| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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provide specific macros, AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2()
to capture path information for audit records. This allows us to
move the definitions of ARG_* out of the public audit header file,
as they are an implementation detail of our current kernel-internal
audit record, which may change.
Approved by: re (kensmith)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
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to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in
order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a
system call.
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
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instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for
lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record
BSM encoding for fooat(2).
Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a
further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2)
auditing.
Approved by: re (kib)
Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 month
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contrib/openbsm and a subset also imported into sys/security/audit.
This patch release addresses several minor issues:
- Fixes to AUT_SOCKUNIX token parsing.
- IPv6 support for au_to_me(3).
- Improved robustness in the parsing of audit_control, especially long
flags/naflags strings and whitespace in all fields.
- Add missing conversion of a number of FreeBSD/Mac OS X errnos to/from BSM
error number space.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Approved by: re (kib)
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Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
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Submitted by: b. f. <bf1783 at googlemail.com>
Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
MFC after: 1 week
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system calls:
- Centralize generation of argument tokens for VM addresses in a macro,
ADDR_TOKEN(), and properly encode 64-bit addresses in 64-bit arguments.
- Fix up argument numbers across a large number of syscalls so that they
match the numeric argument into the system call.
- Don't audit the address argument to ioctl(2) or ptrace(2), but do keep
generating tokens for mmap(2), minherit(2), since they relate to passing
object access across execve(2).
Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 week
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Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
MFC after: 3 days
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capture the domain, type, and protocol arguments to socket(2)
and socketpair(2).
Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
MFC after: 3 days
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rather than as paths, which would lead to them being treated as relative
pathnames and hence confusingly converted into absolute pathnames.
Capture flags to unmount(2) via an argument token.
Approved by: re (audit argument blanket)
MFC after: 3 days
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Approved by: re (kib)
MFC after: 3 days
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Approved by: re (kib)
MFC after: 3 days
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This fixes a problem created by the recent change that allows a large
number of groups per user. The gidset field in struct kaudit_record
is now dynamically allocated to the size needed rather than statically
(using NGROUPS).
Approved by: re@ (kensmith, rwatson), gnn (mentor)
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specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to
follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as
fxr).
In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be
used by third-party kernel modules.
Suggested by: brooks
Approved by: re (kib)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 week
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rlimit RLIMIT_SWAP that limits the amount of swap that may be reserved
for the uid.
The accounting information (charge) is associated with either map entry,
or vm object backing the entry, assuming the object is the first one
in the shadow chain and entry does not require COW. Charge is moved
from entry to object on allocation of the object, e.g. during the mmap,
assuming the object is allocated, or on the first page fault on the
entry. It moves back to the entry on forks due to COW setup.
The per-entry granularity of accounting makes the charge process fair
for processes that change uid during lifetime, and decrements charge
for proper uid when region is unmapped.
The interface of vm_pager_allocate(9) is extended by adding struct ucred *,
that is used to charge appropriate uid when allocation if performed by
kernel, e.g. md(4).
Several syscalls, among them is fork(2), may now return ENOMEM when
global or per-uid limits are enforced.
In collaboration with: pho
Reviewed by: alc
Approved by: re (kensmith)
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Reported by: kib
Pointy hat to: me
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vnode interlock to protect the knote fields [1]. The locking assumes
that shared vnode lock is held, thus we get exclusive access to knote
either by exclusive vnode lock protection, or by shared vnode lock +
vnode interlock.
Do not use kl_locked() method to assert either lock ownership or the
fact that curthread does not own the lock. For shared locks, ownership
is not recorded, e.g. VOP_ISLOCKED can return LK_SHARED for the shared
lock not owned by curthread, causing false positives in kqueue subsystem
assertions about knlist lock.
Remove kl_locked method from knlist lock vector, and add two separate
assertion methods kl_assert_locked and kl_assert_unlocked, that are
supposed to use proper asserts. Change knlist_init accordingly.
Add convenience function knlist_init_mtx to reduce number of arguments
for typical knlist initialization.
Submitted by: jhb [1]
Noted by: jhb [2]
Reviewed by: jhb
Tested by: rnoland
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and used in a large number of files, but also because an increasing number
of incorrect uses of MAC calls were sneaking in due to copy-and-paste of
MAC-aware code without the associated opt_mac.h include.
Discussed with: pjd
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(limited to netatalk) to avoid MAC label lookup on both mbufs if no
policies are registered.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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modules are loaded by avoiding mbuf label lookups when policies aren't
loaded, pushing further socket locking into MAC policy modules, and
avoiding locking MAC ifnet locks when no policies are loaded:
- Check mac_policies_count before looking for mbuf MAC label m_tags in MAC
Framework entry points. We will still pay label lookup costs if MAC
policies are present but don't require labels (typically a single mbuf
header field read, but perhaps further indirection if IPSEC or other
m_tag consumers are in use).
- Further push socket locking for socket-related access control checks and
events into MAC policies from the MAC Framework, so that sockets are
only locked if a policy specifically requires a lock to protect a label.
