seqnumber = *((*repl)->seq_number); + +out: + krb5_data_free (&data); + free_AP_REP (&ap_rep); + return ret; +} + +void +krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (krb5_context context, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *val) +{ + free_EncAPRepPart (val); + free (val); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_req.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_req.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f8df1d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_req.c @@ -0,0 +1,441 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_req.c,v 1.38 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_tkt_enc_part (krb5_context context, + krb5_keyblock *key, + EncryptedData *enc_part, + EncTicketPart *decr_part) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data plain; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + enc_part, + &plain); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_EncTicketPart(context, plain.data, plain.length, + decr_part, &len); + krb5_data_free (&plain); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +decrypt_authenticator (krb5_context context, + EncryptionKey *key, + EncryptedData *enc_part, + Authenticator *authenticator) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data plain; + size_t len; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH, + enc_part, + &plain); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_decode_Authenticator(context, plain.data, plain.length, + authenticator, &len); + krb5_data_free (&plain); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decode_ap_req(krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + size_t len; + ret = decode_AP_REQ(inbuf->data, inbuf->length, ap_req, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ap_req->pvno != 5){ + free_AP_REQ(ap_req); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + if (ap_req->msg_type != krb_ap_req){ + free_AP_REQ(ap_req); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + } + if (ap_req->ticket.tkt_vno != 5){ + free_AP_REQ(ap_req); + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_decrypt_ticket(krb5_context context, + Ticket *ticket, + krb5_keyblock *key, + EncTicketPart *out, + krb5_flags flags) +{ + EncTicketPart t; + krb5_error_code ret; + ret = decrypt_tkt_enc_part (context, key, &ticket->enc_part, &t); + if (ret) + return ret; + + { + int32_t now; + time_t start = t.authtime; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &now); + if(t.starttime) + start = *t.starttime; + if(start - now > context->max_skew + || (t.flags.invalid + && !(flags & KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID))) + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV; + if(now - t.endtime > context->max_skew) + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED; + } + + if(out) + *out = t; + else + free_EncTicketPart(&t); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_authenticator_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context ac, + void *data, + size_t len) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_keyblock *key; + krb5_authenticator authenticator; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + ret = krb5_auth_getauthenticator (context, + ac, + &authenticator); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(authenticator->cksum == NULL) + return -17; + ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &key); + if(ret) { + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_verify_checksum (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, + data, + len, + authenticator->cksum); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); +out: + krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, key); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_ap_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags flags, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_ticket t; + krb5_auth_context ac; + krb5_error_code ret; + + if(auth_context){ + if(*auth_context == NULL){ + krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac); + *auth_context = ac; + }else + ac = *auth_context; + }else + krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac); + + if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key && ac->keyblock){ + ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket, + ac->keyblock, + &t.ticket, + flags); + krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock); + ac->keyblock = NULL; + }else + ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket, + keyblock, + &t.ticket, + flags); + + if(ret) + return ret; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&t.server, ap_req->ticket.sname, + ap_req->ticket.realm); + principalname2krb5_principal(&t.client, t.ticket.cname, + t.ticket.crealm); + + /* save key */ + + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &t.ticket.key, &ac->keyblock); + + ret = decrypt_authenticator (context, + &t.ticket.key, + &ap_req->authenticator, + ac->authenticator); + if (ret){ + /* XXX free data */ + return ret; + } + + { + krb5_principal p1, p2; + krb5_boolean res; + + principalname2krb5_principal(&p1, + ac->authenticator->cname, + ac->authenticator->crealm); + principalname2krb5_principal(&p2, + t.ticket.cname, + t.ticket.crealm); + res = krb5_principal_compare (context, p1, p2); + krb5_free_principal (context, p1); + krb5_free_principal (context, p2); + if (!res) + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH; + } + + /* check addresses */ + + if (t.ticket.caddr + && ac->remote_address + && !krb5_address_search (context, + ac->remote_address, + t.ticket.caddr)) + return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + + if (ac->authenticator->seq_number) + ac->remote_seqnumber = *ac->authenticator->seq_number; + + /* XXX - Xor sequence numbers */ + + /* XXX - subkeys? */ + /* And where should it be stored? */ + + if (ac->authenticator->subkey) { + krb5_copy_keyblock(context, + ac->authenticator->subkey, + &ac->remote_subkey); + } + + if (ap_req_options) { + *ap_req_options = 0; + if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key) + *ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY; + if (ap_req->ap_options.mutual_required) + *ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED; + } + + if(ticket){ + *ticket = malloc(sizeof(**ticket)); + **ticket = t; + } else + krb5_free_ticket (context, &t); + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req_with_keyblock(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ap_req ap_req; + + if (*auth_context == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, inbuf, &ap_req); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_verify_ap_req(context, + auth_context, + &ap_req, + server, + keyblock, + 0, + ap_req_options, + ticket); + + free_AP_REQ(&ap_req); + return ret; +} + +static krb5_error_code +get_key_from_keytab(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_ap_req *ap_req, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_keyblock **out) +{ + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_error_code ret; + int kvno; + krb5_keytab real_keytab; + + if(keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_default(context, &real_keytab); + else + real_keytab = keytab; + + if (ap_req->ticket.enc_part.kvno) + kvno = *ap_req->ticket.enc_part.kvno; + else + kvno = 0; + + ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, + real_keytab, + server, + kvno, + ap_req->ticket.enc_part.etype, + &entry); + if(ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &entry.keyblock, out); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); +out: + if(keytab == NULL) + krb5_kt_close(context, real_keytab); + + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_req(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_const_principal server, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_flags *ap_req_options, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ap_req ap_req; + krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL; + krb5_principal service = NULL; + + if (*auth_context == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, inbuf, &ap_req); + if(ret) + return ret; + + if(server == NULL){ + principalname2krb5_principal(&service, + ap_req.ticket.sname, + ap_req.ticket.realm); + server = service; + } + + if(ap_req.ap_options.use_session_key == 0 || + (*auth_context)->keyblock == NULL){ + ret = get_key_from_keytab(context, + auth_context, + &ap_req, + server, + keytab, + &keyblock); + if(ret) + goto out; + } + + + ret = krb5_verify_ap_req(context, + auth_context, + &ap_req, + server, + keyblock, + 0, + ap_req_options, + ticket); + + if(keyblock != NULL) + krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock); + +out: + free_AP_REQ(&ap_req); + if(service) + krb5_free_principal(context, service); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_safe.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_safe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aebf215 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_safe.c @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +RCSID("$Id: rd_safe.c,v 1.18 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +verify_checksum(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + KRB_SAFE *safe) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_size; + size_t len; + Checksum c; + krb5_crypto crypto; + + c = safe->cksum; + safe->cksum.cksumtype = 0; + safe->cksum.checksum.data = NULL; + safe->cksum.checksum.length = 0; + + + buf_size = length_KRB_SAFE(safe); + buf = malloc(buf_size); + + if (buf == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ret = encode_KRB_SAFE (buf + buf_size - 1, + buf_size, + safe, + &len); + krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + ret = krb5_verify_checksum (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM, + buf + buf_size - len, + len, + &c); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); +out: + safe->cksum = c; + free (buf); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rd_safe(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_data *outbuf, + /*krb5_replay_data*/ void *outdata) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + KRB_SAFE safe; + size_t len; + + ret = decode_KRB_SAFE (inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &safe, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (safe.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + goto failure; + } + if (safe.msg_type != krb_safe) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + goto failure; + } + if (!krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, safe.cksum.cksumtype) + || !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, safe.cksum.cksumtype)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; + goto failure; + } + + /* check sender address */ + + if (safe.safe_body.s_address + && auth_context->remote_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->remote_address, + safe.safe_body.s_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto failure; + } + + /* check receiver address */ + + if (safe.safe_body.r_address + && auth_context->local_address + && !krb5_address_compare (context, + auth_context->local_address, + safe.safe_body.r_address)) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR; + goto failure; + } + + /* check timestamp */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + int32_t sec; + + krb5_timeofday (context, &sec); + + if (safe.safe_body.timestamp == NULL || + safe.safe_body.usec == NULL || + abs(*safe.safe_body.timestamp - sec) > context->max_skew) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW; + goto failure; + } + } + /* XXX - check replay cache */ + + /* check sequence number */ + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE) { + if (safe.safe_body.seq_number == NULL || + *safe.safe_body.seq_number != ++auth_context->remote_seqnumber) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER; + goto failure; + } + } + + ret = verify_checksum (context, auth_context, &safe); + if (ret) + goto failure; + + outbuf->length = safe.safe_body.user_data.length; + outbuf->data = malloc(outbuf->length); + if (outbuf->data == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + goto failure; + } + memcpy (outbuf->data, safe.safe_body.user_data.data, outbuf->length); + free_KRB_SAFE (&safe); + return 0; +failure: + free_KRB_SAFE (&safe); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/read_message.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/read_message.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2cae03 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/read_message.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: read_message.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_read_message (krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t len; + u_int8_t buf[4]; + + ret = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, buf, 4); + if(ret == -1) + return errno; + if(ret < 4) { + data->length = 0; + return 0; + } + len = (buf[0] << 24) | (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, data->data, len) != len) { + krb5_data_free (data); + return errno; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/recvauth.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/recvauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49fe7b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/recvauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: recvauth.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * See `sendauth.c' for the format. + */ + +static krb5_boolean +match_exact(void *data, const char *appl_version) +{ + return strcmp(data, appl_version) == 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + char *appl_version, + krb5_principal server, + int32_t flags, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + return krb5_recvauth_match_version(context, auth_context, p_fd, + match_exact, appl_version, + server, flags, + keytab, ticket); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_recvauth_match_version(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_boolean (*match_appl_version)(void *, + const char*), + void *match_data, + krb5_principal server, + int32_t flags, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_ticket **ticket) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + const char *version = KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION; + char her_version[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)]; + char *her_appl_version; + u_int32_t len; + u_char repl; + krb5_data data; + krb5_flags ap_options; + ssize_t n; + + /* + * If there are no addresses in auth_context, get them from `fd'. + */ + + if (*auth_context == NULL) { + ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, auth_context); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs_from_fd (context, + *auth_context, + p_fd); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if(!(flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION)) { + n = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, &len, 4); + if (n < 0) + return errno; + if (n == 0) + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS; + len = ntohl(len); + if (len != sizeof(her_version) + || krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, her_version, len) != len + || strncmp (version, her_version, len)) { + repl = 1; + krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS; + } + } + + n = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, &len, 4); + if (n < 0) + return errno; + if (n == 0) + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS; + len = ntohl(len); + her_appl_version = malloc (len); + if (her_appl_version == NULL) { + repl = 2; + krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1); + return ENOMEM; + } + if (krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, her_appl_version, len) != len + || !(*match_appl_version)(match_data, her_appl_version)) { + repl = 2; + krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1); + free (her_appl_version); + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS; + } + free (her_appl_version); + + repl = 0; + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &repl, 1) != 1) + return errno; + + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = krb5_read_message (context, p_fd, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_req (context, + auth_context, + &data, + server, + keytab, + &ap_options, + ticket); + krb5_data_free (&data); + if (ret) { + krb5_data error_data; + krb5_error_code ret2; + + ret2 = krb5_mk_error (context, + ret, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + server, + 0, + &error_data); + if (ret2 == 0) { + krb5_write_message (context, p_fd, &error_data); + krb5_data_free (&error_data); + } + return ret; + } + + len = 0; + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &len, 4) != 4) + return errno; + + if (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) { + ret = krb5_mk_rep (context, auth_context, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, p_fd, &data); + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_data_free (&data); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/replay.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/replay.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5adc3db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/replay.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +struct krb5_rcache_data { + char *name; +}; + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + const char *name) +{ + id->name = strdup(name); + if(id->name == NULL) + return KRB5_RC_MALLOC; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache *id, + const char *type) +{ + if(strcmp(type, "FILE")) + return KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND; + *id = calloc(1, sizeof(**id)); + if(*id == NULL) + return KRB5_RC_MALLOC; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_resolve_full(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache *id, + const char *string_name) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + if(strncmp(string_name, "FILE:", 5)) + return KRB5_RC_TYPE_NOTFOUND; + ret = krb5_rc_resolve_type(context, id, "FILE"); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_rc_resolve(context, *id, string_name + 5); + return ret; +} + +const char * +krb5_rc_default_name(krb5_context context) +{ + return "FILE:/var/run/default_rcache"; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_default(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache *id) +{ + return krb5_rc_resolve_full(context, id, krb5_rc_default_name(context)); +} + +struct rc_entry{ + time_t stamp; + unsigned char data[16]; +}; + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + krb5_deltat auth_lifespan) +{ + FILE *f = fopen(id->name, "w"); + struct rc_entry tmp; + if(f == NULL) + return errno; + tmp.stamp = auth_lifespan; + fwrite(&tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), f); + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_recover(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + if(remove(id->name) < 0) + return errno; + return krb5_rc_close(context, id); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_close(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + free(id->name); + free(id); + return 0; +} + +static void +checksum_authenticator(Authenticator *auth, void *data) +{ + struct md5 md5; + int i; + md5_init(&md5); + md5_update(&md5, auth->crealm, strlen(auth->crealm)); + for(i = 0; i < auth->cname.name_string.len; i++) + md5_update(&md5, auth->cname.name_string.val[i], + strlen(auth->cname.name_string.val[i])); + md5_update(&md5, &auth->ctime, sizeof(auth->ctime)); + md5_update(&md5, &auth->cusec, sizeof(auth->cusec)); + md5_finito(&md5, data); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_store(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + krb5_donot_reply *rep) +{ + struct rc_entry ent, tmp; + time_t t; + FILE *f; + ent.stamp = time(NULL); + checksum_authenticator(rep, ent.data); + f = fopen(id->name, "r"); + if(f == NULL) + return errno; + fread(&tmp, sizeof(ent), 1, f); + t = ent.stamp - tmp.stamp; + while(fread(&tmp, sizeof(ent), 1, f)){ + if(tmp.stamp < t) + continue; + if(memcmp(tmp.data, ent.data, sizeof(ent.data)) == 0){ + fclose(f); + return KRB5_RC_REPLAY; + } + } + if(ferror(f)){ + fclose(f); + return errno; + } + fclose(f); + f = fopen(id->name, "a"); + if(f == NULL) + return KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN; + fwrite(&ent, 1, sizeof(ent), f); + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_expunge(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id, + krb5_deltat *auth_lifespan) +{ + FILE *f = fopen(id->name, "r"); + int r; + struct rc_entry ent; + r = fread(&ent, sizeof(ent), 1, f); + fclose(f); + if(r){ + *auth_lifespan = ent.stamp; + return 0; + } + return KRB5_RC_IO_UNKNOWN; +} +const char* +krb5_rc_get_name(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return id->name; +} + +const char* +krb5_rc_get_type(krb5_context context, + krb5_rcache id) +{ + return "FILE"; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2872322 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/send_to_kdc.c @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2000 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: send_to_kdc.c,v 1.36 2000/01/06 07:59:11 assar Exp $"); + +/* + * send the data in `req' on the socket `fd' (which is datagram iff udp) + * waiting `tmout' for a reply and returning the reply in `rep'. + * iff limit read up to this many bytes + * returns 0 and data in `rep' if succesful, otherwise -1 + */ + +static int +recv_loop (int fd, + time_t tmout, + int udp, + size_t limit, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + fd_set fdset; + struct timeval timeout; + int ret; + int nbytes; + + krb5_data_zero(rep); + do { + FD_ZERO(&fdset); + FD_SET(fd, &fdset); + timeout.tv_sec = tmout; + timeout.tv_usec = 0; + ret = select (fd + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout); + if (ret < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + return -1; + } else if (ret == 0) { + return 0; + } else { + void *tmp; + + if (ioctl (fd, FIONREAD, &nbytes) < 0) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + if(nbytes == 0) + return 0; + + if (limit) + nbytes = min(nbytes, limit - rep->length); + + tmp = realloc (rep->data, rep->length + nbytes); + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + rep->data = tmp; + ret = recv (fd, (char*)tmp + rep->length, nbytes, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + rep->length += ret; + } + } while(!udp && (limit == 0 || rep->length < limit)); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Send kerberos requests and receive a reply on a udp or any other kind + * of a datagram socket. See `recv_loop'. + */ + +static int +send_and_recv_udp(int fd, + time_t tmout, + const krb5_data *req, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + if (send (fd, req->data, req->length, 0) < 0) + return -1; + + return recv_loop(fd, tmout, 1, 0, rep); +} + +/* + * `send_and_recv' for a TCP (or any other stream) socket. + * Since there are no record limits on a stream socket the protocol here + * is to prepend the request with 4 bytes of its length and the reply + * is similarly encoded. + */ + +static int +send_and_recv_tcp(int fd, + time_t tmout, + const krb5_data *req, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + unsigned char len[4]; + unsigned long rep_len; + krb5_data len_data; + + _krb5_put_int(len, req->length, 4); + if(net_write(fd, len, sizeof(len)) < 0) + return -1; + if(net_write(fd, req->data, req->length) < 0) + return -1; + if (recv_loop (fd, tmout, 0, 4, &len_data) < 0) + return -1; + if (len_data.length != 4) { + krb5_data_free (&len_data); + return -1; + } + _krb5_get_int(len_data.data, &rep_len, 4); + krb5_data_free (&len_data); + if (recv_loop (fd, tmout, 0, rep_len, rep) < 0) + return -1; + if(rep->length != rep_len) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * `send_and_recv' tailored for the HTTP protocol. + */ + +static int +send_and_recv_http(int fd, + time_t tmout, + const char *prefix, + const krb5_data *req, + krb5_data *rep) +{ + char *request; + char *str; + int ret; + int len = base64_encode(req->data, req->length, &str); + + if(len < 0) + return -1; + asprintf(&request, "GET %s%s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", prefix, str); + free(str); + if (request == NULL) + return -1; + ret = net_write (fd, request, strlen(request)); + free (request); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = recv_loop(fd, tmout, 0, 0, rep); + if(ret) + return ret; + { + unsigned long rep_len; + char *s, *p; + + s = realloc(rep->data, rep->length + 1); + if (s == NULL) { + krb5_data_free (rep); + return -1; + } + s[rep->length] = 0; + p = strstr(s, "\r\n\r\n"); + if(p == NULL) { + free(s); + return -1; + } + p += 4; + rep->data = s; + rep->length -= p - s; + if(rep->length < 4) { /* remove length */ + free(s); + return -1; + } + rep->length -= 4; + _krb5_get_int(p, &rep_len, 4); + if (rep_len != rep->length) { + free(s); + return -1; + } + memmove(rep->data, p + 4, rep->length); + } + return 0; +} + +static int +init_port(const char *s, int fallback) +{ + if (s) { + int tmp; + + sscanf (s, "%d", &tmp); + return htons(tmp); + } else + return fallback; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if succesful, otherwise 1 + */ + +static int +send_via_proxy (krb5_context context, + const char *hostname, + const krb5_data *send, + krb5_data *receive) +{ + char *proxy = strdup(context->http_proxy); + char *prefix; + char *colon; + struct addrinfo hints; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + int ret; + int s; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + colon = strchr(proxy, ':'); + if(colon != NULL) + *colon++ = '\0'; + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", + ntohs(init_port (colon, htons(80)))); + ret = getaddrinfo (proxy, portstr, NULL, &ai); + free (proxy); + if (ret) + return ret; + + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + s = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) + continue; + if (connect (s, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (s); + continue; + } + break; + } + if (a == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + return 1; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + asprintf(&prefix, "http://%s/", hostname); + if(prefix == NULL) { + close(s); + return 1; + } + ret = send_and_recv_http(s, context->kdc_timeout, + prefix, send, receive); + close (s); + free(prefix); + if(ret == 0 && receive->length != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Send the data `send' to one KDC in `realm' and get back the reply + * in `receive'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendto_kdc (krb5_context context, + const krb5_data *send, + const krb5_realm *realm, + krb5_data *receive) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + char **hostlist, **hp, *p; + int fd; + int port; + int i; + + port = krb5_getportbyname (context, "kerberos", "udp", 88); + + if (context->use_admin_kdc) + ret = krb5_get_krb_admin_hst (context, realm, &hostlist); + else + ret = krb5_get_krbhst (context, realm, &hostlist); + if (ret) + return ret; + + for (i = 0; i < context->max_retries; ++i) + for (hp = hostlist; (p = *hp); ++hp) { + char *colon; + int http_flag = 0; + int tcp_flag = 0; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + struct addrinfo hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + + if(strncmp(p, "http://", 7) == 0){ + p += 7; + http_flag = 1; + port = htons(80); + } else if(strncmp(p, "http/", 5) == 0) { + p += 5; + http_flag = 1; + port = htons(80); + }else if(strncmp(p, "tcp/", 4) == 0){ + p += 4; + tcp_flag = 1; + } else if(strncmp(p, "udp/", 4) == 0) { + p += 4; + } + if(http_flag && context->http_proxy) { + if (send_via_proxy (context, p, send, receive)) + continue; + else + goto out; + } + colon = strchr (p, ':'); + if (colon) + *colon++ = '\0'; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + if (tcp_flag || http_flag) + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + else + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", + ntohs(init_port (colon, port))); + ret = getaddrinfo (p, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (ret) + continue; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + fd = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (fd < 0) + continue; + if (connect (fd, a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + close (fd); + continue; + } + break; + } + if (a == NULL) { + freeaddrinfo (ai); + continue; + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + if(http_flag) + ret = send_and_recv_http(fd, context->kdc_timeout, + "", send, receive); + else if(tcp_flag) + ret = send_and_recv_tcp (fd, context->kdc_timeout, + send, receive); + else + ret = send_and_recv_udp (fd, context->kdc_timeout, + send, receive); + close (fd); + if(ret == 0 && receive->length != 0) + goto out; + } + ret = KRB5_KDC_UNREACH; +out: + krb5_free_krbhst (context, hostlist); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/sendauth.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/sendauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9e8dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/sendauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sendauth.c,v 1.17 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * The format seems to be: + * client -> server + * + * 4 bytes - length + * KRB5_SENDAUTH_V1.0 (including zero) + * 4 bytes - length + * protocol string (with terminating zero) + * + * server -> client + * 1 byte - (0 = OK, else some kind of error) + * + * client -> server + * 4 bytes - length + * AP-REQ + * + * server -> client + * 4 bytes - length (0 = OK, else length of error) + * (error) + * + * if(mutual) { + * server -> client + * 4 bytes - length + * AP-REP + * } + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sendauth(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context *auth_context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + const char *appl_version, + krb5_principal client, + krb5_principal server, + krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_data *in_data, + krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_error **ret_error, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + u_int32_t len, net_len; + const char *version = KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION; + u_char repl; + krb5_data ap_req, error_data; + krb5_creds this_cred; + krb5_principal this_client = NULL; + krb5_creds *creds; + ssize_t sret; + + len = strlen(version) + 1; + net_len = htonl(len); + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &net_len, 4) != 4 + || krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, version, len) != len) + return errno; + + len = strlen(appl_version) + 1; + net_len = htonl(len); + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, &net_len, 4) != 4 + || krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, appl_version, len) != len) + return errno; + + sret = krb5_net_read (context, p_fd, &repl, sizeof(repl)); + if (sret < 0) + return errno; + else if (sret != sizeof(repl)) + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE; + + if (repl != 0) + return KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED; + + if (in_creds == NULL) { + if (ccache == NULL) { + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &ccache); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + if (client == NULL) { + ret = krb5_cc_get_principal (context, ccache, &this_client); + if (ret) + return ret; + client = this_client; + } + memset(&this_cred, 0, sizeof(this_cred)); + this_cred.client = client; + this_cred.server = server; + this_cred.times.endtime = 0; + this_cred.ticket.length = 0; + in_creds = &this_cred; + } + if (in_creds->ticket.length == 0) { + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, 0, ccache, in_creds, &creds); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else { + creds = in_creds; + } + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + auth_context, + ap_req_options, + in_data, + creds, + &ap_req); + + if (out_creds) + *out_creds = creds; + else + krb5_free_creds(context, creds); + if(this_client) + krb5_free_principal(context, this_client); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_write_message (context, + p_fd, + &ap_req); + if (ret) + return ret; + + krb5_data_free (&ap_req); + + ret = krb5_read_message (context, p_fd, &error_data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (error_data.length != 0) { + KRB_ERROR error; + + ret = krb5_rd_error (context, &error_data, &error); + krb5_data_free (&error_data); + if (ret == 0) { + if (ret_error != NULL) { + *ret_error = malloc (sizeof(krb5_error)); + if (*ret_error == NULL) { + free_KRB_ERROR(&error); + } else { + **ret_error = error; + } + } else { + free_KRB_ERROR(&error); + } + return error.error_code; + } else + return ret; + } + + if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) { + krb5_data ap_rep; + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *ignore; + + krb5_data_zero (&ap_rep); + ret = krb5_read_message (context, + p_fd, + &ap_rep); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = krb5_rd_rep (context, *auth_context, &ap_rep, + rep_result ? rep_result : &ignore); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (rep_result == NULL) + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (context, ignore); + krb5_data_free (&ap_rep); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b917a92 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/set_default_realm.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: set_default_realm.c,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Convert the simple string `s' into a NULL-terminated and freshly allocated + * list in `list'. Return an error code. + */ + +static krb5_error_code +string_to_list (const char *s, krb5_realm **list) +{ + + *list = malloc (2 * sizeof(**list)); + if (*list == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + (*list)[0] = strdup (s); + if ((*list)[0] == NULL) { + free (*list); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*list)[1] = NULL; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the knowledge of the default realm(s) in `context'. + * If realm != NULL, that's the new default realm. + * Otherwise, the realm(s) are figured out from configuration or DNS. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_default_realm(krb5_context context, + char *realm) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = 0; + krb5_realm *realms = NULL; + + if (realm == NULL) { + realms = krb5_config_get_strings (context, NULL, + "libdefaults", + "default_realm", + NULL); + if (realms == NULL) + ret = krb5_get_host_realm(context, NULL, &realms); + } else { + ret = string_to_list (realm, &realms); + } + if (ret) + return ret; + krb5_free_host_realm (context, context->default_realms); + context->default_realms = realms; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/sock_principal.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/sock_principal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfd4eb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/sock_principal.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: sock_principal.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_sock_to_principal (krb5_context context, + int sock, + const char *sname, + int32_t type, + krb5_principal *ret_princ) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_address address; + struct sockaddr_storage __ss; + struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&__ss; + int len = sizeof(__ss); + struct hostent *hostent; + int family; + char hname[256]; + + if (getsockname (sock, sa, &len) < 0) + return errno; + family = sa->sa_family; + + ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (sa, &address); + if (ret) + return ret; + + hostent = roken_gethostbyaddr (address.address.data, + address.address.length, + family); + + if (hostent == NULL) + return h_errno; + strlcpy(hname, hostent->h_name, sizeof(hname)); + return krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + hname, + sname, + type, + ret_princ); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17b1547 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store.c @@ -0,0 +1,609 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store.c,v 1.32 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +void +krb5_storage_set_flags(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags flags) +{ + sp->flags |= flags; +} + +void +krb5_storage_clear_flags(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags flags) +{ + sp->flags &= ~flags; +} + +krb5_boolean +krb5_storage_is_flags(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_flags flags) +{ + return (sp->flags & flags) == flags; +} + +ssize_t +_krb5_put_int(void *buffer, unsigned long value, size_t size) +{ + unsigned char *p = buffer; + int i; + for (i = size - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + p[i] = value & 0xff; + value >>= 8; + } + return size; +} + +ssize_t +_krb5_get_int(void *buffer, unsigned long *value, size_t size) +{ + unsigned char *p = buffer; + unsigned long v = 0; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) + v = (v << 8) + p[i]; + *value = v; + return size; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_free(krb5_storage *sp) +{ + if(sp->free) + (*sp->free)(sp); + free(sp->data); + free(sp); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_storage_to_data(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_data *data) +{ + off_t pos; + size_t size; + krb5_error_code ret; + + pos = sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_CUR); + size = (size_t)sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_END); + ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, size); + if (ret) { + sp->seek(sp, pos, SEEK_SET); + return ret; + } + if (size) { + sp->seek(sp, 0, SEEK_SET); + sp->fetch(sp, data->data, data->length); + sp->seek(sp, pos, SEEK_SET); + } + return 0; +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t value, + size_t len) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char v[4]; + + _krb5_put_int(v, value, len); + ret = sp->store(sp, v, len); + if (ret != len) + return (ret<0)?errno:KRB5_CC_END; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int32(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t value) +{ + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER)) + value = htonl(value); + return krb5_store_int(sp, value, 4); +} + +static krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t *value, + size_t len) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char v[4]; + unsigned long w; + ret = sp->fetch(sp, v, len); + if(ret != len) + return (ret<0)?errno:KRB5_CC_END; + _krb5_get_int(v, &w, len); + *value = w; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int32(krb5_storage *sp, + int32_t *value) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = krb5_ret_int(sp, value, 4); + if(ret) + return ret; + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER)) + *value = ntohl(*value); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int16(krb5_storage *sp, + int16_t value) +{ + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER)) + value = htons(value); + return krb5_store_int(sp, value, 2); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int16(krb5_storage *sp, + int16_t *value) +{ + int32_t v; + int ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int(sp, &v, 2); + if(ret) + return ret; + *value = v; + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_HOST_BYTEORDER)) + *value = ntohs(*value); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_int8(krb5_storage *sp, + int8_t value) +{ + int ret; + + ret = sp->store(sp, &value, sizeof(value)); + if (ret != sizeof(value)) + return (ret<0)?errno:KRB5_CC_END; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_int8(krb5_storage *sp, + int8_t *value) +{ + int ret; + + ret = sp->fetch(sp, value, sizeof(*value)); + if (ret != sizeof(*value)) + return (ret<0)?errno:KRB5_CC_END; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data data) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, data.length); + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + ret = sp->store(sp, data.data, data.length); + if(ret != data.length){ + if(ret < 0) + return errno; + return KRB5_CC_END; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_data(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_data *data) +{ + int ret; + int32_t size; + + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &size); + if(ret) + return ret; + ret = krb5_data_alloc (data, size); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (size) { + ret = sp->fetch(sp, data->data, size); + if(ret != size) + return (ret < 0)? errno : KRB5_CC_END; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_string(krb5_storage *sp, const char *s) +{ + krb5_data data; + data.length = strlen(s); + data.data = (void*)s; + return krb5_store_data(sp, data); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_string(krb5_storage *sp, + char **string) +{ + int ret; + krb5_data data; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &data); + if(ret) + return ret; + *string = realloc(data.data, data.length + 1); + if(*string == NULL){ + free(data.data); + return ENOMEM; + } + (*string)[data.length] = 0; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_stringz(krb5_storage *sp, + char *s) +{ + size_t len = strlen(s) + 1; + ssize_t ret; + + ret = sp->store(sp, s, len); + if(ret != len) { + if(ret < 0) + return ret; + else + return KRB5_CC_END; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_stringz(krb5_storage *sp, + char **string) +{ + char c; + char *s = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + ssize_t ret; + + while((ret = sp->fetch(sp, &c, 1)) == 1){ + char *tmp; + + len++; + tmp = realloc (s, len); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (s); + return ENOMEM; + } + s = tmp; + s[len - 1] = c; + if(c == 0) + break; + } + if(ret != 1){ + free(s); + if(ret == 0) + return KRB5_CC_END; + return ret; + } + *string = s; + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_principal(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal p) +{ + int i; + int ret; + + if(!krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) { + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_type); + if(ret) return ret; + } + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_string.len + 1); + else + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p->name.name_string.len); + + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_string(sp, p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; i < p->name.name_string.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_store_string(sp, p->name.name_string.val[i]); + if(ret) return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_principal(krb5_storage *sp, + krb5_principal *princ) +{ + int i; + int ret; + krb5_principal p; + int32_t type; + int32_t ncomp; + + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if(p == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_NO_NAME_TYPE)) + type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN; + else if((ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &type))){ + free(p); + return ret; + } + if((ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ncomp))){ + free(p); + return ret; + } + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_PRINCIPAL_WRONG_NUM_COMPONENTS)) + ncomp--; + p->name.name_type = type; + p->name.name_string.len = ncomp; + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &p->realm); + if(ret) return ret; + p->name.name_string.val = calloc(ncomp, sizeof(*p->name.name_string.val)); + if(p->name.name_string.val == NULL){ + free(p->realm); + return ENOMEM; + } + for(i = 0; i < ncomp; i++){ + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &p->name.name_string.val[i]); + if(ret) return ret; /* XXX */ + } + *princ = p; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_keyblock(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_keyblock p) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p.keytype); + if(ret) return ret; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE)){ + /* this should really be enctype, but it is the same as + keytype nowadays */ + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p.keytype); + if(ret) return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, p.keyvalue); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_keyblock(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_keyblock *p) +{ + int ret; + int16_t tmp; + + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) return ret; + p->keytype = tmp; + + if(krb5_storage_is_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_KEYBLOCK_KEYTYPE_TWICE)){ + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) return ret; + } + + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &p->keyvalue); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_times(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_times times) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.authtime); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.starttime); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.endtime); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, times.renew_till); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_times(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_times *times) +{ + int ret; + int32_t tmp; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->authtime = tmp; + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->starttime = tmp; + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->endtime = tmp; + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + times->renew_till = tmp; + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_address(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_address p) +{ + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, p.addr_type); + if(ret) return ret; + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, p.address); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_address(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_address *adr) +{ + int16_t t; + int ret; + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &t); + if(ret) return ret; + adr->addr_type = t; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &adr->address); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_addrs(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_addresses p) +{ + int i; + int ret; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, p.len); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; ilen = tmp; + ALLOC(adr->val, adr->len); + for(i = 0; i < adr->len; i++){ + ret = krb5_ret_address(sp, &adr->val[i]); + if(ret) break; + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_authdata(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_authdata auth) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int i; + ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, auth.len); + if(ret) return ret; + for(i = 0; i < auth.len; i++){ + ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, auth.val[i].ad_type); + if(ret) break; + ret = krb5_store_data(sp, auth.val[i].ad_data); + if(ret) break; + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_authdata(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_authdata *auth) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int32_t tmp; + int16_t tmp2; + int i; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) return ret; + ALLOC_SEQ(auth, tmp); + for(i = 0; i < tmp; i++){ + ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &tmp2); + if(ret) break; + auth->val[i].ad_type = tmp2; + ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &auth->val[i].ad_data); + if(ret) break; + } + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_store_creds(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_store_principal(sp, creds->client); + krb5_store_principal(sp, creds->server); + krb5_store_keyblock(sp, creds->session); + krb5_store_times(sp, creds->times); + krb5_store_int8(sp, 0); /* this is probably the + enc-tkt-in-skey bit from KDCOptions */ + krb5_store_int32(sp, creds->flags.i); + krb5_store_addrs(sp, creds->addresses); + krb5_store_authdata(sp, creds->authdata); + krb5_store_data(sp, creds->ticket); + krb5_store_data(sp, creds->second_ticket); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_ret_creds(krb5_storage *sp, krb5_creds *creds) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + int8_t dummy8; + int32_t dummy32; + + memset(creds, 0, sizeof(*creds)); + ret = krb5_ret_principal (sp, &creds->client); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_principal (sp, &creds->server); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_keyblock (sp, &creds->session); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_times (sp, &creds->times); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_int8 (sp, &dummy8); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_int32 (sp, &dummy32); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + creds->flags.i = dummy32; + ret = krb5_ret_addrs (sp, &creds->addresses); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_authdata (sp, &creds->authdata); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_data (sp, &creds->ticket); + if(ret) goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_ret_data (sp, &creds->second_ticket); +cleanup: + if(ret) +#if 0 + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, creds) /* XXX */ +#endif + ; + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_emem.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_emem.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2497ef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_emem.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store_emem.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:12 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct emem_storage{ + unsigned char *base; + size_t size; + size_t len; + unsigned char *ptr; +}emem_storage; + +static ssize_t +emem_fetch(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + emem_storage *s = (emem_storage*)sp->data; + if(s->base + s->len - s->ptr < size) + size = s->base + s->len - s->ptr; + memmove(data, s->ptr, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static ssize_t +emem_store(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + emem_storage *s = (emem_storage*)sp->data; + if(size > s->base + s->size - s->ptr){ + void *base; + size_t sz, off; + sz = 2 * (size + (s->ptr - s->base)); /* XXX */ + off = s->ptr - s->base; + base = realloc(s->base, sz); + if(base == NULL) + return 0; + s->size = sz; + s->base = base; + s->ptr = (unsigned char*)base + off; + } + memmove(s->ptr, data, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static off_t +emem_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + emem_storage *s = (emem_storage*)sp->data; + switch(whence){ + case SEEK_SET: + if(offset > s->size) + offset = s->size; + if(offset < 0) + offset = 0; + s->ptr = s->base + offset; + if(offset > s->len) + s->len = offset; + break; + case SEEK_CUR: + sp->seek(sp,s->ptr - s->base + offset, SEEK_SET); + break; + case SEEK_END: + sp->seek(sp, s->len + offset, SEEK_SET); + break; + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return s->ptr - s->base; +} + +static void +emem_free(krb5_storage *sp) +{ + free(((emem_storage*)sp->data)->base); +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_emem(void) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = malloc(sizeof(krb5_storage)); + emem_storage *s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + sp->data = s; + sp->flags = 0; + s->size = 1024; + s->base = malloc(s->size); + s->len = 0; + s->ptr = s->base; + sp->fetch = emem_fetch; + sp->store = emem_store; + sp->seek = emem_seek; + sp->free = emem_free; + return sp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_fd.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_fd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4c507c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_fd.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store_fd.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct fd_storage{ + int fd; +}fd_storage; + +#define FD(S) (((fd_storage*)(S)->data)->fd) + +static ssize_t +fd_fetch(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + return read(FD(sp), data, size); +} + +static ssize_t +fd_store(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + return write(FD(sp), data, size); +} + +static off_t +fd_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + return lseek(FD(sp), offset, whence); +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_fd(int fd) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = malloc(sizeof(krb5_storage)); + sp->data = malloc(sizeof(fd_storage)); + sp->flags = 0; + FD(sp) = fd; + sp->fetch = fd_fetch; + sp->store = fd_store; + sp->seek = fd_seek; + sp->free = NULL; + return sp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_mem.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_mem.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8019e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/store_mem.c @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: store_mem.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +typedef struct mem_storage{ + unsigned char *base; + size_t size; + unsigned char *ptr; +}mem_storage; + +static ssize_t +mem_fetch(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + mem_storage *s = (mem_storage*)sp->data; + if(size > s->base + s->size - s->ptr) + size = s->base + s->size - s->ptr; + memmove(data, s->ptr, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static ssize_t +mem_store(krb5_storage *sp, void *data, size_t size) +{ + mem_storage *s = (mem_storage*)sp->data; + if(size > s->base + s->size - s->ptr) + size = s->base + s->size - s->ptr; + memmove(s->ptr, data, size); + sp->seek(sp, size, SEEK_CUR); + return size; +} + +static off_t +mem_seek(krb5_storage *sp, off_t offset, int whence) +{ + mem_storage *s = (mem_storage*)sp->data; + switch(whence){ + case SEEK_SET: + if(offset > s->size) + offset = s->size; + if(offset < 0) + offset = 0; + s->ptr = s->base + offset; + break; + case SEEK_CUR: + return sp->seek(sp, s->ptr - s->base + offset, SEEK_SET); + case SEEK_END: + return sp->seek(sp, s->size + offset, SEEK_SET); + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return s->ptr - s->base; +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_mem(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + krb5_storage *sp = malloc(sizeof(krb5_storage)); + mem_storage *s; + if(sp == NULL) + return NULL; + s = malloc(sizeof(*s)); + if(s == NULL) { + free(sp); + return NULL; + } + sp->data = s; + sp->flags = 0; + s->base = buf; + s->size = len; + s->ptr = buf; + sp->fetch = mem_fetch; + sp->store = mem_store; + sp->seek = mem_seek; + sp->free = NULL; + return sp; +} + +krb5_storage * +krb5_storage_from_data(krb5_data *data) +{ + return krb5_storage_from_mem(data->data, data->length); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e884d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/string-to-key-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: string-to-key-test.c,v 1.2 1999/10/28 23:10:38 assar Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 24 }; + +static struct testcase { + const char *principal_name; + const char *password; + krb5_enctype enctype; + unsigned char res[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {"@", "", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01}}, + {"nisse@FOO.SE", "hej", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0xfe, 0x67, 0xbf, 0x9e, 0x57, 0x6b, 0xfe, 0x52}}, + {"assar/liten@FOO.SE", "hemligt", ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, + {0x5b, 0x9b, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0x97, 0x43, 0xc8, 0x40}}, + {"@", "", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0xce, 0xa2, 0x2f, 0x9b, 0x52, 0x2c, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x6e, 0x6b, 0x64, + 0x73, 0x62, 0x64, 0x73, 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0xce, 0xa2, 0x2f, 0x9b, + 0x52, 0x57}}, + {"nisse@FOO.SE", "hej", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x0e, 0xbc, 0x23, 0x9d, 0x68, 0x46, 0xf2, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x98, 0x5b, + 0x57, 0xc1, 0x57, 0x01, 0x79, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x0e, + 0x13, 0xd0}}, + {"assar/liten@FOO.SE", "hemligt", ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1, + {0x7f, 0x40, 0x67, 0xb9, 0xbc, 0xc4, 0x40, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x73, 0xd9, + 0xd3, 0xcd, 0x7c, 0xc7, 0x67, 0xe6, 0x79, 0x94, 0xd0, 0xa8, 0x34, + 0xdf, 0x62}}, + {NULL} +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct testcase *t; + krb5_context context; + krb5_error_code ret; + int val = 0; + + krb5_init_context (&context); + + for (t = tests; t->principal_name; ++t) { + krb5_keyblock key; + krb5_principal principal; + int i; + + ret = krb5_parse_name (context, t->principal_name, &principal); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_parse_name %s", + t->principal_name); + ret = krb5_string_to_key (context, t->enctype, t->password, + principal, &key); + if (ret) + krb5_err (context, 1, ret, "krb5_string_to_key"); + krb5_free_principal (context, principal); + if (memcmp (key.keyvalue.data, t->res, key.keyvalue.length) != 0) { + const unsigned char *p = key.keyvalue.data; + + printf ("string_to_key(%s, %s) failed\n", + t->principal_name, t->password); + printf ("should be: "); + for (i = 0; i < key.keyvalue.length; ++i) + printf ("%02x", t->res[i]); + printf ("\nresult was: "); + for (i = 0; i < key.keyvalue.length; ++i) + printf ("%02x", p[i]); + printf ("\n"); + val = 1; + } + } + return val; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/ticket.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecb5821 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ticket.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_free_ticket(krb5_context context, + krb5_ticket *ticket) +{ + free_EncTicketPart(&ticket->ticket); + krb5_free_principal(context, ticket->client); + krb5_free_principal(context, ticket->server); + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_copy_ticket(krb5_context context, + const krb5_ticket *from, + krb5_ticket **to) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ticket *tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp)); + if(tmp == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + if((ret = copy_EncTicketPart(&from->ticket, &tmp->ticket))){ + free(tmp); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, from->client, &tmp->client); + if(ret){ + free_EncTicketPart(&tmp->ticket); + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, from->server, &(*to)->server); + if(ret){ + krb5_free_principal(context, tmp->client); + free_EncTicketPart(&tmp->ticket); + return ret; + } + *to = tmp; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/time.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47a5f0b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/time.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: time.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_timeofday (krb5_context context, + int32_t *timeret) +{ + *timeret = time(NULL) + context->kdc_sec_offset; + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_us_timeofday (krb5_context context, + int32_t *sec, + int32_t *usec) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + gettimeofday (&tv, NULL); + + *sec = tv.tv_sec + context->kdc_sec_offset; + *usec = tv.tv_usec; /* XXX */ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/transited.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/transited.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed5a5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/transited.c @@ -0,0 +1,382 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: transited.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +/* this is an attempt at one of the most horrible `compression' + schemes that has ever been invented; it's so amazingly brain-dead + that words can not describe it, and all this just to save a few + silly bytes */ + +struct tr_realm { + char *realm; + unsigned leading_space:1; + unsigned leading_slash:1; + unsigned trailing_dot:1; + struct tr_realm *next; +}; + +static void +free_realms(struct tr_realm *r) +{ + struct tr_realm *p; + while(r){ + p = r; + r = r->next; + free(p->realm); + free(p); + } +} + +static int +make_path(struct tr_realm *r, const char *from, const char *to) +{ + const char *p; + struct tr_realm *path = r->next; + struct tr_realm *tmp; + + if(strlen(from) < strlen(to)){ + const char *tmp; + tmp = from; + from = to; + to = tmp; + } + + if(strcmp(from + strlen(from) - strlen(to), to) == 0){ + p = from; + while(1){ + p = strchr(p, '.'); + if(p == NULL) + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + p++; + if(strcmp(p, to) == 0) + break; + tmp = calloc(1, sizeof(*tmp)); + tmp->next = path; + path = tmp; + path->realm = strdup(p); + if(path->realm == NULL){ + r->next = path; /* XXX */ + return ENOMEM;; + } + } + }else if(strncmp(from, to, strlen(to)) == 0){ + p = from + strlen(from); + while(1){ + while(p >= from && *p != '/') p--; + if(p == from) + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + if(strncmp(to, from, p - from) == 0) + break; + tmp = calloc(1, sizeof(*tmp)); + tmp->next = path; + path = tmp; + path->realm = malloc(p - from + 1); + if(path->realm == NULL){ + r->next = path; /* XXX */ + return ENOMEM; + } + strncpy(path->realm, from, p - from); + path->realm[p - from] = '\0'; + p--; + } + }else + return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; + r->next = path; + + return 0; +} + +static int +make_paths(struct tr_realm *realms, const char *client_realm, + const char *server_realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r; + int ret; + const char *prev_realm = client_realm; + const char *next_realm = NULL; + for(r = realms; r; r = r->next){ + /* it *might* be that you can have more than one empty + component in a row, at least that's how I interpret the + "," exception in 1510 */ + if(r->realm[0] == '\0'){ + while(r->next && r->next->realm[0] == '\0') + r = r->next; + if(r->next) + next_realm = r->next->realm; + else + next_realm = server_realm; + ret = make_path(r, prev_realm, next_realm); + if(ret){ + free_realms(realms); + return ret; + } + } + prev_realm = r->realm; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +expand_realms(struct tr_realm *realms, const char *client_realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r; + const char *prev_realm = NULL; + for(r = realms; r; r = r->next){ + if(r->trailing_dot){ + char *tmp; + if(prev_realm == NULL) + prev_realm = client_realm; + tmp = realloc(r->realm, strlen(r->realm) + strlen(prev_realm) + 1); + if(tmp == NULL){ + free_realms(realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + r->realm = tmp; + strcat(r->realm, prev_realm); + }else if(r->leading_slash && !r->leading_space && prev_realm){ + /* yet another exception: if you use x500-names, the + leading realm doesn't have to be "quoted" with a space */ + char *tmp; + tmp = malloc(strlen(r->realm) + strlen(prev_realm) + 1); + if(tmp == NULL){ + free_realms(realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + strcpy(tmp, prev_realm); + strcat(tmp, r->realm); + free(r->realm); + r->realm = tmp; + } + prev_realm = r->realm; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct tr_realm * +make_realm(char *realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r; + char *p, *q; + int quote = 0; + r = calloc(1, sizeof(*r)); + if(r == NULL){ + free(realm); + return NULL; + } + r->realm = realm; + for(p = q = r->realm; *p; p++){ + if(p == r->realm && *p == ' '){ + r->leading_space = 1; + continue; + } + if(q == r->realm && *p == '/') + r->leading_slash = 1; + if(quote){ + *q++ = *p; + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\\'){ + quote = 1; + continue; + } + if(p[0] == '.' && p[1] == '\0') + r->trailing_dot = 1; + *q++ = *p; + } + *q = '\0'; + return r; +} + +static struct tr_realm* +append_realm(struct tr_realm *head, struct tr_realm *r) +{ + struct tr_realm *p; + if(head == NULL){ + r->next = NULL; + return r; + } + p = head; + while(p->next) p = p->next; + p->next = r; + return head; +} + +static int +decode_realms(const char *tr, int length, struct tr_realm **realms) +{ + struct tr_realm *r = NULL; + + char *tmp; + int quote = 0; + const char *start = tr; + int i; + + for(i = 0; i < length; i++){ + if(quote){ + quote = 0; + continue; + } + if(tr[i] == '\\'){ + quote = 1; + continue; + } + if(tr[i] == ','){ + tmp = malloc(tr + i - start + 1); + strncpy(tmp, start, tr + i - start); + tmp[tr + i - start] = '\0'; + r = make_realm(tmp); + if(r == NULL){ + free_realms(*realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + *realms = append_realm(*realms, r); + start = tr + i + 1; + } + } + tmp = malloc(tr + i - start + 1); + strncpy(tmp, start, tr + i - start); + tmp[tr + i - start] = '\0'; + r = make_realm(tmp); + if(r == NULL){ + free_realms(*realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + *realms = append_realm(*realms, r); + + return 0; +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_decode(krb5_data tr, char ***realms, int *num_realms, + const char *client_realm, const char *server_realm) +{ + struct tr_realm *r = NULL; + struct tr_realm *p, **q; + int ret; + + /* split string in components */ + ret = decode_realms(tr.data, tr.length, &r); + if(ret) + return ret; + + /* apply prefix rule */ + ret = expand_realms(r, client_realm); + if(ret) + return ret; + + ret = make_paths(r, client_realm, server_realm); + if(ret) + return ret; + + /* remove empty components */ + q = &r; + for(p = r; p; ){ + if(p->realm[0] == '\0'){ + free(p->realm); + *q = p->next; + free(p); + p = *q; + }else{ + q = &p->next; + p = p->next; + } + } + { + char **R; + *realms = NULL; + *num_realms = 0; + while(r){ + R = realloc(*realms, (*num_realms + 1) * sizeof(**realms)); + if(R == NULL) { + free(*realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + R[*num_realms] = r->realm; + (*num_realms)++; + *realms = R; + p = r->next; + free(r); + r = p; + } + } + return 0; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_domain_x500_encode(char **realms, int num_realms, krb5_data *encoding) +{ + char *s = NULL; + int len = 0; + int i; + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++){ + len += strlen(realms[i]); + if(realms[i][0] == '/') + len++; + } + len += num_realms - 1; + s = malloc(len + 1); + *s = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++){ + if(i && i < num_realms - 1) + strcat(s, ","); + if(realms[i][0] == '/') + strcat(s, " "); + strcat(s, realms[i]); + } + encoding->data = s; + encoding->length = strlen(s); + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + krb5_data x; + char **r; + int num, i; + x.data = argv[1]; + x.length = strlen(x.data); + if(domain_expand(x, &r, &num, argv[2], argv[3])) + exit(1); + for(i = 0; i < num; i++) + printf("%s\n", r[i]); + return 0; +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_init.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_init.