| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Reviewed by: md5
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kernel, you should expect them to do something, so now they do. This
doesn't affect users who don't load or explicitly compile in the
policies.
Approved by: re (jhb)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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unused. Replace it with a dm_mount back-pointer to the struct mount
that the devfs_mount is associated with. Export that pointer to MAC
Framework entry points, where all current policies don't use the
pointer. This permits the SEBSD port of SELinux's FLASK/TE to compile
out-of-the-box on 5.0-CURRENT with full file system labeling support.
Approved by: re (murray)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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wrong, since we don't want the variable changed, but since we assign
it to variables that may also refer to other non-const strings,
warnings were generated that could break LINT.
Approved by: re
Spotted by: sam
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Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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Approved by: re (jhb)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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function.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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Control) as a MAC Framework policy module. Unlike the existing
src/sys/security/lomac implementation, this one has its fingers out
of the kernel lock order and doesn't make use of flags in existing
kernel structures. This greatly reduces the quantity of replicated
code with src/sys/kern, simplifies the implementation (3000 vs 8500
lines), and correctes a number of known stability problems with
the existing LOMAC implementation, which will be removed. A bit
more hooking up to do here.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This
is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the
struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient
storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to
be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other
label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies
to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that
a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This
permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such
as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update
process properties even when many existing locks are held without
violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use
of this label storage.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting
kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations
based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks
on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc).
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt.
We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should
be fairly deadlock-safe. Because of the cv model and busy
count, it's possible for a cv waiter waiting for exclusive
access to the policy list to be starved by active and
long-lived access control/labeling events. For now, we
accept that as a necessary tradeoff.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We
now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure,
rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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entry points to include an explicit execlabel.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the
image activator instance structure.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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for label access on the interpreter, not just the shell script. No
policies currently present in the system rely on the new labels.
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(1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic
with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the
SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without
MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system
calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules,
rather than the framework.
(2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode
being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell
script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both
vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label.
SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning
via shell script executables. Other policies might want to
take both labels into account during an integrity or
confidentiality decision at execve()-time.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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transitioning, remove their transition entry points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement
flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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require Biba privilege to configure either, and require that accounting
files be high integrity. Note that this does allow implicit information
flow from low to high integrity, but it also protects the integrity
of accounting data.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach.
Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality
of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting,
as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs
server threads.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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construction, labels are always cached.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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three from their BSD-style license. Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates
Laboratories/.
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clause three, and NAI Labs now goes by the name Network Associates
Laboratories.
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augment the system policy for changing the system time.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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the partition once a partition has been set. This is required for correct
operation of sendmail between partitions.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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function takes an int * parameter, not a size_t * parameter.
Arguably, it should rather take a size_t *, but that would
require changing the uio_resid field of struct uio to be a size_t
instead of an int, which I don't want to do that close to
5.0-RELEASE.
Reviewed by: rwatson
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permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:
(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy
with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
a few hundred NULL function pointers.
(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
entry point set.
Both of these no longer apply:
(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.
(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going
rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
complexity.
This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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type checking on entry points (to be introduced shortly).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type
where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument
throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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module build, so I missed it in the merge.
Pointed out by: sam
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Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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and mac_check_system_sysctl(), providing additional integrity
protections relating to swap target device selection and system
management via sysctl(). Require Biba privilege for both; also
require that the target of swap operations be a high integrity
object, since swap data is high integrity.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Asssociates Laboratories
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Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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visible in the recent commit.
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with the new VFS/EA semantics in the MAC framework. Move the per-policy
structures out to per-policy include files, removing all policy-specific
defines and structures out of the base framework includes and
implementation, making mac_biba and mac_mls entirely self-contained.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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earlier merge. It's a 'static int'.
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to evolve the notion of Biba privilege a bit.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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Print a warning if a requested interface name is longer than
IFNAMSIZ.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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reboot checking; remove.
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mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl()
operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we
only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than
the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies
like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity
to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels
only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c,
we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding
the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel.
Approved by: re
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary
object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather
than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this
class into the same check namespace, including reboot(),
sysctl(), et al.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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