This resolves lock order issues during sonewconn() and also in local
domain socket cross-connect where multiple socket locks could not be
held at once for the purposes of propagatig MAC labels across multiple
sockets. Eliminate mac_policy_count check in some entry points where it
no longer avoids locking.
- Add mac_policy_count checking in some entry points relating to network
interfaces that otherwise lock a global MAC ifnet lock used to protect
ifnet labels.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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makes it easier for first-time users to configure and work with biba as
remote acess is still allowed. Effectively, this means that, by default,
only local security properties, not distributed ones, are enforced.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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might arise from WITNESS not understanding its locking protocol, which
should be deadlock-free. Currently these warnings generally don't occur,
but as object locking is pushed into policies for some object types, they
would otherwise occur more often.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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count of the number of registered policies.
Rather than unconditionally locking sockets before passing them into MAC,
lock them in the MAC entry points only if mac_policy_count is non-zero.
This avoids locking overhead for a number of socket system calls when no
policies are registered, eliminating measurable overhead for the MAC
Framework for the socket subsystem when there are no active policies.
Possibly socket locks should be acquired by policies if they are required
for socket labels, which would further avoid locking overhead when there
are policies but they don't require labeling of sockets, or possibly
don't even implement socket controls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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- Add rm_init_flags() and accept extended options only for that variation.
- Add a flags space specifically for rm_init_flags(), rather than borrowing
the lock_init() flag space.
- Define flag RM_RECURSE to use instead of LO_RECURSABLE.
- Define flag RM_NOWITNESS to allow an rmlock to be exempt from WITNESS
checking; this wasn't possible previously as rm_init() always passed
LO_WITNESS when initializing an rmlock's struct lock.
- Add RM_SYSINIT_FLAGS().
- Rename embedded mutex in rmlocks to make it more obvious what it is.
- Update consumers.
- Update man page.
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by creating a child jail, which is visible to that jail and to any
parent jails. Child jails may be restricted more than their parents,
but never less. Jail names reflect this hierarchy, being MIB-style
dot-separated strings.
Every thread now points to a jail, the default being prison0, which
contains information about the physical system. Prison0's root
directory is the same as rootvnode; its hostname is the same as the
global hostname, and its securelevel replaces the global securelevel.
Note that the variable "securelevel" has actually gone away, which
should not cause any problems for code that properly uses
securelevel_gt() and securelevel_ge().
Some jail-related permissions that were kept in global variables and
set via sysctls are now per-jail settings. The sysctls still exist for
backward compatibility, used only by the now-deprecated jail(2) system
call.
Approved by: bz (mentor)
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framework registration for non-sleepable entry points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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the VFS. Now all the VFS_* functions and relating parts don't want the
context as long as it always refers to curthread.
In some points, in particular when dealing with VOPs and functions living
in the same namespace (eg. vflush) which still need to be converted,
pass curthread explicitly in order to retain the old behaviour.
Such loose ends will be fixed ASAP.
While here fix a bug: now, UFS_EXTATTR can be compiled alone without the
UFS_EXTATTR_AUTOSTART option.
VFS KPI is heavilly changed by this commit so thirdy parts modules needs
to be recompiled. Bump __FreeBSD_version in order to signal such
situation.
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MAC_BOOLEAN -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEAN
MAC_BOOLEAN_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_BOOLEANN_NOSLEEP
MAC_CHECK -> MAC_POLICY_CHECK
MAC_CHECK_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_CHECK_NOSLEEP
MAC_EXTERNALIZE -> MAC_POLICY_EXTERNALIZE
MAC_GRANT -> MAC_POLICY_GRANT
MAC_GRANT_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_GRANT_NOSLEEP
MAC_INTERNALIZE -> MAC_POLICY_INTERNALIZE
MAC_PERFORM -> MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_CHECK
MAC_PERFORM_NOSLEEP -> MAC_POLICY_PERFORM_NOSLEEP
This frees up those macro names for use in wrapping calls into the MAC
Framework from the remainder of the kernel.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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login(1) isn't quite ready for them yet on 64-bit systems as it continues
to use the conventions of the old version of the API.
Reported by: stas, Jakub Lach <jakub_lach at mailplus.pl>
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- Add and use mapping of fcntl(2) commands to new BSM constant space.
- Adopt (int) rather than (long) arguments to a number of auditon(2)
commands, as has happened in Solaris, and add compatibility code to
handle the old comments.
Note that BSM_PF_IEEE80211 is partially but not fully removed, as the
userspace OpenBSM 1.1alpha5 code still depends on it. Once userspace
is updated, I'll GCC the kernel constant.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Portions submitted by: sson
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audit_bsm_fcntl.c contain utility routines to map local fcntl
commands into BSM constants. Adaptation to the FreeBSD kernel
environment will follow in a future commit.
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 2 weeks
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here, but isn't needed.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
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better defined.
Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
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when someone is passing new rules, not when he only want to read them.
Because of this bug, even if the given rules were incorrect, they
ended up in rule_string.
- Add missing protection for rule_string when coping it.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 week
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improve performance:
- Eliminate custom reference count and condition variable to monitor
threads entering the framework, as this had both significant overhead
and behaved badly in the face of contention.