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f080ee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: verify_init.c,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + memset (options, 0, sizeof(*options)); +} + +void +krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options, + int ap_req_nofail) +{ + options->flags |= KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL; + options->ap_req_nofail = ap_req_nofail; +} + +/* + * + */ + +static krb5_boolean +fail_verify_is_ok (krb5_context context, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + if ((options->flags & KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL + && options->ap_req_nofail == 1) + || krb5_config_get_bool (context, + NULL, + "libdefaults", + "verify_ap_req_nofail", + NULL)) + return FALSE; + else + return TRUE; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_init_creds(krb5_context context, + krb5_creds *creds, + krb5_principal ap_req_server, + krb5_keytab ap_req_keytab, + krb5_ccache *ccache, + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt *options) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data req; + krb5_ccache local_ccache; + krb5_keytab_entry entry; + krb5_creds *new_creds = NULL; + krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; + krb5_principal server = NULL; + krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; + + krb5_data_zero (&req); + memset (&entry, 0, sizeof(entry)); + + if (ap_req_server == NULL) { + char local_hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + + if (gethostname (local_hostname, sizeof(local_hostname)) < 0) + return errno; + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, + local_hostname, + "host", + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + } else + server = ap_req_server; + + if (ap_req_keytab == NULL) { + ret = krb5_kt_default (context, &keytab); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + } else + keytab = ap_req_keytab; + + if (ccache && *ccache) + local_ccache = *ccache; + else { + ret = krb5_cc_gen_new (context, &krb5_mcc_ops, &local_ccache); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_cc_initialize (context, + local_ccache, + creds->client); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred (context, + local_ccache, + creds); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!krb5_principal_compare (context, server, creds->server)) { + krb5_creds match_cred; + + memset (&match_cred, 0, sizeof(match_cred)); + + match_cred.client = creds->client; + match_cred.server = server; + + ret = krb5_get_credentials (context, + 0, + local_ccache, + &match_cred, + &new_creds); + if (ret) { + if (fail_verify_is_ok (context, options)) + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + } else + new_creds = creds; + + ret = krb5_mk_req_extended (context, + &auth_context, + 0, + NULL, + new_creds, + &req); + + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + auth_context = NULL; + + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + + ret = krb5_rd_req (context, + &auth_context, + &req, + server, + keytab, + 0, + NULL); + + if (ret == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND && fail_verify_is_ok (context, options)) + ret = 0; +cleanup: + if (auth_context) + krb5_auth_con_free (context, auth_context); + krb5_data_free (&req); + krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry); + if (new_creds) + krb5_free_creds (context, new_creds); + if (ap_req_server == NULL && server) + krb5_free_principal (context, server); + if (ap_req_keytab == NULL && keytab) + krb5_kt_close (context, keytab); + if (ccache == NULL + || (ret != 0 && *ccache == NULL)) + krb5_cc_destroy (context, local_ccache); + + if (ret == 0 && ccache != NULL && *ccache == NULL) + *ccache = local_ccache; + + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b9ce28 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_krb5_conf.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include +RCSID("$Id: verify_krb5_conf.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +/* verify krb5.conf */ + +static int version_flag = 0; +static int help_flag = 0; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, + "print version", NULL }, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, + NULL, NULL } +}; + +static void +usage (int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args)/sizeof(*args), + NULL, + "[config-file]"); + exit (ret); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *config_file = NULL; + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_config_section *tmp_cf; + unsigned lineno; + char *error_message; + int optind = 0; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if(getarg(args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if(version_flag){ + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc == 0) { + config_file = getenv("KRB5_CONFIG"); + if (config_file == NULL) + config_file = krb5_config_file; + } else if (argc == 1) { + config_file = argv[0]; + } else { + usage (1); + } + + ret = krb5_config_parse_file_debug (config_file, &tmp_cf, &lineno, + &error_message); + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%u: %s\n", config_file, lineno, error_message); + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_user.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_user.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10c22cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/verify_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: verify_user.c,v 1.11 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +verify_common (krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service, + krb5_creds cred) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_principal server; + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt vopt; + krb5_ccache id; + + ret = krb5_sname_to_principal (context, NULL, service, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, + &server); + if(ret) return ret; + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(&vopt); + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(&vopt, secure); + + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds(context, + &cred, + server, + NULL, + NULL, + &vopt); + krb5_free_principal(context, server); + if(ret) return ret; + if(ccache == NULL) + ret = krb5_cc_default (context, &id); + else + id = ccache; + if(ret == 0){ + ret = krb5_cc_initialize(context, id, principal); + if(ret == 0){ + ret = krb5_cc_store_cred(context, id, &cred); + } + if(ccache == NULL) + krb5_cc_close(context, id); + } + krb5_free_creds_contents(context, &cred); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify user `principal' with `password'. + * + * If `secure', also verify against local service key for `service'. + * + * As a side effect, fresh tickets are obtained and stored in `ccache'. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *password, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service) +{ + + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_creds cred; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + (char*)password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, + &opt); + + if(ret) + return ret; + return verify_common (context, principal, ccache, secure, service, cred); +} + +/* + * A variant of `krb5_verify_user'. The realm of `principal' is + * ignored and all the local realms are tried. + */ + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verify_user_lrealm(krb5_context context, + krb5_principal principal, + krb5_ccache ccache, + const char *password, + krb5_boolean secure, + const char *service) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt opt; + krb5_realm *realms, *r; + krb5_creds cred; + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init (&opt); + + ret = krb5_get_default_realms (context, &realms); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = KRB5_CONFIG_NODEFREALM; + + for (r = realms; *r != NULL && ret != 0; ++r) { + char *tmp = strdup (*r); + + if (tmp == NULL) { + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + return ENOMEM; + } + free (*krb5_princ_realm (context, principal)); + krb5_princ_set_realm (context, principal, &tmp); + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password (context, + &cred, + principal, + (char*)password, + krb5_prompter_posix, + NULL, + 0, + NULL, + &opt); + } + krb5_free_host_realm (context, realms); + if(ret) + return ret; + + return verify_common (context, principal, ccache, secure, service, cred); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/version.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f0fd66 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/version.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: version.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +/* this is just to get a version stamp in the library file */ + +#define heimdal_version __heimdal_version +#define heimdal_long_version __heimdal_long_version +#include "version.h" + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/warn.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/warn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b202f7d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/warn.c @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: warn.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +static krb5_error_code +_warnerr(krb5_context context, int do_errtext, + krb5_error_code code, int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char xfmt[7] = ""; + const char *args[2], **arg; + char *msg = NULL; + + arg = args; + if(fmt){ + strcat(xfmt, "%s"); + if(do_errtext) + strcat(xfmt, ": "); + vasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap); + if(msg == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + *arg++ = msg; + } + if(context && do_errtext){ + const char *err_msg; + + strcat(xfmt, "%s"); + + err_msg = krb5_get_err_text(context, code); + if (err_msg) + *arg++ = err_msg; + else + *arg++ = ""; + } + + if(context && context->warn_dest) + krb5_log(context, context->warn_dest, level, xfmt, args[0], args[1]); + else + warnx(xfmt, args[0], args[1]); + free(msg); + return 0; +} + +#define FUNC(ETEXT, CODE, LEVEL) \ + krb5_error_code ret; \ + va_list ap; \ + va_start(ap, fmt); \ + ret = _warnerr(context, ETEXT, CODE, LEVEL, fmt, ap); \ + va_end(ap); + +#undef __attribute__ +#define __attribute__(X) + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarn(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0))) +{ + return _warnerr(context, 1, code, 1, fmt, ap); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warn(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))) +{ + FUNC(1, code, 1); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vwarnx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))) +{ + return _warnerr(context, 0, 0, 1, fmt, ap); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_warnx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))) +{ + FUNC(0, 0, 1); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verr(krb5_context context, int eval, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 1, code, 0, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_err(krb5_context context, int eval, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 4, 5))) +{ + FUNC(1, code, 0); + exit(eval); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_verrx(krb5_context context, int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 0, 0, 0, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_errx(krb5_context context, int eval, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))) +{ + FUNC(0, 0, 0); + exit(eval); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabort(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, + const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 1, code, 0, fmt, ap); + abort(); +} + + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abort(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 3, 4))) +{ + FUNC(1, code, 0); + abort(); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_vabortx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))) +{ + _warnerr(context, 0, 0, 0, fmt, ap); + abort(); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_abortx(krb5_context context, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))) +{ + FUNC(0, 0, 0); + abort(); +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5_set_warn_dest(krb5_context context, krb5_log_facility *fac) +{ + context->warn_dest = fac; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/write_message.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/write_message.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7f2c28 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/krb5/write_message.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "krb5_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: write_message.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 17:05:13 joda Exp $"); + +krb5_error_code +krb5_write_message (krb5_context context, + krb5_pointer p_fd, + krb5_data *data) +{ + u_int32_t len; + u_int8_t buf[4]; + + len = data->length; + buf[0] = (len >> 24) & 0xFF; + buf[1] = (len >> 16) & 0xFF; + buf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xFF; + buf[3] = (len >> 0) & 0xFF; + if (krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, buf, 4) != 4 + || krb5_net_write (context, p_fd, data->data, len) != len) + return errno; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7d8168 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,715 @@ +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 5:0:0 + +1999-12-30 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (strpftime_test_SOURCES): correct source file name + + * roken.h.in (sockaddr_storage): change padding so that we have + one char[] of pad and then an unsigned long[] (for alignment and + padding). this works much better in practice. + +1999-12-22 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (sockaddr_storage): drop leading underscore on + `public' fields. this was the consensus on the ipng mailing list + +1999-12-21 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (strpftime-test): define sources to avoid having + '.o' + * Makefile.am (print_version.h): use $(EXEEXT) + * Makefile.am (roken.h): add $(EXEEXT) to make this work on cygwin + et al + +1999-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:3:0 + + * getaddrinfo.c (get_nodes): use getipnodebyname instead of + gethostbyname(2) + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_LDFLAGS): bump version to 4:2:0 + + * roken.h.in (struct sockaddr_storage): redefine with the example + code from rfc2553 + + * getaddrinfo.c (get_null): set loopback with correct endianess + for v4. dunno about v6. + +1999-12-13 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: add prototypes for str[pf]time + + * signal.c: macosx = rhapsody ~= nextstep also can't handle + various definitions of the same symbol. + +1999-12-12 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 4:1:0 + +1999-12-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 4:0:0 + +1999-12-05 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: replace inaddr2str with getnameinfo_verified + + * roken-common.h (INADDR_LOOPBACK): add fallback definition + + * roken-common.h: move getnameinfo_verified to roken.h.in + * roken.h.in (inaddr2str): remove + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES); removed inaddr2str + * roken-common.h (getnameinfo_verified): add prototype + * getnameinfo_verified.c: new file + +1999-12-04 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: add constants for getaddrinfo, getnameinfo + * roken.h.in (socklen_t): make independent of sockaddr_storage + (AI_*, NI_*, EAI_*): move to roken-common.h + +1999-12-03 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inted): rewrite to use `getaddrinfo' + * getaddrinfo.c (const_v*): no sizeof(sizeof()) + * getaddrinfo.c (add_hostent): search for the canonical name among + all aliases + (getaddrinfo): handle AI_NUMERICHOST correctly + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add freeaddinfo, + getaddrinfo, getnameinfo, gai_strerror + (getaddrinfo_test): add + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add freeaddinfo, getaddrinfo, + getnameinfo, gai_strerror + (getaddrinfo_test): add + * roken.h.in: arpa/inet.h: include + (socklen_t): add + (struct addrinfo): add + (EAI_*): add + (NI_*): add + (AI_*): add + (getaddrinfo, getnameinfo, freeaddrinfo, gai_strerror): add + * getnameinfo.c: new file + * getaddrinfo-test.c: new file + * gai_strerror.c: new file + * getaddrinfo.c: new file + * freeaddrinfo.c: new file + +1999-11-25 Assar Westerlund + + * getopt.c (getopt): return -1 instead of EOF. From + + +1999-11-13 Assar Westerlund + + * strftime.c (strftime): handle `%z' and `%Z' in a tm_gmtoff-less + world + + * getcap.c: make sure to use db only if we have both the library + and the header file + +1999-11-12 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.h: add arg_counter + * getarg.c: add a new type of argument: `arg_counter' re-organize + the code somewhat + + * Makefile.am: add strptime and strpftime-test + + * snprintf.c (xyzprintf): try to do the right thing with an % at + the end of the format string + + * strptime.c (strptime): implement '%U', '%V', '%W' + * strftime.c (strftime): implement '%U', '%V', '%W', '%z' + + * strftime.c (strftime): correct %E and %O handling. do something + reasonable with "...%" + + * strftime.c: replace the BSD implementation by one of our own + coding + + * strptime.c : new file + * strpftime-test.c: new file + +1999-11-07 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_bytes-test.c: new file + + * Makefile.am: add parse_bytes-test + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): try to handle the case of no + value specified a little bit better + +1999-11-04 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 3:2:0 + +1999-10-30 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf.c (PARSE_INT_FORMAT): add redundant casts to work + around a gcc-bug that manifests itself on Linux-PPC. From Tom + Rini + +1999-10-28 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump version to 3:1:0 + + * roken.h.in: use `unsigned char' instead of `u_int8_t' to avoid + having to have that definition. this is the easy way out instead + of getting the definition here where it's needed. flame me. + +Fri Oct 22 15:39:31 1999 Bjoern Groenvall + + * k_getpwuid.c (k_getpwuid): getspuid() does not exist (even + though it should), use getspnam(). + +1999-10-20 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 3:0:0 + +1999-10-18 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.3: document arg_collect + + * getarg.c: change the way arg_collect works; it's still quite + horrible though + + * getarg.h: change type of the collect function + +1999-10-17 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: undo last commit + + * xdbm.h: reorder db includes + +1999-10-10 Assar Westerlund + + * socket.c: const-ize and comment + + * net_write.c: const-ize + + * base64.c: const-ize + +1999-10-06 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.c (getarg): also set optind when returning error + +1999-09-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: add parse_bytes.[ch] + +1999-09-24 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.3: getarg manpage + + * getarg.{c,h}: add a callback type to do more complicated processing + + * getarg.{c,h}: add floating point support + +1999-09-16 Assar Westerlund + + * strlcat.c (strlcat): call strlcpy + + * strlcpy.c: update name and prototype + + * strlcat.c: update name and prototype + + * roken.h.in: rename strc{py,at}_truncate to strlc{py,at} + + * Makefile.am: rename strc{py,at}_truncate -> strlc{py,at} + + * Makefile.in: rename strc{py,at}_truncate -> strlc{py,at} + + * strcpy_truncate.c (strcpy_truncate): change return value to be + the length of `src' + +1999-08-16 Assar Westerlund + + * getcap.c: try to make this work on systems with DB + +1999-08-16 Johan Danielsson + + * getcap.c: protect from db-less systems + +1999-08-09 Johan Danielsson + + * simple_exec.c: add simple_exec{ve,le} + + * getcap.c: getcap from NetBSD + +1999-08-06 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (sockaddr_storage): cater for those that have + v6-support also + +1999-08-05 Assar Westerlund + + * inet_ntop.c (inet_ntop_v4): remember to call ntohl + +1999-08-04 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: add shutdown constants + + * mini_inetd.c (listen_v4, listen_v6): handle the case of the + protocol not being supported + +1999-08-01 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (socket_set_reuseaddr): remove duplicate + +1999-07-29 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c (mini_inetd): fix my stupid bugs + +1999-07-28 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h: add socket* functions + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add socket.c + + * socket.c: new file, originally from appl/ftp/common + + * Makefile.am: set version to 2:0:2 + + * roken.h.in (inet_pton): add prototype + + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add inet_pton + + * inet_pton.c: new file + + * getipnodebyname.c (getipnodebyname): try gethostbyname2 if we + have it + +1999-07-27 Assar Westerlund + + * mini_inetd.c: support IPv6 + +1999-07-26 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: set version to 1:0:1 + + * roken.h.in (inet_ntop): add prototype + + * roken-common.h: (INET{,6}_ADDRSTRLEN): add + + * inet_ntop.c: new file + + * Makefile.am (EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES): add inet_ntop.c + + * Makefile.am: move some files from libroken_la_SOURCES to + EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES + + * snprintf.c: some signed vs unsigned casts + +1999-07-24 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (struct sockaddr_storage): define it needed + +1999-07-19 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add copyhostent.c, + freehostent.c, getipnodebyname.c, getipnodebyaddr.c + + * roken.h.in: : include + (copyhostent, freehostent, getipnodebyname, getipnodebyaddr): add + prototypes + + * roken-common.h: new constants for getipnodeby* + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add freehostent, copyhostent, + getipnodebyname, getipnodebyaddr + + * freehostent.c: new file + + * copyhostent.c: new file + + * getipnodebyaddr.c: new file + + * getipnodebyname.c: new file + +1999-07-13 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (k_getpwnam): update prototype + + * k_getpwnam.c (k_getpwnam): const-ize + + * get_default_username.c (get_default_username): a better way of + guessing when the user has su:ed + +1999-07-08 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.awk: use puts, as suggested by Jeffrey Hutzelman + + +1999-07-06 Assar Westerlund + + * readv.c (readv): typo + +1999-07-03 Assar Westerlund + + * writev.c (writev): error check malloc properly + + * sendmsg.c (sendmsg): error check malloc properly + + * resolve.c (parse_reply): error check malloc properly + + * recvmsg.c (recvmsg): error check malloc properly + + * readv.c (readv): error check malloc properly + +1999-06-23 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (acc_units): move the special case of 0 -> 1 to + parse_something to avoid having it happen at the end of the string + +1999-06-15 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add get_default_username + + * get_default_username.c: new file + + * roken.h.in (get_default_username): add prototype + + * Makefile.am: add get_default_username + +1999-05-08 Assar Westerlund + + * xdbm.h: also try with DB_DBM_HSEARCH == 1 + + * strnlen.c (strnlen): update prototype + + * Makefile.am: strndup.c: add + + * Makefile.in: strndup.c: add + + * roken.h.in (strndup): add + (strnlen): update prototype + + * strndup.c: new file + +Fri Apr 16 17:59:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: include strsep prototype if needed + +Thu Apr 15 14:04:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: make make-print-version.o depend on version.h + +Wed Apr 7 14:11:00 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: make it compile w/o krb4 + +Sat Mar 27 17:33:03 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * snprintf.c (vasnprintf): correct check if realloc returns NULL + +Sat Mar 27 12:37:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: link print_version with -ldes to avoid unresolved + references if -lkrb is shared + +Sat Mar 20 03:42:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * roken-common.h (eread, ewrite): add + + * simple_exec.c: add + +Fri Mar 19 21:29:58 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add eread, ewrite + + * eread.c, ewrite.c: new files + + * Makefile.am (libroken_la_SOURCES): add eread and ewrite + +Fri Mar 19 14:52:57 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 12:53:32 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: remove include_dir hack + + * Makefile.am: parse_units.h + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Sat Mar 13 23:31:35 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add glob.c + +Thu Mar 11 15:02:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * iruserok.c: move innetgr() to separate file + + * innetgr.c: move innetgr() to separate file + + * hstrerror.c (hstrerror): add const to return type + + * erealloc.c: fix types in format string + + * emalloc.c: fix types in format string + +Wed Mar 10 16:36:55 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: ugly fix for crays + +Mon Mar 8 11:52:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: protos for {un,}setenv + +1999-02-16 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add fnmatch + + * roken-common.h (abs): add + +Sat Feb 13 17:12:53 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * emalloc.c, erealloc.c, estrup.c: new files + + * roken.h.in (mkstemp, gethostname): also includes prototypes if + they are needed. + +1998-12-23 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: mkstemp: add prototype + +1998-12-20 Assar Westerlund + + * snprintf.c, iruserok.c, parse-units.c: unsigned char-correctness + + * roken.h.in (inet_aton): also chedk NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO + + * roken-common.h: __attribute__: check for autoconf'd + HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ instead of GNUC + +Sun Dec 6 19:53:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): func is called with val == 0 if + no unit was given + (acc_flags, acc_units): update to new standard + +Fri Nov 27 03:09:42 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (stot): constify + (type_to_string): always declare + (dns_lookup_int): correct debug output + +Thu Nov 26 23:43:55 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * resolve.c (dns_lookup_int): send rr_class to res_search + +Thu Nov 26 17:09:47 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * resolve.c: some cleanup + + * resolve.h: add T_NAPTR + +Sun Nov 22 10:23:07 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + + * k_getpwnam.c (k_getpwnam): check for `struct spwd' + + * k_getpwuid.c (k_getpwuid): check for `struct spwd' + +Tue Sep 8 05:18:31 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * recvmsg.c (recvmsg): patch from bpreece@unity.ncsu.edu + +Fri Sep 4 16:29:27 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * vsyslog.c: asprintf -> vasprintf + +Tue Aug 18 22:25:52 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * getarg.h (arg_printusage): new signature + + * getarg.c (arg_printusage): new parameter `progname'. NULL means + __progname. + +Sun Aug 9 14:53:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: net_{read,write}.c + +Fri Jul 24 21:56:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * simple_exec.c (simple_execvp): loop around waitpid when errno == + EINTR + +Thu Jul 23 20:24:35 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: net_{read,write}.c + +Wed Jul 22 21:38:35 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * simple_exec.c (simple_execlp): initialize `argv' + +Mon Jul 13 23:01:22 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * inaddr2str.c (inaddr2str): don't advance hostent->h_addr_list, + use a copy instead + +Fri Jul 10 01:20:08 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (net_write, net_read): add prototypes + + * Makefile.in: net_{read,write}.c: add + + * net_{read,write}.c: new files + +Tue Jun 30 17:29:09 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in (issuid): add + + * get_window_size.c: fix misspelling of TIOCGWINSZ and bad use of + fields + +Sun May 31 03:24:34 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): Put short and long options in + SYNOPSIS within the same [ ] pair. + +Sat May 30 00:13:01 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (arg_printusage): try to keep options shorter than + column width + + * get_window_size.c (get_window_size): check COLUMNS and LINES + +Fri May 29 00:05:04 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): Put short and long options in + DESCRIPTION on the same line. + + * getarg.c (arg_match_long): make sure you only get an exact match + if the strings are the same length + +Thu May 14 02:23:40 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.awk: stupid cray awk wants \# + +Fri May 1 01:29:36 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * print_version.c (print_version): according to ISO/ANSI C the + elements of `arg' are not constant and therefore not settable at + compile-time. Set the at run-time instead. + +Sun Apr 19 10:00:06 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h.in: include paths.h + +Sun Apr 5 12:30:49 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (SOURCES): add roken_gethostby.c to make solaris + make happy + +Thu Mar 19 20:41:25 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * simple_exec.c: Simple fork+exec system() replacement. + +Fri Mar 6 00:21:53 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * roken_gethostby.c: Make `roken_gethostby_setup' take url-like + specification instead of split up versions. Makes it easier for + calling applications. + + * roken_gethostby.c: Another miracle of the 20th century: + gethostby* over HTTP. + +Sat Feb 21 15:18:36 1998 assar westerlund + + * parse_time.c (unparse_time_approx): new function that calls + `unparse_units_approx' + + * parse_units.c (unparse_units_approx): new function that will + only print the first unit. + + * Makefile.in: include parse_{time,units} + +Thu Feb 12 03:30:08 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_time.c (print_time_table): don't return a void value. + +Tue Feb 3 11:06:24 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c (mandoc_template): Change date format to full month + name, and day of month without leading zero. + +Thu Jan 22 21:23:23 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c: Fix long form of negative flags. + +Mon Dec 29 23:31:10 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * roken.h.in: Include , to get linux __progname. + +Sun Dec 21 09:45:18 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_time.c (print_time_table): new function + + * parse_units.c (print_flags_table, print_units_table): new + functions. + +Thu Dec 4 02:51:46 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * iruserok.c: moved here. + + * snprintf.c (sn_append_char): don't write any terminating zero. + (as_reserve): don't loop. better heuristic for how much space to + realloc. + (vasnprintf): simplify initializing to one. + +Sun Nov 30 14:56:59 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * getarg.c: Add mandoc help back-end to getarg. + +Wed Nov 12 01:09:17 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * verr.c, verrx.c: Fix warnings by moving exit from. + +Tue Nov 11 21:12:09 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * parse_units.c: Change the list of separating characters (between + units) to comma, space, and tab, removing digits. Having digits in + this list makes a flag like `T42 generate a parse error. This + change makes `17m3s' an invalid time-spec (you need a space). + +Tue Nov 11 02:38:44 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: add + +Sun Nov 9 04:48:46 1997 Johan Danielsson + + * fnmatch.c: Add fnmatch from NetBSD + +Sun Nov 9 02:00:08 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * parse_units.c (parse_something): ignore white-space and ',' + +Mon Nov 3 22:38:32 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: fclose prototype + + * roken.h: add prototype for vsyslog + + * Makefile.in: add some more source files to make soriasis make + happy + +Sat Nov 1 00:19:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: include and . + prototypes for readv and writev + + * readv.c, writev.c: new files + +Wed Oct 29 02:21:38 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * roken.h: Add ugly macros for openlog, gethostbyname, + gethostbyaddr, and getservbyname for the benefit of Crays. Add + default definition of MAXPATHLEN diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6499872 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.65 2000/01/06 22:24:36 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +CLEANFILES = roken.h make-roken.c print_version.h + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libroken.la +libroken_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 5:0:0 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = make-roken make-print-version + +check_PROGRAMS = parse_bytes-test strpftime-test getaddrinfo-test +TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS) + +getaddrinfo_test_LDADD = libroken.la +parse_bytes_test_LDADD = libroken.la +strpftime_test_SOURCES = strpftime-test.c strftime.c strptime.c snprintf.c + +if KRB4 +if KRB5 +## need to link with des here; otherwise, if krb4 is shared the link +## will fail with unresolved references +make_print_version_LDADD += $(LIB_krb4) -ldes +endif +endif + +libroken_la_SOURCES = \ + base64.c \ + concat.c \ + emalloc.c \ + eread.c \ + erealloc.c \ + estrdup.c \ + ewrite.c \ + get_default_username.c \ + get_window_size.c \ + getarg.c \ + getnameinfo_verified.c \ + issuid.c \ + k_getpwnam.c \ + k_getpwuid.c \ + mini_inetd.c \ + net_read.c \ + net_write.c \ + parse_bytes.c \ + parse_time.c \ + parse_units.c \ + print_version.c \ + resolve.c \ + roken_gethostby.c \ + signal.c \ + simple_exec.c \ + snprintf.c \ + socket.c \ + tm2time.c \ + verify.c \ + warnerr.c \ + xdbm.h + +EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES = \ + chown.c \ + copyhostent.c \ + daemon.c \ + err.c \ + err.h \ + errx.c \ + fchown.c \ + flock.c \ + fnmatch.c \ + fnmatch.h \ + freeaddrinfo.c \ + freehostent.c \ + gai_strerror.c \ + getaddrinfo.c \ + getdtablesize.c \ + getegid.c \ + geteuid.c \ + getgid.c \ + gethostname.c \ + getipnodebyaddr.c \ + getipnodebyname.c \ + getnameinfo.c \ + getopt.c \ + gettimeofday.c \ + getuid.c \ + getusershell.c \ + glob.h \ + hstrerror.c \ + inet_aton.c \ + inet_ntop.c \ + inet_pton.c \ + initgroups.c \ + innetgr.c \ + iruserok.c \ + lstat.c \ + memmove.c \ + mkstemp.c \ + putenv.c \ + rcmd.c \ + readv.c \ + recvmsg.c \ + sendmsg.c \ + setegid.c \ + setenv.c \ + seteuid.c \ + strcasecmp.c \ + strdup.c \ + strerror.c \ + strftime.c \ + strlcat.c \ + strlcpy.c \ + strlwr.c \ + strncasecmp.c \ + strndup.c \ + strnlen.c \ + strptime.c \ + strsep.c \ + strtok_r.c \ + strupr.c \ + swab.c \ + unsetenv.c \ + verr.c \ + verrx.c \ + vsyslog.c \ + vwarn.c \ + vwarnx.c \ + warn.c \ + warnx.c \ + writev.c + +EXTRA_DIST = resource.h roken.awk roken.def roken.dsp roken.h.in \ + roken.mak roken.rc + + + +libroken_la_LIBADD = @LTLIBOBJS@ + +$(LTLIBOBJS) $(libroken_la_OBJECTS): roken.h + +include_HEADERS = $(err_h) base64.h getarg.h \ + parse_bytes.h parse_time.h parse_units.h \ + resolve.h roken.h roken-common.h + +build_HEADERZ = $(err_h) $(fnmatch_h) $(glob_h) xdbm.h + +if have_err_h +err_h = +else +err_h = err.h +endif + +if have_fnmatch_h +fnmatch_h = +else +fnmatch_h = fnmatch.h +endif + +if have_glob_h +glob_h = +else +glob_h = glob.h +endif + +roken.h: make-roken$(EXEEXT) + @./make-roken$(EXEEXT) > tmp.h ;\ + if [ -f roken.h ] && cmp -s tmp.h roken.h ; then rm -f tmp.h ; \ + else rm -f roken.h; mv tmp.h roken.h; fi + +make-roken.c: roken.h.in roken.awk + $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/roken.awk $(srcdir)/roken.h.in > make-roken.c + +print_version.lo: print_version.h + +print_version.h: make-print-version$(EXEEXT) + ./make-print-version$(EXEEXT) print_version.h + +make-print-version.o: $(top_builddir)/include/version.h diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02d18cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,800 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.65 2000/01/06 22:24:36 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +CLEANFILES = roken.h make-roken.c print_version.h + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libroken.la +libroken_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 5:0:0 + +noinst_PROGRAMS = make-roken make-print-version + +check_PROGRAMS = parse_bytes-test strpftime-test getaddrinfo-test +TESTS = $(check_PROGRAMS) + +getaddrinfo_test_LDADD = libroken.la +parse_bytes_test_LDADD = libroken.la +strpftime_test_SOURCES = strpftime-test.c strftime.c strptime.c snprintf.c + +@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@make_print_version_LDADD = $(LIB_krb4) -ldes + +libroken_la_SOURCES = base64.c concat.c emalloc.c eread.c erealloc.c estrdup.c ewrite.c get_default_username.c get_window_size.c getarg.c getnameinfo_verified.c issuid.c k_getpwnam.c k_getpwuid.c mini_inetd.c net_read.c net_write.c parse_bytes.c parse_time.c parse_units.c print_version.c resolve.c roken_gethostby.c signal.c simple_exec.c snprintf.c socket.c tm2time.c verify.c warnerr.c xdbm.h + + +EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES = chown.c copyhostent.c daemon.c err.c err.h errx.c fchown.c flock.c fnmatch.c fnmatch.h freeaddrinfo.c freehostent.c gai_strerror.c getaddrinfo.c getdtablesize.c getegid.c geteuid.c getgid.c gethostname.c getipnodebyaddr.c getipnodebyname.c getnameinfo.c getopt.c gettimeofday.c getuid.c getusershell.c glob.h hstrerror.c inet_aton.c inet_ntop.c inet_pton.c initgroups.c innetgr.c iruserok.c lstat.c memmove.c mkstemp.c putenv.c rcmd.c readv.c recvmsg.c sendmsg.c setegid.c setenv.c seteuid.c strcasecmp.c strdup.c strerror.c strftime.c strlcat.c strlcpy.c strlwr.c strncasecmp.c strndup.c strnlen.c strptime.c strsep.c strtok_r.c strupr.c swab.c unsetenv.c verr.c verrx.c vsyslog.c vwarn.c vwarnx.c warn.c warnx.c writev.c + + +EXTRA_DIST = resource.h roken.awk roken.def roken.dsp roken.h.in roken.mak roken.rc + + +libroken_la_LIBADD = @LTLIBOBJS@ + +include_HEADERS = $(err_h) base64.h getarg.h parse_bytes.h parse_time.h parse_units.h resolve.h roken.h roken-common.h + + +build_HEADERZ = $(err_h) $(fnmatch_h) $(glob_h) xdbm.h +@have_err_h_TRUE@err_h = +@have_err_h_FALSE@err_h = err.h +@have_fnmatch_h_TRUE@fnmatch_h = +@have_fnmatch_h_FALSE@fnmatch_h = fnmatch.h +@have_glob_h_TRUE@glob_h = +@have_glob_h_FALSE@glob_h = glob.h +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +libroken_la_DEPENDENCIES = @LTLIBOBJS@ +libroken_la_OBJECTS = base64.lo concat.lo emalloc.lo eread.lo \ +erealloc.lo estrdup.lo ewrite.lo get_default_username.lo \ +get_window_size.lo getarg.lo getnameinfo_verified.lo issuid.lo \ +k_getpwnam.lo k_getpwuid.lo mini_inetd.lo net_read.lo net_write.lo \ +parse_bytes.lo parse_time.lo parse_units.lo print_version.lo resolve.lo \ +roken_gethostby.lo signal.lo simple_exec.lo snprintf.lo socket.lo \ +tm2time.lo verify.lo warnerr.lo +check_PROGRAMS = parse_bytes-test$(EXEEXT) strpftime-test$(EXEEXT) \ +getaddrinfo-test$(EXEEXT) +noinst_PROGRAMS = make-roken$(EXEEXT) make-print-version$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + +parse_bytes_test_SOURCES = parse_bytes-test.c +parse_bytes_test_OBJECTS = parse_bytes-test.$(OBJEXT) +parse_bytes_test_DEPENDENCIES = libroken.la +parse_bytes_test_LDFLAGS = +strpftime_test_OBJECTS = strpftime-test.$(OBJEXT) strftime.$(OBJEXT) \ +strptime.$(OBJEXT) snprintf.$(OBJEXT) +strpftime_test_LDADD = $(LDADD) +strpftime_test_DEPENDENCIES = +strpftime_test_LDFLAGS = +getaddrinfo_test_SOURCES = getaddrinfo-test.c +getaddrinfo_test_OBJECTS = getaddrinfo-test.$(OBJEXT) +getaddrinfo_test_DEPENDENCIES = libroken.la +getaddrinfo_test_LDFLAGS = +make_roken_SOURCES = make-roken.c +make_roken_OBJECTS = make-roken.$(OBJEXT) +make_roken_LDADD = $(LDADD) +make_roken_DEPENDENCIES = +make_roken_LDFLAGS = +make_print_version_SOURCES = make-print-version.c +make_print_version_OBJECTS = make-print-version.$(OBJEXT) +@KRB4_TRUE@@KRB5_TRUE@make_print_version_DEPENDENCIES = +make_print_version_LDFLAGS = +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +HEADERS = $(include_HEADERS) + +DIST_COMMON = ChangeLog Makefile.am Makefile.in getcap.c glob.c \ +make-print-version.c + + +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) + +TAR = tar +GZIP_ENV = --best +SOURCES = $(libroken_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libroken_la_SOURCES) parse_bytes-test.c $(strpftime_test_SOURCES) getaddrinfo-test.c make-roken.c make-print-version.c +OBJECTS = $(libroken_la_OBJECTS) parse_bytes-test.$(OBJEXT) $(strpftime_test_OBJECTS) getaddrinfo-test.$(OBJEXT) make-roken.$(OBJEXT) make-print-version.$(OBJEXT) + +all: all-redirect +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .1 .3 .5 .8 .S .c .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .et .h .lo .o .obj .s .x +$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign lib/roken/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +mostlyclean-libLTLIBRARIES: + +clean-libLTLIBRARIES: + -test -z "$(lib_LTLIBRARIES)" || rm -f $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + +distclean-libLTLIBRARIES: + +maintainer-clean-libLTLIBRARIES: + +install-libLTLIBRARIES: $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir) + @list='$(lib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \ + if test -f $$p; then \ + echo "$(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$$p"; \ + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$$p; \ + else :; fi; \ + done + +uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES: + @$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL) + list='$(lib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \ + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=uninstall rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$$p; \ + done + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +# FIXME: We should only use cygpath when building on Windows, +# and only if it is available. +.c.obj: + $(COMPILE) -c `cygpath -w $<` + +.s.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +.S.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +mostlyclean-compile: + -rm -f *.o core *.core + -rm -f *.$(OBJEXT) + +clean-compile: + +distclean-compile: + -rm -f *.tab.c + +maintainer-clean-compile: + +.c.lo: + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(COMPILE) -c $< + +.s.lo: + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(COMPILE) -c $< + +.S.lo: + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(COMPILE) -c $< + +mostlyclean-libtool: + -rm -f *.lo + +clean-libtool: + -rm -rf .libs _libs + +distclean-libtool: + +maintainer-clean-libtool: + +libroken.la: $(libroken_la_OBJECTS) $(libroken_la_DEPENDENCIES) + $(LINK) -rpath $(libdir) $(libroken_la_LDFLAGS) $(libroken_la_OBJECTS) $(libroken_la_LIBADD) $(LIBS) + +mostlyclean-checkPROGRAMS: + +clean-checkPROGRAMS: + -test -z "$(check_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(check_PROGRAMS) + +distclean-checkPROGRAMS: + +maintainer-clean-checkPROGRAMS: + +mostlyclean-noinstPROGRAMS: + +clean-noinstPROGRAMS: + -test -z "$(noinst_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + +distclean-noinstPROGRAMS: + +maintainer-clean-noinstPROGRAMS: + +parse_bytes-test$(EXEEXT): $(parse_bytes_test_OBJECTS) $(parse_bytes_test_DEPENDENCIES) + @rm -f parse_bytes-test$(EXEEXT) + $(LINK) $(parse_bytes_test_LDFLAGS) $(parse_bytes_test_OBJECTS) $(parse_bytes_test_LDADD) $(LIBS) + +strpftime-test$(EXEEXT): 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roken.awk + $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/roken.awk $(srcdir)/roken.h.in > make-roken.c + +print_version.lo: print_version.h + +print_version.h: make-print-version$(EXEEXT) + ./make-print-version$(EXEEXT) print_version.h + +make-print-version.o: $(top_builddir)/include/version.h + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/base64.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..daed869 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: base64.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include "base64.h" + +static char base64[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + +static int pos(char c) +{ + char *p; + for(p = base64; *p; p++) + if(*p == c) + return p - base64; + return -1; +} + +int base64_encode(const void *data, int size, char **str) +{ + char *s, *p; + int i; + int c; + const unsigned char *q; + + p = s = (char*)malloc(size*4/3+4); + if (p == NULL) + return -1; + q = (const unsigned char*)data; + i=0; + for(i = 0; i < size;){ + c=q[i++]; + c*=256; + if(i < size) + c+=q[i]; + i++; + c*=256; + if(i < size) + c+=q[i]; + i++; + p[0]=base64[(c&0x00fc0000) >> 18]; + p[1]=base64[(c&0x0003f000) >> 12]; + p[2]=base64[(c&0x00000fc0) >> 6]; + p[3]=base64[(c&0x0000003f) >> 0]; + if(i > size) + p[3]='='; + if(i > size+1) + p[2]='='; + p+=4; + } + *p=0; + *str = s; + return strlen(s); +} + +int base64_decode(const char *str, void *data) +{ + const char *p; + unsigned char *q; + int c; + int x; + int done = 0; + q=(unsigned char*)data; + for(p=str; *p && !done; p+=4){ + x = pos(p[0]); + if(x >= 0) + c = x; + else{ + done = 3; + break; + } + c*=64; + + x = pos(p[1]); + if(x >= 0) + c += x; + else + return -1; + c*=64; + + if(p[2] == '=') + done++; + else{ + x = pos(p[2]); + if(x >= 0) + c += x; + else + return -1; + } + c*=64; + + if(p[3] == '=') + done++; + else{ + if(done) + return -1; + x = pos(p[3]); + if(x >= 0) + c += x; + else + return -1; + } + if(done < 3) + *q++=(c&0x00ff0000)>>16; + + if(done < 2) + *q++=(c&0x0000ff00)>>8; + if(done < 1) + *q++=(c&0x000000ff)>>0; + } + return q - (unsigned char*)data; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/base64.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ad1e3b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: base64.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _BASE64_H_ +#define _BASE64_H_ + +int base64_encode(const void *data, int size, char **str); +int base64_decode(const char *str, void *data); + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/chown.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/chown.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3d34e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/chown.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: chown.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/concat.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/concat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca295c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/concat.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: concat.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +int +roken_concat (char *s, size_t len, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, len); + ret = roken_vconcat (s, len, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} + +int +roken_vconcat (char *s, size_t len, va_list args) +{ + const char *a; + + while ((a = va_arg(args, const char*))) { + size_t n = strlen (a); + + if (n >= len) + return -1; + memcpy (s, a, n); + s += n; + len -= n; + } + *s = '\0'; + return 0; +} + +size_t +roken_vmconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, va_list args) +{ + const char *a; + char *p, *q; + size_t len = 0; + *s = NULL; + p = malloc(1); + if(p == NULL) + return 0; + len = 1; + while ((a = va_arg(args, const char*))) { + size_t n = strlen (a); + + if(max_len && len + n > max_len){ + free(p); + return 0; + } + q = realloc(p, len + n); + if(q == NULL){ + free(p); + return 0; + } + p = q; + memcpy (p + len - 1, a, n); + len += n; + } + p[len - 1] = '\0'; + *s = p; + return len; +} + +size_t +roken_mconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, ...) +{ + int ret; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, max_len); + ret = roken_vmconcat (s, max_len, args); + va_end(args); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/copyhostent.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/copyhostent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3be6db --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/copyhostent.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: copyhostent.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * return a malloced copy of `h' + */ + +struct hostent * +copyhostent (const struct hostent *h) +{ + struct hostent *res; + char **p; + int i, n; + + res = malloc (sizeof (*res)); + if (res == NULL) + return NULL; + res->h_name = NULL; + res->h_aliases = NULL; + res->h_addrtype = h->h_addrtype; + res->h_length = h->h_length; + res->h_addr_list = NULL; + res->h_name = strdup (h->h_name); + if (res->h_name == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + for (n = 0, p = h->h_aliases; *p != NULL; ++p) + ++n; + res->h_aliases = malloc ((n + 1) * sizeof(*res->h_aliases)); + if (res->h_aliases == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n + 1; ++i) + res->h_aliases[i] = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + res->h_aliases[i] = strdup (h->h_aliases[i]); + if (res->h_aliases[i] == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + } + + for (n = 0, p = h->h_addr_list; *p != NULL; ++p) + ++n; + res->h_addr_list = malloc ((n + 1) * sizeof(*res->h_addr_list)); + if (res->h_addr_list == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n + 1; ++i) { + res->h_addr_list[i] = NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + res->h_addr_list[i] = malloc (h->h_length); + if (res->h_addr_list[i] == NULL) { + freehostent (res); + return NULL; + } + memcpy (res->h_addr_list[i], h->h_addr_list[i], h->h_length); + } + return res; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/daemon.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/daemon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..758856c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/daemon.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)daemon.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: daemon.c,v 1.3 1997/10/04 21:55:48 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +daemon(int nochdir, int noclose) +{ + int fd; + + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + return (-1); + case 0: + break; + default: + _exit(0); + } + + if (setsid() == -1) + return (-1); + + if (!nochdir) + chdir("/"); + + if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); + if (fd > 2) + close (fd); + } + return (0); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_DAEMON */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/emalloc.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/emalloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bbea1e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/emalloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: emalloc.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like malloc but never fails. + */ + +void * +emalloc (size_t sz) +{ + void *tmp = malloc (sz); + + if (tmp == NULL && sz != 0) + err (1, "malloc %lu", (unsigned long)sz); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/eread.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/eread.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a1b24b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/eread.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: eread.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like read but never fails (and never returns partial data). + */ + +ssize_t +eread (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = net_read (fd, buf, nbytes); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "read"); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/erealloc.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/erealloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8afa8f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/erealloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: erealloc.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like realloc but never fails. + */ + +void * +erealloc (void *ptr, size_t sz) +{ + void *tmp = realloc (ptr, sz); + + if (tmp == NULL && sz != 0) + err (1, "realloc %lu", (unsigned long)sz); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/err.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29b1f7b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/err.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: err.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +err(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + verr(eval, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/err.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0b649f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/err.h @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: err.h,v 1.15 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ERR_H__ +#define __ERR_H__ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern const char *__progname; + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +void warnerr(int doerrno, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0))); + +void verr(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))); +void err(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))); +void verrx(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 0))); +void errx(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((noreturn, format (printf, 2, 3))); +void vwarn(const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 0))); +void warn(const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); +void vwarnx(const char *fmt, va_list ap) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 0))); +void warnx(const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 1, 2))); + +#endif /* __ERR_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/errx.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/errx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f8ec18 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/errx.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: errx.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +errx(int eval, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + verrx(eval, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/estrdup.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/estrdup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c0d9a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/estrdup.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: estrdup.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like strdup but never fails. + */ + +char * +estrdup (const char *str) +{ + char *tmp = strdup (str); + + if (tmp == NULL) + err (1, "strdup"); + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/ewrite.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/ewrite.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2c43de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/ewrite.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: ewrite.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:45 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like write but never fails (and never returns partial data). + */ + +ssize_t +ewrite (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = net_write (fd, buf, nbytes); + if (ret < 0) + err (1, "write"); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fchown.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fchown.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61e8546 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fchown.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: fchown.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +fchown(int fd, uid_t owner, gid_t group) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/flock.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/flock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13da4f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/flock.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK +RCSID("$Id: flock.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +#include "roken.h" + + +#define OP_MASK (LOCK_SH | LOCK_EX | LOCK_UN) + +int +flock(int fd, int operation) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_FCNTL) && defined(F_SETLK) + struct flock arg; + int code, cmd; + + arg.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + arg.l_start = 0; + arg.l_len = 0; /* means to EOF */ + + if (operation & LOCK_NB) + cmd = F_SETLK; + else + cmd = F_SETLKW; /* Blocking */ + + switch (operation & OP_MASK) { + case LOCK_UN: + arg.l_type = F_UNLCK; + code = fcntl(fd, F_SETLK, &arg); + break; + case LOCK_SH: + arg.l_type = F_RDLCK; + code = fcntl(fd, cmd, &arg); + break; + case LOCK_EX: + arg.l_type = F_WRLCK; + code = fcntl(fd, cmd, &arg); + break; + default: + errno = EINVAL; + code = -1; + break; + } + return code; +#else + return -1; +#endif +} + +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fnmatch.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fnmatch.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc01d6e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fnmatch.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +/* $NetBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.11 1995/02/27 03:43:06 cgd Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +#if 0 +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)fnmatch.c 8.2 (Berkeley) 4/16/94"; +#else +static char rcsid[] = "$NetBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.11 1995/02/27 03:43:06 cgd Exp $"; +#endif +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +/* + * Function fnmatch() as specified in POSIX 1003.2-1992, section B.6. + * Compares a filename or pathname to a pattern. + */ + +#include +#include + +#define EOS '\0' + +static const char *rangematch (const char *, int, int); + +int +fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags) +{ + const char *stringstart; + char c, test; + + for (stringstart = string;;) + switch (c = *pattern++) { + case EOS: + return (*string == EOS ? 0 : FNM_NOMATCH); + case '?': + if (*string == EOS) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if (*string == '/' && (flags & FNM_PATHNAME)) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if (*string == '.' && (flags & FNM_PERIOD) && + (string == stringstart || + ((flags & FNM_PATHNAME) && *(string - 1) == '/'))) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + ++string; + break; + case '*': + c = *pattern; + /* Collapse multiple stars. */ + while (c == '*') + c = *++pattern; + + if (*string == '.' && (flags & FNM_PERIOD) && + (string == stringstart || + ((flags & FNM_PATHNAME) && *(string - 1) == '/'))) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + + /* Optimize for pattern with * at end or before /. */ + if (c == EOS) + if (flags & FNM_PATHNAME) + return (strchr(string, '/') == NULL ? + 0 : FNM_NOMATCH); + else + return (0); + else if (c == '/' && flags & FNM_PATHNAME) { + if ((string = strchr(string, '/')) == NULL) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + break; + } + + /* General case, use recursion. */ + while ((test = *string) != EOS) { + if (!fnmatch(pattern, string, flags & ~FNM_PERIOD)) + return (0); + if (test == '/' && flags & FNM_PATHNAME) + break; + ++string; + } + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + case '[': + if (*string == EOS) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if (*string == '/' && flags & FNM_PATHNAME) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + if ((pattern = + rangematch(pattern, *string, flags)) == NULL) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + ++string; + break; + case '\\': + if (!(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE)) { + if ((c = *pattern++) == EOS) { + c = '\\'; + --pattern; + } + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + if (c != *string++) + return (FNM_NOMATCH); + break; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static const char * +rangematch(const char *pattern, int test, int flags) +{ + int negate, ok; + char c, c2; + + /* + * A bracket expression starting with an unquoted circumflex + * character produces unspecified results (IEEE 1003.2-1992, + * 3.13.2). This implementation treats it like '!', for + * consistency with the regular expression syntax. + * J.T. Conklin (conklin@ngai.kaleida.com) + */ + if (negate = (*pattern == '!' || *pattern == '^')) + ++pattern; + + for (ok = 0; (c = *pattern++) != ']';) { + if (c == '\\' && !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE)) + c = *pattern++; + if (c == EOS) + return (NULL); + if (*pattern == '-' + && (c2 = *(pattern+1)) != EOS && c2 != ']') { + pattern += 2; + if (c2 == '\\' && !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE)) + c2 = *pattern++; + if (c2 == EOS) + return (NULL); + if (c <= test && test <= c2) + ok = 1; + } else if (c == test) + ok = 1; + } + return (ok == negate ? NULL : pattern); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fnmatch.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fnmatch.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95c91d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/fnmatch.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* $NetBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:53 cgd Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)fnmatch.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#ifndef _FNMATCH_H_ +#define _FNMATCH_H_ + +#define FNM_NOMATCH 1 /* Match failed. */ + +#define FNM_NOESCAPE 0x01 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ +#define FNM_PATHNAME 0x02 /* Slash must be matched by slash. */ +#define FNM_PERIOD 0x04 /* Period must be matched by period. */ + +int fnmatch (const char *, const char *, int); + +#endif /* !_FNMATCH_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/freeaddrinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/freeaddrinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f963d15 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/freeaddrinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: freeaddrinfo.c,v 1.2 1999/12/03 04:10:06 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * free the list of `struct addrinfo' starting at `ai' + */ + +void +freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + for (; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { + free (ai->ai_canonname); + free (ai->ai_addr); + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/freehostent.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/freehostent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cd92cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/freehostent.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: freehostent.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * free a malloced hostent + */ + +void +freehostent (struct hostent *h) +{ + char **p; + + free (h->h_name); + if (h->h_aliases != NULL) { + for (p = h->h_aliases; *p != NULL; ++p) + free (*p); + free (h->h_aliases); + } + if (h->h_addr_list != NULL) { + for (p = h->h_addr_list; *p != NULL; ++p) + free (*p); + free (h->h_addr_list); + } + free (h); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gai_strerror.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gai_strerror.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07f7c39 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gai_strerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: gai_strerror.c,v 1.2 1999/12/03 04:10:06 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +static struct gai_error { + int code; + char *str; +} errors[] = { +{EAI_NOERROR, "no error"}, +{EAI_ADDRFAMILY, "address family for nodename not supported"}, +{EAI_AGAIN, "temporary failure in name resolution"}, +{EAI_BADFLAGS, "invalid value for ai_flags"}, +{EAI_FAIL, "non-recoverable failure in name resolution"}, +{EAI_FAMILY, "ai_family not supported"}, +{EAI_MEMORY, "memory allocation failure"}, +{EAI_NODATA, "no address associated with nodename"}, +{EAI_NONAME, "nodename nor servname provided, or not known"}, +{EAI_SERVICE, "servname not supported for ai_socktype"}, +{EAI_SOCKTYPE, "ai_socktype not supported"}, +{EAI_SYSTEM, "system error returned in errno"}, +{0, NULL}, +}; + +/* + * + */ + +char * +gai_strerror(int ecode) +{ + struct gai_error *g; + + for (g = errors; g->str != NULL; ++g) + if (g->code == ecode) + return g->str; + return "unknown error code in gai_strerror"; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/get_default_username.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/get_default_username.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10b0863 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/get_default_username.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: get_default_username.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * Try to return what should be considered the default username or + * NULL if we can't guess at all. + */ + +const char * +get_default_username (void) +{ + const char *user; + + user = getenv ("USER"); + if (user == NULL) + user = getenv ("LOGNAME"); + if (user == NULL) + user = getenv ("USERNAME"); + +#if defined(HAVE_GETLOGIN) && !defined(POSIX_GETLOGIN) + if (user == NULL) { + user = (const char *)getlogin (); + if (user != NULL) + return user; + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H + { + uid_t uid = getuid (); + struct passwd *pwd; + + if (user != NULL) { + pwd = k_getpwnam (user); + if (pwd != NULL && pwd->pw_uid == uid) + return user; + } + pwd = k_getpwuid (uid); + if (pwd != NULL) + return pwd->pw_name; + } +#endif + return user; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/get_window_size.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/get_window_size.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4eff8d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/get_window_size.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: get_window_size.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#if 0 /* Where were those needed? /confused */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PROC_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TTY_H +#include +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +int +get_window_size(int fd, struct winsize *wp) +{ + int ret = -1; + + memset(wp, 0, sizeof(*wp)); + +#if defined(TIOCGWINSZ) + ret = ioctl(fd, TIOCGWINSZ, wp); +#elif defined(TIOCGSIZE) + { + struct ttysize ts; + + ret = ioctl(fd, TIOCGSIZE, &ts); + if(ret == 0) { + wp->ws_row = ts.ts_lines; + wp->ws_col = ts.ts_cols; + } + } +#elif defined(HAVE__SCRSIZE) + { + int dst[2]; + + _scrsize(dst); + wp->ws_row = dst[1]; + wp->ws_col = dst[0]; + ret = 0; + } +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + char *s; + if((s = getenv("COLUMNS"))) + wp->ws_col = atoi(s); + if((s = getenv("LINES"))) + wp->ws_row = atoi(s); + if(wp->ws_col > 0 && wp->ws_row > 0) + ret = 0; + } + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getaddrinfo-test.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getaddrinfo-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ede9c95 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getaddrinfo-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getaddrinfo-test.c,v 1.2 1999/12/03 04:10:07 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include "getarg.h" + +static int flags; +static int family; +static int socktype; + +static int version_flag; +static int help_flag; + +static struct getargs args[] = { + {"flags", 0, arg_integer, &flags, "flags", NULL}, + {"family", 0, arg_integer, &family, "family", NULL}, + {"socktype",0, arg_integer, &socktype, "socktype", NULL}, + {"version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag, "print version",NULL}, + {"help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag, NULL, NULL} +}; + +static void +usage(int ret) +{ + arg_printusage (args, + sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), + NULL, + "[nodename servname...]"); + exit (ret); +} + +static void +doit (const char *nodename, const char *servname) +{ + struct addrinfo hints; + struct addrinfo *res, *r; + int ret; + + printf ("(%s,%s)... ", nodename ? nodename : "null", servname); + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = flags; + hints.ai_family = family; + hints.ai_socktype = socktype; + + ret = getaddrinfo (nodename, servname, &hints, &res); + if (ret) { + printf ("error: %s\n", gai_strerror(ret)); + return; + } + printf ("\n"); + + for (r = res; r != NULL; r = r->ai_next) { + char addrstr[256]; + + if (inet_ntop (r->ai_family, + socket_get_address (r->ai_addr), + addrstr, sizeof(addrstr)) == NULL) { + printf ("\tbad address?