| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Submitted by: Seth Kingsley <sethk@osd.bsdi.com>
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support can be gotten via PAM.
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support can be already obtained via PAM.
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The PAM_FAIL_CHECK and PAM_END macros in su.c came from the util-linux
package's PAM patches to the BSD login.c
Submitted by: "David J. MacKenzie" <djm@web.us.uu.net>
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o In practice: the comment indicates that all but umask and
environmental variables of the users login class are applied when su
occurs, unless -m is used to specify a class. This was incorrect;
in practice, the uid, gids, resources, and priority were set, and
then resources and priority were selectively removed. This meant
that some aspects of the user context were not set, including handling
of login events (wtmp, utmp), as well as the path specified in
login.conf.
o I changed it so that the behavior is the same, but instead,
LOGIN_SETALL is used, and appropriate flags are removed, including
the LOGIN_SETLOGIN and LOGIN_SETPATH entries that were implicitly
not present before. I also updated the comment to reflect
reality, selecting reality as the "correct" behavior.
o This has the practical benefit that as new LOGIN_SET* flags are
introduced, they are supported by su unless specifically disabled.
For example, of a LOGIN_SETLABEL flag is introduced to support
MAC labels determined by the user's login class, then su no longer
has to be modified.
o It might be desirable to have su use LOGIN_SETPATH depending on
its command line parameters, as it might or might not be
considered part of the "environment".
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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of the typeset output, tend to make diffs harder to read and provide
bad examples for new-comers to mdoc.
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happened as it was working around problems elsewhere (ie: binutils/ld
not doing the right thing according to the ELF design). libcrypt has
been adjusted to not need the runtime -lmd. It's still not quite right
(ld is supposed to work damnit) but at least it doesn't impact all the
users of libcrypt in Marcel's cross-build model.
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smart because it will definitely get it wrong. This popped up during
cross-linking.
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(emulate the 'd' linker (?)). This was most harmful for the NOSHARED=yes
case since libskey.o isn't linked to libmd.a.
Fixed the usual disorder of DPADD and LDADD, and some tab lossage.
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PR: 10115
Reported by: Gene Skonicki <gene@cif.rochester.edu>
Requested by: jdp
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Reviewed By: eivind
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PR: bin/7986
Submitted by: Dan Nelson <dnelson@emsphone.com>
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linkage is needed for the NOSHARED=YES case, so it is simplest to
never depend on the automagic linkage for elf shared libraries.
Reviewed by: jdp
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being invoked. Add example that clarifies usage of "-c".
PR: 6859
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Abort if given uname is > MAXLOGNAME-1
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group is 0 in /etc/passwd even if they aren't listed
as a member in /etc/group. This is more inline with
what the group manpage says.
PR: 6696
Submitted by: Max Euston <meuston@jmrodgers.com>
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Quieten -Wall a bit.
From Joe Traister:
The previous patch did not propogate the KRBTKFILE environment variable
into the new environment when -l is given to su, making it impossible
for kdestroy to find the ticket file. This patch corrects that problem
as well as the original segfault problem.
(Fixes PR 3903)
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su manpage ambiguous regarding command prompt
Submitted by: sheldonh@iafrica.com
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A
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Submitted by: Josh Gilliam
Closes PR's: 4429, 4431-4438
PS: He has agreed to submit all contrib fixes back to the original author.
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PR: bin/3206
Submitted by: blank@fox.uni-trier.de
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posix standard on the topic.
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no conseqeunces as we ship with a non-empty wheel.
Closes PR/1882
Submitted by: Arne Henrik Juul <arnej@frida.imf.unit.no>
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prevented uid/group change with non-root target.
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This will make a number of things easier in the future, as well as (finally!)
avoiding the Id-smashing problem which has plagued developers for so long.
Boy, I'm glad we're not using sup anymore. This update would have been
insane otherwise.
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As with login(1), LOGIN_CAP_AUTH is not yet enabled since we don't
yet have authorisation modules.
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Detected by: Amancio Hasty
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Obtained from: A Quarter Century of UNIX, Peter H. Salus, page 41
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configured or available.
Also fix a _nasty_ bug that would let one in if su -K was used.
Any old password would work :-( :-(.
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