- Replace reference count with two locks: an rwlock and an sx lock,
which will be read-acquired by threads entering the framework
depending on whether a give policy entry point is permitted to sleep
or not.
- Replace previous mutex locking of the reference count for exclusive
access with write acquiring of both the policy list sx and rw locks,
which occurs only when policies are attached or detached.
- Do a lockless read of the dynamic policy list head before acquiring
any locks in order to reduce overhead when no dynamic policies are
loaded; this a race we can afford to lose.
- For every policy entry point invocation, decide whether sleeping is
permitted, and if not, use a _NOSLEEP() variant of the composition
macros, which will use the rwlock instead of the sxlock. In some
cases, we decide which to use based on allocation flags passed to the
MAC Framework entry point.
As with the move to rwlocks/rmlocks in pfil, this may trigger witness
warnings, but these should (generally) be false positives as all
acquisition of the locks is for read with two very narrow exceptions
for policy load/unload, and those code blocks should never acquire
other locks.
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed with: csjp (idea, not specific patch)
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Discussed with: rwatson
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not there is an audit record hung off of td_ar on the current thread.
Test this flag instead of td_ar when auditing syscall arguments or
checking for an audit record to commit on syscall return. Under
these circumstances, td_pflags is much more likely to be in the cache
(especially if there is no auditing of the current system call), so
this should help reduce cache misses in the system call return path.
MFC after: 1 week
Reported by: kris
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
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extended attribute get/set; in the case of get an uninitialized user
buffer was passed before the EA was retrieved, making it of relatively
little use; the latter was simply unused by any policies.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
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other use of the same variable type.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
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naming by renaming certain "proc" entry points to "cred" entry points,
reflecting their manipulation of credentials. For some entry points,
the process was passed into the framework but not into policies; in
these cases, stop passing in the process since we don't need it.
mac_proc_check_setaudit -> mac_cred_check_setaudit
mac_proc_check_setaudit_addr -> mac_cred_check_setaudit_addr
mac_proc_check_setauid -> mac_cred_check_setauid
mac_proc_check_setegid -> mac_cred_check_setegid
mac_proc_check_seteuid -> mac_cred_check_seteuid
mac_proc_check_setgid -> mac_cred_check_setgid
mac_proc_check_setgroups -> mac_cred_ceck_setgroups
mac_proc_check_setregid -> mac_cred_check_setregid
mac_proc_check_setresgid -> mac_cred_check_setresgid
mac_proc_check_setresuid -> mac_cred_check_setresuid
mac_proc_check_setreuid -> mac_cred_check_setreuid
mac_proc_check_setuid -> mac_cred_check_setuid
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
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privilege grants so that dtrace can be more easily used to monitor
the security decisions being generated by the MAC Framework following
policy invocation.
Successful access control checks will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:<entrypoint>:mac_check_ok
Failed access control checks will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:<entrypoint>:mac_check_err
Successful privilege grants will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:priv_grant:mac_grant_ok
Failed privilege grants will be reported by:
mac_framework:kernel:priv_grant:mac_grant_err
In all cases, the return value (always 0 for _ok, otherwise an errno
for _err) will be reported via arg0 on the probe, and subsequent
arguments will hold entrypoint-specific data, in a style similar to
privilege tracing.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Google, Inc.
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wrapper macros that allow trace points and arguments to be declared
using a single macro rather than several. This means a lot less
repetition and vertical space for each trace point.
Use these macros when defining privilege and MAC Framework trace points.
Reviewed by: jb
MFC after: 1 week
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contrib/openbsm (svn merge) and src/sys/{bsm,security/audit} (manual
merge).
OpenBSM history for imported revision below for reference.
MFC after: 1 month
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
OpenBSM 1.1 beta 1
- The filesz parameter in audit_control(5) now accepts suffixes: 'B' for
Bytes, 'K' for Kilobytes, 'M' for Megabytes, and 'G' for Gigabytes.
For legacy support no suffix defaults to bytes.
- Audit trail log expiration support added. It is configured in
audit_control(5) with the expire-after parameter. If there is no
expire-after parameter in audit_control(5), the default, then the audit
trail files are not expired and removed. See audit_control(5) for
more information.
- Change defaults in audit_control: warn at 5% rather than 20% free for audit
partitions, rotate automatically at 2mb, and set the default policy to
cnt,argv rather than cnt so that execve(2) arguments are captured if
AUE_EXECVE events are audited. These may provide more usable defaults for
many users.
- Use au_domain_to_bsm(3) and au_socket_type_to_bsm(3) to convert
au_to_socket_ex(3) arguments to BSM format.
- Fix error encoding AUT_IPC_PERM tokens.
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Reviewed by: alc
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as an audit pipe with a queue length of 0 is less useful.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week
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event IDs based on arguments to return au_event_t rather than int.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week
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and not the label.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
MFC after: 1 week
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Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
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used for an assertion that we don't really need anymore.
MFC after: 1 week
Reported by: Christoph Mallon <christoph dot mallon at gmx dot de>
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Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 3 days
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