\n"); + continue; + } + printf ("\t(family = %d, socktype = %d, protocol = %d, " + "address = \"%s\", port = %d", + r->ai_family, r->ai_socktype, r->ai_protocol, + addrstr, + ntohs(socket_get_port (r->ai_addr))); + if (r->ai_canonname) + printf (", canonname = \"%s\"", r->ai_canonname); + printf ("\n"); + } + freeaddrinfo (res); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + int i; + + set_progname (argv[0]); + + if (getarg (args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]), argc, argv, + &optind)) + usage (1); + + if (help_flag) + usage (0); + + if (version_flag) { + print_version (NULL); + return 0; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc % 2 != 0) + usage (1); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i += 2) { + const char *nodename = argv[i]; + + if (strcmp (nodename, "null") == 0) + nodename = NULL; + + doit (nodename, argv[i+1]); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db18742 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,400 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getaddrinfo.c,v 1.6 1999/12/20 00:56:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * uses hints->ai_socktype and hints->ai_protocol + */ + +static int +get_port_protocol_socktype (const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + int *port, + int *protocol, + int *socktype) +{ + struct servent *se; + const char *proto_str = NULL; + + *socktype = 0; + + if (hints != NULL && hints->ai_protocol != 0) { + struct protoent *protoent = getprotobynumber (hints->ai_protocol); + + if (protoent == NULL) + return EAI_SOCKTYPE; /* XXX */ + + proto_str = protoent->p_name; + *protocol = protoent->p_proto; + } + + if (hints != NULL) + *socktype = hints->ai_socktype; + + if (*socktype == SOCK_STREAM) { + se = getservbyname (servname, proto_str ? proto_str : "tcp"); + if (proto_str == NULL) + *protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + } else if (*socktype == SOCK_DGRAM) { + se = getservbyname (servname, proto_str ? proto_str : "udp"); + if (proto_str == NULL) + *protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; + } else if (*socktype == 0) { + if (proto_str != NULL) { + se = getservbyname (servname, proto_str); + } else { + se = getservbyname (servname, "tcp"); + *protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + *socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (se == NULL) { + se = getservbyname (servname, "udp"); + *protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; + *socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + } + } + } else + return EAI_SOCKTYPE; + + if (se == NULL) { + char *endstr; + + *port = htons(strtol (servname, &endstr, 10)); + if (servname == endstr) + return EAI_NONAME; + } else { + *port = se->s_port; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +add_one (int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo ***ptr, + int (*func)(struct addrinfo *, void *data, int port), + void *data, + char *canonname) +{ + struct addrinfo *a; + int ret; + + a = malloc (sizeof (*a)); + if (a == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + memset (a, 0, sizeof(*a)); + a->ai_flags = 0; + a->ai_next = NULL; + a->ai_protocol = protocol; + a->ai_socktype = socktype; + a->ai_canonname = canonname; + ret = (*func)(a, data, port); + if (ret) { + free (a); + return ret; + } + **ptr = a; + *ptr = &a->ai_next; + return 0; +} + +static int +const_v4 (struct addrinfo *a, void *data, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin; + struct in_addr *addr = (struct in_addr *)data; + + a->ai_family = PF_INET; + a->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sin); + a->ai_addr = malloc (sizeof(*sin)); + if (a->ai_addr == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)a->ai_addr; + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = port; + sin->sin_addr = *addr; + return 0; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 +static int +const_v6 (struct addrinfo *a, void *data, int port) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6; + struct in6_addr *addr = (struct in6_addr *)data; + + a->ai_family = PF_INET6; + a->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sin6); + a->ai_addr = malloc (sizeof(*sin6)); + if (a->ai_addr == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)a->ai_addr; + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + sin6->sin6_addr = *addr; + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int +get_null (const struct addrinfo *hints, + int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct in_addr v4_addr; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr v6_addr; +#endif + struct addrinfo *first = NULL; + struct addrinfo **current = &first; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + int ret; + + if (hints != NULL) + family = hints->ai_family; + + if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) { + v4_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + v6_addr = in6addr_any; +#endif + } else { + v4_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + v6_addr = in6addr_loopback; +#endif + } + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v6, &v6_addr, NULL); + } +#endif + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v4, &v4_addr, NULL); + } + *res = first; + return 0; +} + +static int +add_hostent (int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo ***current, + int (*func)(struct addrinfo *, void *data, int port), + struct hostent *he, int *flags) +{ + char **h; + int ret; + char *canonname = NULL; + + if (*flags & AI_CANONNAME) { + canonname = he->h_name; + + if (strchr (he->h_name, '.') == NULL) + for (h = he->h_aliases; *h; ++h) { + if (strchr (*h, '.') != NULL) { + canonname = *h; + break; + } + } + canonname = strdup (canonname); + if (canonname == NULL) + return EAI_MEMORY; + } + + for (h = he->h_addr_list; *h != NULL; ++h) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + current, func, *h, canonname); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (*flags & AI_CANONNAME) { + *flags &= ~AI_CANONNAME; + canonname = NULL; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +get_number (const char *nodename, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct addrinfo *first = NULL; + struct addrinfo **current = &first; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + int ret; + + if (hints != NULL) { + family = hints->ai_family; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct in6_addr v6_addr; + + if (inet_pton (PF_INET6, nodename, &v6_addr) == 1) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v6, &v6_addr, NULL); + *res = first; + return ret; + } + } +#endif + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct in_addr v4_addr; + + if (inet_pton (PF_INET, nodename, &v4_addr) == 1) { + ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v4, &v4_addr, NULL); + *res = first; + return ret; + } + } + return EAI_NONAME; +} + +static int +get_nodes (const char *nodename, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + int port, int protocol, int socktype, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct addrinfo *first = NULL; + struct addrinfo **current = &first; + int family = PF_UNSPEC; + int flags = 0; + int ret = EAI_NONAME; + int error; + + if (hints != NULL) { + family = hints->ai_family; + flags = hints->ai_flags; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct hostent *he; + + he = getipnodebyname (nodename, PF_INET6, 0, &error); + + if (he != NULL) { + ret = add_hostent (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v6, he, &flags); + freehostent (he); + } + } +#endif + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) { + struct hostent *he; + + he = getipnodebyname (nodename, PF_INET, 0, &error); + + if (he != NULL) { + ret = add_hostent (port, protocol, socktype, + ¤t, const_v4, he, &flags); + freehostent (he); + } + } + *res = first; + return ret; +} + +/* + * hints: + * + * struct addrinfo { + * int ai_flags; + * int ai_family; + * int ai_socktype; + * int ai_protocol; + * ... + * }; + */ + +int +getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, + const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + int ret; + int port = 0; + int protocol = 0; + int socktype = 0; + + *res = NULL; + + if (servname == NULL && nodename == NULL) + return EAI_NONAME; + + if (hints != NULL + && hints->ai_family != PF_UNSPEC + && hints->ai_family != PF_INET +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + && hints->ai_family != PF_INET6 +#endif + ) + return EAI_FAMILY; + + if (servname != NULL) { + ret = get_port_protocol_socktype (servname, hints, + &port, &protocol, &socktype); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + if (nodename != NULL) { + ret = get_number (nodename, hints, port, protocol, socktype, res); + if (ret) { + if(hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) + ret = EAI_NONAME; + else + ret = get_nodes (nodename, hints, port, protocol, socktype, + res); + } + } else { + ret = get_null (hints, port, protocol, socktype, res); + } + if (ret) + freeaddrinfo (*res); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.3 b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78a8802 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.3 @@ -0,0 +1,317 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan +.\" $Id: getarg.3,v 1.2 1999/10/18 17:14:31 joda Exp $ +.Dd September 24, 1999 +.Dt GETARG 3 +.Os ROKEN +.Sh NAME +.Nm getarg , +.Nm arg_printusage +.Nd collect command line options +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Fd #include + +.Ft int +.Fn getarg "struct getargs *args" "size_t num_args" "int argc" "char **argv" "int *optind" + +.Ft void +.Fn arg_printusage "struct getargs *args" "size_t num_args" "const char *progname" "const char *extra_string" + +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Fn getarg +collects any command line options given to a program in an easily used way. +.Fn arg_printusage +pretty-prints the available options, with a short help text. +.Pp +.Fa args +is the option specification to use, and it's an array of +.Fa struct getargs +elements. +.Fa num_args +is the size of +.Fa args +(in elements). +.Fa argc +and +.Fa argv +are the argument count and argument vector to extract option from. +.Fa optind +is a pointer to an integer where the index to the last processed +argument is stored, it must be initialised to the first index (minus +one) to process (normally 0) before the first call. +.Pp +.Fa arg_printusage +take the same +.Fa args +and +.Fa num_args +as getarg; +.Fa progname is the name of the program (to be used in the help text), and +.Fa extra_string +is a string to print after the actual options to indicate more +arguments. The usefulness of this function is realised only be people +who has used programs that has help strings that doesn't match what +the code does. +.Pp +The +.Fa getargs +struct has the following elements. + +.Bd -literal +struct getargs{ + const char *long_name; + char short_name; + enum { arg_integer, + arg_string, + arg_flag, + arg_negative_flag, + arg_strings, + arg_double, + arg_collect + } type; + void *value; + const char *help; + const char *arg_help; +}; +.Ed +.Pp +.Fa long_name +is the long name of the option, it can be +.Dv NULL , +if you don't want a long name. +.Fa short_name +is the characted to use as short option, it can be zero. If the option +has a value the +.Fa value +field gets filled in with that value interpreted as specified by the +.Fa type +field. +.Fa help +is a longer help string for the option as a whole, if it's +.Dv NULL +the help text for the option is omitted (but it's still displayed in +the synopsis). +.Fa arg_help +is a description of the argument, if +.Dv NULL +a default value will be used, depending on the type of the option: +.Pp +.Bl -hang -width arg_negative_flag +.It arg_integer +the argument is a signed integer, and +.Fa value +should point to an +.Fa int . +.It Fa arg_string +the argument is a string, and +.Fa value +should point to a +.Fa char* . +.It Fa arg_flag +the argument is a flag, and +.Fa value +should point to a +.Fa int . +It gets filled in with either zero or one, depending on how the option +is given, the normal case beeing one. Note that if the option isn't +given, the value isn't altered, so it should be initialised to some +useful default. +.It Fa arg_negative_flag +this is the same as +.Fa arg_flag +but it reverses the meaning of the flag (a given short option clears +the flag), and the synopsis of a long option is negated. +.It Fa arg_strings +the argument can be given multiple times, and the values are collected +in an array; +.Fa value +should be a pointer to a +.Fa struct getarg_strings +structure, which holds a length and a string pointer. +.It Fa arg_double +argument is a double precision floating point value, and +.Fa value +should point to a +.Fa double . +.It Fa arg_collect +allows more fine-grained control of the option parsing process. +.Fa value +should be a pointer to a +.Fa getarg_collect_info +structure: +.Bd -literal +typedef int (*getarg_collect_func)(int short_opt, + int argc, + char **argv, + int *optind, + int *optarg, + void *data); + +typedef struct getarg_collect_info { + getarg_collect_func func; + void *data; +} getarg_collect_info; +.Ed +.Pp +With the +.Fa func +member set to a function to call, and +.Fa data +to some application specific data. The parameters to the collect function are: +.Bl -inset +.It Fa short_flag +non-zero if this call is via a short option flag, zero otherwise +.It Fa argc , argv +the whole argument list +.It Fa optind +pointer to the index in argv where the flag is +.It Fa optarg +pointer to the index in argv[*optind] where the flag name starts +.It Fa data +application specific data +.El +.Pp +You can modify +.Fa *optind , +and +.Fa *optarg , +but to do this correct you (more or less) have to know about the inner +workings of getarg. + +You can skip parts of arguments by increasing +.Fa *optarg +(you could +implement the +.Fl z Ns Ar 3 +set of flags from +.Nm gzip +with this), or whole argument strings by increasing +.Fa *optind +(let's say you want a flag +.Fl c Ar x y z +to specify a coordinate); if you also have to set +.Fa *optarg +to a sane value. +.Pp +The collect function should return one of +.Dv ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH , ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG , ARG_ERR_NO_ARG +on error, zero otherwise. +.Pp +For your convenience there is a function, +.Fn getarg_optarg , +that returns the traditional argument string, and you pass it all +arguments, sans data, that where given to the collection function. +.Pp +Don't use this more this unless you absolutely have to. +.El +.Pp +Option parsing is similar to what +.Xr getopt +uses. Short options without arguments can be compressed +.Pf ( Fl xyz +is the same as +.Fl x y z ) , +and short +options with arguments take these as either the rest of the +argv-string or as the next option +.Pf ( Fl o Ns Ar foo , +or +.Fl o Ar foo ) . +.Pp +Long option names are prefixed with -- (double dash), and the value +with a = (equal), +.Fl -foo= Ns Ar bar . +Long option flags can either be specified as they are +.Pf ( Fl -help ) , +or with an (boolean parsable) option +.Pf ( Fl -help= Ns Ar yes , +.Fl -help= Ns Ar true , +or similar), or they can also be negated +.Pf ( Fl -no-help +is the same as +.Fl -help= Ns no ) , +and if you're really confused you can do it multiple times +.Pf ( Fl -no-no-help= Ns Ar false , +or even +.Fl -no-no-help= Ns Ar maybe ) . + +.Pp +.Sh EXAMPLE +.Bd -literal +#include +#include +#include + +char *source = "Ouagadougou"; +char *destination; +int weight; +int include_catalog = 1; +int help_flag; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { "source", 's', arg_string, &source, + "source of shippment", "city" }, + { "destination", 'd', arg_string, &destination, + "destination of shippment", "city" }, + { "weight", 'w', arg_integer, &weight, + "weight of shippment", "tons" }, + { "catalog", 'c', arg_negative_flag, &include_catalog, + "include product catalog" }, + { "help", 'h', arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; + +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); /* number of elements in args */ + +const char *progname = "ship++"; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + if (getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, progname, "stuff..."); + exit (1); + } + if (help_flag) { + arg_printusage(args, num_args, progname, "stuff..."); + exit (0); + } + if (destination == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: must specify destination\n", progname); + exit(1); + } + if (strcmp(source, destination) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: destination must be different from source\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* include more stuff here ... */ + exit(2); +} +.Ed +.Pp +The output help output from this program looks like this: +.Bd -literal +$ ship++ --help +Usage: ship++ [--source=city] [-s city] [--destination=city] [-d city] + [--weight=tons] [-w tons] [--no-catalog] [-c] [--help] [-h] stuff... +-s city, --source=city source of shippment +-d city, --destination=city destination of shippment +-w tons, --weight=tons weight of shippment +-c, --no-catalog include product catalog +.Ed + +.Sh BUGS +It should be more flexible, so it would be possible to use other more +complicated option syntaxes, such as what +.Xr ps 1 , +and +.Xr tar 1 , +uses, or the AFS model where you can skip the flag names as long as +the options come in the correct order. +.Pp +Options with multiple arguments should be handled better. +.Pp +Should be integreated with SL. +.Pp +It's very confusing that the struct you pass in is called getargS. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr getopt 3 diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..505e418 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.c @@ -0,0 +1,547 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getarg.c,v 1.32 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "getarg.h" + +#define ISFLAG(X) ((X).type == arg_flag || (X).type == arg_negative_flag) + +static size_t +print_arg (char *string, size_t len, int mdoc, int longp, struct getargs *arg) +{ + const char *s; + + *string = '\0'; + + if (ISFLAG(*arg) || (!longp && arg->type == arg_counter)) + return 0; + + if(mdoc){ + if(longp) + strlcat(string, "= Ns", len); + strlcat(string, " Ar ", len); + }else + if (longp) + strlcat (string, "=", len); + else + strlcat (string, " ", len); + + if (arg->arg_help) + s = arg->arg_help; + else if (arg->type == arg_integer || arg->type == arg_counter) + s = "integer"; + else if (arg->type == arg_string) + s = "string"; + else if (arg->type == arg_double) + s = "float"; + else + s = ""; + + strlcat(string, s, len); + return 1 + strlen(s); +} + +static void +mandoc_template(struct getargs *args, + size_t num_args, + const char *progname, + const char *extra_string) +{ + int i; + char timestr[64], cmd[64]; + char buf[128]; + const char *p; + time_t t; + + printf(".\\\" Things to fix:\n"); + printf(".\\\" * correct section, and operating system\n"); + printf(".\\\" * remove Op from mandatory flags\n"); + printf(".\\\" * use better macros for arguments (like .Pa for files)\n"); + printf(".\\\"\n"); + t = time(NULL); + strftime(timestr, sizeof(timestr), "%B %e, %Y", localtime(&t)); + printf(".Dd %s\n", timestr); + p = strrchr(progname, '/'); + if(p) p++; else p = progname; + strlcpy(cmd, p, sizeof(cmd)); + strupr(cmd); + + printf(".Dt %s SECTION\n", cmd); + printf(".Os OPERATING_SYSTEM\n"); + printf(".Sh NAME\n"); + printf(".Nm %s\n", p); + printf(".Nd\n"); + printf("in search of a description\n"); + printf(".Sh SYNOPSIS\n"); + printf(".Nm\n"); + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++){ + /* we seem to hit a limit on number of arguments if doing + short and long flags with arguments -- split on two lines */ + if(ISFLAG(args[i]) || + args[i].short_name == 0 || args[i].long_name == NULL) { + printf(".Op "); + + if(args[i].short_name) { + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 0, args + i); + printf("Fl %c%s", args[i].short_name, buf); + if(args[i].long_name) + printf(" | "); + } + if(args[i].long_name) { + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 1, args + i); + printf("Fl -%s%s", args[i].long_name, buf); + } + printf("\n"); + } else { + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 0, args + i); + printf(".Oo Fl %c%s \\*(Ba Xo\n", args[i].short_name, buf); + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 1, args + i); + printf(".Fl -%s%s Oc\n.Xc\n", args[i].long_name, buf); + } + /* + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + fprintf (stderr, "..."); + */ + } + if (extra_string && *extra_string) + printf (".Ar %s\n", extra_string); + printf(".Sh DESCRIPTION\n"); + printf("Supported options:\n"); + printf(".Bl -tag -width Ds\n"); + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++){ + printf(".It Xo\n"); + if(args[i].short_name){ + printf(".Fl %c", args[i].short_name); + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 0, args + i); + printf("%s", buf); + if(args[i].long_name) + printf(" Ns ,"); + printf("\n"); + } + if(args[i].long_name){ + printf(".Fl -%s", args[i].long_name); + print_arg(buf, sizeof(buf), 1, 1, args + i); + printf("%s\n", buf); + } + printf(".Xc\n"); + if(args[i].help) + printf("%s\n", args[i].help); + /* + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + fprintf (stderr, "..."); + */ + } + printf(".El\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh ENVIRONMENT\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh FILES\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh EXAMPLES\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh DIAGNOSTICS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh SEE ALSO\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh STANDARDS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh HISTORY\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh AUTHORS\n"); + printf(".\\\".Sh BUGS\n"); +} + +static int +check_column(FILE *f, int col, int len, int columns) +{ + if(col + len > columns) { + fprintf(f, "\n"); + col = fprintf(f, " "); + } + return col; +} + +void +arg_printusage (struct getargs *args, + size_t num_args, + const char *progname, + const char *extra_string) +{ + int i; + size_t max_len = 0; + char buf[128]; + int col = 0, columns; + struct winsize ws; + + if (progname == NULL) + progname = __progname; + + if(getenv("GETARGMANDOC")){ + mandoc_template(args, num_args, progname, extra_string); + return; + } + if(get_window_size(2, &ws) == 0) + columns = ws.ws_col; + else + columns = 80; + col = 0; + col += fprintf (stderr, "Usage: %s", progname); + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + size_t len = 0; + + if (args[i].long_name) { + buf[0] = '\0'; + strlcat(buf, "[--", sizeof(buf)); + len += 2; + if(args[i].type == arg_negative_flag) { + strlcat(buf, "no-", sizeof(buf)); + len += 3; + } + strlcat(buf, args[i].long_name, sizeof(buf)); + len += strlen(args[i].long_name); + len += print_arg(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + 0, 1, &args[i]); + strlcat(buf, "]", sizeof(buf)); + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + strlcat(buf, "...", sizeof(buf)); + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(buf) + 1, columns); + col += fprintf(stderr, " %s", buf); + } + if (args[i].short_name) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "[-%c", args[i].short_name); + len += 2; + len += print_arg(buf + strlen(buf), sizeof(buf) - strlen(buf), + 0, 0, &args[i]); + strlcat(buf, "]", sizeof(buf)); + if(args[i].type == arg_strings) + strlcat(buf, "...", sizeof(buf)); + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(buf) + 1, columns); + col += fprintf(stderr, " %s", buf); + } + if (args[i].long_name && args[i].short_name) + len += 2; /* ", " */ + max_len = max(max_len, len); + } + if (extra_string) { + col = check_column(stderr, col, strlen(extra_string) + 1, columns); + fprintf (stderr, " %s\n", extra_string); + } else + fprintf (stderr, "\n"); + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + if (args[i].help) { + size_t count = 0; + + if (args[i].short_name) { + count += fprintf (stderr, "-%c", args[i].short_name); + print_arg (buf, sizeof(buf), 0, 0, &args[i]); + count += fprintf(stderr, "%s", buf); + } + if (args[i].short_name && args[i].long_name) + count += fprintf (stderr, ", "); + if (args[i].long_name) { + count += fprintf (stderr, "--"); + if (args[i].type == arg_negative_flag) + count += fprintf (stderr, "no-"); + count += fprintf (stderr, "%s", args[i].long_name); + print_arg (buf, sizeof(buf), 0, 1, &args[i]); + count += fprintf(stderr, "%s", buf); + } + while(count++ <= max_len) + putc (' ', stderr); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", args[i].help); + } + } +} + +static void +add_string(getarg_strings *s, char *value) +{ + s->strings = realloc(s->strings, (s->num_strings + 1) * sizeof(*s->strings)); + s->strings[s->num_strings] = value; + s->num_strings++; +} + +static int +arg_match_long(struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + char *argv, int argc, char **rargv, int *optind) +{ + int i; + char *optarg = NULL; + int negate = 0; + int partial_match = 0; + struct getargs *partial = NULL; + struct getargs *current = NULL; + int argv_len; + char *p; + + argv_len = strlen(argv); + p = strchr (argv, '='); + if (p != NULL) + argv_len = p - argv; + + for (i = 0; i < num_args; ++i) { + if(args[i].long_name) { + int len = strlen(args[i].long_name); + char *p = argv; + int p_len = argv_len; + negate = 0; + + for (;;) { + if (strncmp (args[i].long_name, p, p_len) == 0) { + if(p_len == len) + current = &args[i]; + else { + ++partial_match; + partial = &args[i]; + } + optarg = p + p_len; + } else if (ISFLAG(args[i]) && strncmp (p, "no-", 3) == 0) { + negate = !negate; + p += 3; + p_len -= 3; + continue; + } + break; + } + if (current) + break; + } + } + if (current == NULL) { + if (partial_match == 1) + current = partial; + else + return ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH; + } + + if(*optarg == '\0' + && !ISFLAG(*current) + && current->type != arg_collect + && current->type != arg_counter) + return ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH; + switch(current->type){ + case arg_integer: + { + int tmp; + if(sscanf(optarg + 1, "%d", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(int*)current->value = tmp; + return 0; + } + case arg_string: + { + *(char**)current->value = optarg + 1; + return 0; + } + case arg_strings: + { + add_string((getarg_strings*)current->value, optarg + 1); + return 0; + } + case arg_flag: + case arg_negative_flag: + { + int *flag = current->value; + if(*optarg == '\0' || + strcmp(optarg + 1, "yes") == 0 || + strcmp(optarg + 1, "true") == 0){ + *flag = !negate; + return 0; + } else if (*optarg && strcmp(optarg + 1, "maybe") == 0) { + *flag = rand() & 1; + } else { + *flag = negate; + return 0; + } + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + } + case arg_counter : + { + int val; + + if (*optarg == '\0') + val = 1; + else { + char *endstr; + + val = strtol (optarg, &endstr, 0); + if (endstr == optarg) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + } + *(int *)current->value += val; + return 0; + } + case arg_double: + { + double tmp; + if(sscanf(optarg + 1, "%lf", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(double*)current->value = tmp; + return 0; + } + case arg_collect:{ + struct getarg_collect_info *c = current->value; + int o = argv - rargv[*optind]; + return (*c->func)(FALSE, argc, rargv, optind, &o, c->data); + } + + default: + abort (); + } +} + +static int +arg_match_short (struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + char *argv, int argc, char **rargv, int *optind) +{ + int j, k; + + for(j = 1; j > 0 && j < strlen(rargv[*optind]); j++) { + for(k = 0; k < num_args; k++) { + char *optarg; + + if(args[k].short_name == 0) + continue; + if(argv[j] == args[k].short_name) { + if(args[k].type == arg_flag) { + *(int*)args[k].value = 1; + break; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_negative_flag) { + *(int*)args[k].value = 0; + break; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_counter) { + ++*(int *)args[k].value; + break; + } + if(args[k].type == arg_collect) { + struct getarg_collect_info *c = args[k].value; + + if((*c->func)(TRUE, argc, rargv, optind, &j, c->data)) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + break; + } + + if(argv[j + 1]) + optarg = &argv[j + 1]; + else { + ++*optind; + optarg = rargv[*optind]; + } + if(optarg == NULL) + return ARG_ERR_NO_ARG; + if(args[k].type == arg_integer) { + int tmp; + if(sscanf(optarg, "%d", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(int*)args[k].value = tmp; + return 0; + } else if(args[k].type == arg_string) { + *(char**)args[k].value = optarg; + return 0; + } else if(args[k].type == arg_strings) { + add_string((getarg_strings*)args[k].value, optarg); + return 0; + } else if(args[k].type == arg_double) { + double tmp; + if(sscanf(optarg, "%lf", &tmp) != 1) + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + *(double*)args[k].value = tmp; + return 0; + } + return ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG; + } + } + if (k == num_args) + return ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH; + } + return 0; +} + +int +getarg(struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + int argc, char **argv, int *optind) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + + srand (time(NULL)); + (*optind)++; + for(i = *optind; i < argc; i++) { + if(argv[i][0] != '-') + break; + if(argv[i][1] == '-'){ + if(argv[i][2] == 0){ + i++; + break; + } + ret = arg_match_long (args, num_args, argv[i] + 2, + argc, argv, &i); + } else { + ret = arg_match_short (args, num_args, argv[i], + argc, argv, &i); + } + if(ret) + break; + } + *optind = i; + return ret; +} + +#if TEST +int foo_flag = 2; +int flag1 = 0; +int flag2 = 0; +int bar_int; +char *baz_string; + +struct getargs args[] = { + { NULL, '1', arg_flag, &flag1, "one", NULL }, + { NULL, '2', arg_flag, &flag2, "two", NULL }, + { "foo", 'f', arg_negative_flag, &foo_flag, "foo", NULL }, + { "bar", 'b', arg_integer, &bar_int, "bar", "seconds"}, + { "baz", 'x', arg_string, &baz_string, "baz", "name" }, +}; + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + while(getarg(args, 5, argc, argv, &optind)) + printf("Bad arg: %s\n", argv[optind]); + printf("flag1 = %d\n", flag1); + printf("flag2 = %d\n", flag2); + printf("foo_flag = %d\n", foo_flag); + printf("bar_int = %d\n", bar_int); + printf("baz_flag = %s\n", baz_string); + arg_printusage (args, 5, argv[0], "nothing here"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7fd374b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getarg.h @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: getarg.h,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __GETARG_H__ +#define __GETARG_H__ + +#include + +struct getargs{ + const char *long_name; + char short_name; + enum { arg_integer, + arg_string, + arg_flag, + arg_negative_flag, + arg_strings, + arg_double, + arg_collect, + arg_counter + } type; + void *value; + const char *help; + const char *arg_help; +}; + +enum { + ARG_ERR_NO_MATCH = 1, + ARG_ERR_BAD_ARG, + ARG_ERR_NO_ARG +}; + +typedef struct getarg_strings { + int num_strings; + char **strings; +} getarg_strings; + +typedef int (*getarg_collect_func)(int short_opt, + int argc, + char **argv, + int *optind, + int *optarg, + void *data); + +typedef struct getarg_collect_info { + getarg_collect_func func; + void *data; +} getarg_collect_info; + +int getarg(struct getargs *args, size_t num_args, + int argc, char **argv, int *optind); + +void arg_printusage (struct getargs *args, + size_t num_args, + const char *progname, + const char *extra_string); + +#endif /* __GETARG_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getcap.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getcap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..997fabf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getcap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1118 @@ +/* $NetBSD: getcap.c,v 1.29 1999/03/29 09:27:29 abs Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Casey Leedom of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +RCSID("$Id: getcap.c,v 1.7 1999/11/17 21:11:58 assar Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_DB_185_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define BFRAG 1024 +#if 0 +#define BSIZE 1024 +#endif +#define ESC ('[' & 037) /* ASCII ESC */ +#define MAX_RECURSION 32 /* maximum getent recursion */ +#define SFRAG 100 /* cgetstr mallocs in SFRAG chunks */ + +#define RECOK (char)0 +#define TCERR (char)1 +#define SHADOW (char)2 + +static size_t topreclen; /* toprec length */ +static char *toprec; /* Additional record specified by cgetset() */ +static int gottoprec; /* Flag indicating retrieval of toprecord */ + +#if defined(HAVE_DBOPEN) && defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#define USE_DB +#endif + +#ifdef USE_DB +static int cdbget (DB *, char **, const char *); +#endif +static int getent (char **, size_t *, char **, int, const char *, int, char *); +static int nfcmp (char *, char *); + + +int cgetset(const char *ent); +char *cgetcap(char *buf, const char *cap, int type); +int cgetent(char **buf, char **db_array, const char *name); +int cgetmatch(const char *buf, const char *name); +int cgetclose(void); +#if 0 +int cgetfirst(char **buf, char **db_array); +int cgetnext(char **bp, char **db_array); +#endif +int cgetstr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str); +int cgetustr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str); +int cgetnum(char *buf, const char *cap, long *num); +/* + * Cgetset() allows the addition of a user specified buffer to be added + * to the database array, in effect "pushing" the buffer on top of the + * virtual database. 0 is returned on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +cgetset(const char *ent) +{ + const char *source, *check; + char *dest; + + if (ent == NULL) { + if (toprec) + free(toprec); + toprec = NULL; + topreclen = 0; + return (0); + } + topreclen = strlen(ent); + if ((toprec = malloc (topreclen + 1)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-1); + } + gottoprec = 0; + + source=ent; + dest=toprec; + while (*source) { /* Strip whitespace */ + *dest++ = *source++; /* Do not check first field */ + while (*source == ':') { + check=source+1; + while (*check && (isspace((unsigned char)*check) || + (*check=='\\' && isspace((unsigned char)check[1])))) + ++check; + if( *check == ':' ) + source=check; + else + break; + + } + } + *dest=0; + + return (0); +} + +/* + * Cgetcap searches the capability record buf for the capability cap with + * type `type'. A pointer to the value of cap is returned on success, NULL + * if the requested capability couldn't be found. + * + * Specifying a type of ':' means that nothing should follow cap (:cap:). + * In this case a pointer to the terminating ':' or NUL will be returned if + * cap is found. + * + * If (cap, '@') or (cap, terminator, '@') is found before (cap, terminator) + * return NULL. + */ +char * +cgetcap(char *buf, const char *cap, int type) +{ + char *bp; + const char *cp; + + bp = buf; + for (;;) { + /* + * Skip past the current capability field - it's either the + * name field if this is the first time through the loop, or + * the remainder of a field whose name failed to match cap. + */ + for (;;) + if (*bp == '\0') + return (NULL); + else + if (*bp++ == ':') + break; + + /* + * Try to match (cap, type) in buf. + */ + for (cp = cap; *cp == *bp && *bp != '\0'; cp++, bp++) + continue; + if (*cp != '\0') + continue; + if (*bp == '@') + return (NULL); + if (type == ':') { + if (*bp != '\0' && *bp != ':') + continue; + return(bp); + } + if (*bp != type) + continue; + bp++; + return (*bp == '@' ? NULL : bp); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Cgetent extracts the capability record name from the NULL terminated file + * array db_array and returns a pointer to a malloc'd copy of it in buf. + * Buf must be retained through all subsequent calls to cgetcap, cgetnum, + * cgetflag, and cgetstr, but may then be free'd. 0 is returned on success, + * -1 if the requested record couldn't be found, -2 if a system error was + * encountered (couldn't open/read a file, etc.), and -3 if a potential + * reference loop is detected. + */ +int +cgetent(char **buf, char **db_array, const char *name) +{ + size_t dummy; + + return (getent(buf, &dummy, db_array, -1, name, 0, NULL)); +} + +/* + * Getent implements the functions of cgetent. If fd is non-negative, + * *db_array has already been opened and fd is the open file descriptor. We + * do this to save time and avoid using up file descriptors for tc= + * recursions. + * + * Getent returns the same success/failure codes as cgetent. On success, a + * pointer to a malloc'ed capability record with all tc= capabilities fully + * expanded and its length (not including trailing ASCII NUL) are left in + * *cap and *len. + * + * Basic algorithm: + * + Allocate memory incrementally as needed in chunks of size BFRAG + * for capability buffer. + * + Recurse for each tc=name and interpolate result. Stop when all + * names interpolated, a name can't be found, or depth exceeds + * MAX_RECURSION. + */ +static int +getent(char **cap, size_t *len, char **db_array, int fd, + const char *name, int depth, char *nfield) +{ + char *r_end, *rp = NULL, **db_p; /* pacify gcc */ + int myfd = 0, eof, foundit; + char *record; + int tc_not_resolved; + + /* + * Return with ``loop detected'' error if we've recursed more than + * MAX_RECURSION times. + */ + if (depth > MAX_RECURSION) + return (-3); + + /* + * Check if we have a top record from cgetset(). + */ + if (depth == 0 && toprec != NULL && cgetmatch(toprec, name) == 0) { + if ((record = malloc (topreclen + BFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); + } + (void)strcpy(record, toprec); /* XXX: strcpy is safe */ + db_p = db_array; + rp = record + topreclen + 1; + r_end = rp + BFRAG; + goto tc_exp; + } + /* + * Allocate first chunk of memory. + */ + if ((record = malloc(BFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); + } + r_end = record + BFRAG; + foundit = 0; + /* + * Loop through database array until finding the record. + */ + + for (db_p = db_array; *db_p != NULL; db_p++) { + eof = 0; + + /* + * Open database if not already open. + */ + + if (fd >= 0) { + (void)lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET); + } else { +#ifdef USE_DB + char pbuf[_POSIX_PATH_MAX]; + char *cbuf; + size_t clen; + int retval; + DB *capdbp; + + (void)snprintf(pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), "%s.db", *db_p); + if ((capdbp = dbopen(pbuf, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, 0)) + != NULL) { + free(record); + retval = cdbget(capdbp, &record, name); + if (retval < 0) { + /* no record available */ + (void)capdbp->close(capdbp); + return (retval); + } + /* save the data; close frees it */ + clen = strlen(record); + cbuf = malloc(clen + 1); + memmove(cbuf, record, clen + 1); + if (capdbp->close(capdbp) < 0) { + free(cbuf); + return (-2); + } + *len = clen; + *cap = cbuf; + return (retval); + } else +#endif + { + fd = open(*db_p, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + /* No error on unfound file. */ + continue; + } + myfd = 1; + } + } + /* + * Find the requested capability record ... + */ + { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + char *b_end, *bp, *cp; + int c, slash; + + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is always room for one more character in record. + * R_end always points just past end of record. + * Rp always points just past last character in record. + * B_end always points just past last character in buf. + * Bp always points at next character in buf. + * Cp remembers where the last colon was. + */ + b_end = buf; + bp = buf; + cp = 0; + slash = 0; + for (;;) { + + /* + * Read in a line implementing (\, newline) + * line continuation. + */ + rp = record; + for (;;) { + if (bp >= b_end) { + int n; + + n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (n <= 0) { + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + if (n < 0) { + free(record); + return (-2); + } else { + fd = -1; + eof = 1; + break; + } + } + b_end = buf+n; + bp = buf; + } + + c = *bp++; + if (c == '\n') { + if (slash) { + slash = 0; + rp--; + continue; + } else + break; + } + if (slash) { + slash = 0; + cp = 0; + } + if (c == ':') { + /* + * If the field was `empty' (i.e. + * contained only white space), back up + * to the colon (eliminating the + * field). + */ + if (cp) + rp = cp; + else + cp = rp; + } else if (c == '\\') { + slash = 1; + } else if (c != ' ' && c != '\t') { + /* + * Forget where the colon was, as this + * is not an empty field. + */ + cp = 0; + } + *rp++ = c; + + /* + * Enforce loop invariant: if no room + * left in record buffer, try to get + * some more. + */ + if (rp >= r_end) { + u_int pos; + size_t newsize; + + pos = rp - record; + newsize = r_end - record + BFRAG; + record = realloc(record, newsize); + if (record == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + return (-2); + } + r_end = record + newsize; + rp = record + pos; + } + } + /* Eliminate any white space after the last colon. */ + if (cp) + rp = cp + 1; + /* Loop invariant lets us do this. */ + *rp++ = '\0'; + + /* + * If encountered eof check next file. + */ + if (eof) + break; + + /* + * Toss blank lines and comments. + */ + if (*record == '\0' || *record == '#') + continue; + + /* + * See if this is the record we want ... + */ + if (cgetmatch(record, name) == 0) { + if (nfield == NULL || !nfcmp(nfield, record)) { + foundit = 1; + break; /* found it! */ + } + } + } + } + if (foundit) + break; + } + + if (!foundit) + return (-1); + + /* + * Got the capability record, but now we have to expand all tc=name + * references in it ... + */ + tc_exp: { + char *newicap, *s; + size_t ilen, newilen; + int diff, iret, tclen; + char *icap, *scan, *tc, *tcstart, *tcend; + + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is room for one more character in record. + * R_end points just past end of record. + * Rp points just past last character in record. + * Scan points at remainder of record that needs to be + * scanned for tc=name constructs. + */ + scan = record; + tc_not_resolved = 0; + for (;;) { + if ((tc = cgetcap(scan, "tc", '=')) == NULL) + break; + + /* + * Find end of tc=name and stomp on the trailing `:' + * (if present) so we can use it to call ourselves. + */ + s = tc; + for (;;) + if (*s == '\0') + break; + else + if (*s++ == ':') { + *(s - 1) = '\0'; + break; + } + tcstart = tc - 3; + tclen = s - tcstart; + tcend = s; + + iret = getent(&icap, &ilen, db_p, fd, tc, depth+1, + NULL); + newicap = icap; /* Put into a register. */ + newilen = ilen; + if (iret != 0) { + /* an error */ + if (iret < -1) { + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + free(record); + return (iret); + } + if (iret == 1) + tc_not_resolved = 1; + /* couldn't resolve tc */ + if (iret == -1) { + *(s - 1) = ':'; + scan = s - 1; + tc_not_resolved = 1; + continue; + + } + } + /* not interested in name field of tc'ed record */ + s = newicap; + for (;;) + if (*s == '\0') + break; + else + if (*s++ == ':') + break; + newilen -= s - newicap; + newicap = s; + + /* make sure interpolated record is `:'-terminated */ + s += newilen; + if (*(s-1) != ':') { + *s = ':'; /* overwrite NUL with : */ + newilen++; + } + + /* + * Make sure there's enough room to insert the + * new record. + */ + diff = newilen - tclen; + if (diff >= r_end - rp) { + u_int pos, tcpos, tcposend; + size_t newsize; + + pos = rp - record; + newsize = r_end - record + diff + BFRAG; + tcpos = tcstart - record; + tcposend = tcend - record; + record = realloc(record, newsize); + if (record == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + free(icap); + return (-2); + } + r_end = record + newsize; + rp = record + pos; + tcstart = record + tcpos; + tcend = record + tcposend; + } + + /* + * Insert tc'ed record into our record. + */ + s = tcstart + newilen; + memmove(s, tcend, (size_t)(rp - tcend)); + memmove(tcstart, newicap, newilen); + rp += diff; + free(icap); + + /* + * Start scan on `:' so next cgetcap works properly + * (cgetcap always skips first field). + */ + scan = s-1; + } + + } + /* + * Close file (if we opened it), give back any extra memory, and + * return capability, length and success. + */ + if (myfd) + (void)close(fd); + *len = rp - record - 1; /* don't count NUL */ + if (r_end > rp) + if ((record = + realloc(record, (size_t)(rp - record))) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); + } + + *cap = record; + if (tc_not_resolved) + return (1); + return (0); +} + +#ifdef USE_DB +static int +cdbget(DB *capdbp, char **bp, const char *name) +{ + DBT key; + DBT data; + + /* LINTED key is not modified */ + key.data = (char *)name; + key.size = strlen(name); + + for (;;) { + /* Get the reference. */ + switch(capdbp->get(capdbp, &key, &data, 0)) { + case -1: + return (-2); + case 1: + return (-1); + } + + /* If not an index to another record, leave. */ + if (((char *)data.data)[0] != SHADOW) + break; + + key.data = (char *)data.data + 1; + key.size = data.size - 1; + } + + *bp = (char *)data.data + 1; + return (((char *)(data.data))[0] == TCERR ? 1 : 0); +} +#endif /* USE_DB */ + +/* + * Cgetmatch will return 0 if name is one of the names of the capability + * record buf, -1 if not. + */ +int +cgetmatch(const char *buf, const char *name) +{ + const char *np, *bp; + + /* + * Start search at beginning of record. + */ + bp = buf; + for (;;) { + /* + * Try to match a record name. + */ + np = name; + for (;;) + if (*np == '\0') { + if (*bp == '|' || *bp == ':' || *bp == '\0') + return (0); + else + break; + } else + if (*bp++ != *np++) + break; + + /* + * Match failed, skip to next name in record. + */ + bp--; /* a '|' or ':' may have stopped the match */ + for (;;) + if (*bp == '\0' || *bp == ':') + return (-1); /* match failed totally */ + else + if (*bp++ == '|') + break; /* found next name */ + } +} + +#if 0 +int +cgetfirst(char **buf, char **db_array) +{ + (void)cgetclose(); + return (cgetnext(buf, db_array)); +} +#endif + +static FILE *pfp; +static int slash; +static char **dbp; + +int +cgetclose(void) +{ + if (pfp != NULL) { + (void)fclose(pfp); + pfp = NULL; + } + dbp = NULL; + gottoprec = 0; + slash = 0; + return(0); +} + +#if 0 +/* + * Cgetnext() gets either the first or next entry in the logical database + * specified by db_array. It returns 0 upon completion of the database, 1 + * upon returning an entry with more remaining, and -1 if an error occurs. + */ +int +cgetnext(char **bp, char **db_array) +{ + size_t len; + int status, done; + char *cp, *line, *rp, *np, buf[BSIZE], nbuf[BSIZE]; + size_t dummy; + + if (dbp == NULL) + dbp = db_array; + + if (pfp == NULL && (pfp = fopen(*dbp, "r")) == NULL) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } + for(;;) { + if (toprec && !gottoprec) { + gottoprec = 1; + line = toprec; + } else { + line = fgetln(pfp, &len); + if (line == NULL && pfp) { + if (ferror(pfp)) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } else { + (void)fclose(pfp); + pfp = NULL; + if (*++dbp == NULL) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (0); + } else if ((pfp = + fopen(*dbp, "r")) == NULL) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } else + continue; + } + } else + line[len - 1] = '\0'; + if (len == 1) { + slash = 0; + continue; + } + if (isspace((unsigned char)*line) || + *line == ':' || *line == '#' || slash) { + if (line[len - 2] == '\\') + slash = 1; + else + slash = 0; + continue; + } + if (line[len - 2] == '\\') + slash = 1; + else + slash = 0; + } + + + /* + * Line points to a name line. + */ + done = 0; + np = nbuf; + for (;;) { + for (cp = line; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { + if (*cp == ':') { + *np++ = ':'; + done = 1; + break; + } + if (*cp == '\\') + break; + *np++ = *cp; + } + if (done) { + *np = '\0'; + break; + } else { /* name field extends beyond the line */ + line = fgetln(pfp, &len); + if (line == NULL && pfp) { + if (ferror(pfp)) { + (void)cgetclose(); + return (-1); + } + (void)fclose(pfp); + pfp = NULL; + *np = '\0'; + break; + } else + line[len - 1] = '\0'; + } + } + rp = buf; + for(cp = nbuf; *cp != '\0'; cp++) + if (*cp == '|' || *cp == ':') + break; + else + *rp++ = *cp; + + *rp = '\0'; + /* + * XXX + * Last argument of getent here should be nbuf if we want true + * sequential access in the case of duplicates. + * With NULL, getent will return the first entry found + * rather than the duplicate entry record. This is a + * matter of semantics that should be resolved. + */ + status = getent(bp, &dummy, db_array, -1, buf, 0, NULL); + if (status == -2 || status == -3) + (void)cgetclose(); + + return (status + 1); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} +#endif + +/* + * Cgetstr retrieves the value of the string capability cap from the + * capability record pointed to by buf. A pointer to a decoded, NUL + * terminated, malloc'd copy of the string is returned in the char * + * pointed to by str. The length of the string not including the trailing + * NUL is returned on success, -1 if the requested string capability + * couldn't be found, -2 if a system error was encountered (storage + * allocation failure). + */ +int +cgetstr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str) +{ + u_int m_room; + const char *bp; + char *mp; + int len; + char *mem; + + /* + * Find string capability cap + */ + bp = cgetcap(buf, cap, '='); + if (bp == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * Conversion / storage allocation loop ... Allocate memory in + * chunks SFRAG in size. + */ + if ((mem = malloc(SFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); /* couldn't even allocate the first fragment */ + } + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem; + + while (*bp != ':' && *bp != '\0') { + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is always room for one more character in mem. + * Mp always points just past last character in mem. + * Bp always points at next character in buf. + */ + if (*bp == '^') { + bp++; + if (*bp == ':' || *bp == '\0') + break; /* drop unfinished escape */ + *mp++ = *bp++ & 037; + } else if (*bp == '\\') { + bp++; + if (*bp == ':' || *bp == '\0') + break; /* drop unfinished escape */ + if ('0' <= *bp && *bp <= '7') { + int n, i; + + n = 0; + i = 3; /* maximum of three octal digits */ + do { + n = n * 8 + (*bp++ - '0'); + } while (--i && '0' <= *bp && *bp <= '7'); + *mp++ = n; + } + else switch (*bp++) { + case 'b': case 'B': + *mp++ = '\b'; + break; + case 't': case 'T': + *mp++ = '\t'; + break; + case 'n': case 'N': + *mp++ = '\n'; + break; + case 'f': case 'F': + *mp++ = '\f'; + break; + case 'r': case 'R': + *mp++ = '\r'; + break; + case 'e': case 'E': + *mp++ = ESC; + break; + case 'c': case 'C': + *mp++ = ':'; + break; + default: + /* + * Catches '\', '^', and + * everything else. + */ + *mp++ = *(bp-1); + break; + } + } else + *mp++ = *bp++; + m_room--; + + /* + * Enforce loop invariant: if no room left in current + * buffer, try to get some more. + */ + if (m_room == 0) { + size_t size = mp - mem; + + if ((mem = realloc(mem, size + SFRAG)) == NULL) + return (-2); + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem + size; + } + } + *mp++ = '\0'; /* loop invariant let's us do this */ + m_room--; + len = mp - mem - 1; + + /* + * Give back any extra memory and return value and success. + */ + if (m_room != 0) + if ((mem = realloc(mem, (size_t)(mp - mem))) == NULL) + return (-2); + *str = mem; + return (len); +} + +/* + * Cgetustr retrieves the value of the string capability cap from the + * capability record pointed to by buf. The difference between cgetustr() + * and cgetstr() is that cgetustr does not decode escapes but rather treats + * all characters literally. A pointer to a NUL terminated malloc'd + * copy of the string is returned in the char pointed to by str. The + * length of the string not including the trailing NUL is returned on success, + * -1 if the requested string capability couldn't be found, -2 if a system + * error was encountered (storage allocation failure). + */ +int +cgetustr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str) +{ + u_int m_room; + const char *bp; + char *mp; + int len; + char *mem; + + /* + * Find string capability cap + */ + if ((bp = cgetcap(buf, cap, '=')) == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * Conversion / storage allocation loop ... Allocate memory in + * chunks SFRAG in size. + */ + if ((mem = malloc(SFRAG)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return (-2); /* couldn't even allocate the first fragment */ + } + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem; + + while (*bp != ':' && *bp != '\0') { + /* + * Loop invariants: + * There is always room for one more character in mem. + * Mp always points just past last character in mem. + * Bp always points at next character in buf. + */ + *mp++ = *bp++; + m_room--; + + /* + * Enforce loop invariant: if no room left in current + * buffer, try to get some more. + */ + if (m_room == 0) { + size_t size = mp - mem; + + if ((mem = realloc(mem, size + SFRAG)) == NULL) + return (-2); + m_room = SFRAG; + mp = mem + size; + } + } + *mp++ = '\0'; /* loop invariant let's us do this */ + m_room--; + len = mp - mem - 1; + + /* + * Give back any extra memory and return value and success. + */ + if (m_room != 0) + if ((mem = realloc(mem, (size_t)(mp - mem))) == NULL) + return (-2); + *str = mem; + return (len); +} + +/* + * Cgetnum retrieves the value of the numeric capability cap from the + * capability record pointed to by buf. The numeric value is returned in + * the long pointed to by num. 0 is returned on success, -1 if the requested + * numeric capability couldn't be found. + */ +int +cgetnum(char *buf, const char *cap, long *num) +{ + long n; + int base, digit; + const char *bp; + + /* + * Find numeric capability cap + */ + bp = cgetcap(buf, cap, '#'); + if (bp == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * Look at value and determine numeric base: + * 0x... or 0X... hexadecimal, + * else 0... octal, + * else decimal. + */ + if (*bp == '0') { + bp++; + if (*bp == 'x' || *bp == 'X') { + bp++; + base = 16; + } else + base = 8; + } else + base = 10; + + /* + * Conversion loop ... + */ + n = 0; + for (;;) { + if ('0' <= *bp && *bp <= '9') + digit = *bp - '0'; + else if ('a' <= *bp && *bp <= 'f') + digit = 10 + *bp - 'a'; + else if ('A' <= *bp && *bp <= 'F') + digit = 10 + *bp - 'A'; + else + break; + + if (digit >= base) + break; + + n = n * base + digit; + bp++; + } + + /* + * Return value and success. + */ + *num = n; + return (0); +} + + +/* + * Compare name field of record. + */ +static int +nfcmp(char *nf, char *rec) +{ + char *cp, tmp; + int ret; + + for (cp = rec; *cp != ':'; cp++) + ; + + tmp = *(cp + 1); + *(cp + 1) = '\0'; + ret = strcmp(nf, rec); + *(cp + 1) = tmp; + + return (ret); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getcwd.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getcwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1f2610 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getcwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getcwd.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +char* +getcwd(char *path, size_t size) +{ + char xxx[MaxPathLen]; + char *ret; + ret = getwd(xxx); + if(ret) + strlcpy(path, xxx, size); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getdtablesize.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getdtablesize.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f9c74b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getdtablesize.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getdtablesize.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H +#include +#endif + +int getdtablesize(void) +{ + int files = -1; +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_OPEN_MAX) + files = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX); +#else /* !defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + struct rlimit res; + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &res) == 0) + files = res.rlim_cur; +#else /* !definded(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) */ +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL) && defined(CTL_KERN) && defined(KERN_MAXFILES) + int mib[2]; + size_t len; + + mib[0] = CTL_KERN; + mib[1] = KERN_MAXFILES; + len = sizeof(files); + sysctl(&mib, 2, &files, sizeof(nfil), NULL, 0); +#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYSCTL) */ +#endif /* !definded(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) */ +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) */ + +#ifdef OPEN_MAX + if (files < 0) + files = OPEN_MAX; +#endif + +#ifdef NOFILE + if (files < 0) + files = NOFILE; +#endif + + return files; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getegid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getegid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6eab85 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getegid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETEGID + +RCSID("$Id: getegid.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int getegid(void) +{ + return getgid(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/geteuid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/geteuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bdf531 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/geteuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETEUID + +RCSID("$Id: geteuid.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int geteuid(void) +{ + return getuid(); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getgid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getgid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2ca01a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getgid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETGID + +RCSID("$Id: getgid.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int getgid(void) +{ + return 17; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gethostname.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gethostname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..753ba9f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gethostname.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETHOSTNAME + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H +#include +#endif + +/* + * Return the local host's name in "name", up to "namelen" characters. + * "name" will be null-terminated if "namelen" is big enough. + * The return code is 0 on success, -1 on failure. (The calling + * interface is identical to gethostname(2).) + */ + +int +gethostname(char *name, int namelen) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_UNAME) + { + struct utsname utsname; + int ret; + + ret = uname (&utsname); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + strlcpy (name, utsname.nodename, namelen); + return 0; + } +#else + strlcpy (name, "some.random.host", namelen); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#endif /* GETHOSTNAME */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getipnodebyaddr.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getipnodebyaddr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f22aad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getipnodebyaddr.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getipnodebyaddr.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* + * lookup `src, len' (address family `af') in DNS and return a pointer + * to a malloced struct hostent or NULL. + */ + +struct hostent * +getipnodebyaddr (const void *src, size_t len, int af, int *error_num) +{ + struct hostent *tmp; + + tmp = gethostbyaddr (src, len, af); + if (tmp == NULL) { + switch (h_errno) { + case HOST_NOT_FOUND : + case TRY_AGAIN : + case NO_RECOVERY : + *error_num = h_errno; + break; + case NO_DATA : + *error_num = NO_ADDRESS; + break; + default : + *error_num = NO_RECOVERY; + break; + } + return NULL; + } + tmp = copyhostent (tmp); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_num = TRY_AGAIN; + return NULL; + } + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getipnodebyname.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getipnodebyname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..576feef --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getipnodebyname.c @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getipnodebyname.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRNO +static int h_errno = NO_RECOVERY; +#endif + +/* + * lookup `name' (address family `af') in DNS and return a pointer + * to a malloced struct hostent or NULL. + */ + +struct hostent * +getipnodebyname (const char *name, int af, int flags, int *error_num) +{ + struct hostent *tmp; + +#ifdef HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME2 + tmp = gethostbyname2 (name, af); +#else + if (af != AF_INET) { + *error_num = NO_ADDRESS; + return NULL; + } + tmp = gethostbyname (name); +#endif + if (tmp == NULL) { + switch (h_errno) { + case HOST_NOT_FOUND : + case TRY_AGAIN : + case NO_RECOVERY : + *error_num = h_errno; + break; + case NO_DATA : + *error_num = NO_ADDRESS; + break; + default : + *error_num = NO_RECOVERY; + break; + } + return NULL; + } + tmp = copyhostent (tmp); + if (tmp == NULL) { + *error_num = TRY_AGAIN; + return NULL; + } + return tmp; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getnameinfo.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getnameinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e2d232 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getnameinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getnameinfo.c,v 1.2 1999/12/03 04:10:07 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +static int +doit (int af, + const void *addr, + size_t addrlen, + int port, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags) +{ + if (host != NULL) { + if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) { + if (inet_ntop (af, addr, host, hostlen) == NULL) + return EAI_SYSTEM; + } else { + struct hostent *he = gethostbyaddr (addr, + addrlen, + af); + if (he != NULL) { + strlcpy (host, he->h_name, hostlen); + if (flags & NI_NOFQDN) { + char *dot = strchr (host, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) + *dot = '\0'; + } + } else if (flags & NI_NAMEREQD) { + return EAI_NONAME; + } else if (inet_ntop (AF_INET, addr, host, hostlen) == NULL) + return EAI_SYSTEM; + } + } + + if (serv != NULL) { + if (flags & NI_NUMERICSERV) { + snprintf (serv, servlen, "%u", ntohs(port)); + } else { + const char *proto = "tcp"; + struct servent *se; + + if (flags & NI_DGRAM) + proto = "udp"; + + se = getservbyport (port, proto); + if (se == NULL) { + snprintf (serv, servlen, "%u", ntohs(port)); + } else { + strlcpy (serv, se->s_name, servlen); + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * + */ + +int +getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + return doit (AF_INET6, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr), + sin6->sin6_port, + host, hostlen, + serv, servlen, + flags); + } +#endif + case AF_INET : { + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + return doit (AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, sizeof(sin->sin_addr), + sin->sin_port, + host, hostlen, + serv, servlen, + flags); + } + default : + return EAI_FAMILY; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getnameinfo_verified.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getnameinfo_verified.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a23d24 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getnameinfo_verified.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: getnameinfo_verified.c,v 1.2 1999/12/05 10:52:09 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +getnameinfo_verified(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags) +{ + int ret; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a; + + if (host == NULL) + return EAI_NONAME; + + ret = getnameinfo (sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = getaddrinfo (host, serv, NULL, &ai); + if (ret) + return ret; + for (a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) { + if (a->ai_addrlen == salen + && memcmp (a->ai_addr, sa, salen) == 0) + return 0; + } + if (flags & NI_NAMEREQD) + return EAI_NONAME; + ret = getnameinfo (sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, + flags | NI_NUMERICSERV | NI_NUMERICHOST); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getopt.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getopt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45fc350 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +static char sccsid[] = "@(#)getopt.c 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/4/93"; +#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ + +#ifndef __STDC__ +#define const +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * get option letter from argument vector + */ +int opterr = 1, /* if error message should be printed */ + optind = 1, /* index into parent argv vector */ + optopt, /* character checked for validity */ + optreset; /* reset getopt */ +char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */ + +#define BADCH (int)'?' +#define BADARG (int)':' +#define EMSG "" + +int +getopt(nargc, nargv, ostr) + int nargc; + char * const *nargv; + const char *ostr; +{ + static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */ + char *oli; /* option letter list index */ + char *p; + + if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */ + optreset = 0; + if (optind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[optind]) != '-') { + place = EMSG; + return(-1); + } + if (place[1] && *++place == '-') { /* found "--" */ + ++optind; + place = EMSG; + return(-1); + } + } /* option letter okay? */ + if ((optopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' || + !(oli = strchr(ostr, optopt))) { + /* + * if the user didn't specify '-' as an option, + * assume it means -1 (EOF). + */ + if (optopt == (int)'-') + return(-1); + if (!*place) + ++optind; + if (opterr && *ostr != ':') { + if (!(p = strrchr(*nargv, '/'))) + p = *nargv; + else + ++p; + fprintf(stderr, "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", + p, optopt); + } + return(BADCH); + } + if (*++oli != ':') { /* don't need argument */ + optarg = NULL; + if (!*place) + ++optind; + } + else { /* need an argument */ + if (*place) /* no white space */ + optarg = place; + else if (nargc <= ++optind) { /* no arg */ + place = EMSG; + if (!(p = strrchr(*nargv, '/'))) + p = *nargv; + else + ++p; + if (*ostr == ':') + return(BADARG); + if (opterr) + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: option requires an argument -- %c\n", + p, optopt); + return(BADCH); + } + else /* white space */ + optarg = nargv[optind]; + place = EMSG; + ++optind; + } + return(optopt); /* dump back option letter */ +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gettimeofday.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gettimeofday.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec8b62f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/gettimeofday.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#ifndef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +RCSID("$Id: gettimeofday.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +/* + * Simple gettimeofday that only returns seconds. + */ +int +gettimeofday (struct timeval *tp, void *ignore) +{ + time_t t; + + t = time(NULL); + tp->tv_sec = t; + tp->tv_usec = 0; + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getuid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ebce0a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETUID + +RCSID("$Id: getuid.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:46 joda Exp $"); + +int getuid(void) +{ + return 17; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getusershell.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getusershell.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87a48ec --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/getusershell.c @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1985, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +RCSID("$Id: getusershell.c,v 1.8 1997/04/20 06:18:03 assar Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_SHELLS +#define _PATH_SHELLS "/etc/shells" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +#define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_CSHELL +#define _PATH_CSHELL "/bin/csh" +#endif + +/* + * Local shells should NOT be added here. They should be added in + * /etc/shells. + */ + +static char *okshells[] = { _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_CSHELL, NULL }; +static char **curshell, **shells, *strings; +static char **initshells (void); + +/* + * Get a list of shells from _PATH_SHELLS, if it exists. + */ +char * +getusershell() +{ + char *ret; + + if (curshell == NULL) + curshell = initshells(); + ret = *curshell; + if (ret != NULL) + curshell++; + return (ret); +} + +void +endusershell() +{ + + if (shells != NULL) + free(shells); + shells = NULL; + if (strings != NULL) + free(strings); + strings = NULL; + curshell = NULL; +} + +void +setusershell() +{ + + curshell = initshells(); +} + +static char ** +initshells() +{ + char **sp, *cp; + FILE *fp; + struct stat statb; + + if (shells != NULL) + free(shells); + shells = NULL; + if (strings != NULL) + free(strings); + strings = NULL; + if ((fp = fopen(_PATH_SHELLS, "r")) == NULL) + return (okshells); + if (fstat(fileno(fp), &statb) == -1) { + fclose(fp); + return (okshells); + } + if ((strings = malloc((u_int)statb.st_size)) == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + return (okshells); + } + shells = calloc((unsigned)statb.st_size / 3, sizeof (char *)); + if (shells == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + free(strings); + strings = NULL; + return (okshells); + } + sp = shells; + cp = strings; + while (fgets(cp, MaxPathLen + 1, fp) != NULL) { + while (*cp != '#' && *cp != '/' && *cp != '\0') + cp++; + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + *sp++ = cp; + while (!isspace(*cp) && *cp != '#' && *cp != '\0') + cp++; + *cp++ = '\0'; + } + *sp = NULL; + fclose(fp); + return (shells); +} +#endif /* HAVE_GETUSERSHELL */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/glob.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/glob.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66e8ec6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/glob.c @@ -0,0 +1,835 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2. + * + * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh). + * + * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX: + * + * GLOB_QUOTE: + * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following + * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained). + * GLOB_MAGCHAR: + * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character. + * GLOB_NOMAGIC: + * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did + * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing] + * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC: + * Use alternately specified directory access functions. + * GLOB_TILDE: + * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo + * GLOB_BRACE: + * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b + * gl_matchc: + * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "glob.h" +#include "roken.h" + +#define CHAR_DOLLAR '$' +#define CHAR_DOT '.' +#define CHAR_EOS '\0' +#define CHAR_LBRACKET '[' +#define CHAR_NOT '!' +#define CHAR_QUESTION '?' +#define CHAR_QUOTE '\\' +#define CHAR_RANGE '-' +#define CHAR_RBRACKET ']' +#define CHAR_SEP '/' +#define CHAR_STAR '*' +#define CHAR_TILDE '~' +#define CHAR_UNDERSCORE '_' +#define CHAR_LBRACE '{' +#define CHAR_RBRACE '}' +#define CHAR_SLASH '/' +#define CHAR_COMMA ',' + +#ifndef DEBUG + +#define M_QUOTE 0x8000 +#define M_PROTECT 0x4000 +#define M_MASK 0xffff +#define M_ASCII 0x00ff + +typedef u_short Char; + +#else + +#define M_QUOTE 0x80 +#define M_PROTECT 0x40 +#define M_MASK 0xff +#define M_ASCII 0x7f + +typedef char Char; + +#endif + + +#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII)) +#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE)) +#define M_ALL META('*') +#define M_END META(']') +#define M_NOT META('!') +#define M_ONE META('?') +#define M_RNG META('-') +#define M_SET META('[') +#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) + + +static int compare (const void *, const void *); +static void g_Ctoc (const Char *, char *); +static int g_lstat (Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static DIR *g_opendir (Char *, glob_t *); +static Char *g_strchr (Char *, int); +#ifdef notdef +static Char *g_strcat (Char *, const Char *); +#endif +static int g_stat (Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static int glob0 (const Char *, glob_t *); +static int glob1 (Char *, glob_t *); +static int glob2 (Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *); +static int glob3 (Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *); +static int globextend (const Char *, glob_t *); +static const Char * globtilde (const Char *, Char *, glob_t *); +static int globexp1 (const Char *, glob_t *); +static int globexp2 (const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *); +static int match (Char *, Char *, Char *); +#ifdef DEBUG +static void qprintf (const char *, Char *); +#endif + +int +glob(const char *pattern, + int flags, + int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), + glob_t *pglob) +{ + const u_char *patnext; + int c; + Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MaxPathLen+1]; + + patnext = (u_char *) pattern; + if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) { + pglob->gl_pathc = 0; + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS)) + pglob->gl_offs = 0; + } + pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; + pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; + pglob->gl_matchc = 0; + + bufnext = patbuf; + bufend = bufnext + MaxPathLen; + if (flags & GLOB_QUOTE) { + /* Protect the quoted characters. */ + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != CHAR_EOS) + if (c == CHAR_QUOTE) { + if ((c = *patnext++) == CHAR_EOS) { + c = CHAR_QUOTE; + --patnext; + } + *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT; + } + else + *bufnext++ = c; + } + else + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != CHAR_EOS) + *bufnext++ = c; + *bufnext = CHAR_EOS; + + if (flags & GLOB_BRACE) + return globexp1(patbuf, pglob); + else + return glob0(patbuf, pglob); +} + +/* + * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion + * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic + * characters + */ +static int globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob) +{ + const Char* ptr = pattern; + int rv; + + /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ + if (pattern[0] == CHAR_LBRACE && pattern[1] == CHAR_RBRACE && pattern[2] == CHAR_EOS) + return glob0(pattern, pglob); + + while ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr((Char *) ptr, CHAR_LBRACE)) != NULL) + if (!globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, &rv)) + return rv; + + return glob0(pattern, pglob); +} + + +/* + * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace. + * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern. + * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. + */ +static int globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, + glob_t *pglob, int *rv) +{ + int i; + Char *lm, *ls; + const Char *pe, *pm, *pl; + Char patbuf[MaxPathLen + 1]; + + /* copy part up to the brace */ + for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++) + continue; + ls = lm; + + /* Find the balanced brace */ + for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++) + if (*pe == CHAR_LBRACKET) { + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pm = pe++; *pe != CHAR_RBRACKET && *pe != CHAR_EOS; pe++) + continue; + if (*pe == CHAR_EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching CHAR_RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for CHAR_RBRACE + */ + pe = pm; + } + } + else if (*pe == CHAR_LBRACE) + i++; + else if (*pe == CHAR_RBRACE) { + if (i == 0) + break; + i--; + } + + /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */ + if (i != 0 || *pe == CHAR_EOS) { + *rv = glob0(patbuf, pglob); + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) + switch (*pm) { + case CHAR_LBRACKET: + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pl = pm++; *pm != CHAR_RBRACKET && *pm != CHAR_EOS; pm++) + continue; + if (*pm == CHAR_EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching CHAR_RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for CHAR_RBRACE + */ + pm = pl; + } + break; + + case CHAR_LBRACE: + i++; + break; + + case CHAR_RBRACE: + if (i) { + i--; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CHAR_COMMA: + if (i && *pm == CHAR_COMMA) + break; + else { + /* Append the current string */ + for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++) + continue; + /* + * Append the rest of the pattern after the + * closing brace + */ + for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != CHAR_EOS;) + continue; + + /* Expand the current pattern */ +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf); +#endif + *rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob); + + /* move after the comma, to the next string */ + pl = pm + 1; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + *rv = 0; + return 0; +} + + + +/* + * expand tilde from the passwd file. + */ +static const Char * +globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, glob_t *pglob) +{ + struct passwd *pwd; + char *h; + const Char *p; + Char *b; + + if (*pattern != CHAR_TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE)) + return pattern; + + /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */ + for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf; *p && *p != CHAR_SLASH; + *h++ = *p++) + continue; + + *h = CHAR_EOS; + + if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == CHAR_EOS) { + /* + * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME + * first and then trying the password file + */ + if ((h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { + if ((pwd = k_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + } + else { + /* + * Expand a ~user + */ + if ((pwd = k_getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + + /* Copy the home directory */ + for (b = patbuf; *h; *b++ = *h++) + continue; + + /* Append the rest of the pattern */ + while ((*b++ = *p++) != CHAR_EOS) + continue; + + return patbuf; +} + + +/* + * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing + * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally + * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0 + * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error + * to find no matches. + */ +static int +glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob) +{ + const Char *qpatnext; + int c, err, oldpathc; + Char *bufnext, patbuf[MaxPathLen+1]; + + qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, pglob); + oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc; + bufnext = patbuf; + + /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */ + while ((c = *qpatnext++) != CHAR_EOS) { + switch (c) { + case CHAR_LBRACKET: + c = *qpatnext; + if (c == CHAR_NOT) + ++qpatnext; + if (*qpatnext == CHAR_EOS || + g_strchr((Char *) qpatnext+1, CHAR_RBRACKET) == NULL) { + *bufnext++ = CHAR_LBRACKET; + if (c == CHAR_NOT) + --qpatnext; + break; + } + *bufnext++ = M_SET; + if (c == CHAR_NOT) + *bufnext++ = M_NOT; + c = *qpatnext++; + do { + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + if (*qpatnext == CHAR_RANGE && + (c = qpatnext[1]) != CHAR_RBRACKET) { + *bufnext++ = M_RNG; + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + qpatnext += 2; + } + } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != CHAR_RBRACKET); + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_END; + break; + case CHAR_QUESTION: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_ONE; + break; + case CHAR_STAR: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + /* collapse adjacent stars to one, + * to avoid exponential behavior + */ + if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL) + *bufnext++ = M_ALL; + break; + default: + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + break; + } + } + *bufnext = CHAR_EOS; +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("glob0:", patbuf); +#endif + + if ((err = glob1(patbuf, pglob)) != 0) + return(err); + + /* + * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern + * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified + * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters + * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh. + */ + if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc && + ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) || + ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) && + !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))) + return(globextend(pattern, pglob)); + else if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) + qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc, + pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), compare); + return(0); +} + +static int +compare(const void *p, const void *q) +{ + return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q)); +} + +static int +glob1(Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob) +{ + Char pathbuf[MaxPathLen+1]; + + /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */ + if (*pattern == CHAR_EOS) + return(0); + return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf, pattern, pglob)); +} + +/* + * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level + * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more + * meta characters. + */ + +#ifndef S_ISLNK +#if defined(S_IFLNK) && defined(S_IFMT) +#define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) +#else +#define S_ISLNK(mode) 0 +#endif +#endif + +static int +glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob) +{ + struct stat sb; + Char *p, *q; + int anymeta; + + /* + * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until + * segment with meta character found. + */ + for (anymeta = 0;;) { + if (*pattern == CHAR_EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) + return(0); + + if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && + pathend[-1] != CHAR_SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) + || (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && + (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) && + S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) { + *pathend++ = CHAR_SEP; + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + } + ++pglob->gl_matchc; + return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob)); + } + + /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */ + q = pathend; + p = pattern; + while (*p != CHAR_EOS && *p != CHAR_SEP) { + if (ismeta(*p)) + anymeta = 1; + *q++ = *p++; + } + + if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */ + pathend = q; + pattern = p; + while (*pattern == CHAR_SEP) + *pathend++ = *pattern++; + } else /* Need expansion, recurse. */ + return(glob3(pathbuf, pathend, pattern, p, pglob)); + } + /* CHAR_NOTREACHED */ +} + +static int +glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, + glob_t *pglob) +{ + struct dirent *dp; + DIR *dirp; + int err; + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + /* + * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is + * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h + * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque + * structures. + */ + struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *); + + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + errno = 0; + + if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { + /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */ + if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { + g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf); + if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) || + pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR) + return (GLOB_ABEND); + } + return(0); + } + + err = 0; + + /* Search directory for matching names. */ + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; + else + readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir; + while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) { + u_char *sc; + Char *dc; + + /* Initial CHAR_DOT must be matched literally. */ + if (dp->d_name[0] == CHAR_DOT && *pattern != CHAR_DOT) + continue; + for (sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name, dc = pathend; + (*dc++ = *sc++) != CHAR_EOS;) + continue; + if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) { + *pathend = CHAR_EOS; + continue; + } + err = glob2(pathbuf, --dc, restpattern, pglob); + if (err) + break; + } + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp); + else + closedir(dirp); + return(err); +} + + +/* + * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accomodate a new item, + * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. + * + * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size + * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic + * behavior. + * + * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated. + * + * Invariant of the glob_t structure: + * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and + * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. + */ +static int +globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char **pathv; + int i; + u_int newsize; + char *copy; + const Char *p; + + newsize = sizeof(*pathv) * (2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs); + pathv = pglob->gl_pathv ? + realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newsize) : + malloc(newsize); + if (pathv == NULL) + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + + if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { + /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ + pathv += pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) + *--pathv = NULL; + } + pglob->gl_pathv = pathv; + + for (p = path; *p++;) + continue; + if ((copy = malloc(p - path)) != NULL) { + g_Ctoc(path, copy); + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy; + } + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; + return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0); +} + + +/* + * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the * + * pattern causes a recursion level. + */ +static int +match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend) +{ + int ok, negate_range; + Char c, k; + + while (pat < patend) { + c = *pat++; + switch (c & M_MASK) { + case M_ALL: + if (pat == patend) + return(1); + do + if (match(name, pat, patend)) + return(1); + while (*name++ != CHAR_EOS); + return(0); + case M_ONE: + if (*name++ == CHAR_EOS) + return(0); + break; + case M_SET: + ok = 0; + if ((k = *name++) == CHAR_EOS) + return(0); + if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != CHAR_EOS) + ++pat; + while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) + if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) { + if (c <= k && k <= pat[1]) + ok = 1; + pat += 2; + } else if (c == k) + ok = 1; + if (ok == negate_range) + return(0); + break; + default: + if (*name++ != c) + return(0); + break; + } + } + return(*name == CHAR_EOS); +} + +/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */ +void +globfree(glob_t *pglob) +{ + int i; + char **pp; + + if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) { + pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp) + if (*pp) + free(*pp); + free(pglob->gl_pathv); + } +} + +static DIR * +g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + if (!*str) + strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof(buf)); + else + g_Ctoc(str, buf); + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf)); + + return(opendir(buf)); +} + +static int +g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + g_Ctoc(fn, buf); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb)); + return(lstat(buf, sb)); +} + +static int +g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MaxPathLen]; + + g_Ctoc(fn, buf); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb)); + return(stat(buf, sb)); +} + +static Char * +g_strchr(Char *str, int ch) +{ + do { + if (*str == ch) + return (str); + } while (*str++); + return (NULL); +} + +#ifdef notdef +static Char * +g_strcat(Char *dst, const Char *src) +{ + Char *sdst = dst; + + while (*dst++) + continue; + --dst; + while((*dst++ = *src++) != CHAR_EOS) + continue; + + return (sdst); +} +#endif + +static void +g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf) +{ + char *dc; + + for (dc = buf; (*dc++ = *str++) != CHAR_EOS;) + continue; +} + +#ifdef DEBUG +static void +qprintf(const Char *str, Char *s) +{ + Char *p; + + printf("%s:\n", str); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + printf("%c", CHAR(*p)); + printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' '); + printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' '); + printf("\n"); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/glob.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/glob.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bece48a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/glob.h @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +#ifndef _GLOB_H_ +#define _GLOB_H_ + +struct stat; +typedef struct { + int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */ + int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */ + int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */ + int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ + char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ + /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ + int (*gl_errfunc) (const char *, int); + + /* + * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement + * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) + * and lstat(2). + */ + void (*gl_closedir) (void *); + struct dirent *(*gl_readdir) (void *); + void *(*gl_opendir) (const char *); + int (*gl_lstat) (const char *, struct stat *); + int (*gl_stat) (const char *, struct stat *); +} glob_t; + +#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */ +#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */ +#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */ +#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */ +#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */ +#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */ + +#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */ +#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */ +#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */ +#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */ +#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */ +#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */ + +#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */ +#define GLOB_ABEND (-2) /* Unignored error. */ + +int glob (const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); +void globfree (glob_t *); + +#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/hstrerror.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/hstrerror.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11b6a03 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/hstrerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: hstrerror.c,v 1.23 1999/12/05 13:18:55 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_HSTRERROR + +#if (defined(SunOS) && (SunOS >= 50)) +#define hstrerror broken_proto +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#if (defined(SunOS) && (SunOS >= 50)) +#undef hstrerror +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRNO +int h_errno = -17; /* Some magic number */ +#endif + +#if !(defined(HAVE_H_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_H_NERR)) +static const char *const h_errlist[] = { + "Resolver Error 0 (no error)", + "Unknown host", /* 1 HOST_NOT_FOUND */ + "Host name lookup failure", /* 2 TRY_AGAIN */ + "Unknown server error", /* 3 NO_RECOVERY */ + "No address associated with name", /* 4 NO_ADDRESS */ +}; + +static +const +int h_nerr = { sizeof h_errlist / sizeof h_errlist[0] }; +#else + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRLIST_DECLARATION +extern const char *h_errlist[]; +extern int h_nerr; +#endif + +#endif + +const char * +hstrerror(int herr) +{ + if (0 <= herr && herr < h_nerr) + return h_errlist[herr]; + else if(herr == -17) + return "unknown error"; + else + return "Error number out of range (hstrerror)"; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_aton.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_aton.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdc6bdd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_aton.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: inet_aton.c,v 1.13 1999/12/05 13:26:20 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +/* Minimal implementation of inet_aton. + * Cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. */ + +int +inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) +{ + addr->s_addr = inet_addr(cp); + return (addr->s_addr == INADDR_NONE) ? 0 : 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_ntop.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_ntop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f79a35e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_ntop.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: inet_ntop.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +/* + * + */ + +static const char * +inet_ntop_v4 (const void *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + const char digits[] = "0123456789"; + int i; + struct in_addr *addr = (struct in_addr *)src; + u_long a = ntohl(addr->s_addr); + const char *orig_dst = dst; + + if (size < INET_ADDRSTRLEN) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + int n = (a >> (24 - i * 8)) & 0xFF; + int non_zerop = 0; + + if (non_zerop || n / 100 > 0) { + *dst++ = digits[n / 100]; + n %= 100; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || n / 10 > 0) { + *dst++ = digits[n / 10]; + n %= 10; + non_zerop = 1; + } + *dst++ = digits[n]; + if (i != 3) + *dst++ = '.'; + } + *dst++ = '\0'; + return orig_dst; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 +static const char * +inet_ntop_v6 (const void *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + const char xdigits[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + int i; + const struct in6_addr *addr = (struct in6_addr *)src; + const u_char *ptr = addr->s6_addr; + const char *orig_dst = dst; + + if (size < INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) { + int non_zerop = 1; + + if (non_zerop || (ptr[0] >> 4)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[0] >> 4]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || (ptr[0] & 0x0F)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[0] & 0x0F]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || (ptr[1] >> 4)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[1] >> 4]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (non_zerop || (ptr[1] & 0x0F)) { + *dst++ = xdigits[ptr[1] & 0x0F]; + non_zerop = 1; + } + if (i != 7) + *dst++ = ':'; + ptr += 2; + } + *dst++ = '\0'; + return orig_dst; +} +#endif /* HAVE_IPV6 */ + +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET : + return inet_ntop_v4 (src, dst, size); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + return inet_ntop_v6 (src, dst, size); +#endif + default : + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + return NULL; + } +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_pton.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_pton.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b195c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/inet_pton.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: inet_pton.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +int +inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst) +{ + if (af != AF_INET) { + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + return -1; + } + return inet_aton (src, dst); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/initgroups.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/initgroups.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dcf1d08 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/initgroups.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: initgroups.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +initgroups(const char *name, gid_t basegid) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/innetgr.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/innetgr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bc57f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/innetgr.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR + +RCSID("$Id: innetgr.c,v 1.1 1999/03/11 14:04:01 joda Exp $"); + +int +innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *machine, + const char *user, const char *domain) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/iruserok.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/iruserok.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b3880b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/iruserok.c @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by the University of + * California, Berkeley and its contributors. + * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: iruserok.c,v 1.23 1999/12/05 13:27:05 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int __check_rhosts_file = 1; +char *__rcmd_errstr = 0; + +/* + * Returns "true" if match, 0 if no match. + */ +static +int +__icheckhost(unsigned raddr, const char *lhost) +{ + struct hostent *hp; + u_long laddr; + char **pp; + + /* Try for raw ip address first. */ + if (isdigit((unsigned char)*lhost) + && (long)(laddr = inet_addr(lhost)) != -1) + return (raddr == laddr); + + /* Better be a hostname. */ + if ((hp = gethostbyname(lhost)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* Spin through ip addresses. */ + for (pp = hp->h_addr_list; *pp; ++pp) + if (memcmp(&raddr, *pp, sizeof(u_long)) == 0) + return (1); + + /* No match. */ + return (0); +} + +/* + * Returns 0 if ok, -1 if not ok. + */ +static +int +__ivaliduser(FILE *hostf, unsigned raddr, const char *luser, + const char *ruser) +{ + char *user, *p; + int ch; + char buf[MaxHostNameLen + 128]; /* host + login */ + char hname[MaxHostNameLen]; + struct hostent *hp; + /* Presumed guilty until proven innocent. */ + int userok = 0, hostok = 0; +#ifdef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN + char *ypdomain; + + if (yp_get_default_domain(&ypdomain)) + ypdomain = NULL; +#else +#define ypdomain NULL +#endif + /* We need to get the damn hostname back for netgroup matching. */ + if ((hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&raddr, + sizeof(u_long), + AF_INET)) == NULL) + return (-1); + strlcpy(hname, hp->h_name, sizeof(hname)); + + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), hostf)) { + p = buf; + /* Skip lines that are too long. */ + if (strchr(p, '\n') == NULL) { + while ((ch = getc(hostf)) != '\n' && ch != EOF); + continue; + } + if (*p == '\n' || *p == '#') { + /* comment... */ + continue; + } + while (*p != '\n' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t' && *p != '\0') { + if (isupper((unsigned char)*p)) + *p = tolower((unsigned char)*p); + p++; + } + if (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') { + *p++ = '\0'; + while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') + p++; + user = p; + while (*p != '\n' && *p != ' ' && + *p != '\t' && *p != '\0') + p++; + } else + user = p; + *p = '\0'; + /* + * Do +/- and +@/-@ checking. This looks really nasty, + * but it matches SunOS's behavior so far as I can tell. + */ + switch(buf[0]) { + case '+': + if (!buf[1]) { /* '+' matches all hosts */ + hostok = 1; + break; + } + if (buf[1] == '@') /* match a host by netgroup */ + hostok = innetgr((char *)&buf[2], + (char *)&hname, NULL, ypdomain); + else /* match a host by addr */ + hostok = __icheckhost(raddr,(char *)&buf[1]); + break; + case '-': /* reject '-' hosts and all their users */ + if (buf[1] == '@') { + if (innetgr((char *)&buf[2], + (char *)&hname, NULL, ypdomain)) + return(-1); + } else { + if (__icheckhost(raddr,(char *)&buf[1])) + return(-1); + } + break; + default: /* if no '+' or '-', do a simple match */ + hostok = __icheckhost(raddr, buf); + break; + } + switch(*user) { + case '+': + if (!*(user+1)) { /* '+' matches all users */ + userok = 1; + break; + } + if (*(user+1) == '@') /* match a user by netgroup */ + userok = innetgr(user+2, NULL, (char *)ruser, + ypdomain); + else /* match a user by direct specification */ + userok = !(strcmp(ruser, user+1)); + break; + case '-': /* if we matched a hostname, */ + if (hostok) { /* check for user field rejections */ + if (!*(user+1)) + return(-1); + if (*(user+1) == '@') { + if (innetgr(user+2, NULL, + (char *)ruser, ypdomain)) + return(-1); + } else { + if (!strcmp(ruser, user+1)) + return(-1); + } + } + break; + default: /* no rejections: try to match the user */ + if (hostok) + userok = !(strcmp(ruser,*user ? user : luser)); + break; + } + if (hostok && userok) + return(0); + } + return (-1); +} + +/* + * New .rhosts strategy: We are passed an ip address. We spin through + * hosts.equiv and .rhosts looking for a match. When the .rhosts only + * has ip addresses, we don't have to trust a nameserver. When it + * contains hostnames, we spin through the list of addresses the nameserver + * gives us and look for a match. + * + * Returns 0 if ok, -1 if not ok. + */ +int +iruserok(unsigned raddr, int superuser, const char *ruser, const char *luser) +{ + char *cp; + struct stat sbuf; + struct passwd *pwd; + FILE *hostf; + uid_t uid; + int first; + char pbuf[MaxPathLen]; + + first = 1; + hostf = superuser ? NULL : fopen(_PATH_HEQUIV, "r"); +again: + if (hostf) { + if (__ivaliduser(hostf, raddr, luser, ruser) == 0) { + fclose(hostf); + return (0); + } + fclose(hostf); + } + if (first == 1 && (__check_rhosts_file || superuser)) { + first = 0; + if ((pwd = k_getpwnam((char*)luser)) == NULL) + return (-1); + snprintf (pbuf, sizeof(pbuf), "%s/.rhosts", pwd->pw_dir); + + /* + * Change effective uid while opening .rhosts. If root and + * reading an NFS mounted file system, can't read files that + * are protected read/write owner only. + */ + uid = geteuid(); + seteuid(pwd->pw_uid); + hostf = fopen(pbuf, "r"); + seteuid(uid); + + if (hostf == NULL) + return (-1); + /* + * If not a regular file, or is owned by someone other than + * user or root or if writeable by anyone but the owner, quit. + */ + cp = NULL; + if (lstat(pbuf, &sbuf) < 0) + cp = ".rhosts lstat failed"; + else if (!S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode)) + cp = ".rhosts not regular file"; + else if (fstat(fileno(hostf), &sbuf) < 0) + cp = ".rhosts fstat failed"; + else if (sbuf.st_uid && sbuf.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid) + cp = "bad .rhosts owner"; + else if (sbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) + cp = ".rhosts writeable by other than owner"; + /* If there were any problems, quit. */ + if (cp) { + __rcmd_errstr = cp; + fclose(hostf); + return (-1); + } + goto again; + } + return (-1); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/issuid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/issuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af2aae5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/issuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: issuid.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +issuid(void) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETUID) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID) + if(getuid() != geteuid()) + return 1; +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GETGID) && defined(HAVE_GETEGID) + if(getgid() != getegid()) + return 2; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/k_getpwnam.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/k_getpwnam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40681cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/k_getpwnam.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: k_getpwnam.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include "roken.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif + +struct passwd * +k_getpwnam (const char *user) +{ + struct passwd *p; + + p = getpwnam (user); +#if defined(HAVE_GETSPNAM) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD) + if(p) + { + struct spwd *spwd; + + spwd = getspnam (user); + if (spwd) + p->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp; + endspent (); + } +#else + endpwent (); +#endif + return p; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/k_getpwuid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/k_getpwuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e2ca54 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/k_getpwuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: k_getpwuid.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:47 joda Exp $"); +#endif /* HAVE_CONFIG_H */ + +#include "roken.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SHADOW_H +#include +#endif + +struct passwd * +k_getpwuid (uid_t uid) +{ + struct passwd *p; + + p = getpwuid (uid); +#if defined(HAVE_GETSPNAM) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD) + if (p) + { + struct spwd *spwd; + + spwd = getspnam (p->pw_name); + if (spwd) + p->pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp; + endspent (); + } +#else + endpwent (); +#endif + return p; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/lstat.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/lstat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f03e19 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/lstat.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: lstat.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +lstat(const char *path, struct stat *buf) +{ + return stat(path, buf); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/make-print-version.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/make-print-version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d08e023 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/make-print-version.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: make-print-version.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef KRB5 +extern char *heimdal_version; +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 +extern char *krb4_version; +#endif +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + FILE *f; + if(argc != 2) + return 1; + f = fopen(argv[1], "w"); + if(f == NULL) + return 1; + fprintf(f, "#define VERSIONLIST { "); +#ifdef KRB5 + fprintf(f, "\"%s\", ", heimdal_version); +#endif +#ifdef KRB4 + fprintf(f, "\"%s\", ", krb4_version); +#endif + fprintf(f, "}\n"); + fclose(f); + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/memmove.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/memmove.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b77d56a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/memmove.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: memmove.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +/* + * memmove for systems that doesn't have it + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +void* memmove(void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n) +{ + char *s=(char*)s2, *d=(char*)s1; + + if(d > s){ + s+=n-1; + d+=n-1; + while(n){ + *d--=*s--; + n--; + } + }else if(d < s) + while(n){ + *d++=*s++; + n--; + } + return s1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/mini_inetd.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/mini_inetd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e92dac3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/mini_inetd.c @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: mini_inetd.c,v 1.21 1999/12/12 00:03:56 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include + +/* + * accept a connection on `s' and pretend it's served by inetd. + */ + +static void +accept_it (int s) +{ + int s2; + + s2 = accept(s, NULL, 0); + if(s2 < 0) + err (1, "accept"); + close(s); + dup2(s2, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(s2, STDOUT_FILENO); + /* dup2(s2, STDERR_FILENO); */ + close(s2); +} + +/* + * Listen on `port' emulating inetd. + */ + +void +mini_inetd (int port) +{ + int error, ret; + struct addrinfo *ai, *a, hints; + char portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + int n, i; + int *fds; + fd_set orig_read_set, read_set; + int max_fd = -1; + + memset (&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + snprintf (portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", ntohs(port)); + + error = getaddrinfo (NULL, portstr, &hints, &ai); + if (error) + errx (1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror (error)); + + for (n = 0, a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next) + ++n; + + fds = malloc (n * sizeof(*fds)); + if (fds == NULL) + errx (1, "mini_inetd: out of memory"); + + FD_ZERO(&orig_read_set); + + for (i = 0, a = ai; a != NULL; a = a->ai_next, ++i) { + fds[i] = socket (a->ai_family, a->ai_socktype, a->ai_protocol); + if (fds[i] < 0) + err (1, "socket"); + socket_set_reuseaddr (fds[i], 1); + if (bind (fds[i], a->ai_addr, a->ai_addrlen) < 0) + err (1, "bind"); + if (listen (fds[i], SOMAXCONN) < 0) + err (1, "listen"); + FD_SET(fds[i], &orig_read_set); + max_fd = max(max_fd, fds[i]); + } + freeaddrinfo (ai); + + do { + read_set = orig_read_set; + + ret = select (max_fd + 1, &read_set, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) + err (1, "select"); + } while (ret <= 0); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) + if (FD_ISSET (fds[i], &read_set)) { + accept_it (fds[i]); + return; + } + abort (); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/mkstemp.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/mkstemp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..350f4cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/mkstemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#include + +RCSID("$Id: mkstemp.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_MKSTEMP + +int +mkstemp(char *template) +{ + int start, i; + pid_t val; + val = getpid(); + start = strlen(template) - 1; + while(template[start] == 'X') { + template[start] = '0' + val % 10; + val /= 10; + start--; + } + + do{ + int fd; + fd = open(template, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600); + if(fd >= 0 || errno != EEXIST) + return fd; + i = start + 1; + do{ + if(template[i] == 0) + return -1; + template[i]++; + if(template[i] == '9' + 1) + template[i] = 'a'; + if(template[i] <= 'z') + break; + template[i] = 'a'; + i++; + }while(1); + }while(1); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/net_read.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/net_read.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d45bfa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/net_read.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: net_read.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like read but never return partial data. + */ + +ssize_t +net_read (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + char *cbuf = (char *)buf; + ssize_t count; + size_t rem = nbytes; + + while (rem > 0) { +#ifdef WIN32 + count = recv (fd, cbuf, rem, 0); +#else + count = read (fd, cbuf, rem); +#endif + if (count < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + return count; + } else if (count == 0) { + return count; + } + cbuf += count; + rem -= count; + } + return nbytes; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/net_write.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/net_write.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f63dbe --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/net_write.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: net_write.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/* + * Like write but never return partial data. + */ + +ssize_t +net_write (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + const char *cbuf = (const char *)buf; + ssize_t count; + size_t rem = nbytes; + + while (rem > 0) { +#ifdef WIN32 + count = send (fd, cbuf, rem, 0); +#else + count = write (fd, cbuf, rem); +#endif + if (count < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + else + return count; + } + cbuf += count; + rem -= count; + } + return nbytes; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes-test.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..499d942 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_bytes-test.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include "parse_bytes.h" + +static struct testcase { + int canonicalp; + int val; + const char *def_unit; + const char *str; +} tests[] = { + {0, 0, NULL, "0 bytes"}, + {1, 0, NULL, "0"}, + {0, 1, NULL, "1"}, + {1, 1, NULL, "1 byte"}, + {0, 0, "kilobyte", "0"}, + {0, 1024, "kilobyte", "1"}, + {1, 1024, "kilobyte", "1 kilobyte"}, + {1, 1024 * 1024, NULL, "1 megabyte"}, + {0, 1025, NULL, "1 kilobyte 1"}, + {1, 1025, NULL, "1 kilobyte 1 byte"}, +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i; + int ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests)/sizeof(tests[0]); ++i) { + char buf[256]; + int val = parse_bytes (tests[i].str, tests[i].def_unit); + size_t len; + + if (val != tests[i].val) { + printf ("parse_bytes (%s, %s) = %d != %d\n", + tests[i].str, + tests[i].def_unit ? tests[i].def_unit : "none", + val, tests[i].val); + ++ret; + } + if (tests[i].canonicalp) { + len = unparse_bytes (tests[i].val, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (strcmp (tests[i].str, buf) != 0) { + printf ("unparse_bytes (%d) = \"%s\" != \"%s\"\n", + tests[i].val, buf, tests[i].str); + ++ret; + } + } + } + if (ret) { + printf ("%d errors\n", ret); + return 1; + } else + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3c514f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_bytes.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include "parse_bytes.h" + +static units bytes_units[] = { + { "gigabyte", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "gbyte", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "GB", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "megabyte", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "mbyte", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "MB", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "kilobyte", 1024 }, + { "KB", 1024 }, + { "byte", 1 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +static units bytes_short_units[] = { + { "GB", 1024 * 1024 * 1024 }, + { "MB", 1024 * 1024 }, + { "KB", 1024 }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +int +parse_bytes (const char *s, const char *def_unit) +{ + return parse_units (s, bytes_units, def_unit); +} + +size_t +unparse_bytes (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units (t, bytes_units, s, len); +} + +size_t +unparse_bytes_short (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units_approx (t, bytes_short_units, s, len); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8116c1c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_bytes.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse_bytes.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __PARSE_BYTES_H__ +#define __PARSE_BYTES_H__ + +int +parse_bytes (const char *s, const char *def_unit); + +size_t +unparse_bytes (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +size_t +unparse_bytes_short (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +#endif /* __PARSE_BYTES_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_time.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a09ded7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_time.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include "parse_time.h" + +static units time_units[] = { + {"year", 365 * 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"month", 30 * 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"week", 7 * 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"day", 24 * 60 * 60}, + {"hour", 60 * 60}, + {"h", 60 * 60}, + {"minute", 60}, + {"m", 60}, + {"second", 1}, + {"s", 1}, + {NULL, 0}, +}; + +int +parse_time (const char *s, const char *def_unit) +{ + return parse_units (s, time_units, def_unit); +} + +size_t +unparse_time (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units (t, time_units, s, len); +} + +size_t +unparse_time_approx (int t, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_units_approx (t, time_units, s, len); +} + +void +print_time_table (FILE *f) +{ + print_units_table (time_units, f); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_time.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_time.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55de505 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse_time.h,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __PARSE_TIME_H__ +#define __PARSE_TIME_H__ + +int +parse_time (const char *s, const char *def_unit); + +size_t +unparse_time (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +size_t +unparse_time_approx (int t, char *s, size_t len); + +void +print_time_table (FILE *f); + +#endif /* __PARSE_TIME_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_units.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_units.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34c5030 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_units.c @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: parse_units.c,v 1.12 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "parse_units.h" + +/* + * Parse string in `s' according to `units' and return value. + * def_unit defines the default unit. + */ + +static int +parse_something (const char *s, const struct units *units, + const char *def_unit, + int (*func)(int res, int val, unsigned mult), + int init, + int accept_no_val_p) +{ + const char *p; + int res = init; + unsigned def_mult = 1; + + if (def_unit != NULL) { + const struct units *u; + + for (u = units; u->name; ++u) { + if (strcasecmp (u->name, def_unit) == 0) { + def_mult = u->mult; + break; + } + } + if (u->name == NULL) + return -1; + } + + p = s; + while (*p) { + double val; + char *next; + const struct units *u, *partial_unit; + size_t u_len; + unsigned partial; + int no_val_p = 0; + + while(isspace((unsigned char)*p) || *p == ',') + ++p; + + val = strtod (p, &next); /* strtol(p, &next, 0); */ + if (val == 0 && p == next) { + if(!accept_no_val_p) + return -1; + no_val_p = 1; + } + p = next; + while (isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + if (*p == '\0') { + res = (*func)(res, val, def_mult); + if (res < 0) + return res; + break; + } else if (*p == '+') { + ++p; + val = 1; + } else if (*p == '-') { + ++p; + val = -1; + } + if (no_val_p && val == 0) + val = 1; + u_len = strcspn (p, ", \t"); + partial = 0; + partial_unit = NULL; + if (u_len > 1 && p[u_len - 1] == 's') + --u_len; + for (u = units; u->name; ++u) { + if (strncasecmp (p, u->name, u_len) == 0) { + if (u_len == strlen (u->name)) { + p += u_len; + res = (*func)(res, val, u->mult); + if (res < 0) + return res; + break; + } else { + ++partial; + partial_unit = u; + } + } + } + if (u->name == NULL) { + if (partial == 1) { + p += u_len; + res = (*func)(res, val, partial_unit->mult); + if (res < 0) + return res; + } else { + return -1; + } + } + if (*p == 's') + ++p; + } + return res; +} + +/* + * The string consists of a sequence of `n unit' + */ + +static int +acc_units(int res, int val, unsigned mult) +{ + return res + val * mult; +} + +int +parse_units (const char *s, const struct units *units, + const char *def_unit) +{ + return parse_something (s, units, def_unit, acc_units, 0, 0); +} + +/* + * The string consists of a sequence of `[+-]flag'. `orig' consists + * the original set of flags, those are then modified and returned as + * the function value. + */ + +static int +acc_flags(int res, int val, unsigned mult) +{ + if(val == 1) + return res | mult; + else if(val == -1) + return res & ~mult; + else if (val == 0) + return mult; + else + return -1; +} + +int +parse_flags (const char *s, const struct units *units, + int orig) +{ + return parse_something (s, units, NULL, acc_flags, orig, 1); +} + +/* + * Return a string representation according to `units' of `num' in `s' + * with maximum length `len'. The actual length is the function value. + */ + +static size_t +unparse_something (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len, + int (*print) (char *s, size_t len, int div, + const char *name, int rem), + int (*update) (int in, unsigned mult), + const char *zero_string) +{ + const struct units *u; + size_t ret = 0, tmp; + + if (num == 0) + return snprintf (s, len, "%s", zero_string); + + for (u = units; num > 0 && u->name; ++u) { + int div; + + div = num / u->mult; + if (div) { + num = (*update) (num, u->mult); + tmp = (*print) (s, len, div, u->name, num); + + len -= tmp; + s += tmp; + ret += tmp; + } + } + return ret; +} + +static int +print_unit (char *s, size_t len, int div, const char *name, int rem) +{ + return snprintf (s, len, "%u %s%s%s", + div, name, + div == 1 ? "" : "s", + rem > 0 ? " " : ""); +} + +static int +update_unit (int in, unsigned mult) +{ + return in % mult; +} + +static int +update_unit_approx (int in, unsigned mult) +{ + if (in / mult > 0) + return 0; + else + return update_unit (in, mult); +} + +size_t +unparse_units (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_something (num, units, s, len, + print_unit, + update_unit, + "0"); +} + +size_t +unparse_units_approx (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_something (num, units, s, len, + print_unit, + update_unit_approx, + "0"); +} + +void +print_units_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f) +{ + const struct units *u, *u2; + unsigned max_sz = 0; + + for (u = units; u->name; ++u) { + max_sz = max(max_sz, strlen(u->name)); + } + + for (u = units; u->name;) { + char buf[1024]; + const struct units *next; + + for (next = u + 1; next->name && next->mult == u->mult; ++next) + ; + + if (next->name) { + for (u2 = next; + u2->name && u->mult % u2->mult != 0; + ++u2) + ; + if (u2->name == NULL) + --u2; + unparse_units (u->mult, u2, buf, sizeof(buf)); + fprintf (f, "1 %*s = %s\n", max_sz, u->name, buf); + } else { + fprintf (f, "1 %s\n", u->name); + } + u = next; + } +} + +static int +print_flag (char *s, size_t len, int div, const char *name, int rem) +{ + return snprintf (s, len, "%s%s", name, rem > 0 ? ", " : ""); +} + +static int +update_flag (int in, unsigned mult) +{ + return in - mult; +} + +size_t +unparse_flags (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len) +{ + return unparse_something (num, units, s, len, + print_flag, + update_flag, + ""); +} + +void +print_flags_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f) +{ + const struct units *u; + + for(u = units; u->name; ++u) + fprintf(f, "%s%s", u->name, (u+1)->name ? ", " : "\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_units.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_units.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f159d30 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/parse_units.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: parse_units.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __PARSE_UNITS_H__ +#define __PARSE_UNITS_H__ + +#include +#include + +struct units { + const char *name; + unsigned mult; +}; + +typedef struct units units; + +int +parse_units (const char *s, const struct units *units, + const char *def_unit); + +void +print_units_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f); + +int +parse_flags (const char *s, const struct units *units, + int orig); + +size_t +unparse_units (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len); + +size_t +unparse_units_approx (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, + size_t len); + +size_t +unparse_flags (int num, const struct units *units, char *s, size_t len); + +void +print_flags_table (const struct units *units, FILE *f); + +#endif /* __PARSE_UNITS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/print_version.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/print_version.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..809bbb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/print_version.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: print_version.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#include "print_version.h" + +void +print_version(const char *progname) +{ + const char *arg[] = VERSIONLIST; + const int num_args = sizeof(arg) / sizeof(arg[0]); + char *msg; + size_t len = 0; + int i; + + if(progname == NULL) + progname = __progname; + + if(num_args == 0) + msg = "no version information"; + else { + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++) { + if(i > 0) + len += 2; + len += strlen(arg[i]); + } + msg = malloc(len + 1); + if(msg == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: out of memory\n", progname); + return; + } + msg[0] = '\0'; + for(i = 0; i < num_args; i++) { + if(i > 0) + strcat(msg, ", "); + strcat(msg, arg[i]); + } + } + fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s)\n", progname, msg); + fprintf(stderr, "Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan\n"); + if(num_args != 0) + free(msg); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/putenv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/putenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80951d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/putenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: putenv.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +extern char **environ; + +/* + * putenv -- + * String points to a string of the form name=value. + * + * Makes the value of the environment variable name equal to + * value by altering an existing variable or creating a new one. + */ +int putenv(const char *string) +{ + int i; + int len; + + len = string - strchr(string, '=') + 1; + + if(environ == NULL){ + environ = malloc(sizeof(char*)); + if(environ == NULL) + return 1; + environ[0] = NULL; + } + + for(i = 0; environ[i]; i++) + if(strncmp(string, environ[i], len)){ + environ[len] = string; + return 0; + } + environ = realloc(environ, sizeof(char*) * (i + 1)); + if(environ == NULL) + return 1; + environ[i] = string; + environ[i+1] = NULL; + return 0; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/rcmd.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/rcmd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4117948 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/rcmd.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: rcmd.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:51 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include + +int +rcmd(char **ahost, + unsigned short inport, + const char *locuser, + const char *remuser, + const char *cmd, + int *fd2p) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Only kerberized services are implemented\n"); + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/readv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/readv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de2f9ea --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/readv.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: readv.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +readv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) +{ + ssize_t ret, nb; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + + for(i = 0; i < iovcnt; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + nb = ret = read (d, buf, tot); + p = buf; + while (nb > 0) { + ssize_t cnt = min(nb, iov->iov_len); + + memcpy (iov->iov_base, p, cnt); + p += cnt; + nb -= cnt; + } + free(buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/recvmsg.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/recvmsg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e94ad68 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/recvmsg.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: recvmsg.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +recvmsg(int s, struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +{ + ssize_t ret, nb; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + struct iovec *iov = msg->msg_iov; + + for(i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + nb = ret = recvfrom (s, buf, tot, flags, msg->msg_name, &msg->msg_namelen); + p = buf; + while (nb > 0) { + ssize_t cnt = min(nb, iov->iov_len); + + memcpy (iov->iov_base, p, cnt); + p += cnt; + nb -= cnt; + ++iov; + } + free(buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resolve.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resolve.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8840740 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resolve.c @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_NAMESER_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RESOLV_H +#include +#endif +#include "resolve.h" + +RCSID("$Id: resolve.c,v 1.22 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); + +#if defined(HAVE_RES_SEARCH) && defined(HAVE_DN_EXPAND) + +#define DECL(X) {#X, T_##X} + +static struct stot{ + const char *name; + int type; +}stot[] = { + DECL(A), + DECL(NS), + DECL(CNAME), + DECL(PTR), + DECL(MX), + DECL(TXT), + DECL(AFSDB), + DECL(SRV), + {NULL, 0} +}; + +int _resolve_debug; + +static int +string_to_type(const char *name) +{ + struct stot *p = stot; + for(p = stot; p->name; p++) + if(strcasecmp(name, p->name) == 0) + return p->type; + return -1; +} + +static const char * +type_to_string(int type) +{ + struct stot *p = stot; + for(p = stot; p->name; p++) + if(type == p->type) + return p->name; + return NULL; +} + +void +dns_free_data(struct dns_reply *r) +{ + struct resource_record *rr; + if(r->q.domain) + free(r->q.domain); + for(rr = r->head; rr;){ + struct resource_record *tmp = rr; + if(rr->domain) + free(rr->domain); + if(rr->u.data) + free(rr->u.data); + rr = rr->next; + free(tmp); + } + free (r); +} + +static struct dns_reply* +parse_reply(unsigned char *data, int len) +{ + unsigned char *p; + char host[128]; + int status; + + struct dns_reply *r; + struct resource_record **rr; + + r = calloc(1, sizeof(*r)); + if (r == NULL) + return NULL; + + p = data; +#if 0 + /* doesn't work on Crays */ + memcpy(&r->h, p, sizeof(HEADER)); + p += sizeof(HEADER); +#else + memcpy(&r->h, p, 12); /* XXX this will probably be mostly garbage */ + p += 12; +#endif + status = dn_expand(data, data + len, p, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + r->q.domain = strdup(host); + if(r->q.domain == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + p += status; + r->q.type = (p[0] << 8 | p[1]); + p += 2; + r->q.class = (p[0] << 8 | p[1]); + p += 2; + rr = &r->head; + while(p < data + len){ + int type, class, ttl, size; + status = dn_expand(data, data + len, p, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + p += status; + type = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + p += 2; + class = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + p += 2; + ttl = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + p += 4; + size = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + p += 2; + *rr = (struct resource_record*)calloc(1, + sizeof(struct resource_record)); + if(*rr == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->domain = strdup(host); + if((*rr)->domain == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->type = type; + (*rr)->class = class; + (*rr)->ttl = ttl; + (*rr)->size = size; + switch(type){ + case T_NS: + case T_CNAME: + case T_PTR: + status = dn_expand(data, data + len, p, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->u.txt = strdup(host); + if((*rr)->u.txt == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + break; + case T_MX: + case T_AFSDB:{ + status = dn_expand(data, data + len, p + 2, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->u.mx = (struct mx_record*)malloc(sizeof(struct mx_record) + + strlen(host)); + if((*rr)->u.mx == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->u.mx->preference = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + strcpy((*rr)->u.mx->domain, host); + break; + } + case T_SRV:{ + status = dn_expand(data, data + len, p + 6, host, sizeof(host)); + if(status < 0){ + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->u.srv = + (struct srv_record*)malloc(sizeof(struct srv_record) + + strlen(host)); + if((*rr)->u.srv == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + (*rr)->u.srv->priority = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + (*rr)->u.srv->weight = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + (*rr)->u.srv->port = (p[4] << 8) | p[5]; + strcpy((*rr)->u.srv->target, host); + break; + } + case T_TXT:{ + (*rr)->u.txt = (char*)malloc(size + 1); + if((*rr)->u.txt == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + strncpy((*rr)->u.txt, (char*)p + 1, *p); + (*rr)->u.txt[*p] = 0; + break; + } + + default: + (*rr)->u.data = (unsigned char*)malloc(size); + if(size != 0 && (*rr)->u.data == NULL) { + dns_free_data(r); + return NULL; + } + memcpy((*rr)->u.data, p, size); + } + p += size; + rr = &(*rr)->next; + } + *rr = NULL; + return r; +} + +static struct dns_reply * +dns_lookup_int(const char *domain, int rr_class, int rr_type) +{ + unsigned char reply[1024]; + int len; + struct dns_reply *r = NULL; + u_long old_options = 0; + + if (_resolve_debug) { + old_options = _res.options; + _res.options |= RES_DEBUG; + fprintf(stderr, "dns_lookup(%s, %d, %s)\n", domain, + rr_class, type_to_string(rr_type)); + } + len = res_search(domain, rr_class, rr_type, reply, sizeof(reply)); + if (_resolve_debug) { + _res.options = old_options; + fprintf(stderr, "dns_lookup(%s, %d, %s) --> %d\n", + domain, rr_class, type_to_string(rr_type), len); + } + if (len >= 0) + r = parse_reply(reply, len); + return r; +} + +struct dns_reply * +dns_lookup(const char *domain, const char *type_name) +{ + int type; + + type = string_to_type(type_name); + if(type == -1) { + if(_resolve_debug) + fprintf(stderr, "dns_lookup: unknown resource type: `%s'\n", + type_name); + return NULL; + } + return dns_lookup_int(domain, C_IN, type); +} + +#else /* NOT defined(HAVE_RES_SEARCH) && defined(HAVE_DN_EXPAND) */ + +struct dns_reply * +dns_lookup(const char *domain, const char *type_name) +{ + return NULL; +} + +void +dns_free_data(struct dns_reply *r) +{ +} + +#endif + +#ifdef TEST +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct dns_reply *r; + struct resource_record *rr; + r = dns_lookup(argv[1], argv[2]); + if(r == NULL){ + printf("No reply.\n"); + return 1; + } + for(rr = r->head; rr;rr=rr->next){ + printf("%s %s %d ", rr->domain, type_to_string(rr->type), rr->ttl); + switch(rr->type){ + case T_NS: + printf("%s\n", (char*)rr->u.data); + break; + case T_A: + printf("%d.%d.%d.%d\n", + ((unsigned char*)rr->u.data)[0], + ((unsigned char*)rr->u.data)[1], + ((unsigned char*)rr->u.data)[2], + ((unsigned char*)rr->u.data)[3]); + break; + case T_MX: + case T_AFSDB:{ + struct mx_record *mx = (struct mx_record*)rr->u.data; + printf("%d %s\n", mx->preference, mx->domain); + break; + } + case T_SRV:{ + struct srv_record *srv = (struct srv_record*)rr->u.data; + printf("%d %d %d %s\n", srv->priority, srv->weight, + srv->port, srv->target); + break; + } + default: + printf("\n"); + break; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resolve.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resolve.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c90f6b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resolve.h @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: resolve.h,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __RESOLVE_H__ +#define __RESOLVE_H__ + +/* We use these, but they are not always present in */ + +#ifndef T_TXT +#define T_TXT 16 +#endif +#ifndef T_AFSDB +#define T_AFSDB 18 +#endif +#ifndef T_SRV +#define T_SRV 33 +#endif +#ifndef T_NAPTR +#define T_NAPTR 35 +#endif + +struct dns_query{ + char *domain; + unsigned type; + unsigned class; +}; + +struct mx_record{ + unsigned preference; + char domain[1]; +}; + +struct srv_record{ + unsigned priority; + unsigned weight; + unsigned port; + char target[1]; +}; + +struct resource_record{ + char *domain; + unsigned type; + unsigned class; + unsigned ttl; + unsigned size; + union { + void *data; + struct mx_record *mx; + struct mx_record *afsdb; /* mx and afsdb are identical */ + struct srv_record *srv; + struct in_addr *a; + char *txt; + }u; + struct resource_record *next; +}; + +#ifndef T_A /* XXX if isn't included */ +typedef int HEADER; /* will never be used */ +#endif + +struct dns_reply{ + HEADER h; + struct dns_query q; + struct resource_record *head; +}; + + +struct dns_reply* dns_lookup(const char *, const char *); +void dns_free_data(struct dns_reply *); + +#endif /* __RESOLVE_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resource.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resource.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01cd01d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/resource.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +//{{NO_DEPENDENCIES}} +// Microsoft Developer Studio generated include file. +// Used by roken.rc +// + +// Next default values for new objects +// +#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +#ifndef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS +#define _APS_NEXT_RESOURCE_VALUE 101 +#define _APS_NEXT_COMMAND_VALUE 40001 +#define _APS_NEXT_CONTROL_VALUE 1000 +#define _APS_NEXT_SYMED_VALUE 101 +#endif +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken-common.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken-common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..164547a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken-common.h @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken-common.h,v 1.24 1999/12/05 13:25:40 assar Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __ROKEN_COMMON_H__ +#define __ROKEN_COMMON_H__ + +#ifndef INADDR_NONE +#define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff +#endif + +#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK +#define INADDR_LOOPBACK 0x7f000001 +#endif + +#ifndef SOMAXCONN +#define SOMAXCONN 5 +#endif + +#ifndef STDIN_FILENO +#define STDIN_FILENO 0 +#endif + +#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO +#define STDOUT_FILENO 1 +#endif + +#ifndef STDERR_FILENO +#define STDERR_FILENO 2 +#endif + +#ifndef max +#define max(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef min +#define min(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#endif + +#ifndef FALSE +#define FALSE 0 +#endif + +#ifndef LOG_DAEMON +#define openlog(id,option,facility) openlog((id),(option)) +#define LOG_DAEMON 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_ODELAY +#define LOG_ODELAY 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_NDELAY +#define LOG_NDELAY 0x08 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_CONS +#define LOG_CONS 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_AUTH +#define LOG_AUTH 0 +#endif +#ifndef LOG_AUTHPRIV +#define LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_AUTH +#endif + +#ifndef F_OK +#define F_OK 0 +#endif + +#ifndef O_ACCMODE +#define O_ACCMODE 003 +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL +#define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_HEQUIV +#define _PATH_HEQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv" +#endif + +#ifndef MAXPATHLEN +#define MAXPATHLEN (1024+4) +#endif + +#ifndef SIG_ERR +#define SIG_ERR ((RETSIGTYPE (*)())-1) +#endif + +/* + * error code for getipnodeby{name,addr} + */ + +#ifndef HOST_NOT_FOUND +#define HOST_NOT_FOUND 1 +#endif + +#ifndef TRY_AGAIN +#define TRY_AGAIN 2 +#endif + +#ifndef NO_RECOVERY +#define NO_RECOVERY 3 +#endif + +#ifndef NO_DATA +#define NO_DATA 4 +#endif + +#ifndef NO_ADDRESS +#define NO_ADDRESS NO_DATA +#endif + +/* + * error code for getaddrinfo + */ + +#ifndef EAI_NOERROR +#define EAI_NOERROR 0 /* no error */ +#endif + +#ifndef EAI_ADDRFAMILY + +#define EAI_ADDRFAMILY 1 /* address family for nodename not supported */ +#define EAI_AGAIN 2 /* temporary failure in name resolution */ +#define EAI_BADFLAGS 3 /* invalid value for ai_flags */ +#define EAI_FAIL 4 /* non-recoverable failure in name resolution */ +#define EAI_FAMILY 5 /* ai_family not supported */ +#define EAI_MEMORY 6 /* memory allocation failure */ +#define EAI_NODATA 7 /* no address associated with nodename */ +#define EAI_NONAME 8 /* nodename nor servname provided, or not known */ +#define EAI_SERVICE 9 /* servname not supported for ai_socktype */ +#define EAI_SOCKTYPE 10 /* ai_socktype not supported */ +#define EAI_SYSTEM 11 /* system error returned in errno */ + +#endif /* EAI_ADDRFAMILY */ + +/* flags for getaddrinfo() */ + +#ifndef AI_PASSIVE + +#define AI_PASSIVE 0x01 +#define AI_CANONNAME 0x02 +#define AI_NUMERICHOST 0x04 + +#endif /* AI_PASSIVE */ + +/* flags for getnameinfo() */ + +#ifndef NI_DGRAM +#define NI_DGRAM 0x01 +#define NI_NAMEREQD 0x02 +#define NI_NOFQDN 0x04 +#define NI_NUMERICHOST 0x08 +#define NI_NUMERICSERV 0x10 +#endif + +/* + * constants for getnameinfo + */ + +#ifndef NI_MAXHOST +#define NI_MAXHOST 1025 +#define NI_MAXSERV 32 +#endif + +/* + * constants for inet_ntop + */ + +#ifndef INET_ADDRSTRLEN +#define INET_ADDRSTRLEN 16 +#endif + +#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN +#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 +#endif + +/* + * for shutdown(2) + */ + +#ifndef SHUT_RD +#define SHUT_RD 0 +#endif + +#ifndef SHUT_WR +#define SHUT_WR 1 +#endif + +#ifndef SHUT_RDWR +#define SHUT_RDWR 2 +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE___ATTRIBUTE__ +#define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +#if IRIX != 4 /* fix for compiler bug */ +#ifdef RETSIGTYPE +typedef RETSIGTYPE (*SigAction)(/* int??? */); +SigAction signal(int iSig, SigAction pAction); /* BSD compatible */ +#endif +#endif + +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execve(const char*, char*const[], char*const[]); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execvp(const char*, char *const[]); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execlp(const char*, ...); +int ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION simple_execle(const char*, ...); + +void ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION print_version(const char *); + +void *ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION emalloc (size_t); +void *ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION erealloc (void *, size_t); +char *ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION estrdup (const char *); + +ssize_t ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION eread (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes); +ssize_t ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION ewrite (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +void +socket_set_address_and_port (struct sockaddr *sa, const void *ptr, int port); + +size_t +socket_addr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa); + +void +socket_set_any (struct sockaddr *sa, int af); + +size_t +socket_sockaddr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa); + +void * +socket_get_address (struct sockaddr *sa); + +int +socket_get_port (const struct sockaddr *sa); + +void +socket_set_port (struct sockaddr *sa, int port); + +void +socket_set_debug (int sock); + +void +socket_set_tos (int sock, int tos); + +void +socket_set_reuseaddr (int sock, int val); + +#endif /* __ROKEN_COMMON_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.awk b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.awk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..626fae5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.awk @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +BEGIN { + print "#include " + print "#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H" + print "#include " + print "#endif" + print "" + print "int main()" + print "{" + print "puts(\"/* This is an OS dependent, generated file */\");" + print "puts(\"\\n\");" + print "puts(\"#ifndef __ROKEN_H__\");" + print "puts(\"#define __ROKEN_H__\");" + print "puts(\"\");" +} +END { + print "puts(\"#endif /* __ROKEN_H__ */\");" + print "exit(0);" + print "}" +} + +$1 == "\#ifdef" || $1 == "\#ifndef" || $1 == "\#if" || $1 == "\#else" || $1 == "\#elif" || $1 == "\#endif" || $1 == "#ifdef" || $1 == "#ifndef" || $1 == "#if" || $1 == "#else" || $1 == "#elif" || $1 == "#endif" { + print $0; + next +} + +{ + s = "" + for(i = 1; i <= length; i++){ + x = substr($0, i, 1) + if(x == "\"" || x == "\\") + s = s "\\"; + s = s x; + } + print "puts(\"" s "\");" +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.def b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.def new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9b0369 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.def @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +LIBRARY roken BASE=0x68f0000 +EXPORTS + gettimeofday + strcasecmp + strtok_r + snprintf + asprintf + vsnprintf + base64_decode + base64_encode + roken_concat + roken_vconcat + roken_vmconcat + roken_mconcat + getuid + dns_free_data + dns_lookup diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.dsp b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.dsp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d84854e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.dsp @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +# Microsoft Developer Studio Project File - Name="roken" - Package Owner=<4> +# Microsoft Developer Studio Generated Build File, Format Version 5.00 +# ** DO NOT EDIT ** + +# TARGTYPE "Win32 (x86) Dynamic-Link Library" 0x0102 + +CFG=roken - Win32 Release +!MESSAGE This is not a valid makefile. To build this project using NMAKE, +!MESSAGE use the Export Makefile command and run +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f "roken.mak". +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE You can specify a configuration when running NMAKE +!MESSAGE by defining the macro CFG on the command line. For example: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f "roken.mak" CFG="roken - Win32 Release" +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE Possible choices for configuration are: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE "roken - Win32 Release" (based on "Win32 (x86) Dynamic-Link Library") +!MESSAGE "roken - Win32 Debug" (based on "Win32 (x86) Dynamic-Link Library") +!MESSAGE + +# Begin Project +# PROP Scc_ProjName "" +# PROP Scc_LocalPath "" +CPP=cl.exe +MTL=midl.exe +RSC=rc.exe + +!IF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Release" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 0 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir ".\Release" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir ".\Release" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 0 +# PROP Output_Dir ".\Release" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir ".\Release" +# PROP Ignore_Export_Lib 0 +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /MT /W3 /GX /O2 /D "WIN32" /D "NDEBUG" /D "_WINDOWS" /YX /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /MT /GX /O2 /I "..\krb" /I "..\des" /I "..\..\include" /I "..\..\include\win32" /I "." /D "NDEBUG" /D "WIN32" /D "_WINDOWS" /D "HAVE_CONFIG_H" /YX /FD /c +# ADD BASE MTL /nologo /D "NDEBUG" /win32 +# ADD MTL /nologo /D "NDEBUG" /mktyplib203 /win32 +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x409 /d "NDEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x409 /d "NDEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LINK32=link.exe +# ADD BASE LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:windows /dll /machine:I386 +# ADD LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib /nologo /base:"0x68e7780" /subsystem:windows /dll /machine:I386 + +!ELSEIF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Debug" + +# PROP BASE Use_MFC 0 +# PROP BASE Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP BASE Output_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP BASE Intermediate_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP BASE Target_Dir "" +# PROP Use_MFC 0 +# PROP Use_Debug_Libraries 1 +# PROP Output_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP Intermediate_Dir ".\Debug" +# PROP Ignore_Export_Lib 0 +# PROP Target_Dir "" +# ADD BASE CPP /nologo /MTd /W3 /Gm /GX /Zi /Od /D "WIN32" /D "_DEBUG" /D "_WINDOWS" /YX /c +# ADD CPP /nologo /MDd /Gm /GX /Zi /Od /I "..\krb" /I "..\des" /I "..\..\include" /I "..\..\include\win32" /I "." /D "_DEBUG" /D "WIN32" /D "_WINDOWS" /D "HAVE_CONFIG_H" /YX /FD /c +# ADD BASE MTL /nologo /D "_DEBUG" /win32 +# ADD MTL /nologo /D "_DEBUG" /mktyplib203 /win32 +# ADD BASE RSC /l 0x409 /d "_DEBUG" +# ADD RSC /l 0x409 /d "_DEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +# ADD BASE BSC32 /nologo +# ADD BSC32 /nologo +LINK32=link.exe +# ADD BASE LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib odbc32.lib odbccp32.lib /nologo /subsystem:windows /dll /debug /machine:I386 +# ADD LINK32 kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib /nologo /subsystem:windows /dll /debug /machine:I386 /def:".\roken.def" +# SUBTRACT LINK32 /pdb:none + +!ENDIF + +# Begin Target + +# Name "roken - Win32 Release" +# Name "roken - Win32 Debug" +# Begin Group "Source Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "cpp;c;cxx;rc;def;r;odl;hpj;bat;for;f90" +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\base64.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\concat.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\gettimeofday.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\getuid.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\resolve.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\roken.def + +!IF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Release" + +!ELSEIF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Debug" + +# PROP Exclude_From_Build 1 + +!ENDIF + +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\snprintf.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\strcasecmp.c +# End Source File +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\strtok_r.c +# End Source File +# End Group +# Begin Group "Header Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl;fi;fd" +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\resolve.h +# End Source File +# End Group +# Begin Group "Resource Files" + +# PROP Default_Filter "ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;cnt;rtf;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe" +# Begin Source File + +SOURCE=.\roken.rc +# End Source File +# End Group +# End Target +# End Project diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.h.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.h.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03cfce4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.h.in @@ -0,0 +1,573 @@ +/* -*- C -*- */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken.h.in,v 1.133 1999/12/30 02:22:54 assar Exp $ */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UIO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET6_IN6_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H) && SunOS != 40 +#include +#endif +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifndef ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION +#if defined(__BORLANDC__) +#define ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION /* not-ready-definition-yet */ +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#define ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION /* not-ready-definition-yet2 */ +#else +#define ROKEN_LIB_FUNCTION +#endif +#endif + +#include + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETSID) && defined(HAVE__SETSID) +#define setsid _setsid +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_PUTENV +int putenv(const char *string); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || defined(NEED_SETENV_PROTO) +int setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int rewrite); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) || defined(NEED_UNSETENV_PROTO) +void unsetenv(const char *name); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETUSERSHELL) || defined(NEED_GETUSERSHELL_PROTO) +char *getusershell(void); +void endusershell(void); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_SNPRINTF_PROTO) +int snprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_VSNPRINTF_PROTO) +int vsnprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 3, 0))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ASPRINTF) || defined(NEED_ASPRINTF_PROTO) +int asprintf (char **ret, const char *format, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || defined(NEED_VASPRINTF_PROTO) +int vasprintf (char **ret, const char *format, va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 2, 0))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ASNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_ASNPRINTF_PROTO) +int asnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, ...) + __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4))); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASNPRINTF) || defined(NEED_VASNPRINTF_PROTO) +int vasnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, va_list ap) + __attribute__((format (printf, 3, 0))); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +char * strdup(const char *old); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP +char * strndup(const char *old, size_t sz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLWR +char * strlwr(char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN +size_t strnlen(const char*, size_t); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) || defined(NEED_STRSEP_PROTO) +char *strsep(char**, const char*); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASECMP +int strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2); +#endif + +#ifdef NEED_FCLOSE_PROTO +int fclose(FILE *); +#endif + +#ifdef NEED_STRTOK_R_PROTO +char *strtok_r(char *s1, const char *s2, char **lasts); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUPR +char * strupr(char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY +size_t strlcpy (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT +size_t strlcat (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETDTABLESIZE +int getdtablesize(void); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && !defined(strerror) +char *strerror(int eno); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_HSTRERROR) || defined(NEED_HSTRERROR_PROTO) +/* This causes a fatal error under Psoriasis */ +#if !(defined(SunOS) && (SunOS >= 50)) +const char *hstrerror(int herr); +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_H_ERRNO_DECLARATION +extern int h_errno; +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) || defined(NEED_INET_ATON_PROTO) +int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *adr); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t size); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_PTON +int +inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) +char* getcwd(char *path, size_t size); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H +#include +struct passwd *k_getpwnam (const char *user); +struct passwd *k_getpwuid (uid_t uid); +#endif + +const char *get_default_username (void); + +#ifndef HAVE_SETEUID +int seteuid(uid_t euid); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETEGID +int setegid(gid_t egid); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_LSTAT +int lstat(const char *path, struct stat *buf); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_MKSTEMP) || defined(NEED_MKSTEMP_PROTO) +int mkstemp(char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_CGETENT +int cgetent(char **buf, char **db_array, const char *name); +int cgetstr(char *buf, const char *cap, char **str); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INITGROUPS +int initgroups(const char *name, gid_t basegid); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWN +int fchown(int fd, uid_t owner, gid_t group); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON +int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR +int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *machine, + const char *user, const char *domain); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_CHOWN +int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_RCMD +int rcmd(char **ahost, unsigned short inport, const char *locuser, + const char *remuser, const char *cmd, int *fd2p); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_INNETGR) || defined(NEED_INNETGR_PROTO) +int innetgr(const char*, const char*, const char*, const char*); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_IRUSEROK +int iruserok(unsigned raddr, int superuser, const char *ruser, + const char *luser); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETHOSTNAME) || defined(NEED_GETHOSTNAME_PROTO) +int gethostname(char *name, int namelen); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_WRITEV +ssize_t +writev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_READV +ssize_t +readv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_MKSTEMP +int +mkstemp(char *template); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK +#ifndef LOCK_SH +#define LOCK_SH 1 /* Shared lock */ +#endif +#ifndef LOCK_EX +#define LOCK_EX 2 /* Exclusive lock */ +#endif +#ifndef LOCK_NB +#define LOCK_NB 4 /* Don't block when locking */ +#endif +#ifndef LOCK_UN +#define LOCK_UN 8 /* Unlock */ +#endif + +int flock(int fd, int operation); +#endif /* HAVE_FLOCK */ + +time_t tm2time (struct tm tm, int local); + +int unix_verify_user(char *user, char *password); + +void mini_inetd (int port); + +int roken_concat (char *s, size_t len, ...); + +size_t roken_mconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, ...); + +int roken_vconcat (char *s, size_t len, va_list args); + +size_t roken_vmconcat (char **s, size_t max_len, va_list args); + +ssize_t net_write (int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +ssize_t net_read (int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes); + +int issuid(void); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_WINSIZE +struct winsize { + unsigned short ws_row, ws_col; + unsigned short ws_xpixel, ws_ypixel; +}; +#endif + +int get_window_size(int fd, struct winsize *); + +#ifndef HAVE_VSYSLOG +void vsyslog(int pri, const char *fmt, va_list ap); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_OPTARG_DECLARATION +extern char *optarg; +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_OPTIND_DECLARATION +extern int optind; +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_OPTERR_DECLARATION +extern int opterr; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME_DECLARATION +extern const char *__progname; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ENVIRON_DECLARATION +extern char **environ; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYNAME +struct hostent * +getipnodebyname (const char *name, int af, int flags, int *error_num); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETIPNODEBYADDR +struct hostent * +getipnodebyaddr (const void *src, size_t len, int af, int *error_num); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEHOSTENT +void +freehostent (struct hostent *h); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_COPYHOSTENT +struct hostent * +copyhostent (const struct hostent *h); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SOCKLEN_T +typedef int socklen_t; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE + +#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +typedef unsigned short sa_family_t; +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 +#define _SS_MAXSIZE sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) +#else +#define _SS_MAXSIZE sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) +#endif + +#define _SS_ALIGNSIZE sizeof(unsigned long) + +#if HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN + +typedef unsigned char roken_sa_family_t; + +#define _SS_PAD1SIZE (_SS_ALIGNSIZE - sizeof (roken_sa_family_t) - sizeof(unsigned char)) +#define _SS_PAD2SIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - (sizeof (roken_sa_family_t) + sizeof(unsigned char) + _SS_PAD1SIZE + _SS_ALIGNSIZE)) + +struct sockaddr_storage { + unsigned char ss_len; + roken_sa_family_t ss_family; + char __ss_pad1[_SS_PAD1SIZE]; + unsigned long __ss_align[_SS_PAD2SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long) + 1]; +}; + +#else /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN */ + +typedef unsigned short roken_sa_family_t; + +#define _SS_PAD1SIZE (_SS_ALIGNSIZE - sizeof (roken_sa_family_t)) +#define _SS_PAD2SIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - (sizeof (roken_sa_family_t) + _SS_PAD1SIZE + _SS_ALIGNSIZE)) + +struct sockaddr_storage { + roken_sa_family_t ss_family; + char __ss_pad1[_SS_PAD1SIZE]; + unsigned long __ss_align[_SS_PAD2SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long) + 1]; +}; + +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN */ + +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO +struct addrinfo { + int ai_flags; + int ai_family; + int ai_socktype; + int ai_protocol; + size_t ai_addrlen; + char *ai_canonname; + struct sockaddr *ai_addr; + struct addrinfo *ai_next; +}; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +int +getaddrinfo(const char *nodename, + const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO +int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +void +freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +char * +gai_strerror(int ecode); +#endif + +int +getnameinfo_verified(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen, + char *host, size_t hostlen, + char *serv, size_t servlen, + int flags); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRFTIME +size_t +strftime (char *buf, size_t maxsize, const char *format, + const struct tm *tm); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME +char * +strptime (const char *buf, const char *format, struct tm *timeptr); +#endif + +/* + * kludges and such + */ + +#if 1 +int roken_gethostby_setup(const char*, const char*); +struct hostent* roken_gethostbyname(const char*); +struct hostent* roken_gethostbyaddr(const void*, size_t, int); +#else +#ifdef GETHOSTBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_gethostbyname(x) gethostbyname(x) +#else +#define roken_gethostbyname(x) gethostbyname((char *)x) +#endif + +#ifdef GETHOSTBYADDR_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_gethostbyaddr(a, l, t) gethostbyaddr(a, l, t) +#else +#define roken_gethostbyaddr(a, l, t) gethostbyaddr((char *)a, l, t) +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef GETSERVBYNAME_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_getservbyname(x,y) getservbyname(x,y) +#else +#define roken_getservbyname(x,y) getservbyname((char *)x, (char *)y) +#endif + +#ifdef OPENLOG_PROTO_COMPATIBLE +#define roken_openlog(a,b,c) openlog(a,b,c) +#else +#define roken_openlog(a,b,c) openlog((char *)a,b,c) +#endif + +void set_progname(char *argv0); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.mak b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.mak new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da9a834 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.mak @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +# Microsoft Developer Studio Generated NMAKE File, Based on roken.dsp +!IF "$(CFG)" == "" +CFG=roken - Win32 Release +!MESSAGE No configuration specified. Defaulting to roken - Win32 Release. +!ENDIF + +!IF "$(CFG)" != "roken - Win32 Release" && "$(CFG)" != "roken - Win32 Debug" +!MESSAGE Invalid configuration "$(CFG)" specified. +!MESSAGE You can specify a configuration when running NMAKE +!MESSAGE by defining the macro CFG on the command line. For example: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE NMAKE /f "roken.mak" CFG="roken - Win32 Release" +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE Possible choices for configuration are: +!MESSAGE +!MESSAGE "roken - Win32 Release" (based on "Win32 (x86) Dynamic-Link Library") +!MESSAGE "roken - Win32 Debug" (based on "Win32 (x86) Dynamic-Link Library") +!MESSAGE +!ERROR An invalid configuration is specified. +!ENDIF + +!IF "$(OS)" == "Windows_NT" +NULL= +!ELSE +NULL=nul +!ENDIF + +CPP=cl.exe +MTL=midl.exe +RSC=rc.exe + +!IF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Release" + +OUTDIR=.\Release +INTDIR=.\Release +# Begin Custom Macros +OutDir=.\.\Release +# End Custom Macros + +!IF "$(RECURSE)" == "0" + +ALL : "$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" + +!ELSE + +ALL : "$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" + +!ENDIF + +CLEAN : + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\base64.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\concat.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\gettimeofday.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\getuid.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\resolve.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\roken.res" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\snprintf.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\strcasecmp.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\strtok_r.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\vc50.idb" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.exp" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.lib" + +"$(OUTDIR)" : + if not exist "$(OUTDIR)/$(NULL)" mkdir "$(OUTDIR)" + +CPP_PROJ=/nologo /MT /GX /O2 /I "..\krb" /I "..\des" /I "..\..\include" /I\ + "..\..\include\win32" /I "." /D "NDEBUG" /D "WIN32" /D "_WINDOWS" /D\ + "HAVE_CONFIG_H" /Fp"$(INTDIR)\roken.pch" /YX /Fo"$(INTDIR)\\" /Fd"$(INTDIR)\\"\ + /FD /c +CPP_OBJS=.\Release/ +CPP_SBRS=. +MTL_PROJ=/nologo /D "NDEBUG" /mktyplib203 /win32 +RSC_PROJ=/l 0x409 /fo"$(INTDIR)\roken.res" /d "NDEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +BSC32_FLAGS=/nologo /o"$(OUTDIR)\roken.bsc" +BSC32_SBRS= \ + +LINK32=link.exe +LINK32_FLAGS=kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib\ + advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib /nologo\ + /base:"0x68e7780" /subsystem:windows /dll /incremental:no\ + /pdb:"$(OUTDIR)\roken.pdb" /machine:I386 /def:".\roken.def"\ + /out:"$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" /implib:"$(OUTDIR)\roken.lib" +DEF_FILE= \ + ".\roken.def" +LINK32_OBJS= \ + "$(INTDIR)\base64.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\concat.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\gettimeofday.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\getuid.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\resolve.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\roken.res" \ + "$(INTDIR)\snprintf.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\strcasecmp.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\strtok_r.obj" + +"$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" : "$(OUTDIR)" $(DEF_FILE) $(LINK32_OBJS) + $(LINK32) @<< + $(LINK32_FLAGS) $(LINK32_OBJS) +<< + +!ELSEIF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Debug" + +OUTDIR=.\Debug +INTDIR=.\Debug +# Begin Custom Macros +OutDir=.\.\Debug +# End Custom Macros + +!IF "$(RECURSE)" == "0" + +ALL : "$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" + +!ELSE + +ALL : "$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" + +!ENDIF + +CLEAN : + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\base64.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\concat.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\gettimeofday.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\getuid.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\resolve.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\roken.res" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\snprintf.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\strcasecmp.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\strtok_r.obj" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\vc50.idb" + -@erase "$(INTDIR)\vc50.pdb" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.exp" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.ilk" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.lib" + -@erase "$(OUTDIR)\roken.pdb" + +"$(OUTDIR)" : + if not exist "$(OUTDIR)/$(NULL)" mkdir "$(OUTDIR)" + +CPP_PROJ=/nologo /MDd /Gm /GX /Zi /Od /I "..\krb" /I "..\des" /I\ + "..\..\include" /I "..\..\include\win32" /I "." /D "_DEBUG" /D "WIN32" /D\ + "_WINDOWS" /D "HAVE_CONFIG_H" /Fp"$(INTDIR)\roken.pch" /YX /Fo"$(INTDIR)\\"\ + /Fd"$(INTDIR)\\" /FD /c +CPP_OBJS=.\Debug/ +CPP_SBRS=. +MTL_PROJ=/nologo /D "_DEBUG" /mktyplib203 /win32 +RSC_PROJ=/l 0x409 /fo"$(INTDIR)\roken.res" /d "_DEBUG" +BSC32=bscmake.exe +BSC32_FLAGS=/nologo /o"$(OUTDIR)\roken.bsc" +BSC32_SBRS= \ + +LINK32=link.exe +LINK32_FLAGS=kernel32.lib user32.lib gdi32.lib winspool.lib comdlg32.lib\ + advapi32.lib shell32.lib ole32.lib oleaut32.lib uuid.lib /nologo\ + /subsystem:windows /dll /incremental:yes /pdb:"$(OUTDIR)\roken.pdb" /debug\ + /machine:I386 /def:".\roken.def" /out:"$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll"\ + /implib:"$(OUTDIR)\roken.lib" +LINK32_OBJS= \ + "$(INTDIR)\base64.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\concat.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\gettimeofday.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\getuid.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\resolve.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\roken.res" \ + "$(INTDIR)\snprintf.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\strcasecmp.obj" \ + "$(INTDIR)\strtok_r.obj" + +"$(OUTDIR)\roken.dll" : "$(OUTDIR)" $(DEF_FILE) $(LINK32_OBJS) + $(LINK32) @<< + $(LINK32_FLAGS) $(LINK32_OBJS) +<< + +!ENDIF + +.c{$(CPP_OBJS)}.obj:: + $(CPP) @<< + $(CPP_PROJ) $< +<< + +.cpp{$(CPP_OBJS)}.obj:: + $(CPP) @<< + $(CPP_PROJ) $< +<< + +.cxx{$(CPP_OBJS)}.obj:: + $(CPP) @<< + $(CPP_PROJ) $< +<< + +.c{$(CPP_SBRS)}.sbr:: + $(CPP) @<< + $(CPP_PROJ) $< +<< + +.cpp{$(CPP_SBRS)}.sbr:: + $(CPP) @<< + $(CPP_PROJ) $< +<< + +.cxx{$(CPP_SBRS)}.sbr:: + $(CPP) @<< + $(CPP_PROJ) $< +<< + + +!IF "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Release" || "$(CFG)" == "roken - Win32 Debug" +SOURCE=.\base64.c +DEP_CPP_BASE6=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + ".\base64.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\base64.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_BASE6) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\concat.c +DEP_CPP_CONCA=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + "..\..\include\win32\roken.h"\ + ".\err.h"\ + ".\roken-common.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\stat.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\concat.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_CONCA) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\gettimeofday.c +DEP_CPP_GETTI=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + "..\..\include\win32\roken.h"\ + ".\err.h"\ + ".\roken-common.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\stat.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\gettimeofday.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_GETTI) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\getuid.c +DEP_CPP_GETUI=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + "..\..\include\win32\roken.h"\ + ".\err.h"\ + ".\roken-common.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\stat.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\getuid.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_GETUI) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\resolve.c +DEP_CPP_RESOL=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + "..\..\include\win32\roken.h"\ + ".\err.h"\ + ".\resolve.h"\ + ".\roken-common.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\stat.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\resolve.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_RESOL) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\snprintf.c +DEP_CPP_SNPRI=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + "..\..\include\win32\roken.h"\ + ".\err.h"\ + ".\roken-common.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\stat.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\snprintf.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_SNPRI) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\strcasecmp.c +DEP_CPP_STRCA=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\strcasecmp.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_STRCA) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\strtok_r.c +DEP_CPP_STRTO=\ + "..\..\include\win32\config.h"\ + "..\..\include\win32\roken.h"\ + ".\err.h"\ + ".\roken-common.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\stat.h"\ + {$(INCLUDE)}"sys\types.h"\ + + +"$(INTDIR)\strtok_r.obj" : $(SOURCE) $(DEP_CPP_STRTO) "$(INTDIR)" + + +SOURCE=.\roken.rc + +"$(INTDIR)\roken.res" : $(SOURCE) "$(INTDIR)" + $(RSC) $(RSC_PROJ) $(SOURCE) + + + +!ENDIF + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.rc b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.rc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7e2f3e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.rc @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +//Microsoft Developer Studio generated resource script. +// +#include "resource.h" + +#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource. +// +#include "afxres.h" + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// Swedish resources + +#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_SVE) +#ifdef _WIN32 +LANGUAGE LANG_SWEDISH, SUBLANG_DEFAULT +#pragma code_page(1252) +#endif //_WIN32 + +#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// TEXTINCLUDE +// + +1 TEXTINCLUDE DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + "resource.h\0" +END + +2 TEXTINCLUDE DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + "#include ""afxres.h""\r\n" + "\0" +END + +3 TEXTINCLUDE DISCARDABLE +BEGIN + "\r\n" + "\0" +END + +#endif // APSTUDIO_INVOKED + + +#ifndef _MAC +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Version +// + +VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO + FILEVERSION 1,0,0,1 + PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,0,1 + FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL +#ifdef _DEBUG + FILEFLAGS 0x1L +#else + FILEFLAGS 0x0L +#endif + FILEOS 0x40004L + FILETYPE 0x2L + FILESUBTYPE 0x0L +BEGIN + BLOCK "StringFileInfo" + BEGIN + BLOCK "040904b0" + BEGIN + VALUE "CompanyName", "Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)\0" + VALUE "FileDescription", "roken\0" + VALUE "FileVersion", "4, 0, 9, 9\0" + VALUE "InternalName", "roken\0" + VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright © 1996 - 1998 Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)\0" + VALUE "OriginalFilename", "roken.dll\0" + VALUE "ProductName", "KTH Kerberos\0" + VALUE "ProductVersion", "4,0,9,9\0" + END + END + BLOCK "VarFileInfo" + BEGIN + VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200 + END +END + +#endif // !_MAC + +#endif // Swedish resources +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + + + +#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource. +// + + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +#endif // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken_gethostby.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken_gethostby.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6df6c57 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/roken_gethostby.c @@ -0,0 +1,274 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: roken_gethostby.c,v 1.5 1999/12/05 13:16:44 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#undef roken_gethostbyname +#undef roken_gethostbyaddr + +static struct sockaddr_in dns_addr; +static char *dns_req; + +static int +make_address(const char *address, struct in_addr *ip) +{ + if(inet_aton(address, ip) == 0){ + /* try to resolve as hostname, it might work if the address we + are trying to lookup is local, for instance a web proxy */ + struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(address); + if(he) { + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)he->h_addr; + ip->s_addr = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + } else { + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int +setup_int(const char *proxy_host, short proxy_port, + const char *dns_host, short dns_port, + const char *dns_path) +{ + memset(&dns_addr, 0, sizeof(dns_addr)); + if(dns_req) + free(dns_req); + if(proxy_host) { + if(make_address(proxy_host, &dns_addr.sin_addr) != 0) + return -1; + dns_addr.sin_port = htons(proxy_port); + asprintf(&dns_req, "http://%s:%d%s", dns_host, dns_port, dns_path); + } else { + if(make_address(dns_host, &dns_addr.sin_addr) != 0) + return -1; + dns_addr.sin_port = htons(dns_port); + asprintf(&dns_req, "%s", dns_path); + } + dns_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + return 0; +} + +static void +split_spec(const char *spec, char **host, int *port, char **path, int def_port) +{ + char *p; + *host = strdup(spec); + p = strchr(*host, ':'); + if(p) { + *p++ = '\0'; + if(sscanf(p, "%d", port) != 1) + *port = def_port; + } else + *port = def_port; + p = strchr(p ? p : *host, '/'); + if(p) { + if(path) + *path = strdup(p); + *p = '\0'; + }else + if(path) + *path = NULL; +} + + +int +roken_gethostby_setup(const char *proxy_spec, const char *dns_spec) +{ + char *proxy_host = NULL; + int proxy_port; + char *dns_host, *dns_path; + int dns_port; + + int ret = -1; + + split_spec(dns_spec, &dns_host, &dns_port, &dns_path, 80); + if(dns_path == NULL) + goto out; + if(proxy_spec) + split_spec(proxy_spec, &proxy_host, &proxy_port, NULL, 80); + ret = setup_int(proxy_host, proxy_port, dns_host, dns_port, dns_path); +out: + free(proxy_host); + free(dns_host); + free(dns_path); + return ret; +} + + +/* Try to lookup a name or an ip-address using http as transport + mechanism. See the end of this file for an example program. */ +static struct hostent* +roken_gethostby(const char *hostname) +{ + int s; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + char *request; + char buf[1024]; + int offset = 0; + int n; + char *p, *foo; + + if(dns_addr.sin_family == 0) + return NULL; /* no configured host */ + sin = dns_addr; + asprintf(&request, "GET %s?%s HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n", dns_req, hostname); + if(request == NULL) + return NULL; + s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if(s < 0) { + free(request); + return NULL; + } + if(connect(s, (struct sockaddr*)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0) { + close(s); + free(request); + return NULL; + } + if(write(s, request, strlen(request)) != strlen(request)) { + close(s); + free(request); + return NULL; + } + free(request); + while(1) { + n = read(s, buf + offset, sizeof(buf) - offset); + if(n <= 0) + break; + offset += n; + } + buf[offset] = '\0'; + close(s); + p = strstr(buf, "\r\n\r\n"); /* find end of header */ + if(p) p += 4; + else return NULL; + foo = NULL; + p = strtok_r(p, " \t\r\n", &foo); + if(p == NULL) + return NULL; + { + /* make a hostent to return */ +#define MAX_ADDRS 16 + static struct hostent he; + static char addrs[4 * MAX_ADDRS]; + static char *addr_list[MAX_ADDRS]; + int num_addrs = 0; + + he.h_name = p; + he.h_aliases = NULL; + he.h_addrtype = AF_INET; + he.h_length = 4; + + while((p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\r\n", &foo)) && num_addrs < MAX_ADDRS) { + struct in_addr ip; + inet_aton(p, &ip); + ip.s_addr = ntohl(ip.s_addr); + addr_list[num_addrs] = &addrs[num_addrs * 4]; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 0] = (ip.s_addr >> 24) & 0xff; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 1] = (ip.s_addr >> 16) & 0xff; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 2] = (ip.s_addr >> 8) & 0xff; + addrs[num_addrs * 4 + 3] = (ip.s_addr >> 0) & 0xff; + addr_list[++num_addrs] = NULL; + } + he.h_addr_list = addr_list; + return &he; + } +} + +struct hostent* +roken_gethostbyname(const char *hostname) +{ + struct hostent *he; + he = gethostbyname(hostname); + if(he) + return he; + return roken_gethostby(hostname); +} + +struct hostent* +roken_gethostbyaddr(const void *addr, size_t len, int type) +{ + struct in_addr a; + const char *p; + struct hostent *he; + he = gethostbyaddr(addr, len, type); + if(he) + return he; + if(type != AF_INET || len != 4) + return NULL; + p = addr; + a.s_addr = htonl((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]); + return roken_gethostby(inet_ntoa(a)); +} + +#if 0 + +/* this program can be used as a cgi `script' to lookup names and + ip-addresses */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *query = getenv("QUERY_STRING"); + char host[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + int i; + struct hostent *he; + + printf("Content-type: text/plain\n\n"); + if(query == NULL) + exit(0); + he = gethostbyname(query); + strncpy(host, he->h_name, sizeof(host)); + host[sizeof(host) - 1] = '\0'; + he = gethostbyaddr(he->h_addr, he->h_length, AF_INET); + printf("%s\n", he->h_name); + for(i = 0; he->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { + struct in_addr ip; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)he->h_addr_list[i]; + ip.s_addr = htonl((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3]); + printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(ip)); + } + exit(0); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/sendmsg.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/sendmsg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7075bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/sendmsg.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: sendmsg.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +sendmsg(int s, const struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +{ + ssize_t ret; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + struct iovec *iov = msg->msg_iov; + + for(i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + p = buf; + for (i = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen; ++i) { + memcpy (p, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len); + p += iov[i].iov_len; + } + ret = sendto (s, buf, tot, flags, msg->msg_name, msg->msg_namelen); + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/setegid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/setegid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f46fe4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/setegid.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: setegid.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +setegid(gid_t egid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SETREGID + return setregid(-1, egid); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRESGID + return setresgid(-1, egid, -1); +#endif + + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/setenv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/setenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15b5811 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/setenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: setenv.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +#include +#include + +/* + * This is the easy way out, use putenv to implement setenv. We might + * leak some memory but that is ok since we are usally about to exec + * anyway. + */ + +int +setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int rewrite) +{ + char *t; + + if (!rewrite && getenv(var) != 0) + return 0; + + asprintf (&t, "%s=%s", var, val); + if (t == NULL) + return -1; + + if (putenv(t) == 0) + return 0; + else + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/seteuid.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/seteuid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee68ba7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/seteuid.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: seteuid.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +int +seteuid(uid_t euid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SETREUID + return setreuid(-1, euid); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRESUID + return setresuid(-1, euid, -1); +#endif + + return -1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/signal.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/signal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85f36ee --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/signal.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: signal.c,v 1.10 1999/12/14 01:37:58 assar Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +/* + * We would like to always use this signal but there is a link error + * on NEXTSTEP + */ +#if !defined(NeXT) && !defined(__APPLE__) +/* + * Bugs: + * + * Do we need any extra hacks for SIGCLD and/or SIGCHLD? + */ + +typedef RETSIGTYPE (*SigAction)(/* int??? */); + +SigAction +signal(int iSig, SigAction pAction) +{ + struct sigaction saNew, saOld; + + saNew.sa_handler = pAction; + sigemptyset(&saNew.sa_mask); + saNew.sa_flags = 0; + + if (iSig == SIGALRM) + { +#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT + saNew.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT; +#endif + } + else + { +#ifdef SA_RESTART + saNew.sa_flags |= SA_RESTART; +#endif + } + + if (sigaction(iSig, &saNew, &saOld) < 0) + return(SIG_ERR); + + return(saOld.sa_handler); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/simple_exec.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/simple_exec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..426f494 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/simple_exec.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: simple_exec.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include + +#define EX_NOEXEC 126 +#define EX_NOTFOUND 127 + +/* return values: + -1 on `unspecified' system errors + -2 on fork failures + -3 on waitpid errors + 0- is return value from subprocess + 126 if the program couldn't be executed + 127 if the program couldn't be found + 128- is 128 + signal that killed subprocess + */ + +static int +check_status(pid_t pid) +{ + while(1) { + int status; + + while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + if (errno != EINTR) + return -3; + if(WIFSTOPPED(status)) + continue; + if(WIFEXITED(status)) + return WEXITSTATUS(status); + if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) + return WTERMSIG(status) + 128; + } +} + +int +simple_execvp(const char *file, char *const args[]) +{ + pid_t pid = fork(); + switch(pid){ + case -1: + return -2; + case 0: + execvp(file, args); + exit((errno == ENOENT) ? EX_NOTFOUND : EX_NOEXEC); + default: + return check_status(pid); + } +} + +/* gee, I'd like a execvpe */ +int +simple_execve(const char *file, char *const args[], char *const envp[]) +{ + pid_t pid = fork(); + switch(pid){ + case -1: + return -2; + case 0: + execve(file, args, envp); + exit((errno == ENOENT) ? EX_NOTFOUND : EX_NOEXEC); + default: + return check_status(pid); + } +} + +static char ** +collect_args(va_list *ap) +{ + char **argv = NULL; + int argc = 0, i = 0; + do { + if(i == argc) { + /* realloc argv */ + char **tmp = realloc(argv, (argc + 5) * sizeof(*argv)); + if(tmp == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + argv = tmp; + argc += 5; + } + argv[i++] = va_arg(*ap, char*); + } while(argv[i - 1] != NULL); + return argv; +} + +int +simple_execlp(const char *file, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char **argv; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, file); + argv = collect_args(&ap); + va_end(ap); + if(argv == NULL) + return -1; + ret = simple_execvp(file, argv); + free(argv); + return ret; +} + +int +simple_execle(const char *file, ... /* ,char *const envp[] */) +{ + va_list ap; + char **argv; + char *const* envp; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, file); + argv = collect_args(&ap); + envp = va_arg(ap, char **); + va_end(ap); + if(argv == NULL) + return -1; + ret = simple_execve(file, argv, envp); + free(argv); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/snprintf.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/snprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0333e87 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/snprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995-1997, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: snprintf.c,v 1.24 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +enum format_flags { + minus_flag = 1, + plus_flag = 2, + space_flag = 4, + alternate_flag = 8, + zero_flag = 16 +}; + +/* + * Common state + */ + +struct state { + unsigned char *str; + unsigned char *s; + unsigned char *theend; + size_t sz; + size_t max_sz; + int (*append_char)(struct state *, unsigned char); + int (*reserve)(struct state *, size_t); + /* XXX - methods */ +}; + +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +static int +sn_reserve (struct state *state, size_t n) +{ + return state->s + n > state->theend; +} + +static int +sn_append_char (struct state *state, unsigned char c) +{ + if (sn_reserve (state, 1)) { + return 1; + } else { + *state->s++ = c; + return 0; + } +} +#endif + +static int +as_reserve (struct state *state, size_t n) +{ + if (state->s + n > state->theend) { + int off = state->s - state->str; + unsigned char *tmp; + + if (state->max_sz && state->sz >= state->max_sz) + return 1; + + state->sz = max(state->sz * 2, state->sz + n); + if (state->max_sz) + state->sz = min(state->sz, state->max_sz); + tmp = realloc (state->str, state->sz); + if (tmp == NULL) + return 1; + state->str = tmp; + state->s = state->str + off; + state->theend = state->str + state->sz - 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +as_append_char (struct state *state, unsigned char c) +{ + if(as_reserve (state, 1)) + return 1; + else { + *state->s++ = c; + return 0; + } +} + +static int +append_number(struct state *state, + unsigned long num, unsigned base, char *rep, + int width, int prec, int flags, int minusp) +{ + int len = 0; + int i; + + /* given precision, ignore zero flag */ + if(prec != -1) + flags &= ~zero_flag; + else + prec = 1; + /* zero value with zero precision -> "" */ + if(prec == 0 && num == 0) + return 0; + do{ + if((*state->append_char)(state, rep[num % base])) + return 1; + len++; + num /= base; + }while(num); + prec -= len; + /* pad with prec zeros */ + while(prec-- > 0){ + if((*state->append_char)(state, '0')) + return 1; + len++; + } + /* add length of alternate prefix (added later) to len */ + if(flags & alternate_flag && (base == 16 || base == 8)) + len += base / 8; + /* pad with zeros */ + if(flags & zero_flag){ + width -= len; + if(minusp || (flags & space_flag) || (flags & plus_flag)) + width--; + while(width-- > 0){ + if((*state->append_char)(state, '0')) + return 1; + len++; + } + } + /* add alternate prefix */ + if(flags & alternate_flag && (base == 16 || base == 8)){ + if(base == 16) + if((*state->append_char)(state, rep[10] + 23)) /* XXX */ + return 1; + if((*state->append_char)(state, '0')) + return 1; + } + /* add sign */ + if(minusp){ + if((*state->append_char)(state, '-')) + return 1; + len++; + } else if(flags & plus_flag) { + if((*state->append_char)(state, '+')) + return 1; + len++; + } else if(flags & space_flag) { + if((*state->append_char)(state, ' ')) + return 1; + len++; + } + if(flags & minus_flag) + /* swap before padding with spaces */ + for(i = 0; i < len / 2; i++){ + char c = state->s[-i-1]; + state->s[-i-1] = state->s[-len+i]; + state->s[-len+i] = c; + } + width -= len; + while(width-- > 0){ + if((*state->append_char)(state, ' ')) + return 1; + len++; + } + if(!(flags & minus_flag)) + /* swap after padding with spaces */ + for(i = 0; i < len / 2; i++){ + char c = state->s[-i-1]; + state->s[-i-1] = state->s[-len+i]; + state->s[-len+i] = c; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +append_string (struct state *state, + unsigned char *arg, + int width, + int prec, + int flags) +{ + if(prec != -1) + width -= prec; + else + width -= strlen((char *)arg); + if(!(flags & minus_flag)) + while(width-- > 0) + if((*state->append_char) (state, ' ')) + return 1; + if (prec != -1) { + while (*arg && prec--) + if ((*state->append_char) (state, *arg++)) + return 1; + } else { + while (*arg) + if ((*state->append_char) (state, *arg++)) + return 1; + } + if(flags & minus_flag) + while(width-- > 0) + if((*state->append_char) (state, ' ')) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +static int +append_char(struct state *state, + unsigned char arg, + int width, + int flags) +{ + while(!(flags & minus_flag) && --width > 0) + if((*state->append_char) (state, ' ')) + return 1; + + if((*state->append_char) (state, arg)) + return 1; + while((flags & minus_flag) && --width > 0) + if((*state->append_char) (state, ' ')) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * This can't be made into a function... + */ + +#define PARSE_INT_FORMAT(res, arg, unsig) \ +if (long_flag) \ + res = (unsig long)va_arg(arg, unsig long); \ +else if (short_flag) \ + res = (unsig short)va_arg(arg, unsig short); \ +else \ + res = (unsig int)va_arg(arg, unsig int) + +/* + * zyxprintf - return 0 or -1 + */ + +static int +xyzprintf (struct state *state, const char *char_format, va_list ap) +{ + const unsigned char *format = (const unsigned char *)char_format; + unsigned char c; + + while((c = *format++)) { + if (c == '%') { + int flags = 0; + int width = 0; + int prec = -1; + int long_flag = 0; + int short_flag = 0; + + /* flags */ + while((c = *format++)){ + if(c == '-') + flags |= minus_flag; + else if(c == '+') + flags |= plus_flag; + else if(c == ' ') + flags |= space_flag; + else if(c == '#') + flags |= alternate_flag; + else if(c == '0') + flags |= zero_flag; + else + break; + } + + if((flags & space_flag) && (flags & plus_flag)) + flags ^= space_flag; + + if((flags & minus_flag) && (flags & zero_flag)) + flags ^= zero_flag; + + /* width */ + if (isdigit(c)) + do { + width = width * 10 + c - '0'; + c = *format++; + } while(isdigit(c)); + else if(c == '*') { + width = va_arg(ap, int); + c = *format++; + } + + /* precision */ + if (c == '.') { + prec = 0; + c = *format++; + if (isdigit(c)) + do { + prec = prec * 10 + c - '0'; + c = *format++; + } while(isdigit(c)); + else if (c == '*') { + prec = va_arg(ap, int); + c = *format++; + } + } + + /* size */ + + if (c == 'h') { + short_flag = 1; + c = *format++; + } else if (c == 'l') { + long_flag = 1; + c = *format++; + } + + switch (c) { + case 'c' : + if(append_char(state, va_arg(ap, int), width, flags)) + return -1; + break; + case 's' : + if (append_string(state, + va_arg(ap, unsigned char*), + width, + prec, + flags)) + return -1; + break; + case 'd' : + case 'i' : { + long arg; + unsigned long num; + int minusp = 0; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, signed); + + if (arg < 0) { + minusp = 1; + num = -arg; + } else + num = arg; + + if (append_number (state, num, 10, "0123456789", + width, prec, flags, minusp)) + return -1; + break; + } + case 'u' : { + unsigned long arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + if (append_number (state, arg, 10, "0123456789", + width, prec, flags, 0)) + return -1; + break; + } + case 'o' : { + unsigned long arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + if (append_number (state, arg, 010, "01234567", + width, prec, flags, 0)) + return -1; + break; + } + case 'x' : { + unsigned long arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + if (append_number (state, arg, 0x10, "0123456789abcdef", + width, prec, flags, 0)) + return -1; + break; + } + case 'X' :{ + unsigned long arg; + + PARSE_INT_FORMAT(arg, ap, unsigned); + + if (append_number (state, arg, 0x10, "0123456789ABCDEF", + width, prec, flags, 0)) + return -1; + break; + } + case 'p' : { + unsigned long arg = (unsigned long)va_arg(ap, void*); + + if (append_number (state, arg, 0x10, "0123456789ABCDEF", + width, prec, flags, 0)) + return -1; + break; + } + case 'n' : { + int *arg = va_arg(ap, int*); + *arg = state->s - state->str; + break; + } + case '\0' : + --format; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '%' : + if ((*state->append_char)(state, c)) + return -1; + break; + default : + if ( (*state->append_char)(state, '%') + || (*state->append_char)(state, c)) + return -1; + break; + } + } else + if ((*state->append_char) (state, c)) + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +int +snprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int ret; + + va_start(args, format); + ret = vsnprintf (str, sz, format, args); + +#ifdef PARANOIA + { + int ret2; + char *tmp; + + tmp = malloc (sz); + if (tmp == NULL) + abort (); + + ret2 = vsprintf (tmp, format, args); + if (ret != ret2 || strcmp(str, tmp)) + abort (); + free (tmp); + } +#endif + + va_end(args); + return ret; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +int +asprintf (char **ret, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int val; + + va_start(args, format); + val = vasprintf (ret, format, args); + +#ifdef PARANOIA + { + int ret2; + char *tmp; + tmp = malloc (val + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) + abort (); + + ret2 = vsprintf (tmp, format, args); + if (val != ret2 || strcmp(*ret, tmp)) + abort (); + free (tmp); + } +#endif + + va_end(args); + return val; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ASNPRINTF +int +asnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int val; + + va_start(args, format); + val = vasnprintf (ret, max_sz, format, args); + +#ifdef PARANOIA + { + int ret2; + char *tmp; + tmp = malloc (val + 1); + if (tmp == NULL) + abort (); + + ret2 = vsprintf (tmp, format, args); + if (val != ret2 || strcmp(*ret, tmp)) + abort (); + free (tmp); + } +#endif + + va_end(args); + return val; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF +int +vasprintf (char **ret, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + return vasnprintf (ret, 0, format, args); +} +#endif + + +#ifndef HAVE_VASNPRINTF +int +vasnprintf (char **ret, size_t max_sz, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + int st; + size_t len; + struct state state; + + state.max_sz = max_sz; + state.sz = 1; + state.str = malloc(state.sz); + if (state.str == NULL) { + *ret = NULL; + return -1; + } + state.s = state.str; + state.theend = state.s + state.sz - 1; + state.append_char = as_append_char; + state.reserve = as_reserve; + + st = xyzprintf (&state, format, args); + if (st) { + free (state.str); + *ret = NULL; + return -1; + } else { + char *tmp; + + *state.s = '\0'; + len = state.s - state.str; + tmp = realloc (state.str, len+1); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free (state.str); + *ret = NULL; + return -1; + } + *ret = tmp; + return len; + } +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +int +vsnprintf (char *str, size_t sz, const char *format, va_list args) +{ + struct state state; + int ret; + unsigned char *ustr = (unsigned char *)str; + + state.max_sz = 0; + state.sz = sz; + state.str = ustr; + state.s = ustr; + state.theend = ustr + sz - 1; + state.append_char = sn_append_char; + state.reserve = sn_reserve; + + ret = xyzprintf (&state, format, args); + *state.s = '\0'; + if (ret) + return sz; + else + return state.s - state.str; +} +#endif + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/socket.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/socket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e9c3df --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/socket.c @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: socket.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_SYSTM_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IP_H +#include +#endif + +#include + +#include + +/* + * Set `sa' to the unitialized address of address family `af' + */ + +void +socket_set_any (struct sockaddr *sa, int af) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = 0; + sin->sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = 0; + sin6->sin6_addr = in6addr_any; + break; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * set `sa' to (`ptr', `port') + */ + +void +socket_set_address_and_port (struct sockaddr *sa, const void *ptr, int port) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + + memset (sin, 0, sizeof(*sin)); + sin->sin_family = AF_INET; + sin->sin_port = port; + memcpy (&sin->sin_addr, ptr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset (sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6)); + sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + memcpy (&sin6->sin6_addr, ptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + break; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the size of an address of the type in `sa' + */ + +size_t +socket_addr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : + return sizeof(struct in_addr); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + return sizeof(struct in6_addr); +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the size of a `struct sockaddr' in `sa'. + */ + +size_t +socket_sockaddr_size (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : + return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : + return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the binary address of `sa'. + */ + +void * +socket_get_address (struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + return &sin->sin_addr; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + return &sin6->sin6_addr; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Return the port number from `sa'. + */ + +int +socket_get_port (const struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + const struct sockaddr_in *sin = (const struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + return sin->sin_port; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + const struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (const struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + return sin6->sin6_port; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Set the port in `sa' to `port'. + */ + +void +socket_set_port (struct sockaddr *sa, int port) +{ + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET : { + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + sin->sin_port = port; + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6 : { + struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + sin6->sin6_port = port; + break; + } +#endif + default : + errx (1, "unknown address family %d", sa->sa_family); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Enable debug on `sock'. + */ + +void +socket_set_debug (int sock) +{ + int on = 1; + +#if defined(SO_DEBUG) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (setsockopt (sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, (void *) &on, sizeof (on)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt SO_DEBUG (ignored)"); +#endif +} + +/* + * Set the type-of-service of `sock' to `tos'. + */ + +void +socket_set_tos (int sock, int tos) +{ +#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if (setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, (void *) &tos, sizeof (int)) < 0) + warn ("setsockopt TOS (ignored)"); +#endif +} + +/* + * set the reuse of addresses on `sock' to `val'. + */ + +void +socket_set_reuseaddr (int sock, int val) +{ +#if defined(SO_REUSEADDR) && defined(HAVE_SETSOCKOPT) + if(setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&val, + sizeof(val)) < 0) + err (1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); +#endif +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strcasecmp.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strcasecmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5e20e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strcasecmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strcasecmp.c,v 1.9 1999/12/02 16:58:52 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASECMP + +int +strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2) +{ + while(toupper(*s1) == toupper(*s2)) { + if(*s1 == '\0') + return 0; + s1++; + s2++; + } + return toupper(*s1) - toupper(*s2); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strdup.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strdup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87fb43e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strdup.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strdup.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +char * +strdup(const char *old) +{ + char *t = malloc(strlen(old)+1); + if (t != 0) + strcpy(t, old); + return t; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strerror.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strerror.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21936d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strerror.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strerror.c,v 1.10 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +extern int sys_nerr; +extern char *sys_errlist[]; + +char* +strerror(int eno) +{ + static char emsg[1024]; + + if(eno < 0 || eno >= sys_nerr) + snprintf(emsg, sizeof(emsg), "Error %d occurred.", eno); + else + snprintf(emsg, sizeof(emsg), "%s", sys_errlist[eno]); + + return emsg; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strftime.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strftime.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b90614b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strftime.c @@ -0,0 +1,396 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strftime.c,v 1.10 1999/11/13 04:18:33 assar Exp $"); + +static const char *abb_weekdays[] = { + "Sun", + "Mon", + "Tue", + "Wed", + "Thu", + "Fri", + "Sat", +}; + +static const char *full_weekdays[] = { + "Sunday", + "Monday", + "Tuesday", + "Wednesday", + "Thursday", + "Friday", + "Saturday", +}; + +static const char *abb_month[] = { + "Jan", + "Feb", + "Mar", + "Apr", + "May", + "Jun", + "Jul", + "Aug", + "Sep", + "Oct", + "Nov", + "Dec" +}; + +static const char *full_month[] = { + "January", + "February", + "Mars", + "April", + "May", + "June", + "July", + "August", + "September", + "October", + "November", + "December" +}; + +static const char *ampm[] = { + "AM", + "PM" +}; + +/* + * Convert hour in [0, 24] to [12 1 - 11 12 1 - 11 12] + */ + +static int +hour_24to12 (int hour) +{ + int ret = hour % 12; + + if (ret == 0) + ret = 12; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return AM or PM for `hour' + */ + +static const char * +hour_to_ampm (int hour) +{ + return ampm[hour / 12]; +} + +/* + * Return the week number of `tm' (Sunday being the first day of the week) + * as [0, 53] + */ + +static int +week_number_sun (const struct tm *tm) +{ + return (tm->tm_yday + 7 - (tm->tm_yday % 7 - tm->tm_wday + 7) % 7) / 7; +} + +/* + * Return the week number of `tm' (Monday being the first day of the week) + * as [0, 53] + */ + +static int +week_number_mon (const struct tm *tm) +{ + int wday = (tm->tm_wday + 6) % 7; + + return (tm->tm_yday + 7 - (tm->tm_yday % 7 - wday + 7) % 7) / 7; +} + +/* + * Return the week number of `tm' (Monday being the first day of the + * week) as [01, 53]. Week number one is the one that has four or more + * days in that year. + */ + +static int +week_number_mon4 (const struct tm *tm) +{ + int wday = (tm->tm_wday + 6) % 7; + int w1day = (wday - tm->tm_yday % 7 + 7) % 7; + int ret; + + ret = (tm->tm_yday + w1day) / 7; + if (w1day >= 4) + --ret; + if (ret == -1) + ret = 53; + else + ++ret; + return ret; +} + +/* + * + */ + +size_t +strftime (char *buf, size_t maxsize, const char *format, + const struct tm *tm) +{ + size_t n = 0; + size_t ret; + + while (*format != '\0' && n < maxsize) { + if (*format == '%') { + ++format; + if(*format == 'E' || *format == 'O') + ++format; + switch (*format) { + case 'a' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", abb_weekdays[tm->tm_wday]); + break; + case 'A' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", full_weekdays[tm->tm_wday]); + break; + case 'h' : + case 'b' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", abb_month[tm->tm_mon]); + break; + case 'B' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", full_month[tm->tm_mon]); + break; + case 'c' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d:%02d:%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_year, + tm->tm_mon + 1, + tm->tm_mday, + tm->tm_hour, + tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec); + break; + case 'C' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", (tm->tm_year + 1900) / 100); + break; + case 'd' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'D' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d/%02d/%02d", + tm->tm_mon + 1, + tm->tm_mday, + (tm->tm_year + 1900) % 100); + break; + case 'e' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%2d", tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'F': + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%04d-%02d-%02d", tm->tm_year + 1900, + tm->tm_mon + 1, tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'g': + /* last two digits of week-based year */ + abort(); + case 'G': + /* week-based year */ + abort(); + case 'H' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_hour); + break; + case 'I' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", + hour_24to12 (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'j' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%03d", tm->tm_yday + 1); + break; + case 'k' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%2d", tm->tm_hour); + break; + case 'l' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%2d", + hour_24to12 (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'm' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_mon + 1); + break; + case 'M' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_min); + break; + case 'n' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, "\n"); + break; + case 'p' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, "%s", + hour_to_ampm (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'r' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d:%02d:%02d %s", + hour_24to12 (tm->tm_hour), + tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec, + hour_to_ampm (tm->tm_hour)); + break; + case 'R' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_hour, + tm->tm_min); + + case 's' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", (int)mktime((struct tm *)tm)); + break; + case 'S' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", tm->tm_sec); + break; + case 't' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, "\t"); + break; + case 'T' : + case 'X' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d:%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_hour, + tm->tm_min, + tm->tm_sec); + break; + case 'u' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", (tm->tm_wday == 0) ? 7 : tm->tm_wday); + break; + case 'U' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", week_number_sun (tm)); + break; + case 'V' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", week_number_mon4 (tm)); + break; + case 'w' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", tm->tm_wday); + break; + case 'W' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", week_number_mon (tm)); + break; + case 'x' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d:%02d:%02d", + tm->tm_year, + tm->tm_mon + 1, + tm->tm_mday); + break; + case 'y' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%02d", (tm->tm_year + 1900) % 100); + break; + case 'Y' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%d", tm->tm_year + 1900); + break; + case 'z': + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%ld", +#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_GMTOFF) + (long)tm->tm_gmtoff +#elif defined(HAVE_TIMEZONE) + tm->tm_isdst ? + (long)altzone : + (long)timezone +#else +#error Where in timezone chaos are you? +#endif + ); + break; + case 'Z' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%s", + +#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_TM_TM_ZONE) + tm->tm_zone +#elif defined(HAVE_TIMEZONE) + tzname[tm->tm_isdst] +#else +#error what? +#endif + ); + break; + case '\0' : + --format; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '%' : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%%"); + break; + default : + ret = snprintf (buf, maxsize - n, + "%%%c", *format); + break; + } + if (ret >= maxsize - n) + return 0; + n += ret; + buf += ret; + ++format; + } else { + *buf++ = *format++; + ++n; + } + } + *buf++ = '\0'; + return n; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlcat.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlcat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3c8baa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlcat.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strlcat.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT + +size_t +strlcat (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz) +{ + size_t len = strlen(dst); + + return len + strlcpy (dst + len, src, dst_sz - len); +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlcpy.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33cd9cb --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strlcpy.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY + +size_t +strlcpy (char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_sz) +{ + size_t n; + char *p; + + for (p = dst, n = 0; + n + 1 < dst_sz && *src != '\0'; + ++p, ++src, ++n) + *p = *src; + *p = '\0'; + if (*src == '\0') + return n; + else + return n + strlen (src); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlwr.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlwr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb36789 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strlwr.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strlwr.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLWR +char * +strlwr(char *str) +{ + char *s; + + for(s = str; *s; s++) + *s = tolower(*s); + return str; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strncasecmp.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strncasecmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c6474f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strncasecmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strncasecmp.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNCASECMP + +int +strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) +{ + while(n > 0 && toupper(*s1) == toupper(*s2)) { + if(*s1 == '\0') + return 0; + s1++; + s2++; + n--; + } + if(n == 0) + return 0; + return toupper(*s1) - toupper(*s2); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strndup.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strndup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31e7e9f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strndup.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strndup.c,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP +char * +strndup(const char *old, size_t sz) +{ + size_t len = strnlen (old, sz); + char *t = malloc(len + 1); + + if (t != NULL) { + memcpy (t, old, len); + t[len] = '\0'; + } + return t; +} +#endif /* HAVE_STRNDUP */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strnlen.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strnlen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fffb3b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strnlen.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strnlen.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +size_t +strnlen(const char *s, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + for(i = 0; i < len && s[i]; i++) + ; + return i; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strpftime-test.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strpftime-test.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7eb8fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strpftime-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strpftime-test.c,v 1.2 1999/11/12 15:29:55 assar Exp $"); + +enum { MAXSIZE = 26 }; + +static struct testcase { + time_t t; + struct { + const char *format; + const char *result; + } vals[MAXSIZE]; +} tests[] = { + {0, + { + {"%A", "Thursday"}, + {"%a", "Thu"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "01"}, + {"%e", " 1"}, + {"%H", "00"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "001"}, + {"%k", " 0"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "4"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL}} + }, + {90000, + { + {"%A", "Friday"}, + {"%a", "Fri"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "02"}, + {"%e", " 2"}, + {"%H", "01"}, + {"%I", "01"}, + {"%j", "002"}, + {"%k", " 1"}, + {"%l", " 1"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "5"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + }, + {216306, + { + {"%A", "Saturday"}, + {"%a", "Sat"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "03"}, + {"%e", " 3"}, + {"%H", "12"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "003"}, + {"%k", "12"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "05"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "PM"}, + {"%S", "06"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "6"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + }, + {259200, + { + {"%A", "Sunday"}, + {"%a", "Sun"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "04"}, + {"%e", " 4"}, + {"%H", "00"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "004"}, + {"%k", " 0"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "0"}, + {"%Y", "1970"}, + {"%y", "70"}, + {"%U", "01"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "01"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + }, + {915148800, + { + {"%A", "Friday"}, + {"%a", "Fri"}, + {"%B", "January"}, + {"%b", "Jan"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "01"}, + {"%e", " 1"}, + {"%H", "00"}, + {"%I", "12"}, + {"%j", "001"}, + {"%k", " 0"}, + {"%l", "12"}, + {"%M", "00"}, + {"%m", "01"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "AM"}, + {"%S", "00"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "5"}, + {"%Y", "1999"}, + {"%y", "99"}, + {"%U", "00"}, + {"%W", "00"}, + {"%V", "53"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL}} + }, + {942161105, + { + + {"%A", "Tuesday"}, + {"%a", "Tue"}, + {"%B", "November"}, + {"%b", "Nov"}, + {"%C", "19"}, + {"%d", "09"}, + {"%e", " 9"}, + {"%H", "15"}, + {"%I", "03"}, + {"%j", "313"}, + {"%k", "15"}, + {"%l", " 3"}, + {"%M", "25"}, + {"%m", "11"}, + {"%n", "\n"}, + {"%p", "PM"}, + {"%S", "05"}, + {"%t", "\t"}, + {"%w", "2"}, + {"%Y", "1999"}, + {"%y", "99"}, + {"%U", "45"}, + {"%W", "45"}, + {"%V", "45"}, + {"%%", "%"}, + {NULL, NULL} + } + } +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j; + int ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests)/sizeof(tests[0]); ++i) { + struct tm *tm; + + tm = gmtime (&tests[i].t); + + for (j = 0; tests[i].vals[j].format != NULL; ++j) { + char buf[128]; + size_t len; + struct tm tm2; + char *ptr; + + len = strftime (buf, sizeof(buf), tests[i].vals[j].format, tm); + if (len != strlen (buf)) { + printf ("length of strftime(\"%s\") = %d (\"%s\")\n", + tests[i].vals[j].format, len, + buf); + ++ret; + continue; + } + if (strcmp (buf, tests[i].vals[j].result) != 0) { + printf ("result of strftime(\"%s\") = \"%s\" != \"%s\"\n", + tests[i].vals[j].format, buf, + tests[i].vals[j].result); + ++ret; + continue; + } + memset (&tm2, 0, sizeof(tm2)); + ptr = strptime (tests[i].vals[j].result, + tests[i].vals[j].format, + &tm2); + if (ptr == NULL || *ptr != '\0') { + printf ("bad return value from strptime(" + "\"%s\", \"%s\")\n", + tests[i].vals[j].result, + tests[i].vals[j].format); + ++ret; + } + strftime (buf, sizeof(buf), tests[i].vals[j].format, &tm2); + if (strcmp (buf, tests[i].vals[j].result) != 0) { + printf ("reverse of \"%s\" failed: \"%s\" vs \"%s\"\n", + tests[i].vals[j].format, + buf, tests[i].vals[j].result); + ++ret; + } + } + } + if (ret) { + printf ("%d errors\n", ret); + return 1; + } else + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strptime.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strptime.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36f0822 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strptime.c @@ -0,0 +1,444 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + * used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "roken.h" + +RCSID("$Id: strptime.c,v 1.2 1999/11/12 15:29:55 assar Exp $"); + +static const char *abb_weekdays[] = { + "Sun", + "Mon", + "Tue", + "Wed", + "Thu", + "Fri", + "Sat", + NULL +}; + +static const char *full_weekdays[] = { + "Sunday", + "Monday", + "Tuesday", + "Wednesday", + "Thursday", + "Friday", + "Saturday", + NULL +}; + +static const char *abb_month[] = { + "Jan", + "Feb", + "Mar", + "Apr", + "May", + "Jun", + "Jul", + "Aug", + "Sep", + "Oct", + "Nov", + "Dec", + NULL +}; + +static const char *full_month[] = { + "January", + "February", + "Mars", + "April", + "May", + "June", + "July", + "August", + "September", + "October", + "November", + "December", + NULL, +}; + +static const char *ampm[] = { + "am", + "pm", + NULL +}; + +/* + * Try to match `*buf' to one of the strings in `strs'. Return the + * index of the matching string (or -1 if none). Also advance buf. + */ + +static int +match_string (const char **buf, const char **strs) +{ + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; strs[i] != NULL; ++i) { + int len = strlen (strs[i]); + + if (strncasecmp (*buf, strs[i], len) == 0) { + *buf += len; + return i; + } + } + return -1; +} + +/* + * tm_year is relative this year */ + +const int tm_year_base = 1900; + +/* + * Return TRUE iff `year' was a leap year. + */ + +static int +is_leap_year (int year) +{ + return (year % 4) == 0 && ((year % 100) != 0 || (year % 400) == 0); +} + +/* + * Return the weekday [0,6] (0 = Sunday) of the first day of `year' + */ + +static int +first_day (int year) +{ + int ret = 4; + + for (; year > 1970; --year) + ret = (ret + 365 + is_leap_year (year) ? 1 : 0) % 7; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set `timeptr' given `wnum' (week number [0, 53]) + */ + +static void +set_week_number_sun (struct tm *timeptr, int wnum) +{ + int fday = first_day (timeptr->tm_year + tm_year_base); + + timeptr->tm_yday = wnum * 7 + timeptr->tm_wday - fday; + if (timeptr->tm_yday < 0) { + timeptr->tm_wday = fday; + timeptr->tm_yday = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Set `timeptr' given `wnum' (week number [0, 53]) + */ + +static void +set_week_number_mon (struct tm *timeptr, int wnum) +{ + int fday = (first_day (timeptr->tm_year + tm_year_base) + 6) % 7; + + timeptr->tm_yday = wnum * 7 + (timeptr->tm_wday + 6) % 7 - fday; + if (timeptr->tm_yday < 0) { + timeptr->tm_wday = (fday + 1) % 7; + timeptr->tm_yday = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Set `timeptr' given `wnum' (week number [0, 53]) + */ + +static void +set_week_number_mon4 (struct tm *timeptr, int wnum) +{ + int fday = (first_day (timeptr->tm_year + tm_year_base) + 6) % 7; + int offset = 0; + + if (fday < 4) + offset += 7; + + timeptr->tm_yday = offset + (wnum - 1) * 7 + timeptr->tm_wday - fday; + if (timeptr->tm_yday < 0) { + timeptr->tm_wday = fday; + timeptr->tm_yday = 0; + } +} + +/* + * + */ + +char * +strptime (const char *buf, const char *format, struct tm *timeptr) +{ + char c; + + for (; (c = *format) != '\0'; ++format) { + char *s; + int ret; + + if (isspace (c)) { + while (isspace (*buf)) + ++buf; + } else if (c == '%' && format[1] != '\0') { + c = *++format; + if (c == 'E' || c == 'O') + c = *++format; + switch (c) { + case 'A' : + ret = match_string (&buf, full_weekdays); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret; + break; + case 'a' : + ret = match_string (&buf, abb_weekdays); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret; + break; + case 'B' : + ret = match_string (&buf, full_month); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mon = ret; + break; + case 'b' : + case 'h' : + ret = match_string (&buf, abb_month); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mon = ret; + break; + case 'C' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_year = (ret * 100) - tm_year_base; + buf = s; + break; + case 'c' : + abort (); + case 'D' : /* %m/%d/%y */ + s = strptime (buf, "%m/%d/%y", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'd' : + case 'e' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mday = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'H' : + case 'k' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_hour = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'I' : + case 'l' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + if (ret == 12) + timeptr->tm_hour = 0; + else + timeptr->tm_hour = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'j' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_yday = ret - 1; + buf = s; + break; + case 'm' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_mon = ret - 1; + buf = s; + break; + case 'M' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_min = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'n' : + if (*buf == '\n') + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + case 'p' : + ret = match_string (&buf, ampm); + if (ret < 0) + return NULL; + if (timeptr->tm_hour == 0) { + if (ret == 1) + timeptr->tm_hour = 12; + } else + timeptr->tm_hour += 12; + break; + case 'r' : /* %I:%M:%S %p */ + s = strptime (buf, "%I:%M:%S %p", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'R' : /* %H:%M */ + s = strptime (buf, "%H:%M", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'S' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_sec = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 't' : + if (*buf == '\t') + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + case 'T' : /* %H:%M:%S */ + case 'X' : + s = strptime (buf, "%H:%M:%S", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'u' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret - 1; + buf = s; + break; + case 'w' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_wday = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'U' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + set_week_number_sun (timeptr, ret); + buf = s; + break; + case 'V' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + set_week_number_mon4 (timeptr, ret); + buf = s; + break; + case 'W' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + set_week_number_mon (timeptr, ret); + buf = s; + break; + case 'x' : + s = strptime (buf, "%Y:%m:%d", timeptr); + if (s == NULL) + return NULL; + buf = s; + break; + case 'y' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + if (ret < 70) + timeptr->tm_year = 100 + ret; + else + timeptr->tm_year = ret; + buf = s; + break; + case 'Y' : + ret = strtol (buf, &s, 10); + if (s == buf) + return NULL; + timeptr->tm_year = ret - tm_year_base; + buf = s; + break; + case 'Z' : + abort (); + case '\0' : + --format; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case '%' : + if (*buf == '%') + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + default : + if (*buf == '%' || *++buf == c) + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + break; + } + } else { + if (*buf == c) + ++buf; + else + return NULL; + } + } + return (char *)buf; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strsep.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strsep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efc714a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strsep.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strsep.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP + +char * +strsep(char **str, const char *delim) +{ + char *save = *str; + if(*str == NULL) + return NULL; + *str = *str + strcspn(*str, delim); + if(**str == 0) + *str = NULL; + else{ + **str = 0; + (*str)++; + } + return save; +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strtok_r.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strtok_r.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45b036a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strtok_r.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strtok_r.c,v 1.5 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOK_R + +char * +strtok_r(char *s1, const char *s2, char **lasts) +{ + char *ret; + + if (s1 == NULL) + s1 = *lasts; + while(*s1 && strchr(s2, *s1)) + ++s1; + if(*s1 == '\0') + return NULL; + ret = s1; + while(*s1 && !strchr(s2, *s1)) + ++s1; + if(*s1) + *s1++ = '\0'; + *lasts = s1; + return ret; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_STRTOK_R */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strupr.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strupr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96dd042 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/strupr.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: strupr.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUPR +char * +strupr(char *str) +{ + char *s; + + for(s = str; *s; s++) + *s = toupper(*s); + return str; +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/swab.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/swab.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c623bd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/swab.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_SWAB + +RCSID("$Id: swab.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); + +void +swab (char *from, char *to, int nbytes) +{ + while(nbytes >= 2) { + *(to + 1) = *from; + *to = *(from + 1); + to += 2; + from += 2; + nbytes -= 2; + } +} +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/tm2time.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/tm2time.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b912e32 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/tm2time.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: tm2time.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +#include +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_TIME_H) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +time_t +tm2time (struct tm tm, int local) +{ + time_t t; + + tm.tm_isdst = -1; + + t = mktime (&tm); + + if (!local) + t += t - mktime (gmtime (&t)); + return t; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/unsetenv.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/unsetenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d95a51 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/unsetenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: unsetenv.c,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +extern char **environ; + +/* + * unsetenv -- + */ +void +unsetenv(const char *name) +{ + int len; + const char *np; + char **p; + + if (name == 0 || environ == 0) + return; + + for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; np++) + /* nop */; + len = np - name; + + for (p = environ; *p != 0; p++) + if (strncmp(*p, name, len) == 0 && (*p)[len] == '=') + break; + + for (; *p != 0; p++) + *p = *(p + 1); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verify.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..842fa9a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verify.c,v 1.13 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +#include +#endif +#include "roken.h" + +int +unix_verify_user(char *user, char *password) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + + pw = k_getpwnam(user); + if(pw == NULL) + return -1; + if(strlen(pw->pw_passwd) == 0 && strlen(password) == 0) + return 0; + if(strcmp(crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd), pw->pw_passwd) == 0) + return 0; + return -1; +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verr.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..511e640 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verr.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verr.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +verr(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(1, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verrx.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verrx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4578d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/verrx.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: verrx.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:53 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +verrx(int eval, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(0, fmt, ap); + exit(eval); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vsyslog.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vsyslog.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22e6a35 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vsyslog.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vsyslog.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VSYSLOG + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "roken.h" + +void +vsyslog(int pri, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *p; + + vasprintf (&p, fmt, ap); + syslog (pri, "%s", p); + free (p); +} + +#endif diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vwarn.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vwarn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15f9a38 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vwarn.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vwarn.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +vwarn(const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(1, fmt, ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vwarnx.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vwarnx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48f1ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/vwarnx.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: vwarnx.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +vwarnx(const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + warnerr(0, fmt, ap); +} + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warn.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warn.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8ee335 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warn.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: warn.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +warn(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vwarn(fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warnerr.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warnerr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4df375d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warnerr.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: warnerr.c,v 1.8 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" +#include "err.h" + +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME +const char *__progname; +#endif + +void +set_progname(char *argv0) +{ +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME + char *p; + if(argv0 == NULL) + return; + p = strrchr(argv0, '/'); + if(p == NULL) + p = argv0; + else + p++; + __progname = p; +#endif +} + +void +warnerr(int doerrno, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + int sverrno = errno; + if(__progname != NULL){ + fprintf(stderr, "%s", __progname); + if(fmt != NULL || doerrno) + fprintf(stderr, ": "); + } + if (fmt != NULL){ + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); + if(doerrno) + fprintf(stderr, ": "); + } + if(doerrno) + fprintf(stderr, "%s", strerror(sverrno)); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warnx.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warnx.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c991176 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/warnx.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: warnx.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "err.h" + +void +warnx(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + vwarnx(fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/writev.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/writev.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3859bf --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/writev.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: writev.c,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "roken.h" + +ssize_t +writev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt) +{ + ssize_t ret; + size_t tot = 0; + int i; + char *buf, *p; + + for(i = 0; i < iovcnt; ++i) + tot += iov[i].iov_len; + buf = malloc(tot); + if (tot != 0 && buf == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + p = buf; + for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; ++i) { + memcpy (p, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len); + p += iov[i].iov_len; + } + ret = write (d, buf, tot); + free (buf); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/xdbm.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/xdbm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83885b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/roken/xdbm.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 - 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: xdbm.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:54 joda Exp $ */ + +/* Generic *dbm include file */ + +#ifndef __XDBM_H__ +#define __XDBM_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_NDBM_H +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_RPCSVC_DBM_H) +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_DB_H) +#define DB_DBM_HSEARCH 1 +#include +#endif + +/* Macros to convert ndbm names to dbm names. + * Note that dbm_nextkey() cannot be simply converted using a macro, since + * it is invoked giving the database, and nextkey() needs the previous key. + * + * Instead, all routines call "dbm_next" instead. + */ + +#ifndef NDBM +typedef char DBM; + +#define dbm_open(file, flags, mode) ((dbminit(file) == 0)?"":((char *)0)) +#define dbm_fetch(db, key) fetch(key) +#define dbm_store(db, key, content, flag) store(key, content) +#define dbm_delete(db, key) delete(key) +#define dbm_firstkey(db) firstkey() +#define dbm_next(db,key) nextkey(key) +#define dbm_close(db) dbmclose() +#else +#define dbm_next(db,key) dbm_nextkey(db) +#endif + +#endif /* __XDBM_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ChangeLog b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eca7217 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +2000-01-06 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: bump both versions to 0:1:0 + +1999-12-16 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y (name2number): not used here. remove. + +Thu Apr 1 17:03:59 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * make_cmds.c: use getarg + +Tue Mar 23 14:36:21 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: don't rename + +Sun Mar 21 14:13:29 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: don't roken-rename + +Sat Mar 20 03:43:30 1999 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: replace return with YYACCEPT + +Fri Mar 19 14:53:20 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: add libss; add version-info + +Thu Mar 18 15:07:06 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: clean lex.c parse.c parse.h + + * Makefile.am: install ss.h + + * Makefile.am: include Makefile.am.common + +Thu Mar 11 15:01:01 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * parse.y: prototype for error_message + +Tue Feb 9 23:45:37 1999 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: add snprintf.o to make_cmds + +Sun Nov 22 10:46:23 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.c (sl_command_loop): remove unused variable + + * ss.c (ss_error): remove unused variable + + * make_cmds.c: include err.h + (main): remove unused variable + + * Makefile.in (WFLAGS): set + +Sun Sep 27 01:28:21 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * make_cmds.c: clean-up and simplification + +Mon May 25 02:54:13 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in (clean): try to remove shared library debris + + * Makefile.in: make symlink magic work + +Sun Apr 19 10:00:26 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.in: add symlink magic for linux + +Sun Apr 5 09:21:43 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * parse.y: define alloca to malloc in case we're using bison but + don't have alloca + +Sat Mar 28 11:39:00 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.c (sl_loop): s/2/1 + +Sat Mar 21 00:46:51 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.c (sl_loop): check that there is at least one argument before + calling sl_command + +Sun Mar 1 05:14:37 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.c (sl_loop): Fix general broken-ness. + + * sl.c: Cleanup printing of help strings. + +Thu Feb 26 02:22:02 1998 Assar Westerlund + + * Makefile.am: @LEXLIB@ + +Sat Feb 21 15:18:21 1998 assar westerlund + + * Makefile.in: set YACC and LEX + +Mon Feb 16 16:08:25 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.am: Some fixes for ss/mk_cmds. + +Sun Feb 15 05:12:11 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * Makefile.in: Install libsl under the `libss' name too. Install + mk_cmds, and ss.h. + + * make_cmds.c: A mk_cmds clone that creates SL structures. + + * ss.c: SS compatibility functions. + + * sl.c: Move command line split to function `sl_make_argv'. + +Tue Feb 3 16:45:44 1998 Johan Danielsson + + * sl.c: Add sl_command_loop, that is the loop body of sl_loop. + +Mon Oct 20 01:13:21 1997 Assar Westerlund + + * sl.c (sl_help): actually use the `help' field of `SL_cmd' + diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/Makefile.am b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/Makefile.am new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e572e21 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/Makefile.am @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 2000/01/06 21:52:20 assar Exp $ + +include $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common + +YFLAGS = -d + +include_HEADERS = sl.h + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsl.la libss.la +libsl_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:1:0 +libss_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:1:0 + +RENAME_SRC = roken_rename.h strtok_r.c snprintf.c + +libsl_la_SOURCES = sl_locl.h sl.c +libss_la_SOURCES = $(libsl_la_SOURCES) ss.c ss.h + +EXTRA_libsl_la_SOURCES = strtok_r.c snprintf.c roken_rename.h + +# install these? + +noinst_PROGRAMS = mk_cmds + +mk_cmds_SOURCES = make_cmds.c make_cmds.h parse.y lex.l + +RENAME_mk_cmds_SRC = roken_rename.h snprintf.c + +EXTRA_mk_cmds_SOURCES = snprintf.c roken_rename.h + +ssincludedir = $(includedir)/ss +ssinclude_HEADERS = ss.h + +CLEANFILES = lex.c parse.c parse.h snprintf.c strtok_r.c + +$(mk_cmds_OBJECTS): parse.h + +LDADD = \ + $(LIB_roken) \ + $(LEXLIB) + +strtok_r.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strtok_r.c . +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/Makefile.in b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..634cd74 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,737 @@ +# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.4 from Makefile.am + +# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995-8, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, +# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without +# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A +# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +# $Id: Makefile.am,v 1.15 2000/01/06 21:52:20 assar Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.3 1999/04/01 14:58:43 joda Exp $ + + +# $Id: Makefile.am.common,v 1.13 1999/11/01 03:19:58 assar Exp $ + + +SHELL = @SHELL@ + +srcdir = @srcdir@ +top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@ +VPATH = @srcdir@ +prefix = @prefix@ +exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@ + +bindir = @bindir@ +sbindir = @sbindir@ +libexecdir = @libexecdir@ +datadir = @datadir@ +sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@ +sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@ +localstatedir = @localstatedir@ +libdir = @libdir@ +infodir = @infodir@ +mandir = @mandir@ +includedir = @includedir@ +oldincludedir = /usr/include + +DESTDIR = + +pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkglibdir = $(libdir)/@PACKAGE@ +pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/@PACKAGE@ + +top_builddir = ../.. + +ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@ +AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@ +AUTOMAKE = @AUTOMAKE@ +AUTOHEADER = @AUTOHEADER@ + +INSTALL = @INSTALL@ +INSTALL_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_PROGRAM@ $(AM_INSTALL_PROGRAM_FLAGS) +INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@ +INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@ +transform = @program_transform_name@ + +NORMAL_INSTALL = : +PRE_INSTALL = : +POST_INSTALL = : +NORMAL_UNINSTALL = : +PRE_UNINSTALL = : +POST_UNINSTALL = : +host_alias = @host_alias@ +host_triplet = @host@ +AFS_EXTRA_LD = @AFS_EXTRA_LD@ +AIX_EXTRA_KAFS = @AIX_EXTRA_KAFS@ +AWK = @AWK@ +CANONICAL_HOST = @CANONICAL_HOST@ +CATMAN = @CATMAN@ +CATMANEXT = @CATMANEXT@ +CC = @CC@ +DBLIB = @DBLIB@ +EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@ +EXTRA_LIB45 = @EXTRA_LIB45@ +GROFF = @GROFF@ +INCLUDE_ = @INCLUDE_@ +LD = @LD@ +LEX = @LEX@ +LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ +LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@ +LIB_ = @LIB_@ +LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS = @LIB_AUTH_SUBDIRS@ +LIB_kdb = @LIB_kdb@ +LIB_otp = @LIB_otp@ +LIB_roken = @LIB_roken@ +LIB_security = @LIB_security@ +LN_S = @LN_S@ +LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@ +MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_PROGS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_BIN_SCRPTS@ +MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS = @MAKE_X_PROGS_LIBEXEC_PROGS@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_FALSE@ +NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE = @NEED_WRITEAUTH_TRUE@ +NM = @NM@ +NROFF = @NROFF@ +OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@ +PACKAGE = @PACKAGE@ +RANLIB = @RANLIB@ +VERSION = @VERSION@ +VOID_RETSIGTYPE = @VOID_RETSIGTYPE@ +WFLAGS = @WFLAGS@ +WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT = @WFLAGS_NOIMPLICITINT@ +WFLAGS_NOUNUSED = @WFLAGS_NOUNUSED@ +YACC = @YACC@ + +AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = foreign no-dependencies + +SUFFIXES = .et .h .1 .3 .5 .8 .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .x + +INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/include + +AM_CFLAGS = $(WFLAGS) + +COMPILE_ET = $(top_builddir)/lib/com_err/compile_et + +buildinclude = $(top_builddir)/include + +LIB_XauReadAuth = @LIB_XauReadAuth@ +LIB_crypt = @LIB_crypt@ +LIB_dbm_firstkey = @LIB_dbm_firstkey@ +LIB_dbopen = @LIB_dbopen@ +LIB_dlopen = @LIB_dlopen@ +LIB_dn_expand = @LIB_dn_expand@ +LIB_el_init = @LIB_el_init@ +LIB_getattr = @LIB_getattr@ +LIB_gethostbyname = @LIB_gethostbyname@ +LIB_getpwent_r = @LIB_getpwent_r@ +LIB_getpwnam_r = @LIB_getpwnam_r@ +LIB_getsockopt = @LIB_getsockopt@ +LIB_logout = @LIB_logout@ +LIB_logwtmp = @LIB_logwtmp@ +LIB_odm_initialize = @LIB_odm_initialize@ +LIB_readline = @LIB_readline@ +LIB_res_search = @LIB_res_search@ +LIB_setpcred = @LIB_setpcred@ +LIB_setsockopt = @LIB_setsockopt@ +LIB_socket = @LIB_socket@ +LIB_syslog = @LIB_syslog@ +LIB_tgetent = @LIB_tgetent@ + +HESIODLIB = @HESIODLIB@ +HESIODINCLUDE = @HESIODINCLUDE@ +INCLUDE_hesiod = @INCLUDE_hesiod@ +LIB_hesiod = @LIB_hesiod@ + +INCLUDE_krb4 = @INCLUDE_krb4@ +LIB_krb4 = @LIB_krb4@ + +INCLUDE_readline = @INCLUDE_readline@ + +LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@ + +cat1dir = $(mandir)/cat1 +cat3dir = $(mandir)/cat3 +cat5dir = $(mandir)/cat5 +cat8dir = $(mandir)/cat8 + +MANRX = \(.*\)\.\([0-9]\) +CATSUFFIX = @CATSUFFIX@ + +NROFF_MAN = groff -mandoc -Tascii + +@KRB4_TRUE@LIB_kafs = $(top_builddir)/lib/kafs/libkafs.la $(AIX_EXTRA_KAFS) + +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_krb5 = $(top_builddir)/lib/krb5/libkrb5.la $(top_builddir)/lib/asn1/libasn1.la +@KRB5_TRUE@LIB_gssapi = $(top_builddir)/lib/gssapi/libgssapi.la + +CHECK_LOCAL = $(PROGRAMS) + +YFLAGS = -d + +include_HEADERS = sl.h + +lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsl.la libss.la +libsl_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:1:0 +libss_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:1:0 + +RENAME_SRC = roken_rename.h strtok_r.c snprintf.c + +libsl_la_SOURCES = sl_locl.h sl.c +libss_la_SOURCES = $(libsl_la_SOURCES) ss.c ss.h + +EXTRA_libsl_la_SOURCES = strtok_r.c snprintf.c roken_rename.h + +# install these? + +noinst_PROGRAMS = mk_cmds + +mk_cmds_SOURCES = make_cmds.c make_cmds.h parse.y lex.l + +RENAME_mk_cmds_SRC = roken_rename.h snprintf.c + +EXTRA_mk_cmds_SOURCES = snprintf.c roken_rename.h + +ssincludedir = $(includedir)/ss +ssinclude_HEADERS = ss.h + +CLEANFILES = lex.c parse.c parse.h snprintf.c strtok_r.c + +LDADD = $(LIB_roken) $(LEXLIB) + +mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs +CONFIG_HEADER = ../../include/config.h +CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = +LTLIBRARIES = $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + + +DEFS = @DEFS@ -I. -I$(srcdir) -I../../include +CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@ +LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@ +LIBS = @LIBS@ +X_CFLAGS = @X_CFLAGS@ +X_LIBS = @X_LIBS@ +X_EXTRA_LIBS = @X_EXTRA_LIBS@ +X_PRE_LIBS = @X_PRE_LIBS@ +libsl_la_LIBADD = +libsl_la_OBJECTS = sl.lo +libss_la_LIBADD = +libss_la_OBJECTS = sl.lo ss.lo +noinst_PROGRAMS = mk_cmds$(EXEEXT) +PROGRAMS = $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + +mk_cmds_OBJECTS = make_cmds.$(OBJEXT) parse.$(OBJEXT) lex.$(OBJEXT) +mk_cmds_LDADD = $(LDADD) +mk_cmds_DEPENDENCIES = +mk_cmds_LDFLAGS = +LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT = @LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT@ +CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@ +COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +LTCOMPILE = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) +CCLD = $(CC) +LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ +HEADERS = $(include_HEADERS) $(ssinclude_HEADERS) + +DIST_COMMON = ChangeLog Makefile.am Makefile.in lex.c parse.c + + +DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST) + +TAR = tar +GZIP_ENV = --best +SOURCES = $(libsl_la_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_libsl_la_SOURCES) $(libss_la_SOURCES) $(mk_cmds_SOURCES) $(EXTRA_mk_cmds_SOURCES) +OBJECTS = $(libsl_la_OBJECTS) $(libss_la_OBJECTS) $(mk_cmds_OBJECTS) + +all: all-redirect +.SUFFIXES: +.SUFFIXES: .1 .3 .5 .8 .S .c .cat1 .cat3 .cat5 .cat8 .et .h .l .lo .o .obj .s .x .y +$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4) $(top_srcdir)/Makefile.am.common $(top_srcdir)/cf/Makefile.am.common + cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --foreign lib/sl/Makefile + +Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status + cd $(top_builddir) \ + && CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status + + +mostlyclean-libLTLIBRARIES: + +clean-libLTLIBRARIES: + -test -z "$(lib_LTLIBRARIES)" || rm -f $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + +distclean-libLTLIBRARIES: + +maintainer-clean-libLTLIBRARIES: + +install-libLTLIBRARIES: $(lib_LTLIBRARIES) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(libdir) + @list='$(lib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \ + if test -f $$p; then \ + echo "$(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$$p"; \ + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL) $$p $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$$p; \ + else :; fi; \ + done + +uninstall-libLTLIBRARIES: + @$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL) + list='$(lib_LTLIBRARIES)'; for p in $$list; do \ + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=uninstall rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(libdir)/$$p; \ + done + +.c.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +# FIXME: We should only use cygpath when building on Windows, +# and only if it is available. +.c.obj: + $(COMPILE) -c `cygpath -w $<` + +.s.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +.S.o: + $(COMPILE) -c $< + +mostlyclean-compile: + -rm -f *.o core *.core + -rm -f *.$(OBJEXT) + +clean-compile: + +distclean-compile: + -rm -f *.tab.c + +maintainer-clean-compile: + +.c.lo: + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(COMPILE) -c $< + +.s.lo: + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(COMPILE) -c $< + +.S.lo: + $(LIBTOOL) --mode=compile $(COMPILE) -c $< + +mostlyclean-libtool: + -rm -f *.lo + +clean-libtool: + -rm -rf .libs _libs + +distclean-libtool: + +maintainer-clean-libtool: + +libsl.la: $(libsl_la_OBJECTS) $(libsl_la_DEPENDENCIES) + $(LINK) -rpath $(libdir) $(libsl_la_LDFLAGS) $(libsl_la_OBJECTS) $(libsl_la_LIBADD) $(LIBS) + +libss.la: $(libss_la_OBJECTS) $(libss_la_DEPENDENCIES) + $(LINK) -rpath $(libdir) $(libss_la_LDFLAGS) $(libss_la_OBJECTS) $(libss_la_LIBADD) $(LIBS) + +mostlyclean-noinstPROGRAMS: + +clean-noinstPROGRAMS: + -test -z "$(noinst_PROGRAMS)" || rm -f $(noinst_PROGRAMS) + +distclean-noinstPROGRAMS: + +maintainer-clean-noinstPROGRAMS: + +mk_cmds$(EXEEXT): $(mk_cmds_OBJECTS) $(mk_cmds_DEPENDENCIES) + @rm -f mk_cmds$(EXEEXT) + $(LINK) $(mk_cmds_LDFLAGS) $(mk_cmds_OBJECTS) $(mk_cmds_LDADD) $(LIBS) +.l.c: + $(LEX) $(AM_LFLAGS) $(LFLAGS) $< && mv $(LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT).c $@ +.y.c: + $(YACC) $(AM_YFLAGS) $(YFLAGS) $< && mv y.tab.c $*.c + if test -f y.tab.h; then \ + if cmp -s y.tab.h $*.h; then rm -f y.tab.h; else mv y.tab.h $*.h; fi; \ + else :; fi +parse.h: parse.c + + +install-includeHEADERS: $(include_HEADERS) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(includedir) + @list='$(include_HEADERS)'; for p in $$list; do \ + if test -f "$$p"; then d= ; else d="$(srcdir)/"; fi; \ + echo " $(INSTALL_DATA) $$d$$p $(DESTDIR)$(includedir)/$$p"; \ + $(INSTALL_DATA) $$d$$p $(DESTDIR)$(includedir)/$$p; \ + done + +uninstall-includeHEADERS: + @$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL) + list='$(include_HEADERS)'; for p in $$list; do \ + rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(includedir)/$$p; \ + done + +install-ssincludeHEADERS: $(ssinclude_HEADERS) + @$(NORMAL_INSTALL) + $(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(ssincludedir) + 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"$$dashes"; \ + test "$$failed" -eq 0; \ + fi + +$(mk_cmds_OBJECTS): parse.h + +strtok_r.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/strtok_r.c . +snprintf.c: + $(LN_S) $(srcdir)/../roken/snprintf.c . + +# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables. +# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded. +.NOEXPORT: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/lex.l b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/lex.l new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7c1c44 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/lex.l @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "make_cmds.h" +#include "parse.h" + +RCSID("$Id: lex.l,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $"); + +static unsigned lineno = 1; +void error_message(char *, ...); +int getstring(void); + +%} + + +%% +command_table { return TABLE; } +request { return REQUEST; } +unknown { return UNKNOWN; } +unimplemented { return UNIMPLEMENTED; } +end { return END; } +#[^\n]* ; +[ \t] ; +\n { lineno++; } +\" { return getstring(); } +[a-zA-Z0-9_]+ { yylval.string = strdup(yytext); return STRING; } +. { return *yytext; } +%% + +#ifndef yywrap /* XXX */ +int +yywrap () +{ + return 1; +} +#endif + +int +getstring(void) +{ + char x[128]; + int i = 0; + int c; + int backslash = 0; + while((c = input()) != EOF){ + if(backslash) { + if(c == 'n') + c = '\n'; + else if(c == 't') + c = '\t'; + x[i++] = c; + backslash = 0; + continue; + } + if(c == '\n'){ + error_message("unterminated string"); + lineno++; + break; + } + if(c == '\\'){ + backslash++; + continue; + } + if(c == '\"') + break; + x[i++] = c; + } + x[i] = '\0'; + yylval.string = strdup(x); + return STRING; +} + +void +error_message (char *format, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start (args, format); + fprintf (stderr, "%s:%d: ", filename, lineno); + vfprintf (stderr, format, args); + va_end (args); + numerror++; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..492e9e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998-1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "make_cmds.h" +#include + +RCSID("$Id: make_cmds.c,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $"); + +#include +#include +#include "parse.h" + +int numerror; +extern FILE *yyin; +FILE *c_file; + +extern void yyparse(void); + +#ifdef YYDEBUG +extern int yydebug = 1; +#endif + +char *filename; +char *table_name; + +static struct command_list *commands; + +void +add_command(char *function, + char *help, + struct string_list *aliases, + unsigned flags) +{ + struct command_list *cl = malloc(sizeof(*cl)); + + if (cl == NULL) + err (1, "malloc"); + cl->function = function; + cl->help = help; + cl->aliases = aliases; + cl->flags = flags; + cl->next = NULL; + if(commands) { + *commands->tail = cl; + commands->tail = &cl->next; + return; + } + cl->tail = &cl->next; + commands = cl; +} + +static char * +quote(const char *str) +{ + char buf[1024]; /* XXX */ + const char *p; + char *q; + q = buf; + + *q++ = '\"'; + for(p = str; *p != '\0'; p++) { + if(*p == '\n') { + *q++ = '\\'; + *q++ = 'n'; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\t') { + *q++ = '\\'; + *q++ = 't'; + continue; + } + if(*p == '\"' || *p == '\\') + *q++ = '\\'; + *q++ = *p; + } + *q++ = '\"'; + *q++ = '\0'; + return strdup(buf); +} + +static void +generate_commands(void) +{ + char *base; + char *cfn; + char *p; + + p = strrchr(table_name, '/'); + if(p == NULL) + p = table_name; + else + p++; + + base = strdup (p); + if (base == NULL) + err (1, "strdup"); + + p = strrchr(base, '.'); + if(p) + *p = '\0'; + + asprintf(&cfn, "%s.c", base); + if (cfn == NULL) + err (1, "asprintf"); + + c_file = fopen(cfn, "w"); + if (c_file == NULL) + err (1, "cannot fopen %s", cfn); + + fprintf(c_file, "/* Generated from %s */\n", filename); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \n"); + fprintf(c_file, "#include \n"); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + + { + struct command_list *cl, *xl; + char *p, *q; + + for(cl = commands; cl; cl = cl->next) { + for(xl = commands; xl != cl; xl = xl->next) + if(strcmp(cl->function, xl->function) == 0) + break; + if(xl != cl) + continue; + /* XXX hack for ss_quit */ + if(strcmp(cl->function, "ss_quit") == 0) { + fprintf(c_file, "int %s (int, char**);\n", cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, "#define _ss_quit_wrap ss_quit\n\n"); + continue; + } + fprintf(c_file, "void %s (int, char**);\n", cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, "static int _%s_wrap (int argc, char **argv)\n", + cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, "{\n"); + fprintf(c_file, " %s (argc, argv);\n", cl->function); + fprintf(c_file, " return 0;\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "}\n\n"); + } + + fprintf(c_file, "SL_cmd %s[] = {\n", table_name); + for(cl = commands; cl; cl = cl->next) { + struct string_list *sl; + sl = cl->aliases; + p = quote(sl->string); + q = quote(cl->help); + fprintf(c_file, " { %s, _%s_wrap, %s },\n", p, cl->function, q); + free(p); + free(q); + + for(sl = sl->next; sl; sl = sl->next) { + p = quote(sl->string); + fprintf(c_file, " { %s },\n", p); + free(p); + } + } + fprintf(c_file, " { NULL },\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "};\n"); + fprintf(c_file, "\n"); + } + fclose(c_file); + free(base); + free(cfn); +} + +int version_flag; +int help_flag; +struct getargs args[] = { + { "version", 0, arg_flag, &version_flag }, + { "help", 0, arg_flag, &help_flag } +}; +int num_args = sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]); + +static void +usage(int code) +{ + arg_printusage(args, num_args, NULL, "command-table"); + exit(code); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int optind = 0; + + set_progname(argv[0]); + if(getarg(args, num_args, argc, argv, &optind)) + usage(1); + if(help_flag) + usage(0); + if(version_flag) { + print_version(NULL); + exit(0); + } + + if(argc == optind) + usage(1); + filename = argv[optind]; + yyin = fopen(filename, "r"); + if(yyin == NULL) + err(1, "%s", filename); + + yyparse(); + + generate_commands(); + + if(numerror) + return 1; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24dbd60 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/make_cmds.h @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: make_cmds.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __MAKE_CMDS_H__ +#define __MAKE_CMDS_H__ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern char *filename; +extern char *table_name; +extern int numerror; + +struct command_list { + char *function; + char *help; + struct string_list *aliases; + unsigned flags; + struct command_list *next; + struct command_list **tail; +}; + +struct string_list { + char *string; + struct string_list *next; + struct string_list **tail; +}; + +void add_command(char*, char*, struct string_list*, unsigned); + +#endif /* __MAKE_CMDS_H__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/parse.y b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/parse.y new file mode 100644 index 0000000..18ef5ca --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/parse.y @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +%{ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998, 1999 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "make_cmds.h" +RCSID("$Id: parse.y,v 1.6 1999/12/16 10:34:11 assar Exp $"); + +void yyerror (char *s); +void error_message(char *, ...); + +struct string_list* append_string(struct string_list*, char*); +void free_string_list(struct string_list *list); +unsigned string_to_flag(const char *); + +/* This is for bison */ + +#if !defined(alloca) && !defined(HAVE_ALLOCA) +#define alloca(x) malloc(x) +#endif + +%} + +%union { + char *string; + unsigned number; + struct string_list *list; +} + +%token TABLE REQUEST UNKNOWN UNIMPLEMENTED END +%token STRING +%type flag flags +%type aliases + +%% + +file : /* */ + | statements + ; + +statements : statement + | statements statement + ; + +statement : TABLE STRING ';' + { + table_name = $2; + } + | REQUEST STRING ',' STRING ',' aliases ',' '(' flags ')' ';' + { + add_command($2, $4, $6, $9); + } + | REQUEST STRING ',' STRING ',' aliases ';' + { + add_command($2, $4, $6, 0); + } + | UNIMPLEMENTED STRING ',' STRING ',' aliases ';' + { + free($2); + free($4); + free_string_list($6); + } + | UNKNOWN aliases ';' + { + free_string_list($2); + } + | END ';' + { + YYACCEPT; + } + ; + +aliases : STRING + { + $$ = append_string(NULL, $1); + } + | aliases ',' STRING + { + $$ = append_string($1, $3); + } + ; + +flags : flag + { + $$ = $1; + } + | flags ',' flag + { + $$ = $1 | $3; + } + ; +flag : STRING + { + $$ = string_to_flag($1); + free($1); + } + ; + + + +%% + +void +yyerror (char *s) +{ + error_message ("%s\n", s); +} + +struct string_list* +append_string(struct string_list *list, char *str) +{ + struct string_list *sl = malloc(sizeof(*sl)); + sl->string = str; + sl->next = NULL; + if(list) { + *list->tail = sl; + list->tail = &sl->next; + return list; + } + sl->tail = &sl->next; + return sl; +} + +void +free_string_list(struct string_list *list) +{ + while(list) { + struct string_list *sl = list->next; + free(list->string); + free(list); + list = sl; + } +} + +unsigned +string_to_flag(const char *string) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/roken_rename.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/roken_rename.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c668802 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/roken_rename.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: roken_rename.h,v 1.3 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef __roken_rename_h__ +#define __roken_rename_h__ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOK_R +#define strtok_r _sl_strtok_r +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +#define snprintf _sl_snprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +#define asprintf _sl_asprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ASNPRINTF +#define asnprintf _sl_asnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF +#define vasprintf _sl_vasprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VASNPRINTF +#define vasnprintf _sl_vasnprintf +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +#define vsnprintf _sl_vsnprintf +#endif + +#endif /* __roken_rename_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..688ca8b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.c @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +RCSID("$Id: sl.c,v 1.25 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $"); +#endif + +#include "sl_locl.h" + +static SL_cmd * +sl_match (SL_cmd *cmds, char *cmd, int exactp) +{ + SL_cmd *c, *current = NULL, *partial_cmd = NULL; + int partial_match = 0; + + for (c = cmds; c->name; ++c) { + if (c->func) + current = c; + if (strcmp (cmd, c->name) == 0) + return current; + else if (strncmp (cmd, c->name, strlen(cmd)) == 0 && + partial_cmd != current) { + ++partial_match; + partial_cmd = current; + } + } + if (partial_match == 1 && !exactp) + return partial_cmd; + else + return NULL; +} + +void +sl_help (SL_cmd *cmds, int argc, char **argv) +{ + SL_cmd *c, *prev_c; + + if (argc == 1) { + prev_c = NULL; + for (c = cmds; c->name; ++c) { + if (c->func) { + if(prev_c) + printf ("\n\t%s%s", prev_c->usage ? prev_c->usage : "", + prev_c->usage ? "\n" : ""); + prev_c = c; + printf ("%s", c->name); + } else + printf (", %s", c->name); + } + if(prev_c) + printf ("\n\t%s%s", prev_c->usage ? prev_c->usage : "", + prev_c->usage ? "\n" : ""); + } else { + c = sl_match (cmds, argv[1], 0); + if (c == NULL) + printf ("No such command: %s. " + "Try \"help\" for a list of all commands\n", + argv[1]); + else { + printf ("%s\t%s\n", c->name, c->usage); + if(c->help && *c->help) + printf ("%s\n", c->help); + if((++c)->name && c->func == NULL) { + printf ("Synonyms:"); + while (c->name && c->func == NULL) + printf ("\t%s", (c++)->name); + printf ("\n"); + } + } + } +} + +#ifdef HAVE_READLINE + +char *readline(char *prompt); +void add_history(char *p); + +#else + +static char * +readline(char *prompt) +{ + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + printf ("%s", prompt); + fflush (stdout); + if(fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n') + buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + return strdup(buf); +} + +static void +add_history(char *p) +{ +} + +#endif + +int +sl_command(SL_cmd *cmds, int argc, char **argv) +{ + SL_cmd *c; + c = sl_match (cmds, argv[0], 0); + if (c == NULL) + return -1; + return (*c->func)(argc, argv); +} + +struct sl_data { + int max_count; + char **ptr; +}; + +int +sl_make_argv(char *line, int *ret_argc, char ***ret_argv) +{ + char *foo = NULL; + char *p; + int argc, nargv; + char **argv; + + nargv = 10; + argv = malloc(nargv * sizeof(*argv)); + if(argv == NULL) + return ENOMEM; + argc = 0; + + for(p = strtok_r (line, " \t", &foo); + p; + p = strtok_r (NULL, " \t", &foo)) { + if(argc == nargv - 1) { + char **tmp; + nargv *= 2; + tmp = realloc (argv, nargv * sizeof(*argv)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + free(argv); + return ENOMEM; + } + argv = tmp; + } + argv[argc++] = p; + } + argv[argc] = NULL; + *ret_argc = argc; + *ret_argv = argv; + return 0; +} + +/* return values: 0 on success, -1 on fatal error, or return value of command */ +int +sl_command_loop(SL_cmd *cmds, char *prompt, void **data) +{ + int ret = 0; + char *buf; + int argc; + char **argv; + + ret = 0; + buf = readline(prompt); + if(buf == NULL) + return 1; + + if(*buf) + add_history(buf); + ret = sl_make_argv(buf, &argc, &argv); + if(ret) { + fprintf(stderr, "sl_loop: out of memory\n"); + free(buf); + return -1; + } + if (argc >= 1) { + ret = sl_command(cmds, argc, argv); + if(ret == -1) { + printf ("Unrecognized command: %s\n", argv[0]); + ret = 0; + } + } + free(buf); + free(argv); + return ret; +} + +int +sl_loop(SL_cmd *cmds, char *prompt) +{ + void *data = NULL; + int ret; + while((ret = sl_command_loop(cmds, prompt, &data)) == 0) + ; + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a6d3fa --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: sl.h,v 1.7 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _SL_H +#define _SL_H + +typedef int (*cmd_func)(int, char **); + +struct sl_cmd { + char *name; + cmd_func func; + char *usage; + char *help; +}; + +typedef struct sl_cmd SL_cmd; + +void sl_help (SL_cmd *, int argc, char **argv); +int sl_loop (SL_cmd *, char *prompt); +int sl_command_loop (SL_cmd *cmds, char *prompt, void **data); +int sl_command (SL_cmd *cmds, int argc, char **argv); +int sl_make_argv(char*, int*, char***); + + +#endif /* _SL_H */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl_locl.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl_locl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bd9660 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/sl_locl.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* $Id: sl_locl.h,v 1.6 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $ */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.c b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3c0546 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "sl_locl.h" +#include +#include "ss.h" + +RCSID("$Id: ss.c,v 1.4 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $"); + +struct ss_subst { + char *name; + char *version; + char *info; + ss_request_table *table; +}; + +static struct ss_subst subsystems[2]; +static int num_subsystems; + +int +ss_create_invocation(const char *subsystem, + const char *version, + const char *info, + ss_request_table *table, + int *code) +{ + struct ss_subst *ss; + if(num_subsystems >= sizeof(subsystems) / sizeof(subsystems[0])) { + *code = 17; + return 0; + } + ss = &subsystems[num_subsystems]; + ss->name = subsystem ? strdup(subsystem) : NULL; + ss->version = version ? strdup(version) : NULL; + ss->info = info ? strdup(info) : NULL; + ss->table = table; + *code = 0; + return num_subsystems++; +} + +void +ss_error (int index, long code, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + com_err_va (subsystems[index].name, code, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +ss_perror (int index, long code, const char *msg) +{ + ss_error(index, code, "%s", msg); +} + +int +ss_execute_command(int index, char **argv) +{ + int argc = 0; + while(argv[argc++]); + sl_command(subsystems[index].table, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +int +ss_execute_line (int index, const char *line) +{ + char *buf = strdup(line); + int argc; + char **argv; + + sl_make_argv(buf, &argc, &argv); + sl_command(subsystems[index].table, argc, argv); + free(buf); + return 0; +} + +int +ss_listen (int index) +{ + char *prompt = malloc(strlen(subsystems[index].name) + 3); + if(prompt == NULL) { + abort(); + } + strcpy(prompt, subsystems[index].name); + strcat(prompt, ": "); + sl_loop(subsystems[index].table, prompt); + free(prompt); + return 0; +} + +int +ss_list_requests(int argc, char **argv /* , int index, void *info */) +{ + sl_help(subsystems[0 /* index */].table, argc, argv); + return 0; +} + +int +ss_quit(int argc, char **argv) +{ + return 1; +} diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.h b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d9d297 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/lib/sl/ss.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* $Id: ss.h,v 1.2 1999/12/02 16:58:55 joda Exp $ */ + +/* SS compatibility for SL */ + +#ifndef __ss_h__ +#define __ss_h__ + +#include + +typedef SL_cmd ss_request_table; + +int ss_create_invocation (const char *, const char *, const char*, + ss_request_table*, int*); + +void ss_error (int, long, const char*, ...); +int ss_execute_command (int, char**); +int ss_execute_line (int, const char*); +int ss_list_requests (int argc, char**); +int ss_listen (int); +void ss_perror (int, long, const char*); +int ss_quit (int argc, char**); + +#endif /* __ss_h__ */ diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/ltconfig b/crypto/heimdal/ltconfig new file mode 100755 index 0000000..62ac479 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/ltconfig @@ -0,0 +1,2101 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +# ltconfig - Create a system-specific libtool. +# Copyright (C) 1996-1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# A lot of this script is taken from autoconf-2.10. + +# Check that we are running under the correct shell. +SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} +echo=echo +if test "X$1" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift +elif test "X$1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # used as fallback echo + shift + cat </dev/null`" = 'X\t'; then + # Yippee, $echo works! + : +else + # Restart under the correct shell. + exec "$SHELL" "$0" --no-reexec ${1+"$@"} +fi + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test "${CDPATH+set}" = set; then CDPATH=; export CDPATH; fi + +if test "X${echo_test_string+set}" != "Xset"; then + # find a string as large as possible, as long as the shell can cope with it + for cmd in 'sed 50q "$0"' 'sed 20q "$0"' 'sed 10q "$0"' 'sed 2q "$0"' 'echo test'; do + # expected sizes: less than 2Kb, 1Kb, 512 bytes, 16 bytes, ... + if (echo_test_string="`eval $cmd`") 2>/dev/null && + echo_test_string="`eval $cmd`" && + (test "X$echo_test_string" = "X$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null; then + break + fi + done +fi + +if test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" != 'X\t' || + test "X`($echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null`" != X"$echo_test_string"; then + # The Solaris, AIX, and Digital Unix default echo programs unquote + # backslashes. This makes it impossible to quote backslashes using + # echo "$something" | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g' + # + # So, first we look for a working echo in the user's PATH. + + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for dir in $PATH /usr/ucb; do + if test -f $dir/echo && + test "X`($dir/echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + test "X`($dir/echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null`" = X"$echo_test_string"; then + echo="$dir/echo" + break + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + if test "X$echo" = Xecho; then + # We didn't find a better echo, so look for alternatives. + if test "X`(print -r '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + test "X`(print -r "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null`" = X"$echo_test_string"; then + # This shell has a builtin print -r that does the trick. + echo='print -r' + elif test -f /bin/ksh && test "X$CONFIG_SHELL" != X/bin/ksh; then + # If we have ksh, try running ltconfig again with it. + ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL="${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}" + export ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL + CONFIG_SHELL=/bin/ksh + export CONFIG_SHELL + exec "$CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --no-reexec ${1+"$@"} + else + # Try using printf. + echo='printf %s\n' + if test "X`($echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + test "X`($echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null`" = X"$echo_test_string"; then + # Cool, printf works + : + elif test "X`("$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + test "X`("$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null`" = X"$echo_test_string"; then + CONFIG_SHELL="$ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL" + export CONFIG_SHELL + SHELL="$CONFIG_SHELL" + export SHELL + echo="$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo" + elif test "X`("$CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo '\t') 2>/dev/null`" = 'X\t' && + test "X`("$CONFIG_SHELL" "$0" --fallback-echo "$echo_test_string") 2>/dev/null`" = X"$echo_test_string"; then + echo="$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo" + else + # maybe with a smaller string... + prev=: + + for cmd in 'echo test' 'sed 2q "$0"' 'sed 10q "$0"' 'sed 20q "$0"' 'sed 50q "$0"'; do + if (test "X$echo_test_string" = "X`eval $cmd`") 2>/dev/null; then + break + fi + prev="$cmd" + done + + if test "$prev" != 'sed 50q "$0"'; then + echo_test_string=`eval $prev` + export echo_test_string + exec "${ORIGINAL_CONFIG_SHELL}" "$0" ${1+"$@"} + else + # Oops. We lost completely, so just stick with echo. + echo=echo + fi + fi + fi + fi +fi + +# Sed substitution that helps us do robust quoting. It backslashifies +# metacharacters that are still active within double-quoted strings. +Xsed='sed -e s/^X//' +sed_quote_subst='s/\([\\"\\`$\\\\]\)/\\\1/g' + +# Same as above, but do not quote variable references. +double_quote_subst='s/\([\\"\\`\\\\]\)/\\\1/g' + +# The name of this program. +progname=`$echo "X$0" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + +# Constants: +PROGRAM=ltconfig +PACKAGE=libtool +VERSION=1.2d +ac_compile='${CC-cc} -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.c 1>&5' +ac_link='${CC-cc} -o conftest $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.c $LIBS 1>&5' +rm="rm -f" + +help="Try \`$progname --help' for more information." + +# Global variables: +default_ofile=libtool +can_build_shared=yes +enable_shared=yes +# All known linkers require a `.a' archive for static linking. +enable_static=yes +ltmain= +silent= +srcdir= +ac_config_guess= +ac_config_sub= +host= +nonopt= +ofile="$default_ofile" +verify_host=yes +with_gcc=no +with_gnu_ld=no +need_locks=yes +objext=o +libext=a + +old_AR="$AR" +old_CC="$CC" +old_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +old_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" +old_LD="$LD" +old_LN_S="$LN_S" +old_NM="$NM" +old_RANLIB="$RANLIB" +old_DLLTOOL="$DLLTOOL" +old_AS="$AS" + +# Parse the command line options. +args= +prev= +for option +do + case "$option" in + -*=*) optarg=`echo "$option" | sed 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;; + *) optarg= ;; + esac + + # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + eval "$prev=\$option" + prev= + continue + fi + + case "$option" in + --help) cat <&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + + *) + if test -z "$ltmain"; then + ltmain="$option" + elif test -z "$host"; then +# This generates an unnecessary warning for sparc-sun-solaris4.1.3_U1 +# if test -n "`echo $option| sed 's/[-a-z0-9.]//g'`"; then +# echo "$progname: warning \`$option' is not a valid host type" 1>&2 +# fi + host="$option" + else + echo "$progname: too many arguments" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi ;; + esac +done + +if test -z "$ltmain"; then + echo "$progname: you must specify a LTMAIN file" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if test ! -f "$ltmain"; then + echo "$progname: \`$ltmain' does not exist" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Quote any args containing shell metacharacters. +ltconfig_args= +for arg +do + case "$arg" in + *" "*|*" "*|*[\[\]\~\#\$\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\\\|\;\<\>\?]*) + ltconfig_args="$ltconfig_args '$arg'" ;; + *) ltconfig_args="$ltconfig_args $arg" ;; + esac +done + +# A relevant subset of AC_INIT. + +# File descriptor usage: +# 0 standard input +# 1 file creation +# 2 errors and warnings +# 3 some systems may open it to /dev/tty +# 4 used on the Kubota Titan +# 5 compiler messages saved in config.log +# 6 checking for... messages and results +if test "$silent" = yes; then + exec 6>/dev/null +else + exec 6>&1 +fi +exec 5>>./config.log + +# NLS nuisances. +# Only set LANG and LC_ALL to C if already set. +# These must not be set unconditionally because not all systems understand +# e.g. LANG=C (notably SCO). +if test "${LC_ALL+set}" = set; then LC_ALL=C; export LC_ALL; fi +if test "${LANG+set}" = set; then LANG=C; export LANG; fi + +if (echo "testing\c"; echo 1,2,3) | grep c >/dev/null; then + # Stardent Vistra SVR4 grep lacks -e, says ghazi@caip.rutgers.edu. + if (echo -n testing; echo 1,2,3) | sed s/-n/xn/ | grep xn >/dev/null; then + ac_n= ac_c=' +' ac_t=' ' + else + ac_n=-n ac_c= ac_t= + fi +else + ac_n= ac_c='\c' ac_t= +fi + +if test -z "$srcdir"; then + # Assume the source directory is the same one as the path to LTMAIN. + srcdir=`$echo "$ltmain" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "$srcdir" = "$ltmain" && srcdir=. +fi + +trap "$rm conftest*; exit 1" 1 2 15 +if test "$verify_host" = yes; then + # Check for config.guess and config.sub. + ac_aux_dir= + for ac_dir in $srcdir $srcdir/.. $srcdir/../..; do + if test -f $ac_dir/config.guess; then + ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir + break + fi + done + if test -z "$ac_aux_dir"; then + echo "$progname: cannot find config.guess in $srcdir $srcdir/.. $srcdir/../.." 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + ac_config_guess=$ac_aux_dir/config.guess + ac_config_sub=$ac_aux_dir/config.sub + + # Make sure we can run config.sub. + if $SHELL $ac_config_sub sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + echo "$progname: cannot run $ac_config_sub" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + echo $ac_n "checking host system type""... $ac_c" 1>&6 + + host_alias=$host + case "$host_alias" in + "") + if host_alias=`$SHELL $ac_config_guess`; then : + else + echo "$progname: cannot guess host type; you must specify one" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi ;; + esac + host=`$SHELL $ac_config_sub $host_alias` + echo "$ac_t$host" 1>&6 + + # Make sure the host verified. + test -z "$host" && exit 1 + +elif test -z "$host"; then + echo "$progname: you must specify a host type if you use \`--no-verify'" 1>&2 + echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +else + host_alias=$host +fi + +# Transform linux* to *-*-linux-gnu*, to support old configure scripts. +case "$host_os" in +linux-gnu*) ;; +linux*) host=`echo $host | sed 's/^\(.*-.*-linux\)\(.*\)$/\1-gnu\2/'` +esac + +host_cpu=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\1/'` +host_vendor=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\2/'` +host_os=`echo $host | sed 's/^\([^-]*\)-\([^-]*\)-\(.*\)$/\3/'` + +case "$host_os" in +aix3*) + # AIX sometimes has problems with the GCC collect2 program. For some + # reason, if we set the COLLECT_NAMES environment variable, the problems + # vanish in a puff of smoke. + if test "${COLLECT_NAMES+set}" != set; then + COLLECT_NAMES= + export COLLECT_NAMES + fi + ;; +esac + +# Determine commands to create old-style static archives. +old_archive_cmds='$AR cru $oldlib$oldobjs' +old_postinstall_cmds='chmod 644 $oldlib' +old_postuninstall_cmds= + +# Set a sane default for `AR'. +test -z "$AR" && AR=ar + +# If RANLIB is not set, then run the test. +if test "${RANLIB+set}" != "set"; then + result=no + + echo $ac_n "checking for ranlib... $ac_c" 1>&6 + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for dir in $PATH; do + test -z "$dir" && dir=. + if test -f $dir/ranlib; then + RANLIB="ranlib" + result="ranlib" + break + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + echo "$ac_t$result" 1>&6 +fi + +if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + old_archive_cmds="$old_archive_cmds~\$RANLIB \$oldlib" + old_postinstall_cmds="\$RANLIB \$oldlib~$old_postinstall_cmds" +fi + +# Set sane defaults for `DLLTOOL' and `AS', used on cygwin32. +test -z "$DLLTOOL" && DLLTOOL=dlltool +test -z "$AS" && AS=as + +# Check to see if we are using GCC. +if test "$with_gcc" != yes || test -z "$CC"; then + # If CC is not set, then try to find GCC or a usable CC. + if test -z "$CC"; then + echo $ac_n "checking for gcc... $ac_c" 1>&6 + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for dir in $PATH; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + test -z "$dir" && dir=. + if test -f $dir/gcc; then + CC="gcc" + break + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + if test -n "$CC"; then + echo "$ac_t$CC" 1>&6 + else + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + fi + + # Not "gcc", so try "cc", rejecting "/usr/ucb/cc". + if test -z "$CC"; then + echo $ac_n "checking for cc... $ac_c" 1>&6 + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + cc_rejected=no + for dir in $PATH; do + test -z "$dir" && dir=. + if test -f $dir/cc; then + if test "$dir/cc" = "/usr/ucb/cc"; then + cc_rejected=yes + continue + fi + CC="cc" + break + fi + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + if test $cc_rejected = yes; then + # We found a bogon in the path, so make sure we never use it. + set dummy $CC + shift + if test $# -gt 0; then + # We chose a different compiler from the bogus one. + # However, it has the same name, so the bogon will be chosen + # first if we set CC to just the name; use the full file name. + shift + set dummy "$dir/cc" "$@" + shift + CC="$@" + fi + fi + + if test -n "$CC"; then + echo "$ac_t$CC" 1>&6 + else + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + + if test -z "$CC"; then + echo "$progname: error: no acceptable cc found in \$PATH" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + fi + + # Now see if the compiler is really GCC. + with_gcc=no + echo $ac_n "checking whether we are using GNU C... $ac_c" 1>&6 + echo "$progname:530: checking whether we are using GNU C" >&5 + + $rm conftest.c + cat > conftest.c <&5; (eval $ac_try) 2>&5; }; } | egrep yes >/dev/null 2>&1; then + with_gcc=yes + fi + $rm conftest.c + echo "$ac_t$with_gcc" 1>&6 +fi + +# Allow CC to be a program name with arguments. +set dummy $CC +compiler="$2" + +echo $ac_n "checking for object suffix... $ac_c" 1>&6 +$rm conftest* +echo 'int i = 1;' > conftest.c +echo "$progname:552: checking for object suffix" >& 5 +if { (eval echo $progname:553: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; }; then + # Append any warnings to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + + for ac_file in conftest.*; do + case $ac_file in + *.c) ;; + *) objext=`echo $ac_file | sed -e s/conftest.//` ;; + esac + done +else + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.c >&5 +fi +$rm conftest* +echo "$ac_t$objext" 1>&6 + +echo $ac_n "checking for $compiler option to produce PIC... $ac_c" 1>&6 +pic_flag= +special_shlib_compile_flags= +wl= +link_static_flag= +no_builtin_flag= + +if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + wl='-Wl,' + link_static_flag='-static' + + case "$host_os" in + aix3* | aix4* | irix5* | irix6* | osf3* | osf4*) + # PIC is the default for these OSes. + ;; + cygwin32* | mingw32* | os2*) + # We can build DLLs from non-PIC. + ;; + amigaos*) + # FIXME: we need at least 68020 code to build shared libraries, but + # adding the `-m68020' flag to GCC prevents building anything better, + # like `-m68040'. + pic_flag='-m68020 -resident32 -malways-restore-a4' + ;; + *) + pic_flag='-fPIC' + ;; + esac +else + # PORTME Check for PIC flags for the system compiler. + case "$host_os" in + aix3* | aix4*) + # All AIX code is PIC. + link_static_flag='-bnso -bI:/lib/syscalls.exp' + ;; + + hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + # Is there a better link_static_flag that works with the bundled CC? + wl='-Wl,' + link_static_flag="${wl}-a ${wl}archive" + pic_flag='+Z' + ;; + + irix5* | irix6*) + wl='-Wl,' + link_static_flag='-non_shared' + # PIC (with -KPIC) is the default. + ;; + + cygwin32* | mingw32* | os2*) + # We can build DLLs from non-PIC. + ;; + + osf3* | osf4*) + # All OSF/1 code is PIC. + wl='-Wl,' + link_static_flag='-non_shared' + ;; + + sco3.2v5*) + pic_flag='-Kpic' + link_static_flag='-dn' + special_shlib_compile_flags='-belf' + ;; + + solaris*) + pic_flag='-KPIC' + link_static_flag='-Bstatic' + wl='-Wl,' + ;; + + sunos4*) + pic_flag='-PIC' + link_static_flag='-Bstatic' + wl='-Qoption ld ' + ;; + + sysv4.2uw2* | sysv5*) + pic_flag='-KPIC' + link_static_flag='-Bstatic' + wl='-Wl,' + ;; + + uts4*) + pic_flag='-pic' + link_static_flag='-Bstatic' + ;; + + *) + can_build_shared=no + ;; + esac +fi + +if test -n "$pic_flag"; then + echo "$ac_t$pic_flag" 1>&6 + + # Check to make sure the pic_flag actually works. + echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler PIC flag $pic_flag works... $ac_c" 1>&6 + $rm conftest* + echo "int some_variable = 0;" > conftest.c + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $pic_flag -DPIC" + echo "$progname:674: checking if $compiler PIC flag $pic_flag works" >&5 + if { (eval echo $progname:675: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; } && test -s conftest.$objext; then + # Append any warnings to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + + # On HP-UX, both CC and GCC only warn that PIC is supported... then they + # create non-PIC objects. So, if there were any warnings, we assume that + # PIC is not supported. + if test -s conftest.err; then + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + can_build_shared=no + pic_flag= + else + echo "$ac_t"yes 1>&6 + pic_flag=" $pic_flag" + fi + else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + can_build_shared=no + pic_flag= + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + $rm conftest* +else + echo "$ac_t"none 1>&6 +fi + +# Check to see if options -o and -c are simultaneously supported by compiler +echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler supports -c -o file.o... $ac_c" 1>&6 +$rm conftest* +echo "int some_variable = 0;" > conftest.c +save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -c -o conftest2.o" +echo "$progname:709: checking if $compiler supports -c -o file.o" >&5 +if { (eval echo $progname:710: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; } && test -s conftest2.o; then + + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test -s conftest.err; then + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + compiler_c_o=no + else + echo "$ac_t"yes 1>&6 + compiler_c_o=yes + fi +else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + compiler_c_o=no + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 +fi +CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" +$rm conftest* + +if test x"$compiler_c_o" = x"yes"; then + # Check to see if we can write to a .lo + echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler supports -c -o file.lo... $ac_c" 1>&6 + $rm conftest* + echo "int some_variable = 0;" > conftest.c + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -c -o conftest.lo" + echo "$progname:737: checking if $compiler supports -c -o file.lo" >&5 +if { (eval echo $progname:738: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; } && test -s conftest.lo; then + + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test -s conftest.err; then + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + compiler_o_lo=no + else + echo "$ac_t"yes 1>&6 + compiler_o_lo=yes + fi + else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + compiler_o_lo=no + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + $rm conftest* +else + compiler_o_lo=no +fi + +# Check to see if we can do hard links to lock some files if needed +hard_links="nottested" +if test "$compiler_c_o" = no && test "$need_locks" != no; then + # do not overwrite the value of need_locks provided by the user + echo $ac_n "checking if we can lock with hard links... $ac_c" 1>&6 + hard_links=yes + $rm conftest* + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>/dev/null && hard_links=no + touch conftest.a + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>&5 || hard_links=no + ln conftest.a conftest.b 2>/dev/null && hard_links=no + echo "$ac_t$hard_links" 1>&6 + $rm conftest* + if test "$hard_links" = no; then + echo "*** WARNING: \`$CC' does not support \`-c -o', so \`make -j' may be unsafe" >&2 + need_locks=warn + fi +else + need_locks=no +fi + +if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + # Check to see if options -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions are supported by compiler + echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler supports -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions ... $ac_c" 1>&6 + $rm conftest* + echo "int some_variable = 0;" > conftest.c + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions -c conftest.c" + echo "$progname:789: checking if $compiler supports -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions" >&5 + if { (eval echo $progname:790: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.err; } && test -s conftest.o; then + + # The compiler can only warn and ignore the option if not recognized + # So say no if there are warnings + if test -s conftest.err; then + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + compiler_rtti_exceptions=no + else + echo "$ac_t"yes 1>&6 + compiler_rtti_exceptions=yes + fi + else + # Append any errors to the config.log. + cat conftest.err 1>&5 + compiler_rtti_exceptions=no + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS" + $rm conftest* + + if test "$compiler_rtti_exceptions" = "yes"; then + no_builtin_flag=' -fno-builtin -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions' + else + no_builtin_flag=' -fno-builtin' + fi + +fi + +# Check for any special shared library compilation flags. +if test -n "$special_shlib_compile_flags"; then + echo "$progname: warning: \`$CC' requires \`$special_shlib_compile_flags' to build shared libraries" 1>&2 + if echo "$old_CC $old_CFLAGS " | egrep -e "[ ]$special_shlib_compile_flags[ ]" >/dev/null; then : + else + echo "$progname: add \`$special_shlib_compile_flags' to the CC or CFLAGS env variable and reconfigure" 1>&2 + can_build_shared=no + fi +fi + +echo $ac_n "checking if $compiler static flag $link_static_flag works... $ac_c" 1>&6 +$rm conftest* +echo 'main(){return(0);}' > conftest.c +save_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $link_static_flag" +echo "$progname:833: checking if $compiler static flag $link_static_flag works" >&5 +if { (eval echo $progname:834: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest; then + echo "$ac_t$link_static_flag" 1>&6 +else + echo "$ac_t"none 1>&6 + link_static_flag= +fi +LDFLAGS="$save_LDFLAGS" +$rm conftest* + +if test -z "$LN_S"; then + # Check to see if we can use ln -s, or we need hard links. + echo $ac_n "checking whether ln -s works... $ac_c" 1>&6 + $rm conftestdata + if ln -s X conftestdata 2>/dev/null; then + $rm conftestdata + LN_S="ln -s" + else + LN_S=ln + fi + if test "$LN_S" = "ln -s"; then + echo "$ac_t"yes 1>&6 + else + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi +fi + +# Make sure LD is an absolute path. +if test -z "$LD"; then + ac_prog=ld + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + # Check if gcc -print-prog-name=ld gives a path. + echo $ac_n "checking for ld used by GCC... $ac_c" 1>&6 + echo "$progname:866: checking for ld used by GCC" >&5 + ac_prog=`($CC -print-prog-name=ld) 2>&5` + case "$ac_prog" in + # Accept absolute paths. + /* | [A-Za-z]:/*) + re_direlt='/[^/][^/]*/\.\./' + sub_uncdrive='s%^\([A-Za-z]\):/%//\1/%' + # Canonicalize the path of ld + while echo $ac_prog | grep "$re_direlt" > /dev/null 2>&1; do + ac_prog=`echo $ac_prog| sed "s%$re_direlt%/%"` + done + case "$host_os" in + cygwin*) + # Convert to a UNC path for cygwin + test -z "$LD" && LD=`echo X$ac_prog | $Xsed -e "$sub_uncdrive"` + ;; + *) + test -z "$LD" && LD="$ac_prog" + ;; + esac + ;; + ## + ## FIXME: The code fails later on if we try to use an $LD with + ## '\\' path separators. + ## + [A-Za-z]:[\\]*) + re_direlt='\\[^\\][^\\]*\\\.\.\(\\\)' + sub_uncdrive='s%^\([A-Za-z]\):\\%//\1/%' + sub_uncdir='s%\\%/%g' + # Canonicalize the path of ld + while echo $ac_prog | grep "$re_direlt" > /dev/null 2>&1; do + ac_prog=`echo $ac_prog| sed "s%$re_direlt%\1%"` + done + case "$host_os" in + cygwin*) + # Convert to a UNC path for cygwin + test -z "$LD" && LD=`echo X$ac_prog | $Xsed -e "$sub_uncdrive" -e "$sub_uncdir"` + ;; + *) + test -z "$LD" && LD="$ac_prog" + ;; + esac + ;; + "") + # If it fails, then pretend we are not using GCC. + ac_prog=ld + ;; + *) + # If it is relative, then search for the first ld in PATH. + with_gnu_ld=unknown + ;; + esac + elif test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + echo $ac_n "checking for GNU ld... $ac_c" 1>&6 + echo "$progname:920: checking for GNU ld" >&5 + else + echo $ac_n "checking for non-GNU ld""... $ac_c" 1>&6 + echo "$progname:923: checking for non-GNU ld" >&5 + fi + + if test -z "$LD"; then + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for ac_dir in $PATH; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f "$ac_dir/$ac_prog"; then + LD="$ac_dir/$ac_prog" + # Check to see if the program is GNU ld. I'd rather use --version, + # but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. + # Break only if it was the GNU/non-GNU ld that we prefer. + if "$LD" -v 2>&1 < /dev/null | egrep '(GNU|with BFD)' > /dev/null; then + test "$with_gnu_ld" != no && break + else + test "$with_gnu_ld" != yes && break + fi + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + fi + + if test -n "$LD"; then + echo "$ac_t$LD" 1>&6 + else + echo "$ac_t"no 1>&6 + fi + + if test -z "$LD"; then + echo "$progname: error: no acceptable ld found in \$PATH" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi +fi + +# Check to see if it really is or is not GNU ld. +echo $ac_n "checking if the linker ($LD) is GNU ld... $ac_c" 1>&6 +# I'd rather use --version here, but apparently some GNU ld's only accept -v. +if $LD -v 2>&1 &5; then + with_gnu_ld=yes +else + with_gnu_ld=no +fi +echo "$ac_t$with_gnu_ld" 1>&6 + +# See if the linker supports building shared libraries. +echo $ac_n "checking whether the linker ($LD) supports shared libraries... $ac_c" 1>&6 + +allow_undefined_flag= +no_undefined_flag= +archive_cmds= +archive_sym_cmds= +old_archive_from_new_cmds= +export_dynamic_flag_spec= +whole_archive_flag_spec= +hardcode_libdir_flag_spec= +hardcode_libdir_separator= +hardcode_direct=no +hardcode_minus_L=no +hardcode_shlibpath_var=unsupported +runpath_var= + +case "$host_os" in +aix3* | aix4*) + # On AIX, the GNU linker works like the native linker. + with_gnu_ld=no + ;; +esac + +ld_shlibs=yes +if test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + + # See if GNU ld supports shared libraries. + case "$host_os" in + amigaos*) + archive_cmds='$rm $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define NAME $libname" > $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define LIBRARY_ID 1" >> $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define VERSION $major" >> $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define REVISION $revision" >> $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$AR cru $lib$libobjs~$RANLIB $lib~(cd $objdir && a2ixlibrary -32)' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + hardcode_minus_L=yes + ;; + + sunos4*) + archive_cmds='$LD -assert pure-text -Bstatic -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + cygwin32* | mingw32*) + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + # hardcode_libdir_flag_spec is actually meaningless, as there is + # no search path for DLLs. + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + # Very, very bogus. + echo ' +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#undef WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include + +BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved); + +#include +DECLARE_CYGWIN_DLL( DllMain ); +HINSTANCE __hDllInstance_base; + +BOOL APIENTRY +DllMain (HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved) +{ + __hDllInstance_base = hInst; + return TRUE; +} +' > ltdll.c + archive_cmds='$CC -c '"`pwd`"'/ltdll.c~echo EXPORTS > $lib-def~ + $DLLTOOL --export-all --output-def $lib-def $libobjs ltdll.$objext~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 $libobjs ltdll.$objext~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $rm ltdll.$objext $soname-base $soname-exp' + archive_sym_cmds='$CC -c '"`pwd`"'/ltdll.c~echo EXPORTS > $lib-def~ + cat "$export_symbols" >> $lib-def~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 $libobjs ltdll.$objext~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $rm ltdll.$objext $soname-base $soname-exp' + old_archive_from_new_cmds='$DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --def $lib-def --output-lib $objdir/$libname.a~$rm $lib.exp' + else + # When not using gcc, we currently assume that we are using + # Microsoft Visual C++. + with_gnu_ld=no + # hardcode_libdir_flag_spec is actually meaningless, as there is + # no search path for DLLs. + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=' ' + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + # Tell ltmain to make .lib files, not .a files. + libext=lib + # FIXME: Setting linknames here is a bad hack. + archive_cmds='$CC -o $lib$libobjs`echo "$deplibs" | sed -e '\''s/ -lc$//'\''` -link -dll~linknames=' + # The linker will automatically build a .lib file if we build a DLL. + old_archive_from_new_cmds='true' + # FIXME: Should let the user specify the lib program. + old_archive_cmds='lib /OUT:$oldlib$oldobjs' + fix_srcfile_path='`cygpath -w $srcfile`' + fi + ;; + + *) + if $LD --help 2>&1 | egrep ': supported targets:.* elf' > /dev/null; then + archive_cmds='$CC -shared ${wl}-soname $wl$soname -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + archive_sym_cmds='$CC -shared ${wl}-soname $wl$soname ${wl}-retain-symbols-file $wl$export_symbols -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + else + ld_shlibs=no + fi + ;; + esac + + if test "$ld_shlibs" = yes && test "$with_gnu_ld" = yes; then + runpath_var=LD_RUN_PATH + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='${wl}--rpath ${wl}$libdir' + export_dynamic_flag_spec='${wl}--export-dynamic' + whole_archive_flag_spec='${wl}--whole-archive$convenience ${wl}--no-whole-archive' + fi +else + # PORTME fill in a description of your system's linker (not GNU ld) + case "$host_os" in + aix3*) + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + archive_cmds='$NM$libobjs | $global_symbol_pipe | sed '\''s/.* //'\' | sort | uniq' > $lib.exp~ + $LD -o $objdir/$soname$libobjs$deplibs -bE:$lib.exp -T512 -H512 -bM:SRE~$AR cru $lib $objdir/$soname' + archive_sym_cmds='$LD -o $objdir/$soname$libobjs$deplibs -bE:$export_symbols -T512 -H512 -bM:SRE~$AR cru $lib $objdir/$soname' + # Note: this linker hardcodes the directories in LIBPATH if there + # are no directories specified by -L. + hardcode_minus_L=yes + if test "$with_gcc" = yes && test -z "$link_static_flag"; then + # Neither direct hardcoding nor static linking is supported with a + # broken collect2. + hardcode_direct=unsupported + fi + ;; + + aix4*) + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + archive_cmds='$NM$libobjs | $global_symbol_pipe | sed '\''s/.* //'\' | sort | uniq' > $lib.exp else cat $export_symbols > $lib.exp~ + $CC -o $objdir/$soname$libobjs$deplibs ${wl}-bE:$lib.exp ${wl}-bM:SRE ${wl}-bnoentry~$AR cru $lib $objdir/$soname' + archive_sym_cmds='$CC -o $objdir/$soname$libobjs$deplibs ${wl}-bE:$export_symbols ${wl}-bM:SRE ${wl}-bnoentry~$AR cru $lib $objdir/$soname' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + ;; + + amigaos*) + archive_cmds='$rm $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define NAME $libname" > $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define LIBRARY_ID 1" >> $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define VERSION $major" >> $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$echo "#define REVISION $revision" >> $objdir/a2ixlibrary.data~$AR cru $lib$libobjs~$RANLIB $lib~(cd $objdir && a2ixlibrary -32)' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + hardcode_minus_L=yes + ;; + + cygwin32* | mingw32*) + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + # hardcode_libdir_flag_spec is actually meaningless, as there is + # no search path for DLLs. + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + # Very, very bogus. + echo ' +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#undef WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include + +BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved); + +#include +DECLARE_CYGWIN_DLL( DllMain ); +HINSTANCE __hDllInstance_base; + +BOOL APIENTRY +DllMain (HINSTANCE hInst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved) +{ + __hDllInstance_base = hInst; + return TRUE; +} +' > ltdll.c + archive_cmds='$CC -c '"`pwd`"'/ltdll.c~echo EXPORTS > $lib-def~ + $DLLTOOL --export-all --output-def $lib-def $libobjs ltdll.$objext~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 $libobjs ltdll.$objext~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $rm ltdll.$objext $soname-base $soname-exp' + archive_sym_cmds='$CC -c '"`pwd`"'/ltdll.c~echo EXPORTS > $lib-def~ + cat "$export_symbols" >> $lib-def~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 $libobjs ltdll.$objext~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC -Wl,--base-file,$soname-base $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --exclude-symbol=_cygwin_dll_entry@12 --def $lib-def --base-file $soname-base --output-exp $soname-exp~ + $CC $soname-exp -Wl,--dll -nostartfiles -Wl,-e,__cygwin_dll_entry@12 -o $lib $libobjs ltdll.$objext$deplibs~ + $rm ltdll.$objext $soname-base $soname-exp' + old_archive_from_new_cmds='$DLLTOOL --as=$AS --dllname $soname --def $lib-def --output-lib $objdir/$libname.a~$rm $lib.exp' + else + # When not using gcc, we currently assume that we are using + # Microsoft Visual C++. + # hardcode_libdir_flag_spec is actually meaningless, as there is + # no search path for DLLs. + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=' ' + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + # Tell ltmain to make .lib files, not .a files. + libext=lib + # FIXME: Setting linknames here is a bad hack. + archive_cmds='$CC -o $lib$libobjs`echo "$deplibs" | sed -e '\''s/ -lc$//'\''` -link -dll~linknames=' + # The linker will automatically build a .lib file if we build a DLL. + old_archive_from_new_cmds='true' + # FIXME: Should let the user specify the lib program. + old_archive_cmds='lib /OUT:$oldlib$oldobjs' + fix_srcfile_path='`cygpath -w $srcfile`' + fi + ;; + + # FreeBSD 2.2.[012] allows us to include c++rt0.o to get C++ constructor + # support. Future versions do this automatically, but an explicit c++rt0.o + # does not break anything, and helps significantly (at the cost of a little + # extra space). + freebsd2.2*) + archive_cmds='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs /usr/lib/c++rt0.o' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-R$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + # Unfortunately, older versions of FreeBSD 2 do not have this feature. + freebsd2*) + archive_cmds='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + # FreeBSD 3, at last, uses gcc -shared to do shared libraries. + freebsd3*) + archive_cmds='$CC -shared -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-R$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=no + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + hpux9*) + archive_cmds='$rm $objdir/$soname~$LD -b +s +b $install_libdir -o $objdir/$soname$libobjs$deplibs~test $objdir/$soname = $lib || mv $objdir/$soname $lib' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + export_dynamic_flag_spec='${wl}-E' + ;; + + hpux10* | hpux11*) + archive_cmds='$LD -b +h $soname +s +b $install_libdir -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='${wl}+b ${wl}$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + export_dynamic_flag_spec='${wl}-E' + ;; + + irix5* | irix6*) + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + archive_cmds='$CC -shared -o $lib ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring$libobjs$deplibs' + else + archive_cmds='$LD -shared -o $lib -soname $soname -set_version $verstring$libobjs$deplibs' + fi + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + ;; + + netbsd*) + # Tested with NetBSD 1.2 ld + archive_cmds='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-R$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + openbsd*) + archive_cmds='$LD -Bshareable -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-R$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + os2*) + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + hardcode_minus_L=yes + allow_undefined_flag=unsupported + archive_cmds='$echo "LIBRARY $libname INITINSTANCE" > $objdir/$libname.def~$echo "DESCRIPTION \"$libname\"" >> $objdir/$libname.def~$echo DATA >> $objdir/$libname.def~$echo " SINGLE NONSHARED" >> $objdir/$libname.def~$echo EXPORTS >> $objdir/$libname.def~emxexp$libobjs >> $objdir/$libname.def~$CC -Zdll -Zcrtdll -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs $objdir/$libname.def' + old_archive_from_new_cmds='emximp -o $objdir/$libname.a $objdir/$libname.def' + ;; + + osf3* | osf4*) + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + allow_undefined_flag=' ${wl}-expect_unresolved ${wl}\*' + archive_cmds='$CC -shared${allow_undefined_flag} -o $lib ${wl}-soname ${wl}$soname ${wl}-set_version ${wl}$verstring$libobjs$deplibs' + else + allow_undefined_flag=' -expect_unresolved \*' + archive_cmds='$LD -shared${allow_undefined_flag} -o $lib -soname $soname -set_version $verstring$libobjs$deplibs' + fi + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='${wl}-rpath ${wl}$libdir' + hardcode_libdir_separator=: + ;; + + sco3.2v5*) + archive_cmds='$LD -G -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_direct=yes + ;; + + solaris*) + no_undefined_flag=' -z text' + # $CC -shared without GNU ld will not create a library from C++ + # object files and a static libstdc++, better avoid it by now + archive_cmds='$LD -G${allow_undefined_flag} -h $soname -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + archive_sym_cmds='$echo "{ global:" > $lib.exp~sed $export_symbols -e "s/.*/\1;/" >> $lib.exp~$echo "local: * }" >> $lib.exp~ + $LD -G${allow_undefined_flag} -M $export_symbols -h $soname -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs~$rm $lib.exp' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-R$libdir' + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + + # Solaris 2 before 2.5 hardcodes -L paths. + case "$host_os" in + solaris2.[0-4]*) + hardcode_minus_L=yes + ;; + esac + ;; + + sunos4*) + # Why do we need -Bstatic? To avoid inter-library dependencies, maybe... + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + archive_cmds='$CC -shared ${wl}-Bstatic -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + else + archive_cmds='$LD -assert pure-text -Bstatic -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + fi + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + hardcode_direct=yes + hardcode_minus_L=yes + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + uts4*) + archive_cmds='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + hardcode_direct=no + hardcode_minus_L=no + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + dgux*) + archive_cmds='$LD -G -h $soname -o $lib$libobjs$deplibs' + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec='-L$libdir' + hardcode_direct=no + hardcode_minus_L=no + hardcode_shlibpath_var=no + ;; + + *) + ld_shlibs=no + can_build_shared=no + ;; + esac +fi +echo "$ac_t$ld_shlibs" 1>&6 + +if test -z "$NM"; then + echo $ac_n "checking for BSD-compatible nm... $ac_c" 1>&6 + case "$NM" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) ;; # Let the user override the test with a path. + *) + IFS="${IFS= }"; ac_save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS="${IFS}:" + for ac_dir in /usr/ucb /usr/ccs/bin $PATH /bin; do + test -z "$ac_dir" && ac_dir=. + if test -f $ac_dir/nm; then + # Check to see if the nm accepts a BSD-compat flag. + # Adding the `sed 1q' prevents false positives on HP-UX, which says: + # nm: unknown option "B" ignored + if ($ac_dir/nm -B /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'; exit 0) | egrep /dev/null >/dev/null; then + NM="$ac_dir/nm -B" + elif ($ac_dir/nm -p /dev/null 2>&1 | sed '1q'; exit 0) | egrep /dev/null >/dev/null; then + NM="$ac_dir/nm -p" + else + NM="$ac_dir/nm" + fi + break + fi + done + IFS="$ac_save_ifs" + test -z "$NM" && NM=nm + ;; + esac + echo "$ac_t$NM" 1>&6 +fi + +# Check for command to grab the raw symbol name followed by C symbol from nm. +echo $ac_n "checking command to parse $NM output... $ac_c" 1>&6 + +# These are sane defaults that work on at least a few old systems. +# [They come from Ultrix. What could be older than Ultrix?!! ;)] + +# Character class describing NM global symbol codes. +symcode='[BCDEGRSTU]' + +# Regexp to match symbols that can be accessed directly from C. +sympat='\([_A-Za-z][_A-Za-z0-9]*\)' + +# Transform the above into a raw symbol and a C symbol. +symxfrm='\1 \1' + +# Define system-specific variables. +case "$host_os" in +aix*) + symcode='[BCDTU]' + ;; +sunos* | cygwin32* | mingw32*) + sympat='_\([_A-Za-z][_A-Za-z0-9]*\)' + symxfrm='_\1 \1' + ;; +irix*) + # Cannot use undefined symbols on IRIX because inlined functions mess us up. + symcode='[BCDEGRST]' + ;; +solaris*) + symcode='[BDTU]' + ;; +esac + +# If we're using GNU nm, then use its standard symbol codes. +if $NM -V 2>&1 | egrep '(GNU|with BFD)' > /dev/null; then + symcode='[ABCDGISTUW]' +fi + +case "$host_os" in +cygwin32* | mingw32*) + # We do not want undefined symbols on cygwin32. The user must + # arrange to define them via -l arguments. + symcode='[ABCDGISTW]' + ;; +esac + +# Write the raw and C identifiers. +global_symbol_pipe="sed -n -e 's/^.* $symcode $sympat$/$symxfrm/p'" + +# Check to see that the pipe works correctly. +pipe_works=no +$rm conftest* +cat > conftest.c <&5 +if { (eval echo $progname:1426: \"$ac_compile\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_compile) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest.$objext; then + # Now try to grab the symbols. + nlist=conftest.nm + if { echo "$progname:1429: eval \"$NM conftest.$objext | $global_symbol_pipe > $nlist\"" >&5; eval "$NM conftest.$objext | $global_symbol_pipe > $nlist 2>&5"; } && test -s "$nlist"; then + + # Try sorting and uniquifying the output. + if sort "$nlist" | uniq > "$nlist"T; then + mv -f "$nlist"T "$nlist" + wcout=`wc "$nlist" 2>/dev/null` + count=`$echo "X$wcout" | $Xsed -e 's/^[ ]*\([0-9][0-9]*\).*$/\1/'` + (test "$count" -ge 0) 2>/dev/null || count=-1 + else + rm -f "$nlist"T + count=-1 + fi + + # Make sure that we snagged all the symbols we need. + if egrep ' nm_test_var$' "$nlist" >/dev/null; then + if egrep ' nm_test_func$' "$nlist" >/dev/null; then + cat < conftest.c +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +EOF + # Now generate the symbol file. + sed 's/^.* \(.*\)$/extern char \1;/' < "$nlist" >> conftest.c + + cat <> conftest.c +#if defined (__STDC__) && __STDC__ +# define __ptr_t void * +#else +# define __ptr_t char * +#endif + +/* The number of symbols in dld_preloaded_symbols, -1 if unsorted. */ +int dld_preloaded_symbol_count = $count; + +/* The mapping between symbol names and symbols. */ +struct { + char *name; + __ptr_t address; +} +dld_preloaded_symbols[] = +{ +EOF + sed 's/^\(.*\) \(.*\)$/ {"\1", (__ptr_t) \&\2},/' < "$nlist" >> conftest.c + cat <<\EOF >> conftest.c + {0, (__ptr_t) 0} +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif +EOF + # Now try linking the two files. + mv conftest.$objext conftestm.$objext + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + LIBS="conftestm.$objext" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS$no_builtin_flag" + if { (eval echo $progname:1487: \"$ac_link\") 1>&5; (eval $ac_link) 2>&5; } && test -s conftest; then + pipe_works=yes + else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.c >&5 + fi + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + else + echo "cannot find nm_test_func in $nlist" >&5 + fi + else + echo "cannot find nm_test_var in $nlist" >&5 + fi + else + echo "cannot run $global_symbol_pipe" >&5 + fi +else + echo "$progname: failed program was:" >&5 + cat conftest.c >&5 +fi +$rm conftest* + +# Do not use the global_symbol_pipe unless it works. +echo "$ac_t$pipe_works" 1>&6 +test "$pipe_works" = yes || global_symbol_pipe= + +# Check hardcoding attributes. +echo $ac_n "checking how to hardcode library paths into programs... $ac_c" 1>&6 +hardcode_action= +if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec" || \ + test -n "$runpath_var"; then + + # We can hardcode non-existant directories. + if test "$hardcode_direct" != no && \ + test "$hardcode_minus_L" != no && \ + test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" != no; then + + # Linking always hardcodes the temporary library directory. + hardcode_action=relink + else + # We can link without hardcoding, and we can hardcode nonexisting dirs. + hardcode_action=immediate + fi +else + # We cannot hardcode anything, or else we can only hardcode existing + # directories. + hardcode_action=unsupported +fi +echo "$ac_t$hardcode_action" 1>&6 + + +reload_flag= +reload_cmds='$LD$reload_flag -o $output$reload_objs' +echo $ac_n "checking for $LD option to reload object files... $ac_c" 1>&6 +# PORTME Some linkers may need a different reload flag. +reload_flag='-r' +echo "$ac_t$reload_flag" 1>&6 +test -n "$reload_flag" && reload_flag=" $reload_flag" + +# PORTME Fill in your ld.so characteristics +library_names_spec= +libname_spec='lib$name' +soname_spec= +postinstall_cmds= +postuninstall_cmds= +finish_cmds= +finish_eval= +shlibpath_var= +version_type=none +dynamic_linker="$host_os ld.so" +sys_lib_search_path="/lib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib" +check_shared_deplibs_method='none' +# Need to set the preceding variable on all platforms that support +# interlibrary dependencies. +# 'none' -- dependencies not supported. +# 'pass_all' -- all dependencies passed with no checks. +# 'test_compile' -- check by making test program. +# 'file_regex' -- check by looking for filenames that look like the shared +# library in the library path. +# 'file_magic [regex]' -- check by looking for files in library path which +# responds to the "file" command with a given regex. This is actually a +# superset of the file_regex command. If you have file on your system, you'll +# want to use this instead. +# Notes: regexes are run through expr. + +echo $ac_n "checking dynamic linker characteristics... $ac_c" 1>&6 +case "$host_os" in +aix3* | aix4*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix $libname.a' + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + + # AIX has no versioning support, so we append a major version to the name. + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + ;; + +amigaos*) + library_names_spec='$libname.ixlibrary $libname.a' + # Create ${libname}_ixlibrary.a entries in /sys/libs. + finish_eval='for lib in `ls $libdir/*.ixlibrary 2>/dev/null`; do libname=`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e '\''s%^.*/\([^/]*\)\.ixlibrary$%\1%'\''`; test $rm /sys/libs/${libname}_ixlibrary.a; $show "(cd /sys/libs && $LN_S $lib ${libname}_ixlibrary.a)"; (cd /sys/libs && $LN_S $lib ${libname}_ixlibrary.a) || exit 1; done' + ;; + +bsdi4*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}.so.$major ${libname}.so' + soname_spec='${libname}.so' + finish_cmds='PATH="$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +cygwin32* | mingw32*) + version_type=windows + if test "$with_gcc" = yes; then + library_names_spec='${libname}`echo ${release} | sed -e 's/[.]/-/g'`${versuffix}.dll $libname.a' + else + library_names_spec='${libname}`echo ${release} | sed -e 's/[.]/-/g'`${versuffix}.dll $libname.lib' + fi + dynamic_linker='Win32 ld.exe' + libname_spec='$name' + shlibpath_var=PATH + ;; + +freebsd2* | freebsd3*) + objformat=`test -x /usr/bin/objformat && /usr/bin/objformat || echo aout` + version_type=freebsd-$objformat + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix $libname.so' + finish_cmds='PATH="$PATH:/sbin" OBJFORMAT="$objformat" ldconfig -m $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +gnu*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +hpux9* | hpux10* | hpux11*) + # Give a soname corresponding to the major version so that dld.sl refuses to + # link against other versions. + dynamic_linker="$host_os dld.sl" + version_type=sunos + shlibpath_var=SHLIB_PATH + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.sl$versuffix ${libname}${release}.sl$major $libname.sl' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.sl$major' + # HP-UX runs *really* slowly unless shared libraries are mode 555. + postinstall_cmds='chmod 555 $lib' + ;; + +irix5*) + version_type=osf + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +irix6*) + version_type=osf + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARYN32_PATH + ;; + +# No shared lib support for Linux oldld, aout, or coff. +linux-gnuoldld* | linux-gnuaout* | linux-gnucoff*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; + +# This must be Linux ELF. +linux-gnu*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -n $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + check_shared_deplibs_method='file_magic ELF 32-bit LSB shared object' + sys_lib_search_path="/lib /usr/lib /usr/local/lib `echo $LD_LIBRARY_PATH | sed -e 's/:/ /g'`" + + if test -f /lib/ld.so.1; then + dynamic_linker='GNU ld.so' + else + # Only the GNU ld.so supports shared libraries on MkLinux. + case "$host_cpu" in + powerpc*) dynamic_linker=no ;; + *) dynamic_linker='Linux ld.so' ;; + esac + fi + ;; + +netbsd* | openbsd*) + version_type=sunos + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/sbin" ldconfig -m $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +os2*) + libname_spec='$name' + library_names_spec='$libname.dll $libname.a' + dynamic_linker='OS/2 ld.exe' + shlibpath_var=LIBPATH + ;; + +osf3* | osf4*) + version_type=osf + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + check_shared_deplibs_method='pass_all' + ;; + +sco3.2v5*) + version_type=osf + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +solaris*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + # ldd complains unless libraries are executable + postinstall_cmds='chmod +x $lib' + ;; + +sunos4*) + version_type=sunos + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}.so$versuffix' + finish_cmds='PATH="\$PATH:/usr/etc" ldconfig $libdir' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +sysv4.2uw2*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +uts4*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so.$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so.$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so.$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +dgux*) + version_type=linux + library_names_spec='${libname}${release}.so$versuffix ${libname}${release}.so$major $libname.so' + soname_spec='${libname}${release}.so$major' + shlibpath_var=LD_LIBRARY_PATH + ;; + +*) + dynamic_linker=no + ;; +esac +echo "$ac_t$dynamic_linker" 1>&6 +test "$dynamic_linker" = no && can_build_shared=no + +# Report the final consequences. +echo "checking if libtool supports shared libraries... $can_build_shared" 1>&6 + +echo $ac_n "checking whether to build shared libraries... $ac_c" 1>&6 +test "$can_build_shared" = "no" && enable_shared=no + +# On AIX, shared libraries and static libraries use the same namespace, and +# are all built from PIC. +case "$host_os" in +aix*) + test "$enable_shared" = yes && enable_static=no + if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + archive_cmds="$archive_cmds~\$RANLIB \$lib" + postinstall_cmds='$RANLIB $lib' + fi + ;; +esac + +echo "$ac_t$enable_shared" 1>&6 + +# Make sure either enable_shared or enable_static is yes. +test "$enable_shared" = yes || enable_static=yes + +echo "checking whether to build static libraries... $enable_static" 1>&6 + +echo $ac_n "checking for objdir... $ac_c" 1>&6 +rm -f .libs 2>/dev/null +mkdir .libs 2>/dev/null +if test -d .libs; then + objdir=.libs +else + # MS-DOS does not allow filenames that begin with a dot. + objdir=_libs +fi +rmdir .libs 2>/dev/null +echo "$ac_t$objdir" 1>&6 + +# Copy echo and quote the copy, instead of the original, because it is +# used later. +ltecho="$echo" +if test "X$ltecho" = "X$CONFIG_SHELL $0 --fallback-echo"; then + ltecho="$CONFIG_SHELL \$0 --fallback-echo" +fi +LTSHELL="$SHELL" + +# Only quote variables if we're using ltmain.sh. +case "$ltmain" in +*.sh) + # Now quote all the things that may contain metacharacters. + for var in ltecho old_CC old_CFLAGS old_CPPFLAGS old_LD old_NM old_RANLIB \ + old_LN_S old_DLLTOOL old_AS AR CC LD LN_S NM LTSHELL VERSION \ + reload_flag reload_cmds wl \ + pic_flag link_static_flag no_builtin_flag export_dynamic_flag_spec \ + whole_archive_flag_spec libname_spec library_names_spec soname_spec \ + RANLIB old_archive_cmds old_archive_from_new_cmds old_postinstall_cmds \ + old_postuninstall_cmds archive_cmds archive_sym_cmds postinstall_cmds postuninstall_cmds \ + check_shared_deplibs_method allow_undefined_flag no_undefined_flag \ + finish_cmds finish_eval global_symbol_pipe \ + hardcode_libdir_flag_spec hardcode_libdir_separator sys_lib_search_path \ + compiler_c_o compiler_o_lo need_locks; do + + case "$var" in + reload_cmds | old_archive_cmds | old_archive_from_new_cmds | \ + old_postinstall_cmds | old_postuninstall_cmds | \ + archive_cmds | archive_sym_cmds | \ + postinstall_cmds | postuninstall_cmds | \ + finish_cmds | sys_lib_search_path) + # Double-quote double-evaled strings. + eval "$var=\\\"\`\$echo \"X\$$var\" | \$Xsed -e \"\$double_quote_subst\" -e \"\$sed_quote_subst\"\`\\\"" + ;; + *) + eval "$var=\\\"\`\$echo \"X\$$var\" | \$Xsed -e \"\$sed_quote_subst\"\`\\\"" + ;; + esac + done + + case "$ltecho" in + *'\$0 --fallback-echo"') + ltecho=`$echo "X$ltecho" | + $Xsed -e 's/\\\\\\\$0 --fallback-echo"$/$0 --fallback-echo"/'` + ;; + esac + + trap "$rm \"$ofile\"; exit 1" 1 2 15 + echo "creating $ofile" + $rm "$ofile" + cat < "$ofile" +#! $SHELL + +# `$echo "$ofile" | sed 's%^.*/%%'` - Provide generalized library-building support services. +# Generated automatically by $PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION) +# NOTE: Changes made to this file will be lost: look at ltconfig or ltmain.sh. +# +# Copyright (C) 1996-1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Sed that helps us avoid accidentally triggering echo(1) options like -n. +Xsed="sed -e s/^X//" + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test "\${CDPATH+set}" = set; then CDPATH=; export CDPATH; fi + +### BEGIN LIBTOOL CONFIG +EOF + cfgfile="$ofile" + ;; + +*) + # Double-quote the variables that need it (for aesthetics). + for var in old_CC old_CFLAGS old_CPPFLAGS old_LD old_NM old_RANLIB \ + old_LN_S old_DLLTOOL old_AS; do + eval "$var=\\\"\$var\\\"" + done + + # Just create a config file. + cfgfile="$ofile.cfg" + trap "$rm \"$cfgfile\"; exit 1" 1 2 15 + echo "creating $cfgfile" + $rm "$cfgfile" + cat < "$cfgfile" +# `$echo "$cfgfile" | sed 's%^.*/%%'` - Libtool configuration file. +# Generated automatically by $PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION) +EOF + ;; +esac + +cat <> "$cfgfile" +# Libtool was configured as follows, on host `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`: +# +# CC=$old_CC CFLAGS=$old_CFLAGS CPPFLAGS=$old_CPPFLAGS \\ +# LD=$old_LD NM=$old_NM RANLIB=$old_RANLIB LN_S=$old_LN_S \\ +# DLLTOOL="$old_DLLTOOL" AS="$old_AS" \\ +# $0$ltconfig_args +# +# Compiler and other test output produced by $progname, useful for +# debugging $progname, is in ./config.log if it exists. + +# The version of $progname that generated this script. +LTCONFIG_VERSION=$VERSION + +# Shell to use when invoking shell scripts. +SHELL=$LTSHELL + +# Whether or not to build shared libraries. +build_libtool_libs=$enable_shared + +# Whether or not to build static libraries. +build_old_libs=$enable_static + +# The host system. +host_alias=$host_alias +host=$host + +# An echo program that does not interpret backslashes. +echo=$ltecho + +# The archiver. +AR=$AR + +# The default C compiler. +CC=$CC + +# The linker used to build libraries. +LD=$LD + +# Whether we need hard or soft links. +LN_S=$LN_S + +# A BSD-compatible nm program. +NM=$NM + +# Used on cygwin32: DLL creation program. +DLLTOOL="$DLLTOOL" + +# Used on cygwin32: assembler. +AS="$AS" + +# The name of the directory that contains temporary libtool files. +objdir=$objdir + +# How to create reloadable object files. +reload_flag=$reload_flag +reload_cmds=$reload_cmds + +# How to pass a linker flag through the compiler. +wl=$wl + +# Object file suffix (normally "o"). +objext="$objext" + +# Old archive suffix (normally "a"). +libext="$libext" + +# Additional compiler flags for building library objects. +pic_flag=$pic_flag + +# Does compiler simultaneously support -c and -o options +compiler_c_o=$compiler_c_o + +# Can we write directly to a .lo ? +compiler_o_lo=$compiler_o_lo + +# Must we lock files when doing compilation ? +need_locks=$need_locks + +# Compiler flag to prevent dynamic linking. +link_static_flag=$link_static_flag + +# Compiler flag to turn off builtin functions. +no_builtin_flag=$no_builtin_flag + +# Compiler flag to allow reflexive dlopens. +export_dynamic_flag_spec=$export_dynamic_flag_spec + +# Compiler flag to generate shared objects directly from archives. +whole_archive_flag_spec=$whole_archive_flag_spec + +# Library versioning type. +version_type=$version_type + +# Format of library name prefix. +libname_spec=$libname_spec + +# List of archive names. First name is the real one, the rest are links. +# The last name is the one that the linker finds with -lNAME. +library_names_spec=$library_names_spec + +# The coded name of the library, if different from the real name. +soname_spec=$soname_spec + +# Commands used to build and install an old-style archive. +RANLIB=$RANLIB +old_archive_cmds=$old_archive_cmds +old_postinstall_cmds=$old_postinstall_cmds +old_postuninstall_cmds=$old_postuninstall_cmds + +# Create an old-style archive from a shared archive. +old_archive_from_new_cmds=$old_archive_from_new_cmds + +# Commands used to build and install a shared archive. +archive_cmds=$archive_cmds +archive_sym_cmds=$archive_sym_cmds +postinstall_cmds=$postinstall_cmds +postuninstall_cmds=$postuninstall_cmds + +# Method to check whether dependent libraries are shared objects. +check_shared_deplibs_method=$check_shared_deplibs_method + +# Flag that allows shared libraries with undefined symbols to be built. +allow_undefined_flag=$allow_undefined_flag + +# Flag that forces no undefined symbols. +no_undefined_flag=$no_undefined_flag + +# Commands used to finish a libtool library installation in a directory. +finish_cmds=$finish_cmds + +# Same as above, but a single script fragment to be evaled but not shown. +finish_eval=$finish_eval + +# Take the output of nm and produce a listing of raw symbols and C names. +global_symbol_pipe=$global_symbol_pipe + +# This is the shared library runtime path variable. +runpath_var=$runpath_var + +# This is the shared library path variable. +shlibpath_var=$shlibpath_var + +# How to hardcode a shared library path into an executable. +hardcode_action=$hardcode_action + +# Flag to hardcode \$libdir into a binary during linking. +# This must work even if \$libdir does not exist. +hardcode_libdir_flag_spec=$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec + +# Whether we need a single -rpath flag with a separated argument. +hardcode_libdir_separator=$hardcode_libdir_separator + +# Set to yes if using DIR/libNAME.so during linking hardcodes DIR into the +# resulting binary. +hardcode_direct=$hardcode_direct + +# Set to yes if using the -LDIR flag during linking hardcodes DIR into the +# resulting binary. +hardcode_minus_L=$hardcode_minus_L + +# Set to yes if using SHLIBPATH_VAR=DIR during linking hardcodes DIR into +# the resulting binary. +hardcode_shlibpath_var=$hardcode_shlibpath_var + +# System search path for libraries +sys_lib_search_path=$sys_lib_search_path + +# Fix the shell variable \$srcfile for the compiler. +fix_srcfile_path="$fix_srcfile_path" +EOF + +case "$ltmain" in +*.sh) + echo '### END LIBTOOL CONFIG' >> "$ofile" + echo >> "$ofile" + case "$host_os" in + aix3*) + cat <<\EOF >> "$ofile" + +# AIX sometimes has problems with the GCC collect2 program. For some +# reason, if we set the COLLECT_NAMES environment variable, the problems +# vanish in a puff of smoke. +if test "${COLLECT_NAMES+set}" != set; then + COLLECT_NAMES= + export COLLECT_NAMES +fi +EOF + ;; + esac + + # Append the ltmain.sh script. + cat "$ltmain" >> "$ofile" || (rm -f "$ofile"; exit 1) + + chmod +x "$ofile" + ;; + +*) + # Compile the libtool program. + echo "FIXME: would compile $ltmain" + ;; +esac +exit 0 + +# Local Variables: +# mode:shell-script +# sh-indentation:2 +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/ltmain.sh b/crypto/heimdal/ltmain.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..397cc1e --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/ltmain.sh @@ -0,0 +1,3079 @@ +# ltmain.sh - Provide generalized library-building support services. +# NOTE: Changing this file will not affect anything until you rerun ltconfig. +# +# Copyright (C) 1996-1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# Gordon Matzigkeit , 1996 +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software +# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. + +# Check that we have a working $echo. +if test "X$1" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift +elif test "X$1" = X--fallback-echo; then + # used as fallback echo + shift + cat </dev/null`" = 'X\t'; then + # Yippee, $echo works! + : +else + # Restart under the correct shell, and then maybe $echo will work. + exec $SHELL "$0" --no-reexec ${1+"$@"} +fi + +# The name of this program. +progname=`$echo "$0" | sed 's%^.*/%%'` +modename="$progname" + +# Constants. +PROGRAM=ltmain.sh +PACKAGE=libtool +VERSION=1.2d + +default_mode= +help="Try \`$progname --help' for more information." +magic="%%%MAGIC variable%%%" +mkdir="mkdir" +mv="mv -f" +rm="rm -f" + +# Sed substitution that helps us do robust quoting. It backslashifies +# metacharacters that are still active within double-quoted strings. +Xsed='sed -e s/^X//' +sed_quote_subst='s/\([\\`\\"$\\\\]\)/\\\1/g' + +# NLS nuisances. +# Only set LANG and LC_ALL to C if already set. +# These must not be set unconditionally because not all systems understand +# e.g. LANG=C (notably SCO). +# We save the old values to restore during execute mode. +if test "${LC_ALL+set}" = set; then + save_LC_ALL="$LC_ALL"; LC_ALL=C; export LC_ALL +fi +if test "${LANG+set}" = set; then + save_LANG="$LANG"; LANG=C; export LANG +fi + +if test "$LTCONFIG_VERSION" != "$VERSION"; then + echo "$modename: ltconfig version \`$LTCONFIG_VERSION' does not match $PROGRAM version \`$VERSION'" 1>&2 + echo "Fatal configuration error. See the $PACKAGE docs for more information." 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if test "$build_libtool_libs" != yes && test "$build_old_libs" != yes; then + echo "$modename: not configured to build any kind of library" 1>&2 + echo "Fatal configuration error. See the $PACKAGE docs for more information." 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Global variables. +mode=$default_mode +nonopt= +prev= +prevopt= +run= +show="$echo" +show_help= +execute_dlfiles= +lo2o="s/\\.lo\$/.${objext}/" +los2o="s/\\.lo /.${objext} /g" + +# Parse our command line options once, thoroughly. +while test $# -gt 0 +do + arg="$1" + shift + + case "$arg" in + -*=*) optarg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]*=//'` ;; + *) optarg= ;; + esac + + # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + case "$prev" in + execute_dlfiles) + eval "$prev=\"\$$prev \$arg\"" + ;; + *) + eval "$prev=\$arg" + ;; + esac + + prev= + prevopt= + continue + fi + + # Have we seen a non-optional argument yet? + case "$arg" in + --help) + show_help=yes + ;; + + --version) + echo "$PROGRAM (GNU $PACKAGE) $VERSION" + exit 0 + ;; + + --config) + sed -e '1,/^### BEGIN LIBTOOL CONFIG/d' -e '/^### END LIBTOOL CONFIG/,$d' $0 + exit 0 + ;; + + --debug) + echo "$progname: enabling shell trace mode" + set -x + ;; + + --dry-run | -n) + run=: + ;; + + --features) + echo "host: $host" + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + echo "enable shared libraries" + else + echo "disable shared libraries" + fi + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + echo "enable static libraries" + else + echo "disable static libraries" + fi + exit 0 + ;; + + --finish) mode="finish" ;; + + --mode) prevopt="--mode" prev=mode ;; + --mode=*) mode="$optarg" ;; + + --quiet | --silent) + show=: + ;; + + -dlopen) + prevopt="-dlopen" + prev=execute_dlfiles + ;; + + -*) + $echo "$modename: unrecognized option \`$arg'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + + *) + nonopt="$arg" + break + ;; + esac +done + +if test -n "$prevopt"; then + $echo "$modename: option \`$prevopt' requires an argument" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi + +if test -z "$show_help"; then + + # Infer the operation mode. + if test -z "$mode"; then + case "$nonopt" in + *cc | *++ | gcc* | *-gcc*) + mode=link + for arg + do + case "$arg" in + -c) + mode=compile + break + ;; + esac + done + ;; + *db | *dbx | *strace | *truss) + mode=execute + ;; + *install*|cp|mv) + mode=install + ;; + *rm) + mode=uninstall + ;; + *) + # If we have no mode, but dlfiles were specified, then do execute mode. + test -n "$execute_dlfiles" && mode=execute + + # Just use the default operation mode. + if test -z "$mode"; then + if test -n "$nonopt"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot infer operation mode from \`$nonopt'" 1>&2 + else + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot infer operation mode without MODE-ARGS" 1>&2 + fi + fi + ;; + esac + fi + + # Only execute mode is allowed to have -dlopen flags. + if test -n "$execute_dlfiles" && test "$mode" != execute; then + $echo "$modename: unrecognized option \`-dlopen'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Change the help message to a mode-specific one. + generic_help="$help" + help="Try \`$modename --help --mode=$mode' for more information." + + # These modes are in order of execution frequency so that they run quickly. + case "$mode" in + # libtool compile mode + compile) + modename="$modename: compile" + # Get the compilation command and the source file. + base_compile= + lastarg= + srcfile="$nonopt" + suppress_output= + force_static=no + + user_target=no + for arg + do + # Accept any command-line options. + case "$arg" in + -o) + if test "$user_target" != "no"; then + $echo "$modename: you cannot specify \`-o' more than once" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + user_target=next + ;; + + -force-static) + force_static=yes + continue + ;; + + -static) + build_old_libs=yes + continue + ;; + esac + + case "$user_target" in + next) + # The next one is the -o target name + user_target=yes + continue + ;; + yes) + # We got the output file + user_target=set + libobj="$arg" + continue + ;; + esac + + # Accept the current argument as the source file. + lastarg="$srcfile" + srcfile="$arg" + + # Aesthetically quote the previous argument. + + # Backslashify any backslashes, double quotes, and dollar signs. + # These are the only characters that are still specially + # interpreted inside of double-quoted scrings. + lastarg=`$echo "X$lastarg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + + # Double-quote args containing other shell metacharacters. + # Many Bourne shells cannot handle close brackets correctly in scan + # sets, so we specify it separately. + case "$lastarg" in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + lastarg="\"$lastarg\"" + ;; + esac + + # Add the previous argument to base_compile. + if test -z "$base_compile"; then + base_compile="$lastarg" + else + base_compile="$base_compile $lastarg" + fi + done + + case "$user_target" in + set) + ;; + no) + # Get the name of the library object. + libobj=`$echo "X$srcfile" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: you must specify a target with \`-o'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + # Recognize several different file suffixes. + # If the user specifies -o file.o, it is replaced with file.lo + xform='[cCFSfmso]' + case "$libobj" in + *.ada) xform=ada ;; + *.adb) xform=adb ;; + *.ads) xform=ads ;; + *.asm) xform=asm ;; + *.c++) xform=c++ ;; + *.cc) xform=cc ;; + *.cpp) xform=cpp ;; + *.cxx) xform=cxx ;; + *.f90) xform=f90 ;; + *.for) xform=for ;; + esac + + libobj=`$echo "X$libobj" | $Xsed -e "s/\.$xform$/.lo/"` + + case "$libobj" in + *.lo) obj=`$echo "X$libobj" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: cannot determine name of library object from \`$libobj'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + if test -z "$base_compile"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify a compilation command" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Delete any leftover library objects. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + removelist="$obj $libobj $lockfile" + else + removelist="$libobj $lockfile" + fi + + $run $rm $removelist + trap "$run $rm $removelist; exit 1" 1 2 15 + + # Calculate the filename of the output object if compiler does + # not support -o with -c + if test "$compiler_c_o" = no; then + output_obj=`$echo "X$srcfile" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%' -e 's%\..*$%%'`.${objext} + lockfile="$output_obj.lock" + removelist="$removelist $output_obj $lockfile" + trap "$run $rm $removelist; exit 1" 1 2 15 + else + need_locks=no + lockfile= + fi + + # Lock this critical section if it is needed + # We use this script file to make the link, it avoids creating a new file + if test "$need_locks" = yes; then + until ln "$0" "$lockfile" 2>/dev/null; do + $show "Waiting for $lockfile to be removed" + sleep 2 + done + elif test "$need_locks" = warn; then + if test -f "$lockfile"; then + echo "\ +*** ERROR, $lockfile exists and contains: +`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null` + +This indicates that another process is trying to use the same +temporary object file, and libtool could not work around it because +your compiler does not support \`-c' and \`-o' together. If you +repeat this compilation, it may succeed, by chance, but you had better +avoid parallel builds (make -j) in this platform, or get a better +compiler." + + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + echo $srcfile > "$lockfile" + fi + + if test -n "$fix_srcfile_path"; then + eval srcfile=\"$fix_srcfile_path\" + fi + + # Only build a PIC object if we are building libtool libraries. + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + # Without this assignment, base_compile gets emptied. + fbsd_hideous_sh_bug=$base_compile + + # All platforms use -DPIC, to notify preprocessed assembler code. + command="$base_compile$pic_flag -DPIC $srcfile" + if test "$compiler_o_lo" = yes; then + command="$command -o $libobj" + output_obj="$libobj" + elif test "$compiler_c_o" = yes; then + command="$command -o $obj" + output_obj="$obj" + fi + + $show "$command" + if $run eval "$command"; then : + else + test -n "$output_obj" && $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + + if test "$need_locks" = warn && + test x"`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null`" != x"$srcfile"; then + echo "\ +*** ERROR, $lockfile contains: +`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null` + +but it should contain: +$srcfile + +This indicates that another process is trying to use the same +temporary object file, and libtool could not work around it because +your compiler does not support \`-c' and \`-o' together. If you +repeat this compilation, it may succeed, by chance, but you had better +avoid parallel builds (make -j) in this platform, or get a better +compiler." + + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + + # Just move the object if needed, then go on to compile the next one + if test "$compiler_o_lo" = no && test x"$output_obj" != x"$libobj"; then + $show "$mv $output_obj $libobj" + if $run $mv $output_obj $libobj; then : + else + error=$? + $run $rm $removelist + exit $error + fi + fi + + # If we have no pic_flag and do not have -force-static, + # then copy the object into place and finish. + if test -z "$pic_flag" && test "$force_static" = no; then + $show "$LN_S $libobj $obj" + if $run $LN_S $libobj $obj; then + exit 0 + else + error=$? + $run $rm $removelist + exit $error + fi + fi + + # Allow error messages only from the first compilation. + suppress_output=' >/dev/null 2>&1' + fi + + # Only build a position-dependent object if we build old libraries. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + command="$base_compile $srcfile" + if test "$force_static" = yes; then + command="$command -DLIBTOOL_STATIC" + fi + if test "$compiler_c_o" = yes; then + command="$command -o $obj" + output_obj="$obj" + fi + + # Suppress compiler output if we already did a PIC compilation. + command="$command$suppress_output" + $show "$command" + if $run eval "$command"; then : + else + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + + if test "$need_locks" = warn && + test x"`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null`" != x"$srcfile"; then + echo "\ +*** ERROR, $lockfile contains: +`cat $lockfile 2>/dev/null` + +but it should contain: +$srcfile + +This indicates that another process is trying to use the same +temporary object file, and libtool could not work around it because +your compiler does not support \`-c' and \`-o' together. If you +repeat this compilation, it may succeed, by chance, but you had better +avoid parallel builds (make -j) in this platform, or get a better +compiler." + + $run $rm $removelist + exit 1 + fi + + # Just move the object if needed + if test "$compiler_c_o" = no && test x"$output_obj" != x"$obj"; then + $show "$mv $output_obj $obj" + if $run $mv $output_obj $obj; then : + else + error=$? + $run $rm $removelist + exit $error + fi + fi + fi + + # Unlock the critical section if it was locked + if test "$need_locks" != no; then + $rm "$lockfile" + fi + + # Create an invalid libtool object if no PIC, so that we do not + # accidentally link it into a program. + if test "$build_libtool_libs" != yes; then + $show "echo timestamp > $libobj" + $run eval "echo timestamp > \$libobj" || exit $? + fi + + exit 0 + ;; + + # libtool link mode + link) + modename="$modename: link" + C_compiler="$CC" # save it, to compile generated C sources + CC="$nonopt" + allow_undefined=yes + compile_command="$CC" + finalize_command="$CC" + + compile_shlibpath= + finalize_shlibpath= + convenience= + old_convenience= + deplibs= + eval lib_search_path=\"$sys_lib_search_path\" + + dlfiles= + dlprefiles= + export_dynamic=no + export_symbols= + generated= + hardcode_libdirs= + libobjs= + link_against_libtool_libs= + ltlibs= + module=no + objs= + prev= + prevarg= + release= + rpath= + perm_rpath= + temp_rpath= + vinfo= + + # We need to know -static, to get the right output filenames. + for arg + do + case "$arg" in + -all-static | -static) + if test "X$arg" = "X-all-static" && test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes && test -z "$link_static_flag"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: complete static linking is impossible in this configuration" 1>&2 + fi + build_libtool_libs=no + build_old_libs=yes + break + ;; + esac + done + + # See if our shared archives depend on static archives. + test -n "$old_archive_from_new_cmds" && build_old_libs=yes + + # Go through the arguments, transforming them on the way. + while test $# -gt 0; do + arg="$1" + shift + + # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + case "$prev" in + output) + compile_command="$compile_command @OUTPUT@" + finalize_command="$finalize_command @OUTPUT@" + ;; + esac + + case "$prev" in + dlfiles|dlprefiles) + case "$arg" in + *.la | *.lo) ;; # We handle these cases below. + *) + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $arg" + test "$prev" = dlfiles && dlfiles="$dlfiles $arg" + prev= + ;; + esac + ;; + exportsyms) + export_symbols="$arg" + if test ! -f "$arg"; then + $echo "$modename: symbol file \`$arg' does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + prev= + ;; + release) + release="-$arg" + prev= + continue + ;; + rpath) + rpath="$rpath $arg" + prev= + continue + ;; + *) + eval "$prev=\"\$arg\"" + prev= + continue + ;; + esac + fi + + prevarg="$arg" + + case "$arg" in + -all-static) + if test -n "$link_static_flag"; then + compile_command="$compile_command $link_static_flag" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $link_static_flag" + fi + continue + ;; + + -allow-undefined) + # FIXME: remove this flag sometime in the future. + $echo "$modename: \`-allow-undefined' is deprecated because it is the default" 1>&2 + continue + ;; + + -dlopen) + prev=dlfiles + continue + ;; + + -dlpreopen) + prev=dlprefiles + continue + ;; + + -export-dynamic) + if test "$export_dynamic" != yes; then + export_dynamic=yes + if test -n "$export_dynamic_flag_spec"; then + eval arg=\"$export_dynamic_flag_spec\" + else + arg= + fi + + # Add the symbol object into the linking commands. + compile_command="$compile_command @SYMFILE@" + finalize_command="$finalize_command @SYMFILE@" + fi + ;; + + -export-symbols) + if test -n "$export_symbols"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot have more than one -exported-symbols" + exit 1 + fi + prev=exportsyms + continue + ;; + + -L*) + dir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%^-L\(.*\)$%\1%'` + case "$dir" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) + # Add the corresponding hardcode_libdir_flag, if it is not identical. + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: \`-L$dir' cannot specify a relative directory" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + deplibs="$deplibs $arg" + lib_search_path="$lib_search_path `expr $arg : '-L\(.*\)'`" + ;; + + -l*) deplibs="$deplibs $arg" ;; + + -module) + if test "$module" != yes; then + module=yes + if test -n "$export_dynamic_flag_spec"; then + eval arg=\"$export_dynamic_flag_spec\" + else + arg= + fi + fi + ;; + + -no-undefined) + allow_undefined=no + continue + ;; + + -o) prev=output ;; + + -release) + prev=release + continue + ;; + + -rpath) + prev=rpath + continue + ;; + + -static) + # If we have no pic_flag, then this is the same as -all-static. + if test -z "$pic_flag" && test -n "$link_static_flag"; then + compile_command="$compile_command $link_static_flag" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $link_static_flag" + fi + continue + ;; + + -version-info) + prev=vinfo + continue + ;; + + # Some other compiler flag. + -* | +*) + # Unknown arguments in both finalize_command and compile_command need + # to be aesthetically quoted because they are evaled later. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case "$arg" in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + ;; + + *.o | *.obj | *.a | *.lib) + # A standard object. + objs="$objs $arg" + ;; + + *.lo) + # A library object. + if test "$prev" = dlfiles; then + dlfiles="$dlfiles $arg" + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + prev= + continue + else + # If libtool objects are unsupported, then we need to preload. + prev=dlprefiles + fi + fi + + if test "$prev" = dlprefiles; then + # Preload the old-style object. + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles "`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + prev= + fi + libobjs="$libobjs $arg" + ;; + + *.la) + # A libtool-controlled library. + + dlname= + libdir= + library_names= + old_library= + + # Check to see that this really is a libtool archive. + if (sed -e '2q' $arg | egrep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + $echo "$modename: \`$arg' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # If the library was installed with an old release of libtool, + # it will not redefine variable installed. + installed=yes + + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case "$arg" in + */* | *\\*) . $arg ;; + *) . ./$arg ;; + esac + + # Get the name of the library we link against. + linklib= + for l in $old_library $library_names; do + linklib="$l" + done + + if test -z "$linklib"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot find name of link library for \`$arg'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Find the relevant object directory and library name. + name=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%' -e 's/\.la$//' -e 's/^lib//'` + + if test "X$installed" = Xyes; then + dir="$libdir" + else + dir=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$dir" = "X$arg"; then + dir="$objdir" + else + dir="$dir/$objdir" + fi + fi + + if test -z "$libdir"; then + # It is a libtool convenience library, so add in its objects. + convenience="$convenience $dir/$old_library" + old_convenience="$old_convenience $dir/$old_library" + deplibs="$deplibs$dependency_libs" + compile_command="$compile_command $dir/$old_library$dependency_libs" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $dir/$old_library$dependency_libs" + continue + fi + + # This library was specified with -dlopen. + if test "$prev" = dlfiles; then + dlfiles="$dlfiles $arg" + if test -z "$dlname" || test "$build_libtool_libs" = no; then + # If there is no dlname or we're linking statically, + # we need to preload. + prev=dlprefiles + else + # We should not create a dependency on this library, but we + # may need any libraries it requires. + compile_command="$compile_command$dependency_libs" + finalize_command="$finalize_command$dependency_libs" + prev= + continue + fi + fi + + # The library was specified with -dlpreopen. + if test "$prev" = dlprefiles; then + # Prefer using a static library (so that no silly _DYNAMIC symbols + # are required to link). + if test -n "$old_library"; then + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $dir/$old_library" + else + dlprefiles="$dlprefiles $dir/$linklib" + fi + prev= + fi + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes && test -n "$library_names"; then + link_against_libtool_libs="$link_against_libtool_libs $arg" + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + # Make sure the rpath contains only unique directories. + case "$temp_rpath " in + *" $dir "*) ;; + *) temp_rpath="$temp_rpath $dir" ;; + esac + fi + + # This is the magic to use -rpath. + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator"; then + if test -z "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + # Put the magic libdir with the hardcode flag. + hardcode_libdirs="$libdir" + libdir="@HARDCODE_LIBDIRS@" + else + # Just accumulate the unique libdirs. + case "$hardcode_libdir_separator$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator" in + *"$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir$hardcode_libdir_separator"*) + ;; + *) + hardcode_libdirs="$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir" + ;; + esac + libdir= + fi + fi + + if test -n "$libdir"; then + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + + compile_command="$compile_command $flag" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $flag" + fi + elif test -n "$runpath_var"; then + # Do the same for the permanent run path. + case "$perm_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) perm_rpath="$perm_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + + + lib_linked=yes + case "$hardcode_action" in + immediate | unsupported) + if test "$hardcode_direct" = no; then + compile_command="$compile_command $dir/$linklib" + elif test "$hardcode_minus_L" = no; then + case "$host" in + *-*-sunos*) + compile_shlibpath="$compile_shlibpath$dir:" + ;; + esac + compile_command="$compile_command -L$dir -l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = no; then + compile_shlibpath="$compile_shlibpath$dir:" + compile_command="$compile_command -l$name" + else + lib_linked=no + fi + ;; + + relink) + # We need an absolute path. + case "$dir" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) ;; + *) + absdir=`cd "$dir" && pwd` + if test -z "$absdir"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot determine absolute directory name of \`$dir'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + dir="$absdir" + ;; + esac + + if test "$hardcode_direct" = yes; then + compile_command="$compile_command $dir/$linklib" + elif test "$hardcode_minus_L" = yes; then + compile_command="$compile_command -L$dir -l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = yes; then + compile_shlibpath="$compile_shlibpath$dir:" + compile_command="$compile_command -l$name" + else + lib_linked=no + fi + ;; + + *) + lib_linked=no + ;; + esac + + if test "$lib_linked" != yes; then + $echo "$modename: configuration error: unsupported hardcode properties" + exit 1 + fi + + # Finalize command for both is simple: just hardcode it. + if test "$hardcode_direct" = yes; then + finalize_command="$finalize_command $libdir/$linklib" + elif test "$hardcode_minus_L" = yes; then + finalize_command="$finalize_command -L$libdir -l$name" + elif test "$hardcode_shlibpath_var" = yes; then + finalize_shlibpath="$finalize_shlibpath$libdir:" + finalize_command="$finalize_command -l$name" + else + # We cannot seem to hardcode it, guess we'll fake it. + finalize_command="$finalize_command -L$libdir -l$name" + fi + else + # Transform directly to old archives if we don't build new libraries. + if test -n "$pic_flag" && test -z "$old_library"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot find static library for \`$arg'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Here we assume that one of hardcode_direct or hardcode_minus_L + # is not unsupported. This is valid on all known static and + # shared platforms. + if test "$hardcode_direct" != unsupported; then + test -n "$old_library" && linklib="$old_library" + compile_command="$compile_command $dir/$linklib" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $dir/$linklib" + else + compile_command="$compile_command -L$dir -l$name" + finalize_command="$finalize_command -L$dir -l$name" + fi + fi + + # Add in any libraries that this one depends upon. + compile_command="$compile_command$dependency_libs" + finalize_command="$finalize_command$dependency_libs" + continue + ;; + + # Some other compiler argument. + *) + # Unknown arguments in both finalize_command and compile_command need + # to be aesthetically quoted because they are evaled later. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case "$arg" in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + + # Now actually substitute the argument into the commands. + if test -n "$arg"; then + compile_command="$compile_command $arg" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $arg" + fi + done + + if test -n "$prev"; then + $echo "$modename: the \`$prevarg' option requires an argument" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test "$module" = yes; then + $echo "$modename: \`-export-symbols' is not supported for modules" + exit 1 + fi + + oldlibs= + # calculate the name of the file, without its directory + outputname=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + case "$output" in + "") + $echo "$modename: you must specify an output file" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + + *.a | *.lib) + if test -n "$link_against_libtool_libs"; then + $echo "$modename: error: cannot link libtool libraries into archives" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$deplibs"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-l' and \`-L' are ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$rpath"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-rpath' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$export_symbols"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-export-symbols' is ignored for archives" 1>&2 + fi + + # Now set the variables for building old libraries. + build_libtool_libs=no + oldlibs="$output" + ;; + + *.la) + # Make sure we only generate libraries of the form `libNAME.la'. + case "$outputname" in + lib*) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: libtool library \`$output' must begin with \`lib'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + name=`$echo "X$outputname" | $Xsed -e 's/\.la$//' -e 's/^lib//'` + eval libname=\"$libname_spec\" + + output_objdir=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$output_objdir" = "X$output"; then + output_objdir="$objdir" + else + output_objdir="$output_objdir/$objdir" + fi + + # All the library-specific variables (install_libdir is set above). + library_names= + old_library= + dlname= + + if test -n "$objs"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot build libtool library \`$output' from non-libtool objects:$objs" 2>&1 + exit 1 + fi + + # How the heck are we supposed to write a wrapper for a shared library? + if test -n "$link_against_libtool_libs"; then + $echo "$modename: error: cannot link shared libraries into libtool libraries" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen' is ignored for libtool libraries" 1>&2 + fi + + set dummy $rpath + if test $# -gt 2; then + $echo "$modename: warning: ignoring multiple \`-rpath's for a libtool library" 1>&2 + fi + install_libdir="$2" + + oldlibs= + if test -z "$rpath"; then + # Building a libtool convenience library. + libext=al + oldlibs="$output_objdir/$libname.$libext $oldlibs" + build_libtool_libs=convenience + dependency_libs="$deplibs" + + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info' is ignored for convenience libraries" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for convenience libraries" 1>&2 + fi + else + + # Parse the version information argument. + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS=':' + set dummy $vinfo 0 0 0 + IFS="$save_ifs" + + if test -n "$8"; then + $echo "$modename: too many parameters to \`-version-info'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + current="$2" + revision="$3" + age="$4" + + # Check that each of the things are valid numbers. + case "$current" in + 0 | [1-9] | [1-9][0-9]*) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: CURRENT \`$current' is not a nonnegative integer" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + case "$revision" in + 0 | [1-9] | [1-9][0-9]*) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: REVISION \`$revision' is not a nonnegative integer" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + case "$age" in + 0 | [1-9] | [1-9][0-9]*) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: AGE \`$age' is not a nonnegative integer" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + if test $age -gt $current; then + $echo "$modename: AGE \`$age' is greater than the current interface number \`$current'" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$vinfo' is not valid version information" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Calculate the version variables. + major= + versuffix= + verstring= + case "$version_type" in + none) ;; + + linux) + major=.`expr $current - $age` + versuffix="$major.$age.$revision" + ;; + + osf) + major=`expr $current - $age` + versuffix=".$current.$age.$revision" + verstring="$current.$age.$revision" + + # Add in all the interfaces that we are compatible with. + loop=$age + while test $loop != 0; do + iface=`expr $current - $loop` + loop=`expr $loop - 1` + verstring="$verstring:${iface}.0" + done + + # Make executables depend on our current version. + verstring="$verstring:${current}.0" + ;; + + sunos) + major=".$current" + versuffix=".$current.$revision" + ;; + + freebsd-aout) + major=".$current" + versuffix=".$current.$revision"; + ;; + + freebsd-elf) + major=".$current" + versuffix=".$current"; + ;; + + windows) + # Like Linux, but with '-' rather than '.', since we only + # want one extension on Windows 95. + major=`expr $current - $age` + versuffix="-$major-$age-$revision" + ;; + + *) + $echo "$modename: unknown library version type \`$version_type'" 1>&2 + echo "Fatal configuration error. See the $PACKAGE docs for more information." 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + # Clear the version info if we defaulted, and they specified a release. + if test -z "$vinfo" && test -n "$release"; then + major= + versuffix= + verstring="0.0" + case "$host" in + *-*-sunos*) + versuffix=".0.0" + ;; + esac + fi + + # Check to see if the archive will have undefined symbols. + if test "$allow_undefined" = yes; then + if test "$allow_undefined_flag" = unsupported; then + $echo "$modename: warning: undefined symbols not allowed in $host shared libraries" 1>&2 + build_libtool_libs=no + build_old_libs=yes + fi + else + # Don't allow undefined symbols. + allow_undefined_flag="$no_undefined_flag" + fi + + # Add libc to deplibs on all systems. + dependency_libs="$deplibs" + deplibs="$deplibs -lc" + fi + + # Create the output directory, or remove our outputs if we need to. + if test -d $output_objdir; then + $show "${rm}r $output_objdir/$outputname $output_objdir/$libname.* $output_objdir/${libname}${release}.*" + $run ${rm}r $output_objdir/$outputname $output_objdir/$libname.* $output_objdir/${libname}${release}.* + else + $show "$mkdir $output_objdir" + $run $mkdir $output_objdir + status=$? + if test $status -ne 0 && test ! -d $output_objdir; then + exit $status + fi + fi + + # Now set the variables for building old libraries. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes && test "$build_libtool_libs" != convenience ; then + oldlibs="$oldlibs $output_objdir/$libname.$libext" + + # Transform .lo files to .o files. + oldobjs="$objs"`$echo "X$libobjs " | $Xsed -e 's/[^ ]*\.'${libext}' //g' -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//g'` + fi + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + # Transform deplibs into only deplibs that can be linked in shared. + ## Gordon: Do you check for the existence of the libraries in deplibs + ## on the system? That should maybe be merged in here someplace.... + ## Actually: I think test_compile and file_magic do this... file_regex + ## sorta does this. Only pas_all needs to be changed. -Toshio + name_save=$name + libname_save=$libname + release_save=$release + versuffix_save=$versuffix + major_save=$major + # I'm not sure if I'm treating the release correctly. I think + # release should show up in the -l (ie -lgmp5) so we don't want to + # add it in twice. Is that correct? + release="" + versuffix="" + major="" + newdeplibs= + case "$check_shared_deplibs_method" in + pass_all) + newdeplibs=$deplibs + ;; # Don't check for shared/static. Everything works. + # This might be a little naive. We might want to check + # whether the library exists or not. But this is on + # osf3 & osf4 and I'm not really sure... Just + # implementing what was already the behaviour. + test_compile) + # This code stresses the "libraries are programs" paradigm to its + # limits. Maybe even breaks it. We compile a program, linking it + # against the deplibs as a proxy for the library. Then we can check + # whether they linked in statically or dynamically with ldd. + $rm conftest.c + cat > conftest.c </dev/null` + for potent_lib in $potential_libs; do + file_output=`file $potent_lib` + if test `expr "$file_output" : ".*$file_magic_regex"` -ne 0 ; then + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + a_deplib="" + break 2 + fi + done + done + ;; + file_regex) + deplib_matches=`eval \\$echo \"$library_names_spec\"` + set dummy $deplib_matches + deplib_match=$2 + for i in $lib_search_path; do + potential_libs=`ls $i/$deplib_match* 2>/dev/null` + if test "$potential_libs" != "" ; then + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + a_deplib="" + break + fi + done + ;; + esac + if test "$a_deplib" != "" ; then + echo + echo "*** Warning: This library needs some functionality provided by $a_deplib." + echo "*** I have the capability to make that library automatically link in when" + echo "*** you link to this library. But I can only do this if you have a" + echo "*** shared version of the library, which you do not appear to have." + fi + else + # Add a -L argument. + newdeplibs="$newdeplibs $a_deplib" + fi + done # Gone through all deplibs. + ;; + none | *) deplibs="" ;; + esac + versuffix=$versuffix_save + major=$major_save + release=$release_save + libname=$libname_save + name=$name_save + deplibs=$newdeplibs + # Done checking deplibs! + + # Get the real and link names of the library. + eval library_names=\"$library_names_spec\" + set dummy $library_names + realname="$2" + shift; shift + + if test -n "$soname_spec"; then + eval soname=\"$soname_spec\" + else + soname="$realname" + fi + + lib="$output_objdir/$realname" + for link + do + linknames="$linknames $link" + done + + # Use standard objects if they are PIC. + test -z "$pic_flag" && libobjs=`$echo "X$libobjs " | $Xsed -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//g'` + + if test -n "$whole_archive_flag_spec"; then + if test -n "$convenience"; then + eval libobjs=\"\$libobjs $whole_archive_flag_spec\" + fi + else + for xlib in $convenience; do + # Extract the objects. + xdir="$xlib"x + generated="$generated $xdir" + xlib=`echo "$xlib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + $show "${rm}r $xdir" + $run ${rm}r "$xdir" + $show "mkdir $xdir" + $run mkdir "$xdir" + status=$? + if test $status -ne 0 && test ! -d "$xdir"; then + exit $status + fi + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR x ../$xlib)" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR x ../\$xlib)" || exit $? + + libobjs="$libobjs `echo $xdir/*`" + done + fi + + # Do each of the archive commands. + if test -n "$export_symbols" && test -n "$archive_sym_cmds"; then + eval cmds=\"$archive_sym_cmds\" + else + eval cmds=\"$archive_cmds\" + fi + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + # Create links to the real library. + for linkname in $linknames; do + if test "$realname" != "$linkname"; then + $show "(cd $output_objdir && $LN_S $realname $linkname)" + $run eval '(cd $output_objdir && $LN_S $realname $linkname)' || exit $? + fi + done + + # If -module or -export-dynamic was specified, set the dlname. + if test "$module" = yes || test "$export_dynamic" = yes; then + # On all known operating systems, these are identical. + dlname="$soname" + fi + fi + ;; + + *.lo | *.o | *.obj) + if test -n "$link_against_libtool_libs"; then + $echo "$modename: error: cannot link libtool libraries into objects" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$deplibs"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-l' and \`-L' are ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$rpath"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-rpath' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for objects" 1>&2 + fi + + case "$output" in + *.lo) + if test -n "$objs"; then + $echo "$modename: cannot build library object \`$output' from non-libtool objects" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + libobj="$output" + obj=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + ;; + *) + libobj= + obj="$output" + ;; + esac + + # Delete the old objects. + $run $rm $obj $libobj + + # Create the old-style object. + reload_objs="$objs"`$echo "X$libobjs " | $Xsed -e 's/[^ ]*\.'${libext}' //g' -e 's/[^ ]*\.lib //g' -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//g'` + + output="$obj" + eval cmds=\"$reload_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + + # Exit if we aren't doing a library object file. + test -z "$libobj" && exit 0 + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" != yes; then + # Create an invalid libtool object if no PIC, so that we don't + # accidentally link it into a program. + $show "echo timestamp > $libobj" + $run eval "echo timestamp > $libobj" || exit $? + exit 0 + fi + + if test -n "$pic_flag"; then + # Only do commands if we really have different PIC objects. + reload_objs="$libobjs" + output="$libobj" + eval cmds=\"$reload_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + else + # Just create a symlink. + $show "$LN_S $obj $libobj" + $run $LN_S $obj $libobj || exit $? + fi + + exit 0 + ;; + + # Anything else should be a program. + *) + if test -n "$vinfo"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-version-info' is ignored for programs" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$release"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`-release' is ignored for programs" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$rpath"; then + # If the user specified any rpath flags, then add them. + for libdir in $rpath; do + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator"; then + if test -z "$hardcode_libdirs"; then + # Put the magic libdir with the hardcode flag. + hardcode_libdirs="$libdir" + libdir="@HARDCODE_LIBDIRS@" + else + # Just accumulate the unique libdirs. + case "$hardcode_libdir_separator$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator" in + *"$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir$hardcode_libdir_separator"*) + ;; + *) + hardcode_libdirs="$hardcode_libdirs$hardcode_libdir_separator$libdir" + ;; + esac + libdir= + fi + fi + + if test -n "$libdir"; then + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + + compile_command="$compile_command $flag" + finalize_command="$finalize_command $flag" + fi + elif test -n "$runpath_var"; then + case "$perm_rpath " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) perm_rpath="$perm_rpath $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + done + fi + + # Substitute the hardcoded libdirs into the compile commands. + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_separator"; then + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e "s%@HARDCODE_LIBDIRS@%$hardcode_libdirs%g"` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e "s%@HARDCODE_LIBDIRS@%$hardcode_libdirs%g"` + fi + + output_objdir=`$echo "X$output" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + if test "X$output_objdir" = "X$output"; then + output_objdir="$objdir" + else + output_objdir="$output_objdir/$objdir" + fi + + if test -n "$libobjs" && test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + # Transform all the library objects into standard objects. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command " | $Xsed -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//'` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command " | $Xsed -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//'` + fi + + if test "$export_dynamic" = yes && test -n "$NM" && test -n "$global_symbol_pipe"; then + dlsyms="${outputname}S.c" + else + dlsyms= + fi + + if test -n "$dlsyms"; then + case "$dlsyms" in + "") ;; + *.c) + if test -z "$export_symbols"; then + # Add our own program objects to the preloaded list. + dlprefiles=`$echo "X$objs$dlprefiles " | $Xsed -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//'` + fi + + # Discover the nlist of each of the dlfiles. + nlist="$objdir/${output}.nm" + + if test -d $objdir; then + $show "$rm $nlist ${nlist}T" + $run $rm "$nlist" "${nlist}T" + else + $show "$mkdir $objdir" + $run $mkdir $objdir + status=$? + if test $status -ne 0 && test ! -d $objdir; then + exit $status + fi + fi + + # Parse the name list into a source file. + $show "creating $objdir/$dlsyms" + + $echo > "$objdir/$dlsyms" "\ +/* $dlsyms - symbol resolution table for \`$outputname' dlsym emulation. */ +/* Generated by $PROGRAM - GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern \"C\" { +#endif + +/* Prevent the only kind of declaration conflicts we can make. */ +#define dld_preloaded_symbols some_other_symbol + +/* External symbol declarations for the compiler. */\ +" + + if test -n "$export_symbols"; then + sed -e 's/^\(.*\)/\1 \1/' < "$export_symbols" > "$nlist" + fi + + for arg in $dlprefiles; do + $show "extracting global C symbols from \`$arg'" + $run eval "$NM $arg | $global_symbol_pipe >> '$nlist'" + done + + if test -z "$run"; then + # Make sure we at least have an empty file. + test -f "$nlist" || : > "$nlist" + + # Try sorting and uniquifying the output. + if sort "$nlist" | uniq > "$nlist"T; then + mv -f "$nlist"T "$nlist" + else + $rm "$nlist"T + fi + + if test -f "$nlist"; then + sed -e 's/^.* \(.*\)$/extern char \1;/' < "$nlist" >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" + else + echo '/* NONE */' >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" + fi + + $echo >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" "\ + +#undef dld_preloaded_symbols + +#if defined (__STDC__) && __STDC__ +# define __ptr_t void * +#else +# define __ptr_t char * +#endif + +/* The mapping between symbol names and symbols. */ +struct { + char *name; + __ptr_t address; +} +dld_preloaded_symbols[] = +{\ +" + + if test -n "$export_symbols"; then + echo >> "$objdir/$dlsyms" "\ + {\"${output}\", (__ptr_t) 0}," + sed 's/^\(.*\)/ {"\1", (__ptr_t) \&\1},/' < "$export_symbols" >> "$objdir/$dlsyms" + fi + + for arg in $dlprefiles; do + name=`echo "$arg" | sed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + echo >> "$objdir/$dlsyms" "\ + {\"$name\", (__ptr_t) 0}," + eval "$NM $arg | $global_symbol_pipe > '$nlist'" + + if test -f "$nlist"; then + sed 's/^\(.*\) \(.*\)$/ {"\1", (__ptr_t) \&\2},/' < "$nlist" >> "$objdir/$dlsyms" + else + echo '/* NONE */' >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" + fi + + done + + if test -f "$nlist"; then + sed 's/^\(.*\) \(.*\)$/ {"\1", (__ptr_t) \&\2},/' < "$nlist" >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" + fi + + $echo >> "$output_objdir/$dlsyms" "\ + {0, (__ptr_t) 0} +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif\ +" + fi + + # Now compile the dynamic symbol file. + $show "(cd $objdir && $C_compiler -c$no_builtin_flag \"$dlsyms\")" + $run eval '(cd $objdir && $C_compiler -c$no_builtin_flag "$dlsyms")' || exit $? + + # Transform the symbol file into the correct name. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e "s%@SYMFILE@%$objdir/${output}S.${objext}%"` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e "s%@SYMFILE@%$objdir/${output}S.${objext}%"` + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: unknown suffix for \`$dlsyms'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + elif test "$export_dynamic" != yes; then + test -n "$dlfiles$dlprefiles" && $echo "$modename: warning: \`-dlopen' and \`-dlpreopen' are ignored without \`-export-dynamic'" 1>&2 + else + # We keep going just in case the user didn't refer to + # dld_preloaded_symbols. The linker will fail if global_symbol_pipe + # really was required. + $echo "$modename: not configured to extract global symbols from dlpreopened files" 1>&2 + + # Nullify the symbol file. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e "s% @SYMFILE@%%"` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e "s% @SYMFILE@%%"` + fi + + if test -z "$link_against_libtool_libs" || test "$build_libtool_libs" != yes; then + # Replace the output file specification. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output"'%g'` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output"'%g'` + + # We have no uninstalled library dependencies, so finalize right now. + $show "$compile_command" + $run eval "$compile_command" + exit $? + fi + + # Replace the output file specification. + compile_command=`$echo "X$compile_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output_objdir/$outputname"'%g'` + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e 's%@OUTPUT@%'"$output_objdir/$outputname"'T%g'` + + # Create the binary in the object directory, then wrap it. + if test ! -d $output_objdir; then + $show "$mkdir $output_objdir" + $run $mkdir $output_objdir + status=$? + if test $status -ne 0 && test ! -d $objdir; then + exit $status + fi + fi + + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + # We should set the shlibpath_var + rpath= + for dir in $temp_rpath; do + case "$dir" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) + # Absolute path. + rpath="$rpath$dir:" + ;; + *) + # Relative path: add a thisdir entry. + rpath="$rpath\$thisdir/$dir:" + ;; + esac + done + temp_rpath="$rpath" + fi + + # Delete the old output file. + $run $rm $output + + if test -n "$compile_shlibpath"; then + compile_command="$shlibpath_var=\"$compile_shlibpath\$$shlibpath_var\" $compile_command" + fi + if test -n "$finalize_shlibpath"; then + finalize_command="$shlibpath_var=\"$finalize_shlibpath\$$shlibpath_var\" $finalize_command" + fi + + if test -n "$runpath_var" && test -n "$perm_rpath"; then + # We should set the runpath_var. + rpath= + for dir in $perm_rpath; do + rpath="$rpath$dir:" + done + compile_command="$runpath_var=\"$rpath\$$runpath_var\" $compile_command" + finalize_command="$runpath_var=\"$rpath\$$runpath_var\" $finalize_command" + fi + + if test "$hardcode_action" = relink; then + # AGH! Flame the AIX and HP-UX people for me, will ya? + $echo "$modename: warning: this platform doesn\'t like uninstalled shared libraries" 1>&2 + $echo "$modename: \`$output' will be relinked during installation" 1>&2 + fi + + $show "$compile_command" + $run eval "$compile_command" || exit $? + + # Now create the wrapper script. + $show "creating $output" + + # Quote the finalize command for shipping. + finalize_command=`$echo "X$finalize_command" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + + # Quote $echo for shipping. + if test "X$echo" = "X$SHELL $0 --fallback-echo"; then + case "$0" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) qecho="$SHELL $0 --fallback-echo";; + *) qecho="$SHELL `pwd`/$0 --fallback-echo";; + esac + qecho=`$echo "X$qecho" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + else + qecho=`$echo "X$echo" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + fi + + # Only actually do things if our run command is non-null. + if test -z "$run"; then + $rm $output + trap "$rm $output; exit 1" 1 2 15 + + $echo > $output "\ +#! $SHELL + +# $output - temporary wrapper script for $objdir/$outputname +# Generated by $PROGRAM - GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION +# +# The $output program cannot be directly executed until all the libtool +# libraries that it depends on are installed. +# +# This wrapper script should never be moved out of the build directory. +# If it is, it will not operate correctly. + +# Sed substitution that helps us do robust quoting. It backslashifies +# metacharacters that are still active within double-quoted strings. +Xsed='sed -e s/^X//' +sed_quote_subst='$sed_quote_subst' + +# The HP-UX ksh and POSIX shell print the target directory to stdout +# if CDPATH is set. +if test \"\${CDPATH+set}\" = set; then CDPATH=; export CDPATH; fi + +# This environment variable determines our operation mode. +if test \"\$libtool_install_magic\" = \"$magic\"; then + # install mode needs the following variables: + link_against_libtool_libs='$link_against_libtool_libs' + finalize_command=\"cd `pwd | sed -e $sed_quote_subst`; $finalize_command\" +else + # When we are sourced in execute mode, \$file and \$echo are already set. + if test \"\$libtool_execute_magic\" != \"$magic\"; then + echo=\"$qecho\" + file=\"\$0\" + # Make sure echo works. + if test \"X\$1\" = X--no-reexec; then + # Discard the --no-reexec flag, and continue. + shift + elif test \"X\`(\$echo '\t') 2>/dev/null\`\" = 'X\t'; then + # Yippee, \$echo works! + : + else + # Restart under the correct shell, and then maybe \$echo will work. + exec $SHELL \"\$0\" --no-reexec \${1+\"\$@\"} + fi + fi\ +" + $echo >> $output "\ + + # Find the directory that this script lives in. + thisdir=\`\$echo \"X\$file\" | \$Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'\` + test \"x\$thisdir\" = \"x\$file\" && thisdir=. + + # Follow symbolic links until we get to the real thisdir. + file=\`ls -ld \"\$file\" | sed -n 's/.*-> //p'\` + while test -n \"\$file\"; do + destdir=\`\$echo \"X\$file\" | \$Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*\$%%'\` + + # If there was a directory component, then change thisdir. + if test \"x\$destdir\" != \"x\$file\"; then + case \"\$destdir\" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) thisdir=\"\$destdir\" ;; + *) thisdir=\"\$thisdir/\$destdir\" ;; + esac + fi + + file=\`\$echo \"X\$file\" | \$Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'\` + file=\`ls -ld \"\$thisdir/\$file\" | sed -n 's/.*-> //p'\` + done + + # Try to get the absolute directory name. + absdir=\`cd \"\$thisdir\" && pwd\` + test -n \"\$absdir\" && thisdir=\"\$absdir\" + + progdir=\"\$thisdir/$objdir\" + program='$outputname' + + if test -f \"\$progdir/\$program\"; then" + + # Export our shlibpath_var if we have one. + if test -n "$shlibpath_var" && test -n "$temp_rpath"; then + $echo >> $output "\ + # Add our own library path to $shlibpath_var + $shlibpath_var=\"$temp_rpath\$$shlibpath_var\" + + # Some systems cannot cope with colon-terminated $shlibpath_var + $shlibpath_var=\`\$echo \"X\$$shlibpath_var\" | \$Xsed -e 's/:*\$//'\` + + export $shlibpath_var +" + fi + + $echo >> $output "\ + if test \"\$libtool_execute_magic\" != \"$magic\"; then + # Run the actual program with our arguments. + + # Export the path to the program. + PATH=\"\$progdir:\$PATH\" + export PATH + + exec \$program \${1+\"\$@\"} + + \$echo \"\$0: cannot exec \$program \${1+\"\$@\"}\" + exit 1 + fi + else + # The program doesn't exist. + \$echo \"\$0: error: \$progdir/\$program does not exist\" 1>&2 + \$echo \"This script is just a wrapper for \$program.\" 1>&2 + echo \"See the $PACKAGE documentation for more information.\" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi +fi\ +" + chmod +x $output + fi + exit 0 + ;; + esac + + # See if we need to build an old-fashioned archive. + for oldlib in $oldlibs; do + + if test "$build_libtool_libs" = convenience; then + oldobjs="$libobjs" + addlibs="$convenience" + build_libtool_libs=no + else + oldobjs="$objs"`$echo "X$libobjs " | $Xsed -e 's/[^ ]*\.'${libext}' //g' -e 's/[^ ]*\.lib //g' -e "$los2o" -e 's/ $//g'` + addlibs="$old_convenience" + fi + + # Add in members from convenience archives. + for xlib in $addlibs; do + # Extract the objects. + xdir="$xlib"x + generated="$generated $xdir" + xlib=`echo "$xlib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + $show "${rm}r $xdir" + $run ${rm}r "$xdir" + $show "mkdir $xdir" + $run mkdir "$xdir" + status=$? + if test $status -ne 0 && test ! -d "$xdir"; then + exit $status + fi + $show "(cd $xdir && $AR x ../$xlib)" + $run eval "(cd \$xdir && $AR x ../\$xlib)" || exit $? + + oldobjs="$oldobjs `echo $xdir/*`" + done + + # Do each command in the archive commands. + if test -n "$old_archive_from_new_cmds" && test "$build_libtool_libs" = yes; then + eval cmds=\"$old_archive_from_new_cmds\" + else + eval cmds=\"$old_archive_cmds\" + fi + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + done + + if test -n "$generated"; then + $show "${rm}r$generated" + $run ${rm}r$generated + fi + + # Now create the libtool archive. + case "$output" in + *.la) + old_library= + test "$build_old_libs" = yes && old_library="$libname.$libext" + $show "creating $output" + + # Only create the output if not a dry run. + if test -z "$run"; then + $echo > $output "\ +# $output - a libtool library file +# Generated by $PROGRAM - GNU $PACKAGE $VERSION + +# The name that we can dlopen(3). +dlname='$dlname' + +# Names of this library. +library_names='$library_names' + +# The name of the static archive. +old_library='$old_library' + +# Libraries that this one depends upon. +dependency_libs='$dependency_libs' + +# Version information for $libname. +current=$current +age=$age +revision=$revision + +# Is this an already installed library? +installed=no + +# Directory that this library needs to be installed in: +libdir='$install_libdir'\ +" + fi + + # Do a symbolic link so that the libtool archive can be found in + # LD_LIBRARY_PATH before the program is installed. + $show "(cd $output_objdir && $LN_S ../$outputname $outputname)" + $run eval "(cd $output_objdir && $LN_S ../$outputname $outputname)" || exit $? + ;; + esac + exit 0 + ;; + + # libtool install mode + install) + modename="$modename: install" + + # There may be an optional sh(1) argument at the beginning of + # install_prog (especially on Windows NT). + if test "$nonopt" = "$SHELL" || test "$nonopt" = /bin/sh; then + # Aesthetically quote it. + arg=`$echo "X$nonopt" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case "$arg" in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + install_prog="$arg " + arg="$1" + shift + else + install_prog= + arg="$nonopt" + fi + + # The real first argument should be the name of the installation program. + # Aesthetically quote it. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case "$arg" in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + install_prog="$install_prog$arg" + + # We need to accept at least all the BSD install flags. + dest= + files= + opts= + prev= + install_type= + isdir=no + stripme= + for arg + do + if test -n "$dest"; then + files="$files $dest" + dest="$arg" + continue + fi + + case "$arg" in + -d) isdir=yes ;; + -f) prev="-f" ;; + -g) prev="-g" ;; + -m) prev="-m" ;; + -o) prev="-o" ;; + -s) + stripme=" -s" + continue + ;; + -*) ;; + + *) + # If the previous option needed an argument, then skip it. + if test -n "$prev"; then + prev= + else + dest="$arg" + continue + fi + ;; + esac + + # Aesthetically quote the argument. + arg=`$echo "X$arg" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + case "$arg" in + *[\[\~\#\^\&\*\(\)\{\}\|\;\<\>\?\'\ \ ]*|*]*) + arg="\"$arg\"" + ;; + esac + install_prog="$install_prog $arg" + done + + if test -z "$install_prog"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify an install program" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -n "$prev"; then + $echo "$modename: the \`$prev' option requires an argument" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -z "$files"; then + if test -z "$dest"; then + $echo "$modename: no file or destination specified" 1>&2 + else + $echo "$modename: you must specify a destination" 1>&2 + fi + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Strip any trailing slash from the destination. + dest=`$echo "X$dest" | $Xsed -e 's%/$%%'` + + # Check to see that the destination is a directory. + test -d "$dest" && isdir=yes + if test "$isdir" = yes; then + destdir="$dest" + destname= + else + destdir=`$echo "X$dest" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$destdir" = "X$dest" && destdir=. + destname=`$echo "X$dest" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + # Not a directory, so check to see that there is only one file specified. + set dummy $files + if test $# -gt 2; then + $echo "$modename: \`$dest' is not a directory" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + fi + case "$destdir" in + /* | [A-Za-z]:[/\\]*) ;; + *) + for file in $files; do + case "$file" in + *.lo) ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: \`$destdir' must be an absolute directory name" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + done + ;; + esac + + # This variable tells wrapper scripts just to set variables rather + # than running their programs. + libtool_install_magic="$magic" + + staticlibs= + future_libdirs= + current_libdirs= + for file in $files; do + + # Do each installation. + case "$file" in + *.a | *.lib) + # Do the static libraries later. + staticlibs="$staticlibs $file" + ;; + + *.la) + # Check to see that this really is a libtool archive. + if (sed -e '2q' $file | egrep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + $echo "$modename: \`$file' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + library_names= + old_library= + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case "$file" in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Add the libdir to current_libdirs if it is the destination. + if test "X$destdir" = "X$libdir"; then + case "$current_libdirs " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) current_libdirs="$current_libdirs $libdir" ;; + esac + else + # Note the libdir as a future libdir. + case "$future_libdirs " in + *" $libdir "*) ;; + *) future_libdirs="$future_libdirs $libdir" ;; + esac + fi + + dir="`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'`/" + test "X$dir" = "X$file/" && dir= + dir="$dir$objdir" + + # See the names of the shared library. + set dummy $library_names + if test -n "$2"; then + realname="$2" + shift + shift + + # Install the shared library and build the symlinks. + $show "$install_prog $dir/$realname $destdir/$realname" + $run eval "$install_prog $dir/$realname $destdir/$realname" || exit $? + test "X$dlname" = "X$realname" && dlname= + + if test $# -gt 0; then + # Delete the old symlinks, and create new ones. + for linkname + do + test "X$dlname" = "X$linkname" && dlname= + if test "$linkname" != "$realname"; then + $show "(cd $destdir && $rm $linkname && $LN_S $realname $linkname)" + $run eval "(cd $destdir && $rm $linkname && $LN_S $realname $linkname)" + fi + done + fi + + if test -n "$dlname"; then + # Install the dynamically-loadable library. + $show "$install_prog $dir/$dlname $destdir/$dlname" + $run eval "$install_prog $dir/$dlname $destdir/$dlname" || exit $? + fi + + # Do each command in the postinstall commands. + lib="$destdir/$realname" + eval cmds=\"$postinstall_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + # Install the pseudo-library for information purposes. + name=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + instname="$dir/$name"i + $show "Creating $instname" + $rm "$instname" + sed 's/^installed=no$/installed=yes/' "$file" > "$instname" + $show "$install_prog $instname $destdir/$name" + $run eval "$install_prog $instname $destdir/$name" || exit $? + $show "$rm $instname" + $rm "$instname" + + # Maybe install the static library, too. + test -n "$old_library" && staticlibs="$staticlibs $dir/$old_library" + ;; + + *.lo) + # Install (i.e. copy) a libtool object. + + # Figure out destination file name, if it wasn't already specified. + if test -n "$destname"; then + destfile="$destdir/$destname" + else + destfile=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + destfile="$destdir/$destfile" + fi + + # Deduce the name of the destination old-style object file. + case "$destfile" in + *.lo) + staticdest=`$echo "X$destfile" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + ;; + *.o | *.obj) + staticdest="$destfile" + destfile= + ;; + *) + $echo "$modename: cannot copy a libtool object to \`$destfile'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + # Install the libtool object if requested. + if test -n "$destfile"; then + $show "$install_prog $file $destfile" + $run eval "$install_prog $file $destfile" || exit $? + fi + + # Install the old object if enabled. + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + # Deduce the name of the old-style object file. + staticobj=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + + $show "$install_prog $staticobj $staticdest" + $run eval "$install_prog \$staticobj \$staticdest" || exit $? + fi + exit 0 + ;; + + *) + # Figure out destination file name, if it wasn't already specified. + if test -n "$destname"; then + destfile="$destdir/$destname" + else + destfile=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + destfile="$destdir/$destfile" + fi + + # Do a test to see if this is really a libtool program. + if (sed -e '4q' $file | egrep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + link_against_libtool_libs= + finalize_command= + + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case "$file" in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Check the variables that should have been set. + if test -z "$link_against_libtool_libs" || test -z "$finalize_command"; then + $echo "$modename: invalid libtool wrapper script \`$file'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + finalize=yes + for lib in $link_against_libtool_libs; do + # Check to see that each library is installed. + libdir= + if test -f "$lib"; then + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case "$lib" in + */* | *\\*) . $lib ;; + *) . ./$lib ;; + esac + fi + libfile="$libdir/`$echo "X$lib" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%g'`" + if test -n "$libdir" && test ! -f "$libfile"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: \`$lib' has not been installed in \`$libdir'" 1>&2 + finalize=no + fi + done + + if test "$hardcode_action" = relink; then + if test "$finalize" = yes; then + $echo "$modename: warning: relinking \`$file' on behalf of your buggy system linker" 1>&2 + $show "$finalize_command" + if $run eval "$finalize_command"; then : + else + $echo "$modename: error: relink \`$file' with the above command before installing it" 1>&2 + continue + fi + file="$objdir/$file"T + else + $echo "$modename: warning: cannot relink \`$file' on behalf of your buggy system linker" 1>&2 + fi + else + # Install the binary that we compiled earlier. + file=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e "s%\([^/]*\)$%$objdir/\1%"` + fi + fi + + $show "$install_prog$stripme $file $destfile" + $run eval "$install_prog\$stripme \$file \$destfile" || exit $? + ;; + esac + done + + for file in $staticlibs; do + name=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + # Set up the ranlib parameters. + oldlib="$destdir/$name" + + $show "$install_prog $file $oldlib" + $run eval "$install_prog \$file \$oldlib" || exit $? + + # Do each command in the postinstall commands. + eval cmds=\"$old_postinstall_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || exit $? + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + done + + if test -n "$future_libdirs"; then + $echo "$modename: warning: remember to run \`$progname --finish$future_libdirs'" 1>&2 + fi + + if test -n "$current_libdirs"; then + # Maybe just do a dry run. + test -n "$run" && current_libdirs=" -n$current_libdirs" + exec $SHELL $0 --finish$current_libdirs + exit 1 + fi + + exit 0 + ;; + + # libtool finish mode + finish) + modename="$modename: finish" + libdirs="$nonopt" + admincmds= + + if test -n "$finish_cmds$finish_eval" && test -n "$libdirs"; then + for dir + do + libdirs="$libdirs $dir" + done + + for libdir in $libdirs; do + if test -n "$finish_cmds"; then + # Do each command in the finish commands. + eval cmds=\"$finish_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" || admincmds="$admincmds + $cmd" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + if test -n "$finish_eval"; then + # Do the single finish_eval. + eval cmds=\"$finish_eval\" + $run eval "$cmds" || admincmds="$admincmds + $cmds" + fi + done + fi + + # Exit here if they wanted silent mode. + test "$show" = : && exit 0 + + echo "----------------------------------------------------------------------" + echo "Libraries have been installed in:" + for libdir in $libdirs; do + echo " $libdir" + done + echo + echo "To link against installed libraries in a given directory, LIBDIR," + echo "you must use the \`-LLIBDIR' flag during linking." + echo + echo " You will also need to do at least one of the following:" + if test -n "$shlibpath_var"; then + echo " - add LIBDIR to the \`$shlibpath_var' environment variable" + echo " during execution" + fi + if test -n "$runpath_var"; then + echo " - add LIBDIR to the \`$runpath_var' environment variable" + echo " during linking" + fi + if test -n "$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec"; then + libdir=LIBDIR + eval flag=\"$hardcode_libdir_flag_spec\" + + echo " - use the \`$flag' linker flag" + fi + if test -n "$admincmds"; then + echo " - have your system administrator run these commands:$admincmds" + fi + if test -f /etc/ld.so.conf; then + echo " - have your system administrator add LIBDIR to \`/etc/ld.so.conf'" + fi + echo + echo "See any operating system documentation about shared libraries for" + echo "more information, such as the ld(1) and ld.so(8) manual pages." + echo "----------------------------------------------------------------------" + exit 0 + ;; + + # libtool execute mode + execute) + modename="$modename: execute" + + # The first argument is the command name. + cmd="$nonopt" + if test -z "$cmd"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify a COMMAND" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" + exit 1 + fi + + # Handle -dlopen flags immediately. + for file in $execute_dlfiles; do + if test ! -f "$file"; then + $echo "$modename: \`$file' is not a file" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + dir= + case "$file" in + *.la) + # Check to see that this really is a libtool archive. + if (sed -e '2q' $file | egrep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + else + $echo "$modename: \`$lib' is not a valid libtool archive" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + # Read the libtool library. + dlname= + library_names= + + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case "$file" in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Skip this library if it cannot be dlopened. + if test -z "$dlname"; then + # Warn if it was a shared library. + test -n "$library_names" && $echo "$modename: warning: \`$file' was not linked with \`-export-dynamic'" + continue + fi + + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$dir" = "X$file" && dir=. + + if test -f "$dir/$objdir/$dlname"; then + dir="$dir/$objdir" + else + $echo "$modename: cannot find \`$dlname' in \`$dir' or \`$dir/$objdir'" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + ;; + + *.lo) + # Just add the directory containing the .lo file. + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$dir" = "X$file" && dir=. + ;; + + *) + $echo "$modename: warning \`-dlopen' is ignored for non-libtool libraries and objects" 1>&2 + continue + ;; + esac + + # Get the absolute pathname. + absdir=`cd "$dir" && pwd` + test -n "$absdir" && dir="$absdir" + + # Now add the directory to shlibpath_var. + if eval "test -z \"\$$shlibpath_var\""; then + eval "$shlibpath_var=\"\$dir\"" + else + eval "$shlibpath_var=\"\$dir:\$$shlibpath_var\"" + fi + done + + # This variable tells wrapper scripts just to set shlibpath_var + # rather than running their programs. + libtool_execute_magic="$magic" + + # Check if any of the arguments is a wrapper script. + args= + for file + do + case "$file" in + -*) ;; + *) + # Do a test to see if this is really a libtool program. + if (sed -e '4q' $file | egrep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # If there is no directory component, then add one. + case "$file" in + */* | *\\*) . $file ;; + *) . ./$file ;; + esac + + # Transform arg to wrapped name. + file="$progdir/$program" + fi + ;; + esac + # Quote arguments (to preserve shell metacharacters). + file=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e "$sed_quote_subst"` + args="$args \"$file\"" + done + + if test -z "$run"; then + # Export the shlibpath_var. + eval "export $shlibpath_var" + + # Restore saved enviroment variables + if test "${save_LC_ALL+set}" = set; then + LC_ALL="$save_LC_ALL"; export LC_ALL + fi + if test "${save_LANG+set}" = set; then + LANG="$save_LANG"; export LANG + fi + + # Now actually exec the command. + eval "exec \$cmd$args" + + $echo "$modename: cannot exec \$cmd$args" + exit 1 + else + # Display what would be done. + eval "\$echo \"\$shlibpath_var=\$$shlibpath_var\"" + $echo "export $shlibpath_var" + $echo "$cmd$args" + exit 0 + fi + ;; + + # libtool uninstall mode + uninstall) + modename="$modename: uninstall" + rm="$nonopt" + files= + + for arg + do + case "$arg" in + -*) rm="$rm $arg" ;; + *) files="$files $arg" ;; + esac + done + + if test -z "$rm"; then + $echo "$modename: you must specify an RM program" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + + for file in $files; do + dir=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%/[^/]*$%%'` + test "X$dir" = "X$file" && dir=. + name=`$echo "X$file" | $Xsed -e 's%^.*/%%'` + + rmfiles="$file" + + case "$name" in + *.la) + # Possibly a libtool archive, so verify it. + if (sed -e '2q' $file | egrep "^# Generated by .*$PACKAGE") >/dev/null 2>&1; then + . $dir/$name + + # Delete the libtool libraries and symlinks. + for n in $library_names; do + rmfiles="$rmfiles $dir/$n" + test "X$n" = "X$dlname" && dlname= + done + test -n "$dlname" && rmfiles="$rmfiles $dir/$dlname" + test -n "$old_library" && rmfiles="$rmfiles $dir/$old_library" + + $show "$rm $rmfiles" + $run $rm $rmfiles + + if test -n "$library_names"; then + # Do each command in the postuninstall commands. + eval cmds=\"$postuninstall_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + if test -n "$old_library"; then + # Do each command in the old_postuninstall commands. + eval cmds=\"$old_postuninstall_cmds\" + IFS="${IFS= }"; save_ifs="$IFS"; IFS='~' + for cmd in $cmds; do + IFS="$save_ifs" + $show "$cmd" + $run eval "$cmd" + done + IFS="$save_ifs" + fi + + # FIXME: should reinstall the best remaining shared library. + fi + ;; + + *.lo) + if test "$build_old_libs" = yes; then + oldobj=`$echo "X$name" | $Xsed -e "$lo2o"` + rmfiles="$rmfiles $dir/$oldobj" + fi + $show "$rm $rmfiles" + $run $rm $rmfiles + ;; + + *) + $show "$rm $rmfiles" + $run $rm $rmfiles + ;; + esac + done + exit 0 + ;; + + "") + $echo "$modename: you must specify a MODE" 1>&2 + $echo "$generic_help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + $echo "$modename: invalid operation mode \`$mode'" 1>&2 + $echo "$generic_help" 1>&2 + exit 1 +fi # test -z "$show_help" + +# We need to display help for each of the modes. +case "$mode" in +"") $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... [MODE-ARG]... + +Provide generalized library-building support services. + + --config show all configuration variables + --debug enable verbose shell tracing +-n, --dry-run display commands without modifying any files + --features display basic configuration information and exit + --finish same as \`--mode=finish' + --help display this help message and exit + --mode=MODE use operation mode MODE [default=inferred from MODE-ARGS] + --quiet same as \`--silent' + --silent don't print informational messages + --version print version information + +MODE must be one of the following: + + compile compile a source file into a libtool object + execute automatically set library path, then run a program + finish complete the installation of libtool libraries + install install libraries or executables + link create a library or an executable + uninstall remove libraries from an installed directory + +MODE-ARGS vary depending on the MODE. Try \`$modename --help --mode=MODE' for +a more detailed description of MODE." + exit 0 + ;; + +compile) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=compile COMPILE-COMMAND... SOURCEFILE + +Compile a source file into a libtool library object. + +This mode accepts the following additional options: + + -static always build a \`.o' file suitable for static linking + +COMPILE-COMMAND is a command to be used in creating a \`standard' object file +from the given SOURCEFILE. + +The output file name is determined by removing the directory component from +SOURCEFILE, then substituting the C source code suffix \`.c' with the +library object suffix, \`.lo'." + ;; + +execute) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=execute COMMAND [ARGS]... + +Automatically set library path, then run a program. + +This mode accepts the following additional options: + + -dlopen FILE add the directory containing FILE to the library path + +This mode sets the library path environment variable according to \`-dlopen' +flags. + +If any of the ARGS are libtool executable wrappers, then they are translated +into their corresponding uninstalled binary, and any of their required library +directories are added to the library path. + +Then, COMMAND is executed, with ARGS as arguments." + ;; + +finish) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=finish [LIBDIR]... + +Complete the installation of libtool libraries. + +Each LIBDIR is a directory that contains libtool libraries. + +The commands that this mode executes may require superuser privileges. Use +the \`--dry-run' option if you just want to see what would be executed." + ;; + +install) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=install INSTALL-COMMAND... + +Install executables or libraries. + +INSTALL-COMMAND is the installation command. The first component should be +either the \`install' or \`cp' program. + +The rest of the components are interpreted as arguments to that command (only +BSD-compatible install options are recognized)." + ;; + +link) + $echo \ +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=link LINK-COMMAND... + +Link object files or libraries together to form another library, or to +create an executable program. + +LINK-COMMAND is a command using the C compiler that you would use to create +a program from several object files. + +The following components of LINK-COMMAND are treated specially: + + -all-static do not do any dynamic linking at all + -dlopen FILE \`-dlpreopen' FILE if it cannot be dlopened at runtime + -dlpreopen FILE link in FILE and add its symbols to dld_preloaded_symbols + -export-dynamic allow symbols from OUTPUT-FILE to be resolved with dlsym(3) + -LLIBDIR search LIBDIR for required installed libraries + -lNAME OUTPUT-FILE requires the installed library libNAME + -no-undefined declare that a library does not refer to external symbols + -o OUTPUT-FILE create OUTPUT-FILE from the specified objects + -release RELEASE specify package release information + -rpath LIBDIR the created library will eventually be installed in LIBDIR + -static do not do any dynamic linking of libtool libraries + -version-info CURRENT[:REVISION[:AGE]] + specify library version info [each variable defaults to 0] + +All other options (arguments beginning with \`-') are ignored. + +Every other argument is treated as a filename. Files ending in \`.la' are +treated as uninstalled libtool libraries, other files are standard or library +object files. + +If the OUTPUT-FILE ends in \`.la', then a libtool library is created, only +library objects (\`.lo' files) may be specified, and \`-rpath' is required. + +If OUTPUT-FILE ends in \`.a' or \`.lib', then a standard library is created +using \`ar' and \`ranlib', or on Windows using \`lib'. + +If OUTPUT-FILE ends in \`.lo' or \`.${objext}', then a reloadable object file +is created, otherwise an executable program is created." + ;; + +uninstall) + $echo +"Usage: $modename [OPTION]... --mode=uninstall RM [RM-OPTION]... FILE... + +Remove libraries from an installation directory. + +RM is the name of the program to use to delete files associated with each FILE +(typically \`/bin/rm'). RM-OPTIONS are options (such as \`-f') to be passed +to RM. + +If FILE is a libtool library, all the files associated with it are deleted. +Otherwise, only FILE itself is deleted using RM." + ;; + +*) + $echo "$modename: invalid operation mode \`$mode'" 1>&2 + $echo "$help" 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +echo +$echo "Try \`$modename --help' for more information about other modes." + +exit 0 + +# Local Variables: +# mode:shell-script +# sh-indentation:2 +# End: diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/missing b/crypto/heimdal/missing new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdf90f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/missing @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# This is a silly file that automake needs diff --git a/crypto/heimdal/mkinstalldirs b/crypto/heimdal/mkinstalldirs new file mode 100755 index 0000000..018b680 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/heimdal/mkinstalldirs @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy +# Author: Noah Friedman +# Created: 1993-05-16 +# Public domain + +# $Id: mkinstalldirs,v 1.1 1996/10/22 22:25:14 joda Exp $ + +errstatus=0 + +for file +do + set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` + shift + + pathcomp= + for d + do + pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" + case "$pathcomp" in + -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; + esac + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + echo "mkdir $pathcomp" 1>&2 + + mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + fi + fi + + pathcomp="$pathcomp/" + done +done + +exit $errstatus + +# mkinstalldirs ends here -- cgit v